

**Russo-Ukraine War and the Involvement of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(2013-2023)**

**Taiwo Hassan RAHEEM
LCU/PG/003191**

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Certification

This is to certify that Taiwo Hassan RAHEEM with Matric No: LCU/PG/003191 carried out this research work titled “**Russo-Ukraine War and the Involvement of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2014-2023)**” in the Department of Politics & International Relations, Faculty of Management & Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan, for the Award of Master Degree in International Law and Diplomacy and that this has not been previously submitted for any publication.

Dr. Emma Jimo
Supervisor

Date

Dr. Adebola Alade
Head of Department

Date

Dedication

This project is dedicated to the Almighty God.

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Acknowledgment

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Abstract

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has not only raised geopolitical tensions but has also drawn significant international attention, particularly concerning NATO's role in the crisis. This study aims to analyse NATO's involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, addressing the complexities and implications of this military alliance's actions in the region. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, initiated by Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent military support for separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine, has evolved into a protracted and multifaceted war. NATO's response to these developments has been pivotal, influencing both diplomatic negotiations and military strategies in the region. The study makes use of descriptive research design. This research design was chosen because it provides a comprehensive snapshot of specific events or conditions, making it ideal for capturing complex situations. Descriptive research design is suitable as it allows for an in-depth exploration of NATO's role and actions within the context of the ongoing conflict. This design facilitates the gathering of rich qualitative data through document analysis, and observational techniques, enabling a thorough examination of NATO's strategies, policies, and impact. Findings revealed that NATO's military support for Ukraine has bolstered the country's defensive capabilities. This also served as a deterrent against further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The study concludes that the implications for NATO's internal cohesion, as differing threat perceptions and priorities among member states could challenge the alliance's unity. Furthermore, the conflict has prompted a re-evaluation of defence policies across Europe, leading to increased military spending and preparedness. The study recommends that NATO should continue to provide comprehensive military assistance to Ukraine, including advanced weaponry, intelligence sharing,. Equally important, diplomacy remains vital in resolving the conflict. NATO and its member states are urged to prioritize diplomatic engagements alongside military measures to foster long-term peace.

Keywords: Russo-Ukraine War, Conflict, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

War, in some cases often arises from the failure of diplomatic means to resolve disputes, escalating into armed confrontations that profoundly impact regional or global stability and security. War and conflict remain the enduring features of international politics, shaped by complex dynamics of power, ideology, and resource competition among states and non-state actors¹. In international relations, wars can be categorised into various types, including interstate conflicts between nations, civil wars within states, and asymmetrical conflicts involving non-state actors like insurgent groups or terrorist organisations². These conflicts are driven by diverse factors such as territorial disputes, ethnic or religious tensions, economic interests, and strategic rivalries.

The Russo-Ukrainian war or conflict, which escalated dramatically on February 24, 2022, has its roots in longstanding geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the emergence of independent states, including Ukraine, which became a crucial element in post-Soviet geopolitics due to its strategic location and historical ties with Russia³. Ukraine's independence marked a significant shift in the regional balance of power allegedly challenging Russia's influence over its former territories. The new Russia, under successive leaders, has consistently viewed Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence, considering it essential for its security and regional dominance⁴. This perspective has driven Russia's policies towards Ukraine, aiming to maintain a pro-Russian government and prevent Ukraine's integration with Western institutions⁵.

Conversely, Ukraine has sought to assert its sovereignty and pursue closer ties with the European Union (EU) and NATO, reflecting its desire for political and economic reforms, as well as security guarantees against Russian aggression⁷. The Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014 underscored Ukraine's aspirations for democratic governance and European integration. These movements led to increased tensions with Russia, culminating in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine⁸. The geopolitical struggle over Ukraine has not only shaped the country's foreign policy trajectory but also influenced broader regional and global security dynamics, highlighting the enduring complexities of post-Soviet geopolitics.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), established in 1949 as a collective 'defence alliance' against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, has significantly evolved post-Cold War⁹. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact opened the door for NATO's eastward expansion, incorporating several former Eastern Bloc countries such as Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and so on. This enlargement has been a point of contention for Russia, which perceives it as a direct threat to its national security and influence in the region.

In 1999, NATO welcomed Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, marking the first wave of Eastern European nations joining the alliance. This inclusion was seen as a critical step in integrating these countries into Western political and military structures, providing them with security guarantees and fostering stability in post-communist Europe¹¹. However, from Russia's perspective, this move encroached upon its traditional sphere of influence and strategic buffer zone. The expansion continued in the 2000s, with the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—joining NATO in 2004, alongside other Eastern European

nations such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The inclusion of the Baltic states was particularly provocative to Russia due to their geographic proximity and historical ties. These countries' membership meant NATO's presence right on Russia's doorstep, exacerbating Moscow's security anxieties.

Russia's apprehension is rooted in historical invasions from the West, fostering a persistent need for a buffer zone to safeguard its territory. NATO's eastward expansion has been interpreted by Russia as a strategy to encircle and contain it, reducing its strategic depth and regional influence¹³. Consequently, this expansion has significantly strained NATO-Russia relations, contributing to a new era of geopolitical tension reminiscent of the Cold War. The strained relationship is evident in various confrontations and conflicts, such as the 2008 war in Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Russia's actions in these regions can be seen as direct responses to NATO's encroachment and an assertion of its security interests.

The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 marked a significant turning point in Russo-Ukrainian relations and international geopolitics. This unilateral move followed the ousting of Ukraine's pro-Russian President during the Euromaidan protests, which sought closer ties with the European Union¹⁴. Russia's swift annexation, under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea, was met with widespread international condemnation and resulted in severe economic sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union, and other Western nations. The situation in Eastern Ukraine further escalated the conflict, as pro-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions declared independence and engaged in fierce battles with Ukrainian forces¹⁵. This insurgency, allegedly supported by Russian military and financial assistance, created a

protracted and devastating conflict, leading to thousands of casualties and displacing millions.

NATO's involvement in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is driven by its strategic interest in deterring Russian aggression and defending its member states¹⁶. The alliance's collective defence principle, enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, underscores the importance of maintaining a strong deterrent posture against potential threats. The deployment of NATO forces and military exercises in Eastern Europe serve as a signal to Russia of NATO's commitment to the security of its members and partners. NATO's support for Ukraine military, economic and political support could be seen from the lens of a broader strategy to promote stability and security in Europe. This support includes military training, intelligence sharing, and the provision of defensive equipment. NATO aims to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression and maintain its sovereignty¹⁷. This support is also intended to send a message to other countries in the region about NATO's willingness to stand by its partners.

From Russia's perspective, NATO's expansion and its involvement in Ukraine are seen as direct threats to its national security. Russia views NATO's activities in Eastern Europe as encroachments on its traditional sphere of influence and as attempts to contain its power¹⁸. The presence of NATO forces near its borders is perceived by Russia as a provocative act that requires a robust response to safeguard its security interests. Russia's actions in Ukraine are also aimed at countering Western influence in its neighbourhood.

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has escalated the conflict by increasing the stakes for both sides. The provision of military aid and support to Ukraine has enabled it to resist Russian advances more effectively, but it has also drawn a strong response from

Russia. The conflict has thus become a proxy war between NATO and Russia, with both sides seeking to assert their dominance. The conflict has significant implications for regional security dynamics in Europe. NATO's increased presence in Eastern Europe has led to heightened tensions and a potential arms race between NATO and Russia. The risk of miscalculation and accidental escalation has increased, raising concerns about the potential for a broader conflict that could involve multiple NATO members.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Russo-Ukrainian war, which commenced in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea by Russia and escalated significantly in 2022, has emerged as one of the most critical geopolitical crises of the 21st century. This conflict has not only resulted in significant human and economic losses but has also had profound implications for global security dynamics, particularly concerning the role and involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This involvement has further intensified the conflict, perceived by Russia as an encroachment on its traditional buffer zones and an attempt by the West to undermine Russian power and influence in the region. Previous studies have extensively examined the origins and progression of the Russo-Ukrainian War, highlighting the historical, political, and economic factors contributing to the conflict. However, there is a lack of comprehensive analysis on the effectiveness of NATO's strategies and the long-term implications of its involvement for regional and global security. This gap is particularly evident in the limited exploration of the political and diplomatic dimensions of NATO's actions, including the challenges and constraints faced by the alliance in formulating and implementing a cohesive strategy. The divergence in the views and

interests of NATO members, particularly between the United States and European nations, has been a critical factor in shaping the alliance's response, yet this aspect remains underexplored in the existing literature. This is the gap the research intends to fill.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of the study is to comprehensively analyse NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Specifically, the objective of the study is to:

- i. analyse the strategic interests/objectives of NATO in its involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
- ii. evaluate the impact of NATO's involvement on the dynamics and outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War.
- iii. examine the geopolitical implications of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War for regional and global security.
- iv. assess the impact of NATO's involvement on its diplomatic relationships with non-NATO countries.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What are the key strategic interests/objectives of NATO in its involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War?
2. How has NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War influenced the dynamics of the conflict?
3. What are the geopolitical implications of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War for regional and global security?

4. How has NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War affected its relationships with non-NATO countries?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study is of paramount significance, given the current geopolitical landscape. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict, which began in 2014 and escalated dramatically in 2022, has profound implications for international security, political alliances, and global economic stability. The necessity of this study arises from the ongoing nature of the conflict and NATO's evolving role in it. As tensions between Russia and NATO countries heighten, understanding the dynamics of NATO's involvement is crucial for predicting future developments and formulating strategic responses. This study is essential now for several reasons. Firstly, it offers a comprehensive analysis of NATO's strategies and actions, shedding light on how collective defence mechanisms are activated in response to regional conflicts. Secondly, it provides insights into the geopolitical shifts that are occurring, influencing global power structures and alliances. Lastly, it examines the impact of NATO's involvement on the conflict's progression and potential resolution, which is critical for policymakers and international relations experts.

The beneficiaries of this study are diverse. Policymakers and government officials can use the findings to craft informed foreign policy and defence strategies. Military strategists and defence analysts can gain a deeper understanding of NATO's operational approaches and preparedness. Academics and researchers in international relations and political science will find the study a valuable resource for theoretical and empirical analysis. Additionally, the general public, particularly in NATO member countries, can benefit from increased

transparency and understanding of their nations' roles and risks in the conflict, fostering informed public discourse and democratic engagement.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The scope of the study covers the period from 2014 to 2023, encapsulating the timeline from the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict in Eastern Ukraine to recent escalations. This ten-year timeframe is crucial as it marks significant NATO actions, evolving strategies, and geopolitical shifts impacting the conflict's trajectory and NATO's role.

1.7 Limitation of the Study

The topic of the research is quite wide and ongoing. Due to the limited time, the researcher has to complete the entire program, the study had to be limited in terms of scope covered, and also access to certain publications were restrained for institutions and/or students. Time spent in collecting data had to be structured within the timeframe of the entire program, as the researcher had to combine lectures with examinations and other academic commitments, as well as deadlines.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

Geopolitics: Geopolitics in this study refers to the study of the effects of geography (human and physical) on international politics and international relations. It involves understanding how geographical factors such as location, resources, and physical terrain influence political behaviour, power dynamics, and strategic decisions on a global scale.

Conflict: Conflict is a disagreement or clash between individuals, groups, or nations with opposing ideas, beliefs, interests, or goals. It can manifest in various forms, such as verbal disputes, physical confrontations, or large-scale wars. Conflicts arise due to competition for resources, differing values, power struggles, or unmet needs. While often seen as negative, conflict can also drive change, foster problem-solving, and lead to new agreements or understandings when managed effectively.

War: War is a state of armed conflict between different countries or groups within a country. It involves organised, prolonged violence, typically driven by political, territorial, or ideological disputes. War results in significant casualties, destruction, and social disruption. It is characterised by the use of military forces and strategies, impacting nations and societies profoundly. The consequences of war extend beyond the battlefield, affecting economies, human lives, and international relations.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a military alliance formed in 1949 comprising North American and European countries. Established for mutual defence against aggression, NATO operates on the principle of collective security, where an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. It aims to promote democratic values, peace, and stability through military and political means, adapting to contemporary security challenges and fostering international cooperation.

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Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 The Concept of Geopolitics

Geopolitics in ordinary parlance can be seen as the study of the effects of geography that is, human and physical, on international politics and relations¹. In contemporary geopolitics, issues such as energy security, climate change, and technological advancements further complicate traditional power dynamics. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and shifting alliances in the Middle East are current examples of how geopolitical strategies evolve in response to changing global circumstances. Additionally, non-state actors and transnational issues like terrorism and cyber warfare add layers of complexity to the geopolitical landscape.

A Swedish political scientist, coined the term “geopolitics” in the early 20th century, conceptualising it as the study of the state as a geographical organism or spatial phenomenon. His explanation of geopolitics involves understanding how political power is influenced by geographic factors, emphasizing the state's need to secure resources, strategic positions, and territorial expansion to sustain itself. His ideas were grounded in the belief that a state's survival and growth depended on its ability to adapt and control its geographic environment².

This explanation of geopolitics is profoundly relevant to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 can be seen through the lens of geopolitical strategy. Russia aims to secure its geopolitical interests, such as access to the Black Sea, control over key resources, and maintaining a

buffer zone against NATO's eastward expansion³. His theories highlight the importance of territorial control and strategic positioning, which are evident in Russia's actions to reinforce its regional dominance and safeguard its geopolitical influence.

The strength of this definition lies in its holistic approach to understanding state behaviour, incorporating geography, resources, and strategic interests into the analysis of international relations. It provides a framework to comprehend why states pursue certain territorial and strategic goals, as seen in Russia's actions in Ukraine. Through the focus on geographic determinism, this geopolitics offers valuable insights into the motivations behind state conflicts and territorial ambitions. However, the weaknesses of this definition are also apparent. His deterministic approach may oversimplify the complexity of international relations by attributing state behaviour primarily to geographic factors, potentially neglecting other critical elements such as economic dynamics, cultural influences, and ideological motivations⁴. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, factors like national identity, historical grievances, and political ideologies also play crucial roles, which his framework might inadequately address.

While his geopolitics provides a foundational understanding of state behaviour in relation to geography, its deterministic nature may not fully capture the multifaceted dimensions of conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war. Nonetheless, it remains a significant perspective for analysing the geographical underpinnings of international conflicts.

Geopolitics, a term used to describe the influence of geography on political power and international relations, revolves around the strategic importance of certain land areas and their control. This concept posits that the geography of a region significantly impacts its political and strategic dynamics. The idea emphasizes the central role of geographical

features, such as location, resources, and physical terrain, in shaping the political power and influence of nations⁵.

A core proposition of this perspective is the idea of a "pivot area" or "heartland," a central region of immense strategic significance due to its geographical position and resource richness⁶. This area, often viewed as the key to global dominance, is thought to be crucial for any power seeking to achieve and maintain global supremacy. The theory suggests that whoever controls this heartland can project power over surrounding regions and, ultimately, the world.

The relevance of this geopolitical theory in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is striking. The heartland concept underscores the strategic importance of Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, as a critical zone for controlling broader regional dynamics. Russia's actions in Ukraine can be seen as an attempt to assert dominance over this pivotal region, aiming to secure its influence and counteract Western encroachment. The geographical positioning of Ukraine, acting as a bridge between Russia and Western Europe, highlights its significance in the broader geopolitical struggle⁷.

The strength of this geopolitical definition lies in its emphasis on the enduring importance of geography in shaping political and strategic outcomes. It provides a framework for understanding how geographical factors continue to influence international relations, as seen in the Russia-Ukraine conflict⁸. This perspective helps explain why control over specific regions remains a critical objective for powerful nations. However, the theory also has its weaknesses. It may oversimplify complex international dynamics by attributing too much significance to geography alone.

Modern geopolitics involves various factors, including economic interdependence, technological advancements, and ideological influences, which are not fully accounted for in this geographical determinism. Additionally, the concept of a static "heartland" may not adequately reflect the fluid and evolving nature of global power structures in the contemporary world. The geopolitical theory that emphasises the strategic importance of certain geographical regions remains relevant in understanding conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war. While its focus on geography provides valuable insights, it must be integrated with other factors to fully grasp the complexities of modern international relations.

Another scholar whose conceptualisation is relevant in understanding the term "geopolitics" is a Dutch-American political scientist who is considered one of the founders of the classical realist school in American foreign policy⁹. He is known as the "godfather of containment" for his influential ideas on geopolitics and geostrategy. His key contribution to geopolitics was his concept of the *Rimland*. He argued that control over the coastal regions of Eurasia, which he called the "Rimland," was the key to global power, rather than control over the "Heartland" as proposed by the British geographer¹⁰. This scholar believed that the United States' security was directly tied to the balance of power in Eurasia, and that isolationism was bound to fail.

Furthermore, his geopolitical thinking has relevance in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be seen as an attempt to exert control over the Rimland and expand its influence in the region. Ukraine's strategic location on the Black Sea coast makes it a crucial part of the Rimland, and controlling Ukraine would give Russia greater sway over the broader Eurasian landmass¹¹. Meanwhile, the strength of this definition of geopolitics lies in its emphasis on the enduring importance of geography in

shaping international relations and the balance of power. He recognised that while other factors like economics, ideology, and technology play a role, geography remains a fundamental conditioning factor in foreign policy. His Rimland concept provides a useful framework for understanding the geopolitical dynamics at play in the Russia-Ukraine conflict¹².

However, his geopolitical thinking has also been criticised for being overly deterministic and neglecting the role of other factors in shaping foreign policy. Some scholars argue that his emphasis on geography can lead to a reductive and simplistic understanding of international politics¹³. Additionally, his writings were heavily influenced by the geopolitical debates of his time, and his ideas may not fully capture the complexities of the modern global order. In summary, his definition of geopolitics, with its emphasis on the Rimland and the importance of controlling the coastal regions of Eurasia, remains highly relevant in understanding the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. While his ideas provide a valuable analytical framework, they should be considered alongside other factors that shape international relations in the 21st century.

A German general and geopolitical theorist is credited with a significant yet controversial definition and exposition of geopolitics. He defined geopolitics as the study of the geographical influences on power relationships in international relations¹⁴. His perspective emphasized the strategic importance of geographical space and its resources, advocating for a country's expansion and dominance based on geographical determinants. Furthermore, his geopolitics merged geography, politics, and strategy, forming a doctrine that was particularly influential in the early 20th century, especially in Nazi Germany, where it was utilized to justify expansionist policies¹⁵.

His exposition of geopolitics was rooted in the concept of "Lebensraum" (living space), which argued that nations must expand their territory to secure resources and ensure their survival and growth. This idea was heavily influenced by Social Darwinism, positing that stronger nations naturally dominate weaker ones. His geopolitical theory was not purely academic; it was intended as a practical guide for national strategy, combining elements of geography with political and military objectives¹⁶. In the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, his geopolitics offers a lens to understand the strategic motivations behind Russia's actions. The conflict can be seen as a contemporary example of a nation seeking to assert control over critical geographical spaces for strategic and resource-based reasons. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its military operations in Eastern Ukraine highlight the enduring relevance of territorial and strategic considerations in international conflicts. The region's resources, access to the Black Sea, and historical ties are pivotal factors driving Russia's geopolitical strategy, aligning with Haushofer's emphasis on geography's role in power dynamics¹⁷.

However, this definition of geopolitics has both strengths and weaknesses. Its strength lies in its clear recognition of the importance of geographical factors in international relations, providing a framework for understanding the strategic imperatives of states. It underscores the enduring relevance of geography in shaping political and military strategies, which remains evident in modern conflicts¹⁸. The weaknesses of this definition are its deterministic nature and its association with aggressive expansionism. His theory has been criticized for justifying imperialism and territorial aggression, which can lead to conflicts and human suffering. Additionally, it overlooks the complexities of international relations,

such as economic interdependence, diplomatic negotiations, and international law, which also play crucial roles in contemporary geopolitics¹⁹.

While this definition of geopolitics provides valuable insights into the geographical underpinnings of state behaviour, its application must be critically assessed to avoid the pitfalls of deterministic and expansionist interpretations. The Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrates the continuing relevance of geographical considerations in geopolitics, albeit within a complex and multifaceted international landscape.

2.1.2 Features and Significance of Geopolitics among Nation States

Geopolitics is the study of the effects of geography on international politics and relations. It involves the strategic assessment of geographic spaces in terms of political, economic, and military implications. Thus, understanding the features and significance of geopolitics is essential in analysing how nation-states interact, compete, and cooperate on the global stage. Some key features of geopolitics are:

i. Geographical Determinism

Geographical determinism posits that a region's physical environment significantly influences its social and cultural development²⁰. It suggests that geographical features such as climate, terrain, and natural resources shape human/state behaviour, societal structures, and economic activities. Proponents argue that these environmental factors can determine the success or failure of civilisations, guiding their development paths. In the context of geopolitics, it emphasises the role of geography in shaping the political power of states. Natural features such as mountains, rivers, and seas influence national borders, defence strategies, and economic resources²¹. For example, the presence of natural barriers like the

Himalayas has historically protected India from northern invasions. Critics, however, highlight its limitations, emphasising that human ingenuity, cultural interactions, and technological advancements also play crucial roles in shaping societies. While geography undeniably impacts development, it is not the sole determinant, and human agency remains significant in influencing outcomes.

ii. Resource Distribution

Resource distribution is a critical feature of geopolitics, influencing global power dynamics and international relations. The availability and control of essential resources such as oil, gas, minerals, and water significantly impact a nation's economic stability and strategic importance²². Countries with abundant resources often wield substantial influence, leveraging their assets for political and economic gains. Conversely, resource-scarce nations may experience dependency and vulnerability, shaping their foreign policies and alliances. Competition for resources can lead to conflicts, while cooperation in resource management can foster diplomatic ties. Thus, resource distribution remains a central factor in the geopolitical landscape, driving both collaboration and contention among nations²³. The Middle East, with its vast oil reserves, is a prime example of how resource distribution impacts global politics and conflicts.

iii. Strategic Locations

Strategic locations play a pivotal role in geopolitics, shaping the power and influence of nations. These are areas of critical importance due to their geographic positioning, which can include chokepoints, trade routes, or border regions. Control over strategic locations such as the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, or Panama Canal allows countries to dominate

key maritime pathways, impacting global trade and military movements²⁴. These locations become leverage points in international diplomacy, often determining alliances and conflicts. For instance, nations with strategic ports or airbases can project military power and secure trade advantages, enhancing their geopolitical clout. Additionally, border regions with rival countries are often zones of heightened military presence and political tension²⁵. The competition for these areas can lead to conflicts, as states seek to secure or deny access to their rivals. Thus, strategic locations are central to geopolitical strategies, influencing global stability and the balance of power.

iv. Political Boundaries

Political boundaries are fundamental to geopolitics, defining the territorial limits of states and influencing international relations. These boundaries, which can be natural (rivers, mountains) or artificial (man-made lines), demarcate sovereign areas, impacting the control of resources, population distribution, and national security²⁶. Political boundaries often reflect historical treaties, conflicts, and negotiations, serving as markers of national identity and political authority. Changes in political boundaries can lead to significant geopolitical shifts. For instance, the dissolution of colonial empires or the breakup of multinational states like the Soviet Union resulted in new countries and altered geopolitical landscapes. Disputed boundaries can be flashpoints for conflict, as seen in regions like Kashmir or the South China Sea, where competing territorial claims fuel tensions. Moreover, political boundaries influence trade, migration, and diplomatic relations. Open borders can facilitate economic integration and cooperation, while closed or fortified borders can isolate countries and exacerbate tensions²⁷. Thus, political boundaries are crucial in shaping the geopolitical dynamics and interactions among states.

v. Cultural and Ethnic Factors

Cultural and ethnic factors significantly influence geopolitics, shaping national identities, political alliances, and conflicts. Diverse cultural and ethnic landscapes can lead to complex political dynamics, as nations often navigate internal and external pressures related to cultural cohesion and ethnic diversity²⁸. Shared cultural and ethnic ties can strengthen alliances and foster regional cooperation, as seen in organizations like the Arab League or the European Union, where common cultural or historical backgrounds enhance unity. Conversely, ethnic and cultural divisions can be sources of conflict and instability. In multi-ethnic states, disparities and historical grievances may lead to tensions or even civil wars, as evidenced in regions like the Balkans or Rwanda. These internal conflicts often have international repercussions, influencing neighbouring countries and attracting global attention²⁹. Additionally, cultural and ethnic identities play a role in nationalist movements and separatist agendas, challenging existing political boundaries and governance structures. Thus, cultural and ethnic factors are pivotal in understanding the geopolitical landscape, influencing both domestic policies and international relations.

vi. Technological Advancements

Technological advancements are a driving force in geopolitics, reshaping global power structures and strategic capabilities. Innovations in communication, military, and economic technologies influence how nations interact, compete, and collaborate on the world stage³⁰. For example, advancements in cybersecurity and information technology enhance a nation's ability to gather intelligence, conduct cyber operations, and protect critical infrastructure, impacting national security and international diplomacy. Military technologies, such as precision weaponry, drones, and artificial intelligence, alter the

balance of power, enabling countries to project force more effectively and deter adversaries. Nations with superior technology gain strategic advantages, often dictating terms in conflicts and negotiations³¹. Economic technologies, including advancements in energy production (like shale oil and renewable energy) and manufacturing (such as automation and robotics), shape global trade dynamics and economic competitiveness. Countries leading in technological innovation attract investments, talent, and influence, solidifying their geopolitical positions³². Thus, technological advancements are central to modern geopolitics, driving shifts in power, security, and economic landscapes.

2.1.3 The Significance of Geopolitics

i. National Security and Defence

National security and defence are fundamental to geopolitics, shaping the strategic interactions among nations. A country's security infrastructure determines its ability to protect its sovereignty, maintain internal stability, and exert influence on the global stage. Strong defence capabilities deter aggression from adversaries, ensuring a balance of power that prevents conflict escalation. National security policies also influence international alliances and partnerships, as nations with robust defence systems are perceived as reliable allies³³. Additionally, military strength supports geopolitical interests by safeguarding critical resources, trade routes, and territorial integrity. In the context of global threats like terrorism and cyber warfare, comprehensive national security strategies are vital for international cooperation and collective defense³⁴. A nation's defence posture directly impacts its geopolitical standing, shaping its role in regional and global power dynamics.

ii. Economic Interests and Trade

Economic interests and trade are pivotal for geopolitics, as they drive the interactions and relationships between nations. A country's economic strength enhances its geopolitical influence by providing the resources necessary for military capabilities, technological advancement, and diplomatic initiatives. Trade relationships create interdependencies that can stabilise regions and foster peace, as countries with strong economic ties are less likely to engage in conflicts that would disrupt mutual benefits³⁵. Economic interests often dictate foreign policy decisions, shaping alliances and rivalries. Nations seek to secure access to essential resources, markets, and investment opportunities, leading to strategic partnerships and, at times, competition. For instance, control over energy resources like oil and gas significantly impacts geopolitical strategies, as energy security is crucial for national stability and growth.

Global trade routes, such as sea lanes and land corridors, are also critical. Control over these routes ensures the smooth flow of goods and services, which is vital for economic prosperity. Consequently, nations invest in securing these routes, sometimes leading to geopolitical tensions and territorial disputes. Economic sanctions and trade agreements are tools of geopolitical strategy. Sanctions can pressure nations into compliance with international norms, while trade agreements can strengthen alliances and promote economic cooperation³⁶. Thus, economic interests and trade are central to the power dynamics that shape the global geopolitical landscape.

iii. Conflict and Cooperation

Conflict and cooperation are crucial components of geopolitics, profoundly influencing the global order and power dynamics. Conflicts, whether they are territorial disputes, ideological clashes, or resource competitions, often redefine national borders, alter alliances, and shift power balances³⁷. They can lead to significant geopolitical changes, such as the emergence of new states, the reconfiguration of regional powers, and the realignment of global alliances. For instance, the Cold War era was marked by intense conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, shaping geopolitical landscapes worldwide. On the other hand, cooperation fosters stability and development, enabling countries to address common challenges like climate change, terrorism, and economic crises³⁸. Diplomatic efforts, such as peace treaties, trade agreements, and international organizations like the United Nations, exemplify how cooperation can mitigate conflicts and promote global governance. Cooperative initiatives, such as the European Union, enhance regional stability and economic prosperity, demonstrating the benefits of collective action.

In summary, geopolitics remains a critical field in understanding the complex interplay between geography and international relations. Its features, such as geographical determinism, resource distribution, and strategic locations, shape the interactions among nation-states. The significance of geopolitics is evident in national security, foreign policy formulation, economic interests, conflict, and cooperation, as well as global power dynamics. As the world continues to evolve, the study of geopolitics will remain indispensable in navigating the intricate landscape of global politics.

2.1.4 Geopolitical Issues: Russia's Invasion of Crimea in 2014

The prelude to the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 is rooted in a complex interplay of historical, political, and social factors. The invasion itself was a significant event that altered the geopolitical landscape and heightened tensions between Russia and the Western world. Crimea has a long and complicated history, having been part of various states and empires over the centuries. It was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1783, following the annexation from the Ottoman Empire³⁹. For the next 170 years, Crimea remained part of Russia until 1954 when it was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by former Soviet leader. This transfer was largely symbolic at the time, as both Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet Union⁴⁰. However, it laid the groundwork for future territorial disputes.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 transformed Crimea into an autonomous republic within the newly independent Ukraine. This change created a unique political status for Crimea, granting it a degree of self-governance while still being part of Ukraine. Despite this autonomy, a significant portion of Crimea's population, particularly ethnic Russians, continued to identify closely with Russia⁴¹. The Russian military's incursion into Crimea, coupled with the ongoing tensions in several major cities in Ukraine's eastern and southern regions, highlights that the Ukrainian crisis is far from resolved. It is now indisputable that the government established in Kyiv after the ousting of former president in February 2014 has lost effective control over the predominantly ethnic-Russian-populated region of Crimea, which is currently under Russia's de facto occupation⁴².

Russia's sudden invasion of the Crimean Peninsula can be seen as part of a broader strategy to exert influence over the newly formed government in Kyiv. Moscow's apparent plan to

annex Crimea is not the ultimate goal. Instead, Russia appears to be pursuing a more nuanced strategy, and it is crucial to understand this correctly⁴³. Moscow aims to shape the future of Ukraine by using Crimea and the instability it has sparked in the eastern and southern regions to pressure Kyiv into adopting a completely new model of governance. Russia's preferred outcome is the federalization of Ukraine, or even the creation of a confederated republic, which would grant significant political and economic autonomy to Ukraine's regions, particularly those with a high population of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Russia likely believes that, with its largely unchallenged influence in Crimea and potentially other regions, it can secure long-term leverage over Ukraine's strategic decisions, including its future direction regarding European integration⁴⁴.

Contrary to the recent assertions made by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a press conference, Crimea was not taken over by a local paramilitary “self-defence” force. Instead, it was seized by a few thousand well-equipped and heavily armed Russian soldiers. These troops primarily originated from the Southern Military District, which is adjacent to Ukraine and the North Caucasus. They also received significant support from the 15,000 soldiers stationed with the Russian Black Sea Fleet⁴⁵. The initial aggression commenced on February 23 in Sevastopol, the largest and most pro-Russian city on the peninsula. Sevastopol is often referred to as the most sacred place of Russian imperialism. During a rally organized by the Russian Front, a radical Crimean organisation, a few thousand people gathered to dismiss the city’s mayor and elect a new one, who is reportedly a Russian citizen. The demonstrators demanded that the autonomous republic of Crimea secede from Ukraine and become a part of Russia⁴⁶.

On February 27, unidentified armed men stormed the Crimean parliament, insisting on a special session to decide the region's future. Under dubious circumstances and without a quorum, according to Ukrainian press reports, some deputies voted to hold an all-Crimean referendum aimed at "improving the status of autonomy and expanding its powers"⁴⁷. They also dismissed the region's pro-Kyiv prime minister and voted in a new one, who belongs to a radical, pro-Russian political party called Russian Unity.

In the following days, several hundred unidentified armed personnel took control of Crimea's airports, main roads, local government buildings, and other strategic locations. It became evident that these actions were not orchestrated by local pro-Russian self-defence groups. The existing paramilitary units in Crimea were too weak and too few in number to carry out such coordinated actions. Despite longstanding claims by the Russia president and other top Russian officials that the armed and uniformed personnel without insignia on the peninsula were not Russian troops, it is now well-established that Crimea was the target of a meticulously planned, Russian-led military operation⁴⁸.

Despite media reports and ongoing Russian efforts to destabilise the region, the eastern and southern areas of Ukraine show little internal potential for separatism and have been politically and economically integrated with the rest of the country for a long time. Crimea, however, stands apart due to its unique ethnic, historical, and social context, making it a vulnerable point for Ukraine where Russia has long been able to exploit separatist sentiments⁴⁹. Crimea has a population of 2 million, with many residents being retired military personnel or employees of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, especially in Sevastopol. Additionally, one-third of Crimea's inhabitants were born in various parts of the former

Soviet Union and settled on the peninsula after 1944, following the forced deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the native Turkic ethnic group, by Joseph Stalin to Central Asia⁵⁰.

In the late 1980s, the Crimean Tatars began returning and resettling in the region. This return led to interethnic tensions, but not to serious conflict. Currently, there are 260,000 Tatars in Crimea, who are the region's poorest and most socially excluded group⁵¹. Despite their small numbers, the Crimean Tatars have played a highly visible and constructive role during the ongoing crisis. Historically, they are strongly anti-Russian and are the most loyal regional force to Ukraine, thus the strongest opponents of separatism. Although Russia has tried to create a pro-Russian faction within the Tatar community, mainly centred around the Milii Firqa organization, the community remains united under the leadership of the Mejlis, a representative body for the Crimean Tatar people⁵².

Due to migration patterns, the diverse local population, and the geographical separation from mainland Ukraine, Crimea has been somewhat isolated from the major political and social developments in the rest of the country since Ukraine's independence in 1991. Nevertheless, in a December 1991 referendum, 54 percent of Crimea's population supported Ukraine's independence⁵³. Public opinion polls indicate that about 15 percent of Crimean residents consider themselves "Soviet people," and only 40 percent regard Ukraine as their homeland. Nearly the entire population of Crimea speaks Russian, including the Tatars and local Ukrainians, most of whom are deeply Russified. Ukrainian is the native language for only 18 percent of Crimea's inhabitants⁵⁴.

After the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, a significant separatist movement emerged in Crimea, rejecting affiliation with Ukraine and gravitating towards Russia. The movement was led by Yuri Meshkov, who declared himself the president of Crimea.

Meshkov aimed to establish close political ties with Moscow and reintegrate the region into Russia. Ukraine's president at the time, Leonid Kuchma, managed to address this issue through a strategy of restraint. Kuchma carefully avoided using force against the separatists and instead offered economic incentives to the Crimean elites in exchange for their loyalty to Kyiv⁵⁵.

Additionally, Ukraine benefited from the lack of consensus among Kremlin decisionmakers, including then-president Boris Yeltsin, who strongly opposed separatism in Crimea. The outbreak of the first Chechen war in 1994 further reinforced Russia's support for the territorial integrity of its neighbours. In the 1997 bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, Russia formally recognized Ukraine's current borders⁵⁷. Under Ukraine's 1996 constitution, Crimea was granted autonomous status, which included its own 100-member parliament and local government heads operating under a Crimean prime minister. Officially, the region is called the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, although the authority of its institutions is quite limited, focusing mainly on economic, social, and administrative areas. The Crimean parliament does not possess the right of legislative initiative. Furthermore, Ukraine's central government has retained significant powers to influence the political situation in Crimea, including the president's absolute veto over any decision made by the Crimean parliament⁵⁸.

The Crimean Constitution reveal that, the parliament has the right to organize local referenda, but this is limited to issues within its competence. The proposed March 16 referendum on changing the region's legal status falls outside the Crimean parliament's authority, making the decision to vote on whether Crimea should join Russia essentially illegal⁵⁹. The legal status of Sevastopol is also notable. The city is not formally part of the

Autonomous Republic of Crimea but is considered one of Ukraine's 27 regions according to the Ukrainian Constitution. Only the capital city, Kyiv, has a similar special status, allowing it to form its own administrative council. Sevastopol retains its privileged status from the Soviet era when it was the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet and a closed city. Even now, about 15 percent of the city's 380,000 residents work for the fleet⁶⁰. Sevastopol's self-governance is limited by the Ukrainian president's right to appoint the head of the city administration. Russian politicians and media have frequently questioned the legitimacy of Ukraine's sovereignty over Sevastopol, claiming that in 1948 the city was administratively separated from the rest of Crimea and placed under the Soviet central government⁶¹. However, this change was not approved in the Soviet Constitution, so Sevastopol remained legally part of the Crimean region.

2.1.5 Causes of the Russia-Ukraine War

Russia's conflict in Ukraine represents the most significant disruption in Europe since the end of World War II. Many in the West interpret this as a war instigated by Russian President. However, Russian president contends that NATO's 2008 decision to support eventual Ukrainian membership posed an existential threat to Russia's borders⁶². Additionally, some analysts trace the roots of the conflict back to the conclusion of the Cold War, arguing that the West's failure to adequately support Russia following the Soviet Union's collapse played a critical role. Given these varying perspectives, how can we accurately determine the origins of a war that may continue for years?

World War I began over a century ago, yet historians continue to write books debating its causes. Was it initiated by the assassination of an Austrian archduke by a Serbian terrorist in 1914, or was it more about the rising power of Germany challenging Britain's

dominance, or perhaps the surge of nationalism across Europe? The answer encompasses all these factors and more. However, war was not inevitable until it actually erupted in August 1914, and even then, it was not predetermined that four years of brutal conflict would ensue⁶³. To better understand, it is useful to differentiate between deep, intermediate, and immediate causes. Imagine building a bonfire: stacking the logs represents a deep cause; adding kindling and paper is an intermediate cause; and striking a match is the precipitating cause⁶⁴. Yet, even with these elements, a bonfire is not guaranteed. A strong wind might blow out the match, or a sudden rainstorm could soak the wood.

In the case of Ukraine, there is no doubt that Putin struck the match when he ordered the invasion by Russian troops on February 24. Similar to the leaders of the great powers in 1914, he likely believed it would be a brief and decisive conflict resulting in a quick victory, akin to the Soviet Union's takeover of Budapest in 1956 or Prague in 1968. Airborne forces were expected to capture the airport, while advancing tanks would seize Kyiv, ousting Ukrainian President and installing a puppet regime⁶⁵. Putin informed the Russian people that he was launching a "special military operation" to "denazify" Ukraine and prevent NATO from encroaching on Russia's borders. However, considering the significant miscalculations he made, we must question his true motives. From Putin's own writings and various biographers like Philip Short, it is evident that an intermediate cause was his refusal to recognise Ukraine as a legitimate state⁶⁶.

The Russian President lamented the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an entity he had served as a KGB officer, and, due to the close cultural ties between Ukraine and Russia, he viewed Ukraine as an artificial state. Additionally, Ukraine had antagonised Russia with its 2014 Maidan uprising, which ousted a pro-Russian government, and its increasingly close

trade relations with the European Union⁶⁷. He aspires to restore what he calls the “Russian world,” and as he nears the age of 70, he is increasingly concerned with his legacy. Historical Russian leaders like Peter the Great had expanded Russian power during their times, and given the weak Western sanctions that followed Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. The prospect of NATO enlargement was a secondary intermediate cause. Although the West established a NATO-Russia Council allowing Russian military officers to attend some NATO meetings, Russia had expected a deeper relationship⁶⁸. In the early 1990s, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had assured his Russian counterpart that NATO would not expand, but historians like have shown that Baker quickly reversed this verbal assurance, which was never backed by a written agreement.

When U.S. President discussed NATO expansion with former Russian President in the 1990s, there was grudging Russian acceptance of some expansion, but expectations on both sides diverged. NATO’s 2008 summit decision in Bucharest to consider Ukraine (and Georgia) for future membership confirmed Putin’s worst suspicions about Western intentions⁶⁹. However, the Russian president attitude shift predates NATO’s 2008 decision. He had supported the U.S. following the September 11, 2001, attacks, but his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference reveals he had already grown disillusioned with the West before the Bucharest summit. Therefore, NATO expansion was just one of several intermediate causes—its significance diminished soon after the Bucharest summit by France and Germany’s announcement that they would veto Ukraine’s NATO membership⁷⁰.

Underlying all these events were the deep causes rooted in the end of the Cold War. Initially, there was optimism in both Russia and the West that the Soviet Union's collapse would usher in democracy and a market economy in Russia. In the early years, Clinton and Yeltsin earnestly tried to foster good relations. While the U.S. provided loans and economic assistance to Russian Prime Minister government, Russians had higher expectations⁷¹. Moreover, after seventy years of central planning, a sudden shift to a thriving market economy was unrealistic. Attempts to force rapid changes led to massive disruptions, corruption, and stark inequality. While some oligarchs and politicians became extremely wealthy through the rapid privatization of state-owned assets, the general standard of living for most Russians declined⁷².

At the Davos meeting in February 1997, the governor of Nizhny Novgorod (later assassinated), reported widespread tax evasion and government arrears in wage payments⁷³. By September of the following year, liberal parliamentarian remarked at a Harvard Kennedy School dinner that "Russia is completely corrupt and the former Russia president has no vision." Struggling to manage the political fallout from worsening economic conditions, the ailing Yeltsin turned to the relatively unknown ex-KGB agent to restore order. None of this suggests that the Ukraine war was inevitable, but it did become increasingly likely over time. On February 24, 2022, Putin miscalculated and ignited the conflict. It is difficult to envision him extinguishing it.

While Russia appears to be experiencing a period of international ascendance, domestic stability remains fragile. The Russian economy heavily depends on natural resources and is afflicted by corruption and crony capitalism. The political system has become increasingly personalized, raising concerns about its sustainability beyond Vladimir Putin's tenure. The

future post-Putin remains uncertain, as does the potential successor to Putinism⁷⁴. Ukraine's trajectory is also uncertain. Despite undergoing two ostensibly democratic revolutions, the oligarch-driven political landscape remains largely unchanged. The political system is driven by the competition among oligarchic groups for power and the benefits of corruption and rent-seeking. Western support for reform following the Orange Revolution yielded limited results and no substantial structural changes⁷⁵. Post-Euromaidan, there have been some economic, fiscal, and energy reforms, yet oligarchic influence persists in the economy and media. Progress in transforming Ukraine into a rule-of-law state has been slow, and high-level corruption continues to be a significant challenge. Consequently, Ukraine remains economically poor, vulnerable to Russian influence, and dependent on Western financial support. President Poroshenko, following in the footsteps of his predecessors, supports NATO and EU membership, referring to the Association Agreement as evidence of Ukraine's definitive break from Russian influence⁷⁶.

Nevertheless, both the EU and NATO have offered Ukraine integration without full membership. The EU has never extended a membership prospect to Ukraine, and NATO has been cautious since 2008 due to ongoing territorial conflicts with Russia, which could escalate into a broader conflict if Ukraine were admitted. The West has also been consistently frustrated by Ukraine's failure to fully commit to reforms, particularly in the areas of the rule of law and corruption⁷⁷. How these domestic political dynamics will influence international relations is uncertain. Since the Cold War, policy has often been based on the presumed link between democracy and peace, despite skepticism from realist scholars. Instead of revisiting this debate, we consider the potential future scenarios if Russia becomes more democratic or if Ukraine does not⁷⁸.

Would a more democratic Russia be a more peaceful one? This has been a guiding assumption of Western policy since 1991, and historically. However, the evidence since 1991 is inconclusive. The electoral success of Russian nationalist parties and Yeltsin's use of extensive powers to counter revanchists in the 1990s suggest that a democratic Russia might not be pro-Western. A majority of Russians, regardless of their views on their president, believe that Russia has the right to control Crimea and do not view Ukrainians as a separate people⁷⁹.

Conversely, would a more autocratic Ukraine gravitate towards Russia? This assumption is prevalent in both Russia and the West, but the evidence is mixed. Yanukovich, who was autocratic, sought Russian support but was not always compliant with Russia's integration efforts. Kuchma, who moved Ukraine toward a competitive authoritarian regime in the late 1990s and early 2000s, strengthened Ukraine's ties with NATO and pursued a 'multi-vector' foreign policy. The West supported Kuchma's strong presidential powers to counter leftist conservatives in parliament⁸⁰.

In conclusion, the relationship between regime type and foreign policy is more complex than commonly assumed. This complexity is critical because much of the conflict stems from the West's efforts to spread democracy (believing it also spreads peace) and Russia's attempts to prevent it (believing it prevents states from aligning against Russia). Both strategies rest on tenuous assumptions about the link between regime type and foreign policy. Breaking this presumption might reduce tensions in this region and beyond.

2.1.6 Concept of Conflict

A prominent sociologist defines conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scarce resources, status, and power, where the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals⁸¹. His definition emphasises the competitive and adversarial nature of conflict, highlighting its inherent aspect of contestation over essential and limited assets. Applying this definition to the current Russia-Ukraine invasion, it becomes evident that the conflict involves a complex struggle over territorial control, political influence, and national identity. The invasion can be seen as Russia's attempt to reclaim perceived lost status and influence over Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, and to prevent its further integration with Western institutions like NATO and the EU⁸².

Ukraine, on the other hand, is striving to assert its sovereignty, secure its borders, and align itself more closely with Western democratic values and economic systems. The advantages of this definition lie in its broad applicability and its capacity to capture the multi-dimensional nature of conflicts. His framework allows for an analysis that encompasses economic, political, and social dimensions, making it a comprehensive tool for understanding the underlying causes and dynamics of conflicts⁸³.

This definition is crucial for research on the Russia-Ukraine invasion as it underscores the importance of understanding the deeper, value-laden issues at play. It encourages researchers to look beyond the immediate military actions and explore the historical, ideological, and geopolitical contexts that fuel the conflict. This definition of conflict as a struggle over values and scarce resources provides a robust framework for analysing the Russia-Ukraine invasion. It highlights the multi-faceted nature of the conflict and underscores the importance of addressing both the tangible and intangible factors driving

the aggression, thereby offering a comprehensive perspective that is invaluable for research and policy formulation⁸⁴.

Furthermore, the concept of conflict has been extensively studied and analysed by various scholars, politicians, diplomats, and conflict management practitioners. Despite these numerous conceptual reviews, there is no consensus on a single definition of conflict. This lack of agreement arises because disputes vary significantly based on the culture of a specific society. In its simplest form, conflict can be understood as any form of tension experienced when an individual believes that their desires or aspirations are threatened or obstructed⁸⁵. Conflict is often described as a misalignment of objectives or values between two or more participants in a relationship, accompanied by attempts to dominate each other and feelings of antagonism toward one another.

Examining the definition from the perspective of the people involved, one scholar noted that conflict is the practice of disagreeing over public issues that affect the lives of groups, primarily concerning the methods and objectives of their mutual connections, various interests, and beliefs, as well as their institutions and organisations. Similarly, conflict can be defined as a disagreement between or among two or more nations, individuals, groups, or organisations attempting to assert their ideas or aims over those of others⁸⁶. Based on these reasons, conflict can be defined as a contradiction or dispute between two or more parties caused by misunderstandings, rivalry for resources, power, and prestige. In other words, it is a disagreement and friction that arise within a group when the beliefs or actions of some members are resisted or deemed unacceptable by one or more members of another group. Conflicts can occur at the individual, group, or organizational levels⁸⁷.

Most definitions of conflict view it as the pursuit of incompatible goals. Consequently, some scholars perceive conflict as a disagreement in the pursuit of conflicting requirements, desires, ideas, interests, or between individuals. These scholars suggest that conflict tends to arise when people or groups strive for goals that neither party can achieve satisfactorily. A distinctly different definition by another scholar emphasises that conflict is a "process that begins when one party perceives that another party has negatively impacted or is about to negatively impact something that the first party cares about"⁸⁸. This definition focuses more on perception rather than the factual basis of human interactions as the root of conflict in society. Being in conflict implies being opposed to one another and refers to disputes between individuals or members of an organisation. This type of conflict is present in all human interactions.

Another definition views conflict as the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups. Armed conflict, specifically, involves the use of force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible and particular interests and goals. The worst form of armed conflict is mass murder and genocide against unarmed civilians. A typical example of mass murder is the killing of 72 people in Benue State in 2018 in a clash between nomadic herdsman and farmers. Conflict resolution scholars argue that conflict has an ontological basis in human needs, and it is the denial of these needs that causes violent conflicts or turns resolvable differences into armed violence and conflict. The conception, management, and resolution of conflict have led to terms such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and so on⁸⁹.

Conflict can take many different forms, with its nature varying greatly, ranging from nonviolent expression of grievances to structural problems and injustice, to the blatant use

of physical force or violence. Specifically, depending on the conditions, the parties involved, and the methods used to resolve disagreements, conflict can range from relatively calm institutionalised ethnic conflict to violent struggles, civil wars, and ethnic cleansing⁹⁰. Factors such as poor communication, competition for limited resources, conflicting goals and desires, inequality and social discrimination, access to competitive opportunities, or increasing desires for dominance, power, or status can all drive conflict.

In summary, conflict can be divided into two types: destructive (negative) and productive (positive). Constructive conflicts address issues, promote clarification, enhance problem-solving equity, boost participation and communication spontaneity, initiate growth, build relationships, and increase efficiency. In a constructive conflict resolution, participants focus on current issues rather than past problems, communicate both positive and negative feelings, share information openly, accept mutual blame, and seek common ground⁹¹. Both parties benefit, leading to improved closeness and trust in the relationship.

On the other hand, destructive conflict drains energy away from the main goal, damages morale, polarises individuals and organisations, deepens differences, blocks cooperative efforts, causes irresponsible behaviour, fosters suspicion and distrust, and reduces productivity. In a destructive conflict resolution approach, participants bring up old issues, express only negative feelings, share selective information, focus on individuals rather than issues, and emphasize differences to resist change⁹². Some academics prefer not to categorise conflict as either positive or negative, adopting a neutral stance instead. They argue that conflict is normal and unavoidable in all human interactions, as the lack of conflict generally indicates the absence of meaningful contact. It is the way conflict is managed that determines whether it is productive or harmful.

From the above definitions, it can be concluded that conflict may be defined as a contradiction or dispute between two or more parties caused by misunderstandings, competition for resources, power, and prestige. However, human society's experience shows that there are degrees of variation in disputes. Intrapersonal conflict, interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict, familial conflict, intrastate conflict, and interstate conflict are all forms of conflict, which will be explained later.

2.1.7 Stages of Conflicts

Conflicts are dynamic phenomena characterised by various stages and phases of change and transformation. They are expressive, ever-evolving, and dialectical rather than static. Understanding the stages of conflict is crucial as they are intricately linked to the conflict's background and dynamics. The five primary stages of conflict are outlined below:

Pre-conflict Stage

In this initial stage, the parties involved have irreconcilable aims, which may lead to an open confrontation. The dispute is not widely known because the parties try to keep it hidden from public view, but communication between them is strained. There must be a tangible or intangible disagreement at this point, causing the conflict to begin to emerge and escalate⁹³. Neither the shadow parties nor the interested parties take sides yet, as the issue might be resolved quickly by the two sides, or they could join together to establish a common stance to bury their differences.

Confrontation

The second stage is where the tension becomes apparent. This stage is characterised by occasional conflicts, low levels of violence, the parties' quest for allies, resource mobilisation, strained relations, and polarisation⁹⁴.

Crisis

This is the third and peak stage of the conflict. In violent conflicts, this is the stage of war and intense fighting, leading to killings, injuries, large-scale population displacements, and the use of small arms and light weapons⁹⁵.

Belief in the Result/Outcome Stage

The fourth stage involves the belief that the conflict will move towards a resolution. This could result in one side winning and the other losing, a cease-fire being proclaimed, one side surrendering, or intervention by a government or other third-party forces stronger than the warring parties to enforce a settlement and end the conflict⁹⁶. The key aspect of this stage is that the violence subsides, allowing for conversation or alternate ways of resolving the problem to begin.

Outcome of Conflict

Conflicts, especially violent ones, have far-reaching consequences for countries. The impacts of violent conflicts are diverse and often difficult to quantify. Both civilians and troops are killed, individuals die due to increased illness incidence, and violent crime rates rise. Wars lead to widespread migration and have significant economic repercussions, causing unemployment, revenue loss, infrastructure devastation, uncertainty, increased business costs, and capital flight⁹⁷.

Conflicts are neither inherently constructive nor always destructive. Conflict management involves reducing a conflict's negative and destructive capacity through various tactics and by engaging with the people involved. While conflict is a universal phenomenon, the ways it is communicated and managed are not. To effectively deal with conflict, whether personally or with others, we must understand our cultural beliefs about conflict and conflict resolution processes

2.1.8 The Personality and Ambition of the Russia President Vladimir Putin

The character, behaviours, education, gender, and ideology of leaders are scrutinized in international relations to explain struggles, wars, and conflicts among nations. For instance, the roles of Hitler and Mussolini were pivotal in causing the Second World War and the resulting deaths of millions of innocent people. Similarly, in the context of the Ukraine-Russia War, Vladimir Putin's role has been critically examined. The Russia President has ruled Russia through an autocratic regime, where decision-making is centralised around him and his close associates⁹⁸. He has consistently criticized Western liberal democracy, deeming it unsuitable for Russia and a threat to its political structure.

Over the past decade, the world has seen a rise in far-right, nationalist, populist, and autocratic leaders, with Putin being a prominent example. As a powerful autocratic leader, he consolidated authority and decided to undertake military operations to halt NATO's expansion, disrupt Ukraine's aspirations for NATO membership, and decisively address the Donbass and Crimea issues⁹⁹. The West largely disregarded Russia's geopolitical concerns, while Ukrainian President persistently sought protection through NATO and the EU, ignoring Russia's anxiety about NATO's expansion towards Ukraine. In response, Putin consciously opted for war. He endeavoured to create conditions that could justify a

significant military strike against Ukraine to resolve the Donbass issue and solidify Crimea's annexation permanently¹⁰⁰.

Since establishing internal political stability through stringent measures, Putin has acted to reclaim geopolitical losses from the 1990s. These actions include not withdrawing forces from Moldova per the 2004 Istanbul OSCE Summit, imposing economic sanctions on Ukraine following the 2004 'Orange Revolution,' attacking and occupying Georgia in 2008, establishing artificial states in occupied Georgian territory, invading Crimea, and destabilizing Donbass¹⁰¹. Although Russia annexed Crimea, most of the world did not recognize this annexation, deeming it illegitimate. The 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements were intended to end the conflict and achieve a political solution in Donetsk and Luhansk¹⁰².

However, these agreements were largely unimplemented by both sides. Despite the Minsk Agreement's intent to resolve the Donbass crisis, the conflict persisted. Putin sought to address these issues through a decisive whole or partial invasion, believing that Ukraine would not resist and that the West would not react strongly. However, this was a miscalculation. He underestimated Ukrainian resistance, the training and preparedness of the Ukrainian army, and the unexpected support from the West before and during the war¹⁰³. In summary, Putin's leadership characteristics have significantly influenced his decision to attack Ukraine.

2.1.9 The Strategic Role of NATO

The urgency for a revitalized NATO alliance to adopt a comprehensive containment policy, both in Europe and globally, has escalated due to a crisis with significant economic, humanitarian, and military dimensions. Recently, the Black Sea coastlines of Poland,

Romania, and the Baltic states have been fortified with additional military troops to ensure robust territorial defence. This strategic initiative underscores the necessity of enhancing NATO's defences to provide the capability to repel any potential Russian aggression across multiple domains, including land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace¹⁰⁴. This undertaking has received backing from ten allied nations, leading to the incorporation of 40,000 troops under NATO's command structure. Despite ongoing concerns about the future of the transatlantic security alliance, there have been significant positive developments, such as the repositioning of US Stryker units from Germany and Italy.

The United States has greatly enhanced this mission by deploying units from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 3rd Armoured Division to Poland. It's important to recognise that the US's contribution is substantial, surpassing the combined efforts of European nations. Despite this, other NATO allies have also made significant contributions¹⁰⁵. For instance, France and the United Kingdom have deployed aircraft to Romania, while Germany and the Netherlands have provided Patriot missile batteries to Slovakia. Currently, there are 100,000 US troops stationed in Europe, marking the highest level of American military presence on the continent since the mid-1990s. This underscores the United States' unwavering commitment to transatlantic security¹⁰⁶.

NATO is planning to enhance security in the Black Sea region by establishing four additional multinational battalions and deploying the High Readiness Reaction Force for the first time. These initiatives are significant steps towards bolstering regional security. However, it is important to recognize that many of these deployments are temporary¹⁰⁷. Partner countries in the region have indicated a preference for NATO to explore more permanent stationing arrangements. This preference brings up complex issues, including

the need to reassess the 1997 agreement with Moscow, which restricts the stationing of sizable combat units in Eastern Europe. This agreement was originally made in response to the political climate of that time. Moving beyond immediate deployments and deterrence, NATO's new Strategic Concept must address longer-term considerations¹⁰⁸.

One critical decision involves reassessing the current Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) strategy, which focuses on the rapid deployment and mobility of military forces throughout Europe. This strategy may need to be re-evaluated in favour of alternatives such as positioning heavy armoured brigades or divisions in permanent locations near border regions¹⁰⁹. Additionally, another priority is the formulation of a comprehensive, theatre-wide strategic plan. This plan should be under the supervision of the NATO command structure and the Supreme Allied Commander to ensure coordinated and cohesive defence efforts across the alliance.

NATO's strategic measures in Europe, while not directly combat-related, are vital for strengthening the alliance's eastern defences. Enhancing training exercises is crucial, ensuring that pre-deployed forces integrate seamlessly with local military, police, and border guards. This preparation addresses the evolving threat landscape and counters potential hybrid warfare tactics employed by Russia. Strengthening cooperation and interoperability with partner countries, including Sweden and Finland, remains a priority as part of ongoing military preparations¹¹⁰.

NATO's success in this crisis also hinges on effective political messaging. In response to Russia's increasing assertiveness and unpredictability, NATO has maintained a reputation for steadfastness and reliability. To avoid feeding into President Putin's narrative of an 'aggressive NATO' or creating the perception of encirclement, NATO should emphasise its

defensive role, calmly reject provocative nuclear posturing, and refrain from deploying forces in Ukraine. However, in the event of a significant Russian escalation within Ukraine, such as the use of chemical weapons, NATO's strategic ambiguity may serve as a valuable diplomatic tool¹¹¹.

The tragic events of the Russian invasion of Ukraine underscore the importance of NATO's revitalization and a renewed focus on its fundamental objectives. This revitalization involves reinvigorating the multilateral system with a renewed sense of purpose. Additionally, recognizing the aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Western Balkan countries to join the European Union (EU) is crucial. The EU is embracing its geopolitical role and taking on the responsibility for the security and economic integration of the entire continent. Through regular policy dialogues and active collaboration, the EU and the US have demonstrated the potential for effective partnership and regional stability¹¹².

In response to the crisis, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is addressing the effects of decreased grain exports from Russia and Ukraine. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating and aiming to prosecute Russian war crimes. Meanwhile, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is tackling the shipping crisis¹¹³. Although it may oversimplify the complexity and depth of the contemporary world, the narrative of a struggle between democracies and authoritarian regimes in the twenty-first century has become evident. This situation presents an opportunity for the transatlantic community to strengthen its defences and establish a more effective multilateral structure¹¹⁴. This structure should be founded on shared values and capable of systematically retaliating against aggression and violations of international law.

2.1.10 Geopolitical Dynamics of Russia, Ukraine and NATO

The relationships between Russia, Ukraine, and NATO have been complex and deeply intertwined for many years. Prior to the outbreak of the current conflict, Russian President had consistently denied any intentions of invading neighbouring countries. However, he also presented a series of demands to Western nations, which included halting NATO's eastward expansion into former Soviet states and curtailing military activities by the United States and its allies near Russian borders¹¹⁵. A major point of contention for President Putin has been the potential inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, a prospect he vehemently opposes. This concern is rooted in the turbulent post-Soviet era of the 1990s, a period he views with bitterness and dissatisfaction, reflecting on the actions and policies of his predecessors during that time¹¹⁶.

As noted by an author, the period often described as "a decade of humiliation" was marked by the perception that the United States was imposing its vision of European order, exemplified by actions such as its intervention in Kosovo in 1999, while Russia was powerless to intervene¹¹⁷. This sentiment was echoed in a letter from President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton in September 1993. In the letter, Yeltsin conveyed an understanding that the inclusion of Eastern European countries into NATO would not necessarily lead the alliance to adopt a hostile position towards Russia. However, he stressed the importance of taking into account the potential reaction of the Russian people to such an expansion¹¹⁸.

To address these concerns, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was officially ratified in 1997. This political agreement explicitly declared the absence of adversarial relations between NATO and Russia. Consequently, the NATO-Russia Council was established in 2002 as a

follow-up measure. Despite these efforts, it is widely believed that the Russian president harbours resentment towards what he perceives as NATO's gradual expansion into Eastern Europe¹¹⁹. For example, the alliance offered membership to former Soviet satellite states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. Subsequently, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004. During the Munich Security Conference in 2007, President Putin articulated his perspective, stating that NATO's enlargement neither aligns with the alliance's modernization efforts nor fulfils its objective of enhancing European security. He argued that this expansion is a significant provocation that undermines mutual trust between Russia and NATO¹²⁰.

In April of the following year, during a NATO summit in Bucharest, the alliance made a commitment to offer future membership to Ukraine and Georgia. This decision was made despite the objections raised by France and Germany. In response, the President of Russia, became even more assertive, emphasizing that no Russian leader could remain indifferent to actions aimed at Ukraine's integration into NATO. He stated that such a move would be seen as a hostile act against Russia¹²¹. This stance reflects the long-standing grievances and his apparent intent to foster anti-Western sentiment within Russia to strengthen his political influence. Consequently, Russia President has been a staunch opponent of the inclusion of additional Eastern European countries in NATO.

The long-standing tensions between Russia and Ukraine along their shared border eventually erupted into a full-scale war following President Vladimir Putin's announcement of a "special military operation" in Ukraine's eastern regions. This development confirmed earlier apprehensions, which had been growing since December, that Putin was amassing troops with the intention of initiating an invasion. The Kremlin leader asserted that Russia

needed to take decisive action in response to what he perceived as a threat to its national security¹²². He declared that Moscow aimed to "demilitarise and de-Nazify" Ukraine by overthrowing its current leadership. Additionally, Putin pledged to address the ongoing conflict in the eastern Donbas region, where Ukrainian government forces had been engaged in combat with pro-Russian separatists for eight years¹²³.

In the following 16 months, the Russian military carried out extensive bombings in cities such as Kharkiv and Mariupol, employing tactics similar to those used in past conflicts in Chechnya and Syria. Furthermore, the Russian forces faced a challenging guerrilla warfare situation in the south-eastern area of Bakhmut. This conflict led to millions of civilians fleeing their homes and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, including Poland, Slovakia, and Moldova¹²⁴.

Amid the escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine, NATO, led by the United States, has adopted numerous measures to heighten pressure on Russia. This situation has notably strained security from both regional and international perspectives. Since February 24, 2023, the U.S. government has dedicated approximately \$3.7 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. The current administration is also seeking Congressional approval for an additional \$33 billion in aid, with \$20.4 billion earmarked for military and security support and efforts to bolster security in Europe alongside NATO allies and partners¹²⁵.

Casualty figures are believed to be significantly higher than the reported statistics. Many documented civilian deaths are attributed to the use of explosive weapons with extensive impact ranges. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine was around 5.08 million as of June 13, 2023, a decline from the 5.4 million recorded in January of the same

year. By August 23, 2023, approximately 5.82 million refugees had migrated from Ukraine to Europe. In 2022, humanitarian partners provided multipurpose cash assistance (MPCA) to an estimated six million individuals, allocating over \$1.2 billion to those affected by the war in Ukraine, marking the fastest and most extensive cash programming scale-up in humanitarian intervention history¹²⁶.

Furthermore, the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, issued on March 23, 2023, by the government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission, and the United Nations, estimated the financial need for reconstruction in Ukraine at \$411 billion¹²⁷. This amount is nearly 2.6 times greater than the nation's projected gross domestic product (GDP) for 2022. The Russia-Ukraine conflict can be traced back to Russia's concerns over NATO's expansion toward its borders. Russia perceives NATO's enlargement as a threat to its security interests. Despite Russia's apprehensions, NATO has continued to expand eastward, disregarding Moscow's security concerns. This perceived disregard for Russia's interests has exacerbated tensions and served as a fundamental trigger for the conflict¹²⁸.

In response to NATO's expansion and perceived threats to its security, Russia has undertaken countermeasures. NATO's increased pressure on Russia, despite repeated warnings, has further intensified the confrontation. NATO has been actively supplying weapons and escalating its military support to Ukraine¹²⁹. The scale of assistance has grown from individual air defence and antitank missiles to heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery, and armoured vehicles. This augmentation of military aid by NATO to Ukraine has significantly increased the possibility of direct confrontation and an accidental clash with Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused NATO of effectively engaging in a war against Russia through proxies and arming Ukrainian forces. Lavrov

argues that NATO's objective is to exhaust Russia's military and industrial capabilities through the conflict in Ukraine. If the confrontation between NATO and Russia continues to escalate, the prospects for stability and security in the region become highly unpredictable¹³⁰.

The intensification of hostilities between NATO and Russia carries considerable implications for global and regional security. The escalating arms race and potential direct confrontation increase the risk of a major conflict with severe consequences. The international community must recognize the urgency of de-escalation efforts and engage in diplomatic negotiations to resolve the Ukraine crisis and address the underlying concerns of both parties¹³¹. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, fuelled by NATO's disregard for Russia's security concerns and subsequent countermeasures, has contributed to the escalation of tensions between NATO and Russia. The ongoing arms buildup and the potential for direct confrontation pose significant threats to global and regional security¹³². It is imperative for all stakeholders to prioritize diplomatic solutions and engage in dialogue to mitigate the risks and work towards a peaceful resolution.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Theory is a systematic framework for understanding phenomena, offering explanations and predictions based on a set of principles or concepts. It provides a structured approach to investigate and interpret data, guiding the formulation of hypotheses and research questions¹³². In research, theory is significant because it underpins the methodology, shapes data collection and analysis, and helps to contextualise findings within broader knowledge. It bridges the gap between abstract ideas and empirical evidence, enabling

researchers to build on existing knowledge, generate new insights, and contribute to the advancement of their field¹³³.

2.2.1 Realist Theory

Realism stands as a prominent theory in international relations, tracing its roots to great thinkers and scholars who are now regarded as the father of international relations or political science. The realist theory posits that international politics is dominated by anarchy and a power struggle among sovereign nation-states, each pursuing its own national interests¹³⁴. Realism is built on several key assumptions. First is that, states are the primary actors and fundamental units of analysis in the anarchic international system, which lacks a supranational authority¹³⁵. Second, all states possess offensive military capabilities, making them potentially dangerous to one another. Third, states can never be certain about the future intentions or actions of other states, leading to mistrust and worst-case scenario planning¹³⁶. In this system, states prioritise their own national interests and survival¹³⁷. While economic and cultural factors are significant, military force and power politics are central to realist analysis.

Realism views human nature as flawed and egoistic, sceptical of lofty ideals like global peace or international cooperation. It emphasises pragmatism over moral principles and ethics, assuming states will act opportunistically when necessary¹³⁸. The accumulation of military and economic power is seen as essential for states to enhance their relative power and security in an anarchic, zero-sum world. Classical realists emphasize human nature and decision-making elites in their understanding of international relations. They argue that politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature¹³⁹. One of the proponents of

this theory is regarded as a significant political thinker of the 20th century and a leading realist thinker.

Classical realists believe their pessimistic view of human nature is reflected in politics and international relations. In contrast, neorealists or structural realists, focus on the constraints imposed by the anarchic structure of the international system¹⁴⁰. A scholar argues that power is the most important factor in international relations. He posits that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities, measured by the number of great powers within the system¹⁴¹.

Within neorealism, there are two main schools of thought: defensive realism and offensive realism. Defensive realists argue that states aim to maintain the existing balance of power for survival. They contend that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to adopt moderate and reserved policies to achieve security¹⁴². They believe aggressive expansion disrupts the balance of power, reducing the primary objective of state security¹⁴³. On the other hand, offensive realists see states as persistently seeking opportunities for relative gain and hegemony. A scholar argues that states aim to maximise their power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. He asserts that creating an imbalance of power in its favour allows a state to maximise its security¹⁴⁴.

Meanwhile, Ukraine shares a 1,500-mile border with Russia, and its core territory was part of Russia until 1991¹⁴⁵. From Moscow's perspective, the prospect of Ukraine aligning with the West and integrating with NATO posed an existential threat to Russian power that it could not accept¹⁴⁶. Realists argue that a Ukraine aligned with NATO could enable the deployment of offensive weaponry close to Russia's borders and threaten its access to the

Black Sea, a warm water port it has long coveted¹⁴⁷. The anarchic and self-help international system means states can never feel secure about other states' future intentions or actions¹⁷. When one state enhances its security, it undermines another's. A scholar states, "Because no state can ever be sure that other states will not use their offensive capabilities for aggressive purposes, every state is compelled to look for ways to guarantee its own survival"¹⁴⁸. Thus, Russia's invasion can be seen as a pre-emptive move to neutralize what it perceived as an imminent strategic threat.

The realist notion of states pursuing spheres of influence or buffer zones to enhance their security is closely related to arguments about great power status. Realists argue that all great powers, including Russia, have historically sought to control security dynamics in adjacent regions by maintaining relations with nearby smaller states aligned with their interests¹⁴⁹. Ukraine, with its geostrategic position between Russia and Europe, is viewed as critically important terrain in Russia's desired sphere of influence. Realists argue that rather than the expansion of Western liberal democracy, Russia was fundamentally motivated to invade to re-establish a favourable balance of power, security arrangements, and compliant buffer states on its periphery¹⁵⁰. Allowing Ukraine to align closely with NATO and host potential offensive forces was seen as unacceptable by Moscow.

From an offensive realism perspective, Russia's invasion of Ukraine reflects a calculated strategy to enhance its power economically and militarily to establish regional hegemony¹⁵¹. The Russian president aimed to exploit a perceived window of opportunity and weakness in the West to redraw boundaries and spheres of influence in Europe. Some realists frame Russia's invasion as an act of revisionism against the U.S.-dominated liberal international order that emerged after the Cold War¹⁵². For decades, Russia complained

about perceived encirclement by NATO and about what it viewed as disrespect and disregard for its interests in relation to Ukraine and its sphere of influence¹⁵³. Realists argue that even after the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and its allies continued to expand in ways that threatened Russia's core interests, leaving it feeling boxed in by NATO's eastward march¹⁵⁴. From this perspective, Russia decided to disrupt the liberal order and use force to re-establish itself as a great power capable of exerting influence on its periphery. Putin ideologically opposes Western liberalism and seeks a multipolar world where Russia has a blocking position or outright veto¹⁵⁵. By altering borders and facts on the ground in Ukraine, realists suggest Russia aimed to disrupt the Western-centric world order and assert its regional dominance.

Another realist interpretation views Russia's invasion through the lens of diversionary war theory – the idea that leaders may provoke external conflict to divert public attention from domestic turmoil or unpopular policies¹⁵⁶. Russian leaders have historically used force abroad for domestic purposes, from Stalin's invasion of Finland in 1939 to Putin's wars in Chechnya and the 2008 invasion of Georgia¹⁵⁷. From this view, Russia president faced numerous domestic challenges in 2022, including economic malaise, corruption, wealth inequality, and the prospect of more anti-regime protests like those in 2020 and early 2022. Some authors suggest that Russia's invasion of Ukraine could have been an attempt to garner popularity by invoking a distorted interpretation of Russia's history and playing on Russian nationalism.

Launching a nationalist, irredentist campaign to reconquer historically Russian lands in Ukraine may have been calculated to bolster Putin's domestic standing and shift attention away from internal grievances. The realist logic is that leaders will take aggressive foreign

policy actions when domestic audiences become restive to rally patriotic support and legitimacy. Finally, another realist explanation rooted in Russia's domestic politics is the theory of autocratic insecurity. This theory suggests that authoritarian leaders like Putin fear that compromising or appearing weak could undermine their regime's survival¹⁵⁸. This aligns with defensive realist logic, where states act pre-emptively and uncompromisingly when core interests and stakes are their very existence. Putin likely viewed the 2022 events in Ukraine as an existential threat to his regime's survival and legitimacy, given its claims to defend ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine¹⁵⁹.

Losing influence over Ukraine could inflame nationalist opposition at home and tarnish Putin's strongman image. The autocratic insecurity thesis suggests Putin escalated in Ukraine to ensure his political survival and Russia's status as a relevant great power. While the realist perspective provides several compelling interpretations of Russia's strategic calculations and motivations underlying the Ukraine invasion, it leaves many fundamental questions unanswered and provokes heated moral debates¹⁶⁰. First, even if Russia had genuine security concerns or resented Western encroachment, it had many foreign policy options short of a full-scale war that caused catastrophic death and suffering. Failure to pursue diplomacy or de-escalation is difficult for realists to fully explain or justify.

Second, a core tenet of the Westphalian system of nation-states is that countries cannot violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others through force or aggression. Russia's actions obliterated this international norm, raising questions about the validity of applying an amoral, power-politics lens that glosses over legal and human rights considerations¹⁶¹. Just as a burglar cannot be the judge of his own cause, a nation cannot be the sole arbiter of its interests against those of the world.

2.2.2 Institutional Theory

Institutional theory is a prominent framework in organisational studies that examines how institutions, defined as rules, norms, and beliefs, shape social behaviour. This theory posits that institutions exert significant influence on the actions and structures of organizations and individuals, leading to conformity and stability within societies¹⁶². The theory suggests that organizations are not just influenced by economic pressures but also by social norms and values that dictate acceptable behaviour. Institutional theory has been significantly shaped by the contributions of several scholars. One of the influential scholars on institutional theory emphasised the role of institutions in embedding values and norms within organisations, making them more than mere economic entities¹⁶³. They introduced the concept of "institutional isomorphism," which describes how organisations tend to become similar over time as they adopt norms and practices deemed legitimate by the institutional environment.

Another scholar this theory by identifying three mechanisms of isomorphism: coercive (stemming from political influence and legitimacy), mimetic (arising from standard responses to uncertainty), and normative (associated with professionalization)¹⁶⁴. The central hypothesis of institutional theory is that organizations and individuals conform to institutional norms and rules to gain legitimacy, ensure survival, and achieve stability. This conformity is driven by the need for legitimacy, which is obtained by aligning with the expectations and norms of the broader institutional environment.

Institutional theory offer valuable insights into the ongoing invasion of Ukraine by Russia and NATO's involvement. From an institutional perspective, the actions of Russia and NATO can be seen as responses to the norms, rules, and beliefs embedded within their

respective institutional environments¹⁶⁵. Russia's actions can be understood through the lens of historical norms and beliefs about its role and influence in the post-Soviet space. The invasion can be seen as an attempt to reassert its influence and challenge the Western norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity that emerged after the Cold War¹⁶⁶.

Domestically, the invasion is also a means for the Russian government to consolidate power and legitimacy by appealing to nationalist sentiments and portraying itself as a defender of Russian interests against Western encroachment¹⁶⁷. NATO's involvement is driven by the institutional norms of collective security and mutual defence, as enshrined in the NATO treaty. The alliance's actions are guided by the need to uphold these norms and deter aggression against its member states¹⁶⁸. For NATO, responding to Russia's actions is also about maintaining its legitimacy and credibility as a security alliance. Failing to act would undermine the alliance's foundational principles and its role in ensuring European security¹⁶⁹.

Institutional theory provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the influence of historical, cultural, and social norms on organizational behaviour, offering a deeper analysis beyond economic or strategic factors¹⁷⁰. The theory highlights the importance of legitimacy and stability, which are crucial in understanding why states and organizations conform to certain behaviours even when it might not be the most economically rational choice. It effectively explains why organizations, including states, adopt similar practices and policies, as seen in NATO's collective response to the invasion.

One critique is that institutional theory may overemphasize stability and continuity, potentially underestimating the role of change and innovation in organisational behaviour¹⁷¹. The theory can sometimes downplay the role of individual agency and

strategic decision-making, focusing more on how institutional pressures shape behaviour rather than how actors might actively shape or resist these pressures. While institutional theory provides a broad explanatory framework, it can struggle with pinpointing specific causal mechanisms, especially in complex geopolitical situations like the Russia-Ukraine conflict, where multiple factors are at play¹⁷².

Institutional theory offers valuable insights into the ongoing invasion of Ukraine by Russia and NATO's involvement by highlighting the role of institutional norms, legitimacy, and historical context. However, its application must be balanced with an understanding of the limitations and the dynamic nature of geopolitical interactions.

2.2.3 Constructivism Theory

Constructivism theory in international relations is a social theory that posits that significant aspects of international relations are historically and socially constructed rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics¹⁷³. Constructivism emphasises the importance of ideational factors, such as beliefs, identities, norms, and social discourses, in shaping state behaviour and the structure of the international system.

One of the proponents of this theory argues that anarchy is what states make of it, highlighting how the international system is shaped by social interactions and shared ideas rather than just material capabilities¹⁷⁴. The theory asserts that the reality of international relations is not objective but is constructed through social processes, including interactions, discourses, and shared understandings among states and other actors¹⁷⁵. Constructivists argue that ideas, beliefs, and identities significantly influence state behaviour. Unlike

realists or liberalists who focus on material power or institutions, constructivists emphasise the role of ideational factors.

Constructivism posits that agents (e.g., states) and structures (e.g., the international system) are mutually constitutive. States shape and are shaped by the international norms, rules, and institutions they interact with. Norms—shared expectations about appropriate behaviour—are central to constructivist analysis. States are socialised into these norms through interactions with other states and international institutions, which can lead to changes in state behaviour over time¹⁷⁶.

Constructivism provides a nuanced framework for analysing the ongoing invasion of Russia in Ukraine and NATO's involvement. The conflict and the responses to it can be understood through the lens of identities, norms, and discourses. Russia's actions in Ukraine can be partly explained by its historical narratives and identity. Constructivists would argue that Russian identity is deeply intertwined with a sense of historical destiny and a sphere of influence that includes Ukraine¹⁷⁷. The narrative of protecting Russian-speaking populations and restoring Russia's great power status are powerful ideational factors driving its actions.

NATO's involvement can be understood through the norm of collective defence, enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. This norm dictates that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. The solidarity and collective identity of NATO members shape their responses to Russian aggression. Additionally, NATO's expansion and the promotion of democratic norms in Eastern Europe challenge Russia's preferred regional order, fuelling its sense of insecurity and antagonism¹⁷⁸.

The international response, including sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Russia, reflects a shared normative stance against territorial aggression and the violation of sovereignty. Constructivists would highlight how these responses are informed by the global norm against changing borders by force, a norm that has been reinforced through international socialization processes since World War II¹⁷⁹. Constructivism excels in explaining how ideational factors, such as beliefs, identities, and norms, influence state behaviour, providing a richer understanding of international relations than materialist theories alone¹⁸⁰. Through social constructs, constructivism can account for changes in state behaviour and international norms over time, offering insights into how new norms emerge and are institutionalised.

Constructivism encourages a holistic analysis of international events, incorporating historical, cultural, and social dimensions that other theories might overlook. Critics argue that constructivism lacks the predictive power of more positivist theories like realism or liberalism, making it less useful for forecasting future events¹⁸¹. The emphasis on ideas and social constructs can lead to subjective interpretations, making empirical validation challenging and sometimes leading to accusations of being overly interpretive or anecdotal.

While constructivists acknowledge material factors, their primary focus on ideational aspects can sometimes underplay the role of tangible power dynamics and economic interests in shaping state behaviour¹⁸². Constructivism offers valuable insights into the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and NATO's involvement by emphasising the role of identities, norms, and historical narratives. While it provides a rich framework for understanding the ideational underpinnings of state behaviour, it faces challenges related to predictive power and empirical validation. Nonetheless, constructivism remains a crucial

theoretical approach in international relations, offering a comprehensive lens through which to analyse the complex interplay of ideas and actions on the global stage.

2.3 Review of Empirical Studies

In 2021, two scholars conducted research on “Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict on military expenditures of European states: security alliances or geography?” The aim of the study is to quantitatively analyse changes in military expenditures (ME) of European states following the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The methodology involves examining ME variations using both capital-to-capital fly distance and road distance from Russia as operational measures of proximity. Findings reveal that distance from Russia significantly influences ME changes, with road distance providing a stronger explanatory power than fly distance. The conclusion emphasises that distance remains a crucial geopolitical factor in the 21st century. Recommendations suggest policymakers consider geographical proximity when addressing defence strategies and enhancing the security of European nations¹⁸³.

The study on “the War in Ukraine and its Challenge to NATO: Peacekeeping to Peace Engineering” was conducted in 2022. The aim of the study is to analyse the transformation of global institutions, particularly NATO, in response to the Russian-Ukrainian war. The methodology involves examining NATO's evolving strategies and the shift from a "peace agenda" to "peace engineering" after the Ramstein meeting on April 26, 2022. Findings indicate that NATO is actively redefining its role, integrating various environments (political-military, diplomatic, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental, and technogenic) to enhance its peacemaking capabilities. The conclusion highlights the necessity for systemic peace engineering to address contemporary war and peace issues.

Recommendations suggest further developing comprehensive peace engineering frameworks to improve international security and institutional effectiveness¹⁸⁴.

A study in 2023 aims to analyse the nuclear decision-making of Russia, particularly in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and assess the likelihood of nuclear weapon use based on statements and actions during the conflict. The study employs a qualitative analysis of authoritative statements, particularly those of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and examines the actions taken by both Russia and NATO during the war. The Russian president has consistently defined Russia's nuclear red line restrictively, reserving nuclear use for existential threats, and focusing on deterring Western intervention rather than punishing Western support for Ukraine. The study concludes that as long as NATO respects Russia president's red line, the risk of Russia authorising nuclear use remains low. NATO should continue to avoid crossing Russia's nuclear red line to minimise the risk of nuclear escalation¹⁸⁵.

Another study aimed to draw parallels between the Russo-Ukraine war, the Second World War, and the Cold War, focusing on similarities and NATO and Russia's national interests regarding border states. The methodology relied on documentary data from government reports, newspapers, and correspondence, with sources subjected to internal and external criticism and textual and contextual analyses. Findings indicated the Russo-Ukraine war as a proxy war, proving parallels between the events. The study concluded that Russia holds a nuclear edge over NATO. Recommendations include further research on proxy wars and enhancing NATO's strategic responses to Russian aggression¹⁸⁶.

A study in 2022 aims to explain the history of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine during Vladimir Putin's reign, highlighting Western interference. It uses quantitative

methods and literature reviews from various sources such as books, newspapers, journals, and online documentation. The findings reveal that the conflict, initially sparked by Crimea's annexation, escalated with separatist movements in eastern Ukraine, prompting US and NATO intervention. In response, Russia deployed troops to the Ukrainian border. The conclusion states that Putin justified these actions as protective measures for Russian citizens in Ukraine and Crimea. The study recommends further research into geopolitical strategies and the impacts of international interventions on regional conflicts¹⁸⁷.

2.3.1 Impact of the Russo-Ukraine Conflict

The Russia-Ukraine war has led to unprecedented humanitarian crises, resulting in significant loss of life, displacement of millions, and widespread destruction of cities and private properties. Over 4.5 million people have become refugees, seeking safety in neighbouring countries, including Turkey¹⁸⁸. The majority of those fleeing are women and children, marking this as the fastest-growing humanitarian crisis since World War II. There is an urgent need for coordinated humanitarian aid operations both within Ukraine and in neighbouring regions¹⁸⁹. International aid organisations, non-governmental organisations, the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO must work together to provide relief to refugees, internally displaced persons, and those trapped in besieged areas. Effective coordination will help alleviate the suffering of those in need of humanitarian assistance.

This conflict has profoundly disrupted fundamental principles, norms, and values established during the post-Cold War era of peace in the 1990s. It has shattered the belief that Europe would remain free of warfare after the 1990s. Notably, this is the first instance since World War II where a country has used military force to alter the established borders

of another sovereign nation²⁰⁰. Consequently, the political and security landscape of Europe has been deeply shaken, exacerbating the fault lines between the West and Russia.

Following the end of the Cold War, many liberals within the American administration favoured the expansion of NATO. They believed that international politics had undergone a significant transformation, moving away from the realist logic that had previously dominated European governance to a more liberal framework²⁰¹. This shift, they argued, would offer a fresh perspective on European international politics. European allies, in turn, supported the American liberals' view, adhering to the belief that geopolitics was no longer relevant and that a liberal order could sustain peace in Europe. However, the West failed to adequately consider Russia's threat perception regarding NATO's expansion and the incorporation of Eastern European states into the European Union²⁰².

As NATO extended its reach eastward and the EU grew larger, Russia's geopolitical concerns intensified. This situation brings to mind the concept of the security dilemma, first articulated by American political scientist John Herz in 1950. According to this concept, NATO's eastward expansion makes Russia feel insecure. In response, Russia takes measures to enhance its security, which paradoxically decreases the security of potential NATO member countries, particularly Ukraine²⁰³. Russia might resort to initiating a war as a countermeasure to actions by its rivals that heighten its insecurity. The underlying rationale for Russia's potential war initiation is rooted in these security concerns. If Ukraine were to join NATO, Russia would likely face direct confrontation with NATO in any ensuing crisis involving Ukraine. Therefore, the West underestimated Ukraine's significance to Russia. Moscow perceived the post-1990s world order as a threat to its national interests²⁰⁴. Coupled with Putin's readiness to challenge the post-1990s rules,

Russia attacked Ukraine to curb NATO's eastward expansion, aiming to protect its national interests.

The conflict in Ukraine has prompted a reevaluation of the validity of international relations (IR) theories in explaining post-1990s international politics. The prevailing belief had been that realist theory was inadequate for describing the post-Cold War world. Consequently, realism was considered insufficient for understanding the interactions between nations. Instead, liberal IR theories, including liberal institutionalism and dependency theory, were assumed to provide better explanations for international politics²⁰⁵. These theories focused on interpreting the struggles among nations through the lens of liberal values, rule-based norms, and institutions. Moreover, dependency theory posited that economic interdependence in the contemporary era would reduce the likelihood of wars between nations.

International Relations (IR) theories such as constructivism, normative theory, and gender IR theory attempt to explain the power struggles among nations through the lenses of identity, norms, values, and gender perspectives. However, these subjective values and norms appear to be inadequate and weak in explaining the Russian attacks on Ukraine. It is evident that Russia's geopolitical concerns are the primary driving force behind this aggression²⁰⁶. This war underscores that geopolitics remains a fundamental dynamic influencing state behaviour, signalling the resurgence of realpolitik and realism.

Russia miscalculated the West's reaction to its invasion of Ukraine. Moscow did not anticipate the extensive and complex sanctions imposed by the West. The West, while abstaining from military intervention, has implemented unprecedented sanctions across various sectors²⁰⁷. The West had foreseen a potential Russian attack and warned Putin of

severe economic repercussions. Reflecting on past events, the West possibly feels remorse for not taking sufficient measures to prevent the Russian aggressions in 2008 and 2014. Consequently, nearly all Western nations are racing to provide comprehensive aid to Ukraine²⁰⁸. This suggests a Western desire to prolong the conflict to weaken Russian power and deter future acts of aggression.

Europe has entered a new era of international politics where power projections are crucial for maintaining peace and security on the continent. In response to the Russia-Ukraine war, Germany has announced a 100-billion-euro budget for modernizing its military capabilities²⁰⁹. This conflict will also impact Russian-American relations, affecting not just Europe but other parts of the world as well. The West has implemented a broad array of economic sanctions on Russia, unprecedented in their scope and intensity. There is widespread frustration globally against Russia for its invasion, which has resulted in the loss of many innocent lives. Due to these heavy sanctions, Russia has become isolated from the West. It is certain that the global landscape will be significantly altered once the war concludes²¹⁰.

On the other hand, Turkey, despite being a NATO member and part of the Western bloc, has not joined in the economic sanctions against Russia. Instead, Turkey has positioned itself as a mediator between the two warring states, hosting meetings in an effort to achieve a ceasefire. This strategic neutrality allows Turkey to maintain balanced relations with both Russia and Ukraine, recognising its geographical and political realities as a neighbour to both countries²¹¹. Additionally, Turkey faces potential confrontations with Russia in conflicts such as those in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, Turkey must

navigate this ongoing war with caution, balancing its NATO commitments with the risks posed by its proximity to the conflict.

2.3.2 What Comes Next in the Crisis in Ukraine?

The Ukrainian crisis, which began in 2014 with Russia's annexation of Crimea and the ensuing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, has imparted several essential lessons about the role of contemporary armed forces in modern warfare. This conflict illuminated the concept of hybrid warfare, a strategy that blends conventional military tactics with irregular warfare and non-military actions such as propaganda, cyberattacks, and information warfare²¹². Russia's employment of these hybrid tactics in Ukraine underscored the necessity for comprehensive military strategies that integrate both traditional and unconventional elements. The crisis revealed the pivotal role that cyberwarfare now plays in modern conflicts²¹³.

In today's digital age, cyberattacks have become potent tools that both state-sponsored and non-state actors can wield to disrupt communications, damage critical infrastructure, and gather intelligence. This underscores the urgent need for robust cybersecurity measures and the integration of cyber capabilities within military operations. Additionally, the conflict saw the involvement of proxy forces, including Russian-backed irregular troops and separatist militias in Eastern Ukraine. The complex network of actors involved in the fighting raised significant questions about accountability and control, making it challenging to pinpoint the true instigators of the conflict. This aspect of the Ukrainian crisis highlighted the difficulties in managing and identifying the sources of aggression in modern hybrid warfare²¹⁴.

The Ukrainian crisis highlighted the crucial need for effective coordination and administration between civilian and military sectors during wartime. The Ukrainian government's ability to manage the civilian aspects of the crisis, deliver essential services, and address the humanitarian needs of the affected population was a key factor in determining the outcome²¹⁵. This crisis also serves as a cautionary tale about the consequences of failing to implement significant governmental reforms in Russia. As a result of the crisis, Russia's foreign policy objectives were questioned, its international relationships became strained, and it faced economic sanctions. These developments underscore the importance of prudent and adaptable governance in a rapidly changing world, emphasizing the significance of diplomacy and the potential repercussions of international isolation²¹⁶. The Ukrainian crisis has provided numerous important insights into the role of modern armed forces in contemporary warfare.

The situation highlights a critical warning that without substantial governmental reforms in Russia, the civil dimensions of the conflict have become increasingly lethal. Even if the confrontation concludes with a compromise, agreement, or ceasefire, there remains a significant risk that it could spark a prolonged civil war involving Russia against NATO, the European Union, and the United States²¹⁷. Currently, it appears unlikely that the dispute will reach a definitive resolution. Consequently, due to this ongoing conflict, Russia is expected to remain a top strategic priority for the United States, on par with China. The likelihood of war involving Russia has increased since its invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the conflict might drive Russia to seek political and economic advantages in regions such as Asia, Africa, or Latin America amid any ensuing unrest or opportunities. It may also

lead to a formal and closer alliance between Russia and China²¹⁸. Additionally, Russia might pursue new areas and opportunities to extend its military dominance.

Another illustration of the challenges in ending a conflict in a manner that ensures lasting peace is the extensive impact of the war on society. At present, it seems unlikely that Ukraine will regain its eastern territories. Furthermore, Ukraine is not anticipated to receive the necessary aid for swift reconstruction. The persistent threat from Russia in the east complicates Ukraine's efforts to revitalize its industrial region. Additionally, the country is expected to face substantial difficulties with maritime trade²¹⁹. The prospect of any peace or truce between Russia and most of Europe, as well as between Russians and Ukrainians, is poised to leave a dire legacy. The political tension between these groups is alarmingly high, suggesting that it could take a decade or more to overcome the animosities and rebuild relations. While it is crucial to cease the fighting, the war's repercussions on the economy and civil society are expected to endure for a prolonged period²²⁰.

The urban core, municipal, and provincial governments, along with a substantial portion of Ukraine's infrastructure, have already suffered severe devastation. These forecasts assume that the war will be resolved through a comprehensive, enduring political and economic agreement²²¹. This agreement would enable Ukraine to reclaim at least the territories it lost during the conflict and bolster its economy to pre-conflict levels. However, political hostility between Russia and NATO is expected to persist as long as Russia's current administration remains in power. Consequently, the E.U. and the United States are likely to continue restricting commerce, investment, technological exchange, and cultural interactions between their regions and Russia. If Russia is unable to restore its previous

levels of energy trade and broader economic relations with Europe and the West, it will inevitably pivot towards China, as well as other Asian and African nations, to sustain its economic activities²²².

For over a decade, NATO and Russia have been significantly increasing their military capabilities, leading to an intense arms race. This military build-up will have various economic impacts, such as substantially raising military expenditure as a percentage of GDP for both sides. The heightened tensions and competition have escalated each side's capacity to threaten the other's population and economic stability. The Ukraine War may have accelerated the development of advanced offensive weapons, including hypersonic missiles, practical cyber and space weaponry, and conventional Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)-like strategies²²³. These strategies will encompass different levels of escalation and will be viable due to the continued presence of strategic nuclear arsenals in both the U.S. and Russia, which ensure increasingly lethal levels of mutually assured destruction.

Efforts to enhance and modernise the control of conventional or nuclear weapons could be significantly undermined by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. In response, the United States might develop theatre systems and low-yield nuclear cruise missiles. Additionally, there could be a need for Britain and France to overhaul their nuclear arsenals to specifically address the threat posed by Russia. Russian President has the capability to deploy all the advanced nuclear weapon systems he has previously demonstrated. The situation cannot be viewed in isolation from the heightened focus that China received from the United States, Europe, and their strategic allies in Asia before Russia's invasion of Ukraine²²⁴. The war in

Ukraine could potentially drive Russia into a closer alliance with China, despite the U.S. strategy that prioritizes China as a greater threat over Russia's resurgence.

The Ukraine conflict, along with the subsequent long-term responses from the US, NATO, the EU, and Russia, will significantly affect key regional military powers such as North Korea, Pakistan, India, Iran, the Arab world, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt. The ongoing de facto conflict between Russia, the United States, and Europe is expected to influence a range of issues, including arms control, security assistance, military bases, economic growth, trade agreements, and diplomatic support in the developing world²²⁵. These impacts will mirror the effects seen on the European continent. This dynamic will become even more pronounced if Russia and China strengthen their collaboration.

2.3.3 The Role of the US within NATO During the Ukraine Conflict

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia, particularly following the 2022 invasion, has reinvigorated NATO's significance in global security dynamics, with the United States playing a pivotal role. NATO, a military alliance founded on collective defence, has long been a mechanism through which the US projects its security and geopolitical influence across Europe²²⁶. Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the US has assumed a leading position in supporting Ukraine, coordinating NATO's response, and managing the delicate balance of deterrence without provoking a broader war with Russia.

2.3.3.1 United States Leadership and Military Support to Ukraine

Many scholars highlight the United States' substantial contribution in terms of military, financial, and political support to Ukraine. The US has been the driving force behind NATO's strong response to Russia's invasion, supplying Ukraine with advanced weaponry, intelligence, and training²²⁷. An author argues that without US involvement, NATO's

reaction would likely have been weaker due to the differing security priorities of European states. The provision of HIMARS rocket systems, Patriot missiles, and M777 howitzers has been crucial in bolstering Ukraine's defence, enabling its armed forces to withstand and counter Russian aggression²²⁸.

Similarly, an author underscores the magnitude of US assistance through the Lend-Lease Act and other aid programs, which have significantly expanded Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Hunter stresses that while NATO operates on collective principles, it is the disproportionate military power of the US that sets the pace for allied support²²⁹. This sentiment is echoed by a scholar who argue that the US's willingness to shoulder much of the logistical burden has stabilized Ukraine's war effort and provided NATO with a unified front.

Despite this, there are critiques about the over-reliance on the US. Tensions within NATO over defence spending and burden-sharing are longstanding, and points out, the Ukraine conflict has revived concerns about European dependence on American security guarantees. The US's dominant role within NATO has, at times, led to disagreements with European allies who favour more cautious approaches to avoid escalation with Russia²²⁹.

2.3.3.2 Diplomatic Manoeuvring and Strategic Unity

From a diplomatic perspective, the US has been instrumental in maintaining strategic unity within NATO, despite the internal divisions among member states. The Biden administration has worked diligently to prevent a fracturing of the alliance, ensuring that even traditionally neutral or cautious countries, such as Germany and France, align with the broader NATO position of supporting Ukraine²³⁰. This includes the imposition of

severe economic sanctions on Russia, which have been coordinated primarily through US diplomatic channels.

However, this strategic unity has not been without friction. Scholars highlight tensions between the US and some NATO members over the appropriate level of engagement in the conflict. For instance, countries like Hungary have been reluctant to adopt harsher measures against Russia, reflecting internal dissent within NATO. The US has had to navigate these tensions, balancing its leadership role with the need to keep all allies on board²³¹.

Interestingly, some scholars argue that the conflict has bolstered the argument for greater European strategic autonomy. In an article, an author notes that while US leadership is indispensable, there is a growing recognition within Europe that it needs to develop a more robust security architecture that is not entirely reliant on Washington²³². This reflects ongoing discussions about Europe's long-term security postures and the potential for reforms within NATO to enhance burden-sharing.

2.3.3.3 NATO's Collective Defence and Deterrence Strategy

NATO's Article 5 commitment to collective defence has been at the forefront of the alliance's deterrence strategy throughout the Ukraine conflict. The US has played a key role in reaffirming this commitment, stationing more troops in Eastern Europe and enhancing military exercises along NATO's eastern flank. An author further highlight that the US has been central to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, a posture designed to deter Russian aggression against alliance members like Poland and the Baltic states²³³.

Many authors argue that the US's robust presence in Europe has been critical in preventing the Ukraine conflict from spilling over into NATO territory. An author asserts that the US's nuclear and conventional military capabilities provide NATO with credible deterrence, ensuring that Russia does not miscalculate and attack NATO members²³⁴. This view is shared by another author who stresses the importance of US leadership in maintaining NATO's readiness and cohesion, particularly in light of the growing Russian threat.

Nevertheless, some analysts express concerns over the potential for the conflict to escalate, given NATO's involvement. An author warns that while the US's deterrence efforts have been successful thus far, there is a fine line between deterrence and provocation. He cautions that US-NATO military assistance to Ukraine, if perceived as overly aggressive by Russia, could inadvertently trigger a wider conflict, possibly involving NATO directly. This highlights the delicate nature of the US's role within NATO, as it seeks to support Ukraine while avoiding direct military confrontation with Russia²³⁵.

2.3.3.5 United State Role in Future NATO Strategy

Looking forward, scholars are divided on how the US should adjust its role within NATO in the context of the Ukraine conflict and beyond. An author argues that the Ukraine war has exposed vulnerabilities in European defence and that the US should use this moment to push for greater defence spending and modernisation among European allies²³⁶. The author suggests that the US should continue to lead within NATO but also encourage Europe to take on more responsibility, ensuring that the alliance remains sustainable in the long term.

On the other hand, some argues that the US's involvement in NATO should remain as robust as ever, particularly given the ongoing Russian threat. He contends that while

European allies can and should do more, the US is the cornerstone of NATO's deterrence strategy and cannot afford to scale back its commitments, especially with the unpredictability of future Russian actions²³⁷. The literature on the role of the US within NATO during the Ukraine conflict reflects a consensus on the indispensable nature of American leadership. The US has provided critical military, economic, and diplomatic support to Ukraine, ensuring a coordinated NATO response to Russian aggression. However, there are ongoing debates regarding burden-sharing, European strategic autonomy, and the potential risks of escalation. As the conflict continues, the US will likely remain at the forefront of NATO's efforts, shaping the alliance's strategy in both the short and long term. Nevertheless, the future of NATO's security architecture may depend on finding a balance between US leadership and greater European responsibility.

Humanitarian and Refugee Response: NATO's Involvement

NATO's role in humanitarian and refugee response has been a subject of increasing academic attention in the context of global security, migration, and crisis management. While NATO is primarily a military alliance focused on collective defence, its involvement in humanitarian and refugee crises, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has drawn varied perspectives from scholars²³⁸.

NATO's role in humanitarian interventions began evolving after the Cold War, with several scholars pointing to the Alliance's shift toward non-traditional security threats, including humanitarian crises. NATO's engagement in humanitarian issues stemmed from the evolving nature of global conflicts that blurred the lines between military and humanitarian concerns²³⁹. He argues that NATO's involvement in crises like the Balkans war of the 1990s demonstrated how military interventions could assist humanitarian objectives,

particularly in complex emergencies where state collapse and mass displacement were at the forefront.

Similarly, an author suggests that NATO's humanitarian and refugee response is tied to its broader role in global security. He emphasizes that as NATO shifted focus from conventional warfare to crisis management, humanitarian assistance became an integral part of its operations²⁴⁰. In this view, NATO's logistical, military, and strategic capabilities enabled it to respond to large-scale displacement, as evidenced by its role in providing support during the Kosovo crisis. Another author also highlights NATO's critical role in post-9/11 humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan, where it coordinated aid distribution and refugee assistance amid a conflict-ridden environment.

However, the blending of military and humanitarian roles has raised ethical and operational concerns among scholars. An author criticises NATO's dual role, arguing that combining military intervention with humanitarian assistance can undermine the neutrality and impartiality essential to humanitarian work. She contends that NATO's military objectives often clash with the principles of humanitarianism, as seen in its interventions in Afghanistan and Libya, where military action led to further displacement and civilian casualties²⁴¹. His work underscores the potential risk of politicising humanitarian aid when it becomes intertwined with military goals.

In contrast, an author adopts a more balanced view, suggesting that while NATO's military-humanitarian nexus presents challenges, the organisation has the capacity to address urgent refugee needs in conflict zones where traditional humanitarian actors are unable to operate. Another author emphasises NATO's role in creating secure environments that facilitate the safe delivery of aid, particularly in high-risk areas²⁴². She


argues that NATO's involvement in refugee crises, such as the Libyan conflict in 2011, allowed humanitarian agencies to access vulnerable populations more effectively.

Regarding refugee response, some scholars argue that NATO's capabilities extend beyond immediate crisis management to addressing longer-term issues of displacement and resettlement. An author explores NATO's potential in refugee protection, focusing on its ability to maintain stability in conflict zones and prevent mass migration. Jacobsen's findings suggest that NATO's involvement in crisis regions can help mitigate refugee flows by ensuring security, thereby reducing the need for large-scale evacuations²⁴³.

On the other hand, critics argue that NATO's involvement in refugee response often lacks a comprehensive, long-term strategy. Jamie Shea (2018) highlights that while NATO can provide immediate relief and logistical support, it often fails to engage with the root causes of displacement, such as political instability and poverty. He emphasises the need for NATO to collaborate more effectively with humanitarian organisations, governments, and international bodies like the United Nations to create sustainable solutions for refugees²⁴⁴.

In conclusion, scholars offer mixed perspectives on NATO's involvement in humanitarian and refugee response. While some see NATO as an essential player in crisis management due to its logistical and military capacities, others raise concerns about the ethical and operational challenges of merging military objectives with humanitarian principles. Ultimately, NATO's role in refugee crises highlights both its potential as a stabilising force and the complexities of ensuring humanitarian neutrality within a military framework. The debate around NATO's involvement underscores the need for better integration of military and humanitarian efforts to address the multifaceted challenges of global displacement.

2.4 Conceptual Framework



Source: Researcher's Compilation

The conceptual framework above is designed to visually represent the interconnected elements and dynamics of the conflict, detailing the causes, events, consequences, and the role of NATO. This framework offers a structured approach to understanding the multifaceted nature of the war and its broader implications. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is rooted in a variety of causes, which can be broadly categorized into historical, political, and ethnic factors²²⁶. Historical causes refer to the long-standing tensions and disputes between Russia and Ukraine, including territorial claims and past conflicts. Political causes encompass Ukraine's pivot towards the West, particularly its aspirations to join the European Union and NATO, which Russia perceives as a threat to its sphere of

influence. Ethnic causes involve tensions in regions with significant Russian-speaking populations, which have fuelled separatist movements and contributed to the outbreak of the war²²⁷.

The key events of the Russo-Ukrainian War highlight the progression and major incidents that have shaped the conflict. The initial military invasion by Russia into Ukrainian territory marks the commencement of the war. This invasion was followed by significant battles and confrontations that have continuously influenced the course of the conflict. Additionally, various efforts to halt the conflict through ceasefires and peace negotiations have been made, although these have often been temporary or unsuccessful, reflecting the persistent volatility of the situation²²⁸.

The consequences of the war are severe and multifaceted, impacting various aspects of both Ukraine and the broader geopolitical landscape. The humanitarian crisis is one of the most immediate and devastating consequences, with civilian casualties, displacement, and widespread suffering. The conflict has also resulted in territorial changes, with regions being contested, occupied, or annexed, thereby altering the geopolitical landscape significantly²²⁹.

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War is a critical aspect of the framework, encompassing political, military, and economic support. Political support from NATO and its member states includes public statements, resolutions, and diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia. Military support involves the provision of aid to Ukraine, such as troop deployments, training, and the supply of weapons and equipment to bolster Ukraine's defence capabilities. Economic support comprises the imposition of sanctions on Russia to

weaken its economic base and limit its ability to sustain the war, as well as economic aid to Ukraine to support its war effort and rebuild its economy²³⁰.

The framework also includes an impact analysis to examine the multifaceted effects of the war and NATO's involvement. The impact on Ukraine is assessed in terms of how NATO's support influences the country's security, defence capabilities, economic stability, and international standing. The impact on Russia is analysed regarding the effects of NATO's actions on its military strategy, economic condition, and domestic political climate. Additionally, the global implications are considered, focusing on broader geopolitical shifts, economic consequences, changes in global alliances, market stability, and energy prices²³¹. In summary, this conceptual framework provides a comprehensive approach to studying the complex dynamics of the Russo-Ukrainian War and NATO's involvement, enabling a detailed analysis of the causes, events, consequences, and broader impacts of the conflict.

2.5 Summary of the Gap in Literature Review

The literature on the Russo-Ukrainian War and NATO involvement reveals several critical gaps that warrant further investigation. Firstly, while extensive research has been conducted on the historical and political context of the conflict, there is a notable lack of analysis on the evolving geopolitical strategies of NATO in response to the war. This includes the alliance's long-term strategic objectives and the implications for global security architecture. Secondly, existing literature often overlooks the multifaceted impacts of NATO's involvement on regional stability in Eastern Europe. Many studies focus predominantly on military aspects, neglecting the socio-economic and political

ramifications for the countries within NATO's sphere of influence and those on the periphery, such as Ukraine and its immediate neighbours.

Thirdly, the role of smaller NATO member states and their individual contributions and perspectives are underrepresented. Research tends to emphasize the actions and policies of major powers like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, thereby marginalising the experiences and strategic concerns of smaller member states. Moreover, there is a scarcity of comprehensive evaluations of NATO's effectiveness in de-escalating the conflict and promoting peace. Studies often fail to critically assess the success and limitations of NATO's diplomatic and military interventions. Lastly, the literature is limited in exploring the broader implications of NATO's involvement for global geopolitics, including the responses from other major powers such as China and their strategic manoeuvres in reaction to the alliance's actions. Addressing these gaps would provide a more holistic understanding of the geopolitical dynamics at play in the Russo-Ukrainian War and NATO's role within it.

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Chapter Three

Methodology

3.1 Research Design

The study made use of descriptive research design. A descriptive research design focuses on detailing and understanding phenomena as they naturally occur, without manipulating variables¹. It provides a comprehensive snapshot of specific events or conditions, making it ideal for capturing complex situations. Descriptive research design is suitable as it allows for an in-depth exploration of NATO's role and actions within the context of the ongoing conflict. This design facilitates the gathering of rich qualitative data through document analysis, and observational techniques, enabling a thorough examination of NATO's strategies, policies, and impact². Through the use of this design, the study will accurately portray NATO's involvement, offering valuable insights into its contributions and challenges during the war.

3.2 Population of the Study

The population of the study consists of scholarly articles, government reports, official NATO documents, news articles, and expert analyses published in international news outlets. Through the use of these sources, the study incorporated a wide range of perspectives and insights, allowing for a comprehensive examination of NATO's role and actions in the conflict. These sources provided historical context, strategic assessments, policy decisions, and the implications of NATO's involvement, contributing to a well-rounded understanding of the complexities and geopolitical ramifications of the war.

3.3 Sample and Sampling techniques

For the study, the sample comprises selected secondary sources, including scholarly articles, government and NATO reports, news articles, and expert analyses published

between 2014 and 2024. The sampling technique employed was purposive sampling, targeting documents and publications that offer relevant, high-quality insights and analysis on NATO's involvement in the conflict. This method ensures the inclusion of diverse perspectives and comprehensive coverage of key themes, such as strategic decisions, military actions, political implications, and international responses, thereby enhancing the study's depth and reliability.

3.4 Instruments for Data Collection

The instrument of data collection for this study is secondary sources of data. This includes scholarly articles, government and NATO reports, news articles, and expert analyses. These secondary sources ensure consistency in capturing key details such as publication date, authorship, main findings, strategic insights, and implications of NATO's actions. This approach facilitates organised and comprehensive data collection, allowing for a thorough analysis of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

3.5 Validity of Research Instruments

The validity of the research instruments in the study is ensured through meticulous selection and rigorous evaluation of secondary sources. The secondary sources of data collection is designed to capture accurate and relevant information consistently. Content validity is achieved by including diverse and reputable sources such as scholarly articles, government reports, and expert analyses, which provided comprehensive insights into NATO's role. To enhance construct validity, these data ensured it accurately reflects the key aspects of NATO's involvement.

3.6 Reliability of the Research Instrument

The reliability of the research instruments is upheld through a systematic and consistent approach to data collection. The secondary data is standardised to ensure uniformity in capturing key data points. To further enhance reliability, the data extraction process is repeated by multiple researchers to check for consistency and inter-rater reliability. Clear guidelines and criteria for source selection and data extraction are established, minimizing subjective interpretation and bias. Maintaining consistency in data collection procedures and periodically reviewing the extraction process, the study ensures that the research instruments produce stable and replicable results, reinforcing the study's overall reliability.

3.7 Administration of Instrument and Method of Data Collection

The data collection for this research were obtained solely from secondary sources. Hence, journals, editorials, articles, reports, conference proceedings, gazette, and so on were adequately sources to elicit relevant information on how nonviolence can be used as a mechanism of conflict resolution in Nigeria.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

The method of analysis for this study involves content and explanatory analysis. Content analysis systematically examines secondary sources, such as scholarly articles and reports, to identify patterns, themes, and key insights regarding NATO's role in the conflict. Explanatory analysis is used to explore and clarify the relationships and underlying reasons behind NATO's actions and their implications. The combination of these analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of NATO's involvement, highlighting strategic decisions, geopolitical impacts, and the broader context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. This dual approach ensures a thorough analysis of the data.

Endnotes

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Chapter Four

Results and Discussion of Findings

4.1 Presentation of Research Questions

4.1.1 Research Question One: What are the Key Strategic Interests and Objectives of NATO in its Involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War?

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war can be understood within the broader context of its strategic interests in Europe and beyond. Since its inception, NATO has served as a collective defence alliance aimed at safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its member states against external threats¹. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began in 2014 with Russia's annexation of Crimea and subsequent involvement in Eastern Ukraine, directly challenges these principles. Some of the key strategic interest and objective of NATO in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war are:

i. Territorial Integrity of Member States

NATO's primary strategic interest in upholding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its member states has been critically underscored by the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have blatantly violated international norms and principles of sovereignty, causing deep-seated alarm among NATO members regarding the security and inviolability of their borders². Numerous reports have documented the severity and implications of Russia's actions. According to a 2022 NATO report, the invasion has led to a significant recalibration of NATO's defensive posture³. The alliance has increased its troop presence in Eastern Europe, reinforcing the borders of member states that are geographically

proximate to Russia. This move aims to deter potential aggression and reassure member states of NATO's commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty⁴.

The United Nations has also highlighted the humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the war, with millions of Ukrainians displaced and thousands of civilian casualties reported⁵. These developments have intensified NATO's resolve to safeguard the territorial integrity of its members by providing substantial military and economic support to Ukraine, viewing its struggle as a frontline defence against Russian expansionism⁶. Furthermore, scholarly analyses emphasise the broader geopolitical ramifications of the conflict. A study notes that Russia's actions have galvanised NATO unity and strengthened alliances with non-member states like Sweden and Finland, who have since expressed their intentions to join NATO. This expansion underscores the perceived threat and the strategic imperative of reinforcing a collective defence framework⁷.

Additionally, economic sanctions imposed by NATO members on Russia aim to weaken its war machinery and signal a robust international response to territorial violations. According to a report by the Brookings Institution, these sanctions have had a significant impact on the Russian economy, limiting its ability to sustain prolonged military campaigns⁸. The war between Russia and Ukraine has significantly influenced NATO's strategic priorities, emphasising the paramount importance of upholding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its member states. This conflict has reshaped NATO's defence strategies, reinforced alliances, and underscored the collective commitment to deterring aggression and preserving international norms.

ii. Deterrence Against Aggression

NATO's involvement in Ukraine serves as a strategic move to deter further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. This approach underscores NATO's commitment to maintaining regional stability and upholding the sovereignty of non-NATO states that face external threats⁹. A study revealed that providing military aid, NATO enhances Ukraine's defence capabilities, enabling the country to better withstand and counter Russian advances. This military support includes the supply of advanced weaponry, intelligence sharing, and logistical assistance, which collectively boost Ukraine's operational effectiveness.

Training programs are another critical component of NATO's support. These programs aim to elevate the proficiency of Ukrainian forces through joint exercises, strategic planning workshops, and specialised training in areas such as cyber defence and counter-insurgency tactics. NATO helps Ukraine to not only defend its territory but also to contribute to broader regional security efforts. Political solidarity is equally significant. NATO's vocal and diplomatic backing of Ukraine signals a unified stance against Russian aggression¹⁰. High-level visits, statements of support from NATO leaders, and the presence of NATO advisors in Ukraine illustrate the alliance's commitment. This political support helps to rally international opinion against Russian actions, garnering further diplomatic and economic pressure on Moscow.

NATO's actions send a clear message: aggression against non-NATO states will not go unchallenged. NATO aims to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This stance is intended to deter Russia from contemplating similar actions against other Eastern European nations, particularly those that may not have the protective umbrella of NATO membership.

NATO's multifaceted involvement in Ukraine – through military aid, training programs, and political solidarity – aims to bolster Ukraine's defences while sending a robust deterrent signal to Russia. This strategy underscores NATO's broader objective of maintaining stability and preventing further escalation of conflict in Eastern Europe.

iii. Stability in Europe

NATO's involvement in Europe, particularly in response to the conflict in Ukraine, is driven by a commitment to maintaining regional stability and preventing the further escalation of tensions that could affect neighbouring countries¹¹. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, continued with the war in the Donbas region, has created significant instability. This instability has resulted in humanitarian crises, with thousands of casualties, millions of displaced persons, and widespread economic disruption. The conflict poses a threat not only to Ukraine but to the entire European security architecture. NATO, founded on the principle of collective defence, sees the situation in Ukraine as a critical issue that could undermine peace and stability in Europe¹². The alliance's involvement includes providing political support, enhancing military presence in Eastern Europe, and offering training and equipment to Ukrainian forces. These measures aim to deter further aggression, reassure NATO member states, and support Ukraine in defending its sovereignty.

NATO's actions are also intended to prevent the conflict from spilling over into neighbouring countries, which could lead to a broader regional crisis. The alliance has increased its presence in member states bordering Ukraine, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, to strengthen their defences and signal a clear deterrence to potential aggression¹³. This proactive stance is crucial in maintaining stability in Europe, as it helps

to contain the conflict, support Ukraine, and prevent further destabilisation that could threaten the security of NATO members and the broader international community.

Objectives of NATO's Involvement

NATO's objectives in the Russo-Ukrainian War are closely aligned with its strategic interests and involve both military and diplomatic efforts:

i. Military Support for Ukraine

NATO's military support for Ukraine encompasses a range of initiatives designed to enhance the country's defence capabilities against Russian-backed separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine. This includes comprehensive training programs for Ukrainian forces, focusing on modern combat techniques and strategies. Additionally, NATO has supplied defensive weaponry, such as anti-tank missiles and advanced surveillance equipment, to fortify Ukraine's military infrastructure¹⁴. These efforts aim to not only improve Ukraine's immediate defence posture but also ensure long-term resilience by fostering a professional and capable military force¹⁵. NATO seeks to deter further aggression and maintain stability in the region.

ii. Political and Diplomatic Pressure

NATO has strategically employed political and diplomatic measures to isolate Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine. This includes leveraging its influence within international bodies to advocate for sanctions and condemnations against Russia. The alliance has coordinated with member states and global partners to impose economic sanctions targeting key Russian sectors and individuals, increasing the economic and political costs of Russia's aggressive behaviour¹⁶. Additionally, NATO's diplomatic efforts aim to unify international opinion against Russia, promoting a concerted and cohesive

stance. These measures are intended to pressure Russia into seeking a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, thereby reinforcing international norms and territorial integrity¹⁷.

iii. Enhancing NATO's Eastern Flank

The conflict in Ukraine has underscored the need for NATO to reinforce its military presence in Eastern Europe, particularly in member states bordering Russia. In response, NATO has significantly increased military exercises in the region, enhancing readiness and interoperability among allied forces¹⁸. Rotational deployments of NATO troops have been established to provide a continuous and robust defence posture. Infrastructure improvements, such as upgraded bases and logistical networks, have been prioritised to support rapid deployment and sustained operations. These enhancements aim to deter potential aggression by demonstrating NATO's commitment to collective defence, thereby reassuring Eastern European allies and maintaining regional stability.

4.1.2 Research Question Two: How has NATO's Involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War Influenced the Dynamics of the Conflict?

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has significantly influenced the dynamics of the conflict, impacting both its progression and the broader geopolitical landscape. The alliance's support for Ukraine, its strategic positioning, and its diplomatic manoeuvres have played crucial roles in shaping the war's trajectory. Different scholars and analysts offer varying perspectives on NATO's involvement, which can be critically examined to understand the complex and multifaceted nature of this influence.

One prominent viewpoint emphasises NATO's role in providing substantial military assistance to Ukraine. This perspective highlights that the alliance's provision of advanced

weaponry, training, and intelligence support has bolstered Ukraine's defensive capabilities¹⁹. By supplying anti-tank missiles, air defence systems, and other sophisticated military equipment, NATO has enabled Ukraine to better resist Russian advances and mount counteroffensives. This infusion of military aid has not only strengthened Ukraine's position on the battlefield but also served as a deterrent to further Russian aggression. Proponents of this view argue that NATO's involvement has been crucial in preventing a swift Russian victory and has prolonged the conflict, thereby providing Ukraine with a fighting chance²⁰.

Another argument focuses on NATO's role in enhancing the strategic cohesion and unity among Western nations. Through cooperative collaborations with member states to support Ukraine, NATO has reinforced the principles of collective defence and mutual support enshrined in its founding treaty. This unity has translated into coordinated sanctions against Russia, diplomatic pressure, and a unified front that counters Russian attempts to sow discord among Western allies²¹. From this perspective, NATO's involvement has been pivotal in maintaining a robust and coherent response to Russian aggression, thereby preventing the fragmentation of Western support for Ukraine. Critics, however, caution that this unity may also be fragile and subject to the differing interests and priorities of individual member states²².

A contrasting viewpoint suggests that NATO's involvement has escalated the conflict by provoking Russia and intensifying its military response. This perspective holds that NATO's support for Ukraine is seen by Russia as a direct threat to its sphere of influence and national security²³. This has led to a more aggressive and uncompromising stance from Moscow, resulting in increased military operations and harsher tactics on the ground.

Analysts with this viewpoint argue that NATO's involvement has exacerbated the conflict, making it more protracted and destructive. They contend that a more restrained approach might have reduced the intensity of the war and opened avenues for diplomatic resolution²⁴.

Furthermore, some scholars argue that NATO's involvement has significant implications for the broader international order. While supporting Ukraine, NATO is perceived as reaffirming the principle of state sovereignty and the right of nations to choose their alliances²⁵. This has strengthened the rules-based international order and sent a clear message that territorial aggression will not be tolerated. However, critics argue that NATO's actions could set a precedent for future conflicts, where great powers might intervene in regional disputes under the guise of protecting sovereignty, potentially leading to greater instability and conflict escalation in other parts of the world.

In addition to military and strategic considerations, NATO's involvement has also influenced the humanitarian and economic dimensions of the conflict. The alliance's support for Ukraine has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid, medical supplies, and economic assistance to war-affected areas. This has alleviated some of the suffering of the Ukrainian population and helped stabilize the country's economy. However, critics argue that the focus on military support has overshadowed the need for comprehensive humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding efforts²⁷. They contend that a more balanced approach, integrating military, humanitarian, and diplomatic initiatives, is necessary to address the multifaceted nature of the conflict and achieve a sustainable resolution.

Another critical examination of NATO's involvement focuses on the internal dynamics within the alliance itself. The war has tested NATO's ability to adapt to new security challenges and respond to a high-intensity conflict on its periphery. Some analysts argue

that NATO's response has revealed strengths in terms of rapid decision-making, operational coordination, and resource mobilization²⁸. However, others highlight underlying challenges, such as varying threat perceptions among member states, differing levels of military readiness, and the complexities of consensus-building in a large and diverse alliance. This internal examination underscores the need for NATO to continually evolve and address these challenges to remain effective in future conflicts.

Moreover, the impact of NATO's involvement on regional security dynamics cannot be overlooked. The alliance's support for Ukraine has heightened security concerns among neighbouring countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. These countries have sought to bolster their own defences and deepen security cooperation with NATO to deter potential Russian aggression. This has led to an increased military presence and activity in the region, further escalating tensions. Critics argue that this militarization of the region could create a security dilemma, where actions taken to enhance security inadvertently increase the risk of conflict²⁹. They advocate for a more nuanced approach that balances deterrence with dialogue and confidence-building measures.

Lastly, NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has significant implications for the future of the alliance itself. The conflict has underscored the importance of NATO's core mission of collective defence while highlighting the need for adaptability in addressing non-traditional security threats³⁰. Some scholars argue that NATO's experience in Ukraine will shape its strategic priorities, operational doctrines, and force structures in the coming years. This includes a greater emphasis on rapid response capabilities, hybrid warfare, cyber defence, and resilience against disinformation. However, there are also concerns that prolonged involvement in the conflict could strain NATO's resources and

divert attention from other critical security challenges, such as terrorism, climate change, and emerging technologies³¹.

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has profoundly influenced the dynamics of the conflict, with significant military, strategic, humanitarian, and geopolitical implications. The alliance's support for Ukraine has strengthened its defensive capabilities and unified Western response, but it has also escalated tensions with Russia and contributed to the protraction of the war. The diverse perspectives of scholars and analysts highlight the complexity of NATO's role, emphasising the need for a balanced approach that integrates military, humanitarian, and diplomatic efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution and maintain regional and global stability.

4.1.3 Research Question Three: What are the Geopolitical Implications of NATO's Involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War for Regional and Global Security?

The Russo-Ukrainian War, which escalated dramatically in 2022, has not only reshaped the regional security landscape but also had significant geopolitical ramifications globally. NATO's involvement in the conflict, through various forms of support to Ukraine, has sparked considerable debate among scholars and analysts regarding its implications for regional and global security³².

One of the primary implications of NATO's involvement is the heightened tensions between the West and Russia. Analysts argue that NATO's military aid to Ukraine, coupled with economic sanctions on Russia, has led to a new Cold War-like atmosphere. This escalation in hostilities has increased the risk of direct confrontation between nuclear-armed powers. The expansion of NATO's presence in Eastern Europe, through troop

deployments and military exercises, is seen by some as a provocative move that could trigger further aggression from Russia³³. This perspective underscores the potential for miscalculation and accidental escalation, which could have catastrophic consequences for global security.

Conversely, some scholars argue that NATO's involvement has served as a crucial deterrent against further Russian aggression. NATO has reinforced the principle of collective defence, signalling to Russia that any attack on a NATO member would be met with a unified response. This deterrence strategy, they contend, has helped to stabilise the situation in Eastern Europe and prevent the conflict from spreading to neighbouring countries³⁴. Additionally, the alliance's support for Ukraine is viewed as a necessary measure to uphold international law and the sovereignty of nations, reinforcing a rules-based international order.

From a regional perspective, NATO's involvement has had significant implications for European security dynamics. The war has prompted a re-evaluation of defence policies among European nations, leading to increased defence spending and greater emphasis on military readiness. Countries like Germany and Sweden, traditionally more restrained in their military postures, have announced substantial investments in their defence capabilities³⁵. This shift reflects a broader recognition of the need for a robust defence posture in the face of potential Russian aggression. However, some experts caution that this militarization of Europe could lead to an arms race, further destabilising the region and diverting resources from essential social and economic development.

Another critical aspect of NATO's involvement is its impact on the internal cohesion of the alliance. The war has underscored the importance of solidarity among NATO members,

but it has also exposed potential fault lines. Disagreements over the extent of support to be provided to Ukraine, concerns about the economic repercussions of sanctions on Russia, and differing threat perceptions have tested the unity of the alliance³⁶. While NATO has managed to maintain a unified front, the long-term sustainability of this cohesion remains uncertain. The war has prompted discussions about the need for NATO to adapt its strategic concept to address contemporary security challenges more effectively, balancing collective defence with crisis management and cooperative security³⁷.

Globally, NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has had significant implications for international relations and the strategic calculations of other major powers. China's response to the conflict, for instance, has been closely watched. While China has expressed a neutral stance publicly, its strategic partnership with Russia suggests a more complex alignment³⁸. The war has highlighted the potential for a Sino-Russian axis challenging Western dominance in global affairs. NATO's actions in Ukraine could influence China's approach to its regional disputes, particularly in the South China Sea and Taiwan. If NATO's support for Ukraine is perceived as successful, it might embolden China to take more assertive actions, anticipating a similarly calculated Western response³⁹.

Furthermore, the conflict has implications for NATO's relationships with non-Western countries. Nations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia are closely observing NATO's actions and the West's commitment to principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The outcome of the war and NATO's role in it could shape these countries' foreign policy orientations and alliances. For some, NATO's involvement might be seen as reaffirming the importance of alliances with Western powers. For others, particularly those with

historical grievances against Western interventionism, it could reinforce suspicions and drive them closer to alternative power centres like China or Russia⁴⁰.

The humanitarian dimension of NATO's involvement also warrants consideration. The conflict has resulted in significant civilian casualties and displacement. NATO's support for Ukraine, including military aid, has been criticized for potentially prolonging the conflict and exacerbating human suffering⁴¹. This critique emphasises the need for a balanced approach that combines military support with diplomatic efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict. The challenge lies in finding a path that ensures Ukraine's sovereignty and security while minimizing further escalation and human cost.

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has profound geopolitical implications for regional and global security. The alliance's actions have both deterred further Russian aggression and heightened tensions between nuclear-armed powers, posing risks of escalation. Regionally, NATO's support has prompted a re-evaluation of defence policies in Europe, leading to increased militarization with potential destabilising effects. Globally, the conflict has influenced the strategic calculations of major powers and shaped international perceptions of NATO and the West. Balancing military support with diplomatic efforts and maintaining alliance cohesion will be crucial for navigating the complex geopolitical landscape shaped by this conflict. The war in Ukraine serves as a critical juncture for NATO, highlighting the need to adapt and reaffirm its role in promoting security and stability in a rapidly changing world.

4.1.4 Research Question Four: How has NATO's Involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War affected its Relationships with Non-NATO Countries?

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has had significant implications for its relationships with non-NATO countries. The multifaceted nature of these impacts can be understood by examining various dimensions such as geopolitical alignments, economic relations, and security dynamics. Scholars and analysts have debated these effects, offering diverse perspectives on the evolving international order.

i. Geopolitical Alignments

One of the primary ways NATO's involvement has influenced relationships with non-NATO countries is through the realignment of geopolitical interests. Several non-NATO countries, particularly those in proximity to the conflict or with historical ties to Russia, have been forced to reassess their strategic positions⁴². For instance, countries in the post-Soviet space, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, have seen increased pressure to align more closely with Russia. This pressure stems from Russia's desire to consolidate its sphere of influence and counter NATO's expansion. These countries face a delicate balancing act, attempting to maintain economic and political relations with both NATO and Russia while avoiding entanglement in the conflict⁴³.

Conversely, countries with aspirations to join NATO, like Sweden and Finland, have accelerated their efforts to strengthen ties with the alliance. The war has underscored the perceived security benefits of NATO membership, prompting these nations to seek closer military and political cooperation with the alliance⁴⁴. This shift has been driven by concerns over regional stability and the desire for a robust security guarantee against potential aggression.

ii. Economic Relations

NATO's involvement has also had significant repercussions for economic relations with non-NATO countries. The imposition of economic sanctions on Russia by NATO member states has created a complex web of economic consequences. Non-NATO countries that have strong trade relations with Russia have been compelled to navigate the sanctions landscape carefully⁴⁵. For example, countries in Asia, such as China and India, have sought to maintain their economic ties with Russia while avoiding actions that would provoke sanctions from NATO countries. The sanctions have also had a ripple effect on global supply chains, particularly in energy markets. European reliance on Russian energy exports has prompted a re-evaluation of energy policies, leading to increased collaboration with non-NATO energy producers in the Middle East and North Africa⁴⁶. This realignment has shifted economic dependencies and fostered new partnerships aimed at ensuring energy security.

iii. Security Dynamics

The security dynamics of the Russo-Ukrainian War have had profound implications for non-NATO countries. The war has prompted a re-evaluation of security policies and defence postures worldwide. In Asia, countries like Japan and South Korea have observed the conflict with concern, recognising the potential parallels between the situation in Ukraine and their security challenges with neighbouring powers⁴⁷. This has led to increased defence spending and greater cooperation with NATO to enhance security capabilities. In the Middle East, the war has influenced the strategic calculations of regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. These countries have been closely monitoring NATO's actions and the international response to the conflict. The war has

highlighted the importance of strategic alliances and military readiness, prompting these nations to reassess their own defence strategies and consider closer ties with NATO or other security arrangements⁴⁸.

Different scholars and analysts offer varied perspectives on the implications of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War for its relationships with non-NATO countries. Some argue that NATO's actions have reinforced the alliance's credibility and deterrence capabilities. NATO has demonstrated its commitment to collective security and its willingness to confront aggression. This, in turn, has reassured both NATO members and non-NATO partners about the alliance's resolve, potentially strengthening global security partnerships⁴⁹.

However, other scholars caution that NATO's involvement has exacerbated tensions with non-NATO countries that perceive the alliance as a threat. Russia's portrayal of NATO as an adversarial force has resonated with some non-NATO countries, leading to increased anti-NATO sentiment. This perspective suggests that NATO's actions may have unintentionally driven a wedge between the alliance and certain non-NATO countries, complicating efforts to build cooperative security arrangements⁵⁰. Moreover, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability of NATO's involvement in the conflict. The financial and military support provided to Ukraine has placed a significant burden on NATO member states. Some scholars argue that prolonged involvement could strain resources and divert attention from other global security challenges. This perspective raises questions about the potential for "mission fatigue" and the implications for NATO's broader strategic objectives⁵¹.

The impact of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War varies across different regions. In Europe, the war has led to a renewed focus on defence cooperation and collective security. Non-NATO countries in Europe, such as Austria and Switzerland, have been drawn into the orbit of NATO's security considerations, balancing their traditional neutrality with the need for security assurances. The war has prompted these countries to engage more actively with NATO through partnerships and cooperation agreements⁵². In the Asia-Pacific region, the conflict has reinforced the importance of alliances and partnerships in maintaining regional stability. Countries like Australia and New Zealand have strengthened their security ties with NATO and other Western allies, recognising the interconnected nature of global security challenges⁵³. This trend highlights the broader implications of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War for regional security architectures beyond Europe.

In the Middle East and Africa, the war has had a more nuanced impact. While some countries have sought closer ties with NATO, others have remained cautious, balancing their relations with both NATO and Russia. The complex geopolitical landscape of these regions has led to diverse responses, with some countries viewing NATO's actions as a necessary deterrent against aggression, while others perceive them as contributing to regional instability⁵⁴.

NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War has had far-reaching implications for its relationships with non-NATO countries. The conflict has reshaped geopolitical alignments, influenced economic relations, and altered security dynamics on a global scale. Scholars and analysts offer diverse perspectives on these impacts, highlighting both the strengthening of NATO's deterrence capabilities and the potential for increased tensions

with non-NATO countries. The war has underscored the importance of strategic alliances and the need for a nuanced understanding of the evolving international order. As the conflict continues to unfold, the long-term implications for NATO's relationships with non-NATO countries will remain a critical area of analysis and debate.

4.2 Discussion of Findings

The findings above about NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War reveals a complex and multifaceted debate among scholars and analysts. The research highlights several key implications and perspectives. First, NATO's military support for Ukraine has bolstered the country's defensive capabilities, enabling it to better resist Russian advances. This aid has also served as a deterrent against further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. However, critics argue that NATO's involvement has escalated the conflict, provoking a more aggressive response from Russia and making the war more protracted and destructive.

The research underscores NATO's role in enhancing strategic cohesion and unity among Western nations, leading to coordinated sanctions and a robust response to Russian aggression. Conversely, concerns are raised about the fragility of this unity and the differing interests of member states. Globally, NATO's involvement has heightened tensions between the West and Russia, increasing the risk of direct confrontation between nuclear-armed powers. Nonetheless, some scholars view NATO's actions as reaffirming the principles of state sovereignty and the rules-based international order.

The research also highlights the implications for European security dynamics, with increased defence spending and military readiness among European nations. However, this militarization raises concerns about an arms race and the diversion of resources from social

and economic development. Lastly, the findings discuss the humanitarian dimension of NATO's involvement, emphasising the need for a balanced approach that integrates military support with diplomatic efforts and comprehensive humanitarian intervention to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict. In conclusion, the discussion of findings underscores the complex and multifaceted nature of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War, with significant military, strategic, humanitarian, and geopolitical implications for regional and global security.

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Chapter Five

Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Findings

The aim of the study is to comprehensively analyse NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War. The objective of the study is to analyse the strategic interests and objectives of NATO in its involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War, evaluate the impact of NATO's involvement on the dynamics and outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War, examine the geopolitical implications of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War for regional and global security and assess the impact of NATO's involvement on its diplomatic relationships with non-NATO countries.

War and conflict are enduring features of international politics, driven by power, ideology, and resource competition among states and non-state actors. Conflicts range from interstate wars to civil wars and asymmetrical conflicts involving insurgent or terrorist groups, fuelled by territorial disputes, ethnic tensions, economic interests, and strategic rivalries. The Russo-Ukrainian war, dramatically escalating on February 24, 2022, stems from long-standing geopolitical tensions. Following the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, Ukraine's independence shifted regional power dynamics, challenging Russia's influence.

Russia views Ukraine as essential for its security, while Ukraine seeks closer ties with the EU and NATO. NATO's eastward expansion, incorporating former Eastern Bloc countries, has heightened Russia's security concerns, leading to strained relations. The 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, supported by Russia, have intensified these tensions. NATO's involvement aims to deter Russian aggression and support Ukraine through military aid, training, and intelligence sharing.

This involvement, seen by Russia as a threat, has escalated the conflict into a proxy war between NATO and Russia, with significant implications for regional security, including heightened tensions and the risk of a broader conflict involving multiple NATO members.

Concepts such as geopolitics and conflict were critically examined. For instance, geopolitics is seen as an ordinary parlance can be seen as the study of the effects of geography that is, human and physical, on international politics and relations. In contemporary geopolitics, issues such as energy security, climate change, and technological advancements further complicate traditional power dynamics. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and shifting alliances in the Middle East are current examples of how geopolitical strategies evolve in response to changing global circumstances. Additionally, non-state actors and transnational issues like terrorism and cyber warfare add layers of complexity to the geopolitical landscape.

The explanation of geopolitics is profoundly relevant to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 can be seen through the lens of geopolitical strategy. Russia aims to secure its geopolitical interests, such as access to the Black Sea, control over key resources, and maintaining a buffer zone against NATO's eastward expansion. The theories highlight the importance of territorial control and strategic positioning, which are evident in Russia's actions to reinforce its regional dominance and safeguard its geopolitical influence.

The concept of conflict is seen as a struggle over values and claims to scarce resources, status, and power, where the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals. Applying this definition to the current Russia-Ukraine invasion, it becomes evident that the conflict involves a complex struggle over territorial control, political influence, and

national identity. The invasion can be seen as Russia's attempt to reclaim perceived lost status and influence over Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, and to prevent its further integration with Western institutions like NATO and the EU.

Ukraine, on the other hand, is striving to assert its sovereignty, secure its borders, and align itself more closely with Western democratic values and economic systems. The advantages of this definition lie in its broad applicability and its capacity to capture the multi-dimensional nature of conflicts. This framework allows for an analysis that encompasses economic, political, and social dimensions, making it a comprehensive tool for understanding the underlying causes and dynamics of conflicts.

This definition is crucial for research on the Russia-Ukraine invasion as it underscores the importance of understanding the deeper, value-laden issues at play. It encourages researchers to look beyond the immediate military actions and explore the historical, ideological, and geopolitical contexts that fuel the conflict.

In terms of theoretical framework, the study used realist theory, institutional theory, and constructivist theory. Realism stands as a prominent theory in international relations, tracing its roots to great thinkers and scholars who are now regarded as the father of international relations or political science. The realist theory posits that international politics is dominated by anarchy and a power struggle among sovereign nation-states, each pursuing its own national interests. Realism is built on several key assumptions. First is that, states are the primary actors and fundamental units of analysis in the anarchic international system, which lacks a supranational authority.

Second, all states possess offensive military capabilities, making them potentially dangerous to one another. Third, states can never be certain about the future intentions or actions of other states, leading to mistrust and worst-case scenario planning. In this system, states prioritize their own national interests and survival. While economic and cultural factors are significant, military force and power politics are central to realist analysis. Realism views human nature as flawed and egoistic, sceptical of lofty ideals like global peace or international cooperation. It emphasizes pragmatism over moral principles and ethics, assuming states will act opportunistically when necessary.

The accumulation of military and economic power is seen as essential for states to enhance their relative power and security in an anarchic, zero-sum world. Classical realists emphasize human nature and decision-making elites in their understanding of international relations. They argue that politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature. One of the proponents of this theory is regarded as a significant political thinker of the 20th century and a leading realist thinker.

One of the findings of the study is that NATO's military support for Ukraine has bolstered the country's defensive capabilities, enabling it to better resist Russian advances. This aid has also served as a deterrent against further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. However, critics argue that NATO's involvement has escalated the conflict, provoking a more aggressive response from Russia and making the war more protracted and destructive. The research underscores NATO's role in enhancing strategic cohesion and unity among Western nations, leading to coordinated sanctions and a robust response to Russian aggression. Conversely, concerns are raised about the fragility of this unity and the differing interests of member states.

5.2 Conclusion

The study concludes that NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War emphasises the profound impact of the conflict on regional and global security dynamics. NATO's actions have reinforced its commitment to collective defence, particularly in response to Russia's aggressive manoeuvres, which have violated the sovereignty of Ukraine and threatened the security of NATO member states. The alliance's military support for Ukraine has bolstered its defensive capabilities, enabling it to resist Russian advances and prolong the conflict, thus preventing a swift Russian victory.

However, this involvement has also escalated tensions between NATO and Russia, creating a precarious geopolitical environment reminiscent of Cold War dynamics. Critics argue that NATO's military aid and presence in Eastern Europe may provoke further aggression from Russia, highlighting the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation. The study also notes the implications for NATO's internal cohesion, as differing threat perceptions and priorities among member states could challenge the alliance's unity. Furthermore, the conflict has prompted a re-evaluation of defence policies across Europe, leading to increased military spending and preparedness.

Ultimately, the study underscores the necessity for NATO to balance military support with diplomatic efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict, ensuring the preservation of international norms while minimizing human suffering and maintaining regional stability.

5.3 Recommendations

The study makes the following recommendations.

- i. **Enhance Military Support and Training for Ukraine:** The study recommends that NATO should continue to provide comprehensive military assistance to Ukraine, including advanced weaponry, intelligence sharing, and extensive training programs. This support will bolster Ukraine's defensive capabilities and enhance its resilience against Russian aggression.
- ii. **Strengthen Diplomatic Efforts:** The study also recommends that NATO must prioritize diplomatic initiatives alongside military support. Engaging in dialogue with Russia, while maintaining a firm stance on territorial integrity, can help de-escalate tensions and open pathways for negotiations aimed at a sustainable resolution to the conflict.
- iii. **Promote Internal Cohesion Among Member States:** To address varying threat perceptions and interests, the study recommends that NATO should facilitate regular consultations among member states to ensure a unified approach to the conflict. This could involve establishing a framework for collective decision-making that accommodates diverse perspectives while reinforcing solidarity.
- iv. **Adapt to Evolving Security Challenges:** The study further recommends that NATO must reassess its strategic priorities in light of the ongoing conflict, focusing on enhancing rapid response capabilities, cyber defence, and resilience against disinformation. Adapting to these evolving challenges will ensure NATO remains effective in addressing both traditional and non-traditional security threats in the future.

- v. **Balanced Military and Humanitarian Responses:** Lastly, the study recommend that NATO should integrate humanitarian assistance into its strategic framework, ensuring that military support does not overshadow the need for comprehensive humanitarian interventions. This approach will help mitigate the conflict's human cost and support the Ukrainian population affected by the war.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

The study contributes significantly to the understanding of NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War by elucidating the complex interplay between military support, geopolitical dynamics, and international norms. It highlights how NATO's actions have reinforced the principles of collective defence and state sovereignty, reshaping the alliance's strategic priorities in response to Russian aggression. Additionally, the research underscores the dual nature of NATO's involvement: while it has bolstered Ukraine's defences and unity among Western nations, it has also escalated tensions with Russia, raising concerns about potential miscalculations. The study further examines the implications for European security, as NATO's response has prompted increased military readiness among member states, reflecting a shift in defence policies. Moreover, the findings reveal the broader geopolitical ramifications, including the potential for a new Cold War atmosphere and the influence on global power dynamics, particularly concerning China's strategic positioning.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Research

Future research on NATO's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War could examine the long-term geopolitical and security implications for Eastern Europe and the broader international community. Comparative studies on NATO's strategic responses to similar

conflicts could provide valuable insights. Additionally, investigating the impact of NATO's support on Ukraine's military and political resilience would be beneficial. Research could also explore the alliance's internal dynamics, member states' differing perspectives, and how these influence collective actions. Lastly, analysing the effectiveness of NATO's diplomatic and military strategies in deterring further aggression and promoting stability in the region would be crucial.

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Thesis/Dissertation

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Tymchuk. H, *NATO and European Security in the East: The Impact of the Ukraine-Russia Conflict on NATO Doctrine and Ukrainian Strategy*, Master's Thesis, 2020

Lead City University Ibadan DO NOT COPY

Bio-data

A. Personal

Name: Taiwo Hassan RAHEEM
Date of Birth: November 26th 1978.
Place of Birth: Lagos State
Email: taiworaheem@hotmail.com
State of Origin: Oyo state
Nationality: Nigeria
Next of Kin: Oreoluwa Lawal
Name and Address of Next of Kin: House 4, Road 8, Zone 5, Basorun Housing Est,
General Gas Akobo, Ibadan.

B. Educational Background

2021 – 2023 Lead City University
MSc. International Law & Diplomacy

2019 – 2021 Lead City University
[Hon. Degree] Politics & International Relations.

2000 – 2005 University of Ibadan.
[Hons Degree] Economics / Education.

C. Work Experience

2023 – 2024 Agency Manager
Avon Health care. (Heirs Subsidiary)

2018 – 2023 Agency Manager
Mutual Benefits Life Assurance Ltd.

2016 – 2018 Unit Manager
Mutual Benefits Life Assurance Ltd

2012 – 2016 Unit Head
Mutual Benefits Life Assurance Ltd.

2009 – 2012 Marketer Executive
Mutual Benefits Life Assurance Ltd.

D. Award Fellowship

2012, Chairman Training and Retreat
Junior Chamber International (JCI)

E. Membership of Professional and Academics Bodies

N/A

F. Publications

Taiwo H. Raheem & Emma Jimo. *Russo-Ukraine War and the Involvement of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*. (Unpublished)

G. Major Conferences Attended with Date

2008, Participant.
Training Award on Gender based Violence
African Union Commission. (AUC)

H. References

- i. Dr. Adebola Alade
Department of Politics and International Relations
Lead City University, Ibadan
alade.adebola@lcu.edu.ng
08033987163
- ii. Mrs Oreoluwa Lawal
House 4, Road 8, Zone 5,
Bashorun Housing Estate
General Gas, Akobo, Ibadan
orpral@yahoo.com
08075138185

Signature

Date

The University Compliance Certification

This is to certify that this thesis by Taiwo Hassan RAHEEM with Matric No. LCU/PG/003191 in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan is in full compliance with the approved university format and style.

Signature

Date

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