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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

Nigerian public administration is said to be based on a dual system, which is also true in much of Africa. On the other hand, both the modern state and traditional systems had a rich institutional model. The traditional institution model dates back to pre-colonial times and is still cherished and relied on by the majority of Nigerians, including those living outside the country¹.

Traditional institutions existed in Nigerian societies before the advent of democratic dispensation in Nigeria. Thus, the British colonial government, which created the democratic government in Nigeria, also provided some roles for the traditional institution through an indirect rule system that enhanced the development process in Nigeria². It further contends that the colonial government recognized traditional institutions through the indirect rule system by appointing them as warrant chiefs and also, as native court judges³. It is important to note that traditional leaders made significant contributions to the prosperity and progress of their communities. As a result, the constitutional framework for traditional democracies was established, with community members voting for a leader they felt would do the best job⁴.

Most rural and urban dwellers regard traditional institutions as directing the affairs that have to do with their welfare despite the existence of a recognised democratic structure⁵. The traditional authority system remains the focal point when it comes to community dwellers sensitizing and disseminating government policies to the people at the community level because the democratic government and its institutions had not yet penetrated the bulk of the population at the grassroots⁶. More importantly, the traditional rulers find it easy to perform the stated functions

because the people still have high regard and respect for their various offices.⁷ Recent research has highlighted the significance of traditional rulers in the planning and implementation of development projects within their spheres of influence⁸. Among their many expected core functions are the recruitment of their communities for developmental purposes, the expression of citizen interest in regional and national policies, the upkeep of peace and order within their domain, and the coordination of self-help projects based on the aggregated felt needs of people living there⁹.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution is unavoidably silent on specific roles for traditional rulers inside the Local Government. Thus, political appointees who have the legal ability to install and remove traditional rulers at whim treat them as an afterthought and treat them accordingly. Politicians only call on traditional rulers during election campaigns, and the monarchs play no part in policy development, implementation, or review. Not providing traditional rulers with constitutional rights severely limited their usefulness, especially in rural areas.

In Osun State, traditional rulers still play a vital role in seeing that development projects within their domains get implemented. For the residents of a community, traditional institutions served as a meeting place to discuss, advance, and organize development projects that would improve their access to essential services and resources. One of their primary roles is to organize the community's resources for growth and improvement. All sorts of infrastructure meant to raise people's living standards in the area are part of this¹⁰. Traditional leaders will occasionally launch development initiatives and enlist the aid of both internal and external development agents to carry them out. Traditional leaders work with members of their community to advance development initiatives that will benefit the entire community as a whole. They are frequently

consulted when making choices about the general welfare of the populace because they are the stewards of the nation's culture and customs¹¹. Virtually nothing in the country could be done without the traditional ruling council's consent. They must be contacted before any governmental, non-Governmental, or neighborhood-based groups prepare to implement programs or development initiatives on the land. They cannot begin development initiatives or activities. In Osun State, traditional leaders have a similar impact on development activities. Without the traditional ruling council's consent, hardly anything in the country could be done. They must be consulted before development projects and activities are undertaken on the land by governmental, non-governmental, and community-based organizations; they are not permitted to initiate such projects and programs. This is how Osun State's traditional rulers have an impact on development projects¹².

Developing rural communities that can sustain themselves is vital to Nigeria's economy, particularly Osun State. It is a well-known fact that self-sustaining rural community development is essential to the economy of Nigeria, and specifically, Osun State, unless the strategies for dramatically accelerating development in the rural areas where more than 80% of Nigeria's population lives are regarded as areas that should not be disregarded at the policy formulation level. Unless the methods for dramatically speeding development in the rural parts of Nigeria, where more than 80% of the country's population lives, are regarded as areas that should not be disregarded while formulating policy¹³. According to the people's customs and traditions, which were formed after the Osun State Traditional Institutions Chieftaincy proclamation, there are quite a few traditional stools in Osun State. First Class, Second Class, and Third Class are the three main categories into which traditional stools in Osun State are divided. There are also other local/traditional leaders in charge of their communities that are not well-liked¹⁴. In addition to

acting as guardians of the people's traditions and customs, traditional leaders increasingly take a more active part in inclusive development and dispute resolution in their respective domains¹⁵. This is the justification behind the many calls for the constitutional protection of this country's essential institutions. However, the envisioned development goes beyond simply providing aid to those in need and instead involves an empowerment process whereby rural communities can take charge of their destiny by realizing that they have the power to act individually and collectively to improve their circumstances. This represents a shift in emphasis from waiting on the government, oil firms, or other contributors to resolve their problems¹⁶.

People can improve their ability to manage their surroundings and the quickly changing global environment through community development, a social process. When choosing and carrying out their community or village development initiatives, all actors must participate and share their ideas, visions, and responsibilities in an equal and democratic manner if sustainable community development is to take place. One tactic for promoting sustainable rural development is to give key participants (traditional leaders) and community members an equal chance to consider and plan their futures. This demonstrates the need for an effective leadership structure and the development of community-level strategic plans to maximize the mobilization of rural resources for growth.¹⁷ Common goals of community development initiatives include raising literacy rates, enhancing productivity and productive systems, implementing appropriate agricultural technology, promoting rural possibilities, disseminating information on resources, inputs, and infrastructures, deploying technical assistance, acquiring skills, and developing skills¹⁸.

The majority of community development initiatives in developing countries should be directed at fulfilling the basic aspirations and requirements of the populace, including, among other things, the provision of adequate roads, power, healthcare facilities, markets, schools, and farm

settlements. Every level of government must incorporate traditional values into mainstream administration to reduce poverty and promote national self-sufficiency. These goals can only be achieved by those who have this belief¹⁹.

The traditional leaders also mobilize the community's resources, which entails bringing the community's members together to work cooperatively to ensure program sustainability and self-reliance. People are driven to participate more when they are filled with fervour and desire to maintain the pace of community development, which leads to efficient time-bound or expedited activities. The goal is to garner a lot of support and give the community the impression that a particular initiative belongs to them.²⁰ Leadership from individuals and groups is necessary to mobilize a rural community. When there is effective leadership, the workforce voluntarily contributes to achieving stated goals. Traditional leaders are always consulted to build rural communities since they serve as project pioneers and work to inspire and motivate their subjects to action. Influential traditional leaders must be involved for any rural community development to be effective; otherwise, they can thwart the creation of such a program²¹.

As a result, any agency or organization developing a development program for the community must first obtain approval from these powerful traditional leaders through a procedure known as "legitimation." It is heartbreaking to think back on how successive Nigerian governments have disregarded rural community development since colonial rule. For instance, while the colonial authority developed a network of highways to places where they exploit natural resources and concentrated its development initiatives, such as roads, schools, hospitals, and pipe-borne water around the big cities, the rural areas were virtually ignored²². The post-independence governments were also involved in the practice of rural neglect because the so-called "national cake" or development initiatives primarily benefited the localities whose sons and daughters

served in public office Even when effective development initiatives for rural regions were created, The lack of scientific and empirical evaluations of the rural communities that should have acted as a guide for their implementation caused them to fail frequently²³. In Nigeria and other African countries, some rural communities have grown more unruly and revolting since the 1980s. Governments were unable to solve these crises since there was no reliable baseline information on the problems facing such rural people; as a result, a partnership between contemporary governments and traditional institutions is necessary²⁴.

In light of this, the study aims to evaluate how traditional administrative procedures and institutions have impacted the development of selected communities in Osun State. several regions of Nigeria are facing major issues with underdevelopment due to the severity of poverty and insecurity on the land. The choice of the research regions is supported by the traditional government of the aforementioned communities, which has played a crucial and strategic role in the achievement of sustainable human development in Osun State. The research work is an effort to generate knowledge about the outcomes of the role traditional administration plays in communicating government messages to residents about various policies in these communities.

The historical events that demonstrated how traditional institutions were ignored as Nigeria's governance system evolved served as the basis for this study. Importantly, ongoing ethnic and political conflicts have set back Nigeria's development, leaving only a small portion of the nation's southwest with traditional institutions integrated, and are now a major cause for concern.²⁵ The Nigerian constitution's absence of a clear role for traditional leaders reinforced the aforementioned claim, which excludes local community members from potential community development programs. The study's focus on community development issues and the venerated standing of chieftaincy in Nigeria is highly fascinating.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The role of the traditional institutions in social and community development has been minimal and traditional rulers such as; chiefs appear to have limited participation in partisan politics because of the absence of meaningful responsibility in the Nigeria 1999 Constitution²⁶. This alienation of traditional institutions in the government process in Nigeria, has led to the community under development due to disconnection between the traditional institutions and the government on the development process²⁷.

The advisory and participatory role of the traditional institutions in Nigeria in the regions and communities cannot be overlooked. Besides their developmental role, they also complement the government's efforts in disseminating information and government policies to their people so that community dwellers can have a sense of belonging in Nigeria's democratic process. Thus, this role has not been adequately recognised in the democratic process in Nigeria which decelerated growth and development in Nigeria²⁸. The present challenges encounter by the country, which has witnessed a series of social disorganisation such as Terrorism, kidnapping, murder, and banditry have become a major concern to the actualisation of expected inclusive development for the community dwellers at local levels. Thus, the simple and communal nature of traditional rulers makes it easy for them to contribute to the socio-economic development process of their various communities in Nigeria, especially in maintaining law and order, and conflict management in the local communities, which is a necessary condition to attain meaningful development in any society²⁹.

Consequently, despite the contribution of traditional institutions in Nigeria, the country's constitution was unavoidably silent on specific roles for the institutions in terms of the governance process in Nigeria.

Several studies have affirmed the legitimacy and relevance of traditional institutions in the sociocultural, economic, and political development of Nigerians, particularly in rural areas³¹. These studies paid little attention to the influence of the traditional administrative system and structure on the development of communities in Nigeria, especially in Osun State. This, therefore, forms the basis of this study.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The main aim is to investigate the influence of the traditional administrative system and structure on the development of selected communities in Osun State. Specific objectives are to:

- i. Assess the roles of the traditional administrative system of selected communities in Osun State towards the infusion of core traditional values into mainstream administration in Nigeria;
- ii. Assess the relevance of traditional institutions in managing inherent conflicts of the selected communities in Osun State;
- iii. Explore the synergy between the traditional institutions and democratic government towards dissemination of government policies in relation to improving the quality of life of people in the study location; and,
- iv. Ascertain the challenges affecting the utility of traditional institutions in community development in relation to modern administration in Nigeria;

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions of this study are;

- 1 What roles do the traditional administrative system of selected communities in Osun state play in inculcating core traditional values into mainstream administration in Nigeria?
- 2 In what ways are the roles of traditional institutions relevant in managing inherent conflict in the current democratic system in the study location?
- 3 How have the traditional institutions partnered with the modern state in disseminating government policies to the community dwellers to improve the quality of life in the study location?
- 4 What are the challenges affecting the utility of traditional institutions in community development in relation to modern administration in Nigeria?

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study will cover Ode-Omu, Oke-Ila, and Ifon communities; their traditional administration and the structure of rulership in Osun State South-Western Region of Nigeria will be looked into. Ode-Omu is a town in Ayedaade Local Government Area of Osun State, founded in 1900 sequel to the implementation of the relocation treaty signed between Ibadan and Ife in 1886. Oke-Ila is also a town in Ifedayo Local Government Area of Osun State while Ifon is a town in Orolu Local Government Area of Osun State, Nigeria. The content of the study includes issues on the influence of traditional administration in the present democratic settings and socio-economic

development in the community. This study will focus attention on the traditional administrative system of these communities in Osun State, Nigeria.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Significance of this study focuses on the development strategy that exists in Nigeria through the administration of community development before the advent of colonialists. The study will provide justification for how the traditional model of administration responds to the people's needs with regard to development in their various areas of justification. In short, this study will provide an opportunity for stakeholders in the institution, especially the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs to better it with regards to policy formulation and implementation and therefore integrating it in the national sphere for sustainable socio-economic development in the country.

The findings of this study will enhance and create an enabling environment for inclusive traditional institutions and community development at the grass root level, which can also be modeled after the macro social structure of the larger society. The outcome of this research could assist current administrative system. Besides, it may be of immense benefit to other researchers who may want to work on this or similar study. This will also aid the theorization of local administrative mechanisms that will further deepen the school of thought that believes in adoption of traditional structure of administration as an alternative to present system of Democratic governance in Nigeria. The study of the administration of community development

in the above-mentioned communities, the academic horizon of the readers will be widened with the outcome of the study.

1.7 Limitation of the Study

The study has provided insight into the influence of traditional administrative system and structure on the development of selected communities in Osun state. It explores dynamics that dominate traditional institutions influences on development processes at the grassroots. However, there are some limitations in this study. The non- indigene in the study communities would have been included to obtain their views about traditional institutions in terms of influence on development in Nigeria as their views may have differed from those of the selected participants. This could have been possible had this study consider the application of quantitative methodology. Lastly, this study did not enable critical examination of level of advisory role given to the traditional administration by the government that emanated during the fieldwork to know the level it is being utilized.

1.8 Operational Definitions of Terms

Community Development: Community members participate in this process to take action collectively and come up with answers to problems that affect the whole group. This study refers to the extent to which a society's institutions strengthen people's abilities to maintain their social lives both as individuals and as social groups. It might be as little as an initiative inside a small group or as big as an effort to build the capability of the community.

Culture: It encompasses all aspects of a person's way of life, including all of their ideas, sentiments, and beliefs as well as how they arrange themselves and conduct their everyday activities. The core of this skill is the capacity to save information and wisdom from previous

generations of society for use in the future as well as to apply and reuse them in the present. Simply described, culture is the cumulative body of information systems that manifest in a people's customs and rituals. A group's or society's collective life can get meaning and purpose from these traditions and customs, which are occasionally well-known cultural practices.

The traditional Administrative System: This is a typical hierarchy of power structures that extends from the king to the Chiefs and the Baales. It establishes the division of labor among the many districts, villages, and the palace as well as how duties, powers, and responsibilities are delegated

Traditional Institutions: In this particular research, these are limited to organizations and offices that evolved or were created and nurtured by the people of the community before the advent of colonialism. They are a long-established system that does not derive their existence from the formal constitutions of the state. Instead, they have their origins in African natural history, tradition, and culture. These institutions are grouped into social organisations, political or administrative institutions age-grade associations, trade, and professional guilds, village unions, community development associations, women's groups, and religious organizations.

Traditional Rulers: This refers to a ruling monarchy, a control authority, or somebody who is regarded as having power over a group of people in daily life. This study refers to a community member who has been collectively chosen to lead his people's affairs by the customs and traditions of the community.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Review

In the present context, the work would examine how different academics have defined and interpreted the topics discussed in this subsection. The concepts that would be looked at in this study are community development, traditional institutions, and traditional administrative rulership.

2.1.1 Administration

Numerous scholars have given various definitions of the term "administration," but most agree that it refers to the process of carrying out all of the organisational tasks of the government. Two men work together to move a stone that neither could do on their own in this scenario³⁰. The leader becomes apparent once society has stabilized. This leader turns into "the initiator" who makes society feasible before becoming "the organizer" or "the administrator" to ensure its continuity. According to him, administration plays a central role in all social interactions and is crucial to the survival of such societies. The administration is responsible for providing for or taking care of people, managing affairs, and choosing the course of action to further an intentional goal³¹.

Every community has a different system in place for managing community growth. This government seeks to uphold the rule of law in the impacted areas and is committed to keeping

the peace so that societies may function normally on a daily basis. Over time, administration evolved from a simple to a complicated structure and it is among the world's oldest professions. When human societies were first discovered, they had to coexist in a broadly defined geographic region where individuals or groups of individuals had to interact with one another, which is when the idea of administration first emerged.

The administration of community development has been crucial to the growth and governance of many African communities. These institutions or administrations are seen as tools that can be used to handle criminal cases and settle disputes without calling the police, which helps to lower the rate of crime among Africans. Our communities have a variety of administrative structures, such as family systems, religious institutions, age-grade organisations, community development organizations, traditional rulers (political administration), trade associations, and women's associations³². These institutions, which are present in these communities, are observed to have played significant roles in their governance and development. Considering that they contributed to the upkeep of social harmony and to the socioeconomic development of our communities even before the arrival of the imperialists, they have continued to do so up to the present³³.

2.1.2 Effects of and Utility of Administration in Societal Affairs

Administration evolved gradually from a simple to a complicated framework. It's one of the world's oldest professions. The administration came into being when human populations recognised, they had to coexist within a clearly defined geographic area where individuals or groups of individuals had to interact with one another. The value conflict originates from politics and the human urge for each person or group to obtain something alone for themselves such a claim calls for the assertion of privileged rights, which would result in anarchy in the absence of law. Therefore, the administration created the first system of decision-making and result-

enforcing. The leader becomes apparent once society has stabilized. This leader turns into "the initiator" who makes society feasible before becoming "the organizer" or "the administrator" to ensure its continuity. All social interactions revolve around administration, which is crucial to the survival of such societies. The public administration is responsible for providing for or taking care of people, managing affairs, and choosing the course of action to further an intentional goal³⁴.

In its simplest form, the head name or ruler is the one who exercises power and authority; he performs or oversees all community activities that concern either individuals or organizations. As the community expands, the exercise of power—whether personally by a despot or on behalf of the community by less autocratic authorities—becomes too much for one man to handle, no matter how complete he may be. As a result, this function must be shared or delegated, and the first administrator or manager appears to work under the leader's direction. The leader and his family have long held the exclusive right to carry out such administration. So, the management of social unit affairs is the administration. Administration grows increasingly intricate and sophisticated as these social entities expand. New concepts are gradually incorporated into its system to address related growth-related issues. A distinction between different types of administration cannot be made at this time.

People's customs have been essential in describing how society, culture, and people have changed over time. The significance stems from the fact that traditions play a significant role in how contemporary African civilisations understand and preserves their history. The importance of tradition in shaping Africa's past cannot be understated, not even by the current increase in literacy. Original conventional institutions have undergone changes notwithstanding their worth. Where no false claims are made, civilisations continue to practice the same customs in various

forms for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, some of them are essentially fabrications meant to justify unfavourable developments, justify contemporary developments, or substantiate claims that, in most cases, have no historical basis but aim to gain an unfair advantage.³⁵ The importance of customs in rewriting African history is beyond dispute. Traditions have been used for many different things, including the management of various communities, the justification of the conquest of one group by another, the justification of the cultural influence or domination of a group or civilization over a large area, and the mystification of various leaders, institutions, and ideas. The genesis of communities, their migrations, and the development of their culture have all been traced or explained using traditions³⁶.

2.1.3 Traditional Institution

The term "traditional institution" refers to the local political framework within which proven leaders are selected and put in place in accordance with the fundamental criteria of their customary laws and customs. Traditional institutions are responsible for upholding local traditions and customs and deciding on matters pertaining to the political activity of citizens across the country in all civilizations³⁷. Traditional institutions are also thought to be the guardians of their people's traditions, practices, and norms³⁸. Traditional institutions were present in Nigeria prior to European contact, yet they are also considered as institutions that gained their authority from the values and norms of their cultures.³⁹

Tradition is defined as something passed down or ongoing in a family's or community's life, as well as verbal transfer from generation to generation. An authority is described as a person or entity that has the ability to grant permission due to reputation. A body given authority has the right and obligation to carry out specific tasks. Traditional authority is an institution or kind of power that has been passed down from one generation to another. This definition is more

acceptable than that of writers or academics who consider traditional authority to be a pre-colonial artifact. Furthermore, it was held that every society in the world is traditional in that it upholds and honors the ideas, customs, and institutions that have been passed down to it from earlier generations⁴⁰.

Traditional chiefdom/rulerships are considered to be equivalent to "traditional authority" by some academics. These experts contend that the word "traditional" should not be regarded in the way that it has previously been defined because colonial overlords used it to contrast with the contemporary powers that they stood for. Therefore, it has a derogatory meaning. The title "chief" is a distinctly tiny colonial epithet used to denigrate the rank of great African Kings like the Obase of Benin, who were regarded as "Kings" in colonial times by both themselves and their people. This also applied to kings of Ghana, such as the YaNaa (king of Dagbon) and the Asantehene (king of the Asantes)⁴¹.

To begin with, the fact that traditional authority has ethnic and/or cultural roots does not alter the fact that it is intrinsically "political" because it involves power. In Ghana, a nation that is predominantly made up of several ethnic groupings, traditional authority is the cornerstone of governance for the bulk of the population. Traditional authority is defined for the sake of this study as power or authorization that an institution has that derives its legitimacy, in whole or in part, from tribal/ethnic/cultural values of a group of people (wherever they may be) that share them. In centralized or acephalous cultures, the traditional authority may be enshrined in law. Thus, traditional power contrasts with the acquisition of authority based on republican ideals, such as through the application of a constitution that, for example, incorporates democratic values. As a result, traditional authorities are referred to as chiefs, chieftaincy institutions, traditional leaders, or traditional rulers in this study. The 1992 constitution of Ghana states that a

chief is someone who has been duly nominated, elected, or chosen as a chief or queen mother by the relevant customary law and usage and who originates from the proper family and lineage⁴².

2.1.4 Traditional Rulers in Nigeria's History

Traditional kings and queens played prominent roles in Nigeria's politics and governance long before the country attained independence in 1960. Before coming into contact with the West in the 19th century, Africa had already developed a highly developed and civilized system of governance. This system was built around the highly revered traditional kings⁴³. The significant roles and contributions of traditional rulers could not be separated from the level of political development shown in pre-colonial Nigerian cultures⁴⁴. In pre-colonial Nigeria, the roles performed by traditional leaders in various kingdoms and communities were obvious. Traditional kings and queens had a big impact on how their own kingdoms developed politically. The level of political development at this time was evidence that these cultures would have served as examples and benchmarks for a political organization for other societies outside the African continent if colonialism had not upended the customary system of administration⁴⁵. Similar to this, the traditional royal system that was in place helped the kingdoms and communities in the western region of pre-colonial Nigeria achieve outstanding levels of political development.⁴⁶ In terms of political growth, the former Oyo Empire, the Ife kingdom, and the Egbaland, to name a few, were powerful nations under the leadership of the Alaafin, Ooni, and Alake, respectively. Under their traditional rulers, the Sokoto Caliphate and Emirs for the emirates like Ilorin and Kano, the Caliphate, and the several Emirates in the northern hemisphere acquired a significant level of development⁴⁷. Traditional leaders were still involved in the administration and

government of the populace during the colonial era, although not as separate organizations. They were to act as a conduit between the colonial authorities and the populace. Although certain traditional rulers, such as Jaja of Opobo and Nana Olomu, who opposed foreign control, made a significant effort to resist, the colonialists were ultimately successful in quelling these resistances⁴⁸.

It became evident during this time that the traditional leaders had to administer their subjects in accordance with new administrative ideas brought in by the colonial authority. Due to the decentralized character of colonial administration, traditional ruler engagement was restricted in the western part of Nigeria and virtually nonexistent in the eastern region of Nigeria, but the Emirs played a more active participatory role in the colonial administration of their local territories in Northern Nigeria⁴⁹. Regrettably, the traditional institution underwent some significant alterations as a result of the colonial administrative system being imposed on the indigenous governing structure led by traditional rulers. It was noted that traditional rulers were no longer sovereign under colonial control; rather, their primary responsibility shifted from securing colonial exploitation to servicing their people. Colonialism further destroyed the deeply ingrained systems used by the populace to remove or punish bad rulers. Traditional rulers now ruled under letters of appointment outlining their powers and responsibilities as colonial underlings, in contrast to the pre-colonial norm whereby rulers controlled through traditionally established rules and processes⁵⁰. They could continue to hold power as long as they carried out the directives of their colonial masters and did not pose a threat to the practice of colonial exploitation. Traditional leaders were used as tools to carry out British colonial objectives, particularly those involving tax collection, levies, and the recruitment of healthy males for forced labor.

The traditional rulers made up the membership of the Houses of Chiefs in the Western and Northern areas of the country during the initial post-independence period, specifically from 1960 to 1966, where they made their fair share of contributions to the nation's growth. However, there are two schools of thought on whether traditional leaders in Nigeria should play any role—if any—in establishing the country's fledgling democracy. Due to the following reasons, traditional rulers' participation in the nation's democratic process is increasingly unpopular on one side of the debate: One is the propensity for a struggle for supremacy between the traditional rulers and the people's elected officials. Second, others contend that the conventional institution has evolved into an anti-democratic one that serves to cement patriarchy and pushes women to the margins at the highest levels of politics as a result of the legacy of colonial meddling⁵¹. Thirdly, it has been suggested that traditional rulers' involvement in national politics could result in archaic political decrees that may not be in line with the reality of the present⁵². For instance, the staging of old rites as part of the institution's signs and symbols can occasionally conflict with contemporary values. The 1979 Constitution gave traditional leaders only consultative roles to play in the management of local governments.

However, it is clear that traditional leaders and the institutions they represent remain important to the democratic process, so long as their influence does not conflict in any manner with that of elected officials at all levels of government. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate how traditional leaders might aid in the development, safety, and peace of their various communities⁵³.

In addition, Nigerians are still essentially cultural people as the traditional behaviours and Traditional ways of living coexist with modernization. As a result, conventional institutions continue to be crucial to society's structure. By promoting development projects in their community, traditional leaders can support security authorities in their efforts to find answers to

the state's pervasive insecurity and high degree of poverty. Traditional leaders still participate in social control mechanisms in our culture. Since both subjects and nobility are now susceptible, the current wave of unrest in the nation has no longer been limited by status⁵⁴. Like other citizens of the nation, the royal fathers have fallen victim to various crimes, including kidnapping. The royal fathers are in a position to support the state's current administration in addressing the core causes of insecurity, including youth unemployment that results in crimes and other vices⁵⁵. When it comes to organizing their people for various government initiatives, royal fathers are creative. These endeavors include farming, carrying out contemporary agricultural development initiatives, and regularly holding festivals and other events to encourage the growth of tourism in their local communities. Due to their close proximity to the populace and to their individual towns, the royal fathers are well-positioned to carry out all of these tasks⁵⁶.

Additionally, it is anticipated that the peace in the villages will gradually extend to the states and, ultimately, the nation. The royal fathers can also help the government tremendously. They could do this by organizing the populace for intelligence gathering, which would ensure that crimes are stopped in their tracks and that offenders are promptly apprehended because they are a major hindrance to the growth of the community⁵⁷. The royal forefathers must promote peaceful coexistence among their subjects and between their subjects and settlers from other regions of the country, particularly settlers from other ethnic groups in the country, in order to adequately maintain peace in their communities. Different platforms for interactions at the community level can be established to accomplish these goals.

2.1.5 Community Development

According to the relevant literature, community development is an ongoing process that improves the standard of living and lifespan of an individual or group of individuals while also

modernizing the socioeconomic environment⁵⁸. It argued that one of the key pillars on which national developmental policies and their implementation depend is community development. Additionally, it is believed that community development is a move made by the residents of a community to meet their basic requirements through their own efforts and, occasionally, with outside support where necessary and practical⁵⁹.

The phrase "community development" has been examined from a number of authors' varied points of view, with each author offering meanings that reflect their area of expertise and experience. The idea is that by grasping the ideas of community and development independently, the definition of community development may be reached with ease. However, because community development is such a broad topic, there are many different opinions and definitions of it. Development entails making alternate decisions, changing one's perspective on ostensible problems, and resisting change⁶⁰. The concepts of "community" and "development" are combined in community development. A group of people who share certain characteristics is referred to as a community. Therefore, rather than individual exploits, which some sociologists referred to as "collective agency," community growth depended on interpersonal interaction and collaborative activity. "Community development is one of the mainboards upon which national development strategies and their implementation are founded," according to one assertion. Community development is not entirely a new idea. The method of application in modern times and its ancestry as a union of community, organization, and economic development are likely to appear novel⁶¹.

Community development instead is a continual process that improves a person's or a group's quality of life and length of life, together with structural change and modernization of the socioeconomic environment. An initiative called "community development" aims to enhance

living conditions for everyone in the community through active participation, creativity, and, if that is not possible, the employment of methods for inciting and stimulating participation⁶². As a result, it suggests that government actions will have a trickle-down impact and that the government will work with the residents of these towns to ensure their best interests are served. Professionals in community development feel that proper injection of external aid by local governments in community self-help activities enhances local development actions⁶³. Similarly, rather than individual exploits, which sociologists referred to as collective agency, the majority of people in the society saw community development as a phenomenon that depended on interpersonal interaction and teamwork⁶⁴. It is also noted that community development has been seen as a program created to promote improved living conditions for the entire community through active participation, if possible, creativity, and if not forth consuming instinctively, by the use of methods for instigating and motivating it to ensure its active fervent reaction to the movement⁶⁵.

Before the British administration began, traditional institutions and their rulers were linked with governance in several parts of modern-day Nigeria for centuries. With a few exceptions, the local government typically depended on the traditional leader, who was seen as the repository of all religious, legislative, executive, and judicial duties (for example, in the south-east amongst Ibo communities)⁶⁶. In actuality, the traditional ruler served as the centre of government. One notable aspect is that none of these traditional rulers ever possessed jurisdiction over the entire geographical territory of contemporary Nigeria; instead, their geographic areas of control were largely localized. The trend has been to evaluate and analyse developments in traditional institutions in the country more in relation to local government than the country's governmental system at large, in part because of this historical foundation. Over time, the function of

traditional leaders in local government administration has changed. Previously serving as their localities' chief executives, they now act as advisors under the modern local government system.

A major theme in postcolonial African philosophy has been the connection between the traditional and the modern⁶⁷. Two issues have emerged as the centre of current discussion among African philosophers who have looked at this topic from various perspectives. The first is the applicability of traditional African institutions to the issues facing the modern democratic process. The issue is whether traditional ways of thinking, acting, and institutions are assets or barriers to Africa's progress and modernisation⁶⁸.

The second viewpoint operates under the presumption that the revivalist agenda is misguided and inadequate for addressing the challenges facing modern-day Africa. This school of thought's proponents contended that cultural revivalism serves as a distraction from important political challenges including authoritarian tyranny, technological illiteracy, and class exploitation⁶⁹. The most extreme version of this viewpoint contends that in order to respond to the most pressing needs of the present, Africans must completely break with their premodern heritage. According to them, modernisation calls for a focus on the issues of the present rather than an effort to revive ideologies from long-gone societies⁷⁰.

Examining the discussion between proponents of cultural revivalism and those who oppose it, the primary issue is whether indigenous customs and traditional institutions advance or obstruct the path of scientific and political modernisation. Given the complexity of the political and administrative elements of traditional systems in different regions of Nigeria, it is challenging to provide an acceptable description of a traditional system of authority in that nation⁷¹.

Traditional rulers are defined as "the traditional head of an ethnic group or clan who is the holder of the highest primary executive authority in an indigenous polity, or who has been appointed to

the positioning in accordance with the customs and tradition of the area concerned by instrument or order of the state government, and whose titling is recognised by the state government"⁷².

Over time, the function of traditional leaders in local governance has changed. The north, south-west, and south-east of Nigeria are three distinct geographical zones that can be identified when tracing the contours of the traditional rulers' roles in local governance has changes the pre-colonial era, a detailed assessment of the established traditional institutions and their rulers indicates that in order to execute these functions, the traditional rulers were required to create proper policies, set priorities, and earn income. The Emir in Northern Nigeria may be described as a powerful executive participant in local governance with limited restrictions on his executive powers.

The town council, the body of kingmakers, and strong secret societies were among the power centres in the South-West that provided the Oba (or king) with balances on his authority. As a result, the Oba can be seen as a weak executive participant in local governance⁷³. With authority being exerted at many levels, from the family level to the village level, and the absence of centralised administrative authority, the indigenous political system in the South-East indicates a significant amount of public participation. Throughout Nigeria's early history, the traditional ruler served as an embodiment of local governance. They played two separate roles that subsequently served as the cornerstones for additional constitutional and political provisions that would be developed to allow for their expanded participation. Traditional rulers were incorporated at the lowest level of the colonial administrative institutions through a strategy of indirect rule, and at the highest level, the Legislative Council, they were also included through their involvement in the earliest political parties. Early Electoral Politics and Traditional Rulers in Nigeria during the early colonial era, electoral politics was fairly limited. A national

legislative body, the Nigerian Council, was established following the unification of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Two Emirs from the North, the Alaafin of Oyo from the South, and one representative from each of Lagos, Calabar, and the Benin-Warri region shall make up the unofficial member. Both the Emirs from the North and the Council's authority over that area were expelled. On the Council, the Clifford Constitution continued to hold a comfortable formal majority. The NNDP, established by Herbert Macaulay and led by Egerton-Shyugle, gave traditional leaders in the south their first opportunity to directly take part in electoral politics⁷⁴. The governor used his Native Administration to impose decrees in the North. There is no proof that the Alaafin of Oyo was kept on as a council member. From 1923 through 1938, this coalition of traditional rulers, based in the Lagos area, fielded all of the winning Town and Legislative Council candidates. It included Imams, market women, town elders, and leaders of traditional societies. Early colonial Nigeria's traditional leaders may not have played a significant role in national elected politics, but rather in local governance. In principle, the concept of indirect rule served as the foundation for Nigeria's administrative systems⁷⁵.

Whether it is referred to as rural development or community development, grassroots development is development. A movement and practice known as "community development" aims to improve living conditions for everyone in a community while enlisting the help of the local populace. Therefore, it is employed in this work as community development to emphasize a few aspects regarding the main goals of this study effort. It has been cleared that "community development is one of the most talked-about problems of traditional institutions." Due to their proximity to the community's residents, traditional rulers are seen as a tool for community development⁷⁶. Community development may also be defined as any activities conducted in a community by any organization with the primary objective of bringing about beneficial changes

in that community. It is also argued that community development is a process designed to promote better living for everyone in a community by encouraging participation and communal initiative. Community development may also be defined as any activities conducted in a community by any organisation with the primary objective of bringing about beneficial changes in that community⁷⁷.

The phrase "community development" can also refer to a project aimed at helping communities, while the concept's strong emphasis on projects that are intended to ameliorate the non-material needs of communities raised concerns among supporters. Community development is centered on community action, using community action as a phenomenon that motivates local residents to actively participate in development activities in order to address issues. Contrarily, community development is a social action process in which people work to meet those needs by using as many of their own resources and initiative as they can, with assistance from any government or non-governmental organisation⁷⁸." Like in most developing countries, traditional institutions in Nigeria are often involved in community development in their areas of responsibility because they are closest to the people. Perhaps for this reason, "The goals of community development should be to improve people's productivity and enable them to engage in their social, political, and economic life into the future⁷⁹. Indeed, it is morally binding on the traditional rulers to do everything possible to achieve the goals. Then what are the real objectives upon which community development stands in developing climes, especially Nigeria? the objectives of community development in Nigeria are: To improve life at the grassroots level as much as our human and material resources can carry us. To develop all aspects of community living equitably to avoid balance or neglect of any area of living, to achieve a self-generating breakthrough in productivity, and to raise the production potentials by stimulating the human and physical

process of change, to minimize poverty and unemployment in the communities, to make families economically viable and to cross over the poverty line, to provide governmental services to communities, to explore and use technical assistance available from outside the community. And to cooperate with and coordinate state and national development plans etc. Therefore, it is well known that, usually, community development programme aims at creating awareness of rural possibilities; providing information on resources, inputs, and infrastructure; deploying technical assistance, skills acquisition, and development; increasing literacy levels; improving productivity and productive systems; adapting appropriate technology in agriculture; sensitising potential.⁸⁰

2.1.6 African Traditional Institutions in the Pre-colonial Era

Socialites in Africa have developed a number of political administration systems based on the distinctive characteristics of different ethnic groups prior to the arrival of colonialism. These institutions had sovereign control over the populace and possessed full administrative, legislative, and judicial authority in their respective fields. Since law and order were upheld by a normative system that was a part of the general social structure but was not particularly sophisticated, traditional institutions during the pre-colonial era were quite expensive. However, the government's machinery was organised enough to handle affairs, ease conflict, and administer justice in society⁸¹. Additionally, certain unwritten laws that guaranteed the safety of the institutions also governed the training. This suggests that traditional rulers contributed positively to the development of the political, economic, and social institutions they dominated.

In the pre-colonial era, the paramount leaders, the council of elders, age classes, and religious institutions were among the pre-colonial nations' political structures. Before the former Igbo communities were colonised, the division of authority among many organs served to prevent tyranny and created a democratic society. Instead of concentrating all the power, on one hand,

the pre-colonial government spread political authority among many factions, which helped to restrain tyranny. There were many strong and influential individuals, but their influence was only felt in the hamlet, clan, or village they were from, or at most, the region in which they lived because this political structure was designed so that a man could only lead people of his lineage⁸². Every village, gimlet, or clan had a village head who was elected based on age, and who worked with other elders to resolve disputes within that community. If the disputes involved another community, the elders, led by the elders from both communities, gathered to resolve the issues, particularly those involving boundary and land, which was a common issue at the time. The positions of the compound head were upheld in this fashion by the leadership structure. It clarifies this. "The compound head was the one who had rightful and individual authority, which he excused by his historic duty. By his authority or some higher authority⁸³.

The African idea that "the King [or Queen] reigned but at the pleasure of the people, for a King without subjects is no King [or Queen]," served as the cornerstone of governance in pre-colonial Africa. The norms (constitution, in modern terminology) by which the actions of the ruler or leader were judged were set by "the people" in terms of the style of administration that was then used in some parts of Africa especially the Yoruba tribe of Nigeria. If the populace did not support the leader's reign, he could not govern⁸⁴. The chiefs, who were regarded as the people's voice and who served as a sort of "checks and balances" on the authority and power of the Chief or King/Queen, as the case may be, were able to represent the will and desires of the people in some cases and in certain civilizations⁸⁵. This is similar to western democracy in many ways, where the people chose the leaders and have the power to dismiss them⁸⁶. Pre-colonial African societies developed their political governance structures as a result of the interaction of the populace and the ruling class. In traditional African societies, political power was based on

rulers' respect and honor for the populace, and vice versa. The people and rulers were connected by a common past, culture, and mythology (belief in the supernatural). There were restrictions on the authority of the kings in pre-colonial African societies. Some of the customs, traditions, and beliefs of the various societies provided proof of these⁸⁷.

For instance, if one king proved to be tyrannical, harsh, or a tyrant, the subjects might readily switch their allegiance to another. The people's respect for the monarch is also expected, and it cannot be gained through threats or coercion. If the populace were dissatisfied, they might opt to cease going to the monarch's court, isolating him, or they might decide to leave and ally themselves with the ruler of another grouping or colony. When a ruler took a dictatorial stance, his family would frequently assassinate him or remove him from power⁸⁸.

In pre-colonial African society, religion was immensely significant. Religion played a role in practically every aspect of social life, such as war, harvest festivals, and various periods of an individual's life. Traditional African societies' concepts of religion are exceedingly ambiguous since they tend to be metaphysical, mystical, and naturalistic⁸⁹. This concept, they claim, explains the significance attached to ancestral worship because it is believed that after death, people convert into spirits (gods) who watch over, help, and guide those living on earth⁹⁰. This is consistent with the belief systems of other traditional African societies.

The Kinship heritage and survival were typically the foundations of the organizational structure of indigenous political systems. These laid the foundations for the creation of communities and societies, which later developed into what we now refer to as ethnic groups. These groups' association is what is today known as ethnicity. A unifying factor around which political systems were set up is ethnicity. Each ethnic group's laws were uniform, and each group's cultural, religious, and linguistic customs were binding on its members. Based on its customs and

traditions, each ethnic group create claims own kind of governance. Many different ethnic groups contributed to the diversity of these political systems⁹¹.

Nevertheless, Vaughan notes that despite these differences, a fundamental premise persisted: "All of the varied political organizations were predicated upon the validity of public ways of settling disputes and conflicts, that is, upon the rule of law." Members of the societies accepted that there was a moral basis for public order and that publicly sanctioned resolutions of disputes and conflicts were necessary for the continuation of social life outside of the family or clan, though this does not necessarily imply that they had formal statutes to regulate behavior⁹².

Different crimes carried different penalties, with some, like treason and murder, carrying the death penalty. The chief would only grant an audience if people brought him gifts and other forms of payment. The higher power of the gods or ancestors could be invoked in most societies. The chief would rely on his understanding of the law and the advice of another senior present, as it was a matter of personal law⁹³. The material token was usually demanded and paid by both the plaintiff and defendant when a matter was brought before the 'court'. The plaintiff would usually be the one who paid more. The payment was used to open proceedings; a token could also be demanded as an admission of guilt, or a material sign of reconciliation (as was seen with the Shona of Southern Africa, Ashanti of Ghana, and Yoruba people of Nigeria).

Indigenous African societies had varying forms of social, political, and legal institutions, which included many different patterns of philosophy and culture. They may be classified into two broad groups; those that have 'centralized'/chiefly political systems (also referred to as 'non-stratified societies' in some quarters), and those that have 'non-centralized'/chief less political systems (also referred to as 'stateless/ non-acephalous societies'). These broad groups will be considered next to highlight the differences and similarities⁹⁴

2.1.7 The Colonial Traditional Institution

The British employed indirect rule as a means of colonial administration at that time. Under the indirect rule system, which relied on native chiefs or other authorized intermediaries, customary law, and traditions, only British officials managed the administration of the colonies. Through indirect rule, the existing conventional structure of governance was used, and it recognized the dignity of traditional rulers who served as its priests. The role of traditional monarchs changed as a colonial rule came into being. This change was required in order to fulfil the objectives of colonialism, which included utilizing Nigeria's natural resources to meet the industrial needs of the capitalist metropolis. Therefore, traditional rulers were used to accomplishing these objectives. Traditional leaders presided over their various domains as political, cultural, economic, and social overseers and lords before the foundation of the colonial authority in Nigeria⁹⁵. With the onset of colonial control, traditional monarchs' standing changed as colonialists took their sovereign authority and imposed their hegemony on them. This invention was intended to give colonialists the tools they needed to maximize their exploitation of traditional leaders. It has been argued that the colonialists utilised and maintained the chieftaincy institution for colonial interests. This phenomenon is attested to by the indirect rule in Eastern Nigeria.

It was thought that the colonial authorities would decide if they had completed all of the conventional pre-equisite for the assumption of office, which would have given them the authority to reign in pre-colonial times. The British, it was said, established Native courts and a warrant designating chiefs gave them authority. The British believed that chiefs should reign

over Africans to maintain the natural integrity of Nigerian civilisation, thus they carried out this action. Many warrant chiefs actually served as nothing more than usurpers of power because they were imposed by the colonial administration. Despite this, they abused their position of authority to their benefit. Their primary source of authority was control over Native courts and labour, such as the construction of colonial roads and streams. One could argue that the power of traditional kings and queens was not affected. Instead, the governing class's positions were strengthened⁹⁶. For instance, the Emir increased his level of involvement in government. This happened as a result of the British management of Emirs and the Native courts obtaining more coercive power. In addition, the rulers exercised executive power as the only legitimate authority, setting the pace and direction of local governance in conformity with British criteria. The justification of the traditional rulers' role in colonial Nigeria provided above shows that there was a change and the traditional rulers adopted new states. In roles that were completely at conflict with the hopes and desires of the colonized societies, they were co-opted⁹⁷.

2.1.8 Features of African Traditional Institution in Post-Colonial Era

Traditional leaders in post-colonial Nigeria played a variety of roles and had varying degrees of status, but regardless of the administration, it can be claimed that they acted as keepers of the country's new colonial status and impeded its continuous progress. According to a claim, chiefs look after the land in trust for the people as caretakers. They acted as a conduit between the government and the rural population. They assist the government in educating and integrating rural residents into politics. They served as the guardians of the populace's traditional religion, creative expression, and way of life. They attempted to uphold the traditions by setting an example. Traditional kings and queens have been given limited power to resolve minor disagreements due to the political system. The community's traditional leaders work to maintain

harmony both within it and with neighboring villages⁹⁸. The traditional rulers serve as a means of local state control, according to the theory, and are in charge of maintaining the roads connecting their regions, providing soldiers for the army of the kingdom, maintaining the royal palace, and collecting taxes and tributes that are owed at different times.

The traditional rulers actively promoted the work of talented African carvers, sculptors, potters, and other artists, he added, in their capacity as the patrons of their people's expressive and creative arts. In this regard, it has been noted that a body of customs is necessary to constrain the function of traditional rulers in any society, and rulers are expected to reign within the bounds of the norms. Customs also serves as a guide for people's political character. The traditional rulers were active in the formation of culture in the majority of the world through the transmission of folklore and folktales. Traditional leaders have played a crucial supporting role in the administration of post-colonial government in Africa even though colonial rule destroyed the supremacy of chiefs⁹⁹.

In the pre-colonial period, traditional rulers occupied important positions of political authority in African kingdoms. They were held in high esteem and believed to be representatives of the gods on earth. Before the emergency of colonial rule in Nigeria, traditional rulers were the political and spiritual heads of the various kingdoms and states that now make up Nigeria impressed by the well-organized system of traditional political institutions in some parts of Nigeria the British colonial masters made use of traditional rulers in the colonial administration, particularly in the implementation of the indirect rule system. However, towards the last years of colonial rule, there was a shift from the traditional rulers to the educated life who eventually succeeded in achieving political independence for the country since 1960, the traditional ruler has been relegated to the background in the political scene in Nigeria and the constitutions stipulate that

they should be non-partisan and be politically neutral in the electoral processes¹⁰⁰. However, in modern Nigeria, traditional leaders still have a significant impact on the political and electoral systems.

2.1.9 The Role of Traditional Leaders Under Different Constitutions in Nigeria

Scholars frequently exaggerate traditional chiefs' contributions to colonial rule and colonialization in Nigeria, particularly their involvement in the management of local affairs¹⁰¹. People frequently see the bad aspects of past traditional rulers' actions because they were motivated by the conditions and reality of their period¹⁰². This is because people tend to view the past through the prism of the present.¹⁰³ Traditional kings and queens were in reality actively involved in the growth of their separate realms. Presently, traditional institutions must remain relevant in the management of community development due to a pressing issue in developing nations¹⁰⁴. The fact that traditional leaders were expected to speak for their people in all interactions with the state and the federal government may also be used to explain why they were so actively involved in upholding law and order. They, therefore, had the traditional authority to deal with issues of community development and crime control.

No African traditional leader can be undervalued, it may be said unequivocally. Factual Statement: Regrettably, researchers have not given enough attention to the function of traditional leaders during the period of European colonial domination of African states¹⁰⁵. Indeed, traditional rulers constituted the early opposition to the colonization of Nigeria throughout the colonial period. They considered the colonial government's desire to seize control of the administration in their territories to be an insult to customs. There are several examples of traditional rulers in this regard. They comprised a large number of people in addition to Kosoko of Lagos, Jaja of Opobo, and Nana Olomu of Itshekiri in the Oil Rivers. Due to the better guns that the Europeans

possessed, all of these monarchs were taken captive, deported, and replaced with puppets so that the Europeans could control the resources of the territories they ruled¹⁰⁶. Traditional chieftaincy institutions in Nigeria would suffer greatly as a result of the European official's removal and enthronement of traditional rulers at this time. Following the commercial rivalries that resulted in the Berlin West African Conference of 1884–1885 and its recommendation of "effective occupation of the areas of influence of individual European states," the Europeans were to follow up their economic control of Nigerian territories with active political control¹⁰⁷.

These kings included Oba Overami of Benin and other traditional rulers in Nigeria who fought the British forces for the protection of their ancestral lands. The territories of these traditional kings were formally colonized as a result of their loss. While dismissing some of the enormous efforts made by Nigerian traditional rulers to uphold the integrity of African customs in the face of alien European dominance. Other scholars have urged for the complete dissolution of traditional institutions in Nigeria¹⁰⁸. Before realizing how vital the traditional rulers' recognition and participation were to the colony's economy, the British colonial administrators did not begin to encourage and integrate the traditional rulers into the indirect rule system.

This understanding was not unrelated to the fact that the Europeans discovered how deeply tied Nigerians were to their traditions and traditional leaders, to the point that whatever they commanded was what the people would do—or not do, as the case may be. The traditional rulers' involvement in the colonial government, which academics have sharply denounced as "criminality," was sparked by this¹⁰⁹. Scholars in this group, once more, frequently see the past through the lens of the present. There is little question that the formation of the Indirect Rule system gave the traditional kings and queens the chance to actively engage in the colonial government through the Native Authority, first in Northern Nigeria and then in Southern

Nigeria¹¹⁰. Along with strengthening the power and influence of traditional rulers, Indirect Rule attempted to establish it where it did not already exist. In the Eastern part of the country among the Igbo, the colonial rulers tried installing "Warrant Chiefs" to act as the Hausa Emirs or Yoruba. This was an illustration of how the many Nigerian peoples' diverse customs and cultural peculiarities were not known to the colonial powers. Although the Indirect Rule was successful in prosperous areas like Northern Nigeria and Yorubaland, it also altered the power dynamics in many of these areas' old political structures. It was a total failure in the East because it caused more problems than it solved¹¹¹. Yorubaland served as an excellent example of how Indirect Rule overthrew established chieftaincy systems. The conventional power structure was significantly altered, and the ultimate rulers were made public.

For instance, the Emir increased his level of involvement in government. The fact that they acted as stooges of the colonial power by dancing to their tune, collecting taxes, and paying them to them must be noted, as opposed to furthering the interests of the people as they once did. After being persuaded of the enormous authority and respect accorded traditional leaders in Nigerian communities, the colonial authorities tried to grant their involvement in the colonial government their constitutional sanctions. This was done in 1914 after the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria were united. In 1914, six Nigerian traditional elders were chosen as unofficial members of the Nigerian Constitution. They included Sultan Attahiru of Sokoto, the Emir of Kano, Chief Richard Henshaw of Calabar, the Shehu of Borno, the Alaafin of Oyo, and the Shehu. Traditional leaders started to receive constitutional status from this point forward, even at the expense of the educated elite who made up the majority of the nationalist leaders. When Nigeria was being decolonized, colonial officials used "divide and rule" strategies to delay the country's independence by pitting the educated and traditional elites against one another. This

is when the issue reached a boiling point. As a result, traditional leaders were given a voice in political decisions as self-government got closer.

Significantly, the 1946 Richards Constitution established a House of Chiefs in Northern Nigeria, whose members were all top-tier regional traditional leaders. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 for the Western Region and the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 for the Eastern Region both copied the same arrangement with a few minor variations. The political influence of Nigeria's traditional leaders was increased as a result, but they also became more partisan as a result of supporting the political parties in power that had the right to decide which traditional leaders would sit in the House of Chiefs. Thus, traditional leaders began to defy traditions that required them to serve their subjects' best interests regardless of their political persuasion. allegiance. The height of traditional leaders' involvement in colonial politics occurred in Nigeria in the late 1950s and during the First Republic, which lasted from 1960 to 1966. During these times, the three regions' main political parties started to favour prominent traditional leaders and entice them to join their ranks by offering them positions in politics¹¹². For instance, in the Western Region, the Action Group (AG) administration of the West selected Oba Adesoji Aderemi, the Ooni of Ife, as the Region's Governor in 1959. Additionally, at this time, a number of famous Yoruba traditional leaders, including the Olubadan of Ibadan land, Osemawe of Ondo, Oluwo of Iwo, Olu of Warri, and a host of others, received ministerial assignments¹¹³. Unfortunately, while the preferred traditional rulers received political posts during this time, those who did not enjoy the favour of the ruling party faced harsh punishment. This was the situation in Nigeria's First Republic, when the politicians used the traditional institutions as tools for political rewards or punishments, as the case may be¹¹⁴.

It's interesting to note that when the military intervened in January 1966 to put an end to the First Republic, this was the scenario regarding the standing of traditional rulers in relation to modern politics. The military suspended the Constitution and assumed control of all previously held by politicians' domains of government. The successive military regimes in Nigeria have secretly and openly excluded traditional rulers from the government because they believe that, despite their great influence and respect among Nigerians, they should not be partisan. This was accomplished through the Nigerian military regimes' Local Government Reforms of 1976, 1979, 1989, and 1999 constitutions. Due to the relatively limited consultative duties, they were granted, traditional monarchs were constitutionally and legally shielded from governing and administration. The military regimes elevated the local government administrator or chairman above the traditional rulers, even at the local levels, where they traditionally had tremendous respect. Traditional leaders continued to receive some recognition during the succeeding military regimes despite this formal constitutional relegation. For instance, as a sign of respect and admiration for traditional institutions in Nigeria, the Aguiyi Ironsi military authority installed traditional rulers as chancellors of the federal government-owned colleges in 1966. (Nigerian Tribune, July 28, 1966). Additionally, the 1989 Constitution mandated the creation of a council of chiefs for each state and local government in Nigeria.

Additionally, the statutory allocations of local governments were to be set aside for the maintenance of the established institutions in such local government areas, according to the dictatorial dictatorship led by General Sani Abacha. The traditional leaders were mostly used by the military to legitimize their authority and resolve conflicts during emergencies. The military, in particular the Babangida government, viewed the traditional rulers as "the most valuable asset the nation had" for this reason¹¹⁵. In addition, it was under the military regimes of Generals

Babangida and Abacha that traditional rulers in Nigeria faced the most criticism for their deeds and words. For instance, all classes of Nigerians, including traditional rulers, overwhelmingly denounced the Ibrahim Babangida administration's decision to void the 1993 presidential elections, which had been deemed the fairest and most free elections in Nigerian history. The dictatorship that succeeded General Babangida, Late General Sani Abacha, quickly forged ties with them and supported their efforts to gain power, much to the total surprise of Nigerians. Some of them started to support June 12, 1993, presidential election's invalidation and Chief MKO Abiola's imprisonment as the presumed winner.¹¹⁶ During the terrible years of General Sani Abacha, they began to frequently stop by the Aso Villa, the official residence of the Nigerian Head of State. They undoubtedly benefited greatly from Abacha's plunder, which included contracts, cash and car gifts, oil blocks, and opportunities to lift oil, among other things. By the turn of the millennium, local government councils in Nigeria had taken over control of traditional rulers' roles in governance and reduced them to advisory roles¹¹⁷.

This does not imply, however, that old institutions have perished naturally, as they were expected to play a significant part in the democratic regime that brought Nigeria into the twenty-first century.: It has been falsely emphasized frequently that traditional institutions are in trouble or are fighting for their lives in modern Nigerian politics. Personal humiliation, salary reduction, salary cessation, restrictions, suspension, exile, dethronement, and murder, according to one expert, are manifestations of the stress of Nigeria's traditional rulers today¹¹⁸. However, it can be absolutely claimed that all of these indices are contemporary occurrences impacting Nigerians of all social levels and are not specific to traditional institutions alone. Therefore, the stance taken here is that there is no crisis of relevance or survival for traditional rule in modern Nigeria. This is because it has remained relevant over time and has resisted numerous deliberate attempts to do

away with it entirely. Traditional chieftaincy institution is very relevant in contemporary Nigeria but what it is clamouring for is constitutional role and recognition.

A traditional chieftaincy institution's lack of constitutional recognition or authority does not imply that it is no longer relevant or that its significance has diminished. What is happening to the traditional chieftaincy institutions in modern Nigeria is simply a manifestation of our inability to design suitable political systems that will contrast with the colonial and military-imposed political structures of the colonial era and the post-independence period, respectively, and reflect our social, economic, and political realities¹¹⁹. Despite this, Nigeria's traditional chieftaincy institutions and traditional rulers have persisted in wielding significant power and participating actively in all spheres of political administration, albeit informally. In the first place, traditional rulers in Nigeria, despite their lack of affiliation with any political party, play a significant influence in the selection and emergence of electoral candidates in modern Nigeria. Political candidates visit the palaces of the traditional leaders in their areas during electioneering in order to get the royal seal of approval and endorsement. All contenders who approach traditional leaders have their royal blessings because they are all from their domains, and whoever succeeds also has the support of the traditional leaders. Our claim is that traditional leaders continue to be held in high regard and awe by Nigerians, which explains why candidates for political office seek their support in the run-up to elections and throughout electioneering activities. Examples of this abound during state and local elections in Nigeria's many regions. Presidential candidates make an effort to visit and win the support of top-tier traditional rulers around the nation, even at the federal level¹²⁰.

2.1.10 Traditional Leaders in Contemporary Politics Administration

In a similar spirit, politicians in Nigeria work to win the approval of traditional leaders in order to legitimate their positions and terms in government. The presidents, state governors, senators, and other high-ranking political office holders frequently pay respect to traditional rulers as their first stop when touring any region of Nigeria. Both military and civilian regimes in Nigeria have acknowledged that traditional rulers play a significant role in the legitimacy of political regimes, which explains why successive governments in Nigeria have shown strong support for the traditional institution despite the absence of a constitutional role for it. Even the harshest detractors of the traditional chieftaincy rulership in Nigeria would acknowledge that they remain the closest governments and most effective mobilizers of the people at the grassroots¹²¹. It is also argued that governments at all levels always strive to associate with traditional institutions in Nigeria because they are aware that traditional rulers continue to be the centre of the people's collective ambitions. It is generally acknowledged that traditional leaders continue to play a crucial role in electoral processes, including the emergence of political leaders and the legitimization of tenures, so it is incorrect to claim that the institution of chieftaincy in modern Nigeria is experiencing a crisis of relevance. The institution's only issue, which has been a serious difficulty for it since the end of the First Republic, is that it has no constitutional support or authority.

Similar to this, it is crucial to attempt an assessment of some of the main criticisms of the chieftaincy institutions in Nigeria after going thus far in the analysis of the nature of the institution's modern political significance¹²². First, there are four main areas where traditional institutions in Nigeria are criticized: the institution of traditional rulers is essentially autocratic and cannot be accommodated under a democratic dispensation; the institution is bound by

tradition and is therefore ineffective in promoting modernization, or development; the institution is primarily male-dominated and contributes to institutionalized gender inequalities at the institutional level; and, the institution is bound by tradition and is therefore bound by tradition. While all of these apply to Nigeria's traditional institutions of government, the truth is that they are not the only issues facing them. These are widespread issues impacting all African political and socio-economic organizations. For example, it may not be accurate to state that a traditional chieftaincy institution is necessarily authoritarian because certain old institutional arrangements included a well-implemented system of checks and balances.

It was exceedingly challenging for the monarch to adopt an autocratic style of rule in the old Oyo political system among the Yoruba. Because traditional institutions are one of the main tools and agents of community development in modern Nigeria, the claim that they are founded on traditions and may not be fit for the promotion of modernization is likewise unconvincing¹²³. Other prominent criticisms of the chieftaincy institutions in contemporary Nigeria include tussling for leadership among traditional rulers in the Council of Traditional Rulers, involvement in partisan politics for personal gains, and lending support for the reigning governments whether civilian or military. Significantly, the traditional institution in Nigeria has also been accused of continued participation in traditional festivals and rituals despite modern influences. Moreover, traditional rulers in Nigeria are fond of bestowing traditional chieftaincy titles to wealthy and affluent people in the society who have not made any significant contribution to the growth and development of the society for their aggrandizement and material benefits.

2.1.11 Traditional Institutions and Sustainable Community Development in Nigeria

Traditional institutions' function in Nigeria has evolved over time. It was thought that traditional communities with many similarities and variances were combined to form pre-colonial Nigeria. It was composed of kingdoms that represented cultural units that varied in various ways, including the conventional institutions of government they used. In pre-colonial Nigeria, there are primarily two different kinds of traditional institutions. These include both decentralized and centralized authority structures¹²⁴.

When tracing the outlines of the function of traditional institutions, particularly in the north, which was founded on a synthesis of African political principles and the Islamic political system, two more different geographic regions—the south-west and the south-east—are visible. In pre-colonial Nigeria, traditional institutions played a larger role in governance. To carry out these duties, traditional leaders, particularly in the north, had to create appropriate policies, set priorities, and raise money to support their communities. Colonialism brought recognition by the British colonial authority of the crucial and powerful position held by traditional institutions in Nigeria. Numerous issues faced the colonial administration, such as a shortage of British staff, insufficient funding to administer the nation, poor communication, etc. In accordance with British colonial policy, colonies were expected to cover the costs associated with maintaining stable law and order and conducting their operations. Later, the colonists used indirect control as a practical method of ruling the populace through their own institutions.

Using local chiefs or other trusted mediators, customary laws, and customs, the indirect rule is a style of colonial governance where British administrators just oversee the administration. They were tasked with teaching the populace about colonial government policies, presenting frequent

reports on a variety of subjects, and instigating local development. These were just a few of their responsibilities throughout the colonial era¹²⁵.

The political elites persisted in their efforts to weaken the impact of established institutions on governance after independence. In the past, traditional institutions played a constitutional role. A Council of Chiefs was established for them in each region under the constitutions of 1960 and 1963, some of whom were even regional officials. The Eastern and Western minority councils further reduced the authority of traditional monarchs to consultative functions. By 1966, when the military took over, the political position of conventional institutions had a significant impact on how much influence they had. Through the 1976 Local Government Reform, the Federal Military Government and State Governments endeavored to establish a standard role for traditional rulers across the nation by 1979. Traditional institutions were separated from politics and legally allocated advisory responsibilities in local decision-making through Traditional/Emirate Councils¹²⁶.

Without clear norms and principles that are ingrained in its institutions and upheld by its leaders, no community can ever attain development, order, and stability. The colonial assault has been able to be resisted by the Traditional Authority. Some pious locations in the new collection The Traditional Authority ended up in the prestigious but entirely ceremonial house of chiefs, despite the fact that it appears that modern politicians are simply commemorating them in the interim. Ministerial posts without portfolios were awarded to several of them. Some were starting to gain greater clout than politicians. To end the dispute and reestablish order and stability, the politicians still needed the institution's support and collaboration. The Traditional Rulers survived due to their usefulness in the new political environment rather than because they were recognized by the constitution. They also needed the support of the traditional leaders to lessen

the weight of the resistance and offer surveillance of persons entering their areas because the parliamentary system had allowed for dissent.

Additionally, the functions of the conventional authority have surely been significantly impacted by local government reforms since independence, not only in local government administration but also across the board for social officials¹²⁷. Traditional chiefs' participation in local government governance gradually decreased once the military entered Nigerian politics in 1966. As a result, structural reorganizations were carried out across the nation to set a number of goals for the actions and duties of local governmental structures. The traditional rulers were deployed as tax collectors and seen as administrative ties between the authority and the people. They were employed to serve as chancellors of a few universities in Nigeria and were frequently called upon to mediate informal disputes on both a national and regional level. Indirect rule was abolished with the enactment of the Federal Constitution in 1954, and both new local government systems that succeeded it were meant to mark a turning point in Nigeria's seizure of the power of traditional rulers.

In terms of power and authority, the Traditional Rulers' position in Northern Nigeria from 1967 to 1972 was severely weakened. They lost control of the means of coercion, including the police, courts, and prisons. The Emir's legal authority and power were compromised by this action, which ultimately prevented them from exercising their powers in a significant way. Similar to this, traditional leaders were not allowed to actively participate in political or security matters during the 1976 local government reforms, which were presided over by Dasuki among others. They were essentially made non-executive, ceremonial, and non-participatory in local government administration, which effectively barred them from the decision-making process of a fully created local government council¹²⁸.

The reform only allowed for the establishment of a traditional council of chiefs at the state and local government levels to deal with chieftaincy and religious issues, support the upkeep of law and order, and handle other issues that the government might occasionally refer to the council for advice on¹²⁹.

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As a result, the establishment of the traditional council of chiefs and its separation from local government council emirates signaled the end of traditional rulers' formal participation in Nigerian politics, administration, the criminal justice system, and security. Contrarily, the administration had determined that it was essential to interact with traditional leaders in order to establish their accountability and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Additionally, they view traditional rulers as a viable and effective link, particularly in the implementation of many of their programs and policies that directly affect the populace at large, such as security, and education. The traditional leaders' recent performance of these and other legal tasks is what led succeeding governments to view them as being crucial to the effective performance of the aforementioned obligation. The government has always valued and owed loyalty to them, and as a result, they are occasionally consulted before making important political appointments at all levels—local, state, and federal. This was made clearer when the former dictatorship of Babangida summoned traditional leaders to a meeting in Abuja and warned them to utilize their authority as traditional leaders of their own communities to address the issue of insecurity in their regions. This indicates that the traditional rulers appeared to be returning to their previous position during the first phase of the colonialist era ever since the Second Republic administration¹³⁰: When civilian politicians returned to power in October 1979 after 13 years of military interregnum, there was a brief return to the practice of allying with traditional rulers to win the mass support of their people or electorates. This alliance formation system eventually started as soon as the ban on partisan politics was lifted during the second half of 1979. But as was the case in the 1960s those that emerged as ruling political leaders quickly, abandoned the idea of traditional rulers as allies and begin to treat them as subordinates.

The formation of the traditional council of chiefs and its separation from local government council emirates thus marked the formal cessation of traditional ruler engagement in Nigerian politics, administration, the criminal justice system, and security. On the other hand, the administration had decided that communication with traditional leaders was crucial to establishing its legitimacy and accountability in the eyes of the general people. In addition, they see traditional leaders as a strong and useful link, especially when it comes to carrying out many of their plans and initiatives that directly influence the general public, such as community policing, acting as middlemen between the government and the community dwellers in passing pressing information about the demands of the grassroots people and youth orientation on education. The recent accomplishment of these and other legal duties by the traditional leaders is what convinced successive governments that they were essential to the successful accomplishment of the aforementioned obligation. Because of the devotion and value that the government has traditionally owed to them, they are periodically consulted before key political appointments are made at all levels—local, state, and federal. This became more obvious when the old Babangida regime called a gathering of traditional leaders in Abuja and cautioned them to use their position as traditional leaders of their own communities to solve the problem of insecurity in their areas. This suggests that ever since the Second Republic administration, the traditional rulers appeared to be resuming their old status during the early colonialist era¹³¹. Nevertheless, the Emir of Ilorin and other traditional leaders harshly rejected the findings. As a result, everyone appears to agree that something needs to be done to address the institution's current issue, but nobody appears to be taking any proactive steps. Since independence, the subject of traditional rulers has not garnered any significant public attention. In the ensuing debate of the Constituent Assembly in 1977–1978, popular democratic forces seriously attacked

and contested the institution, raising the question of what we should do with the traditional administration given our current state of security. In keeping with this, we shouldn't assume that there won't be any crises or problems in the future.

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Therefore, whether or not under British colonial authority, every institution that can aid in stability and quick conflict and crisis resolution must be maintained over time. Traditional leaders have been consulted and employed to settle crises, whether under civilian authority following independence or even under the military with the potent weapon of conquest at its disposal. However, the threat of a crisis in Nigeria did not convince the majority of Assembly members to accept at least a significant role for this institution in maintaining the continuity of the public in the nation. As a result, they were no longer given special treatment as they had in the past, and their only contribution to Nigeria's security administration was advice, which the government might accept or reject. No particular roles are assigned to the traditional leaders for the present, the future, or any other time. This is what prompted the Shehu of Borno to acknowledge that the government exploited the traditional rulers as a fire brigade mechanism that was only effective during times of national emergency¹³².

However, elected local government councilors are not required to heed the counsel of traditional institutions. They were given representation in the National Council of State by the Constitution of 1979. The traditional institutions were not given any administrative responsibilities under the constitution. They are only to act as state-level advisory bodies to the governor on issues pertaining to customary law, relations between communities, chieftaincy, peace, and serenity within their jurisdiction. Traditional institutions were not given any political power or representation in the council of state under the Federal Republic of Nigeria's 1999 constitution. In order to prevent traditional institutions in Nigeria from wielding any political authority, the 1999 constitution is the most radical.

Nevertheless, in order to maintain the standing of Nigeria's traditional institutions, a number of actions are still required. First, the institution needs a constitutional provision. The rules

governing traditional institutions are now (1999) only enacted at the state government level and only give the State Traditional Councils established by these laws the ability to confer with and advise. The Federal Government does not have a similar provision¹³³.

It is crucial that this new balance of roles is accurately captured and given legal backing in the constitution to enable the institution to achieve a greater role after enduring the vicissitudes of the colonial and post-colonial regimes and achieving a workable role within our democratic culture in the country. The constitution should, at the very least, acknowledge the function of traditional institutions in communal life, including their contribution to community empowerment, peacebuilding, security, and preservation of traditional culture. Land management is a crucial function that those traditional institutions can provide in the nation. Because people trust in legitimacy, traditional authority is a respectable source of power. The legitimacy of traditional institutions is therefore a social reality, and development efforts at the local level must take into account this existing structure. While in the western world legitimacy is closely linked to democracy, in many other countries (especially at the local level in rural areas) democracy is a rather foreign concept. Due to the current land concerns in Nigeria, particularly in areas like Plateau, Benue, and the Kaduna States, traditional institutions might be employed to resolve local conflicts¹³⁴.

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Certainly, all ancient institutions may, with minor modifications, be included in the national constitution with substantial bills of rights. The Bill of rights would state that local procedures must be changed as needed to ensure adherence to generally accepted information management methods. It is important to underline and refute various ideas regarding Nigeria's traditional institutions. For example, modernists believe that conventional institutions are by nature despotic. The Oyo Empire's form of government, which makes it very impossible for an Oba to be tyrannical, might be used to criticize this. This act has been included in the administration of the traditional institutions with due consideration for customs and traditions across the Oyo Empire and beyond. The claim that traditional institutions can't effectively promote modernization because they are founded on traditions is unfounded. Traditional institutions are one of the important tools and forces for community development in modern Nigeria.

In modern Nigeria, the chieftaincy institutions must deal with problems like competition for leadership in the Council of Traditional Rulers, participation in partisan politics for one's own benefit, and financial backing of the ruling regimes, whether civilian or military. In Nigeria, traditional institutions are charged with continuing to practice old-fashioned festivals and rituals

despite modern culture's effect. In order to promote themselves and acquire pecuniary advantages, traditional rulers in Nigeria enjoy bestowing traditional chieftaincy titles on wealthy and affluent members of society who haven't materially contributed to the growth and development of the community. It is clear that all problems and other grievances with Nigeria's chieftaincy institutions are signs of larger political degradation throughout the nation and do not solely concern traditional governance. The Awujale of Ijebu land made the right decision by establishing an annual lecture presented by a professor of communication.

Nigeria's democracy is in jeopardy because the populace is not prepared to participate in elections¹³⁶. Lack of political will and capacity on the part of governments, as well as a lack of local involvement in the planning and provision of services, are some of the key causes of the poor status of democratic dividends. Traditional institutions and state democratization can both contribute to the spread of development and democratic dividends. Examples of this include the traditional authority's capacity to inspire locals to get involved in politics, enabling them to influence public policies¹³⁷. Traditional institutions, if applied effectively, will not only conform to modern democratic principles but also be able to augment modern democratic practices by filling in any gaps in their applicability. The traditional institution can address issues like racial marginalization by improving access to public services and involving the peasantry and other marginalized groups in the democratic process¹³⁸.

Nigeria's traditional institutions, when they are included within the system of governance, can be a helpful tool for fostering democratic peace. The traditional laws and values in Nigeria are essential elements for socioeconomic development. These traditional leaders, especially those at the local level, have a better understanding of the people and participate in conversations that prioritize local issues. They may therefore be a priceless tool for informing the government about

the requirements of local communities and motivating rural residents to actively participate in both national political processes and development projects¹³⁹.

2.1.12 Traditional Administrative Structure

Most people agree that traditional administrative rulership refers to indigenous arrangements whereby leaders or people by heredity or people with proven track records are recommended, appointed, and installed in line with their native laws and customs¹⁴⁰. Traditional administrative control is centered on preserving the people's traditions, cultural history, and customs. Additionally, it entails using those customs and the rules that are relevant to that specific group to manage and resolve conflicts that develop between or among community members.¹⁴¹

Similarly, to this, traditional administrative rule is defined in terms of economic, social, and political institutions that receive their authority, influence, and power from a particular group of people's customs¹⁴². The legislative, executive and judicial branches of traditional administrative authors are also seen as organized and methodical administrative body that resolves legal problems in local areas¹⁴³. Furthermore, it has been asserted that the paramount chiefs, the council of elders, age groups, and local religious organizations make up the traditional administrative ruling class¹⁴⁴.

2.1.13 Effects of Traditional Institutions on community development

There is no doubting the important role traditional leaders play in modern Nigeria. This position was widely accepted by a number of societies even before colonization. Because of its importance, colonialists used it to further their own selfish objectives. One of the distinctive characteristics of traditional authority is its capacity to adjust to changing situations and conditions¹⁴⁵. Traditional leaders are said to support the state in maintaining law and order in the localities and promote the peaceful coexistence of people from different racial, social, and

religious backgrounds. Nigerians' everyday lives are deeply engrained in their culture, and maintaining their practices is crucial to maintaining their cultural values and traditions. They found that traditional monarchs are more reachable to the general people in times of need and trouble than elected politicians and government officials. All of the subjects of traditional leaders receive the same treatment. The majority of people respect and trust their traditional leaders¹⁴⁶.

The traditional leaders also mobilize the community's resources, which entails bringing the community's members together to work cooperatively to ensure program sustainability and self-reliance. By supplying members with sufficient knowledge, pertinent instruction, technical support, and decision-possibility, community mobilization empowers individuals to share in the possibilities and responsibilities for taking action in the community's best interests. People are inspired to participate more when they are filled with fervor and desire to maintain the pace of community development, which leads to efficient time-bound, or expedited activities¹⁴⁷. The goal is to garner a lot of support and give the community the impression that a certain initiative is theirs.

2.1.14 Colonial Nigeria's Enduring Institutions and System of Government

Over time and within the confines of norms and traditions, traditional institutions in Nigeria have exercised lawful authority during the pre-colonial era. During the colonial era, these organizations served as tools in the hands of the colonists who used an indirect rule system for their administrative comforts. Various schools of thought exist now on the position of the traditional institution in contemporary administration. The Traditional and Modernist schools of thinking were taken into account in this study.

- ***The Traditional School of Thought:*** maintains that traditional institutions are ingrained in people's history, culture, and sense of self. Long before the emergence of western culture,

these groups were active in managing and governing various affairs. Furthermore, it has been underlined that in this historical institution, the democratic element precedes the western model¹⁴⁸. A particularly reliable illustration of the checks and balances principle in action is the Oyo Empire. These ancient institutions have demonstrated their adaptability and flexibility in order to defy the Western liberal democratic paradigm. They accomplished this by drawing on their past identities as a resource. The ongoing debate about the proper role of traditional leaders in modern-day Africa, particularly in democracies, is complex and multifaceted. Remember that this institution has gone through several historical epoch alterations. Traditional governance is viewed as a kind of government that satisfies the needs of persons with various viewpoints on democracy. The traditional institution covers the governance voids that traditional democracy leaves behind. Without a doubt, despite manipulation by colonial and post-colonial forces, traditional leadership has never vanished and has never been invented. As a result, it has stood the test of time. There are currently worries about ethnicity, ethnic marginalization, and political and democratic instability among diverse ethnic groups as a result of the effects of conventional democratic processes. Traditional leadership is an alternative to democracy that places more emphasis on cultural and moral ideals expressed via human emotions and less emphasis on how the government is founded. Culture and custom should not be perceived as obstacles to democracy, but rather as essential components in the resilience of democratic institutions¹⁴⁹. The majority of individuals concur that the institution of traditional leaders is a part of the cultural past of the African people. Because it is incompatible with democracy, Africans cannot criminalize their culture; rather, they have a fundamental right to it. It argues that the dislike of traditional leaders in the post-colonial era can be connected to the middleman and facilitator roles that

chiefs played in the colonization operations. Their legitimacy was undercut by indirect legislative strategies and the defense that "the excesses and contradictions of the external backing and demands of colonial administration"¹⁵⁰.

- ***The Modernist School of Thought:*** According to the Modernist school of thought, democracy differs from the conventional democratic form of institutions in its concept, practice, traits, and ingredients¹⁵¹. The modernists use western standards to gauge how democratic Africa is. African democracy has regressed throughout the years, largely as a result of interethnic and intercommunal strife, violence associated with elections and electioneering, and sit-tight syndromes. Traditional political structures and systems were seen by modernists as barriers to the growth of democracy.
- Politicians of all stripes are frequently aware of the enormous impact that traditional leaders have in rural communities. Pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial politicians and statesmen in Nigeria have enlisted the support of traditional leaders over time to sway governance and election processes. Reiterating the link between Nigeria's traditional rulers, their ethnicity and culture, and Nigerian citizens is now necessary. It has become obvious in current times that traditional institutions are enlisted for support by political parties as well as by politicians.
- Many thought that because democracy inherited leadership traits, conventional leadership is incompatible with democracy. Despite the denial of the Nigerian constitution, a simple inspection reveals that traditional institutions are striving to survive after colonialism and are attempting to do so through their participation in political concerns¹⁵². Because of its Traditional leadership will eventually be replaced by democratic values and economic models supported by the global discourse. Undemocratic forms of governance in the

leadership process, particularly in electoral democracy as it contradicts the basic idea of fundamental human rights such as the right to vote, be voted for, and the freedom of choice, will fade away. Given the modernist perspective, it is clear that traditional institutions are once again participating in Nigeria's democracy¹⁵³.

The most famous of these strategies is the agreement reached between traditional leadership and the government for election-related goals, although they both vie for the other's power in order to obtain control and maintain their relevancy, respectively¹⁵⁴. The modernists contend that traditional leadership is essentially undemocratic in circumstances where chieftaincy is more or less a system in which only members of the same lineage can hold the role of chief since the ability to vote is a fundamental human right in electoral democracies. Because it is based on ascription and heredity, chieftaincy is intrinsically anti-democratic because it lessens the accountability of incumbents to their constituents.

Early colonial Nigerian administrative institutions prioritized local administration over national electoral politics as the most important role for traditional chieftains¹⁵⁵.

These were theoretically based on the idea of indirect rule, with the Governor-General at the top of the administration and a chain of command that extended through the Lieutenant Governors in the Provinces, the District Officers in the Divisions, and the Native Authorities in the Native Administration. The Native Authority was the regional traditional chief, who was in charge of overseeing local governance and administration by himself. The Native Authority had two responsibilities. First of all, he was the final administrative link in the colonial system, and it was through him that local implementation of decisions taken at the center was ensured. as an The Native Authority reported to the District Officer and was a servant of the central government; hence, indirect rule was quite direct. The Native Authority's function in local government,

however, has seen some alteration. The British created the broad guidelines in this case, but they mostly left the actual policymaking to the various Native Authorities¹⁵⁶.

As long as the Native Authority kept within the boundaries, the District Officer functioned as his advisor. A traditional figurehead cannot become a Native Authority until the Governor recognizes them as such. The senior traditional leader of a territory was designated as the Native Authority in accordance with official British policy. This process was made challenging by Nigeria's numerous traditional chieftains. An aristocratic and authoritarian hierarchical structure of traditional control was formed in the North, led by the senior traditional rulers known as the Emirs. However, political organization in the east was incredibly decentralized and hardly ever went beyond the village level. However, there weren't many central conventional kings even at this level. Instead, village councils made up of members of the principal clans in the village operated. Consequently, it was challenging to select traditional leaders to rule on their own¹⁵⁷.

Along with the identification issue, the succession issue also surfaced. The choosing of a traditional monarch was often a political process that took place inside a particular community. With the inclusion of traditional rulers in the national Administration, political conflicts were conducted, with the traditional ruler emerging as the victor¹⁵⁸. The decision made by the community lost its legitimacy. The community in question had to choose from among the candidates who were acceptable to the Governor because he had to confirm all Native Authorities. so, even in the absence of direct participation. The outcome of the selection process was indirectly impacted by the federal government. Thus, traditional leaders had two ways to influence politics in early colonial Nigeria. The Native American traditional ruler's official position at the local level in accordance with protocol, authority was granted. Traditional leaders no longer had a legal say in the Legislative Council at the national level, but they still had an

impact because they helped form the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which at the time was the only effective political party (N.N.D.P). However, the Native Authority's dual role as an independent local administrator and a direct agent of the federal government tended to drive his subjects away, who were his most important source of power¹⁵⁹.

Traditional leaders actively participated in urban elected politics prior to the 1944-starting constitutional reviews. When it came to power and authority, their rural counterparts were becoming more and more reliant on the federal government and less and less dependent on their communities¹⁶⁰. The Richards Constitution, which was adopted in 1944, was based on this somewhat shaky foundation. The Richards Constitution aimed to close the gap between local Native Authorities and the mostly elected Legislative Council at the federal level. To accomplish this, the Houses of Assembly and the Legislative Council both adopted area presentations based on the idea of regionalism. The constitution established a House of Chiefs in the North and a House of Assembly in each of the three regional divisions. Each House of Assembly was composed of both official and unofficial members, chosen mostly by the Native Authorities Council from among themselves. Official members were those nominated by the Governor to support him in his official capacity¹⁶¹.

In the East, there are 15 to 18 unofficial, of whom 10 to 13 were chosen by Native Authorities and roughly five by the Governor. The importance of native authorities and traditional leaders was highlighted in the western and northern regions. In addition to having 7–11 of the 15–19 unofficial members chosen by and from Native Authorities in the West, the Governor also appointed three Head Chiefs to the House after consulting with the Chiefs of the Western Provinces. Additionally, the Governor chose five minority representatives. To complement the House of Assembly in the North, a House of Chiefs was established. In the House of Assembly,

unofficial numbers were between 20 and 24 and 14 to 18 of whom were chosen from among the Native Authorities, six of whom could be chosen by the Governor. Membership in the House of Chiefs included all First-Class chiefs as well as "not less than 10 Second Class chiefs, selected by their order"¹⁶².

Traditional suzerains in the North were effectively represented twice: once in the House of Chiefs and once as Native Authorities. To ensure adequate representation of minorities who might not have been included otherwise, the Governor chose these individuals. The same setup was in place in the Western region, but to a lesser extent, with the Head Chiefs having direct participation in the Assembly. Traditional leaders' power at the regional level extended to the national level, where the Legislative Council was made up of representatives chosen by the regional assemblies. The installation of the Richards Constitution sparked a fierce reaction from nationalist groups. They pointed out that it had been imposed on Nigeria without any prior input, leading to the creation of a system that only comprised the official members of the administration and the traditional parts of society, with no place for nationalist movements. The nationalists also argued that Native Authorities ought to have been designated as legitimate members of the Houses of Assembly given their status within the Colonial Administration.

Consequently, the nationalists argued. Nigeria's whole governmental system was devoid of any unofficial representation. Two main themes characterized the Cliff Constitution's four-year existence: first, a continual push to have the constitution expanded to include Nigeria's new political parties, and second, an equally continuous push on the part of the country's top politicians to increase their support. When a delegation of nationalists traveled to London in 1947 to demand Traditional authorities actively took part in both crises, according to a reading of Richard's Constitution. They received advice to return to Nigeria and take advantage of the

country's current legal system after their requests were rejected. However, Sir John Macpherson succeeded Arthur Richard as Nigeria's governor in April 1948. Macpherson, who had only been in the country for two months, told the Legislative Council that he had been "greatly encouraged" by the way Richard's constitution operated and that, as a result, he thought it was appropriate to make constitutional changes that would go into effect at the beginning of 1950, five years before the constitution was scheduled to be reviewed¹⁶³.

Nigeria was no longer faced with the dilemma of whether or not to modify the constitution, but rather how to accomplish it. A portion of this problem was overcome when the Legislative Council concurred with Mr. Michael Foot, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that a thorough survey of public opinion be carried out at the village, district, provincial, regional, and national levels. However, rather than directly through elected assemblies, this "canvassing" was to be carried out through a succession of hierarchical conferences. A position was reserved at each level for those authorities, in particular traditional rulers, who were strongly associated with the current political structure. The first stage of the process was a series of village-level meetings, which the Legislative Council approved. It was intended that every Nigerian would have the opportunity to express their views on how the country's constitution should be developed at the "grass-roots" level. These meetings served more as electoral colleges for the conferences that would follow. The Village Council, which included both traditional members and those nominated by the Native Authority that is locally recognized, made its selections for representatives to be sent to the district conferences after the village meetings. After then, the district conference took part in discussions and sent representatives to the provincial conferences. Following consultation with the Provincial House of Assembly, the Native Authority, or "Adding members as he considered fit to any other representative body¹⁶⁴.

Representatives from the provincial conferences and every unofficial member of the Houses of Assembly attended the regional conferences. Reps were dispatched to the national conference in Ibadan, which also comprised all of the unofficial Legislative Council members, from this location. Traditional leaders had two sources of power as a result of the selection procedure for the national conference. The local traditional leader, who was acting as the Native Authority, had a direct influence over the Village Council, which was the first step in the entire process. Second, the Native Authorities choose from among their ranks the unofficial Houses of Assembly representatives who were automatically invited to the regional conferences. This panel then chose the members of the Legislative Council. Therefore, traditional leaders had a significant impact on the final conference's make-up and the constitutional provisions that were enacted as a result. The "Macpherson" constitution went into effect in 1951 when the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council was approved. A unicameral national House of Representatives made up of members of the three regional Houses of Assembly was one of the general stipulations of the new constitution. A complex electoral college method was to be used to elect the regional assemblies.

Twenty-five Electoral Districts, each of which was divided into Intermediate Electoral Districts, were the key voting districts in the West region. Primary Electoral Districts were created from these Districts. All residents of Nigeria who have "paid tax" for at least a year at the Primary level were given the franchise. The Native Authorities of the Area joined the candidates elected in the primary election in the intermediate election. Despite occasional parity between the two categories, elected members were typically more numerous than traditional members. The representatives of its own members who were sent to the Final Electoral College were then used

in the Intermediate Electorate will be chosen. The College then choose from among its members once more the district's representatives in the House of Assembly¹⁶⁵.

The "Houses of Chiefs in the West and the North" was formed under the Macpherson constitution, which gave traditional leaders direct access to the executive branch of government as well as substantial influence over the selection of representatives to the local Houses of Assembly. The House of Chiefs and House of Assembly jointly convened in the North to elect the members of the country's House of Representatives. In actuality, one chief and one assembly member were guaranteed seats in the national House for each province. The House of Chiefs in the West chose three of its members to represent them in the House of Representatives. In addition to having a voice in who was elected to the House of Representatives, the Houses of Chiefs also had a say in regional legislation. Legislation could be introduced in either House, with the exception of money bills, which could only be introduced in the Assembly¹⁶⁶.

The Lieutenant Governor's signature and approval from both Houses, however, were required for legislation to become law. The Lieutenant Governor may call a joint session of both Houses with 20 representatives from each, which was able to discuss and pass legislation for his signature, if neither House passed a piece of legislation that was exactly the same as the other. Traditional chiefs in the West and the North were represented in three different ways under the Macpherson constitution. First, people had a direct say in who would represent each region in the Houses of Assembly through the Intermediate Electoral College in the West and the Final Electoral College in the North. Second, regional Houses of Chiefs were established in both places, and they had a similar influence on the passage of local legislation to the House of Assembly¹⁶⁷.

Finally, through participating in the House of Chiefs and indirectly by having a say in who makes up the regional Houses of Assembly, traditional leaders were represented in the process of

choosing representatives to the national House of Representatives. The Macpherson constitution, however, collapsed under the weight of severe political wrangling after just one year of relative peace and tranquility. a constitutional problem that affects both the national House of Representatives and the Eastern House of Assembly, in addition to unrest in Kano. To explore "defects" in the current constitution and potential solutions, British and Nigerian political leaders first convened in London in 1953 before traveling to Lagos in early 1954. Political parties were used for the first time as a basis for conference participation. According to each party's performance in the 1951 election, Nigeria sent twenty delegates, who were distributed among them. As a result, in the North, the NPC funded five delegates while the NEPU supported one, and in the West, the Action Group sponsored five while the NCNC sponsored one. The NCNC sponsored four delegates from the East, but only those traditional leaders who were deemed to have clout were chosen because it was thought that they would be able to shape how the parties behaved and how the conferences turned out¹⁶⁸.

The London and Lagos conferences' amendments were incorporated into the 1954 Constitution, also referred to as the Lyttelton constitution. The constitutional role of traditional rulers in the Nigerian government was significantly impacted by the final amendments to this constitution, which were enacted in 1957. The constitutional authority of the traditional leaders had drastically decreased by 1957, both on a national and regional level. The two houses that made up the federal legislature were the Senate and the House of Representatives. Each region was represented in the Senate by twelve senators who were appointed by the governor of that region. The Governor-General also proposed two members for Lagos, one of whom was chosen by the chiefs of Lagos. The Oba of Lagos was a member by default. On the other side, there were 320 directly elected members of the House of Representatives. The selection of the representatives to

the House of Chiefs was done independently for the first time. In addition to being prohibited from serving in any regional legislatures, members of the House were also prohibited from serving in the Senate. The Oba of Lagos was automatically included in the Senate, as was already said, and the majority of important chiefs were also represented in the regional legislatures.

Therefore, traditional leaders were de facto forbidden from participating in electoral politics because they were chiefs and thus members of another legislative assembly. At the local level, a House of Chiefs and a House of Assembly continued to make up the legislature. The House of Chiefs in each of the three regions was made up of senior chiefs who were automatically members and junior chiefs who were chosen by the local governor. In the Northern Region, the majority of the House was made up of first-class chiefs and governor-appointed chiefs, while in the Eastern Region, the newly established House of Chiefs was made up entirely of first-class chiefs and governor-appointed chiefs. The House of Chiefs in the Western region consisted of each Head Chief as well as enough more chiefs to make up the necessary fifty members. At both the regional and federal levels, the two houses of the legislature maintained identical functions. Legislation that needed the other house's approval could be introduced by either house¹⁶⁹.

The House of Chiefs, however, no longer had the same authority as the House of Assembly. All other legislation could only be postponed by one year by the Senate and one month by the House of Chiefs. The House of Representatives or the House of Assembly would then have the power to override the veto of the Senate or the House of Chiefs, respectively. The Northern Region was the exception to the aforementioned system, as the House of Chiefs continued to have equal standing with the House of Assembly. The Governor could use Special Procedure when one House passed a bill and the other did not within six months. The President of the House of

Chiefs presided over a joint session of twenty elected members from both chambers in accordance with the Special Procedure. Both proposals could be passed and amended during this joint session. Traditional and appointed rulers also had a place in the cabinet, also known as the Council of Ministers at the federal level and the Executive Council at the regional level¹⁷⁰. In the Council of Ministers, at least one and not more than two, of the eleven members were to be from the Senate. In the North, not less than two and not more than four of the eleven were to be from the House of Chiefs.

However, the Prime Minister was required to be a member of the Assembly. In both the East and the West, the number of Executive Council members from the House of Chiefs depended upon the origin of the Prime Minister. If he was a member of the Assembly, then the East required two representatives from the House of Chiefs on the Executive Council, while the West required three. If the Prime Minister was a member of the House of Chiefs, then these requirements were reduced by one. Regardless of which House the Prime Minister was a member of, he was required to maintain a majority in the House of Assembly.

Under the 1954 constitution, traditional rulers were provided with a formal role through which they could participate in government. However, it was a role greatly reduced from that provided under the Macpherson Constitution. Senior traditional rulers were excluded from standing for election to the House of Assembly or the House of Representatives by their automatic membership in the House of Chiefs. At the same time, the standing of the House of Chiefs as a legislative body was lowered so that it was no longer equal to the House of Assembly, but rather one whose functions resembled the House of Lords in Great Britain. The one area in which traditional rulers enhanced their standing was that of the Executive Council where they were specifically included. Under the Lyttelton Constitution traditional rulers retained a legal position in the

governmental structure; however, the position had changed from that of an active and equal role in the formation of policy to a substantially advisory one¹⁷¹.

The Lyttelton constitution changed the available institutions for traditional rulers by first altering their makeup and then introducing new ones. High-ranking traditional leaders like the Ooni of Ife, elite chiefs, and Head Chiefs were all automatically members of the senate and the local Houses of Chiefs, while lower-ranking chiefs were chosen by the governor. In accordance with the 1960 constitution, this was also true; nevertheless, all of the chiefs who were already automatically members were elevated to ex officio membership. As a result, the Senate and Houses of Chiefs were taken over by members who had been appointed rather than the senior traditional rulers who had previously had a vote. The establishment of two new governmental committees that provided advice to the regional governments was the second constitutional modification that independence brought for traditional leaders¹⁷².

The Premier of the North served as the chairman of the Council of Chiefs, which was established in the Northern Region. All ministers who were House of Chiefs members served on the Council, along with additional House of Chiefs members who were chosen based on the topics under discussion. The Council's authority was restricted to traditional matters, but the government was required to heed its recommendations. Therefore, the Council of Chiefs, rather than the Governor, set policy for issues including the appointments, recognition, and approval of individuals as chiefs, the grading of chiefs, the deposition of chiefs, and the removal of a chief or an ex-chief from the region. A new institution that existed in the Eastern and Western regions permitted traditional leaders to participate in the Minority Councils. A Minority Council may be established by the governor in any territory to provide guidance to the administration on issues like welfare, development, and prejudice in the area. The Council was open to all members of the

House of Assembly and the House of Chiefs whose districts fell entirely or partially within the minority area. Traditional leaders were allowed to participate in the Minority Councils under a new institution that existed in the Eastern and Western districts because the Councils were purely advisory. A Minority Council may be established by the governor in any territory to provide guidance to the administration on issues like welfare, development, and prejudice in the area. The Council was open to all members of the House of Assembly and the House of Chiefs whose districts fell entirely or partially within the minority area. Due to the fact that the Councils were merely advisory, they may make matters public. However, they were unable to make policy decisions. With the coming of independence, traditional rulers saw their positions in the federal and regional legislatures eroded in favor of appointed chiefs. Only in the North were the remains relative the same because of the creation of the Council of Chiefs which was a policy-making body. In both the Eastern and Western regions, the new institutions created the Minority Councils, which further delegated the traditional ruler to an advisory role. At the time of the military coup in 1966 traditional rulers had seen their role eroded from that of being the sole members of the House of Representatives, as was the case under the Richards Constitution to that of being members of a largely advisory body, as was the case under the Lyttleton constitution as well as the Independence and Republican Constitutions. Additionally, traditional rulers had seen the process of their recognition change dramatically, from ultimate dependence upon the British colonial administration to dependence upon Nigeria's elected politicians¹⁷³.

The primary issue became: What function did traditional rulers perform inside Nigerian political parties as the constitutional role of traditional rulers shrunk and the role of political parties grew? Traditional Rulers' Changing Role the Federal Government implemented local government changes as part of the 1976 Local Government Reform, which signaled a turning point in the

nation's local government administration. The Federal Government implemented the reforms in response to the Udoji Public Service Review Commission's recommendations. The changes seek to improve local governments' performance in their fundamental duty of advancing grassroots development. The reform created a uniform, single-tier, multi-purpose system with the same structure and functions over the entire nation. Third-tier local governments were acknowledged inside the federal structure. The primary components of the reform were strengthened when the local government was acknowledged as such in the 1979 Constitution. The Federal Government's political policy in 1976, when General Olusegun Obasanjo served as the Head of State, included the reform of the local government system as a key component. The reforms were initiated because of the inherent defects of the previous local government system practiced under the military between 1968-1975. In the Forward to the Guidelines for Local Government Reforms (1976) the Chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Musa Yar'Adua elaborated on these defects when he said: Local Governments have over the years suffered from the continuous whittling down of their powers. The State Governments have continued to encroach upon what would normally have been the exclusive preserves of Local Governments. The lack of adequate funds and appropriate institutions continued to make Local Governments ineffective and ineffectual¹⁷⁴.

Furthermore, there had been insufficient manpower to guarantee a healthy local government system. Even small advancements had become difficult due to excessive politicking. As a result, there is a fundamental separation between the people and government institutions. The local government reform program had the goal of promoting democratic self-governance, fostering individual initiative and leadership potential, and mobilizing both human and material resources for local growth.

Additionally, Nigeria didn't have a consistent system of local government administration until 1976. The municipal government system underwent some earnest attempts to undergo reform, but these efforts were disjointed and disorganized. A consistent system of local government administration was implemented nationwide as a result of the reforms of 1976. The change marked a significant break from Nigeria's prior local government administration practice. A strong local authority with well-defined functional responsibilities in a power-sharing arrangement with the states is seen to be an institutional bulwark against tyranny. This belief is the intellectual foundation for the reform. Following the reforms of 1976, local government was acknowledged as a level of government deserving of a portion of national income due to the functions that were constitutionally assigned to it.

The 1979 Constitution incorporated the 1976 reform document's clauses. According to Section 7(1) of the Constitution, "the administration of every state shall ensure that such councils are established under legislation providing for their establishment, structure, composition, financing, and functions." Federal Republic of Nigeria's Constitution (1979). This demonstrated that local governments were products of the state and that the state government had control over their importance, power, and level of autonomy. The fact is that a consistent local government structure was implemented by the 1976 local government reforms. The local government was given specific responsibilities¹⁷⁵. This not only increased the local government's functional range but also attempted to decentralize governance, ensuring that the state and local governments had proper functional separations and that local authorities are therefore significantly involved in the development process. In practice, there was some attempt at a distinct delineation of the area that was designed to increase the functional autonomy of local authority while the state's supervisory role was kept. The 1976 local government reform attempted to make a fundamental break from

colonial and early independent times, but it did not address the importance of traditional institutions in local governance. The traditional institutions were simply granted advisory positions, which are not even legally binding, as solace. The truth is that the 1976 reform aimed to provide local governments more autonomy in terms of their functions and sources of funding¹⁷⁶.

2.1.15 The Changing Roles of Traditional Rulers in Local Governance

Over time, the function of traditional leaders in local governance has evolved. The north, southwest, and southeast of Nigeria are the three main geographic zones that can be identified when tracing the contours of the role of traditional rulers in local governance. In the pre-colonial era, a detailed assessment of the established traditional institutions and their rulers indicates that in the exercise of these tasks, the traditional rulers had to create the necessary policies, set priorities, and generate income to meet the requirements of their people. In the North, the emir is often described as a powerful executive who actively participates in local government and has few restrictions placed on him. The body of kingmakers, the town council, and strong secret societies were among the power centers in the South-West that, in addition to the Oba (or king), shaped the local administration and served as checks on the Oba's authority¹⁷⁷. As a result, the Oba could be seen as a weak executive participant in local administration. With authority being exercised at various levels, from the household level to the village level, and the absence of centralized executive authority, the indigenous political system in the South-East reveals a significant amount of public participation. It was also highly decentralized and fragmented. Overall, with the introduction of colonialism, the traditional ruler was an embodiment of local government; the British colonial administrators recognized the strategic and powerful position held by traditional rulers in the nation¹⁷⁸.

The British colonial policy was to generate the expense of operating colonies and managing the unstable law and order situations from the colonies themselves, which left colonial administrators with little British personnel and financial resources to administer the country. These factors played a large role in why the colonizers refrained from making any significant changes to the native local government. Instead, as a practical measure to govern the populace through their traditional institutions and rulers while ensuring close supervision by British administrators, the British colonial administration took steps to establish a system of indirect rule. In this manner, the people's allegiance was guaranteed by their traditional leaders. The colonial authority made a clear effort to consolidate traditional rulers' position as local chief executives, and this effort was extended to places where traditional rulers had not previously had this status¹⁷⁹.

Nationalists were discouraged from holding elected offices at the level of local councils, and this was one of the characteristics of indirect rule and the native authority system. The local councils were firmly under the influence of the traditional leaders, who frequently acted in a tyrannical and authoritarian manner while carrying out their duties, which mainly consisted of upholding the British colonial government's tax laws and maintaining peace and order. However, political parties in the nation started to assert themselves by the middle of the 1940s¹⁸⁰. Nationalists pushed for self-rule while also adamantly seeking adequate representation in government activities. They argued that the current Native Authority System was incompatible with the principles of contemporary secular and democratic local government¹⁸¹. In an effort to develop a system of democratic and effective local administration, the British government was also reviewing its local governance strategy at this time, the goal of the new system was to promote local political interest and the establishment of an effective and democratic local government as a

central component of British policy in Africa. It was acknowledged that building strong local governments was essential to the political development of the territories, that a democratic political system at the national level could not exist without strong local governments, and that if social services were to be increased, they needed to be run by an effective local government body that was directly accountable to the general populace. Since the old sociocultural environment was widely fragmented and there were few autocratic or authoritarian traditional rulers, the South-East of the country offered the British Government's new policy the most fertile ground for implementation. The Local Government Ordinance, 1950, was implemented by the Eastern Region in a historic move to replace the Native Authority System. The Ordinance called for councils to be mostly elected, with non-elected members not exceeding 25%. The elected councilors were to choose the council chairs from among themselves¹⁸².

The Western Region Local Government Law of 1952 was enacted to replace the previous Native Authority System in the Western Region. The law stipulated that local councils must have both elected and traditional members, with the proportion of traditional members to the total membership not to exceed 25%. The law additionally stipulates that recognized chiefs (i.e., traditional leaders) may be nominated president of the councils, but it gives them no special responsibility; as a result, they are only acting in that capacity. Traditional leaders were further prohibited from actively participating in local administration by amending the Local Government Law so that no traditional leader nominated as the council's president could also be appointed as the council's chairman¹⁸³.

In 1954, the Native Authority Law replaced the previous Native Authority Ordinance in the Northern Region. Several operational frameworks, such as Chief-in-Council, Chief-and-Council, and Federated Native Authorities, were allowed under the law. The Emir could veto council

decisions under the Chief-in-Council structure, as long as he informed the governor on each occasion. The statute stipulated that the Emir could not act in defiance of the Council's decision under the Chief-and-Council setup. It was difficult to distinguish any difference in the power of the Emirs between the Chief-in-Council and Chief-and-Council arrangements, though, because Islam has been practiced in the Northern Region for so long and with such a strong foundation that it had blended with that of traditional political authority - a type of Theocracy. In order to serve populations not directly under the Emirates, Federated Native Authorities were also established. Due to this system, which frequently combined villages with different histories and traditions, and an unstable headship structure, the internal harmony, and efficiency of the majority of the Federated Native Authorities were far from satisfactory¹⁸⁴.

The goal of the 1950s was to democratize local government in the nation, and because of the historical climb-down, this meant that traditional authorities in the South-East and South-West of the nation would lose their executive roles and gain participatory roles in local government instead. During this time, the level of power that particular traditional rulers had in the eyes of the local political players determined the extent to which they were involved in the decision-making process. The Chief-in-Council and Chief-and-Council were established in the North, but they were unable to eliminate the Emirs' local executive responsibilities. The argument that the institution of traditional rulership was in direct contrast with democratic values since the system was personalized had gained great traction before Nigeria attained independence in 1960.

Following independence, the governing elite persisted in attempting to lessen the influence of local traditional leaders. The democratic efforts in the Eastern and Western Regions between 1960 and 1966, when the military overthrew the government, significantly lessened the role of traditional leaders in local decision-making. The democratization attempt, however, appeared to

have been defeated by the Emirs' overwhelming power in the majority of the Northern Region, where they still held control over their Councils. By January 15, 1966, when the military took over, the political position of traditional rulers had a significant impact on how much influence they had¹⁸⁵.

The position of traditional leaders in local administration was significantly impacted by the military's seizure of political control in 1966. Customary/Native courts were taken over by state governments in the Northern States between 1966 and 1972, while the federal government took control of the police and prisons. The term "Native Authority" was discarded, and the existing Native Authorities were split up into separate local governments, but the Emirs continued to have a say in local decisions. Two-thirds of the members of the Local Government Councils must now be elected under new rules. Before 1966, traditional leaders played primarily a ceremonial role in local administration in Western states (including the Midwest). In areas of the Eastern States, where the traditional rule was still in place, the situation was the same.

The 1976 Local Government Reform was an attempt by the Federal Military Government, in cooperation with State Governments, to establish a standard role for traditional rulers throughout the nation during the final stages of the Mohammed/Obasanjo military administration, which ended in 1979. Through Traditional/Emirate Councils, traditional leaders were formally given consultative responsibilities in local decision-making while being shielded from politics. The elected local government councilors are not required to heed the traditional leaders' recommendations¹⁸⁶. Traditional leaders in Northern Nigeria, where they still had a large influence on local decision-making, were the ones who opposed these reforms the most, making the effects of the uniform advisory function more noticeable. The 1976 Reform just stated clearly what had been the role of the traditional rulers in the South-West and South-East of the country

for well over a decade. The reform now allocated their advisory roles. As a result, it seemed like the issue with traditional rulers was more prevalent in the North, where a strong dual authority structure between the traditional and the secular existed. The main issue in the nation as a whole, however, is the level of decision-making prominence that the government accords to dynastic traditional rulers in the context of a local government system that is progressively evolving and aimed at popular representation, citizen participation, and mobilization, as well as their role as informed observers and ceremonial participants in local government matters. Traditional leaders criticized the 1979 Constitution harshly when it was adopted because it did not include their function in local administration. Traditional leaders, especially those in the North, were not happy with their allotted advising and ceremonial roles. The Second Republic, which was from 1979 to 1983, saw intense arguments regarding the level of influence that traditional rulers might have in local decision-making through democratically elected local government councils provided by the Constitution. Before the military once again took over in December 1983, these discussions did not quite come to fruition.

The 1989 Constitution outlined the duties of a Traditional Council at the local government level, possibly in response to the desire by traditional rulers for constitutional acknowledgment of their role in local administration. In light of the 1999 Constitution's omission of traditional authorities' roles, this development cannot be seen as a strengthening of their influence over local government activities. The Nigerian Senate's continuing work to draft a constitutional position for traditional leaders is timely and headed in the right direction¹⁸⁷.

2.1.16 Resolving the Modernity Nexus and Emerging Local Government Systems

The second crucial subject of investigation is how traditional authorities and local governments coexist in the current Nigerian local government after cataloging the historical precedents that

shape the current status of traditional rulers in the nation. Local governments should obviously take the lead in the emerging order under the 1999 Constitution, as traditional rulers are still essential to achieving both economic advancement and political stability at the local level¹⁸⁸. The following factors may contribute to traditional authority's ongoing significance to Nigeria's local government system today. First, the mass of the population still lacks a mature political culture, particularly in rural areas. Second, many people still view conventional authorities as legitimate¹⁸⁹.

Third, efforts to institutionalize different local leadership systems in contemporary, reliable, elected local government institutions that would eventually win the support of the populace as a whole have mostly failed¹⁹⁰. For efficient local governance, institutions that primarily have a local base must complement one another's efforts. The country's working relationship between traditional authority and local government has been stated in an effort to ensure that this is achieved. Despite this, there are conflicts, and it is highly unlikely that traditional and local government institutions would coexist peacefully. The main causes are two-fold. First, traditional leaders, particularly those who once held great influence, are disenchanted with the current political system because it only gives them little consultative responsibilities in local government matters.¹⁹¹ In seminars and conferences on traditional authorities and local government interactions, several traditional rulers expressed their worries. The Oba of Benin and the Alaafin of Oyo, two prominent traditional rulers, have fiercely expressed their displeasure with how traditional institutions and their rulers have been pushed to the margins over the years.¹⁹² Unsurprisingly, traditional leaders have been more preoccupied than anything else with their determined efforts to increase their influence in local politics and macro-political issues.

Their interest in, and contribution to, the effectiveness of local government under the current regime have been significantly impacted by this stance¹⁹³.

The ego of traditional rulers is treated with a great deal of insensitivity by modern elected local government councilors¹⁹⁴. Even if they are assigned advising functions, essential provisions are not fully obeyed¹⁹⁵. Section 47 of Part VIII of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict, 1979 defines the following tasks for traditional councils at the local government level in the old Bendel State (since moved to the new Edo and the Delta States): a) The formulation of broad recommendations as counsel to the local government or to all local governments in the region; b) the synchronization and coordination of such local governments' development goals through consultations and advice given jointly.

c) To contribute to the upkeep of law and order (the Bendel State of Nigeria, 1979)¹⁹⁶.

In accordance with the same Edict, the Secretary to the Local Government is also required to give copies of all meeting minutes, agendas, memoranda, and other documents and information that would enable the President of the Traditional Council to fully understand the proceedings of the Local Government Councils to the President of the Traditional Council. When there are two or more local government councils under his authority, the President also has the privilege of checking all books, including the minute books of those councils, in order to gather the necessary information to fully carry out the duties assigned to him by the Edict. Traditional leaders have repeatedly protested that because the Edict only specifies an advising function for them, local government officials view the implementation of these provisions as meaningless and an unnecessary burden¹⁹⁷.

With different outcomes, this dynamic has further distanced traditional leaders from local government operations. Some traditional leaders have used the shoddy treatment they received

from elected local government officials as an excuse for their ambivalence toward carrying out their advisory duty in their local government districts¹⁹⁸. Additionally, contemporary local government players appear to characterize any role of traditional rulers in governance as an unneeded burden. The fact that state and municipal governments around the nation spend a significant amount of taxpayer money on Traditional Councils makes this all the more troubling¹⁹⁹. Traditional councils are legally required to receive up to five percent (5%) of the statutory revenue of local government regions for maintenance. When the military administration led by Sani Abachi decreed, this dependable source of money for traditional rulers was put in place²⁰⁰.

Traditional leaders contributed significantly and actively to the establishment of local government during the pre-colonial era as well as a considerable portion of the colonial period, but today the institutions has been relegated in terms of governance. Due to conflicting viewpoints and interests, the significance of traditional authority in the nation's modernizing polity is a hotly debated topic. In this sense, there are three schools of thought. According to one school of thought, the traditional rulership institution should be eliminated because it is anachronistic in the democratically elected local government system that is guaranteed by Section 7(1) of the Constitutions of 1979, 1989, and 1999, and the traditional rulership institution itself is anomalous. The other is a system built on authoritarian, individualized tradition, whereas the former envisions a competitive, participatory process²⁰¹. Supporters of this school draw the following conclusion:

The abolitionists have a point when they argue that the foundations of democratic local government and the institution of traditional rulership are incompatible, but their proposed solution does not seem workable. For starters, the widespread support for traditional authority,

particularly in rural regions, cannot be disregarded as unimportant, and the legitimacy and popularity of traditional rulers would not be easily destroyed by the dissolution of the concept of traditional rulership. The abolitionist approach is combative and might destabilize local government operations. There may not be a necessity for the institution of traditional rulership at some point in the far future when the polity has undergone full modernization. However, if the goal of developing a democratic, stable, and long-lasting local government system is to be realized, it is desirable to address the issues connected to traditional authority with caution and sensitivity at this modernizing stage²⁰².

The second school of thought promotes political improvement, arguing that traditional rulers should be left to engage in politics in order to strengthen their position within the current system and envisions a scenario in which traditional rulers significantly influence local politics. This strategy's adoption is sure to be complicated by a number of issues. Since democratically elected local government councils are guaranteed under Section 7(1) of the 1979, 1989, and 1999 Constitutions, no active role for individualized institutions in the administration of local government is contemplated. The duties of a Traditional Council at the local government level were outlined in Part II of the Fourth Schedule of the 1989 Constitution (the 1999 Constitution does not contain any provisions in this regard). Nothing in the Schedule shall be interpreted as giving a Traditional Council any executive, legislative, or judicial functions, as stated in the second clause of the Schedule²⁰³. The likelihood of the Constitution being changed to reflect the political upgrading strategy is quite remote. The public's perception of traditional rulership as having a high level of legitimacy is supported by the idea that it is a sacred institution. The traditional authority would become the focus of public scrutiny and lose their sanctity, which is one of their main sources of power if they were subjected to the political process and the petty

politics of society. While the goal is to provide traditional authorities a significant place in local government, their approach could result in the country's institution of traditional rulership failing²⁰⁴.

The retention school of thought, which supports the retention of the traditional authorities as participatory local government actors in advisory and non-executive capacities, represents the middle ground on the continuum between the abolitionists and the political enhancers²⁰⁵. Adopting the retention strategy, as correctly noted, would not only guarantee stability and continuity of the newly emerging local government system based on democratic and participatory principles, but it would also draw on the strengths of traditional authorities in the area of citizen mobilization and acceptance of local government policies²⁰⁶.

Involving traditional authorities in local government matters in addition to their other ceremonial duties would lessen potential hostilities and conflict between traditional authorities and local government actors²⁰⁷. While the retentionist approach may easily meet the needs of the moment, the future of traditional rule would depend on its ability to adapt to its changing environment and how cleverly it modernized in order to maintain the equilibrium between acceptance of modernity and erasure of tradition. Abolition is a radical alternative to current policy in some developing nations²⁰⁸. In Africa, for example, outright legal abolition of traditional authorities had been pursued by Guinea in 1957, Burundi in 1960, Mali in 1961, Rwanda in 1962, and Zaire in 1973 after initially opting for the retention policy²⁰⁹.

What is clear in all of these nations is that the system was overthrown but not destroyed. The fragments of the broken system continue to circulate in the macro and micropolitical processes²¹⁰. The evidence demonstrates that conventional forms of government have succeeded in various spheres of the polity even under a delegitimized state²¹¹. Such dual systems continue to

exhibit feudal orientations and rely on traditional bases for leadership in a variety of spheres of social life despite their apparent democratic pretenses, but their activism has had negative effects on the development of true democracy as well as political modernization.

Other nations, like Senegal in 1960, Upper Volta in 1964, the Central African Republic in 1959, Cameroon in 1959 and 1966, and Congo-Brazzaville in 1967, have adopted a more accommodating retention strategy, perhaps realizing the futility of the abolitionist strategy. These nations have tried to adapt traditional institutions to their modern political and administrative frameworks.

2.1.17 Traditional Leaders: A Product of African Popular Culture

This section has to contextualize its understanding of culture first. Culture is the entirety of a people's way of life, which includes all of their thoughts, feelings, and convictions as well as how they organize themselves for habitation, existence, and growth. It is the intersection of society's capacity to preserve, apply, and utilize its knowledge and wisdom from the past to the present as well as to save them for use in the future²¹². Simply described, culture is the collection of knowledge systems that have been deposited over time and have taken the form of a people's traditions and customs. Sometimes, widely practiced cultural customs, these traditions and practices offer the group's collective meaning and purpose.

Described as the inferior culture that remains after high culture has been established. Therefore, suffice it to say that popular culture, as a reflection of a people's endogenous mode of expression, has its roots in the traditional cultural activities that create meaning and order among a people. This definition of tradition refers to "a series of activities, typically guided by overt or implicitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which strive to implant certain ideals and norms of behavior via repetition, which inevitably implies continuity with the past²¹³.

Therefore, recognized, deeply ingrained, and well-liked traditions and conventions are the sources of traditional leaders in various civilizations. Tradition, which covers the full range of inherited culture and way of life, a people's history, moral and social ideals, and the historic institutions which persist to serve those values, serve as their foundation for legitimacy. A traditional ruler is described as "the traditional leader of an ethnic unit or clan who is currently the holder of the highest traditional authority whose title is recognized as a traditional ruler's title by the government of the state" in another definition²¹⁴. This concept is preferred because it promotes official acknowledgment and encourages the emergence of new traditional rulers for any deserving units or clans. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss the history of an African community without including its traditional leaders. They are a well-known representation of history, customs, culture, and preservation. They play a crucial role in guaranteeing growth and development in their communities by establishing a well-organized system of communication that guarantees the resolution of complaints and other matters of importance to the community's residents²¹⁵.

The traditional system of communication between the rulers always begins from the top to the bottom or vice versa. For instance, the Ward Head will only speak with his District Head; if the District Head determines that the issue is outside of his purview, he will then refer it to the Emirate Council or the local government, depending on the nature of the issue.²¹⁶ For a final resolution, the case can be brought before the state legislature. This strategy is closely followed to maintain discipline and order in the emirates at all times and to prevent any form of communication breakdown. The procedure described above speaks a lot about the traditional institutions' systematic and orderly means of upholding communal peace, wherein the leaders play a crucial role.²¹⁷ The traditional institutional system continues to be closer to the people, and

it is this closeness to the people that must be appreciated to succeed in a development process, despite the fact that it might be argued that it lacks popularity due to its apparent exclusive reserve to a particular family.

Giving the key actors—the people who live in the community—equal opportunities to reflect on and plan their futures is a crucial first step in assuring progress. This supports the requirement for competent local community leadership to channel the rural people's efforts toward their development. It is crucial to remember that there are two outcomes that could result from the identification and involvement of community leaders in community development.

Community leaders who are not accountable to their communities may hijack and short-circuit the entire process if development professionals do not clearly convey their intentions to them. One efficient approach to do this is to start by explaining the initiative's intention, objectives, and goals to the established institutions. Even though Nigerian villages appear to be peaceful and the people are friendly, development professionals should be aware that the lives of the poor are controlled by brutal power structures. As a result, they should consider how to put the needs of the populace first rather than providing a means for the rural elite to become richer and more powerful each day at the expense of the rural poor. Community leaders can both hinder and facilitate the process of communication growth, depending on the situation²¹⁸.

Any development project's ability to be successful depends on how well-equipped it is with monitoring and assessment tools. To guarantee that the targeted objectives are being met, monitoring and assessment are required. Similarly, to this, local leaders are always used in the process of rural community development. These leaders not only serve as project pioneers but also aid in influencing and inspiring their people to take action. Successful rural community development requires the participation of strong local leaders. This implies that when traditional

leaders who are also well-liked by the community are involved in the processes of commencing development, interventions will proceed well.²¹⁹

2.1.18 The Function of Traditional Rulers in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping for Sustainable Development

The people both inside and outside of their domain hold traditional rulers in high regard as the leaders of the people and stewards of the people's culture and tradition. People respect and accept their counsel and opinions on matters, and they consider their words to be laws. The reason for this is that they are respected and cannot be disobeyed since they are viewed as the link between the people and the gods and the ancestors. Therefore, the government must cooperate and partner with them to resolve any national crises or conflicts that could turn into acts of terrorism in Nigeria. They continue to be a powerful force in the community and consequently among their neighbors, safeguarding the peace and harmony of the people in their communities and surroundings, even their close neighbors²²⁰. In order to ensure that crises are resolved amicably as soon as they occur, they mediate disagreements and crises that occasionally erupt. The old rulers made sure that conflicts were resolved in a way that ensured that crises were effectively managed so that normal social institutions and the instruments of control and limitation referred to as "management" could function²²¹.

Because of the position they hold, the traditional rulers are viewed as the go-between for the populace and the gods and their ancestors. Their position is regarded as "divine and holy" in some places. As a result, they are respected for their ability to handle disagreement amicably and with objectivity because they have to answer to the gods for their deeds²²². The traditional leaders were looked up to for case adjudication and conflict settlement in the hunt for unbiased arbitrators.²²³ The Oni of Ife inspired the Yoruba Chiefs and traditional rulers to interfere in the

Ife and Modakeke land problems, which is what the traditional rulers did²²⁴Traditional leaders have repeatedly stepped in to address the Niger Delta situation in an effort to put an end to the militancy that has been disrupting the country's economic activity, particularly the oil and gas industry²²⁵.

The traditional leaders of Northern Nigeria have been working hard to find a solution to the Boko Haram issue, which has claimed more lives and destroyed more property there than any other disaster. They have also recently been reflecting on the issue facing farmers and herders²²⁶.When he said that "in the problems between these communities' efforts were also made by other neighboring and affiliate villages, to interfere," he was speaking about the land dispute between Aguleri and Umuleri and the efforts of the traditional rulers to resolve the dispute²²⁷This type of intervention typically involves making a plea to end the conflict in order to try to achieve a truce and comprehend the necessity.

Although the traditional leaders' actions might not completely or permanently end the disagreements, they are nonetheless effective in resolving the situation.²²⁸They could be palliative, which encourages parties to the crisis to exercise restraint by refraining from violence or other actions that might obstruct the peace process. In order to maintain the unity of the people and their neighbors, the traditional rulers continue to uphold peace and stability not only inside their own realm but also in Nigeria as a whole and their near neighbour²²⁹.When El-Rufai, the governor of Kaduna State, said that "the government will give constitutional tasks to the traditional rulers to oversee the security of people and property in their respective domains," he made notice of the efforts made by the traditional leaders in the resolution of conflict²³⁰. This is an effort to stop the ongoing communal fighting and death in several areas of Kaduna.

Traditional leaders serve as advisors to the government through the state council of chiefs, and they collaborate with the government to further its goals.

The traditional rulers' consultative role is crucial for nation-building because they are local leaders.²³¹ They are closer to the populace since they coexist with them. Their counsel on security concerns cannot be disregarded, and they can provide the government with direct knowledge of security issues. In some instances, the traditional rulers are given access to critical security information because of the people's respect and reverence for them and their implicit trust in them.²³² For their part, the traditional leaders pass forward such information to the government for action. Members of the Security Council of the state are the traditional rulers through the Traditional Council of Chiefs' representation. They contribute to security issues via this organization.²³³ Such efforts have aided in the preservation of peace and the upkeep of public order in Nigeria. The Federal Government's guidelines for local government reforms call for the establishment of a police committee in the local government areas where the traditional rulers are represented in order to recognize the roles of the traditional rulers in maintaining security in the local government areas.²³⁴ The committee must have frequent meetings to discuss and provide suggestions on all issues relating to the police and the maintenance of peace in the area, according to a section of the rules issued by the government printer in Kaduna.

The local vigilante, made up of strong men and area hunters, was established by the traditional rulers to maintain security in their districts. They receive funding from the neighborhood, and occasionally they work on commission.²³⁵ These local vigilantes patrol the neighborhood and keep crime down, preventing acts of lawlessness that can cause unrest and instability. They also share security-related information with security agencies. Through these methods, the traditional leaders support the work done by the government and security forces to maintain the stability

necessary for nation-building and national security. They need to be encouraged and empowered to continue in this regard for sustainable development in Nigeria²³⁶. Traditional rulers are bridge builders that could be used by the government to cement the existing relationship among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria²³⁷.

The North-South divide could not be eliminated by the 1914 unification²³⁸. Our traditional leaders, especially those in the top-tier geopolitical zones like the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Kano, the Oba of Lagos, the Oni of Ife, Alaafin of Oyo, the Oba of Benin, and the Obi of Onitsha, etc., can work their magic and end the North-South divide by getting together²³⁹. Relationships between them and their ability to speak with one voice on national problems will aid in lowering tension, hostility, and mistrust among Nigerians. Since their words have the power to strengthen or weaken the nation, their joining together and working together will contribute to sustaining the nation's unity, peace, and security. The traditional leaders' cooperation and participation will enhance the security of different ethnic groups within their sphere of influence. Given that the king is revered as the father of all, it welcomes visitors. The criterion for inclusive development in Nigeria will be the significance of the traditional chiefs' cooperation.²⁴⁰

Some schools have proposed that traditional rulers' cooperation helps hasten the development of a region.²⁴¹ The government can be urged to create infrastructure and businesses that can create jobs by the traditional rulers, who jointly act as the drivers of supply, demand, and distribution as well as the source of traditional knowledge. They can also encourage their followers to make investments at home in order to give people jobs²⁴². The efforts of the businesspeople and industrialists who have been inspired to act by the traditional leaders will result in economic prosperity for the region. This will be quite advantageous. Every community and nation strive to achieve this because it creates jobs for the people, especially the youth, and leads to inclusive

community development. It is noted that "under economic blessing, crime and criminality including kidnapping, hostage-taking, assassinations, armed robberies, endless strikes, and political violence either do not exist or are reduced to the barest minimum²⁴³.

2.1.19 The Impact of Traditional Institutions on Nigeria's Democratic Administrative Structure

Although, it is true that traditional institutions do not currently have the lofty status they did during the colonial era, it has frequently been falsely underlined that these institutions are in trouble or are fighting for their continued existence in modern Nigerian politics²⁴⁴. Personal humiliation, salary reduction, salary cessation, limitation, suspension, exile, and dethronement are some manifestations of the stress experienced by traditional rulers in modern Nigeria. However, it can also be claimed that all of these indicators are current universal occurrences impacting Nigerians on of all social levels rather than being specific to traditional institutions²⁴⁵. Therefore, the point here is that there is no crisis of relevance or survival for traditional rule in modern Nigeria. This is because it has remained relevant over time and has resisted numerous deliberate attempts to cancel it entirely. With regard to the colonial and military-imposed political structures from the colonial era to the post-independence period, what is happening to Nigeria's traditional institutions is simply a manifestation of our inability to design suitable political systems that will reflect our social, economic, and political realities. Despite this, Nigeria's traditional chieftaincy institutions and traditional rulers have persisted in wielding significant power and participating actively in all spheres of political administration, albeit informally²⁴⁶.

In the first place, traditional rulers in Nigeria, despite their lack of affiliation with any political party, play a significant influence in the selection and emergence of electoral candidates in

modern Nigeria²⁴⁷. Political candidates visit the palaces of the traditional leaders in their areas during electioneering campaigns in order to get the royal seal of approval and endorsement. All contenders who approach traditional leaders have their royal blessings because they are all from their domains, and whoever succeeds also has the support of the traditional leader. The majority of Africans had the opinion that Nigerians still hold traditional rulers in high regard, and that this explains why candidates for political offices seek their support during the campaigning and electioneering procedures. Examples of this abound during state and local elections in Nigeria while Presidential candidates make an effort to visit and win the support of top-tier traditional rulers around the nation, even at the federal level²⁴⁸.

similarly, political office holders in Nigeria try to secure the backing of traditional heads of state in order to legitimize their reigns and terms of office. When visiting any region of Nigeria, it is typical for presidents, state governors, senators, and other high-ranking political officials to pay respect to local traditional leaders as their first point of stop²⁴⁹. This showed that both the military and civilian regimes in Nigeria have acknowledged the importance of traditional rulers in legitimizing political regimes explains why successive governments in Nigeria have given the traditional institution such strong support despite the absence of a constitutional role for it²⁵⁰.

2.1.20 The Importance of Traditional Rulers in Security Management

Traditional leaders must be repositioned to have a significant impact on security issues in the nation, acting not just as mediators of disputes but also as guardians of security within their particular domains²⁵¹. Security has become a great challenge facing the nation today, and the integration of traditional rulers into a security network that will provide necessary stability is desirable. Because of their intimate relationships with the populace at large and excellent

positioning to help security agents neutralize threats coming from their communities, the synergy between traditional institutions and security agencies in Nigeria should be taken seriously²⁵².

In addition, Solomon Arase, a former IGP and a proponent of community policing have stated that since Nigeria gained independence, the nation has not yet put in place an appropriate national internal security plan. According to him, the goal of this strategy is to recognize, support, and accept community policing as a model for internal security in the struggle against crime and the maintenance of law and order. The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, NIPSS, organized a symposium on policing the Nigerian federation with the theme "Towards Integrating Community Policing in Nigeria's Security Architecture: Models, Policy Alternatives, and Strategies." Mr. Arase announced this there. "Mr. According to Arase, "Community policing is historically the rock on which policing and internal security management rests." He said community policing strategy should have different policing philosophies and avenues for enhancing public confidence and the relationship between the police and the population²⁵³.

It was asserted that one of the main causes of the lack of confidence between the police and the public is the force's incapacity to implement reforms necessary for the reorientation of the police psychology acquired from the colonial masters²⁵⁴. The Traditional Rulers played significant roles in recent times that helped defuse tension in crisis situations that could have spiraled into major crises in many parts of the country. It had been determined that police legitimacy draws from public consent and trust, and a lack of effective partnership between the police and the public can only sustain ineffective policing and insecurity among citizens. Therefore, one can conclude that some previous monarchs' interventionist measures have attested to how significant and beneficial the contribution of the traditional rulers are to local security management²⁵⁵. Traditional leaders have always been consulted and employed to resolve crises as they develop. In addition,

succeeding governments understood that working with traditional leaders was the best approach to win over the public's support for important current issues²⁵⁶. The defense of traditional leaders' particular status in the constitution of Nigeria should not imply a rejection of the democratic form of government. It means that old systems should be made to function alongside modern democracy in a way that allows them to reflect and build upon one another²⁵⁷. It is undeniable that without the balancing influence of our traditional leaders, we might not have survived as a nation. They have interacted with elected and appointed government officials on behalf of the people in a respected manner, and they continue to do so. They have consistently acted as steadfast pillars of stability in our society, helping to make our numerous and different populations manageable.

They not only represent the dynamic, changing ties to our past and present but also make us proud of our society's principles and originality²⁵⁸. Nigeria's largely diversified populations today have made it challenging to implement the idea of internal security. It is important to support the traditional chiefs in keeping an eye on events in their immediate territories. Traditional leaders still play a significant role in most communities' control of these areas' security. The conventional security institutions that once supported governance need to be revived. However, these might need to be changed to comply with civility rules. The 1999 Constitution does not grant traditional leaders' official status or security responsibilities, despite the fact that they are graded by State Governments and acknowledged in all states of the Federation²⁵⁹.

Governments at all levels continually seek to associate themselves with traditional institutions in Nigeria as a result of the knowledge that traditional rulers continue to serve as the focal point of the people's collective ambitions²⁶⁰.

However, the role of traditional rulers in the electoral processes, such as the emergence of political leaders and the legitimization of tenures cannot be overlooked, then it is incorrect to claim that the institution of the chieftaincy in modern Nigeria is experiencing a crisis of relevance. Since the collapse of the First Republic, the institution's biggest obstacle has been the fact that it lacks any constitutional support or authority²⁶¹. Involving both traditional leaders and government representatives gives the impression that there is untapped potential for recognizing and supporting the role that traditional leaders can play, but it also acknowledges that very little has been done outside of political debates about the position of traditional leadership relative to that of government²⁶². Apart from the technical comments of those influenced by democratic pragmatism, the majority of government representatives suggested that in response to the question of the function of traditional leaders:²⁶³

- Traditional leadership is a comprehensive style of management that handles problems as they arise in the community. The problems could be urgent, like when there is a natural disaster, or they could be social, like how to deal with HIV/AIDS or moral decay, or they could be administrative, like helping with the certification of residence for their citizens, or they could be related to lobbying or organizing voices to influence service delivery prioritization.
- They were seen to play a special role in law, one that "tries individuals," not to punish them but to mend ties. An illustration of how conventional courts ensure that the accused and the aggrieved come to grips with the problems in their relationship was given in the context of how talks are enabled in courtrooms. Depending on the personalities involved and the situations at hand, several approaches are taken.

2.1.21 African perspectives on democracy and traditional institutions

One significant conclusion that can be drawn from the opinions of the populace about traditional rulers in Nigeria is that those who hold political offices, whether in a lifelong effort to cede their positions of authority or in an electoral campaign that they were successful in, recognized the value of traditional institutions in supplementing their tenuous power bases²⁶⁴. Contemporary democratic government in Nigeria asserts its legitimacy, that is, acceptance and recognition, through the general election. However, it is also abundantly clear that, despite the Constitution's prohibition on traditional institutions from participating in democratic governance, traditional leaders have been complicit in election fraud and the use of traditional institutions to rig elections²⁶⁵.

Contemporary scholars and public policymakers in Nigeria usually state that traditional institutions have challenges with respect to recognition and relevance in the country democratic sphere. The suspension of the Emir of Kano (Sanusi Lamido) by the Kano State Government after it accused him of fraud is a clear example of how this relevance and recognition issue is measured in the humiliation of the personality and individual authority of the traditional rulers, restriction from public policies and local administration, and relegation of welfare policies for a traditional institution²⁶⁶.

Traditional institutions in Nigeria have been battling with the inability of Nigeria's system of administration to incorporate the role of the traditional institution toward a sustainable democratic structure, not only in her constitution but also in her lack of having a suitable system of administration²⁶⁷. The modernists claim that, in contrast to the colonial and military-imposed political structures of the colonial era and the post-independence period, the modern democratic system has not been able to take into account African social, economic, and true political realities.

From the discussion above, it is clear that traditional rulership institutions still exert a significant amount of power and take part actively in the political process at all levels of government²⁶⁸. Despite their lack of affiliation with any political party, traditional rulers in Nigeria have a significant impact on the selection and emergence of electoral candidates in today's Nigeria. Political candidates and parties ask for the king's approval. The political candidate and their political party go to the palace of the traditional monarch during election season for an unofficial act of endorsement. The political actions of Nigeria's traditional rulers

have persisted in modern Nigeria, particularly in the mobilization of the public and during electioneering processes including the selection of political candidates and electoral success.

The purpose of this is to support the claim that traditional institutions are constitutionally relevant rather than lacking societal relevance. President Muhammadu Buhari recently urged all traditional rulers to warn their subjects against vote-buying and vote-selling, which is a threat to free, fair, and legitimate elections and Nigeria's developing democracy. This is just one very evident example²⁶⁹. The pragmatic aspect is that Nigerian political leaders work to uphold their friendly relationship with the traditional institution after the election campaign because the country is a means of preserving their legitimacy, which is acceptance and recognition both within their constituency and among the subjects of the traditional institution. Political office holders honor the traditional leaders in a highly public way. They invite traditional leaders to a significant celebration or the launch of a community development project as the royal fathers of the day. Political office holders and aspirants associate themselves with traditional institutions to legislate their political will and approval because of the respect the community peoples have for their stools. Even the harshest detractors of Nigeria's traditional chieftaincy rule would concede that they continue to be the closest governments and most successful grassroots organizers²⁷⁰.

2.1.22 Community political obligations and the traditional African administrative structure

The history of the state is one of the core topics of political theory. Political philosophers are particularly interested in figuring out the underlying causes of the state's establishment and the institutionalization of government in society²⁷¹. However, a variety of opposing ideas have been proposed to explain the issue, much like any other occurrence in the field of political studies. It has been stated that despite the State being the most extensive political formation in human history, nothing is known about how it came to be. In the context of the traditional African state, religion offers an explanation for the state's inception as well as justification for establishing the ruler's authority. In traditional Africa, the development of nations might be attributed to either the beneficence of an all-powerful deity or the prodigious talents of a legendary or superhuman ancestor²⁷². They are all therefore theocratic.

This fictitious supernatural event serves as the basis for the origin stories of many different ethnic groups, including the Yoruba in southwest Nigeria, the Zulu, the Nyoro of the Bunyoro-Kitara dynasty in Western Uganda, the Tallensi in northern Ghana, and others. Although, there are many diverse interpretations of this legendary genesis in Africa, kinship serves as the link between these distinct notions of social and political order. The idea that all states descended from a single primal stock binds the populations in political union. The legendary origin, which has its roots in kinship, also establishes the boundaries of the ruler's authority as well as the rights of the populace. It also establishes the norms by which behavior is assessed, crimes are recognized, and punishments are assigned²⁷³.

The non-centralized or fragmented traditional state and the centralized state are the two basic types of states recognized by scholars of traditional African political systems. On-centralized traditional states become divided, stateless, acephalous, and devoid of a sovereign at that point. They are distinguished by the consensus-based nature of decisions on the distribution of resources, the creation of laws, and the resolution of conflicts. The dynamics of clanship served as the basis for social control methods in this governmental structure. The normative system is comprised of complex sets of established moral standards that were typically upheld by leaders of dispersed groups and, in more serious or subversive situations, by unannounced collective action. There are two key characteristics of this system²⁷⁴.

A visible democratic process is ensured by the presence of clearly established standards despite the absence of a hierarchical structure headed by a sovereign, as well as by the direct and outspoken participation of individuals belonging to clans, segments, and other social groups.

The "Tallensi" in Northern Ghana, the Ibos in Nigeria, the Baito in Eritrea, the Sukuma in Tanzania, the Oromo in Ethiopia, the Kgotla in Botswana, the Nuer in Southern Sudan, and the

Kikuyu in Kenya are a few examples. The political systems in the centralized states were more organized and complex. Examples include the Yoruba people of Nigeria, the Zulus of South Africa, the Barotse of Zambia, and the Baganda of Uganda. Asante and Mole-Dabgani are from Ghana. These states were set up by established, well-organized, and politically savvy governmental rulers²⁷⁵. They had a political ruler who was supported by efficient law enforcement and was routinely obeyed by the populace. State officials swiftly imposed sanctions for the violation of clearly stated legal norms. While autocracy was not unheard of, the king, chief, or political sovereign ruled by the law alongside his council of elders and advisors, and the rule of law was a crucial component of their system of government. When rules were broken that were deemed exceptionally severe or subversive of the entire political system, the monarch was ultimately responsible and subject to deposition.

The hierarchy of courts presided over by the king, the head chief, or the village chief frequently complemented the political structures. The notion of law in these states was, in substance, barely dissimilar from that of a modern state. There were provisions in most of these governments for citizen groups to participate in decision-making, either indirectly through the leaders of their clans' lineages or families, or more directly through a variety of organizations, such as the Asafo Companies of the Fantes in Ghana. Only members of specific royal lineages were permitted to be installed as king or chief, but in several states of Ghana, the institution of king-makers was comparable to the Electoral College in other nations. As the keeper of the "royal registry" and the one who determined whether candidates met the requirements for principal office, the Queen's mother had a crucial role²⁷⁶.

No matter their primitive or civilization, the resolution of political power is essential to the corporate life of any collection of people. To what extent, however, the state should be held

accountable to anyone as a sovereign or should it be considered as a moral and responsible agent has been a topic of intense dispute in political science literature dating back to Hobbes' time. The general opinion nowadays appears to be that while the state must be self-accounting in accordance with the nation's constitution and laws, those who wield its authority—whether appointed or elected—must be responsible for the decisions they make on the state's behalf. However, the rule of law and a commitment to the community's residents by the leadership were hallmarks of traditional African culture²⁷⁷.

The king or the ruling council held political power under traditional African government in trust for the people. For instance, in Yoruba traditional society, among others, rulers who misused their position of authority were banished and made to commit suicide. Similar to this, the Jukun and Attah of Igala are all considered to be Gods but only have legal authority. It served as a sacred representation of the people's harmony. The people's will be valued more highly than the ruler's ability to impose his own will. Traditional African societies had strong traditional economic structures that dealt with resource distribution in a similar way. The traditional African state had a communal political economy that the rulers held in trust for the people. The primary means of production, land, was acknowledged as society's property. Every community member had a right to use the land through the communal land tenure system. The ancient political structures and democratic values in this country are based on a communal system of resource sharing.

Africa (M). It ensured that local communities' customary land rights would be respected, that they would participate in decision-making, and that they would share in the advantages of allocating land and other geo-resources. For instance, the common diessa land tenure system in Eritrea made sure that arable land was distributed equitably among all of the village's households.

The system made sure that orphans, single widows/widowers, and spinsters had the right to partake in the village's arable land. Azikiwe refers to proto-welfarism as the original African economic doctrine²⁷⁸.

This proto-welfare is welfarist in its "purest form," ensuring everyone's financial security through the family as a unit of the clan and driven by each kindred's benevolence and humanitarianism. Proto-welfares hold the elders, who are referred to as the trustees of the traditional African societies, primarily responsible for finding solutions to the socio-economic problems of the society. They are the guardians of the law, and it is their responsibility to protect and uphold everyone's welfare in the community. According to the resources of each person, Azikiwe's proto-welfare has the ability to advance material prosperity for Africa. The proto-welfare, which is inspired by the idea of "living and letting live," promotes a system of care and assistance based on family²⁷⁹. It exhorts everyone to consider the welfare of every person. The characteristic of traditional African life before to European colonization and the ensuing disruption of Africa's economic and social life, this proto-welfare defines the idea of communalism.

In traditional African civilization, social cohesion predominated over individualism, and this dominance order was natural; as a result, societal peace developed rather than conflict or crises between the two. Traditional African culture was a web of interconnected fates and familial ties. Its inherent tyranny notwithstanding, this has been the basis for constructing nations. Politics, religion, and economics all overlap in traditional African society, which is an integrated system where all social institutions are concerned with the well-being of the group as a whole. It is characterized by fairness, respect for one another, sharing, and acceptance of the duty to work. It

was a happy, classless, pluralistic society that was distinguished by an undeniable great diversity of social organization systems²⁸⁰.

The acceptance of common ancestry, custom, and a shared belief by the populace that they will be able to realize their shared aspirations for peace and security, which are crucial for their physical and spiritual welfare and progress, both as individuals and as a community, gave rise to the political obligation in African traditional states. The duty to comply follows the same logic that norms and the greater benefit of society were used to justify governmental power. In traditional African civilization, myths served as the framework for the connection between the king and the ruled. Communities' willingness to follow advice coming from this source is a result of their acceptance of the myth of descent and the supervising function of the supernatural world thought to provide infallible truths²⁸¹. Therefore, for the purpose of encouraging good behavior among the populace, communities' rulers are respected and believed to speak the truth. The Diami people of Bornu, Yoruba, Jukun, and Onitsha, all in Nigeria, as well as ancient Egypt and other cultures, for instance, thought of their kings as deities.

The organic character of civilization is a traditional African belief. All members of the group share a common ancestry, value, and desire to preserve and advance it. Invoking the anger of the gods or ancestors, whose existence is a necessary component of societal order, is the definition of civil disobedience. In traditional Africa, there is evidence of the pervasive influence of religion and the dread it inspires in men's interactions with one another and their rulers, but there is also evidence of a strong sense of common origins and values, which serves as the foundation for a willingness to submit²⁸².

2.1.23 Southwest Nigerian Traditional Yoruba Court Model

The Yoruba lived by the motto of peaceful coexistence and cohabitation. They held the view that everything, good fortune included, should be shared. Before a person was considered an individual, they were first considered a member of society²⁸³. Therefore, the Yoruba sought to rid themselves of any animosity that would split their society apart. When the land was desecrated, they came together to purify it. Every married man was the head of his own family, as was previously stated, and it was his responsibility to quickly resolve any family conflicts.

Agba kiiwaloja, ki oriomo tun tun wo was spoken (Where there are good elders, there is orderliness). Prior to allowing the accused to make a defense, he would listen to the accuser first. According to Yoruba tradition, "*A gboejoetikan da, agba osikani*" (He who gives judgment after listening to one side of a case is an unjust elder). The family patriarch would endeavor to treat all parties equally and refrain from holding one accountable while holding the other innocent. With the resolution of civil disputes among the Yoruba, this was not the case. Both parties may have overreacted in these situations in some way. Always, neither could escape responsibility²⁸⁴.

One party, though, might be thought to be more guilty than the other. The mediator would point out to both sides any instances of inappropriate behavior. After pointing out each side's wrongdoing, he would either ask the more guilty party to apologize to the less guilty party or just issue a warning to both parties to avoid poor behavior that could lead to conflict in the future.

That was often how a civil matter would be resolved. However, if one party did not approve of the settlement, they might report the matter to OloriEbi and make an appeal to his "court." In a large family, the OloriEbi was typically the oldest male. The homes of members of the same extended family were constructed around the property of their ancestors. The members of the extended family may be related via blood or marriage²⁸⁵.

The Yoruba believed that blood was holy and never intended to act in a way that would harm a family member or close friend. Blood was thicker than water to them. The family would unite to placate the shared ancestors if any member of the family profaned the "common blood" (alajobi). Every adult, married or single, had the right to be present and participate in the discussion in the "court" of the Olori Ebi, which acted as the "court of appeal" to the "court" of the nuclear family. The Olori Ebi served as the "judge," trying to be fair to all parties and basing his decisions solely on their contributions. The accuser or appellant would lay out their complaints and summon witnesses, and then the accused party would do the same and call witnesses. Each presenter was required to squat (male presenters) or kneel (female presenters) throughout the presentation of their cases as a sign of respect to the elders. The Olori Ebi would hear both sides and then ask the adult family members present to remark on the evidence²⁸⁶.

Olori Ebi was tasked with compiling the mediators' inputs and resolving the dispute. The adjudicator's remarks may include factual contributions or fact-finding queries. Sometimes a dinner gathering came after the agreement was reached to reestablish the family's, mutual love. Before they ate or drank, they poured libations to please their ancestors. Olori Ebi's "court" has jurisdiction over civil cases. If two or more extended families were involved, the Olori Adugbo's court would be assigned to hear the matter. Each quarter, or Adugbo, was made up of numerous compounds called Agbole that might or might not have been related through marriage or blood²⁸⁷.

In the Oba's court, the Olori Adugbo served as the ward's representative chief. He had the Oba's blessing and recognition, and he reserved the right to launch preliminary inquiries in criminal matters. He had the ability to render judgment in cases of subtle thievery, adultery, and occasionally witchcraft. His court received all appeals from *Olori Ebi's* "court."

He was typically expected to render judgment alongside some *Olori*

Adugbo, whose members weren't involved in the current legal dispute. The audience for this "court" could consist of every person inside or outside the quarter.

As at the *Olori Ebi's* "court," case presentations were conducted crouching or kneeling for women (male). Nobody made a case while seated or while standing. Everyone was expected to respect the seniors. The quarter head's court case presentation was the same. Every adult present had the right to cross-examine either the witnesses or the litigants after hearing the parties' witnesses and their own. The quarter heads detailed the contributions of the other adults present with a focus on the amicable resolution of the dispute. The decision would be made by him: *Enu agba lobiti n gbo* (Elders have the final say). The *Olori Adugbo* had the authority to fine the more guilty party, while the less guilty person might not get any punishment. However, both parties received fines during the colonial era; the more guilty party was required to pay more money into the funds of the town. Any appeals from the *Olori Adugbo's* court were considered by the Oba's court. The *Olori Adugbo*, as the chief of the town, would preside over the Oba's court, but he would have to defer to the other chiefs in matters that concerned his district. He typically gave each party a quick introduction. After hearing from the parties and his chiefs' arguments, the Oba made a decision. With the exception of situations when a decision was made in a town that was ruled by a more superior town, whatever decision was reached was final. A party that had been wronged in court had the option of appealing to the king's court. Cases were often handled informally and in accordance with the conditions in Yoruba courts. The marketplace or the oba's palace, for instance, could have served as the site of the court. For this reason, the marketplace was always located in front of the Oba's palace. In a case without a dignitary, the defendant and the accuser were present during the criminal trial²⁸⁸.

The defendant would defend himself after being personally confronted by the accuser. Igbimo members would investigate the two parties. A witness would be called. After giving the situation great thought, the most senior chief, or perhaps the Oba himself, would summarize the conclusions. If there were no witnesses or if the facts of the case were not properly established, the accused would be left to their conscience. The victim, however, can be made to go through an experience or swear an oath. In general, there's a good probability you'll think an oath has supernatural strength. The decision was then left up to the deities of the area, who the public thought would curse anybody who lied to themselves after taking the oath. Taking an oath was more than just a solemn pledge to speak "the truth, the complete truth, and nothing but the truth," as is usual in Western courts. It was a self-imprecation with the power to punish. It was given the names of some feared gods or respected things that were thought to be magical happenings that represented the kind of punishment the oath-taker wished to undergo should he make a false claim. After a short while, if no disaster befell the person, society would absolve him and fully reintegrate him into society. But if the person taking the pledge experienced a catastrophe soon after the ceremony, he or she would be considered responsible and would face social stigma²⁸⁹.

It was especially noteworthy how well-tolerated female inmates were throughout the Yoruba legal system (apart from witches). A woman was infrequently formally accused of a crime before an Oba's court. She might have been sent to her father or husband for a swift reprimand if she had committed a crime, like theft. The spouse may just divorce her to end the conflict. However, if she were to be suspected of practicing witchcraft, she might be sent to the Polo deity, who was seen to be a fair judge of witches, or brought before the Oba/Ogboni court. She "could be beheaded, stoned to death, or compelled to drink obo" if found guilty (sassafras). The most

serious crime a woman could be charged with was witchcraft. It was customary to refer a situation involving a well-known person or the Oba himself to the Ogboni cult²⁹⁰.

Typically, before the investigation and eventual decision, that important figure may have been punished through rumors, chitchat, and songs. Additionally, he occasionally suffered physical assault. The Old Oyo Empire's attack on Basorun Gaa is a classic instance of such discriminatory behavior. The Ogboni were probably monitoring and directing the trial since it was taking place in open courts. Any choice the chiefs made was usually regarded as final because the bulk of them belonged to the Ogboni cult. If an Oba is found guilty of a serious crime or if his rule is repressive and unpopular, the Ogboni may bring charges against him. Oba was unable to speak for himself during the trial²⁹¹. The Oba was anticipated to "open the calabash"—a code phrase for being instructed to kill himself—when this occurred. His subjects might take to the streets to protest against him, and the leaders would convene at the palace gate to send word to the king that he was no longer wanted; and then they would refuse to answer his call. There was a potent charm made of parrot eggs within the calabash.

Any Oba doing this and being alive was forbidden. For the Oba, it amounted to certain death. In addition to the courts described above, disagreements that occurred in a public place might be resolved right away. Here, "street ad hoc court" is the term used to describe such immediate judgment. The mediator(s) may or may not be acquainted with the disputing parties. Typically, civil cases were handled as soon as they occurred. However, a criminal case could be brought before the Oba's court for decision²⁹². If it turned out to be a criminal case, it was the elder's responsibility to appease the offended party, safeguard the accused from mob action, and send the matter to the Oba for suitable punishment. The elder(s) present would often resolve a straightforward civil matter, such as a physical altercation where no one was hurt or killed. No

one would be found guilty, and no fine would be imposed. Such dispute resolution aimed to bring people together rather than determining who was innocent or truthful. The issue would be resolved amicably when each party's mistakes were brought out and acknowledged as being responsible in some way. For the party that was more at fault, the verbal reprimand was deemed sufficient punishment²⁹³.

2.1.24 Internal Crises Facing Traditional Institutions in Nigeria

Some of these issues are brought on by traditional institutions, while others are the result of deliberate design. Given this assertion, traditional institutions play a part in Nigeria's democratic relegation process. The Ooni of Ife recently urged cooperation between Nigeria's Obas in an interview that was conducted on September 16, 2018. His charge was based on his staunch belief that established institutions are capable of providing lasting peace and resolving a variety of problems. He declared that "if there were unity and harmony among our people and the traditional authority in the country, the fight for enviable growth in all sectors of life would be a simple endeavor²⁹⁴.

One of the main issues affecting traditional institutions that are self-inflicted is conflict over selection for the Obaship or chieftaincy institution, when the due process for selection based in the people's customs and traditions is neglected. This kind of self-inflicted conflict has a substantial impact on the loss of relevance and place in the modern democratic society. In view of the recent violent elections in Nigeria, the institution should serve as an example of the western democratic process. Such acts of indiscipline will only degrade the status of the traditional institutions when they are discovered to have taken place.

The proliferation of chieftaincy titles is another significant issue that these organizations face, and it hasn't helped matters. The sacredness and individuality of indigenous institutions have

been weakened by their abundance. It is currently legal for anyone to establish themselves as traditional kings outside of their state of origin in a "foreign realm," but historically, it was unusual for two traditional kings to hold power over the same region. A prime example is how Eze Ndigbo chieftain titles are frequently used in Nigeria. In a number of states, notably Oyo and Lagos, it is illegal for the holders of these traditional titles to use them²⁹⁵.

Similar to the previous point, these institutions must overcome internal conflict and rivalry among traditional titleholders over seniority in order to lay a solid foundation for Unity and institutional growth. Both the continuing dispute between Alaafin of Oyo and Olubadan of Ibadan over who will alternately serve as head of the Oyo State Traditional Council and the dispute between the Ooni of Ife and Alaafin of Oyo over which of the two is the more senior in Yoruba land are noteworthy. The conventional institution will not be helped in securing a constitutional position by this; rather, it will demonstrate their inability to manage political difficulties and controversies.

Undoubtedly, traditional rulers strategically engage in partisan politics by backing those they think will support their cause in an effort to strengthen their position in conflicts over who is superior to whom. Their expected obligation of impartiality in performing their royal duties is violated by this. Due to this intra-group rivalry, these institutions foster "tribalism," which may jeopardize national cohesiveness and integration. Traditional leaders no longer have power over land tenure in Nigeria thanks to democracy, which eliminates their ability to amass enormous wealth throughout the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

An example would be the Property Use Decree's enactment in 1978, which gave the State government control of the land. In addition to the monthly pay awarded to them by the state government, the 1984 law that gave traditional rulers who work in local governments One could

consider the 5% of revenue given to local governments as a form of payment. However, this is not the same way that some of them used to live. The bulk of local governments only give this 5% to traditional leaders when they are under duress from higher governmental levels, which happens rarely or never²⁹⁶.

One of the problems traditional institutions in Nigeria face is the erosion of the respect that surrounds them. They currently run errands for elected officials and are always willing to attend events, no matter how unimportant they may be. Traditional Rulers now parade themselves at government offices in pursuit of various favors, despite the fact that by custom and tradition they are not intended to be seen everywhere. They take the stage at political rallies and seek for office themselves in an effort to win over the powerful. Politicians frequently pass laws, impose other sorts of punishment on those who disobey them and support them, which has an impact on how physically developed their towns become.

The absence of constitutional obligations, a hostile work climate, a lack of official recognition, inadequate government incentives, unreasonably high public expectations, and other unpleasant circumstances also hamper traditional rulers. Under the 1999 Constitution, it is evident that local governments should play a leadership role in the emergent order, as traditional rulers are still crucial to the realization of economic prosperity and political stability at the local level. The following explanations may help explain why traditional authority still plays an important role in the modern Nigerian local government system. First, the mass of the population still lacks a mature political culture, particularly in rural areas. Second, many people still view traditional authorities as legitimate. Third, efforts to incorporate different local leadership systems into contemporary, reliable, and elected local government institutions that would eventually win the support of the populace as a whole have largely failed²⁹⁷. Thus, institutions that essentially have

a local base must complement the efforts of each other for effective governance at the local level. To ensure that this is achieved, efforts have been made to state the working relationship between traditional authorities and local government in the country²⁹⁸. Despite this, there are conflicts, and it is highly unlikely that both institutions would live in peace with one another. The main causes are listed as two. First, traditional leaders, especially those who once held great influence, are frustrated by the current political system because it only gives them little advising responsibilities in local government matters. In seminars and conferences on traditional authorities and local government interactions, several traditional rulers expressed their worries. The Oba of Benin and the Alaafin of Oyo, two prominent traditional rulers, have fiercely expressed their displeasure with how traditional institutions and their rulers have been pushed to the margins over the years. Unsurprisingly, traditional leaders have been more preoccupied than anything else with their determined efforts to increase their influence in local politics and macro-political issues. Their interest in, and contribution to, the effectiveness of local government under the current system have been significantly impacted by this stance. The ego of traditional rulers is treated with a great deal of insensitivity by modern elected local government councilors. Despite the fact that they have been given advising functions, pertinent provisions are not fully followed. Section 47 of Part VIII of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict, 1979, specifies the following functions for traditional councils at the local government level in the former Bendel State (now Edo and the Delta States): a) Formulation of general proposals by way of advice to the Local Government or all local governments in the area. b) Through consultation and cooperation, the development plans of these local governments are synchronized and coordinated. c) To contribute to the upkeep of law and order²⁹⁹.

In accordance with the same Edict, the Secretary to the Local Government is also required to give copies of all meeting minutes, agendas, memoranda, and other documents and information that would enable the President of the Traditional Council to fully understand the proceedings of the Local Government Councils to the President of the Traditional Council. When there are two or more local government councils under his authority, the President also has the privilege of checking all books, including the minute books of those councils, in order to gather the necessary information to fully carry out the duties assigned to him by the Edict.

Traditional leaders have frequently complained that local government officials view the enforcement of these requirements as unneeded and unimportant because the functions they are expected to play under the Edict is consultative. With different outcomes, this dynamic has further distanced traditional leaders from local government operations. Some traditional leaders have used the poor treatment they received from elected local government officials as an excuse for their ambivalence toward carrying out their advisory duty in their local government districts. Furthermore, contemporary local government players themselves seek to depict any function of traditional rulers in governance as a pointless burden. This is especially troubling because state and local governments around the country spend a significant amount of tax dollars supporting Traditional Councils. Traditional councils are legally required to receive up to five percent (5%) of the statutory revenue of local government regions for maintenance. When the military government of Sani Abacha ordered it in 1995, a fixed source of revenue for traditional authority was established³⁰⁰.

State governments regularly manipulate the statutory 5% budgetary allocation to traditional institutions, and they frequently fail to pay stipends to any traditional institutions they perceive to be critical of their leadership. Many traditional leaders are thus forced to submit and adhere to

the laws of the administration in -charge of the state level. As a result, traditional governing organizations frequently adopt the persona of a government stooge instead of an institution deserving of respect and dignity.

The constitutional provisions are considered to be another challenge for enduring institutions. Section 7(1) of the Constitutions of 1979, 1989, and 1999 guarantees democratically elected local government councils. Therefore, no active role for ad hoc institutions in the management of local government is envisioned. Part II of the Fourth Schedule of the 1989 Constitution provides a detailed description of the responsibilities of a Traditional Council at the local government level (the 1999 Constitution does not contain any provisions in this regard). The second article of the schedule provides that nothing in the Schedule shall be construed to vest in a Traditional Council any executive, legislative or judicial powers³⁰¹.

The Constitution is changed to match the political upgrading strategy is incredibly unlikely. The public's opinion of traditional rule as having a high level of legitimacy is influenced by the idea that it is an institution that is sacred. The traditional authorities would be scrutinized by the public and lose their holiness, which is one of their main sources of power if they were made to participate in the political process and the small-minded politics of society. Even if the goal is to provide traditional leaders with a significant role in local government, their approach may cause the country's institution of traditional rule to disintegrate³⁰².

2.1.25 Traditional Institution and the Centralized Societies in Africa

During the pre-colonial era, communities operated as distinct political units and were self-sufficient in their governance. They had centralized power, an efficient administrative system, and judicial institutions. They also had their own tribunals, and the native population was subject

to those courts. The Yoruba of Nigeria, the Zulus and Pedi of South Africa, the Bayankole of Uganda, and the Bemba of Zimbabwe are a few examples. The Fanti of Ghana is another. The growth of hierarchy and shifts in the degree of centralization caused small polities to become state polities. The majority of these varied from nomadic bands to intermediary forms to intricate, hierarchical monarchies. These cultures were characterized by a highly developed political consciousness and a sense of race or even national identity³⁰³. The centralized authority in these cultures came through chiefs or rulers. Every aspect of the community life was under their control, and they frequently had support from an established council of elders known as the inner council, as was occasionally observed. This "council of elders" assisted the leaders in running the societies by serving as their counselors. It was not customary for a chief to make choices on his own; instead, he had to speak with, and solicit advice from, his advisors before making any decisions that would affect how the village was run. He was likewise unable to impose his viewpoint on the council. He could try to convince them to see things from his perspective, but if they did not, he had no choice but to adopt the majority position³⁰⁴.

The advisory council was often composed of respected, senior citizens who were chiefs of the many wards or lineages that made up the village. They served as the chief's go-between and the community or tribe. They had two main responsibilities: first, they informed the chief of the issues that affected their people and the events in the various wards, advising and helping the chief to run the village. Second, they served as a check on the chief's use of power, prohibiting misuse of that position. In circumstances where the chief disregarded the revered norms and traditions of the community, they could criticize his actions or inactions and eventually demand his dismissal³⁰⁵.

The fundamental motivation behind village meetings was unanimity, as was also the case in a non-centralized society. The objective of every meeting, at any level, was to come to an agreement that would be embraced by everybody. As a result, discussions and occasionally disagreements would go on until a consensus was established. A key component of the native African system was the consensus. In the council of elders, the majority view did not matter, and most tribal systems required unanimity. Due to this, the African political system is known for discussing, sometimes for days, in order to establish consensus. The meetings occasionally ended early so that everyone could reflect on the problems at hand. Following this time, they would come together, deliberate, and choose the course of action. The Fanti people of Ghana used the following consultation procedure for making decisions that would have an impact on the entire community: "... the Fanti chief has to consult his councilors on all matters affecting the society... the council consisting of elders of the society." Rich and poor people both find themselves on the council because they were appointed as council members based on maturity rather than wealth. The advisors were in charge of making sure that any orders or decisions that directly affected the villages they were in charge of were communicated to the locals. The Fanti chief in Ghana is required to contact his councilors before making any decisions that would have an impact on the community. The council is made up of the community's elders. Rich and poor people alike are represented on the council because they were both appointed as council members due to their maturity rather than their wealth. The advisors were in charge of making sure that the people were informed of any orders or decisions that would have an impact on the villages that they directly controlled³⁰⁶.

Several attempts were made in the early years of US Trusteeship to integrate traditional leaders into the contemporary form of government. Early legislatures frequently established distinct

chambers for traditional chiefs. This arrangement was deemed unacceptable because it had essentially been abandoned throughout Micronesia. Legislative bodies today are made up completely of elected representatives. In 1975, there was a lot of discussion over the place of traditional leaders in contemporary government. A compromise was finally reached. A provision in the Constitution provides that, if necessary, in the future, a chamber of traditional leaders may be established at the state or federal level. However, the delegates did not create such a chamber or assign heads any other official position in the new administration. However, traditional leaders did contribute to the process of preparing for self-government. As representatives to the 1975 Constitutional Convention, some of them actively participated in drafting the document. A few years later, they were also called upon to visit various islands and advocate for Micronesian unification. They played a less formal function in the latter situation, although in locations like Pohnpei, they looked to be extremely good at it³⁰⁷.

A move in this way may seem to some Americans like a return to the islands' pre-democratic era, but the legal foundation has been laid to give chiefs an official position in the administration. The idea that chiefs will ever have their own position in contemporary administration didn't seem to be shared by everyone. The Council of Pilung and the Council of Tamol are the two chiefs' councils in Yap that come the closest to this. These councils can jointly veto any law that has to do with custom and tradition, despite being quite separate from the rest of the government structure.

Their veto cannot also be overruled. But it appears that the major function of the councils is to act as a platform for the discussion of matters that are not directly related to governmental power. Furthermore, majority of the people believed that state governments, rather than the federal one, should be the level at which traditional leaders are tied to contemporary politics. The national

level, after all, lacks traditional leaders. However, there hasn't been much of a push to give chiefs a foothold in the modern state government, not even at the state level. Contrary to what we observe in other South Pacific regions, this is a totally distinct situation. For instance, high chiefs have maintained a firm grip over the modern government of Tonga and Fiji through their parliamentary representation or their control over other political institutions. The chiefs are supposedly expected to maintain modern government, which does not appear to be a stretch³⁰⁸.

By campaigning for electoral offices, some chiefs are broadening their sphere of influence. Most people appear to think that their traditional leaders running for office is somehow inexpensive. They think the chiefs should maintain their distance. Since they would be held accountable for issues with the island's water and power as well as all other smaller disasters, the chiefs themselves are typically reluctant to engage in open politics. The chief must set certain boundaries between himself and such unimportant things because of his position. Chiefs were frequently chosen to serve as the magistrates of their islands or towns in the post-war years of the late 1940s, when the first elections were held throughout Micronesia. A lot of them soon assigned one of their instructors or another person who could speak a little English to serve as their standing. It didn't take long for the magistrate to gain his own support and establish himself as a more autonomous voice in the neighborhood³⁰⁹.

In other words, early attempts to combine the two political systems failed, and a two-track system between elected officials and traditional leaders emerged. The influence of elected officials grew as the contemporary political system evolved. The growing authority of these officials and their access to government financing played a significant role in this. Since then, it appears that modern and traditional leaders have established separate spheres of influence, with

elected officials taking the lead in development initiatives and the like while traditional chiefs have retreated to the realm of customary authority³¹⁰.

The chief gains authority due to his or her capacity to access, centrally control, and manipulate elemental force through a chieftaincy of supporters that is unique to them. An emerging political economy is essential to political strategy. Chiefdoms and governments alike need finance to augment the economy in order to function as properly societies. A description of the currencies, channels, and conversions used in the flows of goods used in finance is necessary to comprehend the nature of political complexity. A description of the bottlenecks where currency flows can be stopped and used to support and institutionalize political power is also essential. The staples, such as domesticated animals and grain, wealth, such as metal objects for display and weaponry, and/or money, could have served as the chiefdoms' and governments' official currencies. The chief's supremacy is supported by economic, military, and ideological strengths³¹¹.

These powers are fundamental in the sense that they are obvious and meet no resistance from members of society. With such authority, the chief could not easily turn down pleas. The ability to provide or withhold necessities and desires, such as wealth, food, housing, and luxuries, is the foundation of economic power. Lowers include chiefs, chieftains, chiefdoms, and chiefly confederacies. Force or the threat of force is the foundation of warrior power. Nobody questions muscle power. "A dread of retribution, which never fails, keeps fear alive." And the capacity to provide supporters with religiously endorsed explanations for compliance and support was the basis for ideological dominance³¹².

The establishment of "permanent" (long-lasting) institutions of governance, bureaucracies, and law, together with the creation of states, however, gave rise to a fourth source of political power

based on the first three. Elemental abilities tend to be distributed, or at the very least dispersed widely across the members of society.

As a result, a freeholder farmer may essentially function as an autonomous organization in charge of protecting his family, pets, and other belongings. Power consolidation efforts are challenging because, for a very long time in human history, leadership was small-scale, approved by the community, and mostly situational. A very open or at least corporately sanctioned access to all authorities was available in the egalitarian society that predated the rise of stronger chiefs, allowing individuals to maintain their independence of action.

Similar values are encompassed in the ability to keep and bear arms, free markets, and religious freedoms, according to the ideology of American governance. The Constitution's creators wanted constitutional restraints on the state's encroachment into local and private sectors because they recognized the negative effects of dominant state powers. In terms of the essence of power, this political opposition to the state represents a return to the prehistoric. However, in the political process, leaders at all levels state or lower seek to consolidate power by restricting access to its sources. They occasionally succeed and frequently fail. Their capacity to monopolize access to one or more sources of elemental power depends on the distribution and inventive design of bottlenecks in the political economics on which power is founded. They govern economies, restrict access to weapons, and construct religions. The movement of resources, manpower, and knowledge is constrained by bottlenecks, also known as choke spots. Bottlenecks develop in the economy when production is constrained by technological expertise or resource availability³¹³.

Available or when trade must pass through constrained channels as those found along roadways, caravan routes through deserts, or a small number of significant rivers. Chiefs operate as stationary raiders or pirates who demand money for safe passage in order to enforce a trade

bottleneck. The very changeable routes that goods are created and transported along are referred to as commodity chains. Production and trade are frequently challenging to regulate due to the extremely dispersed character of many commodity chains, yet circumstances exist or are created that make regulation viable. Most primary (independently evolving) chiefdoms and states share ideal bottlenecks in their agricultural bases, such as property systems. As a result of circumscription, which restricts escape routes and the capacity to demonstrate with one's feet, bottlenecks for warrior might are created. Similar restrictions are imposed on who can access or interpret sacred knowledge and its significance by the institutionalization of religion, which includes intricate rituals and a constructed environment of temples and sanctuaries. The flow of resources, people, and knowledge causes the sources of power to become intricately intertwined³¹⁴.

To safeguard the chief and his land ownership rights, specialized soldiers can be trained and supported with the surplus created by an economic bottleneck. With the use of specialized weaponry and training, the chief control the warriors. Religion establishes social order, including the proper pattern of property ownership and military loyalty. Finance of ceremonial events and temple construction further increased the chief's grip over religion, which justified power. The chief's power techniques involve an innovative and ever-evolving intersection of control flows based on bottlenecks that optimize surplus extraction, military might, and religious validity³¹⁵.

2.1.26 The Ibo Assembly and Traditional Institutions During the Pre-colonial Era (Non-centralized Societies)

Since this type of society was non-centralized, no one individual or group of individuals held the power to rule or govern, as was previously mentioned. In these cultures, the power to rule was

shared by all, and the majority held that position. In a descendant society, this form of government predominated. Societies that are descended from an ancestor, ancestral group, or lineage are developed. They had no chiefs or centralized power because of the way they had evolved. These civilizations' populations were frequently homogeneous, and their political awareness was frequently far more constrained to the needs and social mores of a small, close-knit group. Compared to primary communities, these societies have a greater and more ubiquitous sense of kinship. Families create and provide the ties that keep society together. In certain cases, they have institutionalized strategies for ridiculing centralized political authority through any means, including the use of oral storytelling, to prevent dictatorship. Their way of life and mode of subsistence (they were typically pastoralists) occasionally had a significant impact on the development of political institutions. This is why having a centralized system of government proved impractical for some nations³¹⁶.

The Igbos of Nigeria, the Degaaba of North-Western Ghana, the Masai of Kenya, and the Nuer of Sudan are examples of these cultures. These groups exercise political authority via a variety of techniques, including oral tales. Their way of life and mode of subsistence (they were typically pastoralists) occasionally had a significant impact on the development of political institutions. This is why having a centralized system of government proved impractical for some nations. The Ibos of Nigeria, the Degaaba of North-Western Ghana, the Masai of Kenya, and the Nuer of Sudan are a few examples of these societies. Through the extended family organizations, justice was always upheld by convening ad hoc councils of the parties' kinsmen and neighbors to settle any disagreements that could arise. The moot, or council, would deliberate and make a decision that would be binding on the parties involved. These lengthy discussions helped the group's

members maintain their kinship relationships. There were always procedures in place to hear disagreements in "courts" or "moots," with witnesses and oral petitions also present³¹⁷.

Through the use of two or more centers that were balanced against one another and implemented at all levels of the community, this system provided a system of checks and balances. The majority of the time, there were merely group representatives rather than holders of "office," which made it simpler to resolve disputes by compromises, which was their standard practice rather than passing judgment and imposing punishments. A handful of them had chieftains whose principal duty it was to carry out the people's prevailing will. This contrasts with rulers, who would exercise their authority over the populace and control them; leaders, on the other hand, only guided and showed the way. On occasion, leadership was passed down through ancestry, but on other occasions, it depended on the person's virtues, skills, and admirability. The Degaaba society serves as an illustration of how age was the most significant criterion, followed by the person's personal characteristics. The common denominator throughout societies of this type is that all necessary actions were defined by the people's collective will. The leader put the choices into effect after the "village in council" had made them³¹⁸.

It is the same with regard to the Igbo people of Nigeria's eastern area. They mostly live in what is now known as the states of Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, and Imo in Nigeria. Some can also be found in the states of Delta and Rivers. They have historically adhered to a set of beliefs in which there is no centralized authority. Their strong sense of individualism and staunch belief in the equality of all people allowed them to uphold justice through extended family organizations and ad hoc councils of the parties' kinsmen and neighbors. Typically, these disagreements center on marital and other domestic issues. The moot, or council, would deliberate and make a decision that would be binding on the parties involved. These lengthy discussions helped the

group's members maintain their kinship relationships. There were always procedures in place to hear disagreements in "courts" or "moots," with witnesses and oral petitions also present³¹⁹.

This system established a system of checks and balances that were used at all levels of the community and involved at least two centers being balanced against one another. Since there were mostly merely group spokespeople rather than holders of "office," it was simpler to negotiate agreements in conflict resolution, which was their standard, as opposed to passing judgment and imposing punishments. A handful of them had leaders whose principal duty it was to carry out the peoples' prevailing will. Unlike tyrants, who would rule and abuse their power over the populace, leaders just provided guidance and showed the way. Sometimes leadership was passed down through ancestry, while other times it depended on a person's character, skill, and admirability. By using the Degaaba civilization as an example, it can be seen that age was the most crucial factor, followed by the individual's personal characteristics³²⁰. The common denominator in societies of this type is that whatever action was required to be taken about any issue was determined by the collective decision of the people. The leader carried out the choices made by the "village in council." It is the same with regard to the Igbo people of Nigeria's eastern area. They mostly live in what is now known as the states of Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, and Imo in Nigeria. Some can also be found in the states of Delta and Rivers. They have historically adhered to a set of beliefs in which there is no centralized authority. They have a strong sense of individualism and adhere to the idea of universal equality. Everyone believed that they were equal to one another and had a right to participate in local affairs. Competition between families, lineages, and clans was valued in this culture. They eventually established a loose democratic system as a result, which was marked by independent federations of lineages or villages arranged through lineage chiefs, age classes, and title societies, although being based on

lineage structure. The collective village was at the top of the hierarchy of the society, which also included wards, sections, and extended families (signified by compounds)³²¹.

Governance in the traditional Igbo society (and even today in certain areas) was through two basic institutions; 'the Council' comprising the heads of the extended families or lineages (titleholders and wealthy persons were usually included in the council), and the 'village assembly' (made up of every full aged member of the village) usually depicted by the market square gatherings. The council was the controlling authority in the village, performing all the functions that a chief and his elders would do in the chiefdom. Though the council was a gathering of the elders in the village, the meetings did not preclude any adult male from attending, and such members had the right to voice their opinion, though this was rarely done³²².

The council would convene a "village assembly" at the marketplace for discussion when decisions that affected the entire village needed to be made. In such meetings, everyone was free to express their opinions and concur or disagree, but in the end, decisions had to be unanimous. No one or any decisions made at such meetings could be overruled by the council. According to Webster and Boahen, who goes on to say that "the village assembly was considered the Igbo man's birthright, the assurance of his rights, his shield against persecution, and the vehicle by which the young progressive imprinted their views on the old and conservative."

Finally, it can be said that these two main types of social, political, and legal institutions inside the native African cultures existed and thrived without any restrictions until the period of the European invasion³²³.

2.1.27 Colonialism in Africa (1450s–early 1900s) Gradual Colonization

The invasion and conquering of Africa by Europeans were not as quick and spectacular as had been imagined for many years, as has finally been realized. Instead, it was subtle, the result of

nearly a century of European contact with Africa before colonization happened under many guises. Thus, it was a methodical procedure. The effective year when it started cannot be ascertained, hence the year used above is merely a guide. This emphasizes the fact that colonization cannot be considered to have begun on any specific day or year. Different things happened that signaled the start of subtly colonizing. The interior was explored, the slave trade was abolished, legal commerce was established, missionary work was conducted, commercial posts were established, strategic areas were taken over and occupied, treaties with African monarchs were signed, and permanent settlements were established³²⁴.

Long before Europeans decided to use force against Africans, the indirect invasion of Africa had already begun. This was primarily accomplished through explorers who, while pretending to explore Africa, actually claimed unofficial zones of influence for their various nations. In preparation for the final takeover, missionary efforts were also covertly directed towards "taming" and "pacifying" the so-called savages and claiming the advantages of the "trinity" (Christianity, civilization, and commerce). In the end, under the cover of trade, religion, and the desire to "allow the savages to see the light," the Europeans began to slowly nibble away at various parts of the continent.

All of the aforementioned gave way to direct political authority in the 1870s. As the potential for extracting raw resources and agricultural products from Africa was realized in connection with the industrial revolution in Europe, the economic rewards appeared to be the most compelling motive for the Europeans to acquire political authority. Around the 18th century, the industrial revolution began in Europe. It was a time when Europe's economy and technology underwent significant social changes. The economy transitioned from being largely agricultural and rural to being capitalist and urban; from being based on households and families to being based on

industries. Raw materials and more laborers were needed as the economy shifted to one that was industrial and manufacturing-based. Hobson and Lenin both made the same claims in their separate publications. The idea is that the Europeans were obliged to go abroad and look for new lands due to overproduction, surplus capital, and underconsumption in the industrialized nations of Europe. Additionally, newer and larger markets are required in order to absorb the products produced by manufacturers, along with the demand for raw materials to support emerging factories. All of these ultimately resulted in direct imperial rule through attempts to monopolize markets and raw supplies. According to Lord Lugard, British colonial expansion resulted from the desire to promote trade growth, create new markets for British manufacturers, and utilize excess energy³²⁵.

The French, German, and Portuguese, together with the British, were expanding their spheres of influence in Africa and had started to exert governmental control over the areas they could claim³²⁶. As a result, there was friction among the European powers, which eventually prompted the German Chancellor to call a conference in Berlin to resolve the "African matter" and put an end to the rivalry between the continent's European countries. The "Berlin West Africa Conference" took place from December 1884 to the beginning of 1885. At the summit, representatives from the USA and thirteen different European nations broke up into regions of influence in Africa (without any input from Africa or Africans). This amounted to the drawing of internal and external borders for the continent without any consideration for the people, how they lived, or the effects this would have on them³²⁷. At the conference, it was decided that any claims to land in Africa must be supported by actual occupation. This naturally led to a rush towards Africa's interior, which at the time was still mainly uninhabited. The meeting provided benefits for both the military and the economy. It gave European trading companies the justification they

needed to visit Africa for business and, in doing so, demand that their countries provide them with military protection.

The British Empire extended its territorial claims in West Africa and unilaterally conquered Egypt in 1882. Between 1870 and 1914, the Europeans' race for Africa led to the addition of nearly one-fifth of the world's land area to their overseas colonial holdings. France replied by declaring protectorates over Porto Novo and the northern bank. This, it is said, was accomplished by the Europeans tricking themselves and others into believing that the Africans had truly given over their land, independence, and rights to the Europeans to be ruled by them. Untrustworthy explorers employed murder, genocide, extortion, threats, forgeries, and blackmail to obtain the "so-called" proof of this. Most of the time, all that was needed to divide up African territory was a quill pen "X" mark or a thumbprint on a piece of paper. Sometimes, the individuals whose thumbprints they stole were not even local authorities, and they were unaware of the full repercussions of their actions. To gain commercial advantages, all of these pretentious treaties with African chiefs and kings were signed³²⁸.

Additionally, these accords were eventually annulled by securing the military might of Europe, which was available to support the diverse business interests, as they acquired control of the societies' commercial interests through coercion. Many Africans initially believed that signing the treaties and beginning colonization would improve their affinity with the Europeans rather than be an act of occupation; nevertheless, they eventually came to understand their error. These chiefs and monarchs believed that the motivation behind the treaties was friendship, respect for one another, and fair commercial gain when they entered into the agreements³²⁹. They were unaware that it was a ruse on the part of Europe to obtain access to the immense business prospects that existed on the continent and within the various chiefs' kingdoms. Therefore, it has

been claimed that the colonial border markings on African countries that are still in place today are unlawful. This is predicated on the fact that Africans, who were the original landowners, were not given a voice or included in the border-drawing process. The borders were drawn arbitrarily and failed to arouse any sense of African nationalism; on the contrary, they promoted it³³⁰.

2.1.28 The Growth of Administration and its Organizational Structures in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Examining the pre-colonial political structures of the Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa/Fulani, and Kanuri peoples reveal a political order in which the traditional institution represented sovereignty and personified the political order. Colonially speaking, because the colonial administration used them as a tool of appropriation and oppression, traditional institutions in the diverse communities lost their pride of place. For this reason, it has been stated that "The involvement of colonialism robbed this institution of the original position as the personification of the pre-colonial state and sovereignty. The colonial authorities' indirect rule approach fundamentally altered how conventional rules and the people who lived under them interacted³³¹. As a result, colonialism fundamentally altered the status of the traditional institution; in contrast to the traditional institutional order, which was less susceptible to civil corruption, governance under colonialism became extractive, and the traditional institution became the target of the colonial regime's extractive tendency.

Even when the colonial government made an attempt to democratize the system by instituting the elective principle in 1922, it only served to make the regional Houses of Chiefs—which had been established in response to democratic change—instruments of manipulation in the hands of the newly emerging political elites. Therefore, it was evident that the standing of the traditional

institutions had been molded by both the indigenous political elites and the British colonialists so that they would not pose a competition or danger to the existing levels of authority.

2.1.29 The 20th-century Administration of British Colonies

Because the king and an aristocracy dominated England for a considerable amount of time, feudalism persisted for more than a thousand years. To comprehend the early administrative structure of feudal society in England, the aristocracy merged the current roles of ministers and administrators. It is crucial to look at the fundamental power structure. A division between the fieldworker and the administrator developed early on, and by the thirteenth century a secretariat had emerged, typically in a strong place where valuables were kept. The household of the Lord initially had a simple and essentially personal chief of direction and management to manage the household of the lord and the surrounding land. A steward, chamberlain, constable serving as estate manager, finance officer, and security guards would often be present.

However, William I of Normandy made a number of changes to the pre-existing feudal order when he established his control in Britain. He created the position of the Lord Chancellor, who afterward served as the king's chief secretary, chief priest, and curator of the royal seal, in an effort to fortify the Royal household and out of concern for the need for a more efficient administration. He carefully surveyed the nation, taking into account the people and all of the land's resources, in order to tighten his grip on his domain. Everything was recorded in a large book known as the Domesday book, also known as the Day of Judgment; this became the primary source in how the state conducted its business.

The British Colonial Government discovered that Nigeria already had an effective and efficient system of government as a result of conquering her and imposing their will after the invasion of Northern Nigeria and the fall of Sultan Atahuru in 1902. As a result, it was used for their

objectives. The indirect system of Administration is the name given to this form of government. The Governor-General sat at the top of the pyramid; below him were the Governors for each region, and within each region were provinces led by the representatives of the residents. Districts were created out of each province, and the district oversaw each district. Officer. The local chiefs continued to rule their people but were accountable to the colonial officers. For Native Courts and Native police were established for upholding law and order, and the native authority was founded. The defence was handled by the West African Frontier Force, and it was crucial that the pre-existing system of government was not changed. Emirs and local chiefs still play a significant role in Nigeria's governance today³³².

2.1.30 The Evolution of Administrative Structure (Post-Colonial Era in Nigeria)

The traditional institutions' colonial experiences were only recreated during the postcolonial era. The Regional Constitution of the Northern, Eastern, and Western Regions had Houses of Chiefs and, as a result, involved traditional institutions in partisan politics in regional governance, although the 1963 Federal Constitution was quiet on the role of the traditional institution³³³. The traditional institutions and the immediate post-colonial regional governance did, however, have a constitutional relationship. In particular, by the time of the military coup in 1966, the traditional rulers had not only completely submitted to the authority of the governing politicians but were also seen as rivals for power or as a means of securing and maintaining the politicians' own power.

Traditional institutions are thought to have a natural place within the purview of local administration or local government historically speaking. The organizational function of the national government, in terms of how it saw the utility or impediment of the traditional institution to the overall governance process, has played a crucial role in determining their

prominence or lack thereof in contemporary governance. In the transition from a traditional society to a contemporary one, the challenges of modern governance have a tendency to strip traditional institutions of their former administrative, legislative, and judicial functions in the governing of local subjects³³⁴.

Tradition and its institution-related issues are passed down or conveyed from the past. Most people unquestionably respect its authority, adhere to its rules, and practice its morals. Its behavior demonstrates continuity with the past, which is typically thought to connect generations. Tradition unites a collective's social and political systems; the former defines and govern show members of an ethnic group should live and interact, while the latter enforces adherence to the former by using power to win the people's compliance. This person has ties to African traditions, which saw leadership as permanent in the context of self-recruited oligarchy and political authority as frequently personalized.

The aristocratic flair of Nigeria's traditional authorities was and is still dominant over their subjects. Even the British-instituted warrant chief system, which was meant to help collect taxes and keep the peace in the Middle Belt and Eastern region, eventually evolved into the traditional form of power and took on an air of aristocracy and dominance that inspired respect and submission. The power of traditional authority is rooted in tradition given its deeply ingrained in-group beliefs and values, its powers should not be undervalued as they are intricately linked to spiritualism or cultural levels of giving meaning to people's lives and enabling them to feel a sense of belonging. Consequently, traditional authority obtains its authority by referencing customs and tradition³³⁵.

Traditional authority is arranged and structured in a hierarchy according to status. This status is a combination of characteristics including honor, prestige, standing, and power. The person's

position, rights, and obligations toward the other members of that order define it. Nigerians have a strong attachment to traditional authority because of the gap between the state and the populace caused by ongoing government arbitrary behavior and disregard for populace necessities. The term "traditional authority" as used in this context refers to the system of governance, which is presided over by a traditional ruler. A traditional ruler is a person with suzerainty over the local populace who, by virtue of his ancestors, sits on the throne or stool of a region and who was chosen for the position by the local customs and traditions. If you carefully consider the criteria provided above, it is clear that the only way to become a traditional ruler is by inheritance³³⁶.

Because of this, only members of the traditional governing families have a right to seek out positions as traditional rulers. Even if he possesses better rulership qualities than members of the "ruling" or "royal families, "The point is that, because it is a hereditary position, a person who does not belong to that traditional group or who does not have a traditional institution cannot become the traditional ruler of a particular locality or ethnic group. The exclusion of others occurs even though this definition guarantees privileges for some. Although pinpointing the precise beginning of the traditional institution is still difficult, it is undeniable that the majority of the nation-states dispersed throughout the area that is now known as Nigeria had a traditional institution that was crucial to their expansion, influence, and dominance over other societies. Every traditional institution is headed by the traditional king or queen who ruled the populace in a sovereign capacity. In the pre-colonial era, the majority of traditional institutions had well-organized, centralized governance, and access to the position of rulership was hereditary. Some regions had more distributed or acephalous historic forms of rulership³³⁷.

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The pragmatists, on the other hand, concentrate on their justifications for a "middle road" on the grounds that traditional leaders should be relevant for as long as the expansion of democratic local administration is insufficient for rural areas. On the other side, proponents of organic democracy regard traditional leadership as having its own place in governance, one that simultaneously addresses the social, cultural, and basic needs of the communities. Therefore, the two strategies occasionally put forth ideas that can seem to be advancing in the same direction but actually suggest a distinct legal and resource attitude for traditional leadership.

The post-colonial Nigerian regions of today are the colonies of Europe's direct descendants. During the post-colonial era, the traditional administrative system in Nigeria was severely weakened, leaving the areas quickly defenseless. As military personnel began to accuse the civilian government of corruption, ineptitude, and economic mismanagement, Nigeria started to fall victim to military coups. However, instead of resolving any of these political and

socioeconomic issues, Nigerian military men ultimately made matters worse³³⁹. The function and prestige of traditional leaders in post-independent Nigeria fluctuated, but they may be considered to have remained agents for maintaining our neo-colonial status under several regimes, disrupting the country's continuous development process.

The involvement of traditional rulers in governance gradually decreased after the military entered Nigerian politics in 1966. The traditional suzerains acted as a conduit between the rural populace and the state. They assist the government in educating and integrating the rural population into politics. They served as the guardians of the populace's traditional religion, fine arts, and culture.

However, the regional council of chiefs was established by the constitutions of 1960 and 1963, and some of them even served as regional governors³⁴⁰. For instance, Chief Obafemi Awolowo was the region's premier while Sir Adesoji Aderemi, the former Ooni of Ife, served as the Governor of the Western Region government.

Similar to this, given the political system, consider the scenario during the political storm between Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola. Though Chief Awolowo was elected a member of the Federal House of Representatives, so his deputy could replace him as the premier of the region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo objected to Chief Ladoke Akintola doing so. Then the crisis occurred, and Sir Adesoji Aderemi the Ooni of Ife was succeeded as Premier of the Western Region by Alhaji D.S. Adegbenro. Nevertheless, Chief Ladoke Akintola took the matter to court, won, and was subsequently reinstated as the Premier of the Western Region. The Traditional Rulers survived due to their usefulness in the new political environment rather than because they were recognized by the constitution. Additionally, because the parliamentary system had permitted opposition, they had to enlist the help of the traditional leaders to lessen

the weight of that opposition and to keep an eye out for people entering their community. Traditional leaders play a participatory role in local government administration³⁴¹. The traditional leaders served as tax collectors and were viewed as the government's conduit to the populace. They were employed to serve as chancellors of a few universities in Nigeria and were frequently called upon to mediate informal disputes on both a national and regional level.

When partisan politics were allowed throughout the second half of 1979, this alliance formation method eventually began³⁴². However, as was the case in the 1960s, those who rose to power as political leaders rapidly gave up on the notion of traditional rulers as partners and started treating them as inferiors. The Constitution also grants traditional institutions some limited authority to play specific roles in the political system so that each state has a council of chiefs. However, the threat of a crisis in Nigeria did not convince the majority of Assembly members to accept at least a significant role for this institution in maintaining the continuity of the public in the nation. As a result, they were no longer given special treatment as they had been and had no special responsibility for community administration.

2.1.31 The Challenges of Modernity and Traditional Institutions

Despite the fact that it is clear that traditional institutions no longer hold the same high position they did before the arrival of the colonizers³⁴³. Therefore, it is untrue that traditional institutions in the modern Nigerian administrative system are fighting for relevance and survival. The traditional institutions are still very essential in contemporary Nigeria, but it's crucial to acknowledge them in the nation's constitution so that their duties and responsibilities are made clear. The absence of constitutional duty or recognition for a historic institution does not imply that it is irrelevant or that people do not appreciate it. What is happening to Nigeria's traditional institutions today is simply a reflection of our failure to design a political system that will

adequately reflect our social, economic, and policy realities as opposed to the military- and colonial-imposed political structures of the colonial era and post-independence as opposed to our traditional administrative structure from the pre-colonial era³⁴⁴.

Despite this, traditional chieftaincy institutions and traditional rulers have persisted in exercising significant influence and participating actively in political administration at all levels of government in Nigeria³⁴⁵. In spite of their lack of membership with any political party, the majority of traditional rulers in Nigeria often had a significant role in the selection and emergence of electoral candidates in modern-day Nigeria. Politicians still believe that the populace is still devoted to their monarchs and mostly bent on the wishes of the traditional rulers, thus during electioneering, candidates flock to the palaces of the traditional rulers in their towns to acquire royal blessings and endorsements.

Governments at all levels always strive to associate with traditional institutions in Nigeria because they are aware that traditional rulers remain the center of the people's collective ambitions³⁴⁶.

The elevation of traditional rulers to first-class and second-class status has also been politicized. Another issue among the traditional leaders has been stoked by politicians in order to gain their backing during electioneering campaigns. Both the military and civilian administrations in Nigeria have recognised that traditional leaders play a significant role in the legitimacy of political governments.

• The Initiatives Taken by Local Community Institutions to Promote Inclusive Self-help and the Upkeep of Law and Order

Every community in contemporary society is made up of numerous diverse groups of people that work together in a challenging process to bring about peace and long-term advancement for both

the individuals inside the community and among them. In traditional administrative settings in African societies, as in the world of business, it is crucial to managing people in accordance with their historical background, cultural values, and social context in order to instil morality and discipline in the populace through indigenous administration, especially in the younger ones, in order to have a stable community free of criminal elements³⁴⁷.

Because they are helpful in the reconstruction of Nigerian societal settings and the African states at large, traditional rulers should be re-engaged in order to achieve all these beneficial goals for the society.³⁶² Community development administration is therefore crucial and strategic. It is true that conventional administration has come to be valued in every field of human endeavour as the cornerstone of the community's prosperity and, in fact, its very survival³⁴⁸. On this foundation, the many local communities continue to develop in order to support self-help initiatives that address their socioeconomic needs, including the upkeep of law and order. the maintenance of law and order, the preservation of society's values, culture, and conventions, and the effective maintenance of peaceful, mutually beneficial relationships within the community. Indeed, this instrument of human welfare is so significant that one can concur with the writers on administration who claimed that if our modern society collapses, it will primarily be due to the collapse of traditional institutions, which are supposed to be our source of knowledge for managing modern governance in Africa, and that the future of civilized government and even of civilization itself depends on our ability to develop the philosophy and practice of traditional institutions. Therefore, the administrative role of traditional institutions is to guarantee the survival of the current culture and values, safeguard people and their property, and uphold the rule of law. In this way, traditional leaders can be seen as the keepers of tradition and the stabilizers of society³⁴⁹.

- ***Pre-colonial Administrative Structure in Yorubaland***

In pre-colonial Yoruba country, governmental administration was built on the African idea that "the King governed but at the pleasure of the people." The criteria known as the constitution in today's modern administrative system, by which the activities of the rulers or leaders were subject to verifications, were set by "the people" in terms of the form of a political and administrative system that was then followed in Yorubaland. If the populace did not support the leader's reign, he could not govern. The Yoruba traditional political system functioned with an internal system of checks and balances and was a form of constitutional monarchy. When it comes to the Oyo Empire, the Alaafin served as the ruler's political and administrative head. The Oyomesi Council, which was presided over by the Bashorun, made choices on less crucial matters and forwarded those judgments to the Alaafin for public announcement. Alaafin made decisions regarding crucial matters during the Oyomesi Council session. Similar to how a president would rely on his ministers and advisers, the Alaafin sought guidance from Bashorun, Oyomesi, and Ilari in order to effectively administer the empire.

Additionally, there were some leaders whose contributions to the administration of the empire were crucial. For instance, it is impossible to ignore Are Onakakanfo's contribution. He was the (Army Commander), and Oyo had a standing army that was prepared to end its existence in the event of a crushing military loss. Alaafin's authority is subject to some constraints. For instance, Alaafin would have no choice but to end his life if he disagreed with Oyomesi and Ilari. Traditional Yoruba culture had a largely democratic and partially centralized administrative structure. This parallels western democracy in many aspects, where leaders are chosen and can be overthrown by the people. Structures of political administration in pre-colonial Yoruba. The interaction of the people and the rulers' mutual support gave rise to societies. In

traditional Yoruba communities, political power was based on rulers' respect and honor for the populace, and vice versa. This shows that old institutions had a core value of putting the needs of the people first, which contributed to high levels of loyalty and respect.

• ***Yoruba's Traditional System of Economic Administration***

The Yoruba people had their own methods for running the economy and conducting business with others, whether it be in the fields of art, agriculture, trading, etc. In the Yoruba traditional economic system, *Esusu* outlines traditional forms of collaboration in which groups of people contribute to impromptu savings and credit institutions for the benefit of their own and the community's economic interests. These relationships are primarily seen in trade, credit lending, and agricultural production. The majority of the West African nations, including Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Yoruba people of Nigeria, are thought to have adopted the custom once it spread from there. *ESusu* and *ajo* explain many types of informal finance methods. First, some institutions don't lend much at all and instead focus on mobilizing savings. Second, some lending institutions don't do much savings mobilization. Third, certain organizations participate in self-help finance and use a variety of savings methods, such as revolving accounts and those offered by legally recognized cooperatives.

The *esusu* cooperatives, on the other hand, function as follows: a group of individuals join forces to contribute a fixed and equal amount of money at predetermined intervals - daily, weekly, or monthly - enabling each member to collect the entire sum in rotation with the sole intention of enhancing their economic activities. A new rotation cycle is started once the pool has benefited everyone in the group. Typically, a ballot or random drawing is used to determine the order in which persons receive the money.

by agreement. The system was based exclusively on mutual trust, which ensures that individuals who have already received their money do not leave the group so that other members can also profit from their efforts.

As for *ajo*, reducing risk and maintaining patronage are greatly aided by the credibility of the *alajo*. Despite the establishment of official microfinance organizations in Nigeria, *Esusu* is still widely used. It is used by informal sector employees, market vendors, and residents in both rural and urban areas. In contrast, *Esusu* customizes its financial services to each group member's actual, everyday needs in order to foster economic development. In Yorubaland's pre-colonial age, the people primarily relied on the *Esusu* or *Ajo* to facilitate smooth business dealings and the fulfillment of economic wealth.

2.2 Theoretical Review and Framework

The reviews of theories in this subsection were discussed in terms of how different scholars have defined and explained the theories in relation to the topic of the pursuit study. The institutional approach theory, dependency theory, and structural-functional theory are among the theories considered in this paper.

2.2.1 Structural-functional Theory

Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parson, and Robert Merton are some of the main proponents of the structural-functional theory. The model's primary driving forces include social, structural, functional, manifestation, and underlying functions³⁵⁰. The theory's guiding principles include identifying the structural components of a system, describing the role these components play, examining the effects of social phenomena on the systems they are a part of, and examining how new structures arise. The model makes an attempt at functionalism, which focuses on society in terms of how its fundamental components—such as traditions, practices, norms, and institutions

perform. Making a straightforward correlation from Spencer's postulation depicted these social structures as "organs" that contribute to the appropriate functioning of the "body" as a whole³⁵¹. It emphasizes "the effort to ascribe each feature, custom, or practice on its effect on the operation of a theoretically stable, cohesive system" as strictly as feasible.

The maintenance of social stability, group functioning, and social evolution can be understood as the three fundamental tenets of structural functionalism.

The social structure of a society is made up of a number of interconnected and interdependent elements, such as social institutions, social standards, and values. The balanced and stable operation of society is facilitated by the distinct roles played by each element of the system. If any aspect of the structure changes to meet the changing requirements of society, the social structure will as well. The entire structure may fall apart if any element of it exhibits malfunction. In this context, the theory is predicated on the assumption that new bureaucratic principles should take into account the shared characteristics of the traditional, social, and politico-administrative systems of ethnic groups in Africa. It has been stated that the set of rules and regulations governing a representative of a corporate group may have been strengthened by the social obligations and moral obligations that surrounded them to assure the efficacy of the new bureaucratic structures³⁵². The constant honing of the non-Africanist administrative apparatus "seems to have an inverse relationship with the development issues facing Africa. Then, in order to ensure that public institutions in Africa have an effective and efficient structure functioning, it is inevitable that public administration and traditional administrative systems would be well interdependently fused, as in the United Kingdom and Spain.

2.2.2 The Institutional Approach

The institutional approach theory states that in order to achieve considerable development, the institutional framework for the planning and execution of rural development initiatives should be relocated permanently, not temporarily. The institutional method also takes into account in order to unearth additional facts. This theory states that there should be an institutional framework for the planning and execution of current rural and non-strategic rural development programs, where agencies are created to deal with specific situations and later become dilapidated when such programs were created to handle ends, or are scrapped by succeeding administrations³⁵³.

In the larger scheme of things, the theory offered support for the traditional institution as a mechanism or means of fostering local, regional, and national development. It argued that traditional leaders were essential for local government community development, which would lead to overall national development.

2.2.3 Dependency Theory

According to dependency theory, which was created from a Marxist perspective, the global economic system has a very unequal distribution of power and resources, placing the majority of countries in a dependent position with regard to industrial power.

Dependency theory provides an explanation for why traditional leaders in Nigeria were unable to fulfill their expected duties in support of a stable democracy. According to this theory, Nigeria's political instability is a result of the failure of political systems that granted elected political leaders a lot of authority at the expense of traditional institutions, as well as the denial of the functions of traditional institutions³⁵⁴.

2.2.4 Talcott Parson's Postulation of the Functionalist Theory

Being one of the main theoretical approaches in sociology, functionalism theory has its roots in the writings of Talcott Parson, August Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and others. Functionalism stresses societal consensus and order, emphasizing social cohesion and universal

values³⁵⁵. According to the functionalism theory's postulate, social systems can be used to analyze societies. According to this perspective, for any social system to work at all, four fundamental requirements must be satisfied, or to put it another way, the four fundamental issues known as functional prerequisites, which involve both the social organization and the demands of individual members of society. These include adjusting to the environment, achieving goals, integrating, maintaining patterns, and reducing tension

Parsons said that any society must ensure that its members are sufficiently motivated to play the essential roles and to develop the requisite commitment to the society's principles in order to maintain patterns and manage conflict. They must also be able to control the emotional conflicts that can arise amongst group members during routine social encounters. He went on to say that the presence of multiple people within a system is what causes the issues with upholding, inspiring, and controlling tension as well as integrating member action. In other words, it is acknowledged that social interactions result in societal issues. The social institutions that form the foundation of society, their functional relationships, and how human behavior is shaped to eliminate dissension and assure adherence to societal norms and ideals are all explained by Parson's functionalism³⁵⁶.

2.2.5 Assumption of the Theory

The theory emphasizes how similar human societies are to living organisms and maintained that just as a living organism must ensure that parts work together in unison to ensure survival and life, every part of the society must function in harmony, that is, equilibrium. Also, for any phenomenon to exist, it has a function it must perform in the society³⁵⁷.

2.2.6 Explanations of Talcott Parson's Postulation of Functionalism Theory to the Study

According to the notion, traditional institutions in Nigeria have long been neglected by the government and are even not mentioned in the constitution, but despite this, they continue to play important roles in the nation's overall growth. Importantly, they take steps to sustain long-standing social norms through a variety of means, including cultural events, chieftaincy titles, and festivals that foster communication between members of the community and those in charge of governance for progress and development³⁵⁸.

In another word, in line with the theory, the traditional institution in Nigeria has been actively been functional in collaborating with the government in the management of security challenges that plagued the country in recent times. This has been visible through the active involvement of traditional rulers and chiefs in sensitizing and communicating with people in their community and also encouraging the establishment of vigilante groups in their various communities. This is to collaborate and complement the efforts of government security personnel in the country towards the provision of safety to lives and properties in the communities³⁵⁹.

2.3. Empirical Review

2.3.1 The Traditional Rulers (Political Administration)

Traditional leaders in Yoruba country are referred to as Obas, Chiefs, and Baales. They are part of traditional political organizations and also serve as the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government³⁶⁰. The kings, as the supreme leader, attend festivals and carry out rituals to make an appeal to the dead ancestors in an effort to maintain their society stable and forward-

thinking. The monarch served as the people's representative and spoke for them in court, judged cases that were brought before him, and continues to fulfill his judicial duties today by resolving conflicts between his subjects or citizens³⁶¹. According to him, the monarch carries out some administrative duties on a daily basis and offers annual offerings to every worshipper of Orisa in the realm. The Ifa Oracle is consulted whenever an epidemic like smallpox, drought, or hunger breaks out and, in turn, recommends treatments in the shape of offerings to the angered Orisa. There are very few towns or villages in any Yoruba community where people do not worship ancestors or gods; they feel that by doing so, they are ensuring the society's peace by doing so³⁶².

2.3.2 The Roles of Traditional Administrative Systems of Selected Communities in Osun State Towards the Infusion of Fundamental Traditional Values into Nigeria's Mainstream Government

Before colonialism, there was an indigenous traditional administration system that operated differently in different regions of the country but had the same overall objective of directing a social structure for the organization of its people³⁶³. The literature has demonstrated that the Hausa/Fulani people in the country's north operated a highly centralized form of administration in which the emir serves as both the political and religious head of state³⁶⁴.

Additionally, it has been argued that the Oba served as the head of the monarchical form of government in the country's southwest³⁶⁵. Yoruba Baales who oversaw towns and villages and gave the Oba royalties at specific times of the year supported him in carrying out his tasks, and the Oba's authority was subject to checks and balances³⁶⁶.

Due to the fact that they typically do not have monarchs or chiefs, the Igbo people of Nigeria's Eastern region are republican and egalitarian. Due to the fact that they typically do not have monarchs or chiefs, the Igbo people of Nigeria's Eastern region are republican and egalitarian³⁶⁷.

Many age-grade organizations that carry out broad duties support the Council of Elders in their general duties. These include upholding law and order, acting as an army to defend the village from outside invasion, building and maintaining roads, and preventing elder council abuse of authority³⁶⁸.

It has been argued that traditional rulers and institutions were given various constitutional roles during the colonial era and the period before independence, with the system of indirect rule and native authority system, as introduced by Lord Lugard, giving traditional rulers a prominent role to varying degrees as it could be recorded that they were the major and key actors under the rule³⁶⁹. The traditional institutions during the colonial era provided an administration structure that made individuals organized and coordinated as well as maintained law and order in the society³⁷⁰. The analysis also revealed that traditional monarchs' power appears to have diminished since the country's transition to democracy and post-independence administration³⁷¹. Traditional institutions continue to be an important part of the population, commanding a high degree of loyalty and respect from them and acting as an unconstitutional authority and force to be reckoned with because there still seems to be a strong affinity among indigenous people for traditional rulers despite their lack of constitutional authority to govern³⁷².

Contrarily, it was widely accepted that in African nations, particularly Nigeria, development could not be said to have occurred without the knowledge or participation of traditional rulers in their various communities because they serve as the foundation for the projection and operationalization of new and developmental ideas in their various domains³⁷³. Being the keeper of culture and traditions that the people's way of life in their territory and domain are centered around, as suggested³⁷⁴. Since democracy's foundation and the post-independence era, there appears to have been an ongoing conflict between democratically elected public office holders

and traditional institutions over the institution of traditional rule's place in modern democratic government³⁷⁵.

With the exception of Ode-Omu, Oke-Ila, and Ifon as an extraction of the region, these issues are thought to be more prevalent in South Western Nigeria and hence serve as impediments limiting growth.³⁷⁶It would be extremely helpful to understand how conventional institutions relate to the domestication and operationalization of ideas in their diverse fields³⁷⁷.

2.3.3 Relevance of Traditional Institutions in Managing Inherent Conflict in Local Communities

Traditional leaders serve the economic, social, and political ambitions of their people, which have since become an integral part of our cultural history. Traditional leaders precede the arrival of British colonization in Nigeria³⁷⁸.It is impossible to overstate the value of traditional powers in fostering peace and stability³⁷⁹.The traditional authority is valued and depended upon for the advancement of moral ideals in society, in addition to being significant in mobilization. This is partly because these authorities are considered as the guardians of the people's customs and traditions, which gives them legitimacy³⁸⁰.

According to some claims, the public values the part traditional authorities play in handling and resolving disputes, as well as their leadership skills and approachability to common people. It has also been argued that traditional rulers play a significant role in resolving conflicts between individuals living in their respective domains. Specifically, they ensure that conflicts involving land, communities, and religion are resolved before they escalate into open hostilities that result in human homicide³⁸¹.As a result, the government relies on traditional leaders to maintain social harmony. By making sure that all interpersonal conflicts in each community are resolved or eliminated and do not develop into an ethnic conflict. Particularly in the Northern region, the

widely varied structure of Nigerian communities has further rallied support for traditional rulers as crucial partners in the security of lives and property³⁸².

Therefore, it can be concluded that some traditional rulers' interventionist policies witness to how significant and useful they have been and will continue to be on questions of security and development impacting any part of the country³⁸³. Additionally, it was confirmed in the literature that traditional leaders have always been utilized to diffuse crises as they develop. In addition, succeeding governments understood that working with traditional leaders was the best approach to win over the public's support for important current issues³⁸⁴.

Furthermore, it has been argued that despite the astronomical rise in the number of security incidents in Nigeria, and in the Northern region in particular, traditional institutions have not yet been fully incorporated into the country's security architecture, and that until they are, the results of the government's efforts in that direction will remain underwhelming³⁸⁵. Some have argued that traditional rulers are better equipped to manage Nigeria's security concerns than the traditional law enforcement authorities, citing literature that has clarified the major role played by traditional institutions, particularly in the pre-colonial era³⁸⁶.

In a different perspective, Governor Nasir El-Rufai claimed that traditional institutions are essential to the welfare and security administration of Nigeria, but blamed the usurpation of those roles on the 1976 local government reform that transferred those roles to the local government authorities. El-Rufai was speaking to members of the Kaduna State Traditional Rulers' council during their courtesy visit to his office³⁸⁷. Additionally, he identified the apparent out-of-control degree of crime and insecurity in the area and throughout Nigeria as the result of the failure to give the traditional rulers constitutional authority as the root cause³⁸⁸.

2.3.4 Synergy Between Traditional Institution and Government Towards Dissemination of Government Policies Vis-à-vis Improve Quality of Lives of People in Local Communities

It has been confirmed that traditional institutions of governance in Nigeria performed crucial roles in community development, dispute resolution, and firmness as they wielded strong political influence in their respective provinces prior to the establishment of the British administration³⁸⁹. It was evident that most people in Nigeria opposed the arrival of colonial powers and post-colonial states because they politicized the traditional institutions of power, which prevented them from fulfilling their traditional responsibilities of making decisions, promoting peace, and managing community affairs³⁹⁰. The influence of traditional institutions varies greatly depending on the community. In some places, youth organizations are against them, while in other places, local government officials undermine their influence. Traditional leaders are nonetheless more responsible and accountable than other organizations, although they receive minimal assistance from official sources, most notably the state government³⁹¹.

It is impossible to overstate the value of traditional powers in fostering peace and stability³⁹². It is generally accepted that traditional leaders play a crucial role in mobilization and are valued and depended upon to advance moral principles in society. This is partly because these officials are considered the stewards of the people's customs and traditions, which gives them legitimacy³⁹³. Traditional leaders serve the economic, social, and political ambitions of their people, which have since become an integral part of our cultural history. Traditional leaders precede the arrival of British colonization in Nigeria³⁹⁴.

Traditional leaders are thought of as aiding the state in upholding law and order in the localities and encouraging the peaceful coexistence of individuals from various religious, racial, and social backgrounds. The everyday lives of Nigerians are profoundly steeped in their culture, and their

traditions are essential to upholding their cultural values. They discovered that traditional leaders are more approachable to common people in times of need and difficulty than elected officials and other public servants. Traditional leaders also treat all of their subjects equally. Most people respect and have faith in their traditional leaders³⁹⁵.

The traditional leaders also mobilize community resources that are already accessible, which entails organizing a community's members to work cooperatively to ensure program sustainability and self-reliance³⁹⁶.

2.3.5 Challenges Affecting the Utility of Traditional Administration of the Selected Communities in Osun State

The progressive decline in the importance of traditional rulers in modern government has been caused by and continues to be caused by, a number of factors. While some of these issues are purposefully created, others are self-inflicted by the old institutions themselves³⁹⁷.

Disputes over selection for the Oba ship or chieftaincy institution, in which due process for selection is rooted in the people's customs and traditions are neglected, are one of the major challenges affecting the utility of the traditional administration and are self-inflicted⁴⁰¹. This type of self-inflicted conflict is significantly contributing to the loss of relevance and position in the modern democratic space. The institution should serve as an illustration of the western democratic process in light of the violent nature of recent elections in Nigeria. When traditional institutions are found to have engaged in such acts of disobedience, their status in society will not improve⁴⁰¹.

The expansion of chieftaincy titles has not made problems any easier, which is another significant obstacle facing the usefulness of these institutions. The sacredness and distinctiveness of indigenous institutions have been compromised by this proliferation.⁴⁰² Whereas it was uncommon for two traditional rulers to exercise authority over the same territory in the past, this

is no longer the case when individuals travel outside of their state of origin to assume traditional rulership in a "foreign land." An example in point is the abundance of Eze Ndigbo chieftaincy titles throughout Nigeria. The use of these traditional titles by its bearers has been outlawed in various states, including Oyo and Lagos³⁹⁸.

Without a doubt, traditional rulers strategically engage in partisan politics by supporting individuals they believe can support their cause in an effort to solidify their position in disputes about superiority over one another. This goes against their expected duty of impartiality in carrying out their royal duties. These institutions encourage "tribalism" as a result of this intra-group conflict, which could pose a risk to national cohesion and integration. Due to democracy in Nigeria, traditional leaders no longer have control over land tenure, which was a means of accumulating immense riches throughout the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

The respect that surrounds traditional institutions/rulers is eroding day by day in Nigeria, which is one of the issues they face. They currently perform errands for politicians, and they are always available to attend events, whether they are important or not. 403 Traditional Rulers, who by custom and tradition are not supposed to be visible everywhere, now parade themselves at government offices in search of various favors. To gain favor with those in power, they take center stage at political rallies and run for office themselves. Failure to support and obey the politicians frequently results in sanctions and other forms of punishment, such as withholding the funds intended for them, which typically has an impact on the physical development of their communities³⁹⁹.

The first obstacle traditional rulers must overcome in order to put their ideas for adopting policies or initiatives that can improve the lives of their citizens is financial. Finance is the foundation of community development⁴⁰⁰. Traditional leaders collaborate with their subjects,

thereby enlisting the support of the entire community in order to complete development initiatives that will benefit everyone in the community⁴⁰¹.

The statutory 5% allotted to traditional institutions is frequently manipulated by state governments, and they frequently neglect to pay stipends to any traditional institutions they view as being critical of their leadership. In this way, a lot of traditional leaders are compelled to give in and follow the ruling administration's rules. Because of this, conventional governing bodies frequently take on the role of a government stooge rather than an institution deserving of respect and dignity. The constitution's provisions are seen as another obstacle facing established institutions. Since democratically elected local government councils are guaranteed by Section 7(1) of the 1979, 1989, and 1999 Constitutions, no active role for individualized institutions in the administration of local government is contemplated. The duties of a Traditional Council at the local government level are outlined in Part II of the Fourth Schedule of the 1989 Constitution (the 1999 Constitution does not contain any provisions in this regard). Nothing in the schedule is to be interpreted as giving a traditional council any executive, legislative, or judicial responsibilities, according to the second provision of the schedule⁴⁰².

The respect that surrounds traditional institutions/rulers is one of the issues that traditional institutions in Nigeria are facing, along with their gradual decline in power. They currently conduct errands for politicians, and they can be called upon whenever necessary to attend events that may or may not be of interest⁴⁰³. Traditional Rulers, who by custom and tradition are not supposed to be visible everywhere, now parade themselves at government offices in search of various favors. To gain favor with those in power, they take center stage at political rallies and run for office themselves. Politicians frequently impose sanctions and other forms of punishment for disobedience, which have an impact on how physically developed their towns are⁴⁰⁴.

The likelihood of the Constitution be changed to reflect the political upgrading strategy is quite remote. The public's perception of traditional rulership as having a high level of legitimacy is supported by the idea that it is a sacred institution.

The political system does not work in conventional rulers' favor. Due to their connections to land ownership and sales, traditional kings had access to vast wealth. The Land Use Decree of 1978, which transferred ownership of land to the State government, however, changed this. In addition to the monthly salary granted to them by the state government, the 1984 law that gave traditional rulers who serve in local government 5% of the revenue allotted to local governments may be viewed as a sort of compensation⁴⁰⁵.

- **The Age Grade Organizations:** Age organizations are highly helpful native groups made up of people who are nearly the same age; the difference relies on regional needs, recurring events, or the societal demands of the economy or organization. The age-group organizations move through multiple stages, and each level has distinct yet publicly acknowledged statuses, responsibilities, and rituals. They perform police tasks such as maintaining the peace, guarding public and private property, arresting defaulters, and punishing criminals, among other things, including the construction of roads and public buildings and following the elders' directions in matters of government.⁴⁰⁶ Age-grade groups have seen a number of changes recently, particularly in the functions they play. The age-grade associations later changed into ethnic unions/associations organized for the attainment of particular goals or execution of certain developmental activities because modern militaries no longer perform the age-grades typical function of defense. The ethnic union looks out for the welfare of its members, and the numerous ethnic groups mentioned below emerged in the context of national politics. For instance, the Action

group was organized in 1951 as a result of the Yoruba cultural association "Egbe Omo Oduduwa," which was established in 1945 to encourage the study of Yoruba culture. The Ibo state union, formerly known as the Pan Ibo federal union, was established in 1944 in order to promote Igbo people's unity and education⁴⁰⁷.

- **Community-based Organizations (C.B.O.):** Since integrated rural development attempts to alter the community, local communities benefit from development. Without the recipient communities taking this seriously, it was noted that the government provided the amenities and services that are currently available in the community. It was also observed that prior attempts at integrated community development had less success than when the communities themselves were directly involved. The emphasis on rural dweller empowerment has changed in order to improve this unhealthy scenario. The key claim is that community empowerment through integrated rural development has largely been successful. This is the key to certain community-based organizations' glaring success in the management of community development⁴⁰⁸.
- **Community Development Association:** The terms "Community Development Association" and "Town Union" can both be used to refer to voluntary mutual aid organizations that were founded by members of a particular rural community who also lived in other towns across the nation and occasionally outside of it. It is clear that town unions, more or less, represent the most important organ of local government. In addition to fostering unity, the union helps to maintain peace. Community Development Associations are perceived as elite-controlled organizations focused on promoting local development and mobilizing resources for development projects. Because of this, community development associations carry out development projects fully and

commission them in different towns for the residents of those communities to use wisely. Occasionally, community development associations with religious ties also make significant contributions to community development⁴⁰⁹.

- **Women Associations:** It is common knowledge that women's associations have played important roles in the past and continue to do so today. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Committee on Women's Development (CWD) was established in Oyo State under the administration of Late Chief Bola Ige, while in Osun State, a number of women's organizations were being established. In 1999, the Women's Empowerment Program was established, with Chiefs (Mrs.) Ayo Ojewumi serves as its chair. In light of the (1999–2003 regime, "Local Govt. Areas, Osun State Govt. Retrieved 2014), women have been showcasing their leadership skills by managing Community Development Associations and Co-operative Thrift and Credit Societies, which was an example of women's power⁴¹⁰.

- **The Strength of the Institutions**

Since the institutions are genuine by-products of the communities' history, social evolution, and culture, they enjoy a high level of legitimacy, which is one of the administrations listed in this chapter's advantages. As a result, the institutions play crucial roles in the growth and administration of our communities and people in general, providing them with the political will they need to succeed⁴¹¹.

- **The Weakness of the Traditional Institution:** The Institutions have never kept written minutes or records of their discussions and decisions. Referring to the many precise decisions made on some topics in the past have become challenging as a result of this.

Additionally, there is the issue of internal political strife, particularly chieftaincy disputes, which has been causing delays in the implementation of community projects⁴¹².

2.4 Gaps in the Literature Reviewed

According to the literature, there is more knowledge available on the traditional administration of community development. These studies focus on some topics more than others; in particular, there is little information on how traditional institutions and government work together to disseminate government policies that aim to improve the quality of life for citizens in local communities and the difficulties that traditional administration rulership faced in Nigeria in comparison to modern administration. However, only a small number of these studies focused on the ways in which Nigerian traditional administration has aided and promoted local community development. In this research activity, we shall make an effort to close any gaps left by the earlier investigations.

Chapter Three

Methodology

This chapter focuses on the various methods used in data collection, the procedure followed, and the instruments used in collecting the needed data for the study. It explains the research design, study location, study population, sampling techniques, method of data collection, and methods of data analysis including ethical considerations

3.1 Research Design

This study employed a descriptive research design. The choice was predetermined by the nature of the research, which relied on collecting data through a qualitative approach. The need to report things the way they are, the practices that prevail, conditions that exist, points of view, and opinions of key interviewees and informants warranted the choice of descriptive design. This design was adopted to investigate the objectives with an opinion expressed concerning the subject matter under consideration. The study is descriptive as it seeks to narrate and present the situation as it relates to the influence of Nigerian traditional administration on the community development of selected communities in Osun State.

3.2 Population of the Study

The population for this study comprised of chief-in-council, clans heads, community development union/youth associations, and trade association(s) of Ode-Omu Community in Ayedaade Local Government Areas (LGAs), Oke-Ila Community in Ifedayo Local Government Areas (LGAs), and Ifon Community in Orolu Local Government Areas (LGAs), Osun State. The study engaged four categories of participants, that is, in Ode-Omu, Oke-Ila, and Ifon communities in Osun State, Nigeria. The first category of participants in the chief-in-council comprises the Oba and the high chiefs that manage the traditional administration of the communities. The *Oba* is the titled head of the selected communities that promotes the culture, influences community decisions, and represents the interest of the community on important issues with the assistance of the chiefs. The second category included the clan's heads who are the *Mogaji* in the selected communities. They are in charge of clan management and also assisted the chief-in-council and the king on matters that relate to the communities and their clans. They have titled traditional officers chosen from their clans to represent the interest of their clans in the communities and before the chief in council and the king in the selected communities in

Osun state. The third category captured the community development associations/youth associations which are in charge of specific traditional events and development in the selected communities in Osun state. The fourth category is the trade association, which are market women/men, artisan, and other recognised trade associations by the Chief-in Council in the selected communities in Osun state.

- **Study Areas**

The study areas were selected within Osun State based on the active involvement of traditional institutions in community development and promotion of regional integration in the Southwestern region of the country. The areas included Ode-Omu Community, Oke-Ila community, and Ifon community in Osun State.

- **Osun State**

Osun State is an inland state in Southwestern Nigeria. Its capital is Osogbo. It is bounded in the North by Kwara State, in the east partly by Ondo State, in the South by Ogun State, and in the West by Oyo state.⁴¹³ Osun State is home to a lot of tourist attractions based on its rich history and cultural base of the Yoruba. Osun state is considered a heritage site.⁴¹⁴

Osun State is divided into three federal senatorial districts, each of which is composed of two administrative zones. The state consists of thirty (30) Local Government Areas and Area offices, Nigeria's primary (third-tier) Unit of government.⁴¹⁵ The major Sub-ethnic groups in Osun State are Ife, Ijesa, Oyo, and Igbomina of the Yoruba people, although there are also people from other parts of Nigeria. Yoruba and English are the official languages. People of Osun State practice Islam, Christianity, and their ancient religion, traditional faith. The study areas of interest for this study are the Ode-Omu community in Ayedaade Local Government Area; Oke-Ila Community

in Ifedayo Local Government Area; and Ifon community in Orolu Local government in Osun state.

- **Ode-omu Community**

Ode-Omu is a town in the present Osun State, Nigeria, established in 1900 sequel to the implementation of the relocation treaty signed between the Ibadan (Oyo) and Ife in 1886.⁴¹⁶ This place is situated in Ayedaade, Osun State, Nigeria, its geographical coordinates are 7° 32' 0" North, 4° 24' 0" East, and its original name (with diacritics) is Ode-Omu. The settlement was established following civil unrest in the neighboring Yoruba cities of Ife and Modakeke in southwestern Nigeria. It has a population of 167,254 at the 2006 census.⁴¹⁷ To have a manageable as well as a representative sample, the research will be carried out in the main heart of the town, and some selected locations, which will give room for the spread and equal representation of each of the areas that made up the community.



Fig 4.1 Map of Ode-Omu Community

Source: Google map

- **Oke-Ila Community**

Oke-Ila is an ancient city in southwestern Nigeria. The people of the Oke –Ila kingdom speak a distinctive dialect of the Yoruba language called Igbomina which was the capital of the middle-aged Igbomina-Yoruba city-state of the same name. Oke-Ila is a city in Osun State, Nigeria. It is situated about 12 kilometres to the northeast, separated by the north-trending ridges and gorges of the Oke-Ila Quartzites.

Oke-Ila Orangun is currently the capital of Ifedayo Local Government Area of Osun State, southwest Nigeria. It has a population estimated (2006) census to be 35,000 suspected to be underestimated. It is located at 7.995N 4.986E, at an elevation of 568m (1,863 ft.) on one of the several mountains adjoining the eastern flanks of the Oke-Ila Ridge, a part of the Yoruba Hills.⁴¹⁸




Fig 4.2 Map of Oke-Ila Community

Source: Google Map

- **Ifon Community**

Ifon Osun is a large town in Osun State, Nigeria. It is the headquarters of the Orolu Local Government Area. It consists of many great chiefs and compounds. They include *Eesa*, *Laarapo*, *Asade*, *Ile Basorun*, *Ile oba*, etc. too numerous to mention. It is a great kingdom of the descendants of *Obatala* and has about 74 villages surrounding the town. The town has an official post office and a local government library. Ifon community is predominantly fertile and grassy forest suitable for farming and agro-forestry. It has a stream named *Owala* on its boundary with Ilie Township. It has many attributes for tourist attractions.⁴¹⁹



Fig 4.3 Map of Ifon- Osun Community

Source: Google Map

3.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques

- **Sample Size and Sampling Techniques**

The study employed primary sources of data collection. Primary data were collected through the conduct of an In-depth Interview (IDI) and a Key Informants Interview (KII). Ode-Omu

Community in Ayedaade Local Government Areas (LGAs), Oke-Ila Community in Ifedayo Local Government Areas (LGAs), and Ifon community in Orolu Local Government Areas (LGAs) Osun State were purposively selected for the study because of the community long term preservation of her traditional administration structure and its contribution to community development in the southwest region. The study made use of interviewees and informants, employing purposive and snowball sampling techniques. For the key informant interviews (KII), sessions were conducted for five Chiefs in Councils (*Oba, Balogun, Oosa, Otun, and Osi*) through purposive sampling techniques in each of the King's palaces in the selected communities totaling 15 participants. The purposive sampling technique is a form of non-probability sampling in which researchers rely on their judgment when choosing members of the population to participate in their interviews⁴²⁰. The purposive Sampling technique was selected based on the fact that the Chief-in-Council which comprised the study participants would be easily accessible in the selected community's palace without any difficulty. For the in-depth interviews (IDI), sessions were conducted for eight interviewees (two heads of clans, two officers of the Town development associations/youth associations, and four officers of the trade association, which include, market women, farmers, and artisanship through snowball sampling technique, in each of the selected communities totaling 24 participants. By definition, snowball sampling or chain-referral sampling is a non-probability technique in which the samples have traits that are rare to find⁴²¹. The snowballing technique was selected because of the fact that the study participants might not be easily accessible in a study location in the communities but through referrals from one of the study participants. The participants were selected based on gender, traditional status, community status, experience, and knowledge of traditional administration towards community

development of the selected communities in Osun state. In all, 39 participants were used for the study.

3.4 Description of the Research Instruments

- **In-depth Interviews (IDI) Guide**

This is a method of collecting information that is usually carried out in a structured way. It is an open-ended, discovery-oriented method to obtain detailed information about a topic from a stakeholder⁴²². The goal is to explore in-depth an interviewee's point of view, feelings, and perspectives. As per this research work, interviews were conducted with the heads of clans, community development associations/youth associations, and trade associations of the selected communities in Osun state. The interviewer followed a laid-down procedure through probing of participants. Interviews used to get firsthand information for this research using face-to-face interviews, which produced a high response rate.,. The interviews designed to provide useful information concerning the subject matter under consideration in the study areas.

- **Key Informant Interviews (KII) Guide**

Key informant interviews are qualitative interviews with people who know what is going on in the community. These experts can provide insight into the nature of problems and proffer solutions. It is also a way to get information about a pressing problem from a limited number of informed experts to understand the motivation and beliefs of community residents on a particular issue. The technique used to conduct key informant interviews was Face-to-Face Interviews. The purpose of key informant interviews is to collect information from a wide range of people, including the King, and High chiefs who have first-hand knowledge about the traditional institutional system and structure of the community.⁴²³ Key informant's interview, which was one of the instruments of the study, was conducted mainly for the Chiefs-in-Council, especially

the King (*Oba*), high chiefs, and the clan's heads in each of the selected communities to have a firsthand understanding of Nigerian traditional administration towards community development of selected communities in Osun State.

3.5 Validity of Research Instruments

To assess the validity of the oral interview, interviews were conducted with additional chiefs and a few community organizations that were not specifically designated for interviews. One of the research locations served as the site for the pilot study. It enabled the researcher to obtain first-hand information that was used to develop the research instrument for the study.

3.6 Reliability of Research Instruments

The first questions that were asked were repeated and asked again, collected for evaluation, and the responses got were comparable to the just ones; therefore, the reliability was assessed. This was done by repeating the identical interview questions in all of the study locations.

3.7 Method of Data Collection

The method of collecting data for this study was qualitative instruments, which involved Key Informant Interviews and In-depth Interview guides. A letter of introduction duly signed by the Head of the Department of Public Administration, Lead City University, Ibadan, Nigeria was presented and read out to each of the study's participants to understand the rationale of the study. The key informant and In-depth Interview guides were administered face-to-face to the participants who were prominent leaders in selected categories of the selected communities in Osun State. This allows probing deeper, especially on the issue under consideration. Although the interview followed a formal guide, the interviewees were allowed to express their views independently and will be probed further through questions that arise from the discussions and

will be conducted in the English language for the youth association and indigenous language (Yoruba) for the chief-in-council, trade association and head of clans. It will be done by tape recording and taking notes without losing important details. The qualitative guides were structured in line with the specific objectives of this study.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

Fieldwork data generated through the In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) sessions with the participants were analysed through content analysis. Content analysis is a qualitative research tool or technique that is used widely to analyse content and its features. It is an approach used to quantify qualitative information by sorting data and comparing different pieces of information to summarise it into useful information. Qualitative data obtained from the audio responses of the participants were read and re-read; listened to and re-listened to highlight and label important, descriptive, and informative issues that emerged for sorting and categorisation, and interpretation without losing details. The responses were transcribed and verbatim quotations will be utilised to describe the responses from the qualitative instrument. One major advantage of content analysis is that it is transparent and replicable. When done well, content analysis follows a systematic procedure that can easily be replicated by other researchers, yielding results with a level of high reliability.

3.9 Ethical Consideration

The research subjects in this study maintained their identity both during and after the study. Throughout the research process, the participants' rights and integrity were upheld. To prevent unauthorized use by third parties, the data collected were properly safeguarded. Additionally, no subjects were forced to divulge information important to this study.

Chapter Four

Data Analysis, Presentation, and Discussion of Findings

The chapter focuses on the analysis and presentation of data collected from the research study area on the influence of traditional administrative systems and structures on the development of selected communities in Osun state. The findings in the chapter were in line with the objectives of the study through a qualitative approach. The findings were juxtaposed with relevant literature in order to provide quality outcome for the study.

4.1 Socio-demographic Characteristics of Participants

Table 4.1 below showed that thirty-nine participants participated in the in-depth interviews and key informant interview sessions. The age of the participants ranged from 35years to 85years with the majority of the participants within the age ranges of 56-65years in study areas. Close to half (13) of the participants were equally from Ode-Omu, Oke-Ila, and Ifon Orolu communities in Osun State, respectively. For the participant's status, close to half (15) of the participants were traditional leaders, while equal (12) numbers of participants were youth association officers, and

trade association members respectively. For the occupation, the main means of livelihood of participants in the local communities in the southwest region were trading farming, artisanship, and civil servant, with a few involved in business, and entrepreneurial activities.

Table 4.1 Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Participants

Participants Characteristics	(N=39)		
	In-depth Interview	Key Informant Interview	Total
Age group			
35-45years	11	-	11
46- 55years	7	2	9
56-65years	5	7	12
66-75years	1	4	5
76-85years	-	2	2
Selected study areas			
Ode-Omu Community	8	5	13
Oke-Ila Community	8	5	13
Ifon-Orolu Community	8	5	13
Status			
Traditional leaders	-	15	15
Youth Association officers	12	-	12
Trade Association	12	-	12
Occupation			
Farmer	4	5	9

Trader	7	5	12
Business	1	3	4
Entrepreneur	2	-	2
Artisans	6	-	6
Civil Servant	4	2	6

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

4.2 Roles of Traditional Administrative Systems Towards the Infusion of Core Traditional Values into Mainstream Administration in Nigeria

Evidence sourced from the study areas indicated that traditional administrative systems have contributed immensely towards the integration of traditional values into democratic governance in Nigeria. This is more visible in the findings gathered from the participants of this study. In essence, from the narratives of the participants, findings were constructed within the contexts of the integration of traditional values and democratic governance in local communities, and specific roles of the traditional institution in the current democratic governance.

4.2.1 Integration of Traditional Values into Democratic Governance in Local Communities

Findings sourced from the participants indicated that traditional institutions in local communities have influenced cultural values in current democratic governance in Nigeria to a greater level. This synergy was notably determined by diverse community initiatives such as the community's annual cultural festival and celebration day. This was affirmed by some of the participants that the cultural festival and celebration day is mainly to attract community citizens in the diaspora and government personalities to showcase the beauty and value ingrained in the community's

traditional culture. This is also backed by the conferment of honorary titles to deserving community citizens and government personalities to connect them to the workings and processes of the traditional administrative system in Nigeria. This was stated by one of the participants that the honorary chieftaincy title is conferred on the government officials mainly to connect with the traditional system and value of the community: "...We facilitate the cultural festival and town day celebration which attracts the intelligentsia elite to the community. During this cultural celebration, traditional institutions give honorary chieftaincy titles to deserving government officials so they have a robust knowledge of how the traditional administrative system works and its value to the entire society (**KII, Male, King, 68years, Oke-Ila Community**).” This was reiterated further by one of the community high chiefs that: The infusion of cultural values into the current democratic dispensation is made possible through the annual event put in place by the traditional institution. This event serves as an avenue to mobilize indigenes in and outside the town for the development of the town and the government officials are not left out in the process of making the event a successful one. Honorary chieftaincy titles have been conferred on government officials for them to know the value embedded in the traditional institution structure (**KII, Male, King, 85years, Retired Teacher, Ode-Omu Community**).

The above assertions indicated that the traditional system of administration is progressively attempting to bridge the gap between itself and the modern democratic system through cultural events, festivals, and celebrations. This in itself serves the purpose of cultural relevance but much more recognizes the impact of its citizens and notable individuals in all spheres by honouring them with traditional titles. In what appears like coexistence between traditional and modern systems through this recognition and identity, it is needful to assess how much of the

traditional has become modern and how much of the democratic bear's relevance to cultural essence.

Similarly, findings also showed that the synergy that exists between traditional institutions and democratic governance is further stimulated by the state ministry of local government and chieftaincy affairs. This enabled the local community to promote norms, moral and historical background of the community through the Ministry to people in order to facilitate inclusive development in the community and draw democratic governance closer to the traditional administrative system: "...We integrate cultural value into current government through the ministry of local government and chieftaincy affairs and other related agencies. We do give government officials honorary chieftaincy titles in other to move them closer to the traditional administrative system and why it is useful for the management of the affairs of the local community (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 67years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**). This was also illustrated in the excerpt of a participant that:

Cultural values are integrated into the current democratic dispensation by disseminating information that contains morals, norms, and the historical background of the community through the ministry of local government and chieftaincy affairs (**KII, Male, High Chief (Ejemu), 65years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolo Community**).

This was corroborated by a high chief in one of the communities in Osun State that the cultural festival was designed mainly to promote community values and norms that facilitate moral behaviour needed for the management of democratic governance in Nigeria:

We usually give government officials chieftaincy titles in order to draw their attention to the values of traditional institutions. We integrate traditional values through the organized festival and the annual event organized by the traditional council to awaken the values and norms that later translate to moral behaviour which is a necessary condition in managing democratic governance and the expected development in the community (**KII, Male, High Chief (Otun Balogun), 62years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).

The responses of the participants indicated the local government, a tier of government that is set up for grassroots participation and bringing government closer to the people has proved to be a nexus between democratic government and traditional administration. This is achieved through the involvement and chieftaincy honour of local government officials, who act as intermediaries and spokespersons of the government before the local communities and an instrument that factors cultural values and norms into the moral fabric of democratic systems of government. Nevertheless, it is essential to note the level of identity and recognition given to traditional institutions. The traditional institutions have just been treated locally and are of less importance compared to other stakeholders of community development in the country.

Relatedly, findings further indicated that community initiative through the annual cultural festival is an avenue to promote societal values, norms, and behaviour patterns for youth in order to mold and prepared them for future leadership responsibility. This was affirmed by some of the participants that the dissemination of cultural values through the community cultural initiative is believed to be in synergy with government plans and programmes for the younger generation in the democratic processes and governance in the country. This was corroborated in the excerpts of some participants that:

The traditional Institution through the efforts of the high chiefs keeps monitoring the activities and the behaviour of the youths by cubing youthful exuberant in them in terms of mode of dressing and unbefitting hairstyles. Besides, honorary chieftaincy titles have been given to the sons and daughters of this community that is doing well and making our community proud across Nigeria and also to other government officials for them to have a sense of belonging to how the traditional administrative system works and its value **(KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 68years, Retired Civil Servant, de-Omu Community).**

Traditional institution influenced cultural value through the annual festival and the celebration of the town's days put in place by the palace. Cultural values are being exposed to the youth in the community in terms of societal values and norms and cultivate good behavior in preparation for future leadership post (**KII, Male, High Chief (Oba'ale), 60years, Teacher, Oke-Ila Community**).

The responses of the participants above indicated that it is evident that the modernism of the democratic system is becoming infused with traditional values through the connections between tradition and democracy. The assertions above reflect the effort of traditional institutions to uphold cultural values and norms through its chiefs, events, and structures to enhance the growth and development of its youth, in the moral and general sense. The traditional structures put in place by the traditional institutions helps to develop quality, social moral behaviour in youths towards succession planning, which however is considered a goal of the democratic state. However, this does not reflect the plans of the democratic government for the youth and the degree of inclusion.

4.2.2 Specific Roles of the Traditional Institutions in the Current Democratic Governance

In other words, findings indicated that traditional institutions in local communities in the southwest region performed certain roles as part of efforts to integrate cultural values into democratic governance in Nigeria. These roles were mainly performed within the context of an advisory approach. Some of the participants asserted that the advisory roles are visibly operated in areas such as political sensitization and dialogue for peaceful coexistence, dispute settlement, educational and skills acquisition for young children in the community. This was further illustrated in the excerpts of the community leaders that:

Most time traditional institutions performed advisory roles in the current democratic era in terms of political sensitization, routine dialogue with major political parties, and town hall meetings with political stakeholders on the need for peace and order after the election in the community. We also educate young married men on family understanding and stability and also encourage children on the essence of going to school because education is the key to life and

acquiring knowledge is the most important asset for them to be useful to society (**KII, Male, High Chief (Oba'ale), 60years, Teacher, Oke-Ila Community**).

The traditional institution of this community unites the people through the settling of disputes and major violent conflicts among them amicably (**KII, Male, King, 85years, Retired Teacher, Ode-Omu Community**).

The assertions above indicated that some of the roles performed by the traditional system and institution have a protecting effect on the pillars of the democratic society. The traditional system is responsible for creating political awareness, unification, and grooming of the local people, family life, and education as well as dispute resolution and conflict settlement. Nonetheless, the receptiveness of the democratic system goes a long way to determine the sustenance of political education/orientation and the maintenance of peace in modern society.

Similarly, the provision of self-help projects, indigenous orientation programme to local security personnel, and sources of the communication channel the community needs to the government are some of the roles performed by the traditional institutions in local communities in Nigeria, especially southwestern region of Nigeria. This role which was more advisory and in collaboration with government programme and policy was to ensure inclusive growth of the local communities and connect democratic governance to the grassroots in the country: "...Our roles as an institution in this community are to make sure that the community dwellers are protected against external attack and to facilitate development in terms of providing self-help community projects that add value to the standard of living of people. We provide knowledge of community policing through an orientation programme and the security workshop to our vigilantes and the hunter's group as local security personnel. We ensure there is synergy between local security personnel and the Nigerian police in terms of adequate protection of lives and properties (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 67years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**)."

This was also borne out by a high chief in one of the local communities in Osun state that

There are many roles and functions being performed by the traditional institution in this community in terms of uniting people in the community for the task of developmental projects and also dialogue among the political party members in order to discourage political thuggery which can be an obstacle to many of the developments project initiated in the community (**KII, Male, High Chief (Otun Balogun), 62years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).

This was further corroborated by a participant that traditional institution serves as a means of communicating community values and needs to the government in order to bridge the gaps in the community-government relationship:

Protection of lives and properties, settling disputes, and resolving conflicts among the people living in the community are the major functions performed by the traditional institutions in this current democratic dispensation. Another major role performed by the traditional institution is that they act as a channel of passing information about what the community dwellers are demanding from the government (**KII, Male, High Chief (Eleesi), 62years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The responses above added that apart from dispute and conflict settlement, the traditional institutions are also responsible for the education and channeling of information to the people. Kings, chiefs, and traditional councils are responsible for informing community members of the plans, agenda, and programmes of the democratic government through age grades, and town criers while they also find ways of informing the government about the needs of the community through government officials that are invited during their festivals, alongside other capable and notable individuals. Hence, the traditional system is instrumental in bringing government closer to the people; and engineering political participation.

Relatedly, findings also indicated that the promotion of law and order in the local communities was one of the roles performed by traditional institutions in Nigeria. This is done mainly through routine meetings with local security personnel in the local communities to complement the efforts of the Nigerian police in protecting the lives and properties of people living in the

community. This is done in line with approaches that do not negate the consideration of cultural values and practices that the communities stand for "...The specific roles being performed by the traditional institutions in these current democratic dispensations are many. One of them is the intervention of traditional rulers in dousing the tension of political crisis in the community. Besides, they also manage the insecurity issue in the community by establishing the local security outfit like the hunter's group, and Vigilante group to complement the work of the Nigerian police (**KII, Male, High Chief (Afin), 80years, Textile Merchant, Ifon-Orolu Community**).” This was further reiterated in the excerpt of a chief in one of the local communities that:

Maintaining law and order is one of the primary roles of the traditional institution in this community. There is a locally set up monitoring team to report any strange movement or activities noticed in the community and environs to the palace for necessary action. The High chiefs in their respective domains usually hold meetings with the hunter's group, Oodua People's Congress OPC, and the vigilante group on how to protect people's lives and properties for sustainable inclusive development for the people living in the community (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 68years, Retired Civil Servant, Ode-Omu Community**).

The assertions above indicated that the traditional institutions have also recognised that law and order must be maintained through the creation of security teams such as the Vigilantes, the hunters' groups and OPC members. These groups are responsible for regular patrol of the geographical terrain of the society, to control and prevent criminal activities that are capable of distorting social balance and order of the community, which is core to the democratic government.

4.3 Relevance of Traditional Institutions in Managing Inherent Conflicts in the Current Democratic System

The relevance of traditional institutions emanating from local communities in the southwestern region of Nigeria in terms of managing inherent conflicts in the democratic dispensation was emphasized by the findings in this study. Importantly, from the participant's narratives, the relevance of traditional institutions in managing inherent conflicts in the current democratic system was constructed within the contexts of the nature of conflicts and involvement of traditional institutions in managing inherent conflicts, and the complementary nature of traditional institutions towards government efforts in insecurity management.

4.3.1 Nature of Conflicts and Involvement of Traditional Institutions in Managing Inherent Conflicts

Findings from the participants indicated that the nature of conflicts that emanated from the local communities in Nigeria especially the southwestern region of the country is centered mainly on land disputes, and political crises among major political parties in the country. These conflicts distorted the peaceful co-existence enjoyed in the communities but quick intervention of the traditional institutions prevented the conflicts to degenerate into unmanageable situations. The traditional institutions managed these conflicts through selected traditional high chiefs by inviting the warring parties to the king's palace and employed proactive measures to curb the conflicts between the parties involved: "...Political fight among different factions of political parties and the land dispute are the major crises during democratic dispensation...Traditional rulers as a father to everybody in the community, quickly intervene by calling all political leaders and the major players in the politics to the palace for a peaceful meeting with the king and the high chiefs warning them to control their followers as a proactive measure to save the situation from getting out of control (**IDI, Male, 42years Artisan (Bricklayer), Ifon-Orolu Community**).” This was further illustrated by some of the participants that the collective efforts

of the high chiefs and Baale in line with the king's support makes the peace process between the aggrieved parties easy and thereby ensure peaceful co-existence in the communities:

The political crisis among the politicians and the boundary disputes between the neighboring community and marriage disputes are major conflicts in this community... The affected parties are invited to the palace by the high chiefs in charge of disputes and other unaccepted behaviours in the community. The main purpose of the invitation is to broker peace between the people that are fighting and just to rise to the occasion to nip the ugly situation in the bud (**KII, Male, King, 85years, Retired Teacher, Ode-Omu Community**).

The land disputes and political crises among the politicians and their followers are the major societal conflicts among the people in this community. The collective efforts and support that the high chiefs and the Baales usually render to the King make the process of settling any disputes among the community dwellers and the aggrieved parties possible which in turn generated peace and unity among the affected parties (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 68years, Retired Civil Servant, Ode-Omu Community**).

The responses above indicated that culturally, traditional councils are known to have the powers to adjudicate and preside over the matters of their people; while they also maintain boundaries of their territorials before it gets to court. Undoubtedly, the collective efforts of the leadership of traditional communities through the King and his Chiefs have been a quick intervention in cases of conflict and crises in family, territory, and political matters. The role of the traditional institutions is perceived as complementing and helping the democratic society to achieve its goal of peace and order, although, it is historically the duty of the traditional institutions.

Similarly, findings indicated that apart from land disputes and political crises, marriage conflicts among couples are one of the conflicts that occurred in the local communities in the southwestern region of Nigeria. This conflict among the couples most times resulted in domestic violence with unintended consequences to the family institution and the local communities at large. Importantly, the conflict among the couples is mediated upon by the traditional

institutions through a constituted committee to investigate and make a judgment that is satisfactory and without bias to the aggrieved parties. This measure employed by the traditional institutions have further ameliorated such conflict in the local communities: "...Couples also generated unnecessary disputes and later resulted in domestic violence.... traditional institutions invite the affected parties to the palace for a necessary remedy for the peace to continue to reign among the community dwellers (**IDI, Female, Women leader (Iyalode), 60years, Trader, Ifon-Orolu Community**)."

The findings are further supported in the excerpts of some of the participants that the traditional institutions ensure that disgruntled couples were reunited through the constituted committee of High chiefs, and demarcation lines were also set for such parties to douse such conflict from occurring again, which respected by the concerned couples:

The major conflicts that emerged in this community are mainly land disputes, marriage conflicts, and political crises among the politicians and followers.... traditional institutions settled the land disputes and domestic violence by inviting the parties involved to the palace and the chiefs investigate and the traditional rulers without bias would draw a line of demarcation with the parties involved and they respect the palace decision (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 67years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).

Farm boundary disputes among farmers, marriage crises, and political crises are the major problems in this community... traditional institutions set up a committee in the palace to look into the grievances and possible misunderstandings that may likely occur. The high chiefs in the palace constitute a committee and usually invited the family or individuals that need remedy or seek justice to the palace for possible reconciliation (**KII, Male, Eesa (Regent), 50years, Trader, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The assertions above revealed that through the intervention of the high chiefs of traditional administration, marital conflicts, even domestic violence cases are treated by mediation or by justice, to the end and seeks non-occurrence of such between the parties involved. This mediation approach by the traditional institutions also applies to land disputes in the local

communities. Although there are structures in the modern system that can manage this, traditional local administration seeks to make a quick intervention on such matters before it gets out of hand. The traditional system is a more efficient system of managing and reconciling differences in people based on shared socio-cultural homogeneity, which also lessens the burden of the democratic structure that maintain order and peace.

Relatedly, findings also affirmed that disputes on farmland and community land boundaries fuelled the conflicts that emerged in the local communities in Nigeria. These have pitched families, and communities against each other and also degenerated into loss of lives and properties in the local communities in the southwestern region of the country. Apparently, the traditional institutions intervened in the crisis due to the sensitive and destructive nature of the conflicts, by inviting the concerned and aggrieved families to the palace and mediated on the conflicts with the hope of ensuring peace and order in the communities: "...Conflicts and disputes militating against the peaceful atmosphere in this community are farm boundary disputes, and land disputes between families among others...These conflicts were usually settled by the traditional rulers by inviting the parties concerned to the palace to have insight into what really happened so that to know how to handle it without bias and to restore peace between them **(KII, Male, High Chief (Sobaloju), 66years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community).**" This was illustrated further by some of the participants that intervention of the traditional institutions in conflict resolution among the belligerent parties is to keep the community safe from anarchy:

The major disputes and conflicts are boundary disputes among the communities, political thuggery, and land disputes between compounds among others ...The traditional council's involvement in managing disputes keeps the community going and safe from chaos and external attack from enemies **(IDI, Male, 43years, Artisan, Oke-Ila Community).**

Disputes and conflicts are of different dimensions but the major ones in this community are boundary disputes among villages and towns, land disputes,

and political crises among the politicians and their followers...traditional institutions settled the crisis and conflicts involving different parties by inviting them to the palace and make a balance between them for peace to reign (**IDI, Male, Youth Association Member, 35years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The above responses showed that the equilibrium of the larger society is an aggregation of the order and balance felt in smaller communities and that the traditional structure has been responsible for peace-keeping against inter-family disputes and inter-community boundary clashes, likewise external threats. In reality, the modern structure cannot also handle the complexity associated with some of the historical interactions between communities and families, hence, there is a need for the traditional governance system to complement the democratic system and strategies for maintaining peace and order.

In contrast, findings indicated that the intervention and resolution of the traditional institutions in the conflicts that occur in the local communities among parties in conflicts seem to be weak. This is due largely to the lack of constitutional power of the traditional institution which makes their influence on sensitive cases in the local community frail. Apparently, most of the aggrieved parties after the intervention of the traditional institutions neglected the resolution and approached the law court for further redress on their cases. This is illustrated further in the excerpt from one of the participants that:

Marriage disputes, Land disputes, conflict among political party members as a result of democratic political system...Involvement of the traditional institution in these conflicts is still relevant but weak, though the majority of the people are approaching the courts on so many issues that can be easily handled by the traditional council in the palace because people believed the majority of the traditional rulers are politician which reduced them to mere figurehead in the community and reduce the respect accorded to the stool. Though, after the case is instituted in the courts against one another, the traditional institution still gives the words of advice and wisdom to apply among the people or family involves in the legal battle against each other to keep remembering that they

are sons and daughters of the same community (**IDI, Male, Youth Association member, 35years, Teacher, Ode-Omu Community**).

The response of the participant indicated that despite the attempts and efforts of the traditional institution to address the conflicts discussed above, it is actually limited by the scope of constitutional powers given to it, to permanently and effectively settle these crises. This proves the reason why the court as an institution of the Federal and democratic state is considered as a preferred option. However, traditional authorities still make tremendous efforts to resolve disputes and conflicts of varying forms.

4.3.2 Complementary Nature of Traditional Institutions Towards Government Efforts in Insecurity Management

Findings also indicated that traditional institutions have contributed immensely towards the management of insecurity in local communities, especially in the southwestern region of the country. These contributions have further complemented government efforts at minimizing security challenges that constrain the socio-economic development of the country. In essence, the complementary nature of the traditional institutions in the democratic system has enhanced its relevance in the security management process in Nigeria. Some of the participants illustrated further that the complementary nature of traditional institutions towards government programme in terms of security management is evident in the establishment of local security personnel such as vigilante groups, OPC, and hunter groups to complement the efforts of the Nigeria police in securing lives and properties in the local communities: "...The security committee set up by the palace authority coordinates the activities of the local security agents like vigilante group, OPC, and collaborates with the Nigerian Police in preventing criminal activities and protecting the lives and properties of the community dwellers(**KII, Male, King, 68years, Oke-Ila Community**)." This was further supported by some participants that the establishment of the

local security outfit is to support the security efforts of the state-owned security outfit called Amotekun and complement the security operation of the Nigeria police in the local communities:

Community vigilantes and hunters are the platforms used to curb the security challenges because high chiefs and Baales supervise their activities and link the operation with the Nigerian police effective synergy between the two security agents. Odua people's congress is also among the approach we normally used in the community (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 67years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).

The traditional institution collaborates with government activities to manage insecurity through the local security agents like the hunters' groups, and vigilantes to support the work of Amotekun established by the state government and complement the work of the Nigeria police (**KII, Male, High Chief (Otun-Olukotun, 60years, Surveyor, Ode-Omu Community)**).

The above assertions indicated that the traditional system through local authorities and security groups has been able to supplement the possibilities of security as an agenda of the modern democratic system. The hunters and vigilante groups lead the way to uncovering the hideouts of criminals and supply police with the information they need about the terrain to capture criminals and prevent criminal activities, protect lives, and secure properties. However, there is a perceived incongruence in treatment and relationship between the modern police and these traditional security groups.

Similarly, findings indicated that traditional institutions also complement government efforts at tackling insecurity that may arise from grievances and conflicts through timely intelligence reports gathering and forwards it to the government security agency for quick response. Also, the provision of basic security needs like incentives and infrastructure for the security personnel in the local communities are some of the efforts of the traditional institution towards security management in Nigeria: "...Traditional institution set up the local vigilante and the hunter's group to douse the tension of insecurity by helping police officers and the Amotekun security outfit to give maximum security in the community. The traditional institution always gives

necessary information about all the criminal cases that need urgent government interventions **(KII, Male, High Chief (Ejemu), 65years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community).**” This was further illustrated in the excerpt of one of the participants that:

Traditional institutions in this community intervened in managing insecurity by providing basic needs like incentives for the security operatives. They coordinate OPC, vigilante, and the local hunter’s group to give adequate support for the Nigerian police and the Amotekun operatives to have joint and effective operations in terms of protecting lives and properties, and curbing criminal activities among others **(KII, Male, High Chief (Eleesi), 62years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community).**

Relatedly, findings indicated that traditional institutions as part of efforts to combat criminal activities in the local communities placed an embargo on social activities beyond sunset among the community dwellers. This is mainly to complement government activities on security management in the country. This was further explained in the excerpt from one of the participants that:

The traditional institution always coordinates Odua People’s Congress (OPC), vigilante, and local hunters’ groups to protect lives and properties. The pronouncement from the palace that prohibits the celebration of any funfairs, parties, or carnival beyond 7 pm to checkmate the criminal activities in the community is the intervention of traditional institutions to support government activities in dousing the tension of insecurity in the community **(KII, Male, King, 85years, Retired Teacher, Ode-Omu Community).**

The above responses of the participants indicated that the partnerships of the local security groups with the Nigerian police have enabled the provision of timely information on criminal activities (since they are familiar with the terrain and the people). The Vigilantes, OPC group, and other local securities (who engage in the use of diabolical elements) have more accurate information about criminal activities and hideouts. Likewise, they exist as night guards and local hunters with local guns who are known to place regulations that social events and gatherings in order to control clandestine activities that could be an occasion for the perpetuation of criminal

activities. This complements the shortage in the number of police officers, while it also maintains the security of localities, as a function of government. All that is left is for government to recognize and support them with adequate equipment.

4.4 Synergy Between the Traditional Institution and Government Towards Dissemination of Government Policies vis-a-vis Improving the Quality of Life of People

In line with the available evidence sourced from the study area, the synergy between the traditional institutions and government towards dissemination of government policies in terms of improving the quality of life of people was emphasized in the findings. Importantly, the findings were discussed based on the participants' narratives within the context of the level of partnership between the traditional institutions and government towards the developmental programme, and collaboration between government and traditional institutions in terms of social, economic, and political development.

4.4.1 Level of the Partnership Between the Traditional Institution and Government Towards the Developmental Programme

Findings indicated that the level of partnership that existed between the traditional institutions and government in terms of the development programme in the local communities is relatively symmetrical in nature. This partnership has facilitated social infrastructure, routine security operations, and also, monthly incentives for the traditional institutions. It was affirmed by the participants that the developmental programme made possible in the local communities in the southwestern region of Nigeria is a joint effort of the traditional institutions and government:

“...There is a solid partnership between the traditional institutions and the government. We donated the building and the patrol vehicle used by the Amotekun security personnel and also land to the government whenever they wanted to embark on any project in this community...The government has not provided any meaningful provision to complement the traditional institutions efforts in terms of community development projects. They give us our monthly stipend but it’s not enough (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 67years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).” This was further supported by one of the participants that traditional institutions partner with the government in providing social infrastructure to the community in order to accelerate the development process in the local communities:

There is a clearer partnership between traditional institutions and the government in the community. In the Oke-Ila community, the traditional institutions through the king himself builds a standard secondary school for the community to make the number of school enrolment increase and acquire knowledge for the youth accessible in order to promote community development...The deployment of the state-security outfit–Amotekun is the provision made to the community by complementing the efforts of the Nigerian police and local security personnel introduced by the king (palace) and also 5% of the local government allocation for monthly stipends of traditional Institutions (**KII, Male, High Chief (Osi-Balogun), 55years, Farmer, Oke-Ila Community**).

It was also affirmed in the findings that participation of traditional institutions in the local customary court processing and deployment of state-sponsored security outfits are some of the reflections of partnership that existed between traditional institutions and government in local communities in the southwestern region of the country: “...The authority resides with traditional institutions in presiding over the administration of the local customary court (grade c) is one of the where there is synergy between the government and the traditional institution... monthly salary is paid by the government through the local government council, which is 5% derived from the allocation of the local government (**KII, Male, High Chief (Oba’ale), 60years,**

Teacher, Oke-Ila Community).” This was also borne out in the excerpt of one of the participants that:

We always provided land for the government to build or construct any of their projects in the community...One of the provisions made to this community is the deployment of Amotekun security outfit established by the state government to assist the Nigerian police and the local security agents organized by the palace to douse the tension of insecurity in the community. But the traditional institution provides the Hilux patrol van to the Amotekun personnel to make their operation easy (**KII, Male, Eesa (Regent), 50years, Trader, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The responses above indicated that the level and forms of partnerships between the government and the traditional institutions in community development cut across areas of education, politics, security, and so on. Inasmuch as it appealing to state that there is a collaboration between the modern government and traditional structures, it actually is essential to note the varying degrees of impact that is been made, with the traditional institutions doing more than the modern democratic state. It is deductible that there is no parity in the efforts and contributions the local institutions have given to the partnership beyond the other party in the provision of land, supporting the local security intelligence, and even the building of schools while the state has barely been successful in paying the salary of local officers and partnering in customary court administration. It can then be said that traditional institutions can successfully perform all of the roles if given the power, as they have fulfilled their bargain as well as some of the democratic state duties, yet they have been somewhat subordinated to the modern system of governance.

Similarly, the exchange and provision of intelligence reports to the government security agency, and routine security and empowerment meeting between the traditional institutions and government that affects the lives of people in the local communities are the reflections of the partnership that existed between the traditional institution and government in local communities

in the country. This is essential to connect people in the local communities to government development programme and enhance development processes in the communities. This was illustrated further in the excerpts of some of the participants that:

Traditional institutions and government officials usually hold meetings together to proffer solutions to the issues affecting community dwellers. The consensus reached by the government and the traditional rulers determines which project to embark on and which type of empowerment is necessary for the youth and women in the community...A lot of support was expected from the government which is not forthcoming. Most of the projects in this community were initiated by the traditional institution to make life better for our people (**KII, Male, High Chief (Elesesi), 62years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

Traditional Institutions and the government always update each other on the latest information that helps the community to grow. The government makes sure that the monthly salary due for the traditional rulers is paid as when due and this is the major provision made available to the traditional council (**IDI, Male, Youth Association member, 40years, Trader, Ode-Omu Community**).

The assertions of the participants above showed the communal and collective system by which the traditional institution governs the affairs of the people, which also could have been a veritable platform for the modern government to understand the people of these local communities, access their opinions, and address their demands and needs. However, this has not existed. The input of the local authorities and institutions cannot be compared with the contributions of the government; this could be due to the fact that traditional institutions understand that all social issues affect them and not people in government or rather affects them negligibly, indirectly, or inconsequentially. Nevertheless, with the effort of the traditional institutions, more concrete support from the government would go a long way in meeting their needs quicker, making their communities better, and connecting these localities with developmental programmes.

In contrast, findings indicated that despite the relative outcome of the partnership that existed between the traditional institutions and government in terms of the developmental programme, the process seems to be snail-paced progress in the local communities. This is notably in terms of the government's lack of support to augment the traditional institution efforts in community-based projects which hindered them from promoting development programme in the local communities: "...There is no provision or any form of help from the government currently to assist the community to embark on any self-help project except the monthly salary that has being paid through the local government authority (**IDI, Female, High Chief (Iya-alaje), 64years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).” This was further illustrated in the excerpts of some of the participants that:

No meaningful contribution from the government in supporting the traditional institution efforts in the community self-help project. Most community-based projects are initiated by traditional institutions...The level of assistance by the government through collaboration with the traditional rulers is minimal (**IDI, Male, Youth Association leader, 40years, Civil Servant, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The only feasible provision for the traditional rulers is the 5% of the local government council allocation as their monthly salary. But the government did not provide most of the facilities and funds needed to augment the efforts of the traditional institution (**IDI, Male, 41years, community development Union official, Ode-Omu Community**).

The responses above showed that the level of development that is evident in the traditional institutions and structures owes largely to the effort of these local authorities, and the slow pace of the growth is a function of poor assistance and support of the government. The government has only been steady in providing a low allocation to the traditional institution in form of salaries. Would it not then be critical to state that the government actually slows down the pace of growth of traditional institutions or are in a form of a lopsided partnership with the local authorities?

4.4.2 Collaboration Between the Traditional Institution and Government in Terms of Social, Economic, and Political Development

Findings sourced from the participants conspicuously indicated that synergy between the traditional institutions and government towards improving the quality of life of people have been noticed in aspects of social, economic, and political development in the local communities. In terms of social development, the synergy between the two key stakeholders has facilitated increasing social infrastructure development such as road network construction and renovation, schools renovation, the establishment of Council of Traditional rulers, self-help projects, and water supply projects: “...Construction of roads, borehole drilling, renovation of the community’s primary schools by the government is improving our pupil education standard and also the establishment of Amotekun by the state government to compliment the work of the Nigerian police and other security outfits formed by the palace chiefs **(KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 67years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community)**.” This was further explained in the excerpt of a participant that:

Traditional institutions collaborate together with the government in protecting the lives and properties in this community. Some self-help projects apart from the ones done by the government in this community were jointly done by the community and by NGOs. There is also the establishment of the National Council of Traditional rulers by Nigeria’s federal government **(KII, Male, Eesa (Regent), 50years, Trader, Ifon-Orolu Community)**.

Corroborating further a women leader asserted further that the location and construction of the judicial building and also, the federal youth empowerment center are the reflections of synergy that existed between the traditional institution and government in the local community. This was believed to have contributed towards the social development of the community, thereby enhancing the quality of lives of people:

The collaboration of government and traditional institutions has facilitated some level of development in this community. The location of the state high court to strengthen the judicial process and also the federal youth empowerment center are some of the evidences of this relationship in this community. The police and Amotekun operatives are made available in the community by the government to make secure of lives and properties a reality (**IDI, Female, Women leader (Iyalode), 71years, Trader, Ode-Omu Community**).

The responses of the participants above indicated that the collaborations of the government with traditional institutions, however, have yielded some gains for the people of the localities in terms of road and building projects and programmes for the youths. These achievements cannot be totally attributed to the government as non-governmental organizations, trade councils have also played a pivotal role in bringing about these infrastructural developments. Therefore, it is still valid to say that without the efforts of these other agencies, the assistance rendered by the government remains negligible.

Relatedly, the findings indicated that political development has been encouraged through the synergy of traditional institutions and government in terms of the establishment of a state-sponsored security outfit, which is to complement the efforts of the Nigerian police in crime control and management in the local communities. The state-sponsored security agency called Amotekun is mainly to enhance the peaceful atmosphere that allows for freedom of movement, association, and protection of lives and properties in conjunction with local security such as OPC, Vigilante, and hunters' groups in the local communities in the southwestern region of the country: "...The collaboration of government and traditional institutions has facilitated the establishment of an AMOTEKUN security outfit for the protection of lives and properties for the benefit of community dwellers to better and advance their social and economic life (**KII, Male, High Chief (Oba'ale), 60years, Teacher, Oke-Ila Community**)." This was further illustrated by

some of the participants that politically, the synergy between traditional institutions has contributed immensely to community development in terms of the timely deployment of functional security operatives in crime management in the local community thereby enhancing the standard of living in the local communities in the country:

Amotekun security outfit was deployed to this community to manage the issue of insecurity and other criminal activities. This provision made the youths go to their daily activities which is helping them to add value to themselves on daily basis **(KII, Male, High Chief (Eleesi), 62years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community)**.

The redeployment of more operatives of the Nigerian police force and the creation of Amotekun security outfit working together with the local security outfit like the hunter's group, OPC, and Vigilante has been enjoyed by the community dwellers because it allows them to move freely and go about their daily business activities which increases the standard of living of the community dwellers **(IDI, Female, High Chief (Iya-alaje), 64years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community)**.

The responses showed that the support of the government to traditional territories in terms of security by the establishment of 'AMOTEKUN' remains a solid contribution to social welfare. Inasmuch as this was noted by the participants, what cannot be determined in the responses include the collaboration between this agency and the existing local security units, the recognition, treatments, and preference, and the efficiency of security operations on a collaborative and comparative note.

Economically, findings indicated that the synergy that existed between traditional institutions has facilitated employment considerations at the state and federal levels for youths in the local communities, and also empowerment scheme programme. These opportunities have enhanced the economic prospects of the people and the communities in the country. This was illustrated

further in the excerpts of the participants on the influence of the synergy between the two key stakeholders on the economic development of local communities:

The positive collaboration between the two institutions makes facilitation of more dividends of democracy to the community. When it comes to employment and another level of engaging the youths in terms of means of livelihood, the palace usually contacted the government by sending the name of the people in the community and most of the time yielded positive results (**IDI, Male, 43years, Artisan, Oke-Ila Community**).

The collaboration between traditional Institutions and the government is commendable. They relate positively to some other areas that benefited the community dwellers in terms of youth empowerment scheme like the Osun youth empowerment scheme (Oyes) (**KII, Male, King, 85years, Retired Teacher, Ode-Omu Community**).

The assertion above indicated that youths empowerment has been a dividend of the collaboration between the traditional institutions and the democratic system of governance, where youths are getting employed in federal and state parastatals, as well as youths involvement in politics. Nonetheless, this brings to mind the question of the rate at which youths of these traditional structures have access to government opportunities. It also noted that it is the traditional institutions that make contact with the democratic government to ensure that their youths are factored into consideration, and not that the government has pre-planned reservations for them.

In contrast, findings indicated that in spite of the outcome of the collaboration between traditional institutions and government, the collaboration was viewed by some participants as below expectation and unevenly distributed in the local communities. This is due largely to political colouration that affects the development initiatives meant for the whole in the local communities which slow-down development process in the communities in the country: “...Assistance from the government in relation to economic, social, and political development is minimal. Some empowerment programs by the state government through the local government council were shared based on political affiliations and not evenly distributed among the

community dwellers, particularly the youth (**IDI, Male, Town Development Union Official, 52years, Trader, Ifon-Orolu Community**).” This was further buttressed by one of the participants that:

In terms of social and economic development, the collaboration is not yet yielding the expected support from the government (**IDI, Male, 41years, community development Union official, Ode-Omu Community**).

The responses above further explained that apart from the little support via collaboration from the government; available opportunities are thereon not evenly distributed due to the influence of political bottlenecks and other forms of corruption. The collaboration that would have enhanced gains from the democratic government towards the traditional institutions is being influenced by political corruption and nepotism that does not allow for equal opportunity access. Hence, it can be said that the modern government is responsible for the inadequacy and the uneven distribution of opportunities to local institutions.

4.5 Challenges Affecting the Utility of Traditional Institutions in Community Development vis-a-vis Modern Administration in Nigeria

Evidence sourced from the study areas indicated that traditional institutions encountered various levels of challenges in promoting community development in democratic governance in Nigeria. This was emphasised in the findings gathered from the participants of this study. In essence, findings in line with the narratives of the participants were constructed within the contexts of challenges encountered by the traditional institution in terms of community development, and the impact of the absence of functional roles in the Nigerian constitution on traditional institutions.

4.5.1 Challenges Encountered by the Traditional Institution in Terms of Community Development

Findings indicated that traditional institutions efforts at contributing towards community development in the local communities in the southwest region of the country are laced with diverse challenges. These challenges ranged from lack of funds, lack of political power, lack of political neutrality of the traditional institution, and Insecurity. Importantly, the lack of funds has been attributed to the bane of the downward slide of traditional institutions' visible contributions to community development in local communities in the southwest region of Nigeria. This was believed to have hindered the traditional institutions to embark on development projects and initiatives that could enhance community development in local communities in Nigeria: "... lack of funds to carry out some self-help projects needed by community dwellers is a serious issue for traditional rulers. The law that placed the traditional institution under the local government authority is another obstacle for the traditional council to perform their roles effectively... They source funds through contributions among themselves and the citizens (**KII, Male, High Chief (Otun-Olukotun, 60years, Surveyor, Ode-Omu Community)**)." This was further supported by some of the participants that government negligence in providing sustainable funding to traditional institutions has made community development progress at snail-pace and crippled many development initiatives and projects in the local communities in Nigeria.

The challenge that hindered the level of performance of traditional rulers is the lack of funding to embark on some self-help community projects. It denied them many important functions that were supposed to be performed in their domain (**KII, Male, High Chief (Ejemu), 65years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The major challenge that hinders the power of the traditional institutions to perform community development and the management of their affairs is the lack of funds. It cripples the process of embarking on a community project, particularly self-help ones. At times the government refused to fund the project

and due to the sensitivity and usefulness of some projects to the community dwellers, the traditional council has to raise the fund through community effort and start the project (**KII, Male, High Chief (Eleesi), 62years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolo Community**).

The responses above showed that the traditional institution has been hampered by financial resources and a lack of funds. In discussion, it can be deduced from earlier responses that the traditional structures release their land resources to the administration and use by the government (although with the aim of community development), whereas the government has fixated traditional institutions on low budgetary allocation. This proves that the traditional structures do not control their resources and are also not getting financial support from the government.

Relatedly, the lack of political power of traditional institutions to function independently in terms of performing utility functions in the community contributed to the challenges encountered by the traditional institutions in the course of implementing community development at the local community level. This challenge which is due largely to exclusion of traditional institutions in the Nigerian constitution makes them appendages to the local government authority with no significant power to intervene in the constitutional related crisis in the local communities, thereby limiting their input in community development in the southwest region of the country: “....some of the challenges facing the traditional Institution is the inability to exercise some political rights due to their exclusion in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. Lack of funds is another challenge facing the traditional Institution. Placing the traditional institution under the local government authority is also posed a serious issue for the traditional institution. It denied them to perform some roles in their respective communities (**KII, Male, High Chief (Balogun), 68years, Retired Civil Servant, Ode-Omu Community**).” This was illustrated further in the excerpt of one of the participants that:

One of the major challenges is the power to intervene in some crises within the community dwellers due to a lack of constitutional power. The Nigerian government did not state any power or specific roles backed by a section of the Nigerian 1999 constitution (**IDI, Male, Town Development Union Official, 46years, Civil Servant, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The responses above indicated that the traditional institutions that are said to be in collaboration with the democratic government lack political power and recognition for political development. The constitution of the country does not identify or allot power to the traditional structures in making an impact on community development matters or giving inputs. The traditional institutions appear to like being externalized from governance matters and only awaiting the directions of the democratic state, as they themselves are not given powers nor are recognized by the constitutions, despite their contributions to community development.

In another word, findings indicated that the lack of political neutrality of the traditional institutions in the political processes in the country has further slow-down their contributions to the community development in the southwest region of Nigeria. This is due to the fact that traditional institutions in partisan politics strain their relationship with political leaders and thereby limit the level of community projects and programmes to the local communities: “...Political affiliation of some high chiefs and even the king is one of the major challenges facing traditional institutions in this community. It affects the relationship with the government in terms of provision from the government official believed that traditional institutions are partisan instead to be neutral politically (**IDI, Female, Women leader, 71years, Trader, Ode-Omu Community**).” This was explained further in the excerpt of a participant that:

The majority of the traditional rulers are into partisan politics instead of being politically neutral and it affects their community if their preferred candidate is not in power. The low level of exposure and education of some traditional rulers denied their community some level of respect and make it difficult to develop their domain in terms of facilitating community development projects

for the betterment of the community dwellers (**IDI, Male, Town Development Union Secretary, 53years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).

The assertions of the participants above showed that the political process where traditional communities are associated with a particular party or in cases where the leaders of such institution is partisan could stand as a hindering factor to such community development. Politics has been considered a tool of reward or punishment to traditional institutions that support or do not support the party of those in government, who have been empowered to cater to these localities. All these bring us back to the reason for unpowered traditional authorities and institutions, who would have taken the initiative of themselves to act in the direction of community development, had they the constitutional power.

Relatedly, findings also showed that the insecurity situation in the country undoubtedly contributed to challenges faced by the traditional institutions in terms of community development. Kidnapping and other criminal activities have made the traditional institutions function less in the area of development projects and programmes in the local communities. This challenge made the traditional institutions divert energy and resources meant for development projects toward management of security with a snail-pace positive outcome in the local communities: “...security issue is a great challenge currently facing the traditional council because it diverts the attention given to community self-help projects. Most of their efforts currently are diverted towards how to secure the community in terms of lives and properties (**IDI, Male, 49years, Artisan, Ode-Omu Community**).” This was further supported and illustrated in the excerpts of some of the participants that:

The security challenges in the community and Nigeria at large are one of the sources of hindrance for the traditional institution to embark on a self-help community project. Some kings are afraid of being kidnapped and this fear is

affecting how they are supposed to be functioning in their respective domains (**IDI, Male, Youth Association Member, 35years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community**).

Insecurity is one of the obstacles facing traditional institutions from performing some of their roles in the community (**IDI, Male, 42years Artisan (Bricklayer), Ifon-Orolu Community**).

The responses above indicated that the issue of security which is a national problem in the country is felt a great deal by the traditional structures, as the little finance they have for development actually is deployed towards the management of security issues. The issue of insecurity that the democratic government has not been able to solve is also affecting the development of local communities and traditional institutions. Traditional structures with their lack of funds would need to provide security material to equip local security officials and some of the agents deployed by the democratic government (Amotekun created by the South–Western Governors) to their territory to help combat criminal, kidnappers and curb all sort of crimes; as well as cater for the needs of the security officials in the process of performing their duties.

4.5.2 Impact of the Absence of Functional Roles in the Nigeria Constitution on Traditional Institutions

In another word, findings indicated that the absence of functional roles for traditional institutions in the Nigerian constitution has led to a resultant negative outcome for development programme in the local communities in the southwest region of Nigeria. This problem has further made it difficult for a traditional institution to make critical decisions on issues bothering the well-being of people in the local communities: "...The constitution of Nigeria is silent to state specific roles to perform for the traditional Institution. So, this condition made them handicapped to venture into some activities that can improve the standard of living of the people in the community (**IDI,**

Female, Women leader, 71years, Trader, Ode-Omu Community).” This was further supported by one of the participants that:

The daily operation and functions of traditional rulers are not guided by any sections of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria so it makes it difficult for them to operate at will on some critical issues that bother the community dwellers, especially the development issue (**IDI, Male, 50years, community development Union official, Ode-Omu Community**).

The above responses indicated that the functions of traditional rulers are not contained and informed by the national constitution. The traditional institutions in this case are limited in the scope of operation based on the fact that there is no apportionment of roles or powers to them by the constitution of the country; rather they are being treated as an affiliate of the local government administration. Hence, there is a limit to community development initiatives that traditional institutions can deploy.

Relatedly, findings indicated that the absence of functional roles for the traditional institution in the 1999 Nigerian constitution has greatly affected the utility of the traditional rulers. As result, this problem limits the level of their performance and functions on security, well-being, and social issues that enhance development process of community development in the local communities in the southwest region of the country: “.... Absence of stating any specific roles to traditional institutions in the Nigerian constitution weakens the strength of the institution. It did not allow them to perform certain important needed to act on within their respective domains (**KII, Male, High Chief (Ejemu), 65years, Farmer, Ifon-Orolu Community**). This was further explained in the excerpts of some of the participants that the exclusion of traditional institutions in the Nigeria constitution limits their involvement in sensitive and urgent that threaten the development processes in the local communities in Nigeria:

The absence of specific roles in the Nigerian constitution for the traditional institution does not allow them to function as expected. They can't legislate on some urgent issues needed by the community (**KII, Male, King, 68years, Oke-Ila Community**).

Avoidance of traditional institutions in the Nigerian constitution is greatly affecting their utility, the way they are supposed to handle and treat some societal problems and some developmental projects are weak. No section of the constitution backs most of their daily activities and this does not give them the upper hand to spread their tentacles in terms of their utility functions (**IDI, Female, High Chief (Iya-alaje), 64years, Trader, Oke-Ila Community**).

The assertions above indicated despite the fact that the traditional institutions are being considered partners with the democratic state, there is a limit to the functionality, initiatives, and response of traditional rulers in matters of community development. The non-recognition of traditional institutions by the constitution placed a ceiling of some sort on what and how traditional rulers can attend to matters of community development even in their terrain.

4.6 Discussion of Findings

Findings on the roles of traditional administrative systems towards the infusion of core traditional values into mainstream administration in Nigeria showed that traditional institutions in local communities have influenced cultural values into current democratic governance in Nigeria through diverse community initiatives such as the community annual cultural festival, and celebration day. The community initiative through the annual cultural festival is an avenue to attract community citizens in the diaspora and government personalities to showcase the beauty and value ingrained in the community's traditional culture through the conferment of honorary titles to deserving community citizens and government personalities. It is also to promote societal values, norms, and behaviour patterns for youths in order to mold and prepared them for future leadership responsibility. Thus, the traditional initiative is further stimulated by the state ministry of local government and chieftaincy affairs. This enabled the local community to promote norms, and the moral and historical background of the community through the

Ministry to people in order to facilitate inclusive growth in the community and draw democratic governance closer to the traditional administrative system.

Findings further showed that traditional institutions in local communities in the southwest region performed some certain roles as part of efforts to integrate cultural values into democratic governance in Nigeria. These roles were mainly performed within the context of an advisory approach. the advisory roles are visibly operated in terms of political sensitization and dialogue for peaceful coexistence, dispute settlement, provision of self-help projects, indigenous orientation programme to local security personnel, source of the communication channel of community needs to government, educational and skills acquisition for young children and promotion of law and order in the local communities. This is in line with Dore, 2011 and Bakare 2015 submission that an advisory role was created in the 1976 constitution of Nigeria for traditional institutions putting into cognisance their relevance in terms of supporting government policies and initiatives through history, culture, and social context which are domesticated and operationalised by traditional institutions within their domains.

Findings on the relevance of traditional institutions in managing inherent conflicts in the current democratic system showed that the nature of conflicts that emanated from the local communities in Nigeria especially the southwestern region of the country is centered mainly on land disputes, disputes on farmland, and community land boundary, marriage conflicts, a political crisis among major political parties in the country. These conflicts distorted the peaceful co-existence enjoyed in the communities but quick intervention of the traditional institutions prevented the conflicts to degenerate into unmanageable situations. The traditional institutions managed these conflicts by selecting traditional high chiefs by inviting the warring parties to the king's palace and employing proactive measures to curb the conflicts between the parties involved. This measure

employed by the traditional institution has further ameliorated such conflict in the local communities. This is corroborated in the literature (Osifo, 2017; Darlington, 2020) that traditional rulers play a significant role in settling a dispute among people in their respective domains, in terms of land-related disputes, community disputes, and religious crises before degenerating into the unmanageable situation and are sometimes depended on by the government to promote peace among the people in the communities.

Findings also showed that traditional institutions have contributed immensely towards the management of insecurity in local communities, especially in the southwestern region of the country. These contributions have further complemented government efforts at minimizing security challenges that constrain the socioeconomic development of the country. In essence, the complementary nature of the traditional institution in the democratic system has enhanced their relevance in the security management process programme in terms of timely intelligence reports gathering for governmental security agencies for quick response, provision of basic security needs like incentives and infrastructure for local and government security personnel, the embargo on social activities beyond sunset in the community and also, establishment of local security personnel such as vigilante group, OPC and hunter group to complements the efforts of the Nigeria police in securing lives and properties in the local communities. In contrast, findings showed that the intervention and resolution of the traditional institutions in the conflicts and insecurity issues that occur in the local communities seem to be weak. This is due largely to the lack of constitutional power of the traditional institution which makes their influences on sensitive and security-related cases in the local community frail. This is in support of Ogwari (2015) and Okonkwo, Onuigbo Eme, & Ekekwe, (2019) From the literature, it is also affirmed that traditional institutions played a prominent role in the mediation of disputes, especially in

Africa and Asia, and are often perceived as leaders with the wisdom to navigate the negotiation process. They are also highly valued and regarded in African institutions as an important part of African culture.

Findings on the synergy between the traditional institution and government towards dissemination of government policies in relation to improving the quality of life of people showed that the level of partnership that existed between the traditional institutions and government in terms of improving quality of life of people in the local communities is relatively symmetrical in nature. The synergy between the traditional institutions and government towards improving the quality of life of people has been noticed in the aspect of social, economic, and political development in the local communities. Importantly this partnership has facilitated social infrastructure, routine security meetings and operations, exchange and provision of intelligence reports by the traditional institutions to a government security agency, and also, monthly incentives by the government for the traditional institution. This is in line with Aliyu (2007) and Makinde and Olabode (2020) Findings that traditional authorities cater to the economic, social, and political aspirations of their people and also mobilize available community resources which involve getting the members of a community together to act with a concerted effort to ensure self-reliance and programme sustainability in the communities.

Findings also showed that in spite of the outcome of the collaboration between traditional institutions and government, the collaboration was viewed by some participants as below expectation and unevenly distributed in the local communities. This is due largely to political colouration that affects the development initiatives meant for the whole in the local communities, and also the government's lack of support to augment the traditional institutions efforts in

community-based projects which slow down the development process in the communities in the country.

Findings on challenges affecting the utility of traditional institutions in community development in relation to modern administration in Nigeria indicated that traditional institutions efforts at contributing towards community development in the local communities in the southwest region of the country are laced with diverse challenges. These challenges ranged from lack of funds, lack of political power, lack of political neutrality of the traditional institution, and Insecurity. This was believed to have hindered the traditional institutions to embark on development projects and initiatives that could enhance community development in local communities in Nigeria. Also, findings indicated that the absence of functional roles for traditional institutions in the Nigerian constitution has led to a resultant negative outcome for development programme in the local communities in the southwest region of Nigeria. This problem has further limited the level of their performance and functions on security, well-being, and social issues that enhance the development process of community development in the local communities in the southwest region of the country. This is in line with the literature (Fatile, 2010; Makinde and Olabode, 2020) that there are factors that contributed to the gradual loss of relevance of traditional rulers in governance of recent which include, self-inflicted problems by the traditional institutions and also the exclusion in the Nigerian 1999 constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria to give specific roles to the traditional rulers and placing them under Local Government which makes the traditional an appendage to political appointees.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the study's main conclusions and offers a number of recommendations to all parties involved with regard to the influence of traditional administrative system and structure on the development of selected communities in Osun State

5.1 Summary of Findings

This study was specifically conducted to look at how traditional institutions in the selected communities affect development. The study's objectives are to analyse the traditional management of community development in selected communities in Osun state. A comprehensive introduction that summarized the overview and importance of the study's issue was prepared during the course of the investigation. In chapter one, a problem statement was created to evaluate the roles of traditional institutions, the relevance of traditional institutions in managing inherent conflicts, and the synergy between traditional institutions and democratic government toward the dissemination of government policies with a view to improving the quality of life of people in the study location; and, the challenges affecting the utility of traditional institutions in community development vis-à-vis modern administration in those mentioned tree communities in Osun State, Nigeria.

More crucially, a review of the body of literature was conducted in chapter two of the study, and functionalism theory was employed to explain how traditional institutions influenced the development of the selected communities in Osun State and Nigeria as a whole. Communities in Ode-Omu, Oke-Ila, and Ifon Orolu were chosen as the study's locations. Snowball and purposive sampling procedures were utilized to find and gathered information from 39 participants.

Findings in chapter four demonstrated how traditional institutions in the communities of Ode-Omu, Oke-Ila, and Ifon encourage social, economic, and political development and the integration of fundamental traditional values into the contemporary administrative system. These institutions are also responsible for maintaining peace and harmony in the communities, mediating land disputes and resolving disputes between residents, and relieving tension in the community through traditional mechanisms. A conclusion and suggestions for the study were included in the summary of the research activity, which is in keeping with the clearly stated specified objectives in chapter one.

5.2 Conclusion

Inferring from the study, traditional institutions have not been accorded meaningful roles in the democratic governance in Nigeria, but their influence on community development in recent times contributed immensely to Nigeria's social, economic, and political development of the country. Importantly, the study noted the roles traditional institutions play and the difficulties they have faced in carrying out some of their fundamental administrative duties under the current democratic systems in terms of managing disputes and other social vices among competing communities in accordance with established customs and tradition. It is worthy of note that these contributions of the traditional institution in community development in Nigeria were not made meaningful due largely to certain limitations in the Constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria. The study concluded that the traditional administrative system and structure have influenced community development in the southwest region immensely but are limited in function and operation largely by the absence of a role in the Nigerian Constitution.

5.3 Recommendations

Traditional administrative leaders must be integrated into community administration in order to promote the inclusion of traditional administrative leadership in Nigeria's socioeconomic development across all communities and in Nigeria as a whole. Therefore, the following suggestions could be put into practice:

- i. Government at the federal and state levels should support and reinforce the traditional institutions of governance by rapidly specifying their roles and their mode of operations in the Nigerian Constitution. This is mainly to support their activities in terms of integrating cultural values and norms with government policies backed with cogent laws.
- ii. There is a need for governments at the federal and state levels to ensure routine training and seminar sessions for traditional leaders on capacity building. This is to ensure traditional leaders' integration in conflict management processes in terms of mediation and arbitration among warring parties in the local communities. This undoubtedly will enhance their skills and expertise in early warning disputes and conflicts, and ensure the prevention and solution of grievances and conflicts in communities in Nigeria. Also, Traditional institutions should ensure peace structures for settling disputes and resolving conflicts in relation to intergroup tolerance should be recognized, neutral, and based on the sincere intention to mediate peace.
- iii. Traditional institutions should work with government and non-governmental organizations to improve community development programs that will facilitate financing opportunities for small enterprises, as well as economic and social development, and to empower local people. Government should ensure policies and programme that addressed

local communities are integrated into the government plan and the decision-making process of the such plan should include the traditional leaders.

- iv. Government should empower the traditional institution in the local communities in terms of funding and assistance to strengthen local security in the local communities. This will ensure that local security performs the securitization task without any hindrances supervised by the traditional leaders. Also, the state-sponsored AMOTEKUN should be allowed by the federal government to carry a gun in order to perform their security task of managing insecurity in the local communities in the southwestern region effectively.
- v. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be used to establish the rights and authority of traditional leaders. Even the country's constitution should have some elements borrowed from the diverse communities that make up the nation. There shouldn't be unwise government interference in the selection, installation, and appointment of traditional leaders, but rather in the communities themselves.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

The study contributed to knowledge in the broad area of public administration that traditional institutions in Nigeria have administrative systems and structures that can be of assistance to policy making process in Nigeria. This could help to further integrate traditional values into Nigerian government operations. Additionally, it advances knowledge of both public administration and overall Nigerian political structures.

5.5 Suggested Area for Further Research

The King, High Chiefs, and indigenous people from different professional categories in the chosen communities were primarily involved in this research project, although non indigenous person living in the community were left out. Thus, further research is required to expand the

interview to other community members in order to conduct a thorough investigation of the benefits and drawbacks of the pre-colonial traditional administration system. Further studies should also focus on integrating opinion of government agencies such as the ministry of local government and chieftaincy affairs on the roles and relevance of traditional institutions in Nigeria

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Endnotes

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Endnotes

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