

**Farmers-Armed Herdsmen Conflict in Nigeria: Interrogating the Crisis in  
Selected South-West States  
(2011 - 2021)**

**Kehinde Adewale ADESIYAN**

**LCU/PG/000513**

**Being a Thesis Submitted to the Department of Politics and International  
Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University,  
Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria**

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy  
Degree (PhD) in International Relations**

## Certification

This is to certify that this thesis by Kehinde Adewale Adesiyon with matriculation number LCU/PG/000513 was carried out with the work titled “Farmers-Armed Headsmen Conflict in Nigeria: Interrogating the Crisis in Selected South-West States (2011-2021)” in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan, Oyo State, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Peace and Conflict and that this has not been previously submitted.

---

Modupe ALBERT PhD  
Supervisor

---

Date

---

Akeem AMODU PhD  
(Associate Professor)  
Head, Politics and International Relations

---

Date

### **Dedication**

This research work is dedicated to the glory and adoration of Almighty God and the memory of my late mother, Matron Mary Ebun Adesiyon, for the privilege He bestowed on me for the successful completion of this life-long ambition.

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

## **Acknowledgement**

My profound gratitude goes to Lead City University and the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Ibadan, Oyo State, for the privilege given to me in attaining this academic feat. This cannot be well said without the mention of a rare academician, Dr. M. Albert whose supervision made it possible in both her official and personal time to ensure that this work becomes a reality. The guidance, commitment, academic suggestions and knowledge shared at all times are so innumerable to mention. The recognition of the immediate past head of department, Associate Professor, T. Oseni who gave me the initial impetus to embark on the programme cannot go unnoticed. I appreciate the current departmental head, Associate Professor A. Amodu for his objective contributions each time this study was presented along with other academics in the department such as Professor A. Ogunsanwo, Associate Prof. R. Badru, Dr. A. Alade, Dr. O. Akande, Dr. E. Jimo and others, not forgetting the non-academic staff of the department.

My deepest gratitude goes to my parents, Engr. Saliu and late Ebun Adesiyon for the physical and spiritual supports and my beloved wife, Ajoke and children, Abdullahi, Abdulrahman and Arafat for the patience and sacrifices made towards the attainment of this height. Finally, my appreciation equally goes to my friends, colleagues, brother and younger ones for their supports towards the successful completion of the study. I say thank you all.

“Even though the above-mentioned institution and persons have assisted in the process of this research work, I alone stands responsible for the errors, if any, found in the work”.

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

## **Abstract**

The stiff competitions for limited resources have often times led to violent herdsman-farmers conflict in South-West States in Nigeria, resulting in aggravated crisis in kidnapping, banditry, cow rustling, rapping, murder and population displacement, using small and light weapons (SALW). This study takes a look at the categorization of the concept of armed headsmen in relation to farmer-herder as it affects security architectures in South-West Nigeria. The study adopted the use of three theories; the tragedy of the common theory, the frustration-aggression theory and Fragile State Theory in justifying the nature and the pattern of aggressions arising from the relationships between the farmers-herdsmen in the region. The lacuna in the three theories made the researcher to come up with his theory “the interventionist theory” as adopted for the conduct of the study. The researcher adopted the use of qualitative approach to data gathering and analysis with the use of primary sources using key informant interview (KII) in interrogating identified critical stakeholders; the State, the Groups i.e. the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), All Farmer’s Association of Nigeria (AFAN) and the host communities where the conflicts occurred. Also, the use of secondary sources like books, journals, articles, commission reports, newspapers, and online publications were empirically analyzed. The outcome of the study showed that the conflict has resulted in several thousands of deaths and wanton destructions of properties. The study concluded by explaining that the series of violent clashes could have been nipped in the bud if necessary agencies have done the needful as so much distrust, socio-economic and security breaches were created. The study, however, made several recommendations like the formulation of workable legislation devoid of political jingoism, establishment and implementation of the livestock transformation plan of Federal/State Government, use of information and communication infrastructures among others.

**Keywords:** Armed groups, Security, Extremists, Conflict and Herder.

**Word Count:** 298

## Table of Contents

Title Page	i
Certification	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgement	iv
Abstract	v
Table of Contents	vi
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xi
List of Acronyms	xii
<b>Chapter One: Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	11
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study	12
1.4 Research Questions	13
1.5 Significance of the Study	13
1.6 Scope of the Study	14
1.7 Limitations to the Study	14
1.8 Operational Definition of Terms	15
Endnotes	17
<b>Chapter Two: Literature Review</b>	<b>21</b>
2.1 Conceptual Review	21
2.1.1 Armed Group	21
2.1.2 Nomadic Farming in Nigeria	52
2.1.3 Contextualizing Armed Herdsmen as Armed Group in Nigeria	56
2.1.4 Security	62
2.2 Theoretical Framework	67
2.2.1 The Tragedy of the Common Theory	67

2.2.2	The Frustration-Aggression Theory	69
2.2.3	The Fragile State Theory	74
2.2.4	The Proposed Theory; the Interventionist Theory	75
2.3	Review of Empirical Studies	76
2.3.1	Armed Groups	76
2.3.2	Security	82
2.4	Conceptual Framework	99
2.5	Summary of Literature Reviewed	91
	Endnotes	92
<b>Chapter Three: Methodology</b>		106
3.1	Research Design	106
3.2	Population of the Study	106
3.3	Sample Size and Sampling Techniques	107
3.4	Description of Research Instrument(s)	108
3.5	Validity of Research Instrument	108
3.6	Distribution of the Research Instrument/Method of Data Collection	109
3.7	Method of Data Analysis	110
	Endnotes	111
<b>Chapter Four: Results and Discussion of Findings</b>		112
4.1	Findings on Resource Conflict in Nigeria	112
4.1.1	Pastoral Mobility and Resource Conflict in Nigeria	112
4.2.	Historical Analysis of the Conflict	116
4.3	The Identified Causes of Farmer-Herder Conflict	119
4.3.1	Encroachment of Farmlands	119
4.3.2	Acquisition of Land by Proxy	122
4.3.3	The Nature of Modern State System	123
4.3.4	Power Relations in Indigenous Farming Communities	124

4.3.5	Climate Change	125
4.4	Findings on the Research Questions	126
4.4.1	Farmer-Armed Herder Conflicts and the Security of Selected States in South-West Nigeria	126
4.4.2	The Implication of Farmers-Armed Herders Conflict on Security in South-West Nigeria	143
4.4.3	The Implications of Farmers-Armed Herdsmen Conflict on Socio-Economic Development of Selected States in South-West Nigeria	145
4.4.4	Exploring the Strategies Deployed by the South-West States Governments' at Containing the Conflict	158
4.4.5	Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Containment Strategies of Farmers-Armed Herdsmen Crises in Nigeria	186
4.5	Discussions of the Findings	192
	Endnotes	195
	<b>Chapter Five: Conclusion</b>	210
5.1	Summary of the Findings	210
5.2	Conclusion	211
5.3	Recommendations	212
5.4	Contribution to Knowledge	215
5.5	Area of Further Research/Studies	216
	<b>Bibliography</b>	218
	<b>Appendix (1)</b> Oyo State Anti-Open Grazing and Livestock Rearing Law	239
	<b>Appendix (2)</b> On the Field-Participant Pictures by the Researcher	276
	<b>Bio-data</b>	269
	<b>University Compliance Certificate</b>	272

## List of Tables

<b>Table Page</b>	<b>Title</b>	
2.1:	Types of Armed Groups in Nigeria	47
4.1:	Forest Resources Study	130
4.2:	Compilation of Attacks	136
4.3:	Proposed South-West State's Responses to Security Threats	169
4.4:	Proposed States and Paramilitary Responses to Security Threats In South-West Nigeria	173
4.5:	Legislative Laws and Policies of Grazing Reserves in Nigeria	183

## List of Figures

Figure	Title	Page
2.1a	Total kidnapped/killed in South-West	88
2.1b	Total kidnapped/killed in South-West	89
4.1	An Encroachment on a farm land by a herder	120
4.2	Map of the South West Region of Nigeria	129
4.3	A house razed during attack by the armed herdsmen in Oke Ogun, Oyo State	139
4.4	Structure of Miyetti Allah Kaota Leadership (State Level)	141
4.5	Amotekun Logo/ Insignia	165

## **List of Acronyms**

<b>Abbreviations</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of Nigeria
WNSN	Western Nigeria Security Network
OPC	Odua People's Congress
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
CET	Carbon Emission Tracker
RAIN	Robotic Artificial Intelligence of Nigeria
AFAN	All Farmers Association of Nigeria
JSIS	Joint Security Intervention Squad
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRAG	National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	Ecowas Monitoring Group
LSE	London School of Economics
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
VAC	Violence against Civilian
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
UAGs	Unidentified Armed Groups
GDPs	Gross Domestic Products
BSE	Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
EU	European Union
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
APC	Arewa People's Congress
IPOB	Independent People of Biafra

GTI	Global Terrorism Index
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
UN	United Nations
PMC	Private Military Companies
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
RUGA	Rural Grazing Reserves
COP26	Conference of the Parties
SEC	Security and Exchange Commission
SBM	Intelligence Reporting
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
NLDP	National Livestock Development Plan
PDP	Pastoralist Development Program
PTF	Petroleum Trust Fund
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program

## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Nigerians now live in palpable fear, we are afraid of everything. We are afraid of certain people, afraid of bearded and turbaned cattle herders turned extremists. As we are constantly becoming collateral to rural banditry, ambush and kidnappings will continue to suffice<sup>1</sup>. The above expression underscores the hitherto experience of the security terrain of south-west Nigeria in particular and the entire country in general. One of the major features of the current conjecture in African politics and national security is the appearance of armed groups in a more deadly and impersonal fashion and an incompetent state who may have found it very difficult to address<sup>2</sup>.

The above incidents are snapshots of some Nigerians' security concerns and in the past one decade across the country. They are baffling as they are harmful. Since Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, the country has been grappling with various security challenges ranging from insurgency, kidnapping, and the herder-farmer conflicts. The herdsman/farmer crises have demonstrated high potential to exacerbate the insecurity in rural and urban communities in Nigeria. Violence between armed herdsman and farmers is one of Nigeria's most persistent security problems and has left thousands of people dead in the past few years. This is part of the general security challenges in the country and the focus of this study.

The prevalence of the country's security crises has become a significant concern for the well-meaning Nigerians considering the impact on the nation's peace, security, and economy. Destruction of lives and properties arising from farmer-herder clashes has almost become an everyday affair in different parts of the country, for instance, in the North East, North West, and North Central. These crises have in these areas led to acute instability, killings, abductions for ransom, banditry, thereby creating a fearful atmosphere that harms the economy as it discourages investors, both domestic and foreign.

In recent times, the herder-farmer clashes have taken a new dimension as host communities accuse the herdsmen of kidnappings, rape, murder, and all manner of criminal activities. They are perceived as a severe security threat in many communities in the North and Southern parts of the country. Today, the herdsmen's actions have been viewed by many scholars as the greatest threat to Nigeria's corporate existence.

By analyzing the origins of the farmer-herder imbroglio, farmer-herder crises in Nigeria occur due to resource scarcity; with the growing scarcity of arable land, impending desertification of the Sahel-Savannah, and scarcity of water essential to sustain crop cultivation and cattle herds. The increasing desertification moving from the North and the effects of climate change have further increased the herdsmen's drive to move further south in search of grazing land and pasture for their livestock.

Although, the prevailing discourse about Nigeria in the peace and conflict studies paint a picture of a troubled space with a worst record of internal security breach, since

armed herdsmen, including bandits, terrorists, warlords and insurgencies are becoming increasingly significant actors in global security studies.

With the study of mainstream counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, the emergence of herdsmen, specifically within the context of state system has become increasingly important in peace, conflict and strategic studies<sup>3</sup>. Often at the core of these contestations are profound disagreements over the basic vision of what the nation aspires to achieve<sup>4</sup>.

These southward movements, therefore, always pitch them against farmers and the host community whose crops are regularly \ invaded and destroyed by the cattle during this seasonal movement. The result of this is increased conflict, death, displacement, and the destruction of properties. Cattle rustling, the advent of heavily armed criminal herdsmen and the increasing cultural differences among ethnic groups that predominantly farm, or graze cattle further exacerbate the crisis<sup>5</sup>.

Although, the resurgence of the idea of a conventional regimented war, as codified, is still widely present in most people's minds, which is largely misleading nowadays, since collective violence no longer primarily the concerns of two state armies facing each other in a well-defined area and shooting at each other<sup>6,7</sup>. Instead, internal conflict involving many state and non-state actors have been the dominant form of conflict throughout most of the Post-World War II period<sup>8</sup>.

These conflicts have, however, affected close to one quarter of all countries in the world and are characterized by extremely high numbers of civilian casualties<sup>9</sup>. Civilians are then also no longer isolated from the events on the battlefield. Rather, the

most dramatic and prevalent threat to non-combatants nowadays arises in internal armed conflicts<sup>10</sup>. For instance, it is estimated that these conflicts have caused the death of more than 16.2 million people<sup>11</sup>. Also, as many as 22 million civilians have died since the end of World War II with battle - related deaths of all internal and international wars<sup>12</sup>. However, the exact extent of civilian suffering varies across time, conflict, geographic region, and more important for this study, it varies across armed groups. Some armed groups, such as the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) and hitherto the Extremist Herdsmen may not exhibit restraints in their relationship with non-combatants, while other armed groups, such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) moved its operations from Uganda to Sudan and more recently to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR), all the while attacking targets in Uganda as well as Sudan<sup>13, 14</sup>.

Recently, theorists and practitioners in peace and conflict studies have devoted substantial attention to how armed groups contested with remarkable success the repressive apparatus of the states in Africa in particular and the world in general, the mountains of Hindu Kush, Northern Mesopotamia and Eastern Syria, on the upper banks of the Niger, Boko Haram insurrection in West Africa and rural banditry in form of farmer-herder clashes in Nigeria in the area of the Great Lakes of Africa<sup>15, 16</sup>. Although, these groups aim is not necessarily the usurpation of political power and often did not try to establish state like structures, they were assumed to be part of a new set of social phenomena unleashed by the end of the Cold War, globalization and the breakdown of post-colonial order in African states<sup>17</sup>.

However, the re-democratization of Nigeria in May 1999 has, contrary to expectations, seen the manifestations of armed groups in form of ethnic dimension to an all-time high level as a tool for socio-political mobilization for group protection, socio-political demand /bargaining and security since the capacity of African societies to resist and recover from conflict is partly a function of the nature of the underlying tensions that led to or threaten conflict in the first place. Prime among these are tensions over the nature and control of the state<sup>18</sup>.

Therefore, the transition to civil rule in Nigeria in May 29, 1999 as argued, further rekindled hopes of advancement and political progress of the country. Yet, security studies still had to come to terms with the fact that Nigeria was confronted with several security threats in a way that pose threat to the sustainability of Nigeria's nascent democracy. The consistency of political uprising within the state like violence and criminality, moreover, have come in the form of armed robbery, kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, militancy, banditry, farmer-herder conflict, among other acts of criminality bedeviling the fragile security system.

These obnoxious situations have, however, grown to the extent that many, especially the government, are befuddled and at loss of insight of what meaningfully could be done to avert the menace. Yet, the Nigerian 1999 constitution expressly stated that the government is primarily responsible for the security of lives and property of the citizens of the country irrespective of where the citizen resides. Also, section 42 of the amended 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria in chapter 4 of the constitution takes care of the fundamental human rights of all citizens. This particular section 42 deals specifically with rights to freedom from discrimination, that is, the

right to equality of citizens not only in Nigeria but also everywhere in the world. However, every day we wake up to the news of petty crimes, armed robberies, ethno/religious killings, armed insurgency which appears to have died down after the uproar of amnesty, terrorism, unemployment, Boko Haram massacres and recently the Farmers-herdsmen menace in different parts of the country. For instance, some high-profile cases have been associated with herdsmen including that of Chief Olu Falae who was traced to and kidnapped at his farm in Ilado, in Ondo State. His guard's heart was butchered and taken away along with his rifle which was hitherto registered with the police. Also, in Orin Ekiti, Ido Osi Local Government Area of Ekiti State, the residents took to the street to protest the forceful takeover of their lands by suspected herdsmen, with destruction of crops worth over 50 million in farms belonging to 70 farmers and hoisting of flags on the lands. Seven people were recently killed at Ayete in Ibarapa North Local Government Area of Oyo State when officers and armed herders clashed in fresh violence with several houses equally being razed.

There is no gain saying that the rural banditry has assumed a pervading form in the south west region. This seemingly intractable challenge has been attributed to the state incapacities to curtail non-combatant groups<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, there are dearth's of effective and coordinated adopted strategies by the region's governments in the discharge of its primary responsibility of ensuring safety of lives and property<sup>20</sup>.

Since security is a state of being liberated from all forms of threats confronting human existence. It is the protection of fundamental tenets and the absence of menace to these tenets<sup>21</sup>. To some theorists, security is the freedom from threats to a nation's potential for development in association with creating an avenue where the interest of everyone

is protected. For another, security is a state in which people or things are not vulnerable to the negative activities of external aggression<sup>22</sup>. This view supports the need for the state to protect the integrity of her citizens. Security of lives and property is a dire need for any thriving country. Without security, a country remains exposed to threats and will be continuously vulnerable<sup>23</sup>. In this state, the attainment of such a country's objectives and projects becomes a herculean task.

In the face of insecurity situation in Nigeria generally, the attitude of the government remains unsatisfactory. The issue of insecurity has, however, become a persistently worrisome in the South-West States' in Nigeria.

National security, on the other hand, is also described as the deployment and use of military force to achieve national goals<sup>24</sup>. Also, it is also viewed as the absence of conflict of ideologies coupled with the absence of the uncertainties associated with those ideologies now or in the future<sup>25</sup>. Thus, national security is the preservation of the values a nation holds as it relates to the defense of its territory from human as well as non-human threats and guides in the pursuit of its national interest in the international system<sup>26</sup>.

However, some of the factors responsible for national insecurity leading to the presence of the ethnic militia are feeling of marginalization and economic exploitation, Corruption and Impunity, Inadequate expert training, Lack of will to enforce territorial security and Lack of Unity in the battle against insurgencies with feelings of marginalization, economic exploitation and uneven development.

Internal security, however, has suffered a heavy blow based on the terrible activities of civilian-in-arms against the Nigerian State. It is on the basis of so much insecurity that armed groups arose to fight against the inconsistencies of our national life. An armed group as an idea has several definitions. This indicates that different views on the idea of armed groups could be expressed by different scholars. Armed militias are paramilitary forces that performed police functions within their locality while the government considers armed groups as militia groups that engage in subversive activities against the state<sup>27</sup>. For instance, on July 18, 2021, the so called bandits reportedly shot down an Alpha Jet belonging to the Nigerian Air Force on the boundary between Zamfara and Kaduna states. However, on October 7, 2021, the Wall Street Journal, one of America's most revered news porters, reported that the Nigerian Air force paid 20 million to bandits to buy back "an anti-aircraft gun" that the bandits had seized from the Nigerian military in one of their battles, though, this remains a controversy.

Armed groups in the Nigerian context are viewed as a militant organization established to protect the interest of a particular nationality within the Nigerian federation<sup>28</sup>. Armed groups can, therefore, be seen as irregular/paramilitary actors in a given community who make political demands from the state as citizens. They are also specific in nature and are characterized by their tendencies to change the course of things in a radical and violent way<sup>29</sup>. It's a youth based formation that emerged with the intention of promoting and protecting the limited interests of their groups and whose activities sometimes involve the use of force and coercion. Historically, peasant, semi-nomadic Fulani herders who have lost their cattle have served as an inexhaustible

pool of lumpen proletariat to conscript into all kinds of conflicts<sup>30</sup>. For instance, in the early 1800s, the set of herders then constituted large percentage of Afonja's army in his fight against the Alaafin of Oyo. Professor Abdullahi Smith, of blessed memory in his selected historical writings, argued, that Fulani pastoralists who lost their cattle to tsetse fly bites in Yoruba land "had nothing to lose" became Afonjas' mercenaries.

Armed militias, therefore, are organized violence-oriented groups populated by diverse elements of irregular combatant, cutting across different age strata, but drawing membership exclusively from a group and established to promote and protect the interests of certain groups<sup>31</sup>. Armed groups poses an extreme form of agitation for different reasons and climes, it manifests its strength better when the group assumes militant posture. They serve as a social pressure group designed to influence the structure of power to the best interest of their group and by so doing; they draw the attention of the government to some of the deficiencies suffered by the members of their community in a bid to find lasting solutions to their social problems<sup>32</sup>. Some of these groups include Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC), the Arewa People's Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, 'Kala-Kato', Ombatse and most recently, Fulani herdsmen crises, under the umbrella body of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, (MACBAN)<sup>33</sup>.

The rise of these groups has had great impacts on the numbers of ethnic based conflicts Nigeria has witnessed in recent times. However, about 40% of armed herdsmen instigated violence has occurred in Nigeria's Fourth Republic<sup>34</sup>. There have

been increases between 2012 and 2014 spanning up till date in the occurrences of armed attacks in the country with government's insignificant success in curbing the menace<sup>35</sup>. Thus, activities of armed militias in Nigeria in recent years have been so numerous that it becomes seemingly difficult to address them due to so many factors which are parts of the objectives of this research work.

Since the beginning of another democratic experiment in the fourth republic, farmer-herder violence have killed more than 10,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands more people<sup>36,37</sup>. It followed a trend in the increase of farmer-herder conflicts throughout much of the western Sahel, due to an expansion of agriculturist population and cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands; deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification as it affects Niger Basin, soil degradation and population growth in Nigeria coupled with breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small arms and crimes in the rural areas<sup>38, 39</sup>. Insecurity and violence have led many populations to create self-defense forces and ethnic and tribal militias, which have engaged in further violence<sup>40</sup>. The majority of farmer-herder clashes have occurred between Muslim Fulani Herdsmen and Christian farmers, exacerbating ethno-religious hostilities<sup>41</sup>.

The Global Terrorism Index (2015-2020), the International Crisis Watch (2015-2019) and the International Crisis Group (2015-2019) in its reports described Fulani herdsmen as the fourth deadliest terrorist group in 2014, using sophisticated guns and attacks on villages to assault and intimidate farmers<sup>42</sup>. After killing around 80 people in total from 2010 to 2013, they killed 1,229 in 2014. Most deaths occurred in the

northern parts of Nigeria and South West states in particular which recorded 847 deaths<sup>43</sup>.

Thus, this study seeks to address the relationship between armed groups and the challenges of security in the Nigerian State, its adverse impacts on nationhood and its security implications, and also proffers new management strategies that the Nigerian government can use to contain the conflict.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Farmer-herder conflict has been on the rise in various African countries including Nigeria with the associated numbers of deaths in pastoral communities, herds, herders, farms and farmers in particular, with security forces reaching problematic proportions, yet the drivers of the conflicts could be traceable to cultural and socio-economic roots. More recently, the conflict has grown to a large-scale criminal activity, with strong security implications, direct and indirect effects on the groups involved, entailing living off raids through heavily armed activities.

Since, there is ongoing study into filling the knowledge gap in the security-development continuum in the context of the farmers-herders drags in Nigeria, this study sought to interrogate the conflict in some selected states in South-West of the country through the behavior of Nigeria's security with a specific reference to the threats posed by armed herdsmen as one of the several dimensions of security threats in Nigeria by specifically contextualizing the group as 'armed' since it's now mostly in possession of small and light weapon (SALW) in its routine operations. While herders armed themselves to protect their cattle, the organized criminal groups

increase their weaponry with huge impacts on the livelihoods of pastoral communities as the “cash reserves” that cattle herds represent disappears. Hence, the specific assessment of the intersections of the security sector responses (SSR) in addressing the phenomenon in some of the axis of the crises within the arm-bit of the study scope. Therefore, the study examined the perspectives in the organizational structures of armed group in the context of ‘armed herdsman’ networks in Nigeria in shaping the patterns of violent conflicts in pastoral communities in the south-west region of the country. This constituted the vacuum loosely investigated in previous studies.

### **1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study**

The broad aim of this research is to analyze the security challenges in Nigeria by interrogating the farmer-herder conflict in selected South West States between 2011-2021, while the specific objectives are;

- i. to examine how the activities of farmer-herder have affected security in south-west states in Nigeria.
- ii. to assess the implications of farmer-herder conflicts on security of south-west states in Nigeria.
- iii. to investigate the implications of insecurity on socio-economic development in the south-west states in Nigeria.
- iv. to determine the strategies being used by the south-west states government to contain the farmer-herder conflict.
- v. to analyze the effectiveness of the strategies being used to contain the conflict in the south-west states in Nigeria.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

- i. To what extent have activities of farmer-herder affected security in south-west Nigeria?
- ii. What are the implications of farmer-herder conflicts on security of south-west states in Nigeria?
- iii. What are the implications of farmer-herder conflict on socio-economic development of south-west states in Nigeria?
- iv. What are the strategies adopted by the south-west states government to contain the farmer-herder conflict in the region?
- v. To what extent have the strategies been used to contain the conflict in the south-west states in Nigeria effective?

#### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

The current crises of security as seen in the ongoing farmer-herder clashes posed threats to the nascent democracy in Nigeria. Therefore, the study provided valuable insights to the existing studies on politics of farmer-herder and security in Nigeria and then extended the frontier of knowledge on its conceptualization as an armed group. The study will, therefore, be of immense benefits in creating awareness to the Nigerian citizens and governments at all levels especially the south-west governments, stakeholders in strategic public policy decision as regards the Nigeria's security as this

would go a long way in determining the negative outcomes of politics of agro-pastoralism on security in the country.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

The study was restricted to the examination of threats posed by rural banditry in Nigeria in the context of the farmer-herders' conflicts. Specifically, the activities of the Farmers- Herders attacks in the South-West States in Nigeria was explored which responded to the research questions. For instance, some parts of Oyo State in Ibarapa region, where towns like Igangan in Ibarapa north and Lanlate in Ibarapa east to Igbeti were visited. In Ogun State, communities like Yelwa and Imoke-Afon and other herder-farmer rural communities which are crisis prone areas in the region within 2011 to 2021 were interrogated in the course of this study.

### **1.7 Limitations to the Study**

There were several constraints that challenged the timely completion of this work. Key among was the constraint with the seeking of ethical approval from the research participants. The nature of the research instrument employed in this study dwelt on numerous schedules with the research participants being either cancelled or rescheduled with the emergence of the global health crises exemplified by the covid 19 pandemic as restrictive safety protocols had to be given unexpectedly by the government. Consequently, insecurity of the researcher and his participants in the agrarian communities further posed as constraint/threat to the gathering of the field based evidences especially in the sub-urban areas that are more prone to the conflict

where digital communication was nearly impossible. Thus, despite the identified challenging variables for this research, the researcher ensured the integrity of the field evidences/data being adequately protected.

### **1.8 Operational Definitions of Terms**

**Armed Group** - An irregular army of trained civilians called upon in time of need and the entire able bodied population of a state. It may also mean a private force not under government control. Armed groups are also organizations that challenge the state monopoly of legitimate use of force. This includes varieties of actors, including opposition and insurgent's movements, pro-government militias and community-based vigilante groups.

**Security** – this is referred to as the safety of a nation against threats such as terrorism, war, or espionage. Security is the security of a nation state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government. In this study, security is conceived as protection against military attack, non-military dimensions, including the security from terrorism, crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, cyber security or generally, safety from all forms of infringements on the freedom of either group of individuals or individual in a society.

Similarly, security risks include, in addition to the actions of other nation states, action by violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, and multinational corporations, and also the effects of natural disasters. Governments rely on a range of measures, including political, economic, and military power, as well as diplomacy to enforce national

security. They may also act to build the conditions of security regionally and internationally by reducing transnational causes of insecurity, such as climate change, economic inequality, political exclusion, and nuclear proliferation.

**Farmer** – Person who owns or manages a farm. It can also be referred to as a person who owns, works on or operates an agricultural enterprise, either commercially or to sustain himself or his family.

**Herder** – This refers to a person who is in charge of a large group of animals, especially hoofed mammals that live together or are kept together as livestock. This may also mean a person who looks after a herd of livestock or makes a living from keeping livestock. Invariably, therefore, a herder is a worker who lives a pastoralist life gathering and caring for a herd of domesticated livestock.

**Conflict** - A serious disagreement or argument typically a protracted one. Conflict is a disagreement and argument about something important. If two people or groups are in conflict they have had a serious disagreement or argument and have not yet resolved or on which no agreement is already attained.

**Extremist** – A person who holds extreme political or religious views or opinion especially one who advocates illegal, violent, or other extreme actions.

## Endnotes

1. O.C. Freedom, The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained, *African Security Review* 19(2), 54 – 67, Publishing, Rome-Italy, Vol.5 (16), 2014.
2. I.O. Albert, N. Danjibo & O.O. Albert. *Back to the Past: Evolution of Kidnapping and Hostage Taking in the Niger Delta, Nigeria*. **Beijing Law Review** 11(01): 2020, 211-226.
3. E. Osaghae, *Conflicts without Borders: Fulani Herdsmen and Deadly Ethnic Riots in Nigeria*, University Press, Ibadan, 2017, 49-66.
4. C. V. Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; 1832.
5. A. B. Aremu, & L.O. Lawal, *Tourism Development and Sustainable Economic Development: Evidence from South Western Nigeria*. **South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics**, 2(1), 2018, 1-9.
6. P. J. Azam, *On Thugs and Heroes: Why do Warlords Victimize their Own Civilians*, *Economics of Governance*, 7(1): 2006, 53–73.
7. J. Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997: 47-48.
8. I. M. Abbas, *No Retreat No Surrender: Conflict for Survival between Fulani Cattle Herders and Farmers in Northern Nigeria*, **European Scientific Journal**, Vol. 8 (1), 2018.
9. R. A. Charlton, B. Berenbaum & R. May, 'Warlords and Militarism in Chad', *Review of African Political Economy*, 15, 1989, 45/46.
10. A.S. Aliyu, *Causes and Resolution of Conflict between Cattle Herders and Crop Farmers in Katsina State*. A Published M.Sc. Dissertation by the School of Post Graduate Studies, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, 2015, 1-74.
11. N. P. Gleditsch, P. Wallenstein, M. Eriksson, S. Margareta & S. Harvard, "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," **Journal of Peace Research**, 39(5): 2002, 615–637.
12. Z. Marie-Joelle, "Protégés, Clients, Cannon Fodder: Civil- Militia Relations in Internal Conflicts." In *Civilians in War*, ed. Simon Chester Man, London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2001, 43–65.

13. Balcells & Bruderland, “*Rivalry and Revenge. Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars*,” **International Studies Quarterly**, 54(2): 2010.
14. C.M. Alden & M. Arnold, *Militias and the Challenges of Post-Colonial Peace: Silencing the Guns*; Zed Books, New York, 2011.
15. Amnesty International, “*Harvest of Death: Three Years of Bloody Clashes between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria*,” Amnesty International, December, 17, 2018.
16. H. Macartan & M. J. Weinstein, “*Handling and Manhandling Civilian in Civil War*,” **American Political Science Review**, 100(3): 2006.
17. H. Macartan & M. J. Weinstein. “*Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War*,” **American Journal of Political Science**, 52(2): 2008, 436–455.
18. International Crisis Group, “*Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem*,” Report, No. 288, May 18, 2020.
19. M.O. Shittu, *Farmers and Herders Conflict In South-West Nigeria. From 2011-2019*; Unpublished M.sc Thesis, Department Of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Social Science, National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN), 2020
20. L. P. Layton, *Bringing the Transnational into ‘New Wars’: the Case of Islamic State*, **International Review of Social Research**, vol.5 (3): 2015.
21. J. J. Simpson, *Risk Management Responses to Armed Non-State Actor Risk in Afghanistan*, **International Review of Social Research**, 2015, vol. 5(3): 2015.
22. E. Krahmman, *New Threats and New Actors in International Security*. Amsterdam, Springer, 2005, 125 – 128.
23. J. D. Francis, *The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali*, Norwegian Peace-Building Resource Centre, (NOREF) Report, 2005.
24. W. O. Alli, *The Changing Environment of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy*. In Osita, C.E (eds.) “*Beyond 50 years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and prospects*”, Lagos: **Nigerian Institute of International Affairs**, 2015.
25. R. Floyd, *What is Security: Definition through Knowledge Categorization* **Security Journal**, 23(3), 2019, 225-239.
26. H. T. Ajibo, *Dynamics of Farmers and Herdsmen Conflict in Nigeria; the Implication of Social Work Policy Intervention*, **International Journal of Humanities and Social Science**, Vol.8 (7), 2018.
27. F. C. Onuoha, *The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend*, **Security Journal**, Vol. 25 (2): 2012
28. C.M. Alden & M. Arnold, *Militias and the Challenges of Post-Colonial Peace: Silencing the Guns*; Zed Books, London, New York, 2011.
29. O. Nwolise, ‘*National Security and Sustainable Democracy*’, in *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, ed. E.O. Ojo, Ibadan: John Archers, 2006, 347–55.

30. T. Doyin, *An Empirical Investigation to Incessant Killings in Nigeria*. **Journal of Philosophy, Issue 5**, 2017, 67-82.
31. I. Abiodun, *Bloodbath in Enugu on Fulani Herdsmen Kill 40*. Retrieved from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/04/bloodbath-enugu-fulani-herdsmen-kill-40/>, 2016.
32. N.I. Christopher, *A Critical Analysis of Conflicts between Farmers and Herdsmen in Nigeria. Causes and Socio-Religious and Political Effect on National Development*, ADSIS Publishing, Vol.74 (1), 2018.
33. J. D. Francis, *Peace and Conflict Studies: An African Overview of Basic Concepts*, in S. Gaya-Best (ed.), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, 2007, pp. 20-27.
34. S. Ogunbanwo, Quoted in O.B.C. Nwolise, *'National Security and Sustainable Democracy'*, in *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, ed. E.O. Ojo Ibadan: John Archers, 2006, 349–50.
35. M. K. Aliyu, H. A. Ikedinma & A. E. Akinwande, *Assessment of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict on National Integration in Nigeria*, **International Journal of Humanities and Social Science**, Vol.8 (10) October, 2018.
36. A.U. Leme, *Understanding Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict and the Way Forward*, 2017, Retrieved from <https://www.thecable.ng/understanding-farmers-herdsmen-conflict-way-forward-2017>
37. D. Kamani, *Three Fulani Herdsmen Arrested With Bloodstained Cutlass*:<https://focusnaija.com.ng/2021/02/22/three-fulani-herdsmen-arrested-with-gun-and-bloodstained-cutlass>.
38. J. M. Gidley & H. Jonas, *Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective*. Small Arms Survey.URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10752.13> 2007.
39. A. Vinci, *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents*, Rutledge, New York, 2009.
40. M.A. Popoola, J.A. Adewale, O.I. Idachaba & M.O. Shittu, *Analysis Towards Effective Policing in Crime Control and Prevention in Nigeria*, **IJARW/ISSN (O)-2582-1008**, July 2019/Vol. 1Issue.1.
41. O. Olusola, *Farmer/Herdsmen Conflict and Security Governance in Nigeria*, M.sc Dissertation, University of Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 2019, p.18.
42. O. Aremu & I.O. Albert, Graduate Research Clinic, University of Ibadan. A Watzapp Group Scholarly Interrogation on Whether Fulani Herdsmen are Armed Group or not, unpublished.
43. O. Weaver, *Politics, Security, Theory*. Security Dialogue Vol.42 (5): 2011

## Chapter Two

### Literature Review

#### 2.1 Conceptual Review

##### 2.1.1 Armed Group

Although, scholarly discourse on the concept of armed conflicts observed that actors clearly differ substantially in the amount of violence perpetrated by these groups. Capturing these perceived variations in a way that can be feasibly quantified and reliably recorded is challenged<sup>1</sup>.

For instance, the understanding of armed group is conceived differently, armed groups conceptualizations are laced with confusion and scholarly contestations, with units that are functionally undifferentiated and autonomous from the state<sup>2</sup>. Assigning a particular label to a group entails the risk of over simplification of the concept. Perhaps, the popular saying '*One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter*' of which a scholar draws attention to the potential ideological component inherent in the act of attaching names to armed groups<sup>3</sup>. Any particular term has the ability to distort the group's purpose, activities, local relevance and ideology. As a result, any discussion of armed groups must begin with the problems of unmet statehood requirements<sup>4</sup>. If armed groups are armed organizations that challenge the state's monopoly of coercive force, which may include a variety of actors, opposition and insurgent movements, pro-government militias, and community based vigilante groups or small arm survey, then, it suffices it to be termed as such<sup>5</sup>.

The terms, 'armed group', 'rebel group' and 'insurgents' are interchangeably used as non-state actors that use armed action to challenge the authority of the state<sup>6</sup>. Hence, these groups can be described as existing outside effective government control and using armed violence as a means to a political end. Considering only armed groups that explicitly defy the authority of the state, either through rebellion or resistance, the study excludes criminal organizations as well as paramilitary groups in collusion with the state<sup>7</sup>. Although the delimitation between political and criminal intent may be blurred at times, it is, nevertheless, useful to consider the motives which go beyond the pursuit of material benefits.

While such a broad definition reflects the diversity of armed groups, there is a risk of excessive generalization when analyzing these groups. To avoid simplified conclusions, each group must be understood within its own socio-political environment. An armed group's inherent logic can only be understood through an examination of its history and nature, including "the breadth of its constituency, the cause it pursues, and the degree to which members deem violence to be advancing that cause<sup>8</sup>. Thus, in order to understand and build on the rebels' logic, it is important to consider their discourse as well as their actions.

However, while social complexity increases scholarly controversies as per properly conceiving the meaning of armed group relying on certain basic functions which tend to classify armed groups by historical period. Indeed, certain types of non-state armed groups may be seen to be specific to particular historical periods and in a sense to be entirely contained by the groups.

There are various reasons why addressing the issue of armed gangs is so challenging. One of the most frightening elements is that armed organizations are not only distinct from nations, but also from one another. Even a cursory examination of active armed organizations reveals that there are several sorts of active armed groups. From much decentralized, cellular-structured multinational organizations to state-like, long-term rebellions, which these can be found? In summary, at least three main sorts of armed groups that are relevant to insurgencies may be distinguished: warlords, organizations, and terrorist groups.

At their fundamental level, armed groups are defined just by their numbers, possession of weapons and the willingness and ability to use armed violence to create, defend or contest order on a certain territory or in a certain social segment<sup>9</sup>. Unlike the state and at a subtler level, they do not need to be territorial, as order itself is more than just territorial. Particularly, notions of social and gender composition of armed groups as well as cultural or ideological persuasions and their basic social role could be necessary for proper understanding of the concept<sup>10</sup>.

Armed groups are often conglomerated under broad terms, such as warlords. Terms such as warlord, commander and strongman are infused with ideas as to their fundamentally predatory nature and potential for unchecked violence<sup>11</sup>. There is an immediate need to disaggregate armed groups as well as to differentiate between types of armed groups and types of combatants in order to move beyond stereotypes of armed groups as either fanatics or plunderers. The diverse nature of the armed group was previously embraced as remarkably diverse range of politico-religious forces, varying from the intensely ideological to the avowedly rustic<sup>12</sup>. For instance, the

Afghan resistance, collectively known as Mujahideen (meaning ‘Warriors in the Way of God’), ranged from ‘parties’ (tanzims) with headquarters outside Afghanistan to forces organized on a regional basis, to scattered groups of fighters with local interests and agendas whose attachment to the wider resistance was dictated by a need for access to weaponry, but whose tactics resembled those of seasonal tribal warfare and whose ideological affinity with the parties they nominally represented was potentially quite tenuous<sup>13</sup>.

To a certain degree, states already do co-exist with armed groups, willingly or not, consciously or not with vast areas of African continent and other axis of the world like the Southeast and Central Asia ruled by local armed groups with vast chains of international networks hovering through the world map<sup>14</sup>. Since, different segments of even advanced, democratic Western nations were at one time or another controlled not by the authorities, but by armed and violent criminal groups<sup>15</sup>. Even though legitimacy and authority is formed in many ways, through blood ties, charisma, and provision of counseling and economic subsistence, there is hardly any historical truth or justice behind the idea that legitimacy can only come through elections. For instance, in Latin America, even relatively modern states virtually renounced control over parts of their territory in favor of violent or even non-violent militias or drug-lords<sup>16</sup>. Also, in Ibadan graduate research clinic watsapp group chit-chat with selected scholars who have conducted research in similar topic, it was opined that armed groups are organization equipped with or group of people carrying unlicensed arms or weapons<sup>17</sup>.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies projections, of as many as 262,000 served with the government (whether as part of the Soviet-backed army or in local militias) in Afghanistan. In 2005, the 60,000-strong Afghan Military Forces were disbanded, and the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program was initiated. Presently, the Afghan New Beginnings Project's 'warlord' database for the DIAG process includes 1,800 commanders and militias for as many as 120,000 combatants, dividing these between 'benign' self-defense militias and approximately 100 'dangerous groups'<sup>18</sup>.

Distressingly, 'the rule of the gun' often applied to many post-conflict environments. In essence, the continued dominance of armed groups and its influences over a broad range of sectors, from the political to the economic cannot be over emphasised<sup>19</sup>. In this view, armed groups may continue to be a fundamental component of social and political organization, as they serve a basic function of any said organization. While the removal (by states or other armed groups) of some particular armed groups from a region or segment of society is entirely possible and perhaps sometimes even desirable, the problem itself remains and transcends all cleavages that separate any society from another<sup>20</sup>.

At the core of any society or human permanent gathering is at least one armed group. The literature on armed group has surfaced since 1970, when the famous question "why men rebel" emerged<sup>21</sup>. Several recent studies have also sought to explain why some people join armed groups and why others collaborate with such groups short of joining as full- time combatant. Initially, it was psychopathological studies that dominated the discussion. They assumed that compulsion to join a non- state militant

organization, or the vulnerability to recruitment, was inherent in those who engaged in militancy<sup>22</sup>. In other words, their argument was that members of armed groups (terrorist or not) are born and not made by the surrounding social and political conditions and group processes. For instance, in classifications of individual members as armed group included one classification deemed “Crazies,” who were propelled to engage in terrorist violence because of mental illness<sup>23</sup>. Some militants were sociopaths. This analysis centered on convicted terrorists’ tattoos<sup>24</sup>. Armed group members possess either psychopathic or sociopathic personalities and that the acts of terrorists are merely psychopathic tendencies hidden behind political rhetoric to provide the militant with an excuse as argued<sup>25</sup>.

Studies of this nature, usually, were often condemnatory in nature. More recent studies have, therefore, failed to uncover these initial pathological traits, although not addressing directly the questions of insurgent or terrorist recruitment and collaboration, they have primarily relied explicitly or implicitly on the literature that explains the onset of civil war<sup>26</sup>. Armed groups operate at the elementary level of power and that of coercing someone’s will by force or the threat of violence. While they may acquire other roles, in many cases related to the provision of social services, they are not part of their essence<sup>27</sup>. A militant group can provide food and medicine to a beleaguered community, so can a government, a humanitarian foundation, a businessman or an international aid organization. An armed group may instill loyalty, create preferred behavioral patterns and influence folklore, so can a soccer club<sup>28</sup>. While the additional roles an armed group takes, or has thrown upon itself, are interesting and could make

the bread and butter of anyone working for and on them, they are not defining of their nature and, therefore, cannot help in their classification.

The ability to employ and threaten the use of armed decisive violence against its opponents is a distinguishing trait of an armed organization<sup>29</sup>. As a result, there are two approaches to classify armed groupings on a consistent and fundamental level. The first is the long-term viability of the threat and use of violence, and the second is the reason for the threat or use of violence<sup>30</sup>.

By this, an armed group can be a long-term or short-term social gathering. This trait should be interpreted as follows: it does not relate to the permanence of carrying and using weapons, but rather to the duration of the armed group's meeting. For example, just because a gangster organization can stop from using and threatening violence, and even from carrying weapons, does not indicate that it is not an armed group during that time, just as an army is no less of an armed group during lengthy times of calm. Even in such situations, they remain an armed organization since their societal mission is everlasting.

Other social meetings, such as local defense militias that are organized in the event of a crisis, might be temporarily labeled armed organizations. They are merely armed groups for as long as the emergency lasts. Because their societal purpose is temporally and functionally restricted, they lack coherence outside of an emergency. The same may be said of pre-state sedentary civilizations' defensive or offensive systems, to varying degrees of dependability: their armed groups were more or less temporary. War bands can be considered temporary armed organizations even if all of the

members stay the same from one war path to the next<sup>31</sup>. They vary from the types of armed organizations that create order in states in that they do create order but it is only temporary. To preserve order, the police must be present on the streets at all times. A war band, on the other hand, does not. They resemble the sort of order maintained by a gangster group in this regard, with the exception that gangster organizations are permanent armed groups, whereas most war bands are not.

Armed organizations can also be defined by the goal for which violence or the threat of violence is employed. It must be stated right away that the classification derived from this attribute cannot be construed as a rigorous categorization of armed groups. Indeed, several of these uses may overlap, making it difficult to categorize some groups into a single category<sup>32</sup>.

Furthermore, several historic armed groups have moved from one category to another or had to juggle numerous of them at the same time during their existence. While some armed organizations might be viewed as solely economic institutions, others can be viewed as cultural, identity-based gatherings preserving a specific form of honor or traditions of an ethnic minority that has been marginalized by an apathetic government and a racist majority. Guerrilla organizations, who may be viewed of as either sovereignty or legitimacy challengers, have occasionally switched to purely economic pursuits, either to fund their political action or to become gangster empires in their own right. In other situations, they've played a bigger role as social enforcers, enforcing societal standards that the government is either too lenient on, like drug trafficking, or doesn't deem unlawful, such sexual behaviors<sup>33</sup>. As a result, this

uncertainty should not deter us from considering the goal of using and threatening violence as a criterion for categorizing armed groups.

Nevertheless, organizations such as Amnesty International and the US State Department provide regular estimates on the extent of human rights abuses across the world by the groups as specific indices<sup>34</sup>. These ratings are, however, often not presented in a systematically quantified form which makes using them for any statistical analyses difficult to say at least. Those datasets that form an exception are mostly limited to genocide or mass killing inter-state wars or rely only on a proxy for violence; only few datasets have focused primarily on recording information on violence against the civilian population<sup>35</sup>.

Considerable scholastic efforts were spent in understanding the new movements from this perspective, as an effect of contemporary historical, economic and social processes. The character of novelty was presumed and seldom justified. At their fundamental level, armed groups are defined just by their numbers, possession of weapons and the willingness and ability to use armed violence to create, defend or contest order on a certain territory or in a certain social segment<sup>36</sup>. Unlike the state and at a subtler level, they do not need to be territorial, as order itself is more than just territorial. For understanding in particular, historical armed groups, notions of social and gender composition as well as cultural or ideological persuasions could be necessary.

To understand their basic social role, one can dispense with these perspectives. Practically, political leaders would have to choose between time-tested approaches,

sometimes successful, often not, of accepting and imposing the modern state and associations of states both as the only possible and legitimate authorities in the world<sup>37</sup>. They would have to ponder the co-existence of state with regions dominated by other actors all of them underpinned by armed groups. They would have to consider whether these regions pose an existential threat to their nations and the world system, as we know it. And political leaders of democratic nations will also be confronted by the idea that it may be someone's right to live in a community which is not defined by a nation-state but rather by an armed group<sup>38</sup>. This idea in itself has the potential to rewrite a considerable section of political and constitutional theory and raises interesting questions for learned individuals everywhere.

The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a non- state actor (those actors being other than the state and formally organized by having announced a name), against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths (per year and per actor)<sup>39</sup>.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the criminality and personal violence, as well as fatalities caused by general rioting or other types of unorganized social unrest that excludes extra-judicial killings by the government, the harming of civilians, and most importantly it excludes fatalities as a result of unintentional and indirect use of violence<sup>40</sup>. Unintentional deaths comprise those killings that result inadvertently from conflict, for example, civilians caught in a cross- fire. These killings are not included in the dataset since the intention of the conflicting parties was to kill each other and not the civilian population<sup>41</sup>. Direct killings encompass all deaths caused by the direct use of armed forces by an actor, such as by bombing or shooting. Intentional starvation, what happened for example, in Algeria, is for instance not included in the

UCDP One-sided Violence datasets because it is not a direct action. Although, state actors caused more civilian deaths than all non- state actors together, non-state actors seem to rely more often on armed conflicts: from the 686 events of Violence recorded, 455 were perpetrated by non- state actors, resulting in more than 130,000 civilians getting killed. For instance, the UCDP One-sided Violence datasets report 686 instances of civilian abuse in the period of 1989 - 2010 around the world. These instances were perpetrated by 198 different actors. From these violent events, 231 accounts were perpetrated by government actors resulting in more than 569,000 civilians getting killed<sup>42</sup>.

As a result, the idea of an armed group cannot be defined in a single way. Therefore, there are many different interpretations of the phrase. Armed militias can take many various shapes, yet they all fall into the same general category. Militia organizations are insurgent groups that engage in subversive actions against the state, whereas armed groups are paramilitary units that conduct police tasks within their territory.

In Nigeria, the number of armed organizations is easily in the hundreds. Many communities have such groups. These organizations are sometimes considered as criminal organizations or as a collection of mis-led teenagers. Armed organizations, on the other hand, are not always considered as security dangers; in other circumstances, they are seen as community protectors<sup>43</sup>. In some circumstances, the organizations get logistical assistance, food, money, information, and even weaponry from the community. The bulk of armed organizations are local or regional in scope. There is currently no active armed group on a national level.

In Nigeria, an armed militia is a militant group formed to safeguard the interests of a certain nationality inside the Nigerian federation. As a result, armed militias/groups might be viewed as paramilitary actors in a specific society making political demands on the state as citizens. They are also particularistic in nature, with subversion of deliberative ability, usurpation, and incivility as hallmarks. Thus, youth-based formations that could arise with the goal of promoting and safeguarding the parochial interests of their ethnic groups, and whose actions often entail the use of violence, according to the report. Armed militia politics are, therefore, organized violence-oriented groups populated by varied people from various age groups, but drawn solely from one ethnic group and intended to advocate and safeguard the interests of that ethnic group<sup>44</sup>.

In Nigerian politics, armed groups are an extreme type of ethnic agitation for self-determination that happens when an ethnic group adopts a militant stance. They function as a social pressure group with the goal of influencing the power structure in their favor and drawing attention to their group's or social environment's worsening material conditions, political deprivation, and perceived marginalization. Perceptively, with the Global Terrorism Index, these conflicts have resulted in over 800 deaths by 2015. The year 2016, incidents were reported in Agatu, Benue and Nimbo in Enugu State. In April 2018, armed herdsmen allegedly killed 19 people during attack on the church and also, dozens of homes<sup>45</sup>. Moreover, in June 2018, over 200 people were attacked and killed and about 50 houses equally burnt in clashes between farmers and cattle herders in Plateau. On the night of 22<sup>nd</sup> to the morning of 23<sup>rd</sup> more than 21 villagers were killed in the village of Dowaya, Adamawa state in which the casualties

were mainly women and children. In October 2018, Fulani herdsmen killed at least 19 people in Bassa. And on the 11<sup>th</sup> of February 2019 suspected Fulani gunmen attacked Adara settlement named Ungwar Bardi killing 11 people but a reprisal attack was carried out by the Adara community on the Fulani herders killing at least also 141 people with about 65 missing. On January 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup>, 2020, 32 villagers were murdered in two different attacks by Muslim Fulani herdsmen in Plateau<sup>46</sup>.

Militias are, therefore, classified as non-state actors because of their traditional and present traits, and they are, in theory, independent of the state's structure and apparatus. Simply described, they are armed non-state actors that operate outside of the conventional military apparatus of the state. Militias, whether ethnic, regional, or national in nature, have a proclivity for using crude violence to force change in political and socio-economic arenas. They have a near monopoly on the use of violence in various contexts, employing advanced weaponry and/or small guns indiscriminately to carry out unconventional warfare in target regions.

Militias have become more diverse than ever before, ranging from paramilitary formations used as counter-insurgency forces, small localized village militias centered on self-defense, and militias that have splintered from failures within a state security sector and sought to undermine state power structures<sup>47</sup>. Perhaps to set them apart from other types of soldiers, they have the following distinctive characteristics:

*Part of what differentiates armed militias/groups from more traditional fighters is their operational mode, particularly their propensity to use violent techniques that contravene international war conventions and their predilection for forming alliances based on expediency." Militias are famously difficult to govern in the context of transitions from war to peace since realized entities are prone to pursue conflict in terms of local interests. As a result, the*

*international community's traditional approaches to conflict management and resolution are woefully insufficient in dealing with the issue of militias and the long-term effects they have on post-war scenario*<sup>48</sup>.

However, Scholars have made various attempts to develop global typologies of armed militias, including those by Al Jazeera. These typologies include indigenous peoples dispossessed and over-whelmed by colonizers. Even a cursory examination of active armed organizations reveals that there are several sorts of active armed groups. From much decentralized, cellular-structured multinational organizations to state-like, long-term rebellions, these can be found. In summary, as previously argued, there are at least three sorts of armed groups that are relevant to insurgencies: warlord organizations, terrorist groups, and insurgents.

Guerrilla insurgencies exist, such as the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). From 1983 through 2005, the SPLA conducted a civil war against Sudan's government. It commanded tens of thousands of soldiers and a territory greater than several European countries. It possessed a complex leadership system, foreign policy, a well-trained army, and the capacity to administrate and regulate many tribes inside its borders.

Warlords and their organizations, such as Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, are among the other armed groups (NPFL). In 1989, the NPFL began battling the Liberian government of Samuel Doe. It established its own government in central Liberia known as the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), also known as 'Taylor land,' after being repulsed by the Liberian army and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) army. The NPFL was known for utilizing ruthless tactics against

both its opponents and civilian villages, such as chopping off hands and selling alluvial gems and wood to fund its fighting. Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997 after seizing power in Monrovia.

Armed organizations, are also described as non-state groups since they are independent of the state's authority in armed conflict and the balance of power; International relations of terrorists, warlords, and insurgents by LSE International studies.

In practice, the term "armed group" refers to military entities that are made up of a cohesive collection of persons with military might, such as insurgent groups, terrorist organizations and warlord organizations. This can range from small groups of soldiers armed with light firearms to large armies with planes and tracked vehicles. For an extended period of time, these organizations are capable of committing violence in a coordinated and planned manner. Armed groups can be defined as non-state organizations with the capability of persistent and systematic military action, based on these characteristics across various groups<sup>49</sup>.

This definition excludes short-term mobs of individuals as well as small-scale criminal gangs that, while capable of violence, are unable to do it routinely and at a level that would be considered military. Criminal gangs do occasionally acquire military capabilities, particularly during times of state breakdown. They would then cross the threshold into being an armed group.

For instance, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have similar histories in this respect and contain indigenous minorities Aborigines, Maoris, Native Americans, and Native Canadians who remain in unequal marginalized positions.

Indigenous groups are also found in Latin America, where there have been massacres, for example, in Guatemala in the 1980s, and in most Asian countries, where native groups may be categorized as “tribal peoples” or “hill tribes”<sup>50</sup>. Other categories and contexts include: migrant workers and their descendants forming strong ethnic communities for example, Turks in Germany or Pakistanis in the United Kingdom; ethno-nations for example, the Quebecois in Canada or the Basques in Spain with regional ethnic groups contesting national control; post slavery groups in, for example, Brazil, the United States, and the Caribbean; and people living in post-colonial and post-communist contexts, as in, for example, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Chechnya, or the former Yugoslavia, and Nigeria where ethnic loyalties have had grave consequences in terms of conflict and violence<sup>51</sup>.

Previously, armed movements have been differentiated in terms of the tension between modern and traditional ‘primitive’ armed groups. A political military party is described as bureaucratic organizations<sup>52</sup>. In the book, a clear divide is made between those commanders linked to (and drawing their power from) specific communities or solidarity groups and those that draw their power from specific political parties<sup>53</sup>. At the national level, those commanders and leaders that have achieved prominence are best identified as either emerging from within political military parties or as strongmen warlords. Each ideal type of armed groups differs as to the degree of segmentation within the movement, its goal and objectives and the constitution of the movement, as well as in terms of internal weapons ownership and distribution. Community militias are largely egalitarian, with each individual owning his own weapons and with most combatants possessing similar weapons. Community militias focus on protecting their

local community and enforcing internal norms and community decisions, although, in certain locations, smaller contingents will threaten neighboring communities and engages in district disputes and predation outside local boundaries. The power of community militia and commanders is limited by the community of elders.

In contrast, strongmen and warlords have acquired substantial independence from community checks and balances and community restrictions over their uses of force; although these strongmen may consult the qawmi meshran (community of elders) in order to acquire legitimacy. The relatives, close affiliates and internal enforcers are provided with rare expensive weapons. Commanders possess substantial standing stockpiles of diverse weapons (either accumulated over time or through the capture of government stocks). Other combatants are typically required to purchase and bring their own weapons. Local strongmen will be substantially internally oriented, employing their inazm-e-khas to assure their continued dominance.

Political military parties, in contrast, focus on capturing the state and are more likely to control their weapons and be organized around a conventional military model, dividing their soldiers by specialty as well as incorporating heavy weapons. Although they may be affiliated with community militias or strongmen, these parties are ideologically oriented and delocalized<sup>54</sup>. As will be detailed in the second part of the chapter, each ideal type can bring to bear a different collection of assets to recruit and sustain combatants. Charisma (whether organized around traditional, religious or military capability) plays a role in all three types of armed groups, particularly with the creation of a cult of personality around commanders, complete with murals, posters and other expressions of loyalty and devotion<sup>55</sup>. Different forms of charisma, however,

are aligned with each different ideal type: patronage and tribal authority to community militias and military performance to warlords and strongmen. Each of these three ideal types plays different roles (and requires different strategies) in the reconstitution of state authority and administration in 'collapsed states. While community militias and provincial shuras (consultative bodies) are successful at addressing certain issues (protection against external attack, short-term security), these groups can fall prey to influence meddling and are generally not successful at governing localities beyond the provision of a basic level of protection and conflict resolution due to the absence of a broader consensus beyond stabilization. These militias tend to prefer the reconstitution of central authority by conducting a consultative process with community and tribal elders to select a central leadership and create a power-sharing government.

From the foregoing, it is imperative, therefore, to understand the concept of Ethnicity to properly conceptualize armed groups. The word ethnic can be traced to its Latin and Greek origin "Ethnos" which means nation or race. Ethnicity is the distinction made between groups of individuals who share cultural meanings, memories, and descent as a result of social contact. The phrases ethnos and ethnikos were used in a variety of ways in ancient Greek to refer to a group of people who share similar cultural or biological qualities. A tribe of individuals or a group of friends who were not Greek, for example, came from outside the nation, were alien and strange, and were also seen as inferior, barbarians, and less cultured. In present common use, the distinction between ethnically marked "others" and non-ethnically marked "us" still exists when discussing ethnic dress or food.

Sociological theories of ethnicity vary greatly, but they all tend to disrupt the traditional relationship between ethnicity and "other" by stating that everyone is ethnically situated in the sense that their subjectivity and identity are shaped by history, language, ancestry, and culture. Ethnicity is a term that refers to the classification of social groupings based on a set of characteristics. The concept of a "homeland," or a location of shared origin, is a crucial component. It is sometimes associated with the concept of diaspora, in which members of an ethnic group have migrated from their country to build communities abroad where they identify with their homeland. Second, a common language, whether unique in and of itself or a dialect of a shared language, may be crucial in the development of shared memories and affective attachment.

Many ethnic communities have a major trait of identification with a particular religion, such as Sikhism, or a religion shared with others. Other characteristics used to define ethnic groupings include a common culture with different social structures and behavior, nutrition, and attire, as well as a common tradition or shared history of one's own "people" or nation<sup>56</sup>.

Ethnicities may last millennia and span vast distances, yet they can also emerge from fresh social confluences. Ethnic solidarity can provide a deep sense of physical and psychological security, allowing individuals to identify and find a sense of common purpose with a great and long-lasting tradition of people. But if fictive shared beliefs underlie ethnic differentiation, then the boundaries of ethnic groups are inevitably unclear and caution is required in assessing the extent to which external categories accurately reflect social meanings, social roles, and wider social inequalities. There

may often be a poor fit between the state and bureaucratic constructions of ethnic categories and dynamic forms of inter subjective ethnic identities.

Ethnicity is defined as a community of people who believe they share a common identity based on issues of origin, kinship ties and traditions, cultural uniqueness, shared history, and possibly shared language. In the same vein, ethnic group is defined as a community of people who believe they share a common identity based on issues of origin, kinship ties and traditions, cultural uniqueness, shared history, and possibly shared language. Ethnicity, as a broad term, refers to a group of people who have a common ancestor, are often drawn together by family, and share some cultural differences<sup>57</sup>.

Nigeria has been in the throes of complex identity-based conflicts since the 1990s. Although some of the conflicts such as the one under focus can be regarded as new, spontaneous and fleeting, belonging to the category of what is characterizes as “deadly ethnic riots,” which tend to be episodic rather than ubiquitous, involve widespread hostility and brutal killings, and produce memories that linger and shape group relations afterward. Nevertheless, they are products of historically embedded cleavages and triggers that make divided societies continuously open to conflicts.

In broad terms, however, there are two categories of militant groups, namely the ideological, politically-inspired or principled militants and non-ideological, criminally-motivated militants or opportunistic mercenaries. For instance, Communal conflicts over scarce resources, manifesting as inter-ethnic violence, herdsman-farmer conflicts, and indigene-settler hostilities, ravaged Nigeria’s north-central region,

otherwise known as the middle belt in 2014. Such conflicts are rife in the states of Benue and Nassarawa in the mid-belt region, Plateau in central Nigeria, and Taraba in the north-east. In March 2014, Fulani herdsmen attacked several Tiv villages in the Benue and Nassarawa States, leading to the deployment of specialized mobile police squads as well as the military for internal security operations<sup>58</sup>.

In addition to this, the Fulani traditional nomads living in several West African countries, constitute the indigenous population that lives in the north-east and north-west of Nigeria, as well as parts of the mid-belt region of Nigeria. The quest for pasture to tend their livestock often brings them in conflict with local Tiv farmers that inhabit the Benue and Nassarawa States. Similarly, in the Taraba state in north east Nigeria, which is predominantly occupied by inhabitants from the Jukun ethnic group, armed violence between Fulani herdsmen and Jukun militia led to deaths and the displacement of people in Wukari and surrounding towns and villages between April and June 2014. It is estimated that at least 300 lives were lost due to communal conflicts in the north-central states of Benue, Nassarawa, Kaduna, Plateau, and Taraba states in 2014<sup>59</sup>.

Ideological militants are, therefore, those purpose-driven militants who display aggressive tendencies in reaction to real or perceived social injustice and other forms of marginalization which are considered as threats to their individual and/or collective identity in a given political entity. For instance, The Niger Delta crisis was propelled by ideological militancy as youths chose to take up arms against the state and society in their quest for redress of age long inequality, marginalization, environmental damage and political deprivation. Despite the Niger Delta Amnesty Program of 2009

which rehabilitated and reintegrated into society more than 30,000 militants of the Niger Delta region in southern Nigeria, even though, a segment of former militants has repeatedly threatened to go back to arms if the government does not adhere to the agreement made with the militants to provide jobs and benefits in return for their disarmament. Some former militants have protested the delayed payment of their allowances and their exclusion from the benefits schemes. They have also threatened to blow up oil installations in the region in November 2014, following the purported attempt to impeach President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, the first southern head of state in Nigeria. This is further complicated by the availability of illicit arms in custody of Militia group actors and the existence of sleeper cells of armed groups in all of the six geo-political zones in the country comprising north-east, north-west, north-central, south-east, south-west and south-south<sup>60</sup>.

Non-ideological militants, on the other hand, are individuals who commit acts of violence against other people without justification. As a means of survival, this group of militants resorts to indiscriminate violence and criminal activity. Religious extremists, political thugs, and grassroots-based or college cults make up a bigger number of non-ideological militants who make themselves accessible for commercialized criminality. Unscrupulous forces in society, such as unprincipled politicians, arm criminally motivated militants to perpetrate crimes such as election violence, killing of opponents, public disturbance, and hostage kidnapping, among others<sup>61</sup>. By inference, non-ideological militants' acts are an outlier in any given community since their motivations are not limited to the boundaries of fundamental human rights and the rule of law.

In this light, militancy is not just the province of modern Nigerian society, and by extension, Africa. Militias, for example, have a long history in American history due to their pivotal role in the American battle of independence from British colonial control. They were known as "patriot militias," and their leaders were recruited in the areas where they were operating in the name of self-defense against British rule. It's worth noting that the second Amendment to the United States Constitution granted patriot militias considerable leeway by declaring that "a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state. The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed". Within the American context of militia phenomenon, militias were seen as playing legitimate violent actions though not as "standing armies" or as a perpetually benign force which could be regarded as "national militia" Moreover, in the European hemisphere, there was 'the French Militia' or 'Milice Francoise' in France and the Swiss militia system' in Switzerland<sup>62</sup>.

Since the 1990s, ethnic and ethno-religious contestation and conflicts have escalated in Nigeria. In particular, communal, ethnic, and religious politicization and mobilizations have increased since democratization opened up political space. The intensification and mobilization of ethnic nationalism have fed into a multiplication of ethnic nationalist movements and militias in the Southern and Middle Belt Regions, as well as fundamentalist militias in the Northern region, since militia groups have become the instrument for ethnic contestations and confrontations.

Outside of the historical American and European experience which has dwindle the rest of the world has continued to see a very strong presence and activities of militias and their centrality to conflicts. Thus, they have severally distorted the traditional

application of legitimate force within which context the monopoly of violence was confined in state actors. Apart from perpetrating and perpetuating internal conflicts and violence in various independent states in post-cold war era, militias have continued to play a central role in the generation, intensity and manifestation of various ongoing global conflicts.

Within the African context, the contemporary post-second world war period provides copious examples of conflicts that involve diverse militias. Prominent among them across the continent include the *Janjaweed*, being interpreted as ‘devils on horseback’, in Darfur, Sudan; the ‘*interahamwe*’, (meaning ‘those who work/fight together’) among the Hutu; and the ‘*impuzamugambi*’ (meaning those who have the same goal) among the Hutus in Rwanda; the maumau secret liberation army in Kenya<sup>63</sup>. Odua People’s Congress (OPC), Bakassi Boys, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and Fulani herdsmen, all in Nigeria represent other forms of ethnic militias.

With a particular emphasis on the Fulani Herdsmen, although militias were originally motivated by the urge to agitate for social change and justice in political, economic and environmental terms, the Fulani herdsmen have also employed terrorist instrumentalities for their activities, although, with counter-productive tendencies on Nigeria’s national security by making several spurious demands on federal government of Nigeria. On October 20, 2021, the bandits, whom the Wall Street Journal, argued, having ‘collaborators inside the army’ and who are “better equipped with larger-capacity advanced weaponry than national security agencies,” detonated explosives on the Abuja-Kaduna rail tracks and caused the indefinite suspension of rail transportation between Abuja and Kaduna axis.

Given the uncertainty surrounding this notion, some researchers place a greater emphasis on subjective and objective cultural variables, while others place a greater emphasis on situational circumstances when analyzing ethnicity. However, "ethnicity" is characterized for the sake of this study as an organizational, "mobilizational," emancipatory, and liberating force for both people and communities, whose effectiveness is primarily determined by its level of politicization<sup>64</sup>. "The articulation of interests in the name of the ethnic group and the effort to rectify or protect those interests" is another term for politicized ethnicity. As a result, ethnicity is an identity that may impact a person's sense of belonging as well as his or her behavior in relation to the political community. Given the diversity of the armed groups, it is difficult to generate a simple typology. They are often characterized by observers as (ethnic) militias, confraternities or cults, vigilante groups, or (criminal) gangs, but these terms have often been used interchangeably, creating confusion as to the distinctions among the various categories. Some groups fall into more than one type, further blurring the distinctions.

The definitions below provide a starting point for delineating the differences among the armed group classifications. Regardless of their motivations or activities, many members of armed groups preferred to be called 'freedom fighters' as opposed to any other label, suggesting a strong belief in the reasons why they fight. They are not rebel movements, and are not seeking to capture territory or political power; instead, they serve as a pressure group on government.

**i. Ethnic militias** - These are defined as youth groups formed to promote and protect the interests of a specific ethnic group, and therefore operate across the territory of that ethnic group. They are not rebel movements.

**ii. Confraternities and Cults** – These are similar in their origins, but differ in their areas of operation. These are small groups that originate in tertiary academic institutions. Their origins are in fraternities, initially comprising groups of men with similar interests, but they have since developed over the past few decades into armed groups that are often involved in criminal activities. Confraternities operate on campus, while their affiliated cults operate in off-campus locations. Their activities tend to be localized in proximity to the tertiary institution.

**iii. Vigilante Groups** - These are community groups created to fill a security gap and provide protection on from violent crime and armed robbery to a specific community. They consist of community members and are extremely localized in their area of operation.

**iv. Criminal Gangs** - This tend to be groups of unemployed, poor, and illiterate youths who engage in small-scale crime and offer their services for hire to politicians and others. These gangs go by various local names, such king to capture territory or political power; instead, they serve as a pressure group on government as 'area boys' in Lagos or *yandaba* in the north. They are small groups with little organization, locally formed, and operating in small areas.

**Table 2.1:** Types of Armed Groups in Nigeria

	<b>Ethnic militias</b>	<b>Confraternities/ cults</b>	<b>Vigilante groups</b>	<b>Criminal gangs</b>	<b>Terrorists/Insurgents Groups</b>
<b>Purpose</b>	To redress grievances and injustices and protect and defend the rights of the ethnic group	Self-enrichment and defending territory	Provide security to communities; provide law and order services in areas where police presence is minimal; provide economic opportunities to members	Economic gain	Challenge state's monopoly of legitimate coercive force
<b>Membership</b>	Ethnic group; other sympathetic ethnic groups	Students unemployed Volunteers	Cults: youth, Community organization	Unemployed youth	Unemployed youth, religious sect/ fundamentalist,
<b>Support base</b>	Typically grassroots organizations receiving widespread support; able to mobilize more widely	Alliances with other armed groups; politicians	Community support; community funding through dues; many receive government support	Members; politicians	Organized chain of Command, Propaganda, , Cybercrime, Drug trafficking, Distribution of Narcotics, Kidnapping, Money Laundering, Bulk Cash Smuggling, Black Market Oil Distribution, Car Dealership
<b>Area of operations</b>	Communities of ethnic group; also across states where ethnic group is dominant	Confraternities tend to be on campus, similar to IJS fraternities; cults operate off campus, tend to be the more violent of the two; localized area of operations	Localized area of operations, usually at community level	Dominate particular neighborhoods; localized area of operations	Peculiar to the group operations and its fundamental objectives

<b>Main Activities</b>	Defense of Group's Political Attacks on Politicians, on Oil Pipeline, Kidnapping and Oil Bunkering	Ethnic right: Protest, Attacks on Oil Pipeline, and Oil Bunkering	Control and defend territory: bunkering: reputed for being brutal and secretive with elaborate ritual initiation	Oil defend: Oil reputed for being brutal and with ritual	Activities aimed at community security; Sometimes administer physical punishment to suspects, or take the law into their own hands; some groups work with police to enforce law and order	Engage in Armed robbery and other Criminal activities	Attack civilian populace, Kidnapping, Bombing, Arson, Plane hijacking and other Criminal activities
<b>Arms</b>	Paramilitary are armed groups; best trained, organized; with sophisticated weapons	Not all are armed groups; usually with sophisticated weapons	Not all are violent, but most are armed; prospective members must demonstrate bravery and ability to use weapons	Not all are armed	Not all are armed	Not all are armed	Sophisticatedly armed to attack and breach all security protocols.
<b>Instances</b>	NDPVF Federated Delta Communities (FNDIC), People's Congress (OPC)	MEND Niger Ijaw Oodua Congress	NDVS/ Icelander, Deebam, Deewell, Greenlander, Outlaws, Ayee, Eiye, Alora et al.	Bakassi Boys, Anambra State Vigilante Services, Odua People's Congress (OPC)' Amotekun	Area Boys, One Million Boys, Ekugbemi gang, Badoo, Awawa Boys	Boko Haram Al Qaeda Fulani Extremists	

Sources: Amnesty International (2015); Best & Von Kemedi (2005); DFID (2007); Rotimi (2005); Von Kemedi (2006)

Unidentified armed organizations, whose identities or political connections are either unknown or unreported, are exempted from the preceding categories. Where data is available, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset differentiate between communal and political militias and their unnamed equivalents. There are a variety of reasons why armed organizations' identities are unknown or undisclosed. Reporters may, for example, lack access to war-affected areas or lack precise information about organizations in complicated and dynamic conflict settings<sup>65</sup>.

Furthermore, reporters may believe that in extremely complicated disputes, a group's exact identification is unimportant to intended readers, so they focus instead on the larger struggle. This is especially important in ethnic conflict reporting, because reporters may not provide distinct group identities in the setting of many and complex ethnic connections. This study focuses on unidentified armed organizations for the most part, as there is reason to suspect that nameless communal militias are frequently unnamed due to the difficulty of identifying one of numerous ethnic or communal groupings in various news sources. This is backed by evidence that community militias are almost exclusively active in places where other communal violence occurs, and that these are often remote portions of the state with infrequent reporting. Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan are the most prevalent countries where this sort of group exists. In Somalia, where several communal militias operate in dry and semiarid areas, the identity of which may not be relevant to news coverage on their operations.

Small, fragmented, or less organized violent organizations, on the other hand, may remain unknown or their identities undisclosed because they intend to profit from an

unstable environment that preserves their anonymity. This argument might also be used to freshly created groups that have yet to establish their identity. The Democratic Republic of the Congo's extremely volatile and dynamic environment might be home to an unnamed armed organization, as a large number of contending players see fresh formations and transformations of armed actors and groups in flux. This argument may also apply to factions within bigger, well-known parties that behave with relative independence in specific circumstances, and are therefore labeled as "unidentified" since they act with little regard for a central authority.

A third explanation for the nameless or unknown nature of organizations is that they are acting on behalf of bigger parties or interests that wish to distance themselves from their acts due to the nature of the violence. Peaks in unidentified armed group activity in Kenya and Nigeria coincide with electoral cycles, indicating that nominally unnamed organizations engage in violence against opponents on behalf of, or in the interests of, established political parties. As we'll see later, violence against civilians accounts for a significant portion of the violence conducted by unidentifiable organizations. This shows that groups like rebels, militias, and governments may employ unidentified groups for strategic purposes, such as to engage in action from which they want to dissociate themselves or their regimes<sup>66</sup>.

In each of these cases, include unidentified armed groups in the investigation of violence is crucial. Events in which the offenders' identities are unknown are nonetheless useful to analyzing the experience of violence in a specific territory, the susceptibility of civilians and other groups to assaults, and the degree and volatility of violence throughout a region. As a result, providing a true picture of the lived

experience of violence and vulnerability necessitates the inclusion of these occurrences. Events in which acts are purposefully meant to remain unattributed indicate something about the geography of conflict, the interaction of interests, and the character of violent rivalry in a country that cannot be understood only on the basis of their face value.

Unidentified armed organizations engage in varying degrees of activity in different nations, and their actions vary based on the political and military backdrop of the country. Unidentified armed organizations account for 11.8 percent of violent actors in all nations. The percentage of violent actors varies from 32 percent in Somalia to 1.1 percent in Sierra Leone. Nigeria, Gambia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Kenya, Botswana, Rwanda, Lesotho, and Guinea are the countries with the largest number of unidentifiable players after Somalia. There are variances in the kind of activity among states, in addition to varied amounts of unidentified group activity across nations.

The presence or absence of civil war in a nation during the time period in question is a crucial factor in influencing the extent and kind of unidentified armed group activity. As can be seen from the table above, VAC accounts for more than 60% of unidentified armed group activity in most nations. The presence of various nations that have experienced or continue to endure civil war during the timeframe of ACLED data (1997–2011) is evident in the countries where VAC and battles account for almost similar amounts of unidentified group activity). Burundi and Uganda are prominent outliers among the nations where unidentified armed organizations engage in high levels of VAC as countries that suffered civil conflict throughout the dataset's era. When the data is broken down further by year and nations are evaluated in pre- and

post-civil war periods, it is obvious that the degree of VAC in which unidentifiable organizations participate in Uganda has increased (from 63 percent to 73.6 percent). This is consistent with the broader pattern of non-civil war nations having greater levels of unidentified group violence against civilians than civil war states. In Burundi, VAC by unidentified organizations accounted for 65 percent of unidentified violent behavior during the civil war (1997–2005), but 47.7% after the civil war (2006–2011). This might be due to a lack of interest in or coverage of the Burundian civil war in comparison to the other situations. Unidentified armed organizations make up a large portion of Nigeria's violent players, accounting for 26.1 percent. VAC (57.6% of UAG activity) and battles (40.3% of UAG activity) account for about the same percentage of UAG activity. The proportion of VAC offenders who are recognized and unidentified is almost similar, with 53.2 percent of perpetrators being UAGs<sup>67</sup>. Over time, the drivers of known and unidentified violence against civilians have a lot in common.

### **2.1.2 Nomadic Farming in Nigeria**

Nomads are people whose major source of livelihood is livestock herding. Nomadic farming and rearing of livestock is a major occupation of the people in the Sahel and parts of the Savannah regions of Nigeria. The importance of this industry and its contribution to food production and employment generation cannot be overemphasized. In Africa, nomadic pastoralists are usually a mixture of both the indigenous ones and those who migrated from other neighboring African countries in search of water and pasture. The latter movement is known as transhumance, even though the movement

of the nomadic pastoralists within a country is also regarded as transhumance by some authors.

Since migration is part of a comprehensive economic strategy of the nomads, the movement of the pastoralists is governed by livelihood norms associated with the needs of their cattle for pasture. Livestock production accounts for one third of Nigeria's agricultural GDP. Herds are the main wealth reserve for pastoralists and their livestock are crucial in their socio-economic structure<sup>68</sup>.

The Fula, Fulani or "Fulbe" People are one of the largest ethnic groups in the Sahel and West Africa. Widely dispersed across the region inhabiting many countries, they live mainly in West Africa and Northern part of Central Africa. A significant proportion of the "Fula" are a third or an estimated 12 to 13 million people who are pastoralists and their ethnic group has the largest nomadic pastoral community in the world. The majority of the Fula ethnic group consisted of semi-sedentary people as well as sedentary settled farmers, artisans, merchants and nobility.

Fulani owns approximately 90 per cent of the livestock and contribute about 3.2 percent of the country's GDP<sup>69</sup>. The Fulanis view cattle herding not necessarily as a delightful endeavor but as vocation that is taxing, strenuous and exhausting. Herding livestock is not just a Fulani activity; in Nigeria, 14 other ethnic groups, including the Shuwa, Kanuri, Kanembu, Bororo, Yoruba, Hausa, and Touareg, are all involved in some way in herding<sup>70</sup>.

Cattle perform a variety of services, including providing milk and meat, the ability to breed cattle and beautify stock, as well as serving as carriers and sources of money.

Cattle constitute a social-security guarantee and inheritable assets for the herder's family, particularly his kids, in addition to providing working capital. The herd is so important to pastoral capital that, in addition to serving as a means of production, storage, and transportation, as well as a means of transferring food and wealth to herders, its size indicates an individual's or family's social status and elicits an unspoken dictum to strive to increase the herd. Women are confined to the background and possess little stock in the pastoral system, which is clearly masculinized and youth dominated. A lady with six cows is affluent, but a guy with twenty cows is considered impoverished. The desire to keep healthy cattle and grow the number of his herd to the best of his abilities and by whatever means is a man's lifelong aim. Pastoralism is seen as a lucrative business, therefore, simply owning cattle marks Fulani as wealthy, putting them at risk of predation by less well-off people, groups, and rustling gangs. Accordingly, Ahmadu Suleiman, head of the Kaduna State branch of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), argued that around 7,000 cattle were rustled from commercial livestock farms and traditional herders in Nigeria between October 2013 and March 2014<sup>71</sup>.

The Fulani herdsmen are nomadic Fulani or semi nomadic people whose primary occupation is raising livestock while Fulani extremists are group within the Fulani pastoralists/herdsmen whose interaction are violent with other groups mostly arable farmers from the South. The 2015 global terrorism index report thus classify the Fulani extremists as the fourth most dangerous terrorist group in the world while its 2019 version of the same report also maintained the same nomenclature for the group (Fulani Extremists).

The Fulani herdsmen have a structured hierarchy/chain of command and have delegates that participate in negotiation and mediations but unlike the terrorists are not faceless with any real threats to the security and stability of south-west states in Nigeria.

Moreover, the proscription of Fulani herdsmen as terrorist group is largely political question since the Fulani extremists are yet to make maximum force to make their demands. Perhaps, their activities are often targeted at particular population or institution (Farms and Farmers) with estimated 14 million Fulani in Nigeria and substantial population also in Guinea, Senegal, Mali and Cameroon respectively. Put simply, depending on the perspective from which the concepts is viewed armed group does not bare a monolithic conception. In as much as terrorism is viewed as a strategy and not actor centric, Fulani extremists are terrorists and so an armed group<sup>72</sup>.

However, the Fulani herdsmen conforms to the description of armed banditry and so can be categorized as “ an armed group” in nomenclature but whether or not they constitute a terrorist group is still a subject of debate in counter terrorism literature, since, unlike major terrorists groups like Al Qaeda and Boko Haram, they have no organized network but structures, much less or widely acknowledged agenda for their operations although their activities and strategies constitute act of terror going by the 1999 constitution as amended and the Nigeria’s National Defense Policy respectively.

Certainly, the antagonism between Fulani herdsmen and farmers is historical, and it has been exacerbated in recent times by certain number of factors including climate change. This antagonism has taken a dangerous turn of identity and religion between

two communities that have become irreconcilable and have been governed by different legal systems since Islamic law was re-introduced in 2000 in twelve northern states.

### **2.1.3 Contextualizing Armed Herdsmen as Armed Group in Nigeria**

Although, the conceptualizations of herdsmen as armed group are laced with confusion and scholarly contestations of units that are functionally undifferentiated and autonomous from the state. In Nigeria, however, the discussion of armed organizations must begin with the issues of unmet statehood prerequisites as well as intra- and inter-ethnic strife<sup>73</sup>. If armed groups are armed organizations that challenge the state's monopoly of coercive force, which may include a variety of actors, opposition and insurgent movements, pro-government militias, and community based vigilante groups or small arm survey. It's also an organization equipped with or carry unlicensed arms or weapons.

However, armed groups in the Nigerian context are viewed as a militant organization established to protect the interest of a particular nationality within the Nigerian federation<sup>74</sup>. As a result, armed organizations might be viewed as irregular/paramilitary actors in a specific society who make political demands on the state as citizens. They are also distinct in nature, with a proclivity to shift the course of events in a drastic and violent manner. These organizations are youth-based formations that arose with the goal of promoting and safeguarding their groups' narrow interests, and whose actions occasionally entail the use of force and coercion<sup>75</sup>.

Armed groups are therefore structured violence-oriented groups populated by a variety of irregular combatants from various age groups, but drawn solely from a group and

created to promote and safeguard the interests of a certain group. Armed groups cause great agitation for various causes and in various climates; nonetheless, when the group adopts a militant stance, it expresses its strength more effectively<sup>76</sup>. They function as a social pressure group with the goal of influencing the power structure in their favor and, in doing so, drawing the government's attention to some of the limitations experienced by people of their community in order to find long-term solutions to their social problems. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC), the Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more The Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) and Boko Haram, Ansaru, 'Kala-Ka,' have lately clashed.

The growth of these organizations has had a significant influence on the number of ethnic clashes in Nigeria. However, peace and conflict experts estimate that roughly 40% of armed groups' provoked violence took place in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Between 2012 and 2014, there was an increase in the number of armed assaults in the nation, which has continued until this year, despite the government's ineffectiveness lack in combating the threat<sup>77</sup>.

However, Fulani extremists and not herdsmen conforms to the description of armed bandits and so can be categorized as “ an armed group” in nomenclature but whether or not they constitute a terrorist group is still a subject of debate in counter terrorism literature, since, unlike major terrorists groups like Al Qaeda and Boko Haram, they have no organized network or structures, much less or widely acknowledged agenda

for their operations although their activities constitute act of terror going by the 1999 constitution as amended and the Nigeria's National Defense Policy respectively.

Although, the herdsmen have a structured hierarchy/chain of command and have delegates that participate in negotiation and mediations through Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association unlike the terrorists who are not faceless with any real threats to the security and stability of south-west states in Nigeria. Moreover, the proscription of Fulani herdsmen as terrorist group is largely political question since the Fulani extremists are yet to make maximum force to make their demands. Perhaps, there activities are often targeted at particular population or institution (Farms and Farmers). Put simply, Fulani herdsmen are only nomadic or semi- nomadic. Fulani people whose primary occupation is raising livestock while Fulani extremists are groups within Fulani pastoralists/ herdsmen who uses violence in their interactions with other groups' mostly arable farmers from the south<sup>78</sup>. With estimated 14 million Fulani in Nigeria and substantial population also in Guinea, Senegal, Mali and Cameroon respectively. Moreover, what has become transparently obvious in the last few years is that the plague of so-called Fulani herdsmen banditry is much deeper and more complex than we have persuaded ourselves to believe. The menace we self-deceptively and simplistically attenuate as mere "banditry" is nothing short of well-oiled, deep-rooted, well-practiced, and well-organized mercenary terrorism whose tentacles have spread to unthought-of social territories of the Nigerian society<sup>79</sup>.

In 2015, Global Terrorism Index report classified Fulani extremists as the fourth most deadly terrorist groups in the world after Boko Haram, ISIS and Al- Shabaab with an estimated death toll of approximately 2,500 people in 2016. In 2018, the extremists

were said to have been responsible for more deaths than the Boko Haram group. In the International Crises group report (2018), the Fulani extremists have killed six times more than the Boko Haram group in that year with death toll attributed to the violent conflicts between herdsmen and farmers stood at approximately 2,700 in 2016 alone.

The 2019 Global Terrorism Index report tagged the Fulani herdsmen a terrorist organization due to their operational strategies and supposed objectives which are terrorist-like in nature. Violence between Fulani herdsmen and farmers intensified in early 2018 with approximately 300,000 thousand people fleeing their homes, the most recent escalation in violence follows increased militia attacks and implementation of anti-grazing law. Together, Fulani extremists and Boko Haram account for 78% of terror related incidents and 86% of deaths from terrorism. Also, the Fulani extremist attack was ranked 11<sup>th</sup> in the 20 most fatal terrorist incident in 2018<sup>80</sup>.

Whereas, the herdsmen (extremists) do not constitutes a single terrorist group. Certain deaths within the ongoing conflict between pastoralists and the nomadic herdsmen have been categorized as terrorism and attributed to extremist element within the Fulani cattle breeders. This categorization is reflective of terrorism as a tactics within an ongoing security threat not only in the South-West parts of Nigeria. Also, challenges relating to land and water use, obstruction of traditional migration routes, livestock theft and crop damage tend to trigger these disputes. But, degraded pastures by drought and desertification drying up many natural water sources across Nigeria's far-northern Sahelian belt forcing large numbers of herders to migrate south in search of grassland and water for their herds aggravated the insecurity in South-West zone of the country<sup>81</sup>. With herders migrating into the savannah and rain forests of the

southern states where high population growth over the last four decades has heightened pressure on farmland, increasing the frequency of disputes over crop damage, water pollution and cattle theft. Hence, the increasing availability of illicit firearms, both locally-produced and smuggled in from outside, worsens the intensity of the conflict with an annual average death of more than 2,000 fatalities from 2011 to 2016 exceeding the death toll from the Boko Haram insurgency<sup>82</sup>.

Nigeria, a key regional player in West Africa, accounts for about half of West Africa's population with approximately 202 million people and one of the largest populations of youth in the world<sup>83</sup>. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse federation which consists of 36 autonomous states and the Federal Capital Territory. With an abundance of natural resources, it is Africa's biggest oil exporter, and has the largest natural gas reserves on the continent.

However, Nigeria's economy is primarily known for its oil exploration, agriculture employs about 70 per cent of its labor force. Small-holders in the country's center and south harvest most of the country's tuber and vegetable crops while pastoralists in the north raise most of its grains and livestock.

Thus, the sudden surge of the farmer-herder violence has been attributed partly to pressures on land because of expansion of commercially cultivated areas, corporate mining activities, and competitive overuse of common resources such as forests, pastoral rangelands, and water sources, exacerbated by climate change<sup>84</sup>. The growing aridity in the Sahel and northern regions, as well as advancing desertification and heightened risk of extreme weather conditions result in decreased availability of grazing land. For instance, in northern Nigeria, there is more heat and less rain fall that

consistently worsens the threat of desertification. And as the Sahel moves southward, whole villages are often wiped out reducing the land available for grazing; hence forcing the pastoralists further southward in search of grazing land<sup>85</sup>.

In Nigeria, the necessity to provide food and raw materials for industry and export in order to meet ever growing demands has led to both “intensification and extensification” of land use. Arable crop and cattle producers have not only intensified the use of their respective lands, they have also been exploring other land frontiers for farming and grazing. Farm lands that are normally allowed to fallow for natural rejuvenation of the soil are fast disappearing, while lands that traditionally provide dry season grazing to pastoralists are becoming shorter in supply<sup>86</sup>. This has heightened the frequency and intensity of competition among various land users. The Fulani herdsmen of lower Sahel and Sudan Savannah are now being found in the south (including the forest belt) in search of greener pasture for their herds <sup>87</sup>. Indeed, the competition was equally reported as farmer-herdsmen conflict in South East and parts of South-western Nigeria.

However, the conflicts between arable crop farmers and cattle herders have become common occurrences in many parts of Nigeria including the South-West States. The competition between these two agricultural land user-groups has often times turned into serious overt and covert hostilities and social friction in many parts of the country. In a newspaper report of crises in Nigeria between 1991 and February 2015, it was opined that land related conflicts accounted for about 51% of the major clashes reported by the selected newspapers in Nigeria<sup>88</sup>. Specifically, conflicts involving agricultural land use between farmers and herdsmen accounted for 35% of all reported

crises. Moreover, political, religious and ethnic clashes occurred at lower frequencies. Another study of 27 communities in North Central Nigeria showed that over 40% of the households surveyed had experienced agricultural land related conflicts, with respondents recalling conflicts that were as far back as 1965 and as recent as 2015<sup>89</sup>. In corroborating this statement, it is argued that no less than 20 villages were involved in farmer-herdsmen conflicts annually in the states covered by this study.

While studying the constraints to cassava production in Ibarapa, Oyo State, it was found that over 90% of the farmers interviewed indicated that their greatest production problem is the destruction of their farms by cattle<sup>90</sup>. On their own part, herdsmen have also identified conflicts arising from land use as the “most important” challenge they face in their occupation.

#### **2.1.4 Security**

Security is devoid of universally acceptable definition but has more so been described as the concern of government about the stability and safety of a state or people. It encompasses the sum of what a nation does in order to safeguard itself as a sovereign entity. That is the physical protection of a nation’s subjects, landscape, independence and even issues such as food security and national image<sup>91</sup>. Security, therefore, transcends the boundaries of physical defense or military-strategic capabilities to include human security, food security, and environmental security among others. Corroborating the above argument further, security is seen to be more than military security or security from external attacks. For many inhabitants in developing countries, security is concerned with the basic level of struggle for survival. Therefore,

in order to provide an integrated security assessment, the non-military dimensions of security should be added. Security can also be argued as a cherished value associated with the physical safety of individual, groups or nation-states, together with a similar safety of their other most cherished values<sup>92</sup>. It implies freedom from threats, anxiety or danger. Security, however, extends beyond the safety of the nation-state, the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity by the military establishments and capabilities to the preservation of cherished values of the citizens concerned. The parading shift in the conceptualization of security entails that security also encompasses the right to a sustainable environment, the protection of cultural and religious identity, which individually and collectively has serious implications for the physical security of citizens and the survival of nation-states. Therefore, security is grand strategy towards the preservation of the totality of a nation-state. The citizens and their means of livelihood, the leaders and their regimes, the institutions of the state, state's sovereignty and territorial integrity, ethnic and other social groupings, the environment and ecosystem against internal or external threats and attacks<sup>93</sup>.

However, the idea of "security" has long been a source of heated scholarly controversy. The discussion has resulted in two prevailing positions, which he refers to as *pax atomica*, or *pax armamenta*, and *pax mundi*, respectively. Traditional military techniques are emphasized, while non-military security frameworks that put people first are emphasized.

Realists' conventional security stance stresses military components. During the Cold War, this viewpoint was prevalent, and it may have contributed to the armaments race between the now-defunct Eastern and Western power blocs. It was so critical that

during the Cold War, the military interpretation of national security was elevated to the point where security was based on the belief that only a powerful military system could successfully prevent force and threats of force<sup>94</sup>. The Cold War raised security and its reliance on weaponry to the level of another ideology, if not a religion, as has been contended.

Throughout the Cold War, the negative consequences of equating security almost entirely with military might were clear." This approach is also known as strategic reductionism, which is defined as understanding security in a technical and military manner, as seen by a fixation with military balance, state-of-the-art equipment, and battle order.

Security, according to this military perspective, is primarily concerned with the protection of nation-state independence and sovereignty. In the same vein, security is defined as "the development of a robust military defense to safeguard the state's territorial integrity from both internal and foreign threats"<sup>95</sup>. As discussed later, a country can be regarded to be secured if it can build up its military capabilities to deter possible aggressors or defeat aggressors if deterrence fails. With the passage of time, and particularly with the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a drive toward a non-military conceptualization of security.

At this period, there was a rise of opposition to the strategic approach to national security. For example, in the book "State and Fear," it was argued, that the notion of security is immature and needs to be rehabilitated since the word "security" "has never been in full functioning order".

Critics have concluded that confining security concepts to military factors is not just strategic reductionism, but also self-defeating. These critiques appear to be well-founded, considering that various non-military factors, such as the environment, economic growth, and people's overall well-being, also have implications for national security.

The process of rescuing and rehabilitating the notion of security has ushered in new security thinking that is heavily reliant on non-military factors. This new school of thinking, which is gaining traction in the academic, advocacy, development, and public policy realms, views security as a holistic concept that encompasses the whole range of human needs. Security, in this context, is described as "independence from, or removal of, threats not only to the state's physical existence, but also to its ability to self-protection and growth, as well as the enhancement of the general well-being of all its citizens." Another school of thought, in a similar vein, discusses security from a holistic and Third World/African viewpoint;

*Security entails more than just military protection or protection from external threats. For many of the four billion people living in underdeveloped nations, security is seen as the most fundamental condition of life. As a result, the non-military components of security should be included in an integrated African security assessment. From now on, the term "African security" should be used in its fullest meaning to refer to economic, social, environmental, and food security, as well as equality of life security and technology security<sup>96</sup>*

Several additional academics have chimed in on the re-interpretation of security as a function of non-military factors. Security is about defending and enhancing values against those who seek to limit or destroy their realization, which does not have to be military in nature, contrary to conventional security doctrine. Any society that

attempted to achieve military security in the face of non-military factors such as acute food shortages, population explosion, low levels of production and per capita income, low technological development, insufficient and inefficient public utilities, and chronic unemployment issues had a false sense of security<sup>97</sup>.

In a modernizing society, security means development, security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not a military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military security, though it may encompass it; security is development, and without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secured for the intractable reason that its own citizens cannot shed its human nature that is what we do not always understand and what governments of modernizing nations do not always understand.

Moreover, security can best be conceptualized as the totality of actions and frameworks towards protecting a state from all factors that may constitute impediments to its growth and survival. Considering the meaning of, and implications associated with security, it is important to state that security is a matter that bothers on the posture, well-being, stability and development of a nation. It becomes parameter to express the status of a nation among comity of nations in areas like citizen protection, freedom and well-being, property and other critical infrastructures.

Some fundamental assumptions concerning security may be discerned from the preceding expositions. To begin with, national security consists of both military and non-military elements. Second, while ranking these competing factors in ascending or

decreasing order may be difficult; one unmistakable reality is that military and non-military variables are both significant and mutually reinforcing. Neither of these points of view can exist alone without the other. In these conditions, a holistic definition of security is one that includes both military and non-military security aspects. This is the viewpoint that will guide the examination of national security concerns in the context of Nigeria's armed group conflicts<sup>98</sup>.

## **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical explanations and analyses of issues largely related to this research work are to be anchored on three broad but mutually complementary theories, namely the tragedy of the common, frustration aggression theories and state fragility perspective respectively, that will be used to explain, describe and predict or debunk the menace of herdsmen attacks with the attendant implications for the nation's security and development. Furthermore, the choice of these theories are predicated on the desire to understand how the inability of the Nigerian state to respond to the specific demands of some fractions of its body politics which has triggered armed militias and insurgence in the country thereby further compounding the security sneer of the country and inhibit the level of development.

### **2.2.1 The Tragedy of the Common Theory**

The tragedy of the common theory was first postulated by a biologist. When a group of people jointly owned a resource and each individual makes use of it at his/her own discretion, overuses it and ignores the group's collective interest, and thus, ultimately

destroys the resource. The proponents further compared the shared environmental resource to a common grazing pasture.

Everyone is entitled to the pasture grazes acting in self-interest for the greatest short term personal gain. In this case, the open pasture is used by the herdsmen to allow their cattle to graze while each cattle herder keep on adding cattle to graze on pasture to boost the proceeds from their cattle at the expense of others. This then create a resource conflict with the tragedy of the commons with inexorable logic of individual rational decision for optimizing personal gain to ultimately overstock their herds and destroy their shared resource. Although, in his argument which was originally made with the problem of human population in mind, it has become widely accepted as a general theoretical framework in resource conflict literature to explicate the diverse cases of resource over-exploitation, and has had a considerable influence on resource policy. His thesis has also met with sharp criticism, and it is in this context of such critique that most research on the problem of managing common pool resources such as Cattle rustling, Pollution, and grazing of farm lands, land degradation and fresh water scarcity. In the theorist view and its relevance to the farmers-herdsmen conflicts context, the land is the common pool while the tragedy is the damage done to the farmlands. This theory is relevant to this study as it explains the tragedy created such as drying up of the Lake Chad, desertification and land degradation in the Northern region of the country. The movement of the Fulani Herdsmen down south in search of pasture to feed their herds while doing so, their cattle sometimes ate up the crops of local/ rural farmers in their host communities which then lead to conflicts between the farmers and the Fulani herdsmen mostly in their host communities.

### **2.2.2 The Frustration-Aggression Theory**

Frustration - Aggression Theory is heavily rooted in a traditional method to studying the nature of armed organizations. This theory has its origins in early models that focus on the relationship between levels of inequality and deprivation on the one hand, and the onset of internal conflict on the other with further argument that the potential for collective violence depends on the level of discontent of members of society<sup>99</sup>. This discontent stems from a perceived relative deprivation gap between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are those goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and value capabilities are defined as those goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them. As such, relative deprivation is the term used to denote the frustration that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction. This discrepancy is subjective, in the sense that people may be subjectively deprived with reference to their expectations even though an objective observer might judge otherwise.

In other words, the value standards are set by reference to some group or status with which an individual does or is thought to identify. Relative deprivation might produce variations in collective discontent and provides the motive for violence through the psychological "frustration- aggression" mechanism<sup>100</sup>. As it is equally remarked "the disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated is part of man's biologically inherent tendency, in men and animals, to attack the frustrating agent. It is this mechanism that provides the motivational link between relative deprivation and the potential for collective political violence. Although, the concept of relative deprivation

was already widely used by social scientists, clarifications on the causal mechanisms between relative deprivation and political violence were later thoroughly explicated. The idea that instability in the form of revolutions follows modernization and that protest followed apparent progress, revived in the 1950s and 1960s. The phrase “revolution of rising expectations” became a cliché that endures to this day.

The frustration – aggression thesis is based on the idea of relative deprivation, which argues that factors of discontent are major causal elements that differentiate participants in armed conflict from non- participants. There have been innumerable attempts to identify and categorize these factors of “discontent” or “values” for purposes of psychological, sociological, and political analysis as he has emphasized a three-fold categorization that included welfare values, power values, and interpersonal values. Scholars, have reformulated (and in some cases – added another category) these values in a more feasible and testable categorization of discontent<sup>101</sup>.

The first category of discontent factors are those related to ethnic or religious differences. These groups of discontent factors are to some extent similar to the interpersonal discontent values. For some people, religious or ethnic differences between groups, sometimes as the result of a history of animosity, are believed to make conflict more likely. For instance; the conflicts in former Yugoslavia could be explained as the commutation of ongoing animosity between the Serb, Croat, and Bosnia ethnic groups. By extension, the specific actions of armed groups in this area, such as those of the Serb militias in Kosovo, could be seen as being motivated by a desire to redress these “ancient hatreds”<sup>102</sup>.

The frustration aggression hypothesis formulated by these authorities Aggression is always the outcome of frustration, according to the core concept. Frustration, they claim, triggers a variety of reactions, including aggressiveness. Expounding on the above hypothesis, people or groups who are frustrated in achieving their needs and demands frequently respond by directing violent behavior against those who are thought to be responsible for denying or obstructing those desires as a replacement. He goes on to say that "violent conflict is engendered by unfulfilled aspirations and expectations, not abject deprivation'. The formation of armed organizations and insurgency in Nigeria may have come in part from the Nigerian state's incapacity to satisfy the yearnings and ambitions of its inhabitants, according to the following perspectives. The fact is that the country suffers from poverty, unemployment, and a lack of fundamental infrastructure. As a result, basic services, poverty eradication, and job opportunities, among other things, can assist to diminish the magnitude of the violent insurgency that has seized the nation in recent years.

Not only might identification with a particular ethnicity be a source of conflict, but also, for example, religious or national difference. For example, a 14-year-old boy residing in the Irish Republic, who identified himself as an Irish Catholic during an interview, clearly exemplified this when answering the question why he thinks that people join paramilitary organizations: "I think that most young people join the groups of their religion as they want to stand up for their country and for what they believe in.

A second important factor that might cause grievances and discontent is focused on economic inequality or welfare values. This source of grievance does not only refer to unequal income between people and the unequal ownership of assets, but also to the

economic mismanagement of national governments<sup>103</sup>. If a government is seen to inflict sufficient economic misery on its population, it may face an uprising. The successful National Resistance Movement (NRM) rebellion in Uganda in the early 1980s is often seen as an uprising due to despair at gross economic mismanagement by successive regimes.

The idea of the “rage of the poor” is a rather old argument that can also be found in the work of Marx and Engels. Economic inequality also plays an important role in attracting recruits for armed movements<sup>104</sup>. The Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN- M) for example, is primarily based on class, in accordance with its Maoist ideology, but the conflict also has ethnic and caste overtones. Nepal’s highly diverse society is dominated by the elite Bahun- Chetri-Newari peoples centered on the Kathmandu valley. The Maoists have proved skilled in exploiting discontent among less privileged ethnic groups primarily based outside this valley, such as the Magars of mid-western<sup>105</sup>.

A third narrative of grievance is focused on the lack of political rights or power values. Political oppression occurs either through generalized repression or because there is a relative difference in policy influencing capabilities, i.e. some individuals become frustrated because they are unable to express their opinion or concerns via “normal” non-violent political channels. For example, the 1989 uprising in Romania is usually considered to be an example falling into this category of discontent factors. As such, violence may meet an individual’s basic need when they experience social exclusion<sup>106</sup>. The birth, for example, of the Odua People’s Congress (OPC) in Nigeria in 1994, was connected with a feeling of alienation of the Yoruba group. This ethnicity has been at

the sideline of mainstream of Nigerian politics since the 1950s. Some other scholars emphasize the importance of another important grievance factor, the one of vengeance. Or as Keen states: “participation in armed groups may also offer excitement and a chance to revenge past wrong doings. For example, revenge is said to be a common motivations for Tamils joining the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) voluntarily, and other Tamils join rival groups or state forces to avenge violence by the LTTE. Also in African rebellious revenge plays an important role. When a child soldier in Sierra Leone was asked why she joined the national army, she replied “when the government soldiers came I wanted to join to get revenge<sup>107</sup>. Although, the example shows that it is possible to find rebellions that are primarily caused by grievances, the grievance theory of conflict, finds surprisingly little robust empirical support. This has led many scholars to believe that it is unlikely that grievances alone are sufficient for organizing internal conflict and collective mobilization <sup>108</sup>.

Most of these scholars have argued that factors such as inequality or other relative deprivation type of factors are always present and that the free rider, coordination, and time- consistency problems together pose formidable obstacles to rebellions motivated purely by grievances. In furtherance to this, although, the popular descriptive literature on the impetus for civil conflict and the conduct of armed groups has primarily focused on group grievance, real or imagined, the analytic economic literature, sees grievances as being ubiquitous across most at- risk countries <sup>109</sup>.

### **2.2.3 The Fragile State Theory**

As defined by its proponent, a fragile state is a country that has serious developmental issues such as limited institutional capability, poor governance, political instability, unemployment, poverty, and low economic development<sup>110</sup>. It is a theory that describes how extreme poverty is concentrated in a given state, and how low levels of human and social development are linked to weak institutional capacity, governance, and internal conflict, all of which undermine the state's ability to provide basic social and infrastructure services, as well as provide citizens with security.

A fragile state is one that is caught in a vicious cycle of violent conflict and poverty, or one that is afflicted by a natural resource curse. Others have a history of failing to provide fundamental services to their inhabitants. Excellent health facilities, good roads, great education, power, and good water supply are examples of such essential services. In the argument of key proponent of this idea, a fragile state is very vulnerable to crises in one or more of its subsystems. A fragile state, according to him, is one that is particularly prone to internal shocks and domestic disputes. This means that in a fragile state, institutional arrangements encapsulate and perhaps sustain the economic and social circumstances that lead to crises.

In terms of economics, these might be institutions, particularly property rights, that promote stagnation or sluggish growth rates, or that encapsulate excessive disparity in wealth, access to land, or access to the means of subsistence. Institutions might represent excessive inequality or a complete lack of access to health or education in social terms. In weak nations, statutory institutional arrangements are open to challenges from other institutional systems, whether they are drawn from conventional

authorities or from the private sector created by communities under hardship who don't see much of the state (in terms of security, development, or welfare)<sup>111</sup>.

#### **2.2.4 The Proposed Theory: Interventionist Theory**

From the discussed theories thus far, it is expedient for the researcher to come up with an empirical explanation deduced from the postulations of previous theorists/studies leading to the emergence of a new theory. Therefore, from the analysis of the theory of tragedy of the common, the over-depletion of common patrimony by either beneficiary without recourse to the access for the other to benefit, however, put pressure on either party to want to make such demand on either the other users or the other party. In this case, it's between the farmer and the herder clashes. The second theory, by its argument, is coming from the parlance of deprivations of individual's expectation that ultimately leads to the frustration of not achieving the set target of partaker in available resources. If the resources like land, water, plants among others to be used by both farmers and herders are scarce and shrinking day by day, there is bound to be damning pressure on either of the user in the process of having access to the use of such, hence, the occurrence of frustrations emanating from aggressions by either party. Moreover, the seemingly lack of institutional capacity, as the third theory elucidated, through the lack of state ability or capacity for spontaneous response and resolution of conflict as demonstrated by the state fragility theory, posed a serious challenge. Thus, the researcher recommends "the theory of intervention" in the conduct of the study.

This proposed theory seeks to proffer empirical argument to the different components of the variables under study and then eclectically address the pitfalls of past theoretical postulations as identified above. Specifically, intervention theory is anchored or

underpinned on building a holistic framework that will address the components of individual postulations by the above theories, i.e. tragedy of common (resource conflict), Frustration – Aggression (reactionary), and Fragility State Theory (state-wide-state-actors' weaknesses in response to the conflict). Hence, intervention theory summed up the presumed tripod assumptions of the above theories in its intervention framework. Thus, state intervention is expected in every component of the variables under study to address the studied problem. For instance, if adequate irrigation in the Sahel during off season is provided, there might not be need to have migration of herders to the south. Also, the proposed theory by the researcher directs spontaneous response of relevant agencies of government to either the distress calls, rapid intervention of relevant bodies or agencies in preventing the occurrence of conflict or speedy resolution of conflicts without waiting for or watching the body language of either side to the conflict as the case may dictate. Therefore, the researcher seeks to adopt the use of the interventionism theory to the conduct of the study.

## **2.3 Review of Empirical Studies**

### **2.3.1 Armed group**

Armed organizations, such as terrorists, warlords, and insurgencies, are becoming more prominent players in international politics. Armed organizations acted locally or, if they acted globally, via another state during the majority of the Cold War. Armed organizations, on the other hand, began to have worldwide lives of their own towards the end of the Cold War, in which they interacted on a political, economic, or military level across state boundaries at will. This 'globalization of insurgency' has been

attributed to a number of factors, including advances in transportation technology, the proliferation of information and communication technology, deregulation of international markets, and an increase in migration, all of which have allowed a variety of non-state actors (NSAs), including armed groups, to break their local ties<sup>112</sup>. Although this globalization began with terrorist organizations, it has now expanded to include other sorts of armed groups such as warlord organizations and insurgencies.

Armed groups have a long history of intervening in international politics. Warfare over international borders, in particular, is widespread. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), for example, has expanded its activities from Uganda to Sudan, and more recently to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR), all while assaulting targets in Uganda and Sudan<sup>113</sup>. Boko Haram activities are more prominent in West Africa and hitherto Boko Haram security threats in Nigeria are not unconnected to the Fulani Herdsmen menace in Nigeria. Al Qaeda is a really worldwide organization that targets countries all over the globe. Armed factions are also engaging in what is best called as diplomacy<sup>114</sup>. For example, President Ronald Reagan met with Jonas Savimbi, the head of Angola's National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Through a television broadcast, Osama bin Laden once proposed a ceasefire to European nations. Armed organizations have come to have significant worldwide economic holdings, with Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) making millions from international diamond and wood sales, for example<sup>115</sup>.

Local armed organizations, on the other hand, are increasingly causing policy difficulties for other foreign players. For instance, the Movement for the Emancipation

of the Niger Delta (MEND), Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC), the Arewa People's Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, 'Kala-Kato', and Ombatse and most recently, Fulani herdsmen crises, under the umbrella body of Miyetti Allah cattle breeders association of Nigeria (MACBAN). Armed groups must now be taken into account by states and allied intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations (UN). Because of state failure, a state government may no longer be able to deal with armed organizations operating inside its borders<sup>116</sup>. The implication is that international bodies or nations may be forced to deal directly with a terrorist organization. In Somalia, for example, the UN has had to deal with militias on a military, diplomatic, and economic level.

With the increasing relevance of armed groups' international contacts, international relations as a topic of study have become vital to make sense of these interactions. In order to achieve its goal of understanding, characterizing, and explaining international affairs, international relations must analyze and hypothesize about all international players. Armed groupings in international relations are not only a matter of scholarly interest; they also have important ramifications for political and military decisions<sup>117</sup>. Indeed, International Relations have always straddled the line between trying to discover theoretical explanations and providing the foundations for political and military actions.

Understanding armed organizations better, particularly in the context of an international state system, can help political and military decision-makers make better choices. Furthermore, in the discipline of Strategic Studies, a redirection of academic

discourse is already taking place, with the study of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency taking precedence over more typical interstate warfare<sup>118</sup>. However, there are various reasons why addressing the issue of armed groups in security studies is so challenging. One of the most frightening elements is that armed organizations are not only distinct from nations, but also from one another. Even a cursory examination of active armed organizations reveals that there are several sorts of active armed groups. From much decentralized, cellular-structured multinational organizations to state-like, long-term rebellion, these can be found<sup>119</sup>.

In short, there are at least three sorts of armed groups that are relevant to international relations: insurgencies, warlord organizations, and terrorist organizations. Guerrilla insurgencies exist, such as the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). From 1983 through 2005, the SPLA conducted a civil war against Sudan's government. It commanded tens of thousands of soldiers and a territory greater than several European countries. It possessed a multi-layered leadership structure, foreign policy, a well-trained and disciplined army, and the capacity to administrate and rule many tribes inside its borders. Warlords and their organizations, such as Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, are among the other armed groups (NPFL). In 1989, the NPFL began battling the Liberian government of Samuel Doe. The Liberian army and the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) repelled them. The army of the Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) established its own government in central Liberia called the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), sometimes known as "Taylor land"<sup>120</sup>. The NPFL was known for utilizing ruthless tactics against both its opponents and civilian villages, such as chopping off

hands and selling alluvial gems and wood to fund its fighting. Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997 after seizing power in Monrovia<sup>121</sup>.

Terrorist organizations exist as well, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). JI utilizes bombings and other assaults against people to achieve its political objectives, such as the Bali bombings in 2002, which targeted Australian tourists. In a nutshell, we may expect armed formations to have leadership and the ability to work as a coherent unit to some extent. They are capable of obtaining resources and motivating soldiers to battle. Finally, they have military capability since they have men and weaponry that allow them to fight other actors<sup>122</sup>.

Armed groups are non-state organizations in the sense that they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the state. In practice, the phrase "armed group" refers to military entities such as insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and warlord organizations that are made up of a coherent group of individuals with military strength<sup>123</sup>. This includes everything from tiny bands of men armed with small guns to big armies equipped with planes and tracked vehicles. For an extended period of time, these organizations are capable of committing violence in a coordinated and planned manner. Armed groups may be defined as non-state organizations with the ability for persistent and systematic military action, based on these commonalities among various groupings. This definition excludes short-term mobs of individuals as well as small-scale criminal gangs that, while capable of violence, are unable to do it routinely and at a level that would be considered military. Criminal gangs do occasionally acquire military capabilities, especially during times of state breakdown<sup>124</sup>. They would then cross the threshold into being an armed group at that point.

Groups that are best thought of as proxy for governments are also mentioned; such organizations are completely funded, equipped, and governed by a state sponsor and have little to no life outside of the state. These organizations are really a part of another actor, and the simplest way to interpret its activities is to look at the patron. Armed groupings are defined as a 'group' by their isolation from other players. They are, however, the armed arm of another organization, most often a civilian political entity such as a clan or tribe<sup>125</sup>. In extreme circumstances, such as in Somalia, a clan's armed militia wing effectively takes over. In other circumstances, the militia is only a temporary arming of people who are ordinarily part of a wider society.

Certain terrorist groups present a particularly difficult problem for definition. Some groups that are classed as terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, are clearly armed groups. The reason for this is that such groups are in many ways similar to what we would call insurgencies in that they have an army (or semi-professional to professional group of armed men), leadership, bases of operation and even a government-like organization. Al Qaeda on the other hand is much more difficult to define because it is decentralized. Some would even call it a movement rather than a 'group' per se. However, a group like Al Qaeda still appears to have the essential aspects of an armed group in that there remains a central cadre of leaders and fighter<sup>126</sup>.

Mercenaries and Private Military Companies (PMCs) are also armed and have a significant military capability in situations such as Executive Outcomes or Black water. These organizations, on the other hand, are better viewed as businesses that offer services to a state and are subject to its laws. When PMCs engage in foreign relations activities, such as when Black water fights in Iraq, they do so as an extension of a state,

in this case the United States, because their strategic actions are decided by the government (while the PMCs tend to maintain control over their tactical decisions). As a result, examination of US foreign policy is the most important factor in determining their international relations decisions. Of course, we may conceive a renegade PMC that no longer submits to the state and instead acts independently on the world stage. An organization like this should be classified as an armed group<sup>127</sup>.

### **2.3.2 Security**

Essentially, "security" refers to the safety or freedom from danger and dangers to the existence of individuals, nations, and international systems on both an internal and external level. This may explain why security is defined as "the safeguarding of a state's or nation-interests state's and values from threats"<sup>128</sup>.

As a result, security refers to the lack of actual hazards, threats, 'challenges,' 'vulnerabilities,' and 'risk,' as well as the sense of subjective anxieties or concerns. Individuals, social groups, the state, regional or global international organizations can achieve objective security by avoiding, preventing, managing, coping with, mitigating, and adapting to the dangers offered by a variety of threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and hazards. Security is attained after the perception and worries of security threats "Challenges; vulnerabilities and hazards" are allayed and conquered, according to the social constructivist perspective<sup>129</sup>.

This may be defined as a country's protection against dangers such as terrorism, war, or espionage. The security of a nation state, including its inhabitants, economy, and institutions, is viewed as a government responsibility. Originally envisaged as a

defense against military assault, security has come to encompass non-military aspects such as terrorism, crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, and cyber security<sup>130</sup>. Similarly, in addition to the acts of other nation states, security concerns include the actions of violent non-state actors, drug cartels, and multinational businesses, as well as the consequences of natural disasters. To impose security, governments use a variety of tools, including political, economic, and military power, as well as diplomacy<sup>131</sup>.

During the Cold War, for example, some historians associated security almost solely with military might. "This approach might be characterized as strategic reductionism," they said, "which is thinking security in a technological and military perspective, as man". Military security and/or national security is the most significant security study (possibly no longer) in key security researches, according to traditional or mainstream (mainstream) security or strategic studies<sup>132</sup>. It is rooted in classical realism philosophy, which emphasized power maximization and military force facilitation in anarchic international politics. Military power is a priority for nation-states in order to protect it and use it to achieve political goals. As a result, one of the most important responsibilities that governments have to their population is to safeguard the state against foreign threats<sup>133</sup>.

During the Cold War, for example, some historians associated security almost solely with military might. This approach might be characterized as strategic reductionism, "which is thinking security in a technological and military perspective, as man"<sup>134</sup>. Military security and/or national security is, therefore, the most significant security study (possibly no longer) in key security researches, according to traditional or

mainstream (mainstream) security or strategic studies<sup>135</sup>. It is rooted in classical realism philosophy, which emphasized power maximization and military force facilitation in anarchic international politics. Military power is a priority for nation-states in order to protect it and use it to achieve political goals<sup>136</sup>.

Security, according to this military perspective, is primarily concerned with "the preservation of nation-state independence and sovereignty." Others, speaking from a similar standpoint, define national security as "the development of a robust military defense to safeguard the state's territorial integrity from both internal and foreign threats". Every country values its security.

Various countries, on the other hand, had different ideas about it. It is a component of international relations since it arose from international interactions. National security, however, to the Wikipedia of the social sciences, is a country's ability to safeguard its internal values against foreign threats<sup>137</sup>. There is a heavy military territorial focus in this description. An examination of the existing literature on the issue of the aforementioned definition of national security reveals that the vast majority of it is skewed toward a restricted militaristic interpretation<sup>138</sup>.

This perspective arose from the tense Post-World War II era (Cold War) and was a reflection of how intellectuals saw national security issues. There was also a considerable focus on the effect of an international system marked by rivalry among nation-states; as well as increasing concern about self-preservation and the necessity for military dominance, strategic balance, or both<sup>139</sup>.

Furthermore, the term encourages the formation of a security-state. To begin with, the security-state is preoccupied with maintaining international law and order and the status quo (encourages arms race). Second, fewer resources and attention will be directed into the "crucial" sector of domestic growth and development. Third, the chances of developing a system for conflict resolution are hampered since the fight for supremacy frequently leads to a stalemate, which in turn leads to insecurity in the long run (for example, the misunderstanding between Libya and the United States of America)<sup>140</sup>. Defense and security are inextricably linked in this definition. This further creates a climate in which military preparations in the name of defense manifest themselves in the common tendency to portray the armed forces as the sole capable guardians of security by entrusting them with excessive responsibility on them<sup>141</sup>.

Although it is primarily concerned with the security of nation-states, the majority of the analysis may be applied at any level, including the person, family society, state, international system, or humanity as a whole . This is required in order to encourage logical policy analysis by making it easier to compare different types of security<sup>142</sup>. Also, to enhanced intellectual discussion by providing a common ground for persons with opposing viewpoints. Perhaps there is more in common amongst scholars from various schools than is often recognized. When the term "national security" is used without qualification, it creates more uncertainty than political advice or scientific researchers can handle<sup>143</sup>.

The concept of military-focused security is explained in terms of its operationalization in the broadest sense, its definitional connections with other terms, drawing attention

to theoretically important aspects of the concept that might be easily overlooked, and finally, its closeness to ordinary language when applied to a given situation<sup>144</sup>.

During the Cold War, security studies were mostly written by military statecraft experts. As a result, if military force was important to a problem, it was classified as a security issue; on the other hand, if military action was not required or essential, the topic was relegated to the low politics category<sup>145</sup>. To summarize, security has been a simple flag to be flown, a label to be attached, but not a notion to be employed by most security experts, according to research. Security studies have focused on military force rather than security, prejudicing policy in favor of military solutions to practically all security issues<sup>146</sup>.

Military security has long been considered the most basic form of security<sup>147</sup>. Terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and other forms of violent political movement have expanded the scope of military-focused security from traditional forms of conflict between nation-states to fourth-generation warfare between a state and non-state actors, such as terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and other forms of violent political movement<sup>148</sup>. So, what are the common aspects in multiple security conceptions? Is the idea of security utilized by proponents of economic or environmental security fundamentally different from that of Realists? Or are they just accentuating distinct parts of a larger idea? Finally, does military-focused security give the nation-state a higher priority than the individual?

The four key questions that form the basis/structure of international security studies (ISS) barely two decades after the remarkable end of the Cold War, namely, (i) the

state as the key referent object (ii) internal and external threats (iii) broadening beyond the military dimension and the resort to force (iv) linkage to a dynamism of threats, dangers, and urgency. Furthermore, during the Cold War, the bulk of ISS concentrated on foreign threats, but following the end of the Cold War, "ethnic strife and civil conflicts, as well as concerns of domestic security and cohesiveness" have become more prominent<sup>149,150</sup>.

According to current speculation, the threat concept as a basis for military planning and legitimizing military programs has fundamentally changed since 1990, at least among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations<sup>151</sup>. As a result, as the security concept has expanded beyond traditional military and diplomatic security to include new economic, societal, and environmental dimensions, the threat concept has expanded as well, like the current Russian-Ukrainian war and is now being applied to a variety of new threats, not only to the state but also to other referents of new security concepts, ranging from humans to global security<sup>152, 153,154</sup>. In the words of the former Taraba Chairman of MACBAN, and the presidential hopeful in the MACBAN April election, Danburam, said;

*Our people all over the country are backward in education and modern ways of life as they are denied information that could properly position them for greater future*

Below are the empirical compilations of recent resultant effects of several forms of attacks by various armed groups that recently took place around the various regions in Nigeria;

## SOUTH WEST

### Lagos

	Jan
<i>Deaths</i>	6
<i>Kidnapping</i>	-

### Ogun

	Jan
<i>Deaths</i>	17
<i>Kidnapping</i>	9

### Ondo

	Jan
<i>Deaths</i>	14
<i>Kidnapping</i>	-

### Osun

	Jan
<i>Deaths</i>	11
<i>Kidnapping</i>	-

### Oyo

	Jan
<i>Deaths</i>	3
<i>Kidnapping</i>	5

### Ekiti

	Jan
<i>Deaths</i>	-
<i>Kidnapping</i>	-




Figure 2.1a: Total kidnapped/killed in South-West

Source: Eons Intelligence.com, 2022




Figure 2.1b: Total kidnapped/killed in South-West

Source: Eons Intelligence.com, 2022

## **.2.4 Conceptual Framework**

This section analyses the most important conceptual findings in relation to some assumptions and issues raised in the literature review. First, it is conceptualized that armed groups as contextualized by farmer-herder (independent variable) were involved in violent conflict due to some unforeseen dependent variables as demonstrated by the changing climatic or resource scarcity, coupled with eco-survivalism leading to competition and conflict between farmers and herders in South West Nigeria. The available scholarly literature identified good climatic conditions, market opportunity, green vegetation, forage, land, water, sparsely population and alliance with landowners as the major factors that influenced the migration of the herdsmen to the South West Nigeria. The factors underpinned the sorting and analysis of the social, economic, natural and political reasons behind the arrival of the herdsmen in South West Nigeria.

Within the international and national literature, the known conflict relationship between the farmers and the herdsmen are the destruction of food crops, shooting of innocent people, threat and intimidation, raping and sexual harassment, bushfires, water pollution, overgrazing, cattle rustling, population explosion and ethnicity thereby posing grievous security challenges in South West Nigeria. This known factors served as indicators in identifying local understanding and perception about the implications of the conflict, as well as the analysis of data. The consequences of the farmer-herder conflicts are linked to loss of life, population displacements into internally displaced persons (IDPs), human injury and livelihood crisis, with people becoming widows, fear and animosity, low agricultural productivity and low income,

security crisis, threatening of peace and sustainable development. These concepts helped in the analysis of the humanitarian, social, economic, and security effects of the conflict in South West Nigeria.

## **2.5 Summary of Literature Reviewed**

The literature review has been classified into the conceptualization of armed herdsmen as armed group because they now possess small and light weapon (SALW), and causes of the farmers-herdsmen conflict coupled with cattle rustling and banditry. This has equally been subdivided into the implications of the farmers-armed herders on the insecurity in south west Nigeria.

The president-general of Agbekoya farmers association, Mr. Okikiola argued that the armed herdsmen have killed over 4000 farmers in south west in 6years during interview. In his opinion, the marauding herdsmen perpetuating crime in the south west have godfathers, who specialize in purchasing arms and ammunition for them. The identified gaps by the researcher was the significant focus earlier by writers on North East, North East, North West and North Central with less focus on South West and the conceptualization of herdsmen as armed group. These form the gaps this study fills.

## Endnotes

1. S. C. Poe, T. N. Woods, & C.K. Linda, “*Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross- National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993*,” **International Studies Quarterly**, 43(2): 1999, 291–313.
2. J. Ochentenwu, “*Suspected Herdsmen Attack Adamawa Village, Kill Many*” Daily Post Nigeria, 2020.
3. J.C. Udemezue, & N. A. Kanu, *Challenges of Nigerian Agricultural Sector in the Twenty First Century: The Case of Nomadic Insurgence and Terrorist Sects*, **Universal Journal of Agricultural Research**, 7(2), 2019, 117-124.
4. A. Raufu, & D. Ehrhardt, (eds). *Creed and Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations and Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria*, Oxford: James Curry, 2018.
5. T. Babawale, “*The Rise of Ethnic Militias, De-legitimization of the State and the Threat to Nigeria*,” Ibadan; Ibadan University Press, 2001
6. J. M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
7. M. Humphreys & W. Jeremy, “*Handling and Manhandling Civilian in Civil War*,” **American Political Science Review**, 100(3): 2016, 429–447.
8. M. Lichbach, “*What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action*,” *World Politics* 46(3): 2014, 383–418.
9. M. Lichbach, *The Rebel’s Dilemma*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2015.
10. C. E. Asogwa, *Interne-Based Communications: A Threat or Strength to National Security*, SAGE, 2020.
11. A. Gutiérrez, “*Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War*,” **Politics & Society**, 36(1): 2018, 3–34.
12. R. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

13. O.A. Solomon, & O.O. Chinwe, *Climate Change and Pastoral Conflicts in the Middle Belt and South-East Nigeria: Implication on Human Resource of the Regions*, **Global Journal of Human Resource Management**, 2015.
14. J. Scott, *A Useful Category of Historical Analysis*, **The American Historical Review**, 1986, vol. 91, no. 5, 2016
15. P. Gill, "Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative and Causal Qualities of Group-based Behaviors." *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 17(6): 2012, 565–574.
16. N.P. Oli; C.C. Ibekwe & I.U. Nwankwo, *Prevalence of Herdsmen and Farmers Conflict in Nigeria*, **Bangladesh E-Journal of Sociology**, 15(2), 2018, 171-197
17. K. L. Pearce, "Police Negotiations; A New Role for the Community Psychiatrist," **Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal**, 22(4), 2017
18. M. P. Couper, "Web Surveys: A Review of Issues and Approaches," **Public Opinion Quarterly**, 64(4): 2018, 464–494.
19. P. Collier, "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective." In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, eds. M. Berdal & D. M. Malone, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, 91–111.
20. J. D. Fearon, & D. D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," **American Political Science Review**, 97(1): 2013, 75–90.
21. T. R. Gurr. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1970.
22. A. Arjona, & K. N. Stathis, "Rebelling Against Rebellion: Comparing Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Recruitment, Presented at the Crisis Workshop, March, 2009, 17–18.
23. D. Biro, *State-Failure or Polity-Creation? World Politics beyond State-Centrism*, PhD Thesis, Canberra, Australian National University, 2015
24. U. Schnekener, *Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood*, SBF Governance Working Paper Series no. 21 (October), 2009, pp. 1-36.

25. B. Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," **American Political Science Review**, 97(1): 2013, 57–73.
26. B. Valentino; H. Paul & D. B. Lindsay, *Draining the Sea: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare*, International Organization, 58(1): 2007, 375–407.
27. A. Olaniyan, And A. Yahaya, *Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern Nigeria*, Africa Spectrum, 2016.
28. A. Downes, "Targeting Civilians in War," PhD Dissertation at the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2004
29. A.C. Okoli & F.N. Okpaleke, *Banditry and Crisis of Public Safety in Nigeria: Issues in National Security Strategies*, **European Scientific Journal**, 10(4), 2014a, 350-362
30. A.C. Okoli & F.N. Okpaleke, *Cattle Rustling and the Dialectics of Security in Northern Nigeria*, **International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science**, 2(1), 2014b, 109-117.
31. F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, London, Penguin, 1884, 2010, pp. 219
32. B. Omitola, *Between Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen: Organized Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria*. In a Paper Presented at the 5<sup>th</sup> Institute of Security Studies Conference on Crime and Crime Reduction (vol.14), 2014
33. K. Eck & H. Lisa, "One- Sided Violence against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data," **Journal of Peace Research**, 44(2), 2017, 233–246.
34. R. T. Akinyele, "Ethnic Militancy and National Stability in Nigeria": A Case Study of the Odua People's Congress', African Affairs, 2017.
35. E. Osaghae, "Ethnicity and its Management in Africa: the Democratization Link", CASS Occasional Monograph No 2. Malt House Press Ltd, Lagos, 1994.
36. A. Agbaje, "The Historical Antecedent of the Phenomenon of Ethnic Militias in Nigeria", in T. Babawale, (EdS). *Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, Lagos; Concept Publications, 2003, 1-17.

37. M. O. Ochuko, *Campus Cultism and the Intensity of Electoral Violence in Nigeria*, **African Journal of Stability and Development**, Vol. 7 No. 2 2013
38. S. Tonah; M.B. Setrana, & J.A. Arthur, *Migration and Development in Africa: Trends, Challenges, and Policy Implications*, NY: Lexington Books, 2017.
39. O. Nwolise, 'National Security and Sustainable Democracy', in *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, eds. E.O. Ojo, Ibadan: John Archers, 2006, 347–55.
40. K.N. Bukari; P. Sow, & J. Scheffran, *Cooperation and Co-Existence between Farmers and Herders in the Midst of Violent Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Ghana*, **African Studies Review**, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2018.
41. C.I. Erondu, & E. Nwakanma, *New Dimensions of the Farmers and Herdsmen Crisis in Nigeria and the Implications for Development*, **Africa Research Review**, 12(4), 2018, 16-27.
42. T. Imobighe, "Doctrine for and Threats to Internal Security," In *A.E. Ekoko and M.A. Vogt (Eds). Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems*, Lagos: Malt house Press. M. Midlarsky, 1975, On War, New York: The Free Press, 2017
43. C. Cabot, *Climate Change and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in West Africa, In Climate Change, Security Risks and Conflict Reduction in Africa*, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg 2017.
44. S. Ogunbanwo Quoted in O.B.C. Nwolise, 'National Security and Sustainable Democracy', in *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, ed. E.O. Ojo Ibadan: John Archers, 2006, 349–50.
45. S. Ochoche, 'Electoral Violence and National Security in Nigeria', **Africa Peace Review**, 1997
46. R. Slater, "Social Protection and Basic Services in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations, Retrieved on October 7, 2013 from <http://www.securelivelihoods.Org/> Publications
47. U. Akwara, *The Attack of Herdsmen on Farmers in Nigeria: The Problems and Solutions, Nigeria: Weafri Well Services CO*, 2018.

48. H. Clark, *Over 6,000 Nigerians in Christian-Identified Communities Murdered or Maimed by Fulani Muslims in 2018*, Retrieved from <https://christiannews.net/2018/07/11/over-6000-nigerians-in-christian-identified-community-ties-murdered-or-maimed-by-Fulani-Muslims-in-2018/>
49. Al-Jazeera) “*Message to United States October 2003*,” Al Jazeera. Amnesty International 1999 ‘*Uganda: Breaking the Circle: Protecting human rights in the northern war zone*’, London: Macy, 18 October 2003
50. J. Angstrom, ‘*Debating the Nature of Modern War*’ in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, London: Frank Cass, 2005.
51. G. Burton, *Background Report: The Fulani Herdsmen*, Project Cyma Publication, 2016, 1-18.
52. African Union, *Political Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities*. 2013, <https://au.int/en/documents/20110131/policy-framework-pastoralism-africa-securing-protecting-and-improving-lives>
53. R. J. Art & R. Jervis, *International Politics* 2nd ed., Boston: Little, Brown, 2015.
54. A. Adeniyi, *The Human Cost of Uncontrolled Arms in Africa: Cross-National Research on Seven African Countries*, **Oxfam Research Reports**, 2017.
55. O.A. Adekunle, & R. Solagberu, *Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict: A factor Analysis for Socio-Economic Conflict Variable among Arable Crop Farmers in North Central Nigeria*. **Journal of Human Ecology**, 30, 2010, 1-9.
56. B. J. Wirtz; J. E. Cohen, & C.S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, H. Behrend, (TR. By Mitch Cohen) 1999, Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits: *War in Northern Uganda*, 1985–97, Oxford: James Currey, 2002.
57. O.E. Adedokun; B. Adurogbangbe, & L.A. Akinbile, *Socio-Economic effects of Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict on Agricultural Extension Service Delivery in Oyo State, Nigeria*, **Journal of Agricultural Extension**, 19(2), 2015, 59-70.
58. M. Berdal & D. Malone, (eds.), *Greed and Grievance Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

59. P. L. Bergen, *'The Long Hunt for Osama'*, Atlantic Monthly, Washington, DC: **Atlantic Monthly**, 2004.
60. M. Albert & B. Buzan, *Securitization Sectors and Functional Differentiation*, **Security Dialogue**, 42, 2011.
61. K. Annan, *In Large Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General A/59*, New York: United Nations, 2005.
62. W. J. Ansorge, *Spirit of War: A field Manual*, International Political Sociology, 4 (4), 2010
63. O.O. Adebayo & O.A. Olaniyi, *Factors Associated with Pastoral and Crop Farmers Conflict in Derived Savannah Zone of Oyo State, Nigeria*, **Journal of Human Ecology**, 23(1), 2010, 71-74.
64. International Crises Group. *Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's expanding Deadly Conflict*, Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/Africa/west-africa/Nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-nigerias-expanding-deadly-conflict>, 2017.
65. B. Kwaghga, *Herdsman/Farmers Crisis: A Threat to Democratic Governance in Nigeria*, **Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Sciences**, 8 (11), 2018
66. I. Ezeonwuka & O.N. Orizu, *Fulani Herdsmen Attacks on Farming Communities: Psychological Implications*, Practicum Psychologia, 8, 2018, 156-166.
67. C.K. Imo, *The Demographic Implications of Nomadic Herdsmen and Farmers Clashes in Nigeria*, **International Journal of Development and Management Review**, (INJODEMAR), 2017.
68. M.J. Fasona & A.S. Omojola, *Climate Change, Human Security and Communal Clashes in Nigeria*, Paper Presented at the International Workshop in Human Security and Climate Change, Oslo, Sweden, 2005.
69. A. Nyong & C. Fiki, *Drought-Related Conflicts, Management and Resolution in the West African Sahel*, Human Security and Climate Change International Workshop, Oslo; Sweden, Retrieved from [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong\\_Fiki.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong_Fiki.pdf). 2005.

70. Asylum Research Consultancy, Nigeria: *The Situation of Indegene-Settlers*, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017.
71. G.O. Negedu, *Constraints to Cassava Production in Ilorin South L.G.A, Kwara State, Nigeria*. Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ilorin, Nigeria, Retrieved from <http://www.kwarastate.gov.ng/ministry-of-agriculture-and-naturalresources.html.2005>
72. M.B. Ajibefun, *Social and Economic effects of the Menace of Fulani Herdsmen Crises in Nigeria*, **Journal of Educational and Social Research**, 8(2), 2018
73. O. Oyetunde, *Farmer/Herdsmen Conflict and Security Governance in Nigeria*, Unpublished M.sc Dissertation, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, University Press, 2019, p.18
74. O. Albert & A. Oyesoji, *Graduate Research Clinic, University of Ibadan*. A Watsapp Group Scholarly Interrogation on Whether Fulani Herdsmen are Armed Group or not, 2020.
75. National Express, *Cattle Rustling Could be More Dangerous than Boko Haram*, in: National Express, 4 February, 2016 online: <[www.national-express.com.ng/cattle-rustling-could-be-more-dangerous-than-boko-haram](http://www.national-express.com.ng/cattle-rustling-could-be-more-dangerous-than-boko-haram)>
76. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “*The Approach – Facing the Challenge*” 2 April, 2018<<http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/x3810e/x3810e04.htm>>
77. A.U. Leme, *Understanding Farmers-Herdsman Conflict and the Way Forward*, Retrieved from <https://www.thecable.ng/understanding-farmers-herdsmen-conflict-way-forward>, 2017.
78. *Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, Oyo State, 2017, s 3(c)*
79. Rejecting calls by the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders’ Association for the amendment of the law to accommodate their wishes, Governor Ortom, among other things, stated that the law “...was popularly made by Benue people and it has come to stay”. Samson Toromade, “Ortom Vows to Keep Anti-Open Grazing Law Despite Herdsmen Threat” *Pulse NG*, 12 January 2018 <<http://www.pulse.ng/news/local/ortom-vows-to-keep-anti-open-grazing-lawid7837835>.Html>

80. R. Blench, *The Transformation of Conflict between Pastoralists Cultivators in Nigeria*, online: <[www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf](http://www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf)> 2003
81. H. W. Köster, & J. De Wolff, *Dairy Development Programme in Nigeria Baseline*, 'Report: Key Findings and Recommendations, Alabama: IFRC, 2012
82. A. Olaniyan, & U. Okeke-Uzodike, *Desperate Guests, Un-willing Hosts: Climate-Induced Migration and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in South-Western Nigeria: Conflict Studies Quarterly*, 10, 1, 2015, 23-40
83. U.J. ILO; J. Ichaver, & Y. Adamolekun, "The Deadliest Conflict you've Never Heard of: Nigeria's Cattle Herders and Farmers Wage a Resource War." *Foreign Affairs*, January 13, 2019
84. A. Tauna, *We Have Tamed Cattle Rustling, We Will Tame Kidnapping* - Northern Governors, in: Daily Post, 30 January, 2016, online
85. T. Akowe, & K. Bodunrin, *Cattle Rustling: A Nightmare*, in: The Nation, 30 March, 2014, online: <<http://onlineng.net/catde-rustling-northern-nightmare>>
86. T. Adeniyi, Why Incoming FCT Minister Must Act Cattle Rustling, in: Daily Trusty 1 July, 2015, online: [www.dailytrust.com/daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling](http://www.dailytrust.com/daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling)
87. A. Achor, *260 Killed, 2,501 Cattle Rustled in Jos Attacks* - JTF, in: Leadership, 25 April, 2014, online: <<http://leadership.ng/news/368441/260-killed-2501-catde-rusted-jos-attacks-jtf>>
88. A. Bankole, "The Nigerian Tourism Sector: Economic Contribution, Constraints, and Opportunities." *Journal of Hospitality Financial Management*, 10(1):7, 2002, 1-89. Available at: <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm/vol10/iss1/7>
89. T. Adeniyi, *Why Incoming FCT Minister Must Act Cattle Rustling*, in: Daily Trusty 1 July, 2015 online: [www.dailytrust.com/daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling](http://www.dailytrust.com/daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling),
90. K. Kinyua; Y. Guliye; N. Kamau & H. Bett, *Livestock Marketing Decisions among Pastoral Communities: The Influence of Cattle Rustling in Baringo District, Kenya: International Journal of Agricultural Management and Development*, 1, 3, 1 23, 2011.

91. O. Albert & B. Isine, *Causes, Effects and Resolution of Farmers-Nomadic Cattle Herders Conflict in Delta Nigeria*, in: **International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology**, 2009.
92. A. Okoli & F. Okpaleke, *Cattle Rustling and the Dialectics of Security in Northern Nigeria*, in: **International Journal of Uberai Arts and Social Science**, 2, 1, 2014, 109-117.
93. R. Blench, *The Transformation of Conflict between Pastoralists Cultivators in Nigeria*, online: <[www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf](http://www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf)>. 2003
94. A. Olaniyan; M. Francis & O. Ufo, *The Cattle Are "Ghanaians" but the Herders Are Strangers: Farmer- Herder Conflicts, Expulsion Policy and Pastoralist Question in Agogo, Ghana*, in: **African Studies Quarterly**, 15, 2, 2015, 53-67.
95. C. Kwaja, *Blood, Cattle, and Cash: Cattle Rustling and Nigeria's Bourgeoning Underground Economy*, in: **West African Insight**, 4, 3, 2014, 1-6.
96. N. Okoroafor; U. Chikwen & S. Enoch, *Ramifications of National Security; the Food Component*; **Journal of Global Studies**, 6(2), 2012
97. O. Nnoli, *National Security in Africa: A Radical New Perspective*, Enugu: Pacrep Book Series, 2006
98. G.H. Gjørsv, "Security by any other Name: Negative Security Positive Security and a Multi-Actor Security Approaches, **Review of International Studies**, Vol.30, No.4, 2012.
99. D. Groudin, *The New Frontiers of the National Security State: The US Global Governmentality of Contingence*, IN: Doucet MG and De Larrinaga M. (eds). *Security and Global Governmentality*, London: Routledge, 2012, 79 – 95.
100. S. Hameiri & L. Jones, *Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of Sate Transformation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
101. U. Egbuta, *Understanding the Farmer-Herder Conflict in Nigeria*, **ACCORD: Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes**, 2018.

102. T.E. Akinyemi & A. Olaniyan, Nigeria: *Climate War, Migratory Adaptation and Farmer-Herder Conflicts*, **Conflict Studies Quarterly**, 2017.
103. Premium Times, *Farmers-Herders Conflict: How South-West Governors, Miyetti Allah agreed to Tackle Insecurity*. October 25, 2020.
104. K. Holsti, "War, Peace and the State of the State," **International Political Science Review**, 16 (October), 1995
105. C. Schuck, *Security in a Changing Global Environment: Challenging the Human Security Approach*, Baden: **Nomos**, 2011, 59-77
106. H. Richard, & Shultz Jr, *Security Studies for the 1990s*, Washington, Brassey (US), 1993.
107. R. Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in Modern World*, London; Penguin Books, Allen Lane, 2005.
108. O. Waever, *Politics of Security: The Concepts*: In O. Waever, B. Buzar, M. Kelstrup & P. Lemaitre, (eds). *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, 2011
109. O.I. Aluko, *Agricultural Policy and Food Security in Nigeria: A Rational Choice Analysis*, Springer, 2020
110. Y. P. Yikwab & O. Tade, *How Farming Communities Cope With Displacement Arising from Farmer-Herder Conflict in North Central Nigeria*, **Journals.sagepub.com**, 2021
111. E. K. Oyeoku; C.G. Verumun & F.A. Nkem, *The Media and Displacements: News Frames of Victims of Herders/Farmers Conflict in Nigeria*, **Journal of Refugee Studies**, 34 (4), 2021, 4428-4444
112. C. Wasinski, *On Making War Possible: Soldiers, Strategy and Military Grand Narrative*, **Security Dialogue**, 42(1)2011.
113. C. Weber & M. James Lacy, *Designing Security*, In Burgess JP (ed) *Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies*, London: Routledge, 2010, 240-252.

114. M. C. Williams, *Words, Images Enemies: Securitization and International Politics*, **International Studies Quarterly**, 47 (4), 2003.
115. M. Mawoli & A. Adamu, *Solutions to Herders-Farmers Conflict in Nigeria: The Academic Perspectives and Business Implications*, **Papers.ssrn.com**, 2020
116. R. B. Woodward & H. Jenkins, *Soldiers Bodies and the Contemporary British Military Memoirs*, In: Mcorley K. (ed.) *War and the Body: Militarization, Practice and Experience*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2013
117. J. Dawes, "Do Data Characteristics Change According to the Number of Scale Points used, An Experiment Using 5-point 7-Point and 10-Point Scales," **International Journal of Market Research**, 50(1): 2018, 61–77
118. N. Sambanis, "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War," *Defense and Peace Economics*, 13(3): 2012, 215–243.
119. A. Vinci, "The 'Problems of Mobilization' and the Analysis of Armed Groups," **Parameters**, 36(1): 2016, 49–62
120. O. T. Muldoon; M. Katrina; R. Nathalie & T. Karen, "Adolescents' Explanations for Para-Military Involvement," **Journal of Peace Research**, 45(5): 2018, 681–695.
121. J. Bray; N. L. Leiv & M. Mansoob, "Nepal: Economic Drivers of the Maoist Insurgency." In *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, eds. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 107–132.
122. A. Hoeffler & P. Collier, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War" **Oxford Economic Papers**, 2014, 563–595.
123. P. Collier & A. Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," CSAE WPS/2002–01
124. A. Mohammed & Y.T. Baba, *Herdsmen-Farmers' Conflicts and Rising Security Threats in Nigeria*, Researchgate.net, 2018
125. I. O. Aluko, *Urban Violence Dimension in Nigeria: Farmers and Herders Onslaught*. *Agathos*, 8(1), 2017, 187

126. O. Ajala, *New Drivers of Conflict in Nigeria: An Analysis of the Clashes between Farmers and Pastoralists*, **Third World Quarterly**, **Taylor and Francis**, 2020.
127. D. Penu & S.A. Palo, *Institutions and Pastoralist Conflicts in Africa: A Conceptual Framework*, SAGE, 2021.
128. K. Enojo, *Political Violence and Ethno- Religious Conflicts: Implications for Sustainable Development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic*, 2010, Available at <https://oer.kogistateuniversity.edu.ng/read/political-violence-and-ethno-religious-conflicts-implications-for-sustainable-development-in-nigerias-fourth-republic>. Accessed on 29th November, 2020.
129. A. Vinci, *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents*, London, Routledge, 2008.
130. J. M. Hazen & H. Jonas, *Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective*, *Small Arms Survey*, URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10752.13> 2017.
131. *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project .Unidentified Armed Groups*, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03815> Accessed: 04-05-2020 10:08 UTC, 2012.
132. A. Nwozor; J.S Olanrewaju & S. Oshewolo, *Herder-Farmer Conflicts: The Politicization of Violence and Evolving Security Measures in Nigeria*, Taylor and Francis, 2021
133. A. Okoli & Okpaleke Francis, *Cattle Rustling and the Dialectics of Security in Northern Nigeria*, in: **International Journal of Uberai Arts and Social Science**, 2014, 109 -117
134. W. Clack, "The Extent of Livestock Theft in South Africa," **Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology**, 26, 2, 2013: 84-85.
135. K. Adejumo, *Special Report: Lanlate: How Armed 'Herdsmen' Kill, Kidnap Farmers in Oyo Community*, January 02, 2021
136. O. Albert & A. Oyesoji, Graduate Research Clinic, University of Ibadan. A Watsapp Group Scholarly *Interrogation on Whether Fulani Herdsmen are Armed Group or not*. 2019. Unpublished

137. J. George; A. Adelaja; A. Titus & V. Olufemi, *Terrorist Attacks, Land Resource Competition and Violent Farmer-Herder Conflicts*, Land Use Policy, 102,105241, 2021
138. C. H. Kodili, *Constructing the Herder-Farmer Conflict as (In) Security in Nigeria*, African Security, 13 (1), 2020, 54-76
139. M. Samiri, *Nigeria Threatened by Desertification*, Environs News Nigeria, 2018-11-18.
140. A. Alao; J. Mackinlay & F. Olonisakin, *Peacekeeper, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process*, New York: The UN University, 1999
141. I. A. Madu & C. F. Nwankwo, "Spatial Pattern of Climate Change and Farmer-Herder Conflict Vulnerabilities in Nigeria," **Geo Journal**, 86(6), 20 May 2020, 2691-2707.
142. R. Blench, *Is Fencing a Solution to Reducing Herder-Farmer Conflict in Nigeria? Field Investigations on Pastoralist-Farmers Crisis Areas and Enhancement of MISEREOR Partner Interventions in Nigeria, Phase3*, 2017
143. M. W. Baca, *My Land, Not Your Land, Farmer-Herder Wars in the Sahel*, **Foreign Affairs**, 21 August 2015
144. Farmer-Herder Clashes Amplify Challenge for Beleaguered Nigeria Security, IPI Global Observatory, 16 July 2015
145. R. Blench, *The Fire Next Time: the Upsurge in Civil Insecurity across the Central Zone of Nigeria*, Cambridge: Kay Williamson Educational Foundation, 2016
146. T. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
147. Time, "How Climate Change Is Spurring Land Conflict in Nigeria," **Arabian journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter)** Vol. 2, No.1; Aug. 2012
148. S. Pavanello, "Improving the Provisions of Basic Services of the Poor in Fragile Environment," **International Literature Review Synthesis**, Paper Overseas Development Institute, Oxford University, 2008

149. R. Slater, “*Social Protection and Basic Services in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations*, Retrieved on October 7, 2013 from <http://www.Securelivelihoods.Org/publications>, 2012
150. O. Nwolise, “*National Security and Sustainable Democracy*,” in E. O. Ojo (eds). *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Limited, 2008, Pp. 347-355
151. U. Egbata, *Undastanding the Herder-Farmer Conflict in Nigeria*, Sabinet, 2018
152. Surulola Eke, ‘*Nomad Salvage*’ and Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Nigeria: the (Un) Making of an Ancient Myth, **Third World Quarterly**, 41 (5), 2020, 745-763
153. L. Amusan; O. Abegunde & T. E. Akinyemi, *Climate Change, Pastoral Migration, Resource Governance and Security: the Grazing Bill Solution to Farmer-Herder Conflict in Nigeria*, Environmental economics, 2017, 35-45.
154. I.O. Albert, Security Regimens in Africa, *CODESTRIA Policy Briefs, Number 3 June, Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESTRIA)*, 2017b

## **Chapter Three**

### **Methodology**

#### **3.1 Research Design**

This study adopted a historical approach. This helped the researcher in providing answers to the research questions and provides solution to the research problems historically and not conclusively. This was used to obtain information on the current situation on the Farmer-herdsmen conflict in the selected states (Oyo and Ogun) and the regional intersections on security sector responses which gave some valuable pointers as to which aspect was examined, yielding rich data from every element of the study that was then analyzed and leading to important conclusion and recommendations.

#### **3.2 Population of the Study**

The population under study is south-west Nigeria which consists of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Lagos and Ekiti States. It is also known as the south west geographical zone of Nigeria. The area lies between longitude 2°31'1" and 6°00'1" East and Latitude 6°21'1" and 8° 37'1"N with a total land area of 77,818 km<sup>2</sup> and a projected population of 28, 767,752 in 2002<sup>1</sup>. The study area is bounded in the East by Edo and Delta states, in the North by Kwara and Kogi states in the West by the republic of Benin and in the south by the Gulf of Guinea. The study area had 85 constituted forest reserves with a forest area cover of 842,499. The south-west zone of Nigeria is dominated by the Yoruba people, who are also one of the 3 major ethnic groups in the country. In Nigeria, each of the 36 states belongs to one of the six geopolitical zones. In general,

states with similar history and cultural heritage belong to the same zone. In other words, the grouping is not entirely based on location.

The climate of South-West Nigeria is tropical in nature and it is characterized by wet and dry seasons. The temperature ranged between 21 and 34°C while the annual rainfall ranged between 150 and 3000 mm. The wet season is associated with the South-west monsoon wind from the Atlantic Ocean while the dry season is associated with the northeast trade wind from the Sahara Desert. The vegetation in South-west Nigeria is made up of fresh water swamp and mangrove forest at the belt. The low land in the forest stretches inland to Ogun and parts of Ondo State, while secondary forest is towards the northern boundary where the derived southern savannah exists <sup>2</sup>.

The population of the South-West region of Nigeria was estimated at 32.5 million people. The region's population is predominantly Christian, and members of the Yoruba ethnic group, who made up approximately 21% of the national population, were concentrated in this area<sup>3</sup>.

### **3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques**

This study specifically focused on two states out of the six states in the South-West region (Oyo and Ogun). The choice of these two states hinged upon the intensity and susceptibility of most communities in these states to the farmers-herdsmen attacks in the region. For instance, the 2015 global terrorism index ranked the Fulani Herdsmen as the fourth deadliest group after Boko – Haram, ISIS and Al-Qaeda while in 2018, the International Crises Watch estimates revealed that the Fulani Herdsmen Clashes have killed six times more than the Boko – Haram group in Nigeria. In Oyo State,

communities like; Igangan, and Lanlate in Ibarapa area were interviewed. In Ogun State, the Yewa North and Imeko-Afon communities were equally interrogated and by extension other herder-rural community prone areas in the region were also interrogated.

### **3.4 Description of Research Instrument(s)**

Two research instruments were used to gather data. First, information was derived from Structured and Key informant Interview (KII) where interviews were conducted with respondents as identified key informant relevant to the security of the South-West Nigeria<sup>4</sup>. The informants were carefully drawn from the three segments/actors involved; the state, the group and residents of the affected communities in South-West. The interviews were conducted to explore the viewpoints of the identified segments/actors involved and gained insights about the current situation on the herdsmen/farmers attacks, its implications on the behavior of security architectures in the region and the security sector responses (SSR). Also, renowned scholars who have worked extensively on this topic were interviewed using key structured interview (KSI) i.e. Professor Olawale Albert, of the Peace and Conflict Institute, University of Ibadan, Professor Akinteru Akinyemi (MACBAN Grand Patron), among others.

### **3.5 Validity of Research Instrument**

Since the research design is the plan, structure and strategy of investigation conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions and objectives and also to control variance in the variables under investigation. The design served as an important guide

for the researcher on how the data were collected, analyzed and interpreted. While the variables were controlled, internal validity was strongly assured in this research.

### **3.6 Distribution of the Research Instrument and Method of Data Collection**

In the conduct of this research, primary and secondary data were used. Two research instruments were used to gather data. First, information was derived from Structured and Key informant Interview (KII) for the primary data where interviews was conducted with respondents as identified key informant relevant to the security of the South-West Nigeria. Here, the samples were carefully selected to avoid selection bias to achieve the purpose of the study. The informants were drawn from the three segments involving; the state, the group and Residents of the affected communities in the selected states (Oyo and Ogun states).

The study was conducted to explore the viewpoints of the identified segments/actors involved, gained insights about the subject of investigation. Also, renowned scholars who have worked extensively on the related topic were interviewed using key structured interview. Also, information drawn from secondary sources such as printed materials like official/government publications, journals, seminars and conference papers, newspapers, texts, commission reports like Global Terrorism Index (2015 – 2019), International Crises Group (2015 – 2019), International Crises Watch (2015 – 2019), Global Peace Index (2015 – 2019), Study of Terrorism and Response Terrorism (START) Database, Development Agenda for Western Nigeria (DAWN Commission) were also used. Also, non-printed electronic materials from the internet, unpublished

materials and other relevant sources that were helpful in the course of this study were contextually interpreted.

### **3.7 Method of Data Analysis**

In the analysis of this work, the historical and qualitative data interpretation method was adopted. The data collected from the secondary source were subjected to in-depth, critical and logical reasoning which captured the dimension of the farmers-herders conflict and the security implication in the South-West through the critical examination of the selected states in the region. Data collected through the key informant interviews were meticulously transcribed and contextually interpreted for accurate analysis to complement the information gathered from the secondary source. Therefore, this research is historical and qualitative in nature through the use of primary and secondary data sources.

## Endnotes

1. C.R. Kothari, *Research Methodology; Methods and Techniques*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, **New Age International Publishers**, 2004.
2. S.A. Agboola, *An Agricultural Atlas of Nigeria*, Oxford University Press, Nigeria, 1979, Pp. 248
3. FORMECU, *Forest Resource Survey, Geometrics*, Nigeria Ltd, Abuja, **National Population Commission**, 2006, Abuja, Nigeria.
4. I.O. Albert; O.O. Williams & O. Aremu, *Research Methods in Peace and Conflict Studies*, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 2014, ISBN: ISBN 978-93306-5-2.

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

## Chapter Four

### Results and Discussion of Findings

#### 4.1 Findings on Resource Conflict in Nigeria

##### 4.1.1 Pastoral Mobility and Resource Conflict in Nigeria

The expansion of livestock production in many parts of South West plays a central economic role in many states in Nigeria and the Sahel belt<sup>1</sup>. The livestock sector's contribution to agricultural GNP is projected to be 40%, rising to 50% if animal traction, manure, and the transformation of animal products are included<sup>2</sup>. It also employs millions of people and provides a vital source of food and money for the poor, particularly those who live in environmentally sensitive areas and are at risk of food insecurity<sup>3</sup>.

The International Organization for Migration and the Economic Community of West African States document on regional policies and response to pastoral movements in West Africa, pastoral mobility involving seasonal and cyclical migration of varying degrees between complementary ecological areas with most of the group remaining sedentary and engaging in crop production<sup>4</sup>. Pastoralists have been expanding their grazing areas southwards in recent decades due to demographic and climatic changes, particularly into the sub-humid "Middle Belt" and high-altitude grasslands for access to quantities of forage or quality grass with plant species such as *andropogon gayanus* and *zornia glochidiata*, harvest residues, insufficient water for livestock during the dry season, decision to abandon areas affected by animal diseases, and searching.

In the north, nomads have been flocking into the highly populated semi-arid zone around the main Hausa towns of Sokoto, Kano, and Kaduna. Tensions between farmers and pastoralists have risen as a result of land pressure<sup>5</sup>.

Transhumant pastoralism is a highly productive system that is ideally suited to South West's ecological and economic circumstances. While population increase, climate change, the extension of agricultural regions, the privatization of formerly shared resources, and official policies supporting agriculture at the expense of nomadic pastoralism, transhumant pastoralism is facing growing obstacles. Pastoralist transhumance, in particular, has been neglected, aggravating competition for few natural resources in rural areas. Conflicts and violence that arise have a detrimental influence on pastoralists as a group and deepen their marginalization. Pastoralism is a cultural system and way of life that permits pastoral peoples like the Fulani, Bororo's, and Moors to thrive in hard surroundings while simultaneously expressing their cultural identity<sup>6</sup>.

Cattle rustling and rural banditry are intimately connected to resource conflict between sedentary farmers and pastoralists in this scenario. The paucity of land and water resources is also at the root of this conflict. Changes in agricultural modification, climate change, the increase of agro-pastoralism, and other factors all contributed to scarcity. The tendency for diverse occupational groups to compete for finite resources exacerbates the friction. This sometimes leads to fatal clashes between different community groupings, especially where occupation and communal boundaries intersect.

A review of different theoretical perspectives of the conflict reveal non-monolithic meaning, corroborating the view with convergence viewpoints on the centrality of resource scarcity and environmental decline as posited in tragedy of the common theory<sup>7,8</sup>. While the tragedy of the commons provides a useful perspective by bringing resource-induced conflict to the fore, the inherent logic of the tragedy of the commons focuses on self-interested actors whose quest is to maximize exploitation and receive the full benefits of resources held in common, which tends to spread the costs among the users, and thus returns the crises of pastoralism to the pastoralists themselves.

The postulation has a tendency to blame herders and grazers for overgrazing and soil erosion, rather than focusing on the constraints and challenges that pastoralists face as an occupational group in extremely dangerous conditions. This has been highlighted as a fundamental flaw in these viewpoints<sup>9</sup>.

Nonetheless, the combined effects of resource scarcity, agricultural transformation, and environmental degradation have altered the two groups' ties (armed herdsmen and the farmers). Previously, their interactions were marked by different degrees of collaboration and conflict; currently, the groups are mostly mired in animosity and violent conflict. As previously stated, the two occupational groups have historically been connected in terms of sharing land, water, fodder, and other resources<sup>10</sup>. They also reveal that pastoralists' and many sedentary cultivators' occupational identities are muddled in some cases, since many sedentary cultivators are also stock breeders and vice versa. The deepening of agricultural capitalism and the emergence of agrarian transformation has significantly affected patterns of land usage and access among various occupational groups.

As a result, the issues at hand transcend beyond peasantry internal difference as a result of agricultural commodity production. The influence of direct governmental policies aimed at expanding agricultural production as a strategy for diversifying the economy in non-oil sectors, both for local food security and for export in Nigeria, is a major role. In the backdrop of economic collapse and the implementation of severe neo-liberal policies, these policies also fostered alienation in urban and rural communities.

The structural adjustment program was prompted by the necessity to cope with economic hardship, in addition to the scarcity generated by this process and the strain on the African lineage system of land allocation. While peasants have shown amazing flexibility and dynamism in the face of persistent pressure, the necessity to cope with the reality of ethnic variety has, in certain cases, damaged social connections, according to proponents<sup>11, 12</sup>. Land acquisition and labor regulation are both controlled. As it has been noted, in certain situations, lineage members have attempted to reclaim property that has been sold to persons, whether kinsmen or strangers, as a response to rising land scarcity<sup>13</sup>. Other causes of pressure on rural land include the reality of straddling urban and rural regions, as well as the adoption of different modes of subsistence, as urban based worker and salary groups that saw actual income declines participated in family land farming. Senator Abaribe, the minority leader in the Senate, claims that the core cause of the farmer-herder problem is people's devotion to land. He goes on to argue that the 19 northern states account for over 80% of Nigeria's area. However, just approximately 22% of the population lives in the 18 southern states.

‘How do you think someone in the south would feel if he was instructed to leave his country in order to stay alive so that another person may stay there?’<sup>14</sup>.

#### **4.2 Historical Analysis of Conflict between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria**

In the pre-colonial era, records of conflict between herders and farmers were lean<sup>15</sup>. The mention of competition between both groups in the 12th and 13th centuries, without reference to violence was argued. The socio-economic interaction between both groups showed to be symbiotic where farmers and herders had a stake in the well-being of the opposite group. The symbiosis was characterized by complementarity of farming and herding activities such as cattle entrustment, dung and stubble exchanges which were mutually beneficial and supported increased productivity. There also existed a social structure called *Ruga*, created by some Fulani groups in the pre-colonial era to preserve the harmony between both groups. The *Ruga* was an elected official who regulated grazing activities within his group, selecting grazing areas and migratory routes. The official also took responsibility for conflict resolution within herdsman groups and between his kinsmen and farming groups<sup>16</sup>.

The colonial period was marked by an emergence of modifications in the social and physical landscapes that undermined the cooperative system that existed between the herders and farmers in the north of Nigeria. The changes reduced the pastoralist-farmer compatibility and weakened the informal land tenure and resource use arrangement that was already in place. For example, the colonialists introduced systems of conflict management alien to the locals and thus ineffective. More so, the interest of the colonial administrators were in policies that supported the manipulation

of their subjects for different purposes, such as laws regarding land ownership which availed large expanse of land to the Europeans through privatization. This reduced indigenous peoples and herders' control and access to land, thus making the resource scarce and enhancing environmental degradation. The colonial period also introduced improved medical knowledge and medicine to man and cattle. The increased adaptability to diseases and the sense of security during the colonial era also gave impetus for southern expansion of herders who were hitherto in some cases restricted to some areas due to threats of armed raids on their herds<sup>17</sup>.

The conflicts between both groups in recent time is worsened by urbanization, increasing need for farmlands and grazing lands, increased desperation for pasture and water, migration and sedentarization of herders at new, unfamiliar, socio-cultural communities, proliferation of arms, the collapse of the *Ruga* system and so on. Different from these anthropogenic arguments are the natural factors such as climate change. For example, the significant decline in average rainfall in Africa's arid and semi-arid zone since the 1970's have been associated with modifications in land tenure and domestic modes of agricultural production. The present situation is marred by endless reports of bitter resentment and violent conflict between pastoralist and sedentary farming groups. One recent declaration by the south-west and the south-south governors in Asaba (Asaba Declaration) where local people resented the appropriation of land for large scale ranches in their community. It was also reported that in Igangan, Ibarapa North Area Council and Imeko Afon local government area of Ogun State, scores of violent clashes occurred between herders and farmers in different parts of the states. The conflict may easily be perceived as a continuation of

ethno-religious struggles that predate the colonial era, but the relative absence of such widespread conflict throughout Nigeria's pre-independence history suggests more contemporary factors are to blame<sup>18</sup>.

There have been efforts by past and present government administrations to curb the menace occasioned by the farmer-herder conflict. Before the collapse of the first republic, the government's Grazing Reserve Act of 1964 provided grazing areas and paths for the passage of livestock, but after 1966, the paths became moribund and overtaken by other anthropogenic activities. More recently, bills have been presented by lawmakers such as the National Grazing Routes and Reserve Bill 2012 and the National Grazing Reserve Bill 2016 which sought to establish new grazing reserves and routes in each State of the Federation. However these bills have been unsuccessful. This is largely due to criticisms and distrust of the outcomes by different regions. For instance, southern leaders and groups fear that the bill is an attempt to seize power and colonize the region. Similarly, in mid-2019, Nigeria's Executive wing proposed to establish Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) settlements all over the country in a bid to check the conflicts and improve agricultural productivity. The RUGA program sought to settle migrant pastoral families and other animal farmers in an organized place with provision of necessary and adequate social amenities. This too met a dead end and was eventually shelved as different groups accused the process as a plot to "Fulanize" the country.

### **4.3. THE IDENTIFIED CAUSES OF FARMER-HERDER CONFLICT**

The non-exhaustive elements mentioned below, obtained from the field report by the researcher, are recognized as the causes of the farmer-herder conflict in this study.

**4.3.1 Encroachment of Farm lands** – The increasing scarcity of land for farming and grazing, as well as the tendency for different ethnic and occupational groups to compete for land, leads to inter-communal conflict and land drag, which is exacerbated by climate change pressures, particularly the threat of desertification and erosion. With deserts spreading southward, the problem of desert encroachment has been a struggle for decades. This has had a significant impact on the availability and fertility of soil for crop growers, as well as pastures for grazers who have been compelled to migrate southward in search of pastures. Similarly, gully erosion and topsoil washing have reduced the amount and fertility of agricultural land available to farmers in several parts of the country. This has increased rivalry among farmers and herders for land and water resources<sup>15</sup>. Land shortages and risks to peasant communities' livelihoods are also frequently responsible for peasant rebellions, and to a considerable degree, they are also responsible for confrontations between agricultural crop growers and herders. Crop farmers' reactions to cattle grazers in the context of competition for land and water resources are not entirely unique to peasant revolts.



**Figure 4.1:** Cattle Herder Encroaching on a Farm Land in Igbeti- Okeogun, Oyo State

**Source:** Akoya Police Station, Akoya

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY

Peasant revolts are more likely to result in various forms of localism, including ethnocentrism, which can disguise the populace's true economic and social problems. This has previously served as the primary building element for severe confrontations between farmers and herders, which have had catastrophic consequences because of the harm it causes to crops and fallow fields left to recover nutrients after lengthy periods of usage.

According to Professor Akinteru Akintunde, (MACBAN) grand patron in a face-to-face interview on 05 August, 2021, he opined that:

*“The herdsmen’s cows often stray into the farmlands of the farmers without permission and destroy crop nurseries or full-grown crops, which they hope to harvest and sell in the near future. This attitude, no doubt, provokes the farmers to go after their animals”.*

In addition, the interview indicated that the diminishing of ecological space and resorts produces an atmosphere of eco-scarcity, raising the stakes and placing a price on existing resources. Usually, this leads to severe rivalry and a desperate battle for survival. As a result, conflict becomes not only unavoidable, but also a necessity of survival in this situation. For example, late colonial authorities constructed a system of transhumance corridors (burti/burtali), under which Fulani chiefs and local community authority agreed on pre-defined stock routes linking established grazing grounds (hurmi) with one another under the auspices of local government. To handle any problems originating from agricultural damage or roaming livestock, local committees were formed. The system of stock routes began to fall apart in the 1970s, when farmers began to claim ownership of the land passed by the routes and cultivate the

well-manure plots. Cattle following stock trails invariably wandered into newly established farms, resulting in friction and bloodshed.

**4.3.2 Acquisition of Land by Proxy** - By assigning state governors the ability to allot urban property and local government chairmen the right to allocate rural land, the 1976 land use act explicitly placed political control over land access, which does not exclude commercialization. Land became more important in local political calculations, and there was conformity to the dominant situation in post-colonial Africa, in which local councils tend to function as ethnic organizations, legislating in favor of local ethnic groups and depriving strangers of the right to permanent tenure<sup>19</sup>. The herders, on the other hand, utilize other individuals to acquire property in their name while lying to the indigenous that they are purchasing land for one of their businesses. However, when the landowners see the land being used by herdsmen for cattle business against their will, they realize they have been duped by the herdsmen, which leads to conflict. Several government proposals, for example, are being criticized as a "land grab" scheme. This is evidenced by a January 2018 proposal to build "cattle colonies" across Nigeria, as well as a May 2019 plan to set aside territory for herders in settlements known as Rural Grazing Areas (RUGA). Only certain herders' organizations in the north and eleven northern states gave 55,000 hectares of land for its execution due to government distrust, while other areas backed out. The southern governors, on the other hand, were adamantly opposed. The Ruga project, according to the pan-yoruba socio-political movement Afenifere, is an expansionist agenda that is perceived as furthering the fulanization of the South West. 'South West would not yield one inch of its territory to Ruga,' said the late Yinka Odumakin, the

National Publicity Secretary of Afenifere. If the South West does so, it will be a betrayal of Yoruba warriors who drove the Fulani out of Oshogbo during the Jihad. Dansaaki Ade Agbede, the head of the Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE), echoed this sentiment, asking why a group of people who are considered as a danger to the peace and security of others would be seen to control towns beyond their own areas. The Egbe Igbimo Agba Yoruba, also known as the Yoruba council of elders, went on to say that the recent experiences of the people at the hands of herders leave a lot to be desired, especially given the spirit of openness and accommodation shown by the South-West towards the herders being subjugated. 'How can they compel people and states to approve the Ruga project,' Aare Gani Adams, the Aare Ona Kakanfo of Yoruba said during one of the interviews?

He contended that the project is dead on arrival by emphasizing that the lands belong to the state's government. Thus, almost all the South -West governors, however, denied the federal government land for such Ruga project thereby forcing federal government to announce its suspension and replacing it with Ranching.

**4.3.3 The Nature of Modern State System** – While there is a staggering diminishing return in the availability of Land for agricultural farming and grazing purpose in Nigeria, the different cultural notions and understanding of land and land use have fuelled conflicts between nomadic herders and the farmers. For instance, in the postulations of some theorists, it was argued that the sovereign importance of movement of pastoralists is driven by little regard for boundaries and territories<sup>20</sup>. A stark contrast with the delimited space of the modern state system and the farmer's

lack of flexibility in responding to constraints imposed by the pressure arising from climate change substantiate further. The constraint imposed by modern state system is more complex in Nigeria's case, where interests, fuelled by ethnic demands and the ideology of ingenuity have occasioned frequent redrawing of internal administrative boundaries. The administrative boundaries are claimed as exclusive economic and political spheres of interests by elites and the majority of people. The lack of flexibility on part of the farmers predisposes them to conflict with nomadic grazers, who have greater adaptability and less exposure to risk. While the nomads can disperse their herds and move to new areas, farmers are tied to their land and their products and can suffer crop failure and starvation caused by a lack of comparable options<sup>21</sup>.

**4.3.4 Power relations in Indigenous farming communities** – This appears to be skewed toward pastoralists who are always on the go. This was obvious not just in Nigeria's North Central but also in its South-West. Violent conflicts between farmers and grazers demonstrate this dynamic. This, for example, exacerbates anti-herdsman sentiment in the states of Ogun and Oyo which has been driven in part by indigenous agricultural communities' exclusive claims to land and water resources. These claims have heightened rivalry for land and water between the two occupational groups.

Elected and appointed local government officials, as well as traditional institutions, have an active role in managing access to land and water resources under the current Land Use Act of 1978. This includes the ability for grazers to dwell in specific domains for a period of time. The politics of safeguarding local resources against perceived others have raised the chance of greater animosities and conflicts happening

in states where ethnic majorities / minorities and indigenes / settler dichotomies have existed for a long time.

**4.3.5 Climate Change** - This has also played a prominent role in the course of evolving the conflict. The impact of climate change in the Lake Chad region reflects and rebound the dimensions of the herder/ farmers conflicts in the South-West Nigeria. It has had a significant impact on the livelihoods of the region's pastoralists. Lake Chad has dropped in size from 25,000km<sup>2</sup> to 18,000km<sup>2</sup>. As a result of the dams, the volume of water coming into the lake from inside and outside Nigeria has changed. The impacts of desert encroachment have amplified the impact of dams. Nigeria covers around 21% of Lake Chad's traditional basin, which stretches over six other African nations in North and Central Africa. Dams have been built in Nigeria's two sub-basins that run into Lake Chad, the Yedseram and Ngadda dams, as well as the Hadeija – Jumaare – Koundougou and Yobe dams. They have had a negative impact on the lake's water input. They have caused the lake to recede and have had a significant impact on irrigation for both fishing and pastoral purposes<sup>21</sup>. This has resulted in periodic reductions in fishing activity surrounding Lake Chad, as well as a drop in water supplies for pastoral and irrigated farming<sup>22</sup>.

This is because shepherds were forced to leave their primary settlement in search of greener pastures when the weather became bad. Climate change has been cited as the single most important cause in causing migration and population displacement, which lends credence to this. This has impacted people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, agricultural disruption, cattle invasion of farm lands, herder assault

on non-Fulani women, blockage of stock routes and water points, fresh water scarcity, burning of rangelands, cattle theft, inadequate animal health care and disease control, overgrazing on fallow lands, cattle defecation on streams and roads, and ineffective cattle management, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change<sup>23</sup>. As a result, migration is defined as individuals moving from one geographical location to another in order to take up permanent or semi-permanent residence<sup>24</sup>.

The recently held United Nations Conference on Climate Change otherwise known as COP26 was the 26<sup>th</sup> climate change conference held at the SEC Centre in Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom from 31<sup>st</sup> October to 13<sup>th</sup> November 2021. The conference was the first since COP 21 that expected parties involved to make enhanced commitments towards mitigating climate change effect having identified the negative effects it has on migration and conflicts. The Paris agreement reached requires participants to carry out a process colloquially as the ‘ratchet mechanism’ every five years with improved national pledges to sort out climatic issues.

#### **4.4 Findings on the Research Questions**

##### **4.4.1 Farmer-Armed Herder Conflict and the Security of Selected States in South-West Nigeria**

Nomadic cattle grazing and rearing is a major occupation of the people in the Sahel and parts of the Savannah regions of Nigeria<sup>25</sup>. Pastoralists are people whose major source of livelihood is livestock herding. The importance of this industry and its contribution to food production cannot be overemphasized.

Conversely, the environmental implications of this sector cannot be ignored as well. Since, migration is part of a comprehensive economic strategy in Nigeria<sup>26</sup>. The movement of the pastoralists is governed by livelihood norms associated with the needs of their cattle for pasture. Livestock production accounts for one third of Nigeria's agricultural GDP. As argued, herds are the main wealth reserve for pastoralists generally, and their livestock are crucial in their socio-economic structure<sup>27</sup>.

In South-West Nigeria, nomadic pastoralists are usually a mix of both the indigenous ones and those who migrated from other neighboring northern states in search of water and pasture. The latter movement is known as transhumance, as even so the movement of the nomadic pastoralists within a country is also regarded as transhumance by some scholars<sup>28</sup>. Transhumance came about as a result of a policy of Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). In furtherance of this policy, ECOWAS developed a Transhumance Protocol, 1998 under Decision A/DEC.5/10/98. This Protocol was signed by ECOWAS States, including Nigeria. It guarantees the free movement of pastoralists or herders across the sub-region<sup>29</sup>. This explains why there are foreign herdsmen in Nigeria.

No doubt, this protocol plays an important role in West African society by providing livestock and its products as well as revenue from the cattle trade. However, in recent times, the practice has resulted in severe conflicts wherever nomadic pastoralists and their herds pass through or attempt to settle temporarily.

Against this backdrop, insecurity and increased conflict occurs, threatening national security, the livelihood of crop farmers and environmental sustainability, not only in Nigeria but also in most countries in Africa and other non-African countries<sup>30</sup>. The diagram below shows the various locations of states in the South West of Nigeria on the map. The following table shows the corresponding forest locations and the land mass of coverage area under study.

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA



Figure 4.2: Map of the South West Region of Nigeria

**Table 4.1:** Forest Resources Study

State	Total Land Area (Km) 2	Number of LGA	Area of Forest Reserve
Osun	9,491	30	91,491
Ogun	16,086	20	278,362
Oyo	27,848	33	169,173

Source: (FORMECU Report, 2015).

The table above shows the vast area of forest reserves in the three South-West States under review. In Osun State, a total of 91,491 forest area was identified comprising of 9,491(Km) <sup>2</sup> covering the entire 30 local government areas, while in Ogun State, a total of 278,362 forest areas were found, covering total land area of 16,086 (Km) <sup>2</sup> across 20 local government area while in Oyo State with 33 local government, 27,848 (Km) <sup>2</sup> of land area with a total of 169,173 forest reserves were discovered. All these reserves fall under the purview of the state government without prejudice. According to the national bureau of statistics, the population of the South-West region of Nigeria is estimated at 32.5 million people<sup>31</sup>. The region's population is predominantly Christian and Muslim, and members of the Yoruba ethnic group, who make up approximately 21% of the national population, is concentrated in this area. The South-West, one of the six geopolitical regions of Nigeria, has an estimated GDP of about N67 trillion naira (about \$305 billion US dollars), more than half of the GDP of the nation<sup>32</sup>.

However, the growing phenomenon of the hitherto conflicts between herders and farmers may merely forge Fulani cultural practice of testing a person's bravery and prowess at bloody warfare involving various actors. Moreover, herding is not holistically practiced only by the Fulani's<sup>33</sup>. Since the phenomenon has seen the emergence of well-funded banditry in some states in Nigeria with the Fulani ethnic group often considered at the epicenter of the scenario because of its deep involvement in pastoralism. Farmer/pastoralists conflicts have recently become a major internal security concern in Nigeria, with the country's northern region as the worst hit.

This was also further buttressed that almost all coastal states in South-West (Lagos, Oyo and Ondo) with borders with landlocked dry states with large pastoral herds have experienced conflicts between host communities and cattle herders from the northern states<sup>34</sup>. Conflicts have been reported to be usually centered on the destruction of crops, pollution of rivers and ponds serving as source of drinking water for communities, indiscriminate bush burning by herders and harassment of nomads by host communities' youths, among other complaints.

A technical report on climate change adaptation strategy for Nigeria noted that Lake Chad's shrinking has increased the influx of long distance migrant nomadic cattle herders from the Republic of Niger, as well as the migration of citizens of Chad and Niger further south in search of optimum opportunities. The report noted that these long distance migrants have been well-armed since the mid-1990s and are willing to use violence to assure their grazing. This has contributed to the violent conflicts between herders and farmers in not only in the northern parts of the country but also in South West region of Nigeria.

Reports of bandits with small and light weapons storming herders' settlements and with the mission of killing people and pillaging cows proliferate progressively. According to Ahmadu Suleiman, the chairman of the Kaduna State chapter of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, between October 2013 and March 2014, approximately 7,000 cattle were rustled from commercial livestock farms and traditional herders in Nigeria. However, herding livestock is not an exclusive preserve of Fulani as in Nigeria, 14 other ethnic groups, including the Shuwa, Kanuri, Kanembu, and Touareg, are in some way involved in it<sup>35</sup>. Fulani owns approximately 90 per cent of

the livestock and contribute about 3.2 percent of the country's GDP<sup>36</sup>. Since Fulani views cattle herding not necessarily as a delightful endeavor but as vocation that is taxing, strenuous and exhausting. Moreover, as posited by the Miyetti Allah Chairman in Oyo State, Alhaji Ibrahim Jiji in a face-to- face interview;

*The type of cow breeds in Nigeria are not suitable for ranching system but only fit for constant and progressive herding both by Fulani's and non- Fulani's alike". The type of cow that we rear in Nigeria cannot produce quality milk if ranched.*

Animals, no doubt, perform a variety of functions, including providing milk and meat, breeding cattle and beautifying stock, and serving as carriers and sources of wealth. Cattle constitute a social-security guarantee and inheritable assets for the herder's family, particularly his kids, in addition to providing working capital. Apart from serving as a source of production, storage, and transportation, as well as a means of transferring food and money to the Fulani, the herd's size reflects an individual's or family's social standing and invokes an implicit edict to seek to expand the herd's size.

Women are confined to the background and possess little stock in the pastoral system, which is clearly masculinized and youth dominated. A lady with six cows is affluent, but a guy with twenty cows is considered impoverished. The desire to keep healthy cattle and grow the number of his herd to the best of his abilities and by whatever means is a man's lifelong aim. Pastoralism is seen as a lucrative business, therefore simply owning cattle marks Fulani as wealthy, putting them at risk of predation by less well-off people, groups, and rustling cartels<sup>37</sup>.

The Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) in charge of Southwest, Mr Taiwo Lakanu as cited in the 2019 DAWN report;

*The security challenge in the region is likened to the menace of a snake on the roof which could not be ignored. Although, the scourge of terrorism was predominantly confined to the North Eastern Nigeria, herdsmen-related violence and banditry were increasingly spreading like wildfire down South, thereby ravaging Yoruba States.*

According to him, of greater concern to all is the aspect of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report which indicated that whereas death toll recorded from Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East of the country had reduced drastically, killings by herdsmen in the North Central Region and Southern areas have been on the increase. Today, criminal activities of herdsmen are no longer limited to the North Central.

Also, in March 2017, the humanitarian needs assessment report in 2016, at least 2,069 people died in herder-farmer related violence in Nigeria<sup>38</sup>. In February 2017, SBM Intelligence report indicated that 1,425 people killed in attacks involving herders in 2016, as against 1,240 killed by Boko Haram in same year<sup>39</sup>. The Council on Foreign Relations on Nigeria Security Tracker report also stipulates that communal violence, mainly involving herders and farmers in Southwest Nigeria, had killed around 1,300 since January 2016, compared to about 850 killed by Boko Haram over the same period all in the North East alone,<sup>40,41</sup>.

In June 2017, the *Sun* newspaper reported incidents which stated that 1,102 people were killed in herder-farmer violence over the twelve months from June 2016 to May 2017, compared to 474 killed by Boko Haram over the same period in the North East

Nigeria. This conflict described as “one of the world’s deadliest conflicts” claimed over 10,000 lives in the last ten years and almost 4,000 of them in the last two years alone<sup>42</sup>.

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

**Table 4.2:** Compilation of Attacks.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Death Toll Recorded</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>	<b>Place of Attack</b>
February 18, 2021.	17	Buildings burnt and maiming of residents	Shasha Market in Ibadan, Oyo State.
January 30, 2015	9	-----	Logo LGA, Benue State
March 15, 2015	90	-----	Egba Village, Agatu LGA, Benue State
April 27, 2015	28	Houses and Farmland Razed	Guma LGA, Benue State
March 6, 2021	5	7 kidnapped	Oshogbo-Obokun road, Osun State
May 24, 2015	2	2 Abducted	Wasinmi Village, along Ife-Ibadan Expressway.
July 7, 2021	2	Several Injured	Iseyin, Okeogun LGA, Oyo State
March 6, 2021	2	25 injured	Ekiti LGA, Plateau State
February 8, 2016	10	300 displaced	Ayetoro Area, Ogun State
Feb. 21-24, 2016	500	7000 displaced	Agatu LGA, Benue State
February 29, 2016	11	-----	Agatu LGA, Benue State
March 5, 2016	-	Houses Burnt	Agatu LGA, Benue State
March 9, 2016	8	-----	Logo LGA, Benue State
March 10, 2016	2	-----	Obagaji, Agatu, Benue State
March 13, 2016	6	-----	Tarka LGA, Benue State
January 24, 2017	15	-----	Ohimini LGA, Benue State
March 2, 2017	10	-----	Akure Ondo State

March 8, 2017	3	-----	Logo LGA, Benue State
March 11, 2017	7	-----	Buruku, Benue State
May 13, 2017	8	-----	Logo LGA, Benue State
June 12, 2017	1	-----	Ife – Ibadan Highway, Osun State
November 24, 2017	17 cows killed	-----	Ifelodun LGA, Osun State
November, 26, 2017	-----	5 Passengers Kidnapped	Obokun LGA, Osun State
April 1, 2017	2	4 injured	Atakumosa LGA, Osun State
March 20, 2017	2	Farmers Stabbed, 19 houses razed	Igbeti, Oke Ogun, Oyo State
February 19, 2018	9	-----	Saki, Oyo State
March 5, 2018	58	-----	Gwaska, Kaduna State
April 1, 2018	1	-----	Saki town, Oyo State
April 5, 2019	2	Two injured	Iyemoro-Ekiti, Ikole local government, Ekiti State
June 5, 2019	5	Destruction of crop worth over 50 million in farms belonging to 70 farmers, about 2500 acres of land in Orin Ekiti farm settlement.	Orin Ekiti, Ekiti State
June 7, 2019	1	-----	Ise Ekiti, Ekiti State
February 5, 2019	1	-----	Ayegbaju Ekiti Oye local government, Ekiti State
October 2, 2015	2	3 raped	Ogun State
May 20, 2018	2	20 houses razed	Oke Ogun area, Oyo State
April 1, 2018	2	-----	Lagun village, Lagelu local government, Oyo State
May 22, 2016	1	6 injured	Ekiti State
August 19, 2019	7	-----	Ido LGA, Oyo State
December 12, 2019	3	-----	Ibadan, Oyo State
January 15, 2019	4	5 farms invaded	Lagelu LGA, Oyo State

June 10, 2015	4	3 injured	Matokun Village, Patigi LGA, Kwara State
November 21, 2012	3	1 raped on farm	Ogun State
February 11, 2015	1	Mother of three raped on farm	Ogun State
February 3, 2019	1	-----	Afijio LGA, Oyo State
Dec 2, 2016	5	Farm lands destroyed	Abugi Community, Kogi State
August 19, 2019	7	Farmlands destroyed	Araro, Ido LGA, Oyo State
March 7, 2021	5	Several people kidnapped, raped.	Ayete area in Ibarapa
February 6, 2020	5	Invasion of Rice farm worth 10 million naira by Cattle	Akure North LGA, Ondo State
June 4, 2015	7	Farmlands destroyed	Oro Ago community, Ifelodun LGA, Kwara State
February 14, 2018	2	Farmland destroyed	Yewa North LGA, Ogun State.

---

Source: DAWN Commission Report, 2019.




**Figure 4.3:** A house razed during attack by the armed herdsmen in Oke Ogun, Oyo State

**Source:** Reuter/Quartz Africa, 2017.

However, given the severity of the conflict, this study interrogates the conflict with a specific interest in the two selected states out of the six states in the region (Oyo and Ogun). The choice of these three states hinged upon the intensity and susceptibility of most communities in these states to the Fulani herdsmen attacks in the region. For instance, professor Akinteru, the grand patron of Miyetti Allah cattle breeders in Oyo State in a joint face- to-face interview with the chairman of Miyetti Allah in Oyo State, argued that;

*Miyetti Allah is not tribalistic, it's to farm, to rear and learn" .... We don't know anything about violence, we are organized group.*

The diagram below, therefore, justifies the fact that the Miyetti Allah has a formidable structure of administration as an organized group.



**Figure 4.4:** Structure of Miyetti Allah Leadership (State Level)

**Source:** Grand Patron, Miyetti Allah Association of Nigeria, 2021

Consequently, not only the Northern parts of the country but also the South-West. In the backdrop of farmer/herder disputes in Nigeria, there has been an unfettered rise of cattle rustling, with maiming, raping, murdering, and pillaging as a result<sup>43</sup>. The pastoralist, in most situations, damages crops on farmland and several holdings<sup>44</sup>. In certain cases, girls or women are kidnapped in the process<sup>45</sup>.

Cattle rustling affect practically every state in the northern area, as well as several regions in the southwest. Cattle rustling, for example, is common in eight of Oyo State's 33 local government districts (Eruwa town, Igangan, Igboora, Ayete, Shaki, Ibarapa, and Oyo town), as opposed to Lagos and Ekiti, which only impact the state's distant areas<sup>46</sup>. Several communities in the area between the two southern states of Ogun and Oyo have been under siege by cattle rustlers who openly terrorize herders and cow farmers, according to reports<sup>47</sup>. The Special Task Force (STF) established by Nigerian security forces in response to security concerns in Ogun acknowledged that 300 cows were rustled and 20 persons died in six months of strife between farmers and herders. The rustlers were usually dressed in military-style camouflaged clothes and had a lot of expertise herding cattle<sup>48,49</sup>.

Although, farmer/herder conflicts have been known to be noticeably rampant in the remote areas of the South-West States in Nigeria, for instance, Oyo and Ogun, the menace of cattle rustling and the farmers/herders conflicts has however, consistently been receiving growing attention in other parts of the country<sup>50,51</sup>. In Nigeria, apart from focusing on clashes between herders and communities predatory rustling has yet to receive adequate scholarly attention<sup>52</sup>. The limited attempts to address this issue, admirable as they are, suffer from being primarily historical in character or because

their insights and consequences are based mostly on experience in not just Northern Nigeria but also a few states in the country's south-west<sup>53,54</sup>. Nonetheless, as everywhere, the current wave of violence and the devastation that has resulted from the conflicts demands for attention. This claim is supported by the statement;

*“It’s instructive to know that the apparent inability of the federal government to regulate indiscriminate cattle grazing may be inextricably linked to the political economy of cattle rearing in Nigeria. First, President Muhammad Buhari is a Fulani man and the Grand patron of the Miyetti Allah cattle breeders’ Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), the umbrella body for cattle rearers in the country. The fact that the president himself is a major cattle breeder/dealer could be responsible for this seemingly inability to separate the responsibilities of his office as the president from ethnic and economic interests, cattle dealer and grand patron of MACBAN, thus, constraining him to call the rampaging Fulani herdsmen to order”<sup>55</sup>.*

#### **4.4.2 The Implication of Farmers-Armed Herders Conflict on Security in South-West Nigeria**

The activities of farmer and herder conflict in farming and pastoral activities in the area of the relationships and interactions in Ogun and Oyo States calls for immediate interventions. The parties involved in conflict contribute significantly to the economic and safety of lives of individual in carrying out their daily live activities<sup>56</sup>. The hazardous conflict between the farmers and herders caused serious damages and by extension destroys lives and properties where a lot of socio-economic activities were affected<sup>57</sup>. Thousands of Nigerians have been displaced into various internally displaced homes or camps. Women and girls were greatly affected, with extreme poverty and lack of access to numerous resources and their husbands were being killed

in several altercations between herders and farmers in the region<sup>58, 59</sup>. In September 2015, herdsmen above 20 were reported to have abducted a former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) and chieftain of Afenifere, Chief Samuel Oluyemisi Falae on his 77<sup>th</sup> birthday after invading his farm in llado village in Akure North Area of Ondo State<sup>60</sup>. The kidnappers, in less than two hours after the incident, made a demand of 100m ransom. Following this abduction, the Yoruba socio-cultural group made call for the expulsion of the herdsmen from south west if the peace enjoyed is being jeopardized in the south west.

Furthermore, almost on the same day, the herdsmen struck again by launching an attack in Oyo state on farmers in Lagun, Iyana Offa, Atagba, Laapata and the surrounding communities in Lagelu Local government area of Oyo State where valuables were reportedly stolen<sup>61</sup>. In Saki area, communities like Ago-Are, Oje - Owode areas of Oyo state were attacked. During all these attacks, lives and properties were lost and villagers highly displaced<sup>62</sup>. For the people in Ibarapa and Oke-Ogun area of Oyo State, it has been one day off and the other day on with crises. The death of Dr. Aborode, who was murdered near his farm around Apodun Village in Igangan, Ibarapa North West Local Council Development Area by suspected herdsmen, was painful as the entire community now sleeps with one eye closed. During interrogation by the researcher, it was discovered that the farmer, Dr. Aborode, only returned to Nigeria two years ago to establish cotton farm with billions of naira and also providing jobs. Dr. Aborode was said to have been attacked by four men who spoke Hausa language. Some months after this incident, a female farmer, Mrs. Muyibat Taiwo, who lives in Akoya, one of the notable villages in Ibarapa and also, a certified pharmacist

cum farmer, was also attacked by some people alleged to be herdsmen while she was working on her farm, even though, she escaped by whisker<sup>63</sup>. Another disheartening incident was the case of a family of three children who returned to the country around December, 2020 from overseas enroute Ilesha for Christmas celebrations. At Gbongan area, while travelling home, they were ambushed and taken to the bush by suspected armed herdsmen where the husband was killed, the daughter raped in the presence of the mother while millions of naira ransom was demanded from the extended family and friends of the kidnapped family.

#### **4.4.3 The Implications of Farmers-Armed Herdsmen Conflict on Socio-Economic Development of South West Nigeria**

No doubt, South-West states were blessed with abundant mineral resources and vast fertile arable lands with many trappings of natural aesthetics that beckons. The Olumo Rock in Abeokuta, Ogun State, the Olumirin waterfall of Erin-Ijesha in Osun State, twins' festival in Eruwa, Oyo state among others cannot be wished away. These historical sites in the south west which, hitherto, contributed immensely to the economic growth and development have sadly been threatened by the advent and encroachment of cattle herders<sup>64</sup>. These problems really started in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (1998) with the exponential growth in population and as a consequence, the competition for arable land for agriculture purposes began. This, however, forced the herders to take a notable look into the natural treasure of grazing land in the south, howbeit small. This brought land degradation, wanton destructions to the lands by the animals' hoofs trampling and destroying the soil structures thus, leaving the soil prone to erosions and evapotranspiration, in turn resulting in low yield of plants translating

economic woes for local farmers. The kidnapping and killing of people have also made many tourists to have second thought of visiting the historical sites in the region. Livestock husbandry, no doubt, has the potential to be a treasure that is progressively formed and used to lessen the dangers of income loss and food insecurity in West Africa. Livestock raising is the most important economic activity that relies on rural inhabitants for food and financial income. According to an OECD survey from 2007, cattle farming offer 34 percent of rural families with cash income, compared to 14 percent for plant-based goods <sup>65</sup>. It also serves as the primary safeguard for millions of poor people whose livelihoods are dependent on rain-fed crops. However, it is acknowledged that the balance between the requirements of a growing population and the conservation of natural resources is being disrupted.

The latest conflicts between nomadic herders and residents of south west states are not a one-time occurrence. The battles between herders and farmers in the southwest area highlight the Nigerian federation's triple dialectics of social integration, economic inequity, and political turmoil.

A survey of various agro-pastoralists in the southwest offers insight into the value of breeding revenue in rural lives. According to a family budget/consumption study in Ogun State, the livestock industry provides over 15% of the household budget, and its contribution to satisfying food demands is estimated to be 25%<sup>66</sup>. Livestock production, on the other hand, suffers from a lack of strategies to promote regional commerce and receives little governmental investment, in terms of processing and packaging facilities, all of West Africa's countries are lacking.

Demand for animal products in the South West has increased at the rate of population growth and taking into account rapid urbanization, with an estimated annual growth rate of 4%. This also hinted at a considerable demand for animal products as pools of consumption in the South West, particularly in Nigeria, which might increase by more than 250 percent by 2022<sup>67</sup>. As a result, interstate commerce growth potential exists. However, for the time being, these requirements are supplied by imports from the European Union (EU) and others. Between 1970 and 1999, the percentage of beef imported from outside Africa climbed from 3% to 19% in the Ivory Coast and from 4% to 17% in Togo. The emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), often known as "mad cow disease," had an influence on meat demand in the South West Region, resulting in reduced intra-state commerce<sup>68</sup>.

Dairy products, on the other hand, play a significant role in the economies of most South Western states. For example, in Ogun, 40% of the population lives in Oyo, 38% in Osun, and 20% in Ibadan. Imports of dairy products from outside the South West are rising, despite the fact that they are still insufficient to fulfill the demands of the population. Dairy products continue to add to Nigeria's food import costs in a variety of ways, denying the country's pastoralists the opportunity to engage in the pastoral sector and successfully combat poverty and food insecurity <sup>69</sup>.

Droughts in the Sahel in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as heightened tensions and conflicts in pastoral regions moving southward, all contribute to the tragedy of common resource conflict. As a result, pastoral mobility and communal resource tenure regimes were seen as major roadblocks to pastoralists' socio-economic growth in the south west states. For example, the personnel of the Ondo State Security Agency,

Amotekun Corps, detained over 100 cows for violating the state's anti-open grazing rules. They were apprehended along the congested Akure-Ilesa route.

Mr. Seye Oyeleye, the director general of the DAWN Commission, argued in an interview with the Guardian newspaper, on August 11th, 2019:

*We understood the fact that insecurity in Southwest Nigeria is not just a matter of one ethnic group. What we discovered was a lot of social problems. We can only solve the problem by looking at it socially, and finding socio-economic solutions to it. How do you create more jobs? How do you make the hopeless have hope? What are the social things that need to be put in place? How do you reduce the number of out-of-school children?*

The first thing I would say is that it gladdened my heart. The language we put out there matters a lot. Recently, the language has not been temperate. Yes, we are facing challenges, but you don't want to cut off your nose because you don't like your face. Some people may be attacking our farmers and stuff like that, but it does not mean the next thing we should do is pick up cudgels and cutlasses and guns and start fighting wars.

However, within the South West in Nigeria, a large section of the population depends on the livestock production and survival for their livelihood. According to a school of thought, more than 2 million people depend on livestock production in South West<sup>70</sup>. While more than 70 million people also depend on livestock related enterprise for their livelihood whereas, the nomadic population in Nigeria currently makes up an estimated 9.3 million, approximately 6.8 percent of its total estimated population of 140 million people and over 200 million in 2017 as stipulated by the World Bank group<sup>71</sup>.

However, the contemporary definition of 'nomadism' refers to any type of existence characterized by the absence of a fixed domicile. Thus, three categories of nomadic groups are identified. These include: hunter/food gatherers, itinerant fishermen, and pastoralists/herdsmen<sup>72</sup>.

In Nigeria, there are six nomadic groups: The Fulani with population of 5.3 million, the Shuwa with population of 1.0 million, the Buduman, with population of 35,001, the Kwayam with population of 20,000, the Badawi with population yet to be established, the Fishermen with population of 2.8 million. All these set of pastoralists have been found in the South West due to migration.

Pastoralists appear to be in higher numbers than any other group in Nigeria interested in animal husbandry. Their population consumed a lot of animal flesh, which is a great source of protein. As a result, they make a significant contribution to the Nigerian economy. The Fulani, according to some, are undeniably a big part of Nigeria's economy<sup>73</sup>. They are the most important cattle breeders and the principal source of meat in Nigeria, as well as the most commonly available and cheapest form of animal protein. The Fulani possess nearly 90% of the country's cattle population, accounting for one-third of agricultural GDP and 3.2 percent of total GDP<sup>74</sup>.

Clashes, therefore, between farmers and herdsmen over the use of natural resources are in recent years becoming a major source of bloodletting in some parts of the country. The relationships between nomads and sedentary farmers are often characterized by conflicts due to incompatible approach to resource protection<sup>75</sup>.

As revealed by the researcher, conflicts between pastoral groups and farming population not only in the south west parts of the country but also a frequent phenomenon, especially around grazing reserves <sup>76, 77</sup>. This, moreover, showed that states where these are prevalent are in areas like Oyo, Kwara, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Ogun, Benue, Plateau, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Sokoto, Taraba, Zamfara, and Anambra<sup>78</sup>.

It was observed by the scholar that the effects of the Herdsmen attack on Nigeria's national security and Socio-political underdevelopment are found in several parts of the country<sup>79</sup>. It consists of the humanitarian, socio-economic implications of the conflict. The attendant's security and livelihood implications threatening the collective subsistence and survival of the affected population cannot be over emphasized. For instance, while proportionally small, Nigeria's nomadic people represent a sizable population that needs access to adequate food, clean water, health care, clothes, or shelter and literary skills<sup>80</sup>.

However, the frequent attack on the farmers and citizens of Nigeria by the herdsmen is terribly alarming. Insecurity exerts a heavy toll on national economies. It is inevitable that the economic impact of the activities of herdsmen would be more felt in unsophisticated mono-cultural low-income economies than they would be felt in highly advanced, diversified industrial economies like the South West.

Therefore, the continued rise in the attack by herdsmen in the country, if not quickly checked, may result in greater investor apathy for the country and resulting in low

inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and would make institutional investors look for other stable economies to invest their money.

On the state of the country, when people feel insecure, their appetite to invest, to buy or rent from the product of investment reduces; and that is why all over the world, any country that radiates an environment of insecurity naturally repels investment initiatives from both the international community and its own local investors. Hence, the activities of herdsmen are a threat to the economic, political and social security of a nation and a major factor associated with underdevelopment; because it discourages both local and foreign investments, reduces the quality of life, destroys human and social capital, damages relationship between citizens and the states.

Attesting to this fact, it was asserted that the herdsmen were known to have wreaked havoc in certain communities in Nigeria, but now the rate at which they are committing these crimes in Southwest parts of the country have increased exponentially<sup>81</sup>. This endangers the nation's peace, security, and unity as a single geographical entity, as well as stifling progress and development in many aspects of people's life.

For instance, In January 2013, Fulani herdsmen attacked some villages in Igangan, killing 10 people and displacing over 5000 people<sup>82</sup>. In a fresh attack on some villages in Yelwa and Imeko-Afon, about 33 people were killed in early 2021. In 2016, the armed Fulani herders launched further attacks. According to other accounts, in February 2016, Fulani herders attacked Agatu Local Government Area in Benue State, driving over 7000 people from six villages<sup>83</sup>. Despite the herdsmen's numerous gunfire,

the people noticed no military or security presence. Over 200 people were murdered, and hundreds of homes were destroyed.

Most of the problems the nomads are facing have to do with socio-economic issues, grazing areas and grazing reserves in South West. This project will go a long way in building cordial relationships between the farmers and herdsmen as well as improve the economy of the herdsmen<sup>84</sup>. The plan of the government to settle the herdsmen and stop the perennial movement around the country is a welcome development. The nomads do not need 100 or 200 cows. 15 of the right type of cattle yielding meat and milk are enough for a nomad, according to Dr. Ibrahim Mohammed, National Secretary General, Gan Allah Fulani Development Association of Nigeria, (GAFDAN), with the need to improve livestock production. The fatal excursions of arms-wielding herders are clearly growing increasingly disturbing. They've left their imprint on almost every corner of the country. In their most recent outings, they have been particularly harsh on the communities<sup>85</sup>.

According to the latest Global Terrorism Index, Fulani ethnic militants are thought to have killed at least 1,229 people in Nigeria in 2014. Africa is classified as the world's third most terrified country. More than 7000 people died in Nigeria in 2014 as a result of Fulani militants and the terror group Boko Haram working together. While Boko Haram dominates the news when it comes to terrorism in Nigeria, little is known about the Fulani herdsmen's assaults and kidnappings. According to information published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, 1229 individuals were slain in 2014, up from 63 in 2013, and Benue State appears to be the most impacted in recent years, according to some researchers<sup>86</sup>.

In July 2015, suspected herdsmen assaulted Adeke, a town on the outskirts of the state capital, Makurdi. Six people were slain at Idele village in the Oju Local Government Area in December 2015. Three Fulani herders were slain and decapitated as a result of a retaliatory attack by local teenagers<sup>87</sup>.

Prior to this period, there had been reports of Fulani pastoralist raids in the country's southern states, particularly Ekiti and Ondo. Fulani herders have murdered 710 other Nigerians, according to the Igbo Youth Movement (IYM), omitting the 48 Agatu people in Benue. Evangelist Elliot Uko, the founder of the IYM and the leader of the South-East Democratic Coalition, issued a statement titled "Ten Months of Carnage" in which he stated: "Between June 2015 and April 2016, Fulani herdsmen killed over 710 Nigerians (excluding the Agatu incident) in 48 recorded incidents, the highest in recent years<sup>88</sup>." The 2016 southern Kaduna massacre, which some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have described as genocide against southern Kaduna indigenes, was another horrific incident. According to the Catholic Archdiocese of Kafanchan, 808 people have died as a result of the disturbance in southern Kaduna State<sup>89</sup>. According to the church, 53 communities have been targeted thus far, with 57 people injured. The assailants, according to Governor Nasir El Rufai, were foreign Fulani herdsmen seeking vengeance for previous attacks on them and their cattle. Mr Yakubu claimed that 808 people were murdered and 1422 residences, 16 churches, 19 stores, and one elementary school were damaged in four local government districts<sup>90</sup>.

However, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, which represents herders, claims that the situation in southern Kaduna has cost it 6000 cows<sup>91</sup>. According to the National Emergency Management Agency, 204 persons have died in the southern

Kaduna crisis<sup>92</sup>. Furthermore, conflicts between Fulani herders and civilians in southern Kaduna have been ongoing for months. The most recent incident is a Fulani herdsmen attack on farmers and other residents of Jos, Plateau State, on Saturday, June 24th, around 11 p.m. The occurrence was considered by the majority of Nigerians as extremely sad and terribly unfortunate. In 2018, the news agency Idegü reported that 86 people were slain in Plateau State after a weekend attack by gunmen suspected of being Fulani herders. Terna Tyopev, a police spokesman who confirmed the amount, claimed 8 people were hospitalized and roughly 50 homes were destroyed. However, because many families buried their dead before the police came, additional individuals may have died. According to the Nigerian Television Authority International's 9pm news on Tuesday, June 26th, over 200 persons were murdered in a confrontation between farmers and herders in Jos, Plateau State, on Saturday, June 24th, the biggest death toll in the history of warfare between the herders and farmers.

The consequences of the farmers/herders' conflict cannot be overstated. The acts of Fulani herdsmen/extremists against farmers have unquestionably resulted in a massive multi-dimensional setback in the region today. Conversely, the causes mentioned below are based on the above implications on the country's south-west area.

The following are some of these setbacks:

**(i) Wanton Destruction of lives and Properties:** When herders attack, tens, hundreds, or thousands of people are murdered, and property worth hundreds of millions of naira is destroyed. In this regard, it was said during a conversation with some of the victims of farmer/herder confrontations on 02 March 2021 that the crisis

had resulted in the destruction of lives and property worth thousands of millions of naira, as well as the irreversible loss of human lives. People are murdered or wounded during pastoral assaults. Because of their handicap, those who have been wounded may no longer be able to perform what they could previously do. And they may turn to begging as a source of income, resulting in an increase in the number of beggars on the streets of our cities. In an oral interview with Dr. Seyi Olawiyo, a farmer on the Apete-Akufo Road in Ibadan, Oyo State, he stated that the crises inevitably reduce agricultural communities' economic viability, food supply deficits, and food insecurity in both rural and urban regions. Even worse is the employment of offensive weapons during the combat, which result in serious wounds and other abnormalities.

**(ii) Discouragement of Agro - allied investors in the rural communities:** The incessant spates of attacks by the armed herdsmen/extremists scare away agro-allied merchants who are willing to invest their resources in agricultural sector. Perhaps, the South-West region of the country possess fertile arable large expanse of land suitable for agro-allied business. The region covers a landmass of 16,409sqkm, and it shares an international boundary with the Republic of Benin to the west and interstate boundaries with Oyo State to the North, Lagos and the Atlantic to the south and Ondo state to the east. The weather conditions vary between two distinct seasons in Nigeria; the rainy season (March – November) and dry season (November – February) with the harmattan dust of the dry season, the cold dry winds from the northern deserts often blow around this time.

**(iii) Creation of Artificial Scarcity:** From what we know, anytime farmers are attacked they will run away from their farmlands and find it difficult to return for fear

of being attack again. This sometimes lasts for a long time, thereby hindering sowing and harvesting. This undoubtedly creates an artificial scarcity of goods and food insecurity. In line with this, Dr. Hakeem Tijani (zoom interview on 10 March 2021) expressed that the herders frequent attacks on the farmers have led to the creation of an artificial scarcity of goods and services and, consequently, to inflation and devaluation of the naira. To buttress her point further, she cited the Shasha Market attack in Oyo State that happened on 18 February, 2021, in which over 20 people were reportedly killed, houses burnt and looting of goods occurred. Out of fear, the traders refused to come back to the market for a long time. This created a man-made scarcity, which ordinarily would have been avoided if the Fulani attack on the marketers and inhabitants had not happened. Consequent upon this, revenue for further cropping from sales expected from the market will also be affected negatively.

**(iv) Restriction of Movement:** People's movements are usually limited when there are assaults. The government may decide to impose curfew hours or a dawn-to-dusk curfew in particular instances. This is a violation of the citizen's constitutional right to free movement. Dr. Lawal and Dr. Nathaniel Danjibo of the institute of peace and conflict at the University of Ibadan, in a personal communication / interview on April 5, 2021, emphasized the fact that whenever any aggrieved group attacks citizens, whether it is a religious sect or an armed herdsmen group, the government usually declares a state of emergency or imposes a curfew. People's movements are constrained as a result of this, as are the economic and socio-political interactions of every other person in the community.

**(v) Exposure of the Weaknesses of the Security Agencies of the region:** Where there is a violent attack by the armed herdsmen/extremists, it makes for concomitant response as required. As a result, the local authority is rendered weakened in the enforcement of the agreement reached between the feuding groups. In the views of Nigerian reports, thieves reportedly stole nearly 60,000 cattle in recent years. Many herdsmen have to arm themselves with weapons to protect their cattle and homes to ensure security. Government, however, prioritized the conflict as threats to national security. Lending credence to this viewpoint, the deputy commissioner of police in charge of Joint Security Intervention Squad (JSIS Operations), Ogun State DCP Ahmed Abdullahi said, during inter-personal interaction with the researcher, that government is truly distracted in times of crisis of this sort. Hence, the lingering spates of attack persist as a result of the weakness of the security sector managers in the region.

**(vi) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):** Houses are burned down and people are made homeless whenever there is a severe attack on the citizens. As a result, some of those who are not well-off are unable to locate a home and are thus housed in public facilities as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Professor Aremu Oyesoji stated in a Zoom interview that conflict causes refugees and significant numbers of people are displaced, referred to as IDPs. People have been driven from their homes as a result of arson attacks by armed herders, and they have taken up residence in public facilities.

**(vii) Extra financial burden on the government:** In the event of a major assault, the government is expected to offer relief goods such as food, clothing, medications, and potentially palliative measures, to name a few. This viewpoint was supported by

the Chairman, Ogun State Peace Committee on Herder-Farmer Conflicts, in an inter-personal email on February 28, 2021, when he joked that the government spends a lot of money caring for war casualties, which sometimes necessitates a supplemental budget. Several individuals were murdered and approximately 200 people were displaced in February 2021 in Oyo State as a consequence of a fight between armed herders and farmers. At least 50 people were critically injured<sup>92</sup>. Most recently, more than 62 Nigerians were massacred by suspected Fulani herdsmen in Oyo at shasha market in a fracas that ensued over superiority between seriki shasha and oba yoruba in Ojo area of Ibadan this year. Also, before this time, there were reported attacks by the Fulani pastoralists in the southern states of the country, including Oyo, Osun and Ogun States without the federal government addressing the conflict.

#### **4.4.4 Exploring the Strategies Adopted by the South-West States Governments to Contain the Conflicts in South-West Nigeria.**

Although, the importance of security cannot be over-emphasized as it is the most fundamental of the socio-contractual responsibilities of the State to its citizens which directly or indirectly affects its landscape <sup>93</sup>. Thus, security is the protection or defense of people against all kinds of victimization from physical attack, economic want, poverty, illiteracy, disease/ill-health, political exclusion, social exploitation and criminality<sup>94</sup>. According to some respondents during the interrogations while studying the constraints to cassava production in Ogun State it was found that over 90% of the farmers interviewed indicated that their greatest production problem is the destruction of their farms by cattle<sup>95</sup>. On their own part, herdsmen have also identified conflicts arising from land use as the “most important” problem they face in their occupation<sup>96</sup>.

Thus, there is a compelling need to identify the causes of, as well as explore the strategies to resolve the farmers - herdsman conflicts in Nigeria in general and the southwest states in particular. Ogun State Governor, Mr. Dapo Abiodun, recently handed over patrol vehicles to the Joint Security Intervention Squad (JSIS) to secure lives and property in Yewa (Ogun West Senatorial District) axis of the State against further attacks by suspected killer Herdsmen in Yewa Ketu area. This is particularly true if any reasonable success is to be achieved in mainstreaming overarching strategies to curtail the constantly evolving threats posed by resource conflict between agricultural crop growers and the pastoralists in Nigeria. However, measures being taken to mitigate these seemingly intractable conflicts by governments at various levels over the years in the South West Nigeria include;

**(i) Grazing Reserves Policies and the Crises of Pastoralism in Nigeria**

With 417 grazing reserves, pastoralism and livestock production still form a considerable subsector in Nigeria<sup>97</sup>. According to FAO, it accounts for 40% of the global value of agricultural output, providing partial source of income and food security to 70% of the world's poor population. While farmer-herdsmen reconciliatory committees in most conflict-prone states have been set up to control resource-based conflicts among farmers and pastoralists<sup>98</sup>.

The Nigerian government also continues to carve out new stock routes for herdsman, not only in the North-Central states but also in other parts of the country. Despite the lack of an integrated approach in Nigeria that generates synergy between crop and livestock production, policymakers understand the importance of livestock in achieving food security and addressing the nutritional demands of the people. Quoting

a senior agriculture ministry official, as reported by Integrated Regional Information Network, (IRIN), the government is also demarcating a 1,400km livestock route from Sokoto State in the northwest, to Oyo State in the southwest and another 2,000km route from Adamawa State in the northeast to Calabar in the delta region. This is in addition to demarcating 175,000 hectares of grazing land, building veterinary service centers, and constructing settlements for nomads to use en route, at a cost of US\$247 million<sup>99</sup>. With shared violent perception of the armed Fulani Extremists by the non-pastoralists groups as evident by its hitherto rank in the Global Terrorism Index and its perverted response to economic interests, social and cultural identity. The threat posed to pastoralism by the nature of grazing reserve policy in Nigeria has hitherto been loosely investigated<sup>100</sup>.

However, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture's National Livestock Production Project, which was formed in 1976, has a broad responsibility that includes identifying and addressing livestock production difficulties<sup>101</sup>.

Although, it is established that the common source of pressure and anxiety on pastoralists groups generic to Nigeria's context include population pressure from both external encroachers and internal demographic growth; insecure tenure and the weakening or incomplete breakdown of customary governance institutions; loss access to key resources; sedentarisation policies and land degradation lead to conflicts between pastoralists groups as well as crop farmers<sup>102</sup>. These have helped to identify the threats to pastoralism in Nigeria and the cycle of violent conflicts pitched by the nomadic pastoralists. Consequently, these issues have occupied the focus of

government efforts to find solutions to the challenges of the pastoralists for promoting the growth of the livestock subsector in Nigeria's Agricultural sector<sup>103</sup>.

(ii) In 1976, the government of Nigeria passed the grazing law to encourage the settlement of herdsmen for several reasons. These include lack of land rights, facilitation of the adoption of a modernized approach to cattle rearing and institutionalization of a ranching system. However, the deliberate entrenchment of the legal grazing rights and titles to land flowed from the recognition of increasing pressure on traditional grazing lands by farmers seeking arable plots and by government agricultural projects. In the grazing law, 121, 762-hectare plots of land was marked at Rumar Kukar – Jingali in Kaduna State, with investment made in demarcation, fire protection, and water development<sup>104</sup>.

There had been no remarkable progress in the establishment of grazing reserves until the establishment of the National Livestock Development Project (NLDP). This also formed the target of the Second National Development Plan (1970 - 1980) in Nigeria. The establishment of grazing reserves with a total of 115,000 hectares of land for cattle clearly designated and demarcated through the Livestock Department in the Federal Ministry of Agriculture<sup>105</sup>.

With the establishment of grazing reserves policy in most Nigerian domain for the settlement of herds which is still uncommon in other parts of the country is a *sin qua non* for resolving farmer-herder conflict. For instance, the Kachia grazing reserve established by Kaduna state government is one of the measures highlighted. Others include Rumar-Kukar-Jangali grazing reserve which occupies 121, 762 hectares of land, Gujba (Borno State), Udobo (Bauchi State) and Garkada and Sorau in Adamawa

State with a total 1, 850 families were expected to be settled. The old Gongola State comprises of Adamawa and Taraba States, proposed 72 grazing reserves and 52 grazing reserves respectively. The government of Bauchi similarly proposed the establishment of 105 grazing reserves. Also, Oyo states recently established grazing reserves linking herders to markets with Oyo and Ogun as the only two grazing reserves in South-West Nigeria<sup>106</sup>. The Director in the department of animal husbandry services, federal ministry of agriculture and rural development, Mrs. Winnie Tai-Solarin, argued, that Nigeria has 415 grazing reserves in twenty-one states, in which only one hundred and forty-one are gazetted<sup>107</sup>.

Thus, the establishment of grazing reserves has not been accompanied by the establishment of a clear-cut production unit. In contrast, the grazing reserves in other countries like Kenya, Tanzania, and Burkina-Faso have clearly defined production units within grazing reserves in form of cooperative among groups of pastoralists or individual leasing, such that herders in established ranches have access to long term loan. Also, the grazing reserves established by these states have not been demarcated enough to permit introduction of rotational or block grazing, bush control and control of overgrazing around water points, thereby threatening ecological balance<sup>108</sup>. The non- guarantee of financial commitment by the government for the provision of necessary infrastructure dams, dips, veterinary clinics and drugs; outlawing setting reserves on fire; adequate supply of supplementary feeds; eradication of tse tse fly; adequate security theft and construction of market outlets and accessible road network are parts of the efforts outlined to meet the conditions of a successful grazing reserves policy in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, the Development Agenda for Western Nigeria (DAWN) Commission has Homeland Affairs and Security Matters as one of its key development pillars. The Commission, as a technocratic institution set up to facilitate corporation and collaboration among the six Southwest States and between governments and other governance stakeholders operating in the Region to address and proffer practical solutions to the issues that could pose a threat to the security of lives and properties of citizens.

In June 2019, the Governors of the six States of South West Nigeria: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo met in Abuja to discuss the central issues of development and incidents of insecurity in the Region. Consequently, the Governors, after the meeting of June 7, 2019 the pivotal issues of insecurity in the Region were extensively discussed. Collectively, the Governors expressed their commitment to protect and safeguard lives and property of people living in the Region. At the end of the meeting, the Governors mandated the Development Agenda for Western Nigeria (DAWN) Commission to convene a stakeholders' summit on security<sup>109</sup>.

In 2019, Western Nigeria witnessed an upsurge in crimes and criminality that was perpetuated by some criminal elements within and outside the Region who posed a threat to the tranquility and serenity of the Region and attempted to disrupt and change the hospitable nature of the people. The crime surge became rampant and it manifested in different dimensions such as banditry, kidnapping, robbery, assassinations and farmers-herdsmen clashes.

The Stakeholders' Security Summit was hosted at the political headquarters of the Yoruba-Ibadan between June 25 - 27, 2019, to discuss security matters and proffer immediate, medium- and long-term actionable solutions to identified challenges.

All Governors present reiterated their solidarity towards security at the State and Regional level and specifically emphasized their support for the creation of State and Local Police. Various Security Agencies and Representatives of Groups gave their speeches and remarks about the state of security in the South West Region. The summit brought about the decision to establish a security outfit code named "Amotekun". It's a paramilitary security group in the southwest region of the country. This is part of the responses to incessant insecurity of lives and properties of the inhabitants in the region which have been subjected to security threats arising from the armed herdsmen and farmer's drags.



Figure 4.5: Amotekun Logo/ Insignia

Source: DAWN Commission 2019

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

The Summit continued with a series of technical sessions entrusted with other mandate to develop strategies geared towards improving security of lives and properties in the South West region with the Associate Professor, Tunde Oseni of Lead City University, Ibadan, Oyo State, as one of the resource persons. The Group identified issues such as;

**(i) Incompatibility of Value System:** When parties in social interaction have different and incompatible values and idea. For instance, Nigeria hosts about 250 ethnic groups. Within West Africa Sub-region, a large section of the population depends on the production of livestock for their livelihood and survival in which 12 million people depend on livestock related enterprise for their livelihood. According to the National Bureau of Statistics in 2019, the population of the Southwest region of Nigeria is estimated at 32.5 million people. The region's population is predominantly members of the Yoruba ethnic group, who make up approximately 21% of the national population, which are concentrated in this area. How then can sharing of values and ideas not result into rivalries/disagreement? The relation between farmers and nomads by incompatible approaches to resource protection. The attacks by the armed herdsmen have not only been observed in North Central and South East alone. For instance, in March 2016, about 500 persons were killed by the rampaging herdsmen following a siege on Ibarapa North, East and Central area of Oyo State. The affected communities include: Igangan in Ibarapa North, Lanlate in Ibarapa East and Igboora in Ibarapa Central. Farmers in these areas and their surrounding council areas of Oyo State alleged that a group of armed herdsmen attacked their communities, carting away valuables. In 2018, at least 9 people were killed in the herdsmen and farmers violence, the deceased include senior police officer in 2019<sup>110</sup>. At least, 3million maize farm

was lost in Akoya community in Ibarapa North Local government area of Oyo State over herdsmen cattle graze invasion on eight hectares of land in 2018. Narrating his ordeal during interrogation by the researcher, Olaitan, the commercial farm owner lamented that;

*I am looking forward to police and judiciary to adjudicate over the loss of millions of naira lost to herdsmen invasion, noting the need for herders to be willing to lease, purchase or rent land to ranch their cattle without incurring losses for other farmers as it's done in several parts of the world.*

According to Adisa, leader of Akoya community in Oyo State, in one of the interrogations, noted as transcribed, that;

*The report of farmland invasion had assumed an alarming dimension and has threatened the peaceful coexistence between herders and community dwellers. The herdsmen have continued to wreak havoc on farmland in this area, more worrisome was the seeming failure of security agents and traditional rulers to effectively call the herdsmen to order, we have met with them several times not to continue to graze on our farmlands but they remain hesitant. We have informed leaders around to caution them but this has not yielded results. We report to the police but they only beg us to remain calm. The Police seem to be conniving with the herdsmen leaders. What we basically want is that the herdsmen should stop grazing on our farmlands. It's the herds of cattle that meet the farmland not farmland meeting the herds of cattle*

This allegation of confinement of the herdsmen leader was later debunked as false, spurious and baseless by the Nigerian Police Force through its former Public Relations Officer in Oyo State, S.P. Ajisebutu during interview by the researcher, he stressed further that the police usually admonished both parties to embrace alternative dispute resolution to prevent a resort to violence while offenders are charged to court when amicable settlement could not be reached. According to him, no fewer than six cases

involving farmer herdsmen involving farmer and herdsmen in the area have been charged to court while others are still under investigation<sup>111, 112</sup>.

However, reacting to the herdsmen incursion, a member of the All-Farmers Association and also the Secretary of Ibarapa farmers association, Mr. Taiwo Adeagbo in his argument, stated that;

*“The situation had assumed grave dimension with reports of herdsmen destruction of farmlands totaling about 100 acres. He further illustrated the extent of fear that has gripped farmers in Igangan, who are scared to go to their farms for fear of attack from herdsmen. According to him, these occurrences began in 2013 where the destruction of farmland ranging 20 to 30 acres. I have just been notified those cows are on farmland grazing”<sup>113</sup>*

When we questioned the Seriki Fulani on why the cattle continued to graze over farmlands, his response was that;

*The occurrences of cattle grazing over farmlands were not new and that as the numbers of herdsmen were growing, so as cattle growing farmers increasing. Hence, farmers have to be patient*

**(ii) Border Insecurities:** The control over scarce resources is essential to survival.

The struggle by different parties to appropriate perceived scarce resources to self in order to guarantee self/group instigates the group against the state<sup>114</sup>. For instance, as a result of increasing desertification in Nigeria’s North most fringes, many pastoral people/cattle breeders have started moving southward in search of grazing land, accounting to some extent for the conflict between farming communities in the south and pastoralist moving their herds down south in search of grazing land<sup>115</sup>.

**Table 4.3:** Proposed South-West States' Response to Security Threats

S/ N	State	Identified Threats	Responses
1.	Ekiti State	Proliferation of Arms Kidnapping Cultism Armed robbery	<p>(i) Democratize Security operations to enhance security intelligence.</p> <p>(ii) Increase budgetary allocations to security agencies.</p> <p>(iii) Support and promote inter-agency collaboration among security and intelligence agencies at all levels of the Federation.</p> <p>(iv) Advocate for structural reforms such as creation of State/Local Police.</p> <p>(v) Facilitate sustainable reform of the criminal justice system.</p> <p>(vi) Include informal security agencies into the security apparatus of the State.</p> <p>(vii) Invest in technology to tackle rising crime rate.</p> <p>(viii) Replicate Lagos State Security Trust Fund Model in order to adequately finance security initiatives in the State, as Ekiti State currently is doing.</p> <p>(ix) Create a Joint Task Force comprising of different security agencies.</p> <p>(x) Involve the public in the gathering and processing of intelligence.</p>

2. Lagos State
- (i) Review the Security Trust Fund, which is currently being done in the State.
  - (ii) Continue to Strengthen the State's Criminal Justice System.
  - (iii) Advocate for structural reforms such as creation of local police.
3. Ogun State
- Drug abuse (i) Launch a portal where unemployed youths can be registered and engaged in skills acquisition and certification.
  - Kidnapping (ii) Invest in local content law
  - Armed robbery (iii) Leverage agriculture as a means of employing youths, by providing about 10,000 hectares to curtail idleness.
  - Proliferation of arms (iv) Provide a window for surrender of weapons and vices, after which the law catches up with culprits.
  - Porous Borders
4. Ondo State
- Armed robbery (i) Need for a proper coordination of the activities of all formal and informal security groups in the State.
  - Drug abuse, (ii) Free flow of information regarding crime from members of the public as encouraged by the State.
  - Cultism, (iii) Need for a toll-free line for crime reporting in the State.
  - Kidnapping, (iv) Need for Joint Border Patrols with neighboring States
  - Porous borders, (v) Promote inter-agency cooperation and collaboration.
  - Thuggery, (vi) Ensure gaps in legislation are filled in order to sanction deviance promptly, firmly and comprehensively.
  - Farmers/herders clashes (vii) There must be ownership of the State's security programmes/initiatives/measures by the people to ensure the

effective implementation of such programmes.

5. Osun Killings, State Kidnapping, Rape Banditry, Insurgency, Weak Local Security Architecture Ill - Equipped Security Agencies, Lack of Collaboration among security agencies.
- (i) Organized a State-wide security stakeholders' meeting. This was accompanied with a stakeholders' meeting in the mining area in Ife-Ilesa zone to ensure a cordial relationship between the people and the mining vendors.
- (ii) Created a committee on peaceful coexistence between Fulani/Bororo and crop farmers to ensure peace among the residents and herdsmen.
- (iii) Border security—the aforementioned committee is also responsible for engaging the Government and communities in all the States that share boundaries with Osun (Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Ekiti and Kwara) to prevent the influx of criminals into the State.
- (iv) Information garnered through these meetings and strategies are currently being used to develop strategic and long-lasting solutions to insecurity in the State.
- (v) Collaborating with local vigilante groups and hunters to properly police communities as a complement to the national security architecture for optimum results.
- (vi) Community leaders must be involved in the peace building and conflict resolution processes through sensitization and awareness.
- (vii) Establish Joint Security Patrol Teams, consisting of the Police, the Army and other security agencies to patrol the State

especially the highways and flashpoints where criminals attack citizen.

(viii) The Police should be adequately funded and provided with enough personnel and other logistic support for effectiveness.

(ix) Security Chiefs should be encouraged to share information amongst them.

(x) Invest heavily in technology to tackle crime

(xi) Sensitize citizens to desist from sharing unverified and unfounded messages which drive fear into the people and exacerbate the situation.

- |    |           |  |  |
|----|-----------|--|--|
| 6. | Oyo State | Kidnapping<br>Farmers<br>Herders'<br>Clashes | (i) Strengthen community policing and neighborhood watch - capacity. |
|----|-----------|--|--|

---

Source: Development Agenda for Western Nigeria: DAWN Commission, 2019.

**Table 4.4:** Proposed States and Paramilitary Responses to Security Threats in South West Nigeria

S/N	Agency	Identified Threats	Identified Responses
1.	Nigerian Police Force (South-West Political Zone)	<p>Kidnapping, Robbery, Burglary, Ritual Killings, Proliferation of arms and ammunition</p> <p>Car Theft, Inadequate resources provided to carryout operations effectively, Lack of adequate Strategic Information.</p> <p>Porous Boundaries</p>	<p>(i) Deployment of additional Police Mobile Force (PMF) Personnel, Intelligence Response Team, Vehicles and other logistic support to Zone XI Osogbo to deal with recent security challenges in some part Ondo, Osun, and Oyo States.</p> <p>(ii) Operation Puff Adder' has been launched by the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Mohammed Adamu, to complement existing security apparatus and across the Country.</p> <p>(iii) Plans are underway to re-organize and re-launch the safer Highway and Safer City Models of</p>

---

Policing which will entail the acquisition of new fleet of vehicles that will be deployed to dominate the public space as well as the emplacement of CCTV and other cutting-edge technologies for city surveillance.

(iv) The current attempts at adopting and implementing the concept of Community Policing also represents part of enduring strategies aimed at changing the policing narratives of the country.

(v) In Zone XI, the Security Stakeholders' Forum was inaugurated on the 25th of April, 2019, which included individuals, associations and corporate organizations in order to contribute meaningfully to the security of the zone.

---

(vi) Marine Police in Igbokoda in Ilaje

Local Government Area of Ondo State need logical and infrastructural support in order to apprehend criminals who commit crimes on the hinterland and plant house the water fronts as escape routes. (12 speed boats including gunboats are needed for effective anti-piracy, enforcement of navigational laws, rescue/recovery mission and other operations.) (Including well equipped sophisticated helicopters to enhance aerial surveillance).

(vii) Increase the number of vehicles and speed motor bikes to curtail the excesses of criminal elements.

(viii) Incorporating Science Technology Innovation (STI) with appropriate software

---

applications to complement operational efforts in the security space, especially in addressing heinous crimes such as kidnapping and armed robbery.

(ix) The Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) should be strengthened, funded, and integrated into the security architecture of the States in the Region.

2 Vigilante Group ill-equipped security of Nigeria agency, Insufficient (VGN) Osun Funds, State Command Lack of Integration into the States' Security Apparatus

(i) Provision of mobility facilities such as Patrol Vans, Patrol Motorcycles for each LGA; and Walkie Talkies.

(ii) Integration of VGN Osun State Command Budget into the State's Annual Budget.

(iii) Acquisition of part of VGN personnel in the Governor, Deputy and First Lady Convoy.

(iv) Recognition and integration of the organization as part of South

3. Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) Ekiti State Command  
 Kidnappings, Ritual Killings, Robbery  
 Fraudulent Activities,  
 Lack of Recognition and  
 Integration into the States' Security Apparatus  
 Inadequate resources provided to carryout operations effectively.

West Security Council.

(v) Posting and acceptance to all Local Government Councils and Area Office.

(i) VGN complements the efforts of other security agencies by providing local intelligence from all the nooks and crannies of the State.

(ii) As a community-based security agency, they are perfectly positioned to survey bushes and forests where criminal elements might be hiding.

(iii) Proactive measures by the VGN Ekiti State Command.

(iv) Provision of patrol vehicles to be strategically placed at all hotspots that connect the States in the Region.

4	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC)	Inter-Agency Rivalry Lack of collective training and planning by all security agencies in the State. Appointment of inappropriate officers, Inadequate resources provided to carryout operations effectively. Dysfunctional radio communication systems for command and control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Foster greater collaboration among security agencies among states.</li> <li>(ii) Facilitate joint training among security agencies in the State.</li> <li>(iii) Deployment of joint intelligence apparatus in motor parks and other hotspots for information gathering and proactive security.</li> <li>(iv) Provision of more CCTV cameras, more security logistics and more men in volatile areas.</li> <li>(v) Sensitization by Village Heads, Monarchs to their subjects as part of internal security.</li> <li>(vi) Provision of functional radio communication systems.</li> </ul>
---	--	---	---

5. Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) South-West Zone Fulani Herdsmen/Farmers Clashes, Armed Robbery Fraudulent Activities, Ritual Killings Kidnapping, Inadequate resources provided to carryout operations effectively
- (i) Integrate and Recognize the VGN into States' Security Architecture.
- (ii) Support the VGN with the resources to carry out its responsibilities respectively (finances, operational vehicles and motorbikes.
- (iii)The need to foster Inter-Agency Collaboration.
6. Vigilante Group of Nigeria (Lagos State) Inadequate resources provided to carryout operations effectively, Collapse of Internal Security Architecture, Under Policing of the Population.
- (i) Institutionalize Community Police

---

Source: DAWN Commission, 2019

### **(iii) Legal Instrument**

The legislative engagement and the challenge of pastoralism in Nigeria have a long history. The legislative instrument is the result of a long-running attempt to confront sedentary transhumant pastoralists and their production practices. In 1942, as part of the "Fulani Settlement Scheme," pastoralist communities in Plateau State were assigned plots and encouraged to adopt mixed farming<sup>115</sup>. The idea proved to be expensive, and tin mining activities swiftly took control.

Late colonial authorities constructed a system of transhumance corridors (burti/burtali), in which Fulani chiefs and local community authority agreed on pre-defined stock routes linking established grazing grounds (hurmi) with one another under the auspices of local government. To handle any problems originating from agricultural damage or roaming livestock, local committees were formed. The system of stock routes began to fall apart in the 1970s, when farmers began to claim ownership of the land passed by the routes and cultivate the well-manure plots. Cattle following stock trails invariably wandered into newly established farms, resulting in friction and bloodshed.

In addition, in 1954, a focus was made on pastoralist settlement in order to reduce potential for farmer-herder conflict. In 1965, the Grazing Reserve Act gave the Ministry of Animal and Forest Resources the authority to acquire, maintain, control, and manage grazing resources<sup>116</sup>. The Act also permitted for the creation of stock roads that connected the Grazing Reserves. The notion of a grazing reserve became an element of the national livestock development strategy, and it was represented in a number of national development plans (1970-1985). According to the 1988 National

Agricultural Policy, at least 10% of Nigeria's land area should be lawfully purchased for lease to herders. The federal and state governments committed more than \$50 million in the creation of Grazing Reserves between 1970 and 1980. While local states were in charge of grazing field selection and acquisition, the National Livestock Development Department was in charge of infrastructure development and reserve management<sup>117</sup>. The World Bank and USAID, among other major foreign development partners, provided financial support for the equipment and operation of selected reserves. Unfortunately, this well-intentioned approach quickly ran into problems. Nigeria had built 2.3 million hectares of grazing reserves by 1980, which was only about 10% of the anticipated amount. The Federal Land Use Act of 1978 imposed high levels of land compensation, which deterred many states from creating reserves. Nigeria now has 415 grazing reserves, although about a third of them are in operation, with the rest either not completely formed or encroached upon by cropland, urban development projects, or mining. Overcrowding, poor infrastructure, and mismanagement plague the functional Grazing Reserves<sup>118</sup>.

The Pastoralist Development Programme (PDP) of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) rehabilitates Grazing Reserves and stock routes while also increasing the availability of veterinary services (1997–2000)<sup>119</sup>. A National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill was proposed to parliament in 2016 by the "Special Committee on Strategic Action Plan for the Development of Grazing Reserves and Stock Routes Nationwide," which was tasked with offering ideas to alleviate farmer-herder disputes.

However, the following are some of the substantive laws that have been enacted in Nigeria to address farmer/herder conflicts.

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

**Table 4.5:** Legislative Laws and Policies of Grazing Reserves in Nigeria.

<b>Pastoralism Legislations (Federal)</b>	<b>State Legislations</b>	<b>Federal Projects</b>	<b>Law</b>	<b>Federal Policies</b>
Hides and Skin Act, Law No. 14 of 1942;	Laws establishing grazing reserves in several northern States (Kaduna, Katsina, Plateau State, 1960s);	National Reserve (Establishment) Bill, 2016 (rejected by Parliament).	Grazing	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, The Agriculture Promotion Policy (2016 – 2020). Building on the Successes of the ATA, Closing Key Gaps. Policy and Strategy Document. Abuja, 2016.
Grazing Reserve Law N.N (Northern Nigeria), Law No. 4 of 1965;	Taraba State, Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Bill, 2017;			
Land Use Act, Law No. 6 of 1978;	Benue State, Open Grazing Prohibition Law, 2017			
Animal Diseases Control Decree, No. 10 of 1988;	Oyo State, anti-open rearing and Grazing of livestock and provide for the regulation of activities of herdsmen and connected purposes, 2019			
Nomadic Education Act, Law No. 41 of 1989.	Ogun State;			

Osun State;

---

Source: Ecowas & Iom (2017)

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

Nomadic cattle rearing system has generated considerable attention in Nigeria. Therefore, there have been several legislative efforts geared towards addressing the challenge. Although as opined by some scholars, more deadly farmer/herder conflicts in south west Nigeria is relatively recent<sup>120</sup>. This area shows a mixed pattern of conflict and cooperation. While a range of caretaking arrangements have developed in some south west axis of the country, herders are employed to rear the animals of local farmers either separately or along with their own herds<sup>121, 122</sup>. Pastoralists usually take great care to avoid damages to farmers' fields during their movements. While conflicts over grazing areas and crop damage are usually resolved peacefully by the local authorities, there is a risk of reprisal attacks against the Fulani as a response to violence against southern migrants in the northern regions<sup>123, 124</sup>.

For instance, Oyo State house of assembly approved anti open rearing and grazing of livestock in 2019 while Ekiti state government passed into law Anti grazing bill in 2016 to resolve various conflicts between herdsmen and farmers in the state unlike other states in the region<sup>125</sup>. For instance, Osun state, until recently settled for adoption of traditional methods of dispute resolution instead of enactment of extant laws to regulate the conflicts<sup>126</sup>. However, in September, the governor of Ondo State, Arakunrin Rotimi Akeredolu, stated that as parts of the resolution arrived at and termed 'Asaba Declaration' Delta State, issued on 11 May 2021 by 17 Southern Governors Forum in Nigeria, comprising South-West, South-South and South-East, "he is signing into law Ondo State anti-open grazing bill into law and that no particular tribe or ethnic group is the target"<sup>127</sup>. For instance, according to the same report, anti-land grabbing law enacted by Ogun State house of assembly around September 2021,

to regulate animal grazing and establishment of cattle ranching has taken care of the conflicts; it will only strengthen its conflict resolution committee<sup>128</sup>.

#### **4.4.5 Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Containment Strategies of Farmers-Armed Herdsmen Crises in Nigeria.**

The issue of insecurity in the country in general and the south west in particular as fallouts from the parasitic relationships of the farmer-herder activities, recently propelled the south west governors to meet to deliberate on the effectiveness of the various strategies put in place to address the rising conflicts<sup>129,130</sup>. According to many security theorists, the country has never experienced this level of insecurity since Nigeria gained independence in 1960<sup>131</sup>. The meeting, among others, deliberates on the effectiveness or otherwise of the containment strategies towards addressing the menace of herdsmen in South West Nigeria. These include:

(i) The Nigerian Police Force launched in 2014 a specialized Task Force on Cattle Rustling and Associated Crime, attempted to coordinate action between the police, the military, and other state security services<sup>132</sup>. For instance, while state like Niger state implemented a more fruitful initiative (Operation Sharan Daji) which brought together “the military, police, security service, Civil Defense corps, and local vigilante groups” to directly confront the rustlers in the forest<sup>133</sup>. The initiative showed promising results and also inspired the Katsina state to adopt a similar approach, leading to the recovery of thousands of cattle<sup>134</sup>. The introduction of similar initiative in South-West recorded failure as in other regions because the police are underfunded with mundane training facilities to match modern policing architecture. More so, the police force is known to

be partisan in her approach in taking sides. The case of the notorious Fulani kidnapper, Iskili Wakili at Ayete in Igangan who was arrested by the OPC and other paramilitary groups forces for terrorizing farmers and other citizens of the region<sup>135</sup>. The police in Igboora detained three members of the Odua People's Congress after they arrested Iskili. This is a clear case of miscarriage of justice and abuse of power as the police DPO in Igboora, Ajayi Mark, said that he got a signal from the Commissioner of police through Iyaganku to detain them at Iyaganku in Ibadan. This is a clear manifestation of the failure of police to help stamp out the activities of criminal herders and criminality in the society<sup>136</sup>.

(ii) The Nigerian Civil Defense corps also launched Agro Rangers Programme designed to protect farmers and their investments from attacks by criminals. The Agro Rangers unit, an initiative of the former minister of agriculture and rural development under the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) to forestall attacks on farms and boost farmers' confidence to work on their farm. This was necessitated by a recommendation of the committee headed by the director of joint services in the ministry (Mr Noah Auta) which was inaugurated in 2016 on operational modalities for guard deployed to protect farms and ranches<sup>137</sup>. However, the reported shortcomings of the initiative leave much to be desired. There have been several incidences of accidental discharges where several innocent people have been either killed or maimed as the outfit has been used on several occasions to settle personal scores by notable individuals in the community which negates its existence. In the response of a security expert, Mr. Jackson Lekan Ojo, of the International Security Association, Switzerland, to the researcher questions through zoom, he argued, that it is going to be difficult for

both the Western Nigeria Security Network (WNSN) otherwise code-named Operation Amotekun (Leopard) and the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) to win the war against insecurity in the South West. He queried that the necessary tools to use are definitely not available<sup>138</sup>. He asked 'can the defenseless defend people'. The OPC guys are not engaged in one form of employment or the other. Opc being a voluntary organization which has nobody paying them or appreciating them. They are just trying their best and a time is coming when they will get tired as the level of economic situation will hit them hard. Most of them will have to withdraw and the question is 'where are they withdrawing to?'

(iii) Also, a proposal by another Nigerian State, in the South -West, Oyo, combines direct presence of security agents within herders, increased controls at the border, and the use of microchip implants to monitor the animals. However, information on the results of the implementation of this approach could not be found. The security agents in most cases have been known to compromise both in kind and cash<sup>139</sup>. The allegations of bribery and corruption are being levied against them for the miscarriage of justice and engaging in delay in prosecution of cases to favor a particular group against the other<sup>140</sup>. The police, however, in most cases do not have enough encouragement, and the military are overwhelmed with what is being experienced in the North East, North West and Middle-belt of Nigeria. As argued, the police in the South- West are not better equipped, motivated, and funded than any other parts of the country. It was, therefore, advised that those little things like good accommodation, uniform operational vehicles, booths, trainings and other things that have to do with welfare of the police should be provided for them to perform optimally<sup>141,142</sup>. This and

many more, if not done, reduces the confidence the society have in their ability to check criminality in banditry, kidnapping and controlling farmer-herder conflict effectively<sup>143</sup>.

(iv) The establishment of large-scale cattle ranches is also seen as a way to prevent the conflict by concentrating the herds and providing security to all animals in a delimited area. However, such strategy depends on the level of fees and the sanitation situation in particular ranches to be interesting for cattle owners. According to the grand patron and the President of Miyetti Allah in Oyo State:

*“The type of cows we rear in Nigeria cannot be in a place, they may likely die. Therefore, ranching system may not work”*

Perhaps, section 16 & 17(1) of the 2019 open rearing and grazing of livestock law in Oyo State states that:

*.....Movement of livestock on foot from one destination to another in the state is prohibited except such movement is by rail, wagon or truck or picked – up wagon is within 7.00am to 6.00pm. However, 17(1) (2) Also stated;*

;

*....Any person found moving livestock on foot within and across urban centers; rural settlements or any part of the state in contravention of subsection (1) of this section is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 5 years imprisonment or a fine of 500,000 or both.*

*While 16 (1) also spelt out clearly that;*

*.....Any person who engages in open rearing or herding or grazing of livestock is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for 5 years or a fine of 500,000 thousand or both for the first offenders while subsequent offenders shall on conviction be liable to 10 years imprisonment or a fine of 2,000,000 or both’.*

Thus, an arm proliferation has also made the conflicts more deadly and also facilitated the militarization of criminal groups to stem the flow of SALWs. Furthermore, in the words of, Jiji & Akinteru, in the same focused group discussion with the Miyetti Allah cattle breeders' association members at the Seriki Sasha residence in Ibadan: it was transcribed by the researcher, that,

*“Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders group is neither violent nor tribalistic. We are to farm, rear and learn. We don't know anything about violence. It's the duty of the security agencies to find out the perpetrators of violence. We are not extremists; we are not violent. We have disciplinary committee to punish the erring members; therefore, we are not extremists like them”.*

According to the section 18 (1) (2) of the 2019 open rearing and grazing of livestock in Oyo State on prohibition of the use of offensive weapon, it affirmed that:

(v) 18 (1) No herdsman shall use or possess offensive weapon within or outside the ranch.

(vi) 18 (2) any herdsman who uses or possess offensive weapon is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 2 years imprisonment or a fine of 200,000 or both.

However, in a reaction to this promulgated law, during the focus group discussion with the current chairman of the Miyetti Allah group, Alhaji Jiji and its patron, Prof. Akinteru at the palace of seriki shasha in Ibadan, it was, argued, by them that the law might work because;

*“We are dealing with public asset not private business. Perhaps, a law is created for man not man for the law. We have already won that law.”*

At the training for anti-stock theft by several groups or institutions of government, therefore, the improvement of communications between the police and communities,

roving courts to palliate the weaknesses of the local judicial institutions are seen as potentially valuable in this regard but drastic increase in material and financial flows to institutions that address the conflict need be sustained<sup>144, 145</sup>. Deficiencies in the equipment of agencies or training of the staff are also presented as challenge to their missions.

However, section 4(1) (2) of the law prohibits open rearing and grazing of livestock in South-West States, stating as follows:

*“No person shall, as from the commencement of this law, engage in open rearing or herding or grazing of livestock in the state outside the permitted ranches.”*

(2) *A minor is prohibited from grazing, rearing or herding of livestock except under the supervision of an adult’.*

Arguing further, in trying to find a lasting solution to this, prompted the proposed establishment of the National Livestock Transformation Plan by the Buhari administration as approved by the National Economic Council in January 2019, to curtail the movement of cattle, boost livestock production and quell the country’s lethal herder-farmer conflict. The plan represents the most comprehensive effort to overhaul Nigeria’s inefficient and gravely underperforming livestock system. But two years into the ten- year Plan, the first new ranch, one of the expected strategies, has yet to be built, and the obstacles are multifarious. Distrust, partly among herders predominantly from the Fulani ethnic group but also among farmers who resent the Plan’s advantages to pastoralists, hinders the reform drives. Both Federal and State budgets are hinged, partly due to the Covid 19 pandemic’s economic fallout, and the country’s lack of sufficient technical expertise for managing ranches and grazing reserves. With the clock waning down to the 2023 elections, both federal and state

governments will need to move quickly to make visible mark at ending the conflict in South-West of Nigeria if the recommendations, among others, adduced in the study by the researcher are strictly implemented.

#### **4.5 Discussions of Findings**

Like other Northern axis of Nigeria, the farmer-herder conflict has taken a violent dimension in the South-West States. This has consequently cost too many innocent lives while tolls of property and livelihood loss is on the rise. Transhumant/farmer drags has not only sparked ethnic and socio-economic tensions in agrarian communities but also altered the security behavior of rural livelihood in the South-West. Climate change, desertification and rural-urban drift have increased the lethality of the conflict between transhumant pastoralist and sedentary farmers. Even though, as being widely deduced, the inefficiency of the Nigerian government, armed vigilante groups sprung up in many farmers communities. This led to many vicious cycles of bloody feuds among the farmers and herder. Since 2015 when transhumance projects started through the middle-belt, most northern lawmakers agreed to it but their southern counterparts opposed it making the effort hardly possible. In 2019, President Mohammad Buhari made concerted efforts to create Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) settlements which of-course was greeted with fierce opposition. Although, farmer-herder drags/herdsmen crises in the south-west parts of the country have grown to a large-scale criminal activity with strong security implications and associated numbers of deaths in pastoral communities yet the drivers of the conflicts are traceable to not only socio-economic roots but also strongly linked to cattle rustling and rural banditry.

The tendency for competition among different occupational groups over scarce resources further exacerbates the tension. This tends to pitch different communal groups into deadly confrontations mostly where occupation and communal boundaries overlap. This tends to be a reflective of the nature of conflict between the farmer-herdsmen (extremists) and the occupational groups that constitute the bulk of agricultural farmers in the central and southern parts of the country during seasonal movement of cattle for pasture.

Despite the efforts of government (federal/state) to contain the excesses of the “armed herdsmen” through diverse instruments and strategies as revealed in study findings, the “armed herdsmen” terror is still on the rise in the country. From Yelwa and Imole Afon in Ogun State and Oke Ogun- Ibarapa in Oyo State to Igbeti in Olorunsogo local government area, the mission to draw more blood by the armed herdsmen is still ongoing.

The underlying assumptions on the response of the South-West states are discernible (military and Para-military). It may be difficult to rank these contending variables in ascending or descending order, one incontrovertible fact is that, although, South-West states approaches are mutually reinforcing but not clearly seen to be complemented by the federal government. Neither of these two is both not mutually exclusive. Hence, the contexts that shaped pattern of intersections of states government in the region. However, the study revealed despite varying instrumental responses by states governments in the region, the containment of the crisis is still questionable. A meeting should be convened by federal government comprising, state governors, senior security officials, herder, and farmer representative of ‘All farmers association

of Nigeria', (AFAN), along with traditional rulers and religious leaders. The essence of this meeting would be to state out a set of good working principles to resolving the conflict. The few attempts to address the crisis, commendable as they are, suffered either from being essentially not effective in selected states in south-west of the country but merely seen as respite.

On 17<sup>th</sup> of May 2021 the 17 southern governors issued the Asaba Declaration which condemned Federal Government effort. Ranching, where cattle are kept in a modern way in enclosed parcels of land, has, however, proven to be highly unfeasible due to poor infrastructure i.e. unstable power supply, water, fuel and perhaps, the difficulties in acquisition and legal ownership of land. Since, until recently, the phenomenon just gained the attention of the security sector in the South-West with the establishment of laws (anti-open grazing laws) and creation of paramilitary agencies like Amotekun and Agro rangers to forestall and address incessant attacks by the herdsmen. How effective these efforts in curtailing the conflict remain a nightmare by the federal and state governments in South West Nigeria.

## Endnotes

1. D. H. Cees, *Pastoralism Development in the Sahel: A Road to Stability?* World Bank: Global Center on Conflict, Security and Development, 2014.
2. G. Djohy, *Thwarting Social Conflicts Regarding Water Resources access in Climate Change Context: Cattle Pastoralists' Schemes in Northern Benin*. **Journal of Livestock Science**, 4: 2013, 51–59.
3. A. Dongmo, *Herding Territories in Northern Cameroon and Western Burkina Faso: Spatial arrangements and Herd Management*, *Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice*, 2012, 2:26
4. ECOWAS/OECD, *Livestock and Regional Market in the Sahel and West Africa. Potentials and Challenges*, **Abuja/Paris**, 2008
5. A. Okoli & A. G. Atelhe, *Nomads against Natives: A Political Ecology of Herder/Farmer Conflicts in Nasarawa State, Nigeria*: **American International Journal of Contemporary Research**, 4, 2, 2014. 76-88
6. R. Blench, *The Transformation of Conflict between Pastoralists Cultivators in Nigeria*, online: [www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf](http://www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf). 2003.
7. A. Olaniyan & O. Ufo, *Desperate Guests, Un-willing Hosts: Climate-Induced Migration and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in South-Western Nigeria*: **Conflict Studies Quarterly**, 10, 1, 2015, 23-40
8. A. Okoli & F. Okpaleke, *Cattle Rustling and the Dialectics of Security in Northern Nigeria*: **International Journal of Uberai Arts and Social Science**, 2, 1, 2014, 109-117
9. P. Baker; C. Gabrielatos; M. Khosravinik; M. Krzyzanowski; T. McEnery & R.A. Wodak, *useful methodological synergy, Combining Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics to examine discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press*, *Discourse & Society*, 19(3), 2008, 273-306
10. S. Egwu, "The Political Economy of Rural Banditry in Contemporary Nigeria," In M.J. Kuna & Jibril Ibrahim (eds.), *Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern, Nigeria*, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development, 2016, pp.14-68
11. A. Okoli & F. Okpaleke, *Cattle Rustling and the Dialectics of Security in Northern Nigeria*: **International Journal of Uberai Arts and Social Science**, 2, 1, 2014, 109-1
12. A. Kok, "Natural Resources, The Environment and Conflict" (*African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*, 19 November 2009) <<http://www.accord.org.za/publication/natural-resources-the-environmentand-conflict/>>
13. A.U. Leme, *Understanding Farmers-Herdsman Conflict and the Way Forward*, Retrieved from <https://www.thecable.ng/understanding-farmers-herdsmen-conflict-way-forward>, 2017.

14. P. Havlik, "Climate Change Mitigation through Livestock System Transitions", Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 3709, 2014, Pp.111
15. UN report warns" *UN News* (29 November 2006) <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/11/201222-rearing-cattle-produces-more-greenhouse-gases-driving-cars-un-report-warns>> accessed 20 June 2018. See the full report: Livestock, Environment and Development Initiative, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Livestock's Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options* (FAO 2006) <<http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e.pdf>>
16. P.H. Gleick, *Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria*, American Meteorological Society, Washington, 2010
17. C.N. Ibenwa; V.C. Nwokocha & A.B. Okoli, 'Gsp, Climate Change and Eschatological Events', in A.A. Nwosu (ed.), A pre-conference proceeding for the 2017 school of general studies international conference held at University of Nigeria, Nsukka, May 7-10th, Grand-Heritage Global Communications, Nsukka, 2017, p. 290
18. A. Nyong & C. Fiki, *Drought-related Conflicts, Management and Resolution in the West African Sahel*, Human Security and Climate Change International Workshop. Oslo; Sweden. Retrieved from [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong\\_Fiki.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong_Fiki.pdf). 2005.
19. J.O. Gefu & A. Kolawole, Conflict in Common Property Resource Use: Experiences from an Irrigation Project. *Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property*. Retrieved from <http://d/c.dlib.Indiana.edu/archive/00000823/00/gefuj080502.pdf>. 2002.
20. D.B. Oyesola, *Training Needs for Improving Income Generating activities of Agro-Pastoral Women in Ogun State, Nigeria*. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation), Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ibadan. 2000.
21. S.A. Ingawa; L.A. Ega & P.O. Erhabor, *Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict in Core-States of the National Fadama Project*. Retrieved from <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/30459435/CASESTUDY-ON-FADAMA-CONFLICT-ISSUES>.1999.
22. Premium Times Nigeria, *How to Resolve Herdsmen Crisis – Nigerian Working Group*, Retrieved from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/255364-resolve-herdsmen-crisis-Nigerian-working-group.html>, 2018
23. T. Skodvin, Structure and Agent in the Scientific Diplomacy of Climate Change: An Empirical Case Study of Scientific-Policy Interaction in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Springer Netherlands, 2010.
24. Danielle Ogbeche, *Borno: Governor Shettima Claims Boko Haram Now Sell Stolen Cattle to Fund Terror Campaigns*, in: Daily Post, March, online: <<http://dailypost.ng/2016/03/05/orno-governor-shettima-claims-boko-haram-now-sell-stolen-cattle-to-fund-terror-campaigns>> 6 February 2016.
25. A. Otunuga, *Why The Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers Fight: How Climate Change and The Boko Haram Crisis Created The Crisis*, Retrieved from <http://saharareporters.com/2016/06/03/why-fulani-herdsmen-farmers-fight-how-climate-change-Boko-haram-crisis-created-crisis-and>.

26. International Crisis Group, *Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence*, 2018 Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence>.
27. Ban Ki-moon, *United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation*, 2012. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation\\_UNDPA2012%28english%29\\_0.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf).
28. P. Duru, *7000 Persons Displace in Fulani Herdsmen, Agatu Farmers Clash in Benue*, Vanguard Newspaper, February 29, 2016.
29. V.I. Ede, *Christian Religious Response to the Plights of the Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria*, PhD thesis presented to the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. 2016.
30. A. Olaniyan & O. Ufo, *Desperate Guests, Un-willing Hosts: Climate-Induced Migration and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in South-Western Nigeria*, in: **Conflict Studies Quarterly**, 10, 1, 2015, 23-40
31. M. Emeka & N. Clifford, *'710 Nigerians killed by Fulani Herdsmen in 10 months - Igbo Youth Movement'*, Vanguard News, 27 April, 2016. p. 1
32. P. Dada, *"Fulani Herdsmen Set Falae's Five-Hectare Oil Palm Plantation Ablaze"* Punch Akure, 21 January, 2018 <<http://punchng.com/breakingfulani-herdsmen-set-olu-falae's-farm-ablaze/>> accessed 19 June 2018. See also Sahara Reporters, *"Suspected Fulani Herdsmen Set Ablaze Olu Falae's Farm in Ondo"* Sahara Reporters (New York, 21 January 2018) <<http://saharareporters.com/2018/01/21/suspected-fulani-herdsmen-set-ablaze-olufalae-farm-ondo>>
33. Z. Cervenka, *"The Relationship Between Armed Conflict and Environmental Degradation in Africa"* in Anders Hjort af Ornäs and M.A. Mohamed Salih (eds), *Ecology and Politics: Environmental Stress and Security in Africa* Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1989, 30.
34. *"Decision A/Dec.5/10/98 relating To the Regulation on Transhumance between ECOWAS Member States"* (1998) 35 Official Journal of the Economic Community of Western American States <<http://ecpf.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Decision-1998-English.pdf>>
35. C.N. Ibenwa & F.C. Uroko, *The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna of Nigeria: Causes and Implication for National Development*, A paper presented at the international conference of the society for research and academic excellence, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 6-9th February, 2017. pp.9
36. M. Garba, *Nigerian Govt. says 204 killed in Southern Kaduna Crisis*, viewed 28 January 2018, from <http://www.trezyhelm.com/2016/12/more-graphic-photos-from-fulani.html?m=1>
37. M.A. Mohamed-Saleem, Report submitted to FAO, Rome, *on Feed and Forage Potential of Awe and Keana Grazing Reserves*, Plateau State, Nigeria, 1987.
38. O. Nwolise, *National Security and Sustainable Democracy*, in *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, ed. E.O. Ojo, Ibadan: John Archers, 2006, 347-55

39. J.C. Udemezue & N.A. Kanu, *Challenges of Nigerian Agricultural Sector in the Twenty Century: The Case of Nomadic Insurgence and Terrorist Sects. Universal Journal of Agricultural Research*, 7(2), 2019, 117-124
40. A statement by the president of the Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore Fulani Socio-Cultural Group, Abdullahi Bello Bodejo is instructive on this point. He stated, at a joint news conference with the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, that “*Anywhere you keep this volume of cows we have now, for two weeks, they will eat out everything and you will have ecological disaster*”. Abbas Jimoh, “Grazing Laws: Nigerian Cows Unsuitable for Ranching” Daily Trust, Nigeria, 19 November 2017
41. P. Havlik, “Climate Change Mitigation Through Livestock System Transitions,” 2014 See Kwaku Agyemang, “Transhumance Pastoralism in Africa: Thoughts from the Field” in Ndiaga Gueye (ed), *Sustainable Pastoralism and Rangelands in Africa*, vol 31, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2017.
42. See also Edward Kilawe & P. M. Bahal’Okwibale, “Pastoralism and Rangeland Management in Drylands of Eastern Africa: A Review of Issues, Challenges and Practices” Ndiaga Gueye (ed.), *Sustainable Pastoralism and Rangelands in Africa*, vol 31, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2017.
43. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 3709. See also “Rearing Cattle Produces More Greenhouse Gases than Driving Cars, UN report warns” *UN News* (29 November 2006) <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/11/201222-rearing-cattle-produces-more-greenhouse-gases-driving-cars-un-report-warns>> accessed 20 June 2018. See the full report: Livestock, Environment and Development Initiative, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options* FAO 2006<<http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e.pdf>> accessed 20 June 2018.
44. M. Bashir, *Hopes for an End to Cattle Theft*, in: Daily 4 September, 2014, online: [www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/feature/hopes-for-an-end-to-cattie-theft](http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/feature/hopes-for-an-end-to-cattie-theft),
45. I.M. Abass, ‘*No Retreat, No Surrender Conflict for Survival between Fulani Pastoralists and Farmers in Northern Nigeria*’, **European Scientific Journal**, (8)1, 2014.
46. D.J. Francis, ‘*Peace and Conflict Studies: An African Overview of Basic Concepts*’, in S. Gaya-Best (ed.), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, 2007, pp. 20-27
47. C.N. Ibenwa, ‘*Fanaticism and Religious Riots in Northern Nigeria: Its Implications for Societal Development*’, A PhD Thesis Submitted to the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2012.
48. Y.A. Idegu, ‘*Curfew in Plateau as Herdsmen Kill 86: Fulani we have Lost 300 Cows*’, The Nation Newspaper, Lagos, Vintage Press Limited, Monday 25 June, 2018, P. 37
49. I. Ludovica, ‘*Nigeria Fulani Militants: Herdsmen accused of Killing 1,200 People in 2014*’, viewed 28 January 2018, from

<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-fulani-militants-herdsmen-accused-killing-1200-people-2014-1530042>

50. E. Mamah; C. Ndujihe; C. Nkwopara & C. Ozor, 'Bloodbath in Enugu as Fulani herdsmen kill 40,' April 26, 2016.
51. K. A. Mkutu, *Pastoral and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Africa Peace Forum, University of Bradford, Bradford, 2019.
52. C.O. Okeke & C.N. Ibenwa, 'The Igbo Example of Conflicts between African Traditional Religion and Christianity in Eastern Nigeria', 2017. Unpublished article.
53. A.C. Okoli & G.A. Atelhe, 'Nomads against Natives: A political Ecology of Herder/Farmer Conflicts in Nasarawa State, Nigeria', **American International Journal of Contemporary Research** 4(2), 2014, 76-88.
54. See Article 3 of the Decision which states that "The crossing of land borders for the transhumance of cattle, sheep, goats, camels and donkeys according to conditions defined by this Decision is authorized between all the countries of the community"; See Felix Lankester and Alicia Davis, "Pastoralism and Wildlife: Historical and Current Perspectives in the East African rangelands of Kenya and Tanzania" 2016, 35 Rev Science Tech. 473.
55. Akinteru and Jiji in a Focus Group Discussion in September 17, 2020 by 3pm at Seriki Sasha residence, Ibadan.
56. A. Ofuoku & B. Isin, *Causes, Effects and Resolution of Farmers-Nomadic Cattle Herders Conflict in Delta Nigeria: International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, 2009.
57. The Cable, *Youth Leaders Defy Makinde, Insist Herders must Vacate the Oyo Community*. Available at <https://www.thecable.ng/> January 30 2021
58. J.C. Udemezue & H.U. Nwalieji, "Effect of Cattle Menace on Farm Land in Anambra State, Nigeria." *Current Trends in Biomedical Engineering & Biosciences*, 7(5), 2017, 94-99
59. "Decision A/Dec.5/10/98 Relating To the Regulation on Transhumance between ECOWAS Member States" (1998) 35 Official **Journal of the Economic Community of Western African States** <<http://ecpf.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Decision-1998-English.pdf>>
60. *Daily Post* (Nigeria, 10 December 2021) <<http://dailypost.ng/2017/12/04/breaking-suspected-herdsmen-attackvillages-Ondo>> accessed 6 April 2021
61. M. Bashir, *Hopes for an End to Cattle Theft*, in: Daily 4 September, online: <[www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/feature/hopes-for-an-end-to-cattie-theft](http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/feature/hopes-for-an-end-to-cattie-theft)> (2016)
62. H. W. Köster, & J. Wolff, *Dairy Development Program in Nigeria baseline Report: Key Findings and Recommendations*, Alabama: IFRC. 2012.
63. J.M. Powell, *Crop-Livestock Interactions in the Sub-Humid Zone of Nigeria*. In: Kaufmann R. Von, Chater S. and Blench R M. (eds) 1986
64. C. Oxby, *Progress in the Settlement of the Nomadic Herds in the Sub-Humid Savannahs of Africa*. Report prepared for FAO under the Program for the Control of African Animal Trypanosomiasis and Related Development. ODI, London. 1982b.

65. A. Waters-Bayer, & E. Taylor-Powell, *Settlement and Land Use by Fulani Pastoralists in Case Study Areas*. In: Kaufmann R von, Chater S. and R. Blench, (eds). 1986
66. C. Oxby, *Group R. Sanches in Africa*, Pastoral Network Paper 13d. Overseas, 1982a
67. C. Kwaja, *Blood, Cattle, and Cash: Cattle Rustling and Nigeria's Bourgeoning Underground Economy*, in: *West African Insight*, 4, 3, 2014, 1-6
68. S. Ladan, *Forests and Forest Reserves as Security Threats in Northern Nigeria*, in: **European Scientific Journal**, ' 10, 35, 2014, 120-142
69. Leadership 2015, *Combating Cattle Rustling Digitally: The el-Rufai Model*, 26 August, online: <<http://leadership.ng/opinions/456170/combating-cattle-rustling-digitally-the-el-rufai-model>> 20 March 2016
70. National Express, *Cattle Rustling Could Be More Dangerous than Boko Haram*, in: National Express, 4 February, online: <[www.national-express.com.ng/cattle-rustling-could-be-more-dangerous-than-boko-haram](http://www.national-express.com.ng/cattle-rustling-could-be-more-dangerous-than-boko-haram)> 6 February 2016.
71. J. Osamba, *The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya*, in: **African Journal on Conflict Resolution**, 1, 2, 2000, 11-37
72. J. Schilling; F. Opiyo & J. Scheffran, *Raiding Pastoral Livelihood: Motives and Effects of Violent Conflict in North-Western Kenya*, in: *Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice*, 2, 25, 2012, 1-16
73. A. Tauna & A. Satya, *Understanding Inter-Pastoralists Conflicts in Uganda: The Cattle Raiding Phenomenon in Kapchorwa District, Stadtschlaining*: Centre for Peace Studies, European Peace University, 2004.
74. I. S. Sani, "Building of a Community Cattle Ranch and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology as Alternative Methods of Curtailing Cattle Rustling in Katsina State," *Pastoralism*, 6.1, 2016.
75. M. Y. Gebre & K. Hadgu, "Addressing Pastoralist Conflict in Ethiopia," *The Case of the Kuraz and Hamer Sub-districts of South Omo Zone*, Saferworld, 2005
76. E. K. Bunei, Gerard McElwee and Robert Smith, "From Bush to Butchery: Cattle Rustling as an Entrepreneurial Process in Kenya." **Journal of Business and Economic Review**, University of Huddersfield, 2016
77. J. Sowole, *Suspected Kidnappers Kill First Class Monarch in Ondo*, January 02 2021. Available at <https://www.thisdaylive.com/> Retrieved.
78. A. Olaniyan & A. Yahaya, "Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern Nigeria." *Africa Spectrum* 51.3, 2016:110.
79. J.M. Kowal & A.H. Kassam, *An Agricultural Ecology of Savanna: A Study of Africa*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978.
80. U. Akwara, *The Attack of Herdsmen on Farmers in Nigeria: The Problems and Solutions*, Nigeria: Weafri Well Services Co, 2018
81. R.S. Adisa & O. Adekunle, *Farmer-Herder Conflict: A Factor Analysis of Socio-Economic Conflict Variables among Arable Crop Farmers in North*

- Central Nigeria, Journal of human ecology*, DOI:10.1080/09709274.2010.11906266, 2010
82. African Union Commission, *African Union in Mediation*, Retrieved from [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3B408148510828464925779F00068B10-AU\\_Mediation.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3B408148510828464925779F00068B10-AU_Mediation.pdf). 2009
  83. M. Branine, *Managing Across Cultures*, London: Sage Publications, 2011.
  84. M. Moritz, *Understanding Herder-Farmer Conflicts in West Africa: Outline of a Processual Approach*, **Human Organization**, Vol.69, No.2, 2010, pp.138-148
  85. H. Clark, *Over 6000 Nigerians in Christian-Identified Communities Murdered or Maimed by Fulani Muslims in 2018*, Retrieved from <http://christiannews.net/2018/07/11/over-6000-nigerians-in-christian-identified-community-ties-murdered-or-maimed-by-Fulani-Muslims-in-2018/>.
  86. I. Christopher & C.A. Ndubuisi, *Critical Analysis of Conflicts between Herdsmen and Farmers in Nigeria: Causes and Socio-religious and Political Effects on National Development*, AOSIS Publishing, Vol. 74, No. 1, 2018
  87. J. Galtung, *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*, Sage Publications, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969, pp. 167-191
  88. J. Galtung, *Cultural Violence*, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 27 No. 3, Aug. 1990, Pp.291-305
  89. International Crisis Group, *Stopping Nigeria's Spiraling Farmer- Herder Violence*, 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence>.
  90. B. Ki-moon, *United Nations Guidance for effective Mediation*, Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation\\_UNDPA2012%28english%20\\_0.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%20_0.pdf).
  91. M.M. Mohammed; B. F. Umar & S. Hamisu, *Farmer-Herder Conflicts Management: The Role of Traditional Institutions in Borno State, Nigeria*, Lambert Publishing, 2017
  92. N. Mikailu, *Making Sense of Nigeria's Fulani-Farmer Conflict*, Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36139388>, 2016
  93. I. Mohammed, A. B. Ismaila & U.M. Bibi, *An Assessment of Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict in Nigeria Using GIS*, **International Journal of Engineering Science Invention**, Volume 4, 2015, Pp.23-33.
  94. M. Moritz, *Understanding Herder-Farmer Conflicts in West Africa: Outline of Processual Approach*, Human Organization, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2010.
  95. A. Otunuga, *Why The Fulani Herdsmen & Farmers Fight: How Climate Change & The Boko Haram Crisis Created the Crisis*, Retrieved from <https://saharareporters.com/2016/06/03/why-fulani-herdsmen-farmers-fithg-how-climate-change-boko-haram-crisis-created-crisis-and>. 2016.
  96. Premium Times Nigeria, *How to Resolve Herdsmen Crisis- Nigerian Working Group*, 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/topnews/255364-resolve-herdsmen-crisis-Nigerian-working-group.html>.

97. M.B. Ajibefun, *Social and Economic effects of the Menace of Fulani Herdsmen crises in Nigeria*, **Journal of Educational and Social Research**, 8(2), 2018, 133-139
98. R. Akinkuolie, *Herdsmen /Farmers Clashes: Problems and Solutions*, The Guardian, 2018, <https://guardian.ng/opinion/herdsmen-farmers-clashes-Problenis-and-solutions>,
99. B. Akinloye, *Peace and War: Despite the Violent History of Coexistence, Herdsmen and Farmers form Unusual Alliance in Oyo Towns*, Available at <http://www.icirnigeria.or/> January 02 2021.
100. D. Akinrefon, O. Ajayi & S. Abubakar, *Insecurity: Why Fulani herders must leave Oyo – Igboho*, Available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/01/insecurity-why-fulani-herders-must-leave-oyo-igboho/>
101. M. M. Alamai, U. H. Kirfi & A. F. Ladi, *Tourism and the Economy of Nigeria: Synthesis of its Contributions to GDP from 2005-2026*. **Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal**, 5(1 1), 2018, 256-263.
102. O. Atoyebi, *Fulani Herdsmen Attack Oyo farmers*, Available at <https://punchng.com>, 2016.
103. BBC, *Fulani Herdsmen: Nigeria Supposes Declare dem Terrorists?* 2018. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/pidgin>,
104. BBC, *How Nigeria’s Cattle War is Fuelling Religious Tension*, Posted on 9 May 2018, Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44039546>; CFR (Council on foreign relations/guest blogger for John Campbell, perceptions of tribalism and the farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria), 6 April 2018, Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37021044>.
105. R. Blench, *The Expansion and Adaption of Fulbe Pastoralism to Sub-humid and Humid Conditions in Nigeria*, *Cahiers d’études africaines*, 34(133), 1994, 133-135
106. R. Blench, “*Conflict between Pastoralists and Cultivators in Nigeria*” Review paper prepared for the British government’s Department for International Development (DFID), Nigeria, and August 9th 2010, Cambridge Publishing, UK. 2010, Pp. 1-14.
107. Blueprint, *Gunmen Kidnap 24yr-old Farmer in Ibadan*, February 30 2021. Available at <https://www.blueprint.ng/> 2021a,
108. Blueprint, *Uneasy Calm as Suspected Herders Kill two Farmers in Oyo Community*, Available at <https://www.blueprint.nj> 2021b.
109. Crisis Group, Interview *University of Maiduguri Lecturer, Maiduguri*, 22 October 2016 edition, Available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west/africa/nigeria/nigeria-women-and-boko-haram-insurgency>.
110. F. N. Enor, S. E. Magor & C. E. Ekpo, *Contending Perspective and Security Implications of Herdsmen Activities in Nigeria*, **International Journal of Research-GRANTHAALAYAH**, 7(7), 2019, 265-286
111. Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, *The Green Alternative: The Agricultural Promotion Policy 2016-2020*, 2016 edition, Available at <https://fmard.gov.ng/>

112. Global Terrorism Index, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2015 edition, pp. 43-44, Available at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%202017%20%284%29.pdf>.
113. S. Herbert & S. Husaini, *Conflict, Instability, and Resilience in Nigeria: Rapid Literature Review*, Birmingham, U.K: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. 2018, Pp. 1-29
114. M. Ikeke, *The National World and Violent Conflict in Nigeria: An Appraisal*. UJAH Unizik, **Journal of Arts and Humanities**, 15(1), 2014, 91-109
115. International Crisis Group, *Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's expanding Deadly Conflicts*. International Crisis Group Report No 252/Africa, Brussels, Belgium, Available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/> 2017.
116. ISS, *Today, Herdsmen Crisis underscores Nigeria's Complex Security Threats, 2018*. Available at <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/herdsmen-crisis-underscores-nigeriascomplex-security>
117. S. James, *Nigeria: Marauding Herdsmen have Launched Guerrilla Warfare in Yorubaland - Agbekoya*. Available at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/> 2021.
118. D. Johnson, & D. Akinrefon, *Herdsmen: Tension, anger in the Southwest*, Available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/> 2019.
119. D. Johnson, *How Fulani Herdsmen abducted Olu Falae*, Available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/>2015.
120. S.H. Jore, *The Conceptual and Scientific Demarcation of Security in contrast to Safety*. **European Journal of Security Research**, 4, 2019, 157-174
121. B. Kwaghga, *Herdsmen/Farmers Crisis: A Threat to Democratic Governance in Nigeria*, *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, 8(11), 2018, 100-108
122. L. Mohammed, *Farmers/Herdsmen's Clashes Triggered by Environmental, Non-ethnic/Religious issues*, Available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/3/953761>.
123. Naija247News, *Call us when there is attack by Fulani Herdsmen in your Domains, OPC, Agbekoya, others tell Yoruba Traditional Rulers*, Available at <https://www.naija247news.com/> 2021.
124. C. Nwosu, *Between Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers*, Available at <https://republic.com.ng/> 2017.
125. H. Ojo, *Nigeria: Herders and Farmers Clash over Land*, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Available at <https://iwpr.net/>2016.
126. E. Usman & V. Arjiromanus, *Nigeria - Killer Herdsmen*, Available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/> 2019.
127. O. Ojo, *Quit notice to Herdsmen: Untold Story of how Mayhem was visited on Oyo Town*, Available at <https://www.sunnewsonline.com/>2021.
128. L. Oke & O. Olawale, *The Menace of Fulani Herdsmen and the Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria*, **European Journal of Educational and Social Sciences**, 4(2), 2019, 84-98.
129. P. A. Olayoku, *Trends and Patterns of Cattle Grazing and Rural Violence in Nigeria, 2006-2014*, IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, No 34, Pp 1 – 25, Available at <http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/> 2014.

130. N. Oli, C.C. Ibekwe & I. U. Nwankwo, *Prevalence of Herdsmen and Farmers' Conflicts in Nigeria*, **International Journal of innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities**, 3(1), 2018, 34-39.
131. B. Omitola, *between Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen: Organized Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria*, A Paper Presented at the 5th institute of security studies conference on crime and crime reduction, 14 and 15 August, 2014, Sandston, South Africa.
132. D. O. Omonijo; C.B. Obiorah; C.O.O. Uche; M.C. Anyaegbunam; A.O. Shuaibu & C.F. Ogunwa, *Exploring Social Theories in the Study of Insecurity in Contemporary Nigeria*, **The Journal of Social Sciences Research**, 3(7), 2017, 59-76.
133. M. Otabor, *Suspected Killers of Ifon Monarch Arrested*, Available at <https://thenationonlineng.net/> 2020,
134. D. Pilling, *Killer Herdsmen blamed for a wave of Deadly Nigeria Clashes*, Available at <https://www.ft.com/2018>.
135. Proshare, *Sunday Igboho and the Yoruba Nation - People, Politics and Policy*, Available at <https://www.proshareng.com/> 2021.
136. Oyo State Anti-Open Rearing and Grazing Regulation Law, 2019
137. L. Ramalan, *3 killed, 2 Injured as Amotekun, Fulani Herdsmen Clash in Oyo*, Available at <https://dailynigerian.com/> 2021.
138. M.B. Ajibefun, *Social and Economic effects of the Menace of Fulani Herdsmen Crises in Nigeria*, **Journal of Educational and Social Research**, 8(2), 2018, 133-139.
139. R. Akinkuolie, *Herdsmen /Farmers Clashes: Problems and Solutions*. The Guardian, 2018. <https://guardian.ng/opinion/herdsmen-farmers-clashes-Problenis-and-solutions>,
140. B. Akinloye, *Peace and War: Despite the Violent History of Co-existence, Herdsmen and Farmers form unusual alliance in Oyo Towns*, 2018. Available at <http://www.icirnigeria.or/>
141. D. Akinrefon, O. Ajayi & S. Abubakar. *Insecurity: Why Fulani Herders must Leave Oyo – Igboho*, Available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/01/insecurity-why-fulani-herders-must-leave-oyo-igboho/>
142. M.M. Alamai; U.H. Kirfi & A.F. Ladi, *Tourism and the Economy of Nigeria: Synthesis of its Contributions to GDP from 2005-2026*. **Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal**, 5(1 1), 2018, 256-263.
143. A.B. Aremu & L.O. Lawal, *Tourism Development and Sustainable Economic Development: Evidence from South Western Nigeria*, **South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics**, 2(1), 2018, 1-9.
144. O. Atoyebi, *Fulani Herdsmen attack Oyo Farmers*, January 02 2021. Available at <https://punchng.com/>
145. BBC, *Fulani Herdsmen: Nigeria Supposes Declare dem Terrorists?* 2018. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/pidgin>,

## Chapter Five

### Conclusion

#### 5.1 Summary of the Findings

In summary, the unresolved farmer-herder clashes have posed serious concerns for the safety of lives and property of the citizens of the country. The inability of government in tackling headlong the root causes of the clashes remains its albatross. The security sector managers in Nigeria in general and south west states in particular are entangled with the growth in population, climate change, and uncontrolled illegal armament of non- state groups, impunity, and ineffectiveness of the security agencies.

The activities of herdsmen in the region have, however, been seen as working antithetical to achieving such. Several notable deaths of farmers coupled with farmland destructions, kidnapping for ransom, rapping of innocent girls and women, maiming among others were experienced not only by the farmers, but other members of the communities where the attacks had taken place. The state governments' fragile attitude and failure to timely solve the security gaps of the conflict is what led to many losses of lives and wanton destruction of property. This has created more problems than solutions as it has ended up profiling the state and country into ethnic dimension thus putting the nascent democracy under threat. The citizens could no longer trust the government to providing them with security. In the understanding of the DAWN Commission, (2019), report, the state shortcomings in ensuring protections has led to citizen's distrust; instead they have created their own security measures like vigilant groups including Odua people's congress.

However, there must be training, re-training and adequate funding of security personnel for effective policing of the communities. Also, there should be deployment of information and communication technology infrastructure by government through the security sector response agencies for proper intelligence gathering and management. Lastly, ranching should be considered as an option in the face of land scarcity by government to prevent further escalation of the conflict.

As noted, security worldwide is pertinent to any nation's quest for sustainable peace, safety and development.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

Drawing from the foregoing expositions in the study, the study not only provides plausible insights on the farmer-herder scholarship within the South-West region but also contributed immensely to Conflict, Governance and Development Studies in Nigeria. First, the herdsmen are mostly a nomadic or semi nomadic people whose primary occupation is raising livestock while the extremists are only group within the pastoralists-herdsmen whose interaction are violent with other groups, mostly arable farmers. For instance, the 2018 global terrorism index report classified the Fulani Herdsmen (extremists), as the fourth most dangerous terrorist groups in the world while its 2019 version of the same report also maintained the same nomenclature for the group (Fulani Extremists). In the country's southern zone (South West), the increasingly incessant trespass on farms, deadly clashes between herders and local farmers, and criminal element by armed gangs camped alongside and often undistinguishable from the entirely forest dwelling nomadic/herders have no doubt ignited widespread anti-herder and anti- Fulani sentiment. However, not until recently,

rising tension and the risk of wider inter-ethnic, inter-regional violence have revived the urgency of finding enduring solutions to the herder-farmer conflict.

The farmer-herder conflict has arguably become the greatest threat to Nigeria's peace and security. It is exacting an ever-deadlier toll and, with elections looming in 2023, could destabilize the country if the government and other actors fail to contain it. Without measures ranging from immediate dialogue between affected communities to long-term livestock sector reform, the conflict risks escalating as President Buhari and the federal government must redouble efforts to check the violence, the drift of many young men toward ethnic militancy, the proliferation of assault weapons and the entrenchment of impunity. The states enacting anti-open grazing policies should see herders not as unwanted intruders, but as a crucial link in the effective security chain. Specifically, the herdsman have a structured hierarchy/chain of command and have delegates that participate in negotiation and mediations but unlike the terrorists they are not faceless with any real threats to the security and stability of south west states in Nigeria. Moreover, the proscription of Fulani herdsman as terrorist group is largely political question since the Fulani extremists are yet to make maximum force to make their demands. Perhaps, their activities are often targeted at particular population or institution (Farms and Farmers). Put simply, depending on the perspective from which the concepts are viewed it does not bare a monolithic assumption. This constitutes one of the loosely investigated areas the study bridged.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The 'herdsman crisis' persists because the government has not demonstrated the much-needed political will to end the crises. For a conflict that has the capacity of

tearing the country apart, it is instructive that political leaders have failed to invoke appropriate legislation and executive actions capable of tackling the issue.

Forging conflict resolution strategies in the pastoral communities where the conflicts are most dreaded in the South-West States (Oyo and Ogun) may not be far-fetched. Based on these strategic observations, the study findings and report, thus, recommend different but complementary measures, as stated below:

(i) There should be effective and workable legislation devoid of any political undertone guiding the activity and the relationships of the herdsmen with farmers and other Nigerian citizens at large. The rule of law should be applied to all defaulters, that is, to say that there should be no sacred cow. Furthermore, there is need for change of behavior. We may have to learn to accommodate, open up to divergent views, with the view to finding common ground that may end up preserving the unity of the people. Moreover, the Nigeria government should seek amendment to article 3 of the ECOWAS protocol, especially as it relates to the free movement of cattle and other livestock without special permits. If this is done, we have over 5million hectares of land in old grazing reserves left to accommodate over 40 million cows if well grassed and watered.

(ii) Another National Conference is seriously advocated. The herdsmen should be ordered by government to surrender the guns and live ammunitions in their possession to government. Thereafter, they should be banned from carrying such weapons. The shoot at sight order of Mr. President, Mohammed Buhari, (GCFR), on perpetrators, is not seen so far as game changer to the perpetuation of the conflicts. This, no doubt,

might have helped to stop cases of nefarious activities like highway robbery, kidnapping and indiscriminate killings in which they engage these days. The government should be more proactive in their action rather than being reactive. Government's quick response to early signs and warnings of impending crisis is highly advocated. The proposed reform of the Nigerian law enforcement apparatus towards state and community policing can help in this regard, (state policing).

(iii) Deployment of Electronic/digital devices in remote locations or the use of the radio frequency identification tags has also been hailed as a potentially useful technology against cattle raids in Nigeria. The tracking of stolen cows using information and communication technologies (ICT) can be a deterrent to cattle rustling, but requires efficient and timely response by the security forces, or alternative ways to manage the conflict between the rustlers and the victims to be effective.

(iv) Innovations in farming system being canvassed by the federal ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) that part of the best ways to end the incessant attacks and killing of innocent Nigerian farmers by marauding criminal herdsmen is to devise new means of planting their crops. For instance, planting of yams in sack bags at home, thereby remaining alive to still farm during the next season

(v) Improved judicial responses to the phenomenon, through adopting two measures. The first relates to ensuring effective sanctions for cattle theft, paralleling the recommendations on the improvement of the material and human capacities of institutions. The second stresses the potential benefits of customary justice systems and their capacity to mediate and involve the parties in negotiations. Broader involvement of traditional approaches and civil society organizations is also advocated

for their potential role in conflict resolution and in gathering information, (intelligence gathering mechanism). The establishment of a community-level conflict resolution system (native intelligence) would be helpful in addressing the farmer-herder conflict. This is justified in the advice the president gave to South-West governors to resolve the conflict locally using existing traditional institutions.

(vi) Re-consideration for the establishment of Ruga settlements in states of the federation. The South West is basically agrarian region which makes it prone to herders' crisis. Each state should provide the lands and human resources for the project which prevents the roaming about of the cattle thereby preventing the conflict.

(vii) Lastly, the Federal and State governments should endeavor to put in place compensation mechanism/commission for cushioning the effects of the conflict on victims affected so as to placate any aggrieved party. This will go a long way to douse tension as the assurance will be there that at least there is going to be succor to their immediate and long-term sufferings in event of any untold crisis.

#### **5.4 Contribution to Knowledge**

This study explores how the nexus between farmers and armed herders has recently contributed to the growth and lethality of conflict in agrarian communities which affected traditional and human security in Nigeria. However, previous studies on agro-pastoral conflict focus more on intensity of the clashes, victims and level of damage mostly in the northern axis of Nigeria and the Middle Belt. Specifically, there is a scarcity of in-depth analysis on how the recent lethality of the conflicts posed threats to security of the south-west states in Nigeria. Many of the previous studies on the

farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria have often been on contesting the severity of confrontations and attacks in the affected areas without really adding to the understanding of how their fundamental roles (root causes of the conflict) played out on physical security in the south west region. This study extends the narrative of recent escalation of agro-pastoral conflicts and its impacts on physical security of rural dwellers and occupational farmers in the region. The failure to control small and light, over-bloating legal instruments and inappropriate enforcement of existing legal order further exacerbated the conflicts in the region. For Instance, according to section 18(2) of the 2019 open rearing and grazing of livestock law in Oyo State, Nigeria, as similar in other South-West States, reported that:

*...Any herdsman who uses or in possession of offensive weapon is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to two years imprisonment or a fine of 200, 000 naira*

Also, The Nigerian Police Force and civil defense corps launched a specialized Task Force (Agro-Ranger) on Cattle Rustling and Associated Crime in 2014 and 2019. This is often far-fetched in terms of mitigating small and light weapon spread among the cattle herders to South-West region of Nigeria. Thus, the study changed the scant attention that had long been devoted to this phenomenon in other axis of the country. This constitutes the huge knowledge vacuum, or loosely investigated area of study this study filled.

### **5.5 Area of Further Research/Studies**

While the farmer-herder conflict is on the frightening rise, the several institution of measures to address the security implications and its socio-economic drivers of the

phenomenon in rural as well as urban communities in the North Eastern and Middle Belt parts of the country have been overly researched.

More recently, extant discourses on the climate change and transhumant adventure created gives more attention to the intensity of the crises without giving detailed attention to the security-development continuum in the context of regional-wide security sector responses and intersections in other parts of Nigeria like the South - West States. This constitutes the knowledge vacuum this thesis fundamentally fills. Specifically, this study also examines how organized structures of ‘armed herdsman’ group network now shape the patterns of violent conflicts in pastoral communities in Nigeria’s south-west region. Further studies may consider the following:

- (i) The Effects of National Livestock Transformation Plan in ensuring food security in South West States, Nigeria.
- (ii) The Implication of State Policing on the detection of early warning signs in farmer-herder conflict in South West Nigeria.

## Bibliography

### Chapters in Book

- Achor, A. *260 Killed, 2,501 Cattle Rustled in Jos Attacks* - JTF, in: Leadership, 25 April, online: <[http://leadership.ng/news/36\\_8441/260-killed-2501-cattle-rustled-jos-attacks-jtf](http://leadership.ng/news/36_8441/260-killed-2501-cattle-rustled-jos-attacks-jtf)> (30 August) 2014
- Adigun, A. "The Historical Antecedent of the Phenomenon of Ethnic Militias in Nigeria", in Babawale, T. (Ed.), *Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, Lagos; Concept Publications, 2003, 1-17.
- Akowe, T. & Bodunrin K. *Cattle Rustling: A Nightmare*, in: The Nation, 30 March, online: <<http://onlineng.net/cattle-rustling-northern-nightmare>, 2014.
- Bayer, A.W. & Taylor, E. P. *Settlement and Land Use by Fulani Pastoralists in Case Study Area*, In: Von Kaufmann R, Chatter S. & Blench R. (eds.), 1986
- Bray, J. Leiv, N. L. & Mansoob, M. "Nepal: Economic Drivers of the Maoist Insurgency." In *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, eds. Karen Ballantine and Jake Sherman, London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2003, 107–132.
- Egwu, S. "The Political Economy of Rural Banditry in Contemporary Nigeria," In M.J. Kuna & Jibril Ibrahim (eds.), *Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria*, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development, 2016, Pp.14-68
- Francis, D. J. *Peace and Conflict Studies: An African Overview of Basic Concepts*, in S. Gaya-Best (eds). *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, 2007, Pp. 20-27.
- Nwolise, O. 'National Security and Sustainable Democracy', in *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, ed. E.O. Ojo, Ibadan: John Archers, 2006, 347–55.
- Nwolise, O. "National Security and Sustainable Democracy," in Emmanuel O. Ojo (ed.), *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Limited, 2008, Pp. 347-355
- Ogunbanwo, S. Quoted in Nwolise O.B.C. 'National Security and Sustainable Democracy', in *Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*, ed. E.O. Ojo Ibadan: John Archers, (2006), 349–50.

- Omitola, B. *between Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen: Organized Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria*, in a paper presented at the 5<sup>th</sup> Institute of Security Studies Conference on Crime and Crime Reduction (vol.14), 2014.
- Schilling, J. Opiyo, F. & Scheffran, J. *Raiding Pastoral Livelihood: Motives and Effects of Violent Conflict in North-Western Kenya*, in: *Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice*, 2, 25, (2012), 1-16
- Waever, O. *Politics of Security: The Concepts*: In Waever O. Buzar B. Kelstrup M. Lemaitre P. (eds). *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, 2011
- Weber, C. & James, L.M. *Designing security*, In Burgess JP (ed.) *Rutledge Handbook of New Security Studies*, London: Rutledge, 2010, 240-252
- Woodward, R. B. & Jenkins, H. *Soldiers Bodies and the Contemporary British Military Memoirs* In: Mcsorley K. (eds.) *War and the Body: Militarization, Practice and Experience*, Abingdon: Rutledge, 2013
- Zahar, M. "Protégés, Clients, Cannon Fodder: Civil- Militia Relations in Internal Conflicts." In *Civilians in War* (ed.) Simon Chester Man, London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2001, 43–65.

## **Journals**

- Abbas, I.M. *No Retreat No Surrender: Conflict for Survival between Fulani Cattle Herders and Farmers, In Northern Nigeria*, **European Scientific Journal**, Vol. 8 (1), 2018.
- Abbas, I.M. 'No Retreat, No Surrender Conflict for Survival between Fulani Pastoralists and Farmers in Northern Nigeria', **European Scientific Journal**, (8)1, 2014
- Adebayo, O.O. & Olaniyi, O.A. *Factors Associated with Pastoral and Crop Farmers Conflict in Derived Savannah Zone of Oyo State, Nigeria*. **Journal of Human Ecology**, 23(1), 2010, 71-74.
- Adekunle, O.A. & Solagberu, R. *Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict: A factor Analysis for Socio-Economic Conflict Variable among Arable Crop Farmers in North Central Nigeria*. **Journal of Human Ecology**, 30, 2010, 1-9.

- Adelakun, O.E. Adurogbangbe, B. & Akinbile, L.A. *Socio-Economic effects of Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict on Agricultural Extension Service Delivery in Oyo State, Nigeria*. **Journal of Agricultural Extension**, 19(2), 2015, 59-70.
- Adisa, R.S. & Adekunle, O. *Farmer-Herder Conflict: A Factor Analysis of Socio-Economic Conflict Variables among Arable Crop Farmers in North Central Nigeria*, **Journal of human ecology**, DOI:10.1080/09709274.2010.11906266.
- Ajibefun, M.B. *Social and Economic effects of the menace of Fulani Herdsmen Crises in Nigeria*, **Journal of Educational and Social Research**, 8(2), 2018, 133-139
- Ajibo, H. T. *Dynamics of Farmers and Herdsmen Conflict in Nigeria; the Implication of Social Work Policy Intervention*, **International Journal of Humanities and Social Science**, Vol.8 (7), 2018
- Albert, O. & Isine, B. *Causes, Effects and Resolution of Farmers-Nomadic Cattle Herders Conflict in Delta Nigeria*, in: **International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology**, 2009.
- Aliyu, K. M. Ikedinma H.A. & Akinwande A.E. *Assessment of Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict on National Integration in Nigeria*, **International Journal of Humanities and Social Science**, Vol.8 (10) October, 2018.
- Bunei, E. K. McElwee Gerard & Smith Robert, *"From Bush to Butchery: Cattle Rustling as an Entrepreneurial Process in Kenya"*, **Journal of Business and Economic Review**, University of Huddersfield, 2016
- Clack, W. *"The Extent of Livestock Theft in South Africa"* **Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology**, 26, 2, 2013: 84-85.
- Dawes, J. *"Do Data Characteristics Change According to the Number of Scale Points Used, An Experiment using 5-point 7-point and 10-Point Scales,"* **International Journal of Market Research**, 50(1): 2018, 61-77
- Djohy, G. *Thwarting Social Conflicts Regarding Water Resources access in Climate Change Context: Cattle Pastoralists' Schemes in Northern Benin*, **Journal of Livestock Science**, 4: 2013, 51-59.
- Doyin, T. *An Empirical Investigation to Incessant Killing in Nigeria*, **Journal of Philosophy**, Issue 5, 2017, 67-82.

- Floyd, R. *What is Security: Definition through Knowledge Categorization*, **Security Journal**, 23(3) 2019, 225-239.
- Gleditsch, N. P. Wallenstein P. Eriksson M. Margareta S. & Harvard S. "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," **Journal of Peace Research**, 39(5): 2002, 615–637.
- Gleditsch, P. Wallenstein, A. Mikael, E. Margareta, S. & Harvard, S., *Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset*, **Journal of Peace Research**, 39 (5): 2002
- Ibenwa, C.N. & Uroko, F.C. *The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna of Nigeria: Causes and Implication for National Development*, A paper presented at the international conference of the society for research and academic excellence, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Afro **Asian Journal of Social Sciences**, Vol.9 (2), 2018. ISSN 2229-5313, 6-9<sup>th</sup>, Pp. 9
- Imo, C.K. *The Demographic Implications of Nomadic Herdsmen and Farmers Clashes in Nigeria*, **International Journal of Development and Management Review**, (INJODEMAR), 2017
- Kinyua, K. Yakub, G. Kamau, N. & Bett, H. *Livestock Marketing Decisions among Pastoral Communities: The Influence of Cattle Rustling in Baringo District, Kenya*: **International Journal of Agricultural Management and Development**, 1, 3, 1 23, 2011.
- Kwaghga, B. *Herdsmen/Farmers Crisis: A Threat to Democratic Governance in Nigeria*, **Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Sciences**, 8 (11), 2018
- Ladan, S. *Forests and Forest Reserves as Security Threats in Northern Nigeria*, in: **European Scientific Journal**, ' 10, 35, 2014, 120-142
- Macartan, H. & Weinstein, J. M. "Who Fights?" *The Determinants of Participation in Civil War*, " **American Journal of Political Science**, 52(2): 2008, 436–455.
- Mawoli, M. & Adamu, A. *Solutions to Herders-Farmers Conflict in Nigeria: The Academic Perspectives and Business Implications*, **International Journal of Business & Entrepreneurship**, Vol. 10 (1), 2020, 101-112.

- Muldoon, O. T. Katrina, M. Nathalie, R. & Karen, T. “*Adolescents’ Explanations for Para-military Involvement,*” **Journal of Peace Research**, 45(5): 2018, 681–695.
- Ochuko, M. O. *Campus Cultism and the Intensity of Electoral Violence in Nigeria,*” **African Journal of Stability and Development**, Vol. 7 No. 2, 2013
- Ofuoku, A. & Isin, B. *Causes, Effects and Resolution of Farmers-Nomadic Cattle Herders Conflict in Delta Nigeria:* **International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology**, 2009, 256-263.
- Okoli, A.C. & Atelhe, G.A. 'Nomads against Natives: A Political Ecology of Herder/Farmer Conflicts in Nasarawa State, Nigeria', **American International Journal of Contemporary Research**, 4(2), 2014, 76-88
- Okoli, A.C. & Okpaleke, F.N. *Cattle Rustling and the Dialectics of Security in Northern Nigeria,* **International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science**, 2(1), 2014b, 109-117.
- Okoli, A.C. & Okpaleke, F.N. *Banditry and Crisis of Public Safety in Nigeria: Issues in National Security Strategies,* **European Scientific Journal**, 10(4), 2014a, 350-362
- Okoli, A. & Francis, O. *Cattle Rustling and the Dialectics of Security in Northern Nigeria,* in: **International Journal of Uberai Arts and Social Science**, 2014, 109 -117
- Okoroafor, N. Chikwen, U. & Enoch, S. *Ramifications of National Security; the Food Component;* **Journal of Global Studies**: 6(2), 2012.
- Olonisakin, I. A. & Nwankwo, C. F. “*Spatial Pattern of Climate Change and Farmer-Herder Conflict Vulnerabilities in Nigeria,*” **Geo Journal**, 86(6), 20 May 2020, 2691-2707
- Onuoha, C. F. *The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend,* **Security Journal**, Vol. 25 (2): 2012
- Osamba, J. *The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya,* in: **African Journal on Conflict Resolution**, 1, 2, 2000, 11-37

Oyeoku, E. K. Verumun, C.G. & Nkem, F.A. *The Media and Displacements: News Frames of Victims of Herders/Farmers Conflict in Nigeria*, **Journal of Refugee Studies**, 34 (4), 2021, 4428-4444

Udemezue, J.C. & Kanu, N.A. *Challenges of Nigerian Agricultural Sector in the Twenty Century: The Case of Nomadic Insurgence and Terrorist Sects*, **Universal Journal of Agricultural Research**, 7(2), 2019, 117-124

Yikwab, Y. P. & Tade, O. *How Farming Communities Cope With Displacement Arising from Farmer-Herder Conflict in North Central Nigeria*, **Journals.sagepub.com**, 2021

### **Magazine Articles**

Christopher, I. & Ndubuisi, C.A. *Critical Analysis of Conflicts between Herdsmen and Farmers in Nigeria: Causes and Socio-Religious and Political Effects on National Development*, **AOSIS Publishing**, Vol. 74, No. 1, 2018

Kwaja, C. *Blood, Cattle, and Cash: Cattle Rustling and Nigeria's Bourgeoning Underground Economy*, in: **West African Insight**, 4, 3, 2014, 1-6.

Wasinski, C. *On Making War Possible: Soldiers, Strategy and Military Grand Narrative*, **Security Dialogue**, 42(1) 2011.

### **Newspapers**

A Statement by the President of the Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore Fulani Socio- Cultural Group, Bodejo Abdullahi Bello is instructive on this point. He stated, at a joint news conference with the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, that “Anywhere you keep this volume of cows we have now, for two weeks, they will eat out everything and you will have ecological disaster,” Jimoh Abbas, “Grazing Laws: Nigerian Cows Unsuitable for Ranching” Daily Trust, Nigeria, 19 November 2017

Dada, P. “*Fulani Herdsmen Set Falae’s Five-Hectare Oil Palm Plantation Ablaze*”

*Punch* (Akure, 21 January 2018) <[http://punchng.com/breakingfulani-](http://punchng.com/breakingfulani-herdsmen-set-olu-falae-farm-ablaze/)

[herdsmen-set-olu-falae-farm-ablaze/](http://punchng.com/breakingfulani-herdsmen-set-olu-falae-farm-ablaze/)> accessed 19 June 2018. See also Sahara

Reporters, “Suspected Fulani Herdsmen Set Ablaze Olu Falae’s Farm in Ondo”

*Sahara Reporters* (New York, 21 January 2018)

<[http://saharareporters.com/2018/01/21/suspected-fulani-herdsmen-set-ablaze-](http://saharareporters.com/2018/01/21/suspected-fulani-herdsmen-set-ablaze-olufalae-farm-ondo/)

[olufalae-farm-ondo](http://saharareporters.com/2018/01/21/suspected-fulani-herdsmen-set-ablaze-olufalae-farm-ondo/)>

*Daily Post Nigeria*, 10 December 2021, <<http://dailypost.ng/2017/12/04/breaking-suspected-herdsmen-attackvillages-Ondo>>

Duru, P. *7000 Persons Displace in Fulani Herdsmen, Agatu Farmers Clash in Benue*, Vanguard Newspaper, February 29, 2016.

Emeka, M. & Clifford N. *'710 Nigerians Killed by Fulani Herdsmen in 10 Months - Igbo Youth Movement'*, Vanguard News, 27 April, 2016, p. 1

Premium Times, “How Climate Change Is Spurring Land Conflict in Nigeria, 28 June 2018.

Vanguard Newspaper, *Bloodbath in Enugu on Fulani Herdsmen Kill 40*, Retrieved from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/04/bloodbath-enugu-fulani-herdsmen-kill-40>

### **Periodical Articles**

African Union, *Political Framework for pastoralism in Africa: Securing, protecting and improving the lives, livelihoods and rights of pastoralist communities*, 2013, <https://au.int/en/documents/20110131/policy-framework-pastoralism-africa-securing-protecting-and-improving-lives>

Albert, I.O. Danjibo, N. & Albert, O.O. *Back to the Past: Evolution of Kidnapping and Hostage Taking in the Niger Delta, Nigeria*. **Beijing Law Review** 11(01): 2020, 211-226.

- Arjona, A. & Stathis, N. K. “*Rebelling Against Rebellion: Comparing Insurgent and Counter-insurgent Recruitment*,” Presented at the **Crisis Workshop**, March, 2009, 17–18.
- Asylum Research Consultancy Nigeria: *The Situation of Indegene-Settlers*, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017.
- Baca, M. W. *My Land, Not your Land, Farmer-Herder Wars in the Sahel*, **Foreign Affairs**, 21 August 2015.
- Bergen, P. L. ‘*The Long Hunt for Osama*’, *Atlantic Monthly*, Washington, DC: **Atlantic Monthly**, 2004.
- Bukari, K.N. Sow, P. & Scheffran, J. *Cooperation and Co-Existence between Farmers and Herders in the Midst of Violent Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Ghana*, **African Studies Review**, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2018.
- Charlton, A. R. & Berenbaum, R. M. ‘*Warlords and Militarism in Chad*’, **Review of African Political Economy**, 15, 1989, 45/46.
- ECOWAS/OECD, *Livestock and Regional Market in the Sahel and West Africa, Potentials and Challenges*, **Abuja/Paris**, 2008
- Egbuta U. *Understanding the Farmer-Herder Conflict in Nigeria*, **ACCORD**: Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2018.
- Eke S. ‘*Nomad Savage*’ and *Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Nigeria: the (Un) Making of an Ancient Myth*. **Third World Quarterly**, 41 (5), 2020, 745-763
- Fearon D. J. & Laitin D. D. “*Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War*,” **American Political Science Review**, 97(1): 2013, 75–90.
- Francis D. J. *The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali*, Norwegian Peace-Building Resource Centre (**NOREF**) Report, 2005
- Gutiérrez, A. “*Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War*” **Politics & Society**, 36(1): 2008, 3–34.

- Harff B. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,” **American Political Science Review**, 97(1): 2013, 57–73.
- Hoefler A. & Collier P. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” (**Oxford Economic Papers**), 2014, 563–595
- International Crisis Group, “Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem,” **Report** No. 288, May 18, 2020.
- Köster, H. W. & Wolff, J. *Dairy Development Programme in Nigeria Baseline Report: Key Findings and Recommendations*, Alabama: **IFRC**, 2012.
- Kwaja, C. *Blood, Cattle, and Cash: Cattle Rustling and Nigeria's Bourgeoning Underground Economy*, in: **West African Insight**, 4, 3, 2014, 1-6.
- Samiri, M. *Nigeria Threatened by Desertification*, **Environs News**, Nigeria, 2018-11-18.

## **Books**

- Abdul, R. & Ehrhardt, D. (eds). *Creed and Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations and Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria*, Oxford: James Curry, 2018, ISBO 978-1-8471-1069
- Akwara, U. *The Attack of Herdsmen on Farmers in Nigeria: The Problems and Solutions, Nigeria*: Weafri Well Services Co, 2018, 256-263.
- Alao, A. Mackinlay J. & Olonisakin F. *Peacekeeper, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process*, New York: The UN University, 1999
- Albert, O.I. Williams, O.O. & Aremu, O. *Research Methods in Peace and Conflict Studies*, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 2014, ISBN: ISBN 978-93306-5-2.
- Alden, C.M. & Arnold, M., *Militias and the Challenges of Post-Colonial Peace: Silencing the Guns*; Zed Books, London, New York, 2011.

- Al-Jazeera, "Message to United States October 2003," Al Jazeera. Amnesty International, 1999 'Uganda: *Breaking the Circle: Protecting Human Rights in the Northern War Zone*', London: Macy, 18 October 2003
- Aluko, I. O. *Urban Violence Dimension in Nigeria: Farmers and Herders Onslaught*. *Agathos* 8(1), 2017, 187
- Amusan, L. Abegunde, O. & Akinyemi, T. E. *Climate Change, Pastoral Migration, Resource Governance and Security: the Grazing Bill Solution to Farmer-Herder Conflict in Nigeria*, *Environmental Economics*, 2017, 35-45
- Angstrom, J. 'Debating the Nature of Modern War' in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, London: Frank Cass, 2005.
- Aremu, A.B. & Lawal, L.O. *Tourism Development and Sustainable Economic Development*: 2018, 256-263.
- Asogwa, E. C. *Internet-Based Communications: A Threat or Strength to National Security*, SAGE, Nd. 10c2, 2020.
- Azam, J. P. *On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords victimize their own Civilians*. *Economics of Governance*, 7(1): 2006, 53–73.
- Babawale, T. "The Rise of Ethnic Militias, De-legitimization of the State and the Threat to Nigeria," Ibadan; Ibadan University Press, 2001
- Berdal, M. & Malone, D. (eds). *Greed and Grievance Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
- Bergen, P. L. 'The Long Hunt for Osama', *Atlantic Monthly*, Washington, DC: Atlantic Monthly, 2004.
- Blench, R. *The Fire Next Time: the Upsurge in Civil Insecurity across the Central Zone of Nigeria*, Cambridge: Kay Williamson Educational Foundation, 2016.
- Burton, G. *Background Report: The Fulani Herdsmen*, Project Cyma Publication, 2016, 1-18.

- Cabot, C. *Climate Change and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in West Africa, In Climate Change, Security Risks and Conflict Reduction in Africa*, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2017.
- Clausewitz, V. C. *On War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; 1832.
- Collier, P. & Hoeffler A. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," CSAE WPS/2002–01
- Penu, DAK & Palo, S.A. *Institutions and Pastoralist Conflicts in Africa: A Conceptual Framework*, SAGE, 2021.
- Diamond, J. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997: 47-48
- Dongm, O. A. *Herding Territories in Northern Cameroon and Western Burkina Faso: Spatial Arrangements and Herd management, Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice*, 2012, 2:26
- Egbata, U. *Understanding the Herder-Farmer Conflict in Nigeria*, Sabinet, 2018
- Engels, F. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, London, Penguin, 1884, 2010, Pp. 219.
- Ezeonwuka, I. & Orizu, O.N. *Fulani Herdsmen Attacks on Farming Communities: Psychological Farmer-Herder Clashes Amplify Challenge for Beleaguered Nigeria Security*, IPI Global Observatory, 16 July 2015
- Galtung, J. *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*, Sage Publications, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969, pp. 167-191
- Gebre, M. Y. & Hadgu, K. "Addressing Pastoralist Conflict in Ethiopia," *The Case of the Kuraz and Hamer Sub-Districts of South Omo Zone*, Safer World, 2005
- George, J. Adelaja, A. Awokuse, T. Titus, A. & Vaughan, O. *Terrorist Attacks, Land Resource Competition and Violent Farmer-Herder Conflicts*, Land Use Policy, 102, 2021, 105241.ISSN:0264-8377
- Gill, P. "Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative and Causal Qualities of Group-Based Behaviors," *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 17(6): 2012, 565–574.

- Gleick, P.H. *Water, Drought, Climate Change and Conflict in Syria*, American Meteorological Society, Washington, 2010
- Gurr, T. R. *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Haan, D. *Pastoralism Development in the Sahel: A Road to Stability?* World Bank: Global Center on Conflict, Security and Development, 2014.
- Hameiri, S. & Jones L. *Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Keen, D. *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
- Krahmann, E. *New Threats and New Actors in International Security*, Amsterdam, Springer, 2005, 125 – 128
- Lichbach, M. “*What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action*,” *World Politics* 46(3): 2014, 383–418
- Lichbach, M. *The Rebel’s Dilemma*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015.
- Mkutu, K. A. *Pastoral and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Africa Peace Forum/Safer wood/ University of Bradford, Bradford, 2011
- Ndubuisi, C.I. *A Critical Analysis of Conflicts between Farmers and Herdsmen in Nigeria, Causes and Socio-Religious and Political Effect on National Development*, ADSIS Publishing, Vol.74 (1), 2018
- Nwozor, A. Olanrewaju, J.S & Oshewolo, S. *Herder-Farmer Conflicts: The Politicization of Violence and Evolving Security Measures in Nigeria*, Taylor and Francis, 2021
- Aluko, O. I. *Agricultural Policy and Food Security in Nigeria: A Rational Choice Analysis*, Springer, 2020
- Olaniyan, A. & Yahaya, A. *Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern Nigeria*, Africa Spectrum, 2016

- Olusola, O. *Farmer/Herdsmen Conflict and Security Governance in Nigeria*, M.sc Dissertation, University of Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 2019, Pp.18
- Onuoha, C. F. The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained, *African Security Review*, 19(2), 54 – 67, Publishing, Rome-Italy, Vol.5 (16), 2014
- Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, Oyo State, 2017, s 3(c)*
- Osaghae, E. *Conflicts without Borders: Fulani Herdsmen and Deadly Ethnic Riots in Nigeria*, University Press, Ibadan, 2017, 49-66.
- Osaghae, E. "Ethnicity and its Management in Africa: The Democratization Link", CASS Occasional Monograph No 2. Malt House Press Ltd, Lagos, 1994.
- Collier, P. "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective." In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, eds. Mats B. & Malone D.M. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, 91–111.
- Petersen, R. *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Richard, H. & Shultz, Jr. *Security Studies for the 1990s*, Washington, Brassey, (US) 1993
- Robert, J. A. & Jervis, R. *International Politics* 2nd ed., Boston: Little, Brown, 2015.
- Saleem, M.A. Mohammed- Report Submitted to FAO, Rome, on *Feed and Forage Potential of Awe and Keana Grazing Reserves*, Plateau State, Nigeria, 1987.
- Sambanis, N. "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War," *Defense and Peace Economics*, 13(3): 2012, 215–243.
- Sani, I. S. "Building of a Community Cattle Ranch and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology as Alternative Methods of Curtailing Cattle Rustling in Katsina State," *Pastoralism*, 6.1, 2016.
- Smith, R. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in Modern World*, London; Penguin Books, Allen Lane, 2005.

- Tauna, A. & Satya, A. *Understanding Inter-Pastoralists Conflicts in Uganda: The Cattle Raiding Phenomenon in Kapchorwa District, Stadts chlaining*: Centre for Peace Studies, European Peace University, 2004.
- Tonah, S. Setrana, M.B. & Arthur, J.A. *Migration and Development in Africa: Trends, Challenges, and Policy Implications*. NY: Lexington Book, 2017.
- Valentino, B. Huth, P. & Dylan, B. L. *Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare*, International Organization, 58(1): 2007, 375–407.
- Vinci, A. "The 'Problems of Mobilization' and the Analysis of Armed Groups," *Parameters*, 36(1): 2016, 49–62
- Vinci, A. *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents*, London, Routledge, 2008.
- Vinci, A. *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents*, Routledge. New York, 2009
- Weinstein, M. J. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

## Interviews

Ahmed A. Deputy Commissioner of Police, (DPO), Ogun State

Ajayi M. Deputy Commissioner of Police, (DPO), Igboora, Oyo State

Albert, O. & Oyesoji, A. Graduate Research Clinic, University of Ibadan, A Watzapp Group Scholarly Interrogation on Whether Fulani Herdsmen are Armed Groups or not. 2020.

Akinteru, A. & Jiji, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, Oyo State Chapter (MACBAN) in a face-to-face interview, August 5, 2021 by 3pm at Seriki Sasha residence, Ibadan

Atilola, S. In a face-to -face interview, August 19, 2020 by 1pm at Sunbeam farm,  
Akufo road, Ibadan

Chief Kamorudeen, Chairman Agbekoya Farmers Association, South West Nigeria,  
2021

Dr. Lawal & Dr. Nathaniel Danjibo of the Institute of Peace and Conflict, University  
of Ibadan

Mr. Akinteye, Director General, DAWN Commission, Cocoa House, Ibadan, Oyo  
State

Oyo State Secretary, House Committee on Agriculture, Oyo State House of Assembly,  
Secretariat, Ibadan.

Taiwo Adeagbo, Secretary of Ibarapa Farmers Association, Ibarapa, Oyo State

#### **Thesis / Dissertation (Unpublished)**

Aliyu, A.S. *Causes and Resolution of Conflict between Cattle Herders and Crop Farmers in Katsina State*, A published M.Sc. Dissertation by the School of Post Graduate Studies, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, 2015, 1-74

Biro, D. *State-Failure or Polity-Creation? World Politics beyond State-Centrism*, PhD thesis, Canberra, Australian National University, 2015

Downes, A. *“Targeting Civilians in War,”* PhD dissertation at the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2004

Okeke, C.O. & Ibenwa, C.N. *'The Igbo example of Conflicts between African Traditional Religion and Christianity in Eastern Nigeria'*, 2017, unpublished article.

Oyesola, D.B. *Training Needs for Improving Income Generating Activities of Agro Pastoral Women in Ogun State, Nigeria.* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation),

Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ibadan, 2000

Oyetunde, O. *Farmer/Herdsman Conflict and Security Governance in Nigeria*, Unpublished M.sc Dissertation, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, University Press, 2019, p.18

Shittu, M.O. *Farmers and Herders Conflict, In South-West Nigeria, From 2011-2019*; Unpublished M.sc Thesis, Department Of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Social Science, National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN), 2020

### Websites

Adejumo, K. *Special Report: Lanlate: How Armed 'Herdsman' Kill, Kidnap Farmers in Oyo Community*, Available at <https://www.premiumtimesng.com>/Retrieved January 02 2021

Adeniyi, T. *Why Incoming FCT Minister Must Act Cattle Rustling*, in: Daily Trusty 1 July, online: [www.dailytrust.com](http://www.dailytrust.com)/ [daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling](http://daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling), 2015

African Union Commission: *African Union in Mediation*, Retrieved from [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3B408148510828464925779F00068B10-AU\\_Mediation.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3B408148510828464925779F00068B10-AU_Mediation.pdf). 2009

Akinkuolie, R. *Herdsman /farmers clashes: Problems and solutions*. The Guardian, <https://guardian.ng/opinion/herdsmen-farmers-clashes-Problenis-and-solutions>

*Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, Unidentified Armed Groups*, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03815> Accessed: 04-05-2020 10:08 UTC, 2012.

Atoyebi, O. *Fulani Herdsmen Attack Oyo Farmers*, Available at <https://punchng.com/> Retrieved Available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/01/insecurity-why-fulani-herders-must-leave->

Bashir, M. *Hopes for an End to Cattle Theft*, in: Daily 4 September, 2016, online: [www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/feature/hopes-for-an-end-to-cattie-theft](http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/feature/hopes-for-an-end-to-cattie-theft)

- Blench, R. *The Transformation of Conflict between Pastoralists Cultivators in Nigeria*, 2003 online: [www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf](http://www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/der-farmer%20conflict%20in%20Nigeria.pdf).
- Clark, H. *Over 6,000 Nigerians in Christian-Identified Communities Murdered or Maimed by Fulani Muslims in 2018*, Retrieved from <https://christiannews.net/2018/07/11/over-6000-nigerians-in-christian-identified-community-ties-murdered-or-maimed-by-Fulani-Muslims-in-2018/>.
- Leme, A.U. *Understanding Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict and the Way Forward* 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.thecable.ng/understanding-farmers-herdsmen-conflict-way-forward>
- Mohammed, A. & Baba, Y.T. *Herdsmen-Farmers' Conflicts and Rising Security Threats in Nigeria*, Researchgate.net, 2018
- UN report warns” *UN News*, 29 November 2006 <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/11/201222-rearing-cattle-produces-more-greenhouse-gases-driving-cars-un-report-warns>> accessed 20 June 2018. See the full report: Livestock, Environment and Development Initiative, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Livestock's Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options* (FAO 2006) <<http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e.pdf>>
- Danielle, O. *Governor Shettima Claims Boko Now Sell Stolen Cattle to Fund Terror Campaigns*, in: Daily Post, March, online: <<http://dailypost.ng/2016/03/05/orno-governor-shettima-claims-boko-haram-now-sell-stolen-cattle-to-fund-terror-campaigns>>
- Decision A/Dec.5/10/98 relating To the Regulation on Transhumance between ECOWAS Member States” 1998, 35 Official Journal of the Economic Community of Western American States <<http://ecpf.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Decision-1998-English.pdf>>
- Desmond, K. *Three Fulani Herdsmen Arrested with Bloodstained Cutlass*: <https://focusnaija.com.ng/2021/02/22/three-fulani-herdsmen-arrested-with-gun-and-bloodstained-cutlass>,
- Enojo, K. *Political Violence and Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Implications for Sustainable Development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic*, 2010. Available at <https://oer.kogistateuniversity.edu.ng/read/political-violence-and-ethno-religious-conflicts-implications-for-sustainable-development-in-nigerias-fourth-republic>. Accessed

- Environment and Development Initiative, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Livestock's Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options* (FAO 2006) <<http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e.pdf>>
- Fiki, N. A. *Drought-Related Conflicts, Management and Resolution in the West African Sahel*, Human Security and Climate Change International Workshop, Oslo; Sweden, Retrieved from [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong\\_Fiki.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong_Fiki.pdf). 2005
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “*The Approach – Facing the Challenge*” <<http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/x3810e/x3810e04.htm>> accessed 2 April 2018.
- Garba, M. *Nigerian Govt. says 204 killed in Southern Kaduna Crisis*, viewed 28 January 2018, from <http://www.trezyhelm.com/2016/12/more-graphic-photos-from-fulani.html?m=1>
- Gefu, J.O. & Kolawole, A. *Conflict in Common Property Resource Use: Experiences from an Irrigation Project, Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property*, 2002. Retrieved from <http://d/c.dlib.Indiana.edu/archive/00000823/00/gefuj080502.pdf>
- Gidley, M. J. & Hans, J. *Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective*. Small Arms Survey. URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10752.13> 2007.
- Global Terrorism Database, ‘Codebook: *Inclusion Criteria and Variables*’, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook>. Pdf. 2012
- ILO, U.J. Ichaver, J. & Adamolekun, Y. “*The Deadliest Conflict you’ve Never Heard of: Nigeria’s Cattle Herders and Farmers Wage a Resource War.*” *Foreign Affairs* (January, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2019-01-23/deadliest-conflict-youvenever-heard>. 2019
- Ingawa, S.A. Ega, L.A. & Erhabor, P.O. *Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict in Core-States of the National Fadama Project*, retrieved from <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/30459435/CASESTUDY-ON-FADAMA-CONFLICT-ISSUES>, 1999.
- International Crises Group. *Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s expanding Deadly Conflict*, Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/Africa/west-africa/Nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-Nigeria’s-expanding-deadly-conflict>., 2017

- International Crisis Group, *Stopping Nigeria's Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence*, 2018 Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence>,
- Ki-moon, B. *United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation* Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation\\_UNDPA2012%28english%29\\_0.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf)
- Kok, A. "Natural Resources, The Environment and Conflict" (*African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*, 19 November 2009) <<http://www.accord.org.za/publication/natural-resources-the-environmentand-conflict/>>
- Leadership, *Combating Cattle Rustling Digitally: The El-Rufai Model*, 26 August, 2016 online: <<http://leadership.ng/opinions/456170/combating-cattle-rustling-digitally-the-el-rufai-model>>
- Leme, U. A. *Understanding Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict and the Way Forward*, Retrieved from <https://www.thecable.ng/understanding-farmers-herdsmen-conflict-way-forward> 2017
- Ludovica, I. 'Nigeria Fulani Militants: Herdsmen accused of Killing 1,200 people in 2014', viewed 28 January 2018, from <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-fulani-militants-herdsmen-accused-killing-1200-people-2014-1530042>
- National Express: *Cattle Rustling Could Be More Dangerous than Boko Haram*, in: National Express, 4 February, 2016 online: <[www.national-express.com/ng/cattle-rustling-could-be-more-dangerous-than-boko-haram](http://www.national-express.com/ng/cattle-rustling-could-be-more-dangerous-than-boko-haram)>
- Negedu, G.O. *Constraints to Cassava Production in Ilorin South L.G.A, Kwara State, Nigeria*, Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, University of Ilorin, Nigeria, Retrieved from <http://www.kwarastate.gov.ng/ministry-of-agriculture-and-naturalresources.html>.2005
- Nyong, A. & Fiki, C. *Drought-Related Conflicts, Management and Resolution in the West African Sahel*, Human Security and Climate Change International Workshop, Oslo; Sweden, Retrieved from [http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong\\_Fiki.pdf](http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Nyong_Fiki.pdf). 2005
- Otunuga, A. *Why the Fulani Herdsmen & Farmers Fight: How Climate Change & the Boko Haram Crisis Created the Crisis*, 2016 Retrieved from <https://saharareporters.com/2016/06/03/why-fulani-herdsmen-farmers-fithg-how-climate-change-boko-haram-crisis-created-crisis-and>.
- Premium Times Nigeria, *How to Resolve Herdsmen Crisis- Nigerian Working Group*, 2018 Retrieved from

<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/topnews/255364-resolve-herdsmen-crisis-Nigerian-working-group.html>,

Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 3709, See also “Rearing Cattle Produces More Greenhouse Gases than Driving Cars, UN report warns” *UN News* (29 November 2006) <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/11/201222-rearing-cattle-produces-more-greenhouse-gasesdriving-cars-un-report-warns>> See the full report: Livestock

Rejecting calls by the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders’ Association for the amendment of the law to accommodate their wishes, Governor Ortom, among other things, stated that the law “...was popularly made by Benue people and it has come to stay”. Toromade Samson, “Ortom Vows to Keep Anti-Open Grazing Law despite Herdsmen Threat” (*Pulse NG*, 12 January 2018) <<http://www.pulse.ng/news/local/ortom-vows-to-keep-anti-open-grazing-lawid7837835>>

Slater, R. “*Social Protection and Basic Services in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations*, Retrieved on October 7, 2013 from <http://www.Securelivelihoods.Org/publications>

Taiwo, A. Why Incoming FCT Minister Must Act Cattle rustling, in: Daily Trusty 1 July, 2015 online: [www.dailytrust./daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling](http://www.dailytrust./daily/index.php/city-news/58662-why-incoming-fct-administration-must-act-fast-on-cattle-rustling)

Tauna, A. *We Have Tamed Cattle Rustling, We Will Tame Kidnapping* - Northern Governors, in: Daily Post, 30 January, 2016 online

The Cable *Youth Leaders Defy Makinde, insist Herders must vacate the Oyo Community*, Available at <https://www.thecable.ng/> Retrieved January 30 2021

**Appendix (1)**

Oyo State Anti-Open Grazing and Livestock Rearing Law

**Assented to by me this 31<sup>st</sup> day October 2019**

.....

**Engr. Seyi Makinde**  
**His Excellency, the Executive Governor**



**OYO STATE OF NIGERIA**

**NO. 17**

**A LAW TO PROHIBIT OPEN REARING AND GRAZING OF LIVESTOCK  
AND PROVIDE FOR THE REGULATION OF ACTIVITIES OF HERDSMEN  
AND FOR CONNECTED PURPOSES**

Date of Commencement.

( )

Enactment.

**ENACTED** by the House of Assembly of Oyo State of  
Nigeria as follows:

Short Title

1. This Law is cited as Oyo State Open Rearing and  
Grazing

Regulation Law, 2019

Interpretation

2. in this Law-

“Cattle” means bulls, cows, oxen, heifers and calves;

“Chairman” means a Chairman of Local Government  
Area or any person charged with the responsibility of the  
Local Government Area;

“Citizen” means any Nigerian citizen with verifiable  
means of identification such as International Passport or  
National Identity Card or national Driver’s License and  
Permanent Voters Card;

“Commercial Ranch” means a large farm for breeding  
and raising livestock;

“Commissioner” means the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development or any person charged with the responsibility of the Ministry;

“Committee” means the Local government Advisory Committee established under section 28 of this Law to represent the interest of stakeholders at the grassroots level;

“Community” includes village, hamlet, farm settlement and urban areas;

“Department” means the Department of Animal Husbandry Services of the Ministry;

“Farmer” means arable farmer and pastoralist;

“Governor” means the Governor of Oyo State;

“Herding” means the act of bringing livestock together into a group, maintaining the group, and moving the group from place to places;

“Herdsman” means a person who raises livestock and causes them to graze on land or river and includes an owner or agent of the livestock owner or herd of livestock;

“Land” means any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever, and everything annexed to it, whether by nature, or by man;

“Land grabbing” means any illegal, forceful and violent takeover of land in the State by individual, group or association;

“Lease” means to hire out a piece of land for a specified period of time in return for a fee called rent;

“Livestock” means camels, cattle, horses, mules, donkeys, sheep, goats, antelopes, (domesticated) and swine, and includes any animal, which the Governor may by notice in the State Gazette declare to be included in the term “Livestock” for the purpose of this Law;

“Local Government Area” includes Local Council Development Area;

“Ministry” means Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development;

“Minor” means any person under the age of 18years;

“Open Grazing” means the act of pasturing livestock to feed on dry grass, growing grass, shrubs, herbage, farm crops, in open field without any form of restriction;

“Offensive weapons” include dagger, gun, knife, sword or any other weapon that can be harmful to man;

“Open Grazing Prohibition Task Force” means the Livestock Open Rearing and Grazing Prohibition Task Force established under section 22 of this Law;

“Permit” means the ranching permit issued under this Law for the purpose of setting up and running a ranch;

“Personal Ranch” means an enclosed area used by the owner of such area to contain livestock that is strictly for personal consumption and not for commercial purposes;

“Ranch” means a secured area of land used for nurturing, grazing and rearing of livestock;

“Rustling” means the act of stealing or moving away livestock without the consent of the herdsman;

Objectives of this Law 3. The objectives of this Law are to-

- (a) prevent the destruction of farms, farm crops, community ponds, settlements and property by open rearing and grazing of livestock;
- (b) Prevent killings, sexual molestation and clashes between arable farmers and pastoralists;

- (c) Protect the environment from degradation and pollution caused by open rearing and grazing of livestock;
- (d) Optimize the use of land resources in the face of overstretched land and increasing population;
- (e) Prevent, control and manage the spread of animal diseases;
- (f) Create a conducive environment for large scale crop production; and
- (g) Reduce incidence of road accidents caused by open rearing and grazing of livestock.

Prohibition of open 4 (1) No person shall, as from the commencement of this Law,

Engage in rearing and grazing open rearing or herding or grazing of livestock in the State outside of livestock.

the permitted ranches.

- (2) A minor is prohibited from grazing, rearing or herding of livestock except under the supervision of an adult.
- (3) A minor who contravenes the provision of this section commits an offence, and the guardian or parent of the minor or owner of the livestock as the case may be shall

be vicariously liable on conviction to a fine of N300,000.00.

- Permit.
- (5). The Ministry shall issue or cause to be issued permits subject to the Governor's approval to graze livestock on such ranches to any herdsman wishing to set up ranches in the State, upon the payment of a permit fee prescribed in Schedule II to this Law:

Provided that

- (a) Permits shall only be issued to a Nigerian who is authorized to conduct business under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Preference shall be given in issuance of ranching permits to those within or near a district who are landowners interest in livestock business.
- (b) permits shall be for a period of three years and renewable after expiration, subject to the approval of the land owner and upon existence of other factors for the initial grant;
- (c) anybody who contravenes the provision of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section commits an offence and is liable on conviction to 5 years imprisonment or a fine of N500,000.00 or both.

- Application for ranch 6
- (1) A herdsman shall, apply in writing to the owner for the land which he requires as ranch whereupon he intends to site his ranch.
- (2) The owner, after consultation with community leaders and with the endorsement of the Kindred

head may grant his consent in writing for three years lease of the land and on such terms and conditions as the parties may agree upon.

- (3) The herdsman shall forward a written application for permit to the Ministry alongside the consent of the owner and the Kindred Head of the land.
- (4) The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources shall carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment of the land applied for.
- (5) A copy of the report of the Environment Impact Assessment shall be forwarded to the owner and the Kindred head of the land, within which the land is situated for considerations and their views thereon to be submitted at a joint meeting convened for that purpose by the Ministry within 30 days.
- (6) The report of the Environmental Impact Assessment if found suitable, by the owner and the Kindred Head of the land the owner shall recommend to the Ministry to issue permit to the herdsman.

- (7) Any person who contravenes the provision of subsections (1), (2), (3) and (6) is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 2 years imprisonment or a fine of N200, 000.00 or both.
- Issuance of permit      7.(1)      The Commissioner shall, upon the receipt of the recommendations of the Department, the owner and the Kindred Head of the land within which the land is situated, forward a report thereon to the Governor who may, if satisfied that the best interest of the public will be served approve the issuance of a ranching permit.
- (2)      The Ministry shall upon approval of the Governor, within 30 days issue a permit to the herdsman alongside regulations for fencing and other activities in accordance with this Law.
- (3)      The permit fee shall be as prescribed in Schedule Ii to this Law.
- (4).      Every ranch shall be fenced as shall be prescribed by the Ministry.
- Registration      8. (1)      A herdsman shall submit himself for registration to the Ministry with letter of recommendation from the Local Government of his settlement and

shall pay the fee specified in schedule I to this Law.

(2) The registration of a Herdsman shall be as prescribed in Schedule I to this Law.

(3) Every registered Herdsman shall be issued an identification card and shall wear such card at all times.

Penalty for non-registration 9 (1) Any herdsman who contravenes subsection (1) of section 8 is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 2 years imprisonment or a fine of N200, 000.00 or both.

(2) Any herdsman who contravenes subsection (3) of section 8 is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 1 year imprisonment or a fine of N100, 000.00 or both.

Payment to land owner 10(1) whenever any land has been approved for use as ranch, the Herdsman shall pay for lease of the land to the owner or any person whose interest in the land has been affected.

Publication of permit 11(1) The Ministry shall after the issuance of the permit, give notice thereof and cause it to be published in the State Gazette, specifying as

clearly as possible the location and limits of the land, the privileges conceded in respect of the land and any special conditions intended to govern the ranch.

- (2) The Ministry shall cause the particulars of the land upon which permit is issued to be made known in the community in which the land is situated by causing a notice thereof to be read and interpreted in the local language of the community and also cause a notice in writing to the communities or persons residing on or claiming interest in such land.

Exemption

12

Any person in the State who wishes to set up a personal ranch on his own land which shall not be above twenty (20) cattle shall be exempted from the provisions of section 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of this Law.

Lease and permit

13. (1)

The lease and permit granted under this Law shall not create any title, or estate to the land.

- Revocation of permit (2) The ministry may subject to the approval of the Governor revoke permit at any time without the payment of compensation to the herdsman for
- (a) Breach of State security; or
  - (b) Interest of peace; or
  - (c) Breach of any term or condition of the leasehold; or
  - (d) Overriding public interest as stipulated by the Land Use Act.
- Prohibition of sale of 14.(1) The sale, transfer, mortgage of any leased land to herdsman for the purpose of ranching, residence and other related purposes is prohibited.
- (2) A herdsman may under the permit, issued or cooperative agreement, approved by the Ministry, construct temporary structures and other improvements for the management of permitted livestock within the ranch.
  - (3) No permit shall entitle the herdsman to use improvements constructed or owned by a prior occupant until the herdsman has paid the prior occupant the reasonable value of the

improvements, as may be determined under the regulations made thereunder.

- (4) A herdsman may engage the service of registered security guard for the protection of his ranch.

Functions of the Ministry 15

The Ministry shall –

- (a) prescribe the number of livestock to be kept on a ranch;
- (b) control the settlement and activities of herdsman within the various communities in the State;
- (c) establish enforcement posts in the State for the purpose of monitoring activities within the ranches;
- (d) prescribe the number of ranches to be established in each zone of the State;
- (e) provide free technical expertise on the management and sustenance of ranch;
- (f) register and issue identification cards to Herdsmen;
- (g) have power to cancel or revoke the permit granted to any herdsman;
- (h) have power to cancel or revoke the registration of any herdsman, where any provisions of this Law is breached;
- (i) determine the compensation, if any, to be paid to any person who suffers any loss as a result of an infraction of any provision of this Law; and
- (j) perform any other function which are incidental or expedient to give effect to this Law.

Offence of open

16(1) Any person who engages in open rearing or

herding or rearing and grazing of livestock is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to

imprisonment for 5 years imprisonment or a fine of N500, 000.00 or both for the first offenders while subsequent offenders shall on conviction be liable to 10 years imprisonment or a fine of N2,000,000.00 or both.

- (2) Where the offence in subsection (1) causes-
- (a) damage to farm or crops or property of any person, the herdsman shall, after evaluation of the damage by the Ministry, pay the prevailing value of monetary compensation to the owner of the farm or crops or property so damaged.
  - (b) injury to any person, the herdsman is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for 5 years or a fine of N500,000.00 or both, in addition to paying the medical bill of the person and paying relevant compensation as the court may determine.
  - (c) the death of any person, the herdsman is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to be sentenced for unlawful

homicide under the Criminal Code Law in force in the State.

- Prohibition of movement      17 (1)      Movement of livestock on foot from one destination of livestock to another in the State is prohibited, except such movement is by rail wagon or truck or pick-up wagon and is within 7.00am to 6.00pm.
- (2)      Any person found moving livestock on foot within or across urban centers, rural settlements or any part of the State in contravention of subsection (1) of this section is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 5 years imprisonment or a fine of N500, 000.00 or both.
- Prohibition of use of      18 (1).      No herdsman shall use or possess offensive weapon      Within or outside the ranch
- (2)      Any herdsman who uses or possesses offensive weapon is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 2 years

imprisonment or a fine of N200, 000.00  
or both.

- Offence of land grabbing                      19                      Any person who grabs land for the  
  
purposes of residence or grazing or  
  
ranching or other purposes connected  
thereto is guilty of an offence and where-
- (a) a life is lost, liable on conviction to be sentenced, for unlawful homicide under the criminal code in force in the State; or
  - (b) no life is lost but grievous injury is caused, liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years or a fine not less than N500,000.00 or both, in addition to paying the medical bill of the victim.
- Offence of rustling.                      20. (1) Any person who rustles any livestock from any ranch is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than 5 years or a fine of N200,000.00 per livestock or both.
- (2)                      Where a rustler-
- (a)                      injures or maims any person while carrying out his activities, he shall on conviction be liable to 3 years imprisonment or a fine of N300,000.00 or both; or

(b) causes death, he is liable on conviction to be sentenced for unlawful homicide under the Criminal Code Law in force in the State.

(3) Any person convicted for the offence of rustling may, in addition pay compensation to the livestock owner as the court may direct.

Impoundment of livestock 21 (1) Where any livestock strays into any person's land other than a ranch and causes destruction to agricultural crops or contaminates any source of water supply, the herdsman is liable to pay damages or compensation to the owner or community with proprietary interest in the land or source of water as may be determined by a proper valuation ordered by the Ministry.

(2) Any livestock found grazing or wandering or herding in an area not permitted as a ranch shall be impounded

by the Ministry or any person authorized in that behalf.

(3) The Ministry or person authorized may release the livestock impounded to the herdsman upon showing good cause and after paying the prescribed fine and expenses to the land owner as may be determined by the valuation ordered by the Ministry.

(4) Any livestock impounded under this Law which is not claimed within 7 days of such impoundment shall—

(a) be sold on auction to the public without a valid court order; and

(b) the proceeds of such sale shall be paid to the landowner whose crop was destroyed or source of water supply contaminated.

Establishment of Open Rearing and Grazing Task Force.	22	There is a Livestock Open and Grazing Rearing or Grazing Prohibition Task Force (referred to in this Prohibition Task
---	----	---

		Force Law as “Open Grazing Prohibition Task Force”)
Composition of Open Rearing and Grazing Task Force	23	The Open Grazing Prohibition Task Force shall be composed of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development who shall be the Chairman of the Committee;</li> <li>(b) the Special Adviser to the Governor on Security;</li> <li>(c) The State Chairman of Community Vigilante Guards;</li> <li>(d) Representative of the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice not below the level of a Deputy Director;</li> <li>(e) Director of Animal Husbandry Services in the Ministry to serve as Secretary;</li> </ul>

(f) Director of Crops and Farm Settlement in the Ministry;

(g) A representative of each of the following –

(i) Commissioner of Police not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police;

(ii) Nigeria Immigration Services not below the rank of Deputy Comptroller;

(iii) Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps not below the rank of Deputy Commandant;

(iv) Department of State Security Services (DSS) not below the rank of Deputy of Director;

(v) Nigerian Legion of Ex-Service men not below the position of Chairman or Vice Chairman;

(g) The State Chairman of All Farmers Association

(h) State Chairman of MIYETTIH ALLAH CATTLE BREEDERS ASSOCIATION;

(i) A representative of the Conference of Oyo State Local Government Directors of Agriculture

Functions of the Open 24 The Open Grazing Task Force shall –

Grazing Prohibition  
Task Force

(a) promote cooperation among those interested in the use of ranches, such as herdsmen, State land officials of the State, Federal and International Agencies engaged in the Conservation or propagation of livestock and Wildlife;

- (b) Create awareness among the general public through seminars and symposia to ensure peaceful co-existence of herdsmen with the host community;
- (c) Take head count of livestock yearly for the purpose of taxation
- (d) Guarantee the safety of herdsmen and the community;
- (e) Ensure peaceful co-existence between herdsmen, farmers and host communities;
- (f) Organize yearly immunization for the cows against animal diseases for herdsmen that show evidence of tax payment;
- (g) Monitor the activities of herdsmen:
- (h) Determine and report extent of damage of any farmland, crop or source or water supply to the Ministry;

- (i) settle the emergence of any rift between local farmers and herdsmen;
- (j) Organize and hold meeting of the stakeholders;
- (k) Ensure that herdsmen pay taxes due to the coffers of the State;
- (l) Ensure that livestock graze only in ranches;
- (m) Perform or implement any other policy initiative as may be determined by the Governor;
- (n) Arrest and impound any livestock that is left by the herdsmen to ranch freely in contravention of any provisions of this Law;
- (o) Proscribe and provide guidelines for the minimum hygiene standards for meat and dairy products at the ranches;
- (p) Ensure compliance with all veterinary checks on livestock for guarantee or bio security measure; and

(q) Perform any other functions that are incidental or expedient to give effect to this Law

Remuneration of the Open Grazing Prohibition Task Force 25 The Open Grazing Prohibition Task Force shall be paid remuneration from contributions from the State and Local Governments and from donations as the Governor may determined.

Power of Arrest 26(1) the Open Grazing Prohibition Task Force or any of its members shall with or without the assistance of the security agencies have power to arrest and detain any person or group of persons who contravenes any provisions of this law and such person shall immediately be handed over to the relevant Security Agency

(2) The period of detention of such arrested person by the Grazing Prohibition Task Force or the security agencies shall not be more than 48 hours.

Protection against Liability No member of the Open Grazing Prohibition Task Force shall be liable to legal action, liability or demand on account of Anything done or omitted to be done in good faith and in Accordance with the provisions of this Law



- (i) Head of the Fulani in the Local Government;
- (j) A representative of the Department of State Security Services in the Local Government;
- (k) A representative each of the Christian, Islamic and traditional religious group; and
- (l) Baale Agbe of the Local Government

Functions of the Committee	30	<p>The Committee shall offer advice and make recommendations on permit or an application thereof: Provided that no Committee member shall Participate in any advice or recommendations in which he is directly or indirectly interested.</p> <p>(2) The Committee shall offer advice or make recommendations concerning rules and regulations for the administration of this Law, the establishment of ranches, the modification of the boundaries thereof and nay other matter affecting the administration of this Law within the area.</p>
Meeting of the Committee	31	<p>Each Committee shall meet at least once in a month, at a time to be fixed by the Committee and at such time as it may be Expedient</p>
Jurisdiction	32	<p>The High Court and Magistrate Court shall have jurisdiction to try offences Under this Law.</p>

Transitional 33 A herdsman shall within 6 months of the commencement of this provision law, establish a ranch and move the livestock under his control to the ranch.

Power to make 34 The Commissioner may, after consultation with the Governor, regulations make regulations for the carrying into effect of the purposes of this Law.

Repeal 35. The Nomadic Grazing Zone Law, 2003 is hereby repealed.

This printed impression has been carefully compared with the Law which has been passed by the Oyo State House of Assembly and found by me to be a true and correct printed copy of the Law.

Ms. Foluke Felicia Oyediran

Clerk of the State

House of Assembly

Rt. Hon. Ogundoyin Adebo Edward

Speaker of the State

House of Assembly

**Schedule 1**

**(Section 8)**

**(Form 01)**

**Oyo State Government**

**Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development**

**Department of Animal Husbandry Services**

**Registration Form for Herdsman**

**Registration Fee – N5, 000 per Herdsman**

**Local Government Area ( )**

Date Registration ( )

1. Name .....
2. State of Origin .....
3. Local Government of Origin .....
4. Age .....
5. Name of Parents or guardian  
Parent(s) .....
- Guardian .....
6. Details of Biometrics taken  
(a) Fingerprint .....
- (b) Facial Recognition/Passport Photograph .....
7. Identification Card  
(a) Issued ..... Yes / No
8. Number of livestock

.....  
**Signature or thumbprint of Applicant**

Appendix (2)



On the Field-Participant Interrogation Pictures by the Researcher with the Chairman Miyetti Allah Kaota and the Grand Patron in Ibadan, Oyo State



Researcher Field based Visit to Imoke Afon Cattle/Farm

Settlement in Ogun State, Nigeria



The Researcher interview visit to the Secretary,  
Oyo State House Committee on Agriculture,  
Secretariat, Ibadan, Oyo State

## Bio-data

Kehinde Adewale ADESIYAN

### Personal Data

Date of Birth: 19<sup>th</sup> April, 1975

Sex: Male

Marital Status: Married

State of Origin: Kwara

L.G.A: Irepodun

Religion: Islam

Nationality: Nigerian

Email: ademireal@gmail.com

<b>Institutions Attended</b>	<b>Academic Qualifications</b>	<b>Dates</b>
Lead City University, Ibadan	PhD International Relations, (Peace and Conflict)	(2022)
University of Ilorin, Ilorin	M.Sc. Political Science	(2006)
University of Ilorin, Ilorin	B.Sc. (Hons) Political Science	(1999)
University of Ilorin, Ilorin	Certificate in Data Processing	(2001)

General Certificate of Education	Senior School Certificate	(1993)
Kwara State Polytechnic, Ilorin	IJMB Certificate	(1993)

**Professional Institutions**

**Qualifications**

**Dates**

NIIT	Microsoft Certified System Engineering (MCSE), Server 2003 Editions.	(2011)
Microsoft	Microsoft Certified Professional (MCP), (Certifications)	(2010)
Microsoft	Microsoft Certified Technology Specialist (MCTS) Windows7 Configuration (Certifications)	(2010)

**Membership and Fellowships**

Fellow Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)

**Thesis/Publications**

Adesiyan, A.K. & Albert, M.O. *Security Challenges in South West Nigeria: Interrogating the Farmer- Herder Conflict in Oyo State (2015-2022)* **African Journal of International Affairs and Development, (AJIAD), Lead City University, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan. (Acknowledged)**

Adesiyan, A.K. & Albert, M.O. *Global Peace and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Critique of Russia-Ukraine War (2015-2022).* **Journal of Management and Social Sciences, Faculties of Management and Social Sciences, Redeemers University (Unpublished).**

Adesiyan, A.K. Privatization and the Management of Public Enterprises in Nigeria: An Appraisal of NITEL PLC. M.sc Thesis University of Ilorin, Ilorin, *Unpublished*.

Adesiyan, A.K. *The Politics of State Creation under the Shagari Administration*, The **Journal of Postgraduate Students University of Ilorin**, Vol.3 (1), (2002), 23 - 27.

Adesiyan, A.K. *Privatization and Commercialization of Nigerian Public Enterprises: Problems and Prospects*, the **Journal of Postgraduate Students Association, University of Ilorin Researcher**, Vol.4 (3) (2003), 116 – 128.

**Working Experiences:**

Imo State University, Ilorin Study Centre (Adjunct Lecturer)	2001-2003
Power Holding Company of Nigeria	2004-2013
Ibadan Electricity Distribution Company (IBEDC)	2013

**Hobbies**

Reading and Footballing

-----  
**Signature**

-----  
**Date**

### **University Compliance Certificate**

This is to certify that the thesis by Kehinde Adewale ADESIYAN with the Matric Number LCU/PG/000513 in the Department of POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan, is in full compliance with the approved university format and style.

-----

**Signature**

-----

**Date**

DO NOT COPY. LEAD CITY UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA