

Islamic Movement of Nigeria, State Terrorism and National Security

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Certification

This is to certify that **Joel Ikechukwu Ojiakor**, with matriculation number LCU/PG/0001382 carried out this research work titled “**Islaminc Movement of Nigeria, State Terrorism and National Security**” in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan, Oyo State, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in War and Strategic Studies.

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Dedication

This research work is dedicated to all the innocent Islamic Movement of Nigeria members killed, maimed and displaced by the Federal Government of Nigeria since December, 2015.

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“Even though the above-mentioned institutions and persons have assisted in the process of this research work, I alone stand responsible for the errors, if any, found in the work”.

Abstract

Throughout their non-violent rallies that started mid-December, 2015, the Nigeria Police Force have been ruthless with members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). The Nigerian government went a step further to label the religious body a terrorist organisation in 2019 without evidence or proof that IMN members were involved in any terrorist act. This is a breach to freedom of worship and violation of the human rights of Muslim members of the group. All these were sequel to the confrontation between IMN worshippers and troops of the Nigerian Military on December 12, 2015 that led to the killing of over 300 IMN members and one soldier, incarceration of many including its leader El-Zakzakky and wife, Zeenab. The aim of the study is to investigate Islamic Movement of Nigeria, State Terrorism and National Security. The study employed secondary sources of data collection such as journals, newspaper reports and editorials, magazines and so on. Some of the findings include mass killing and detention of IMN members, gross violation of their human rights, proscription of IMN, etc. Part of the recommendations include that the Federal Government should allow the rule of law to prevail, promote human rights and also avert extra-judicial killing of IMN leader to avoid another Boko Haram imbroglio. This will to a large extent reduce the violence between the warring parties. This is a new area with limited research that needs more studies especially Federal Government's penchant for disobeying valid court orders and mishandling Army and civil relations.

Keywords: Conflict, Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Terrorism, Nigeria, Democracy

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

The phenomena of social movements have always been an integral part of human existence. As long as two or more people exist, conflicts are bound to happen. Scholars of Peace Studies believe that conflict and crisis could only be managed while terrorism whether it emanates from the state or non-state actors or movements or leftists is inevitable due to man's desire for scarce resources, power and influence. Islamic Movements are significant players in the international arena¹. Numerous strides have been taken to identify and study effective conditions, elements and incentives on the formation motives, operations and impact of such movements.

These movements are seeking to revive Islamic identity by relying on Islam as an intellectual origin and saviour paradigm¹. They have emerged in response to one or more factors such as western colonization and domestic anarchy hasty secularization of Islamic societies, and indoctrination. Some authors employ various terms such as fundamentalism, and radicalism to describe these movements; such terms may not be viable to represent detailed and comprehensive nature of contemporary Islamic movements².

It is believed that, the contemporary global wave of Islamic Movements is a direct response to the global changes that constitute modernity. The modernization of societies, including the formation of nation-states, the organization of economies, technological and scientific developments, and the cultural and social changes that accompany this phenomenon have generated religious movements among Muslims, Christians, Jews and Hindus and other populist, and nationalist organizations³.

The formation of Islamic Movements is also influenced by subjective and intellectual factors like Islamic reformist instructions and religious orders concerning fighting against oppression, paganism, blasphemy, and attempting to establish a society bound together by religion. Therefore, all these movements stress the returning to Islamic values and reviving the original Islam as the only way out of the current crises in Islamic societies, even though some are mere materialistic quest within the real pursuit of Islamic values and interests.

There are a lot of Islamic Movements in the world today. Some of them are, the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan, Students Islamic Movement of India, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Sometimes, these religious movements are formed through a political party like the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan. The Islamic Movement in Afghanistan is a former faction of the Afghan Northern Alliance formed through the political party in 1978⁴.

The movement was led by Ayatollah Muhammad. In the 80s, the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan was part of the 'Tehran Eight', an alliance of Shia mujahedin factions supported by Iran that fought against the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government and Soviet troops. The movement joined the Hezb- Wahdat, which was intended as a united Shia political front, but soon pulled out of it⁴. Their activities revolve around challenging the constituted authority with the intent to change the polity to a religious one.

The banned Student Islamic Movement of India is another example of Islamic Movement around the world. The movement was formed in Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, in April 1977. The mission of this movement is to see to the "liberation of India" from Western

materialistic cultural influence and to convert its Muslim society to live according to the Muslim code of conduct⁵. Some years back, the Indian government described it as a ‘terrorist organization’, just the same way the Nigeria Government labelled IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra) and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) as terrorist groups⁶.

The Islamic Movement in Kurdistan is an Islamist group founded by Uthman Abd-Aziz and several other Sunnis who were all part of the non-political union called the “Union of Religious Scholars” in 1979⁷. The party’s major support comes from the region controlled by the movement. Even though the movement is reputed to have received aids in the form of money from Iran, the movement still holds some ministerial positions in government⁷.

Furthermore, Islamic Movement crept into the shore of Africa in 1928 when the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Ismailia, a city in north-eastern Egypt⁸. It was formed by Hassan al-Banna whose teachings spread far beyond Egypt, influencing various organizations. Just like every other Islamic Movement, the movement preached Islam in Egypt, educated the illiterate and set up hospitals and business enterprises⁸.

Nigeria is listed among one of the largest Muslim populations in Africa according to report from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)⁹. In addition to that, the British Broadcasting Corporation rate the Muslims in Nigeria to be over fifty percent¹⁰. Muslims in Nigeria are predominantly Sunni of the Maliki school of thought, that is, a religious believe that relies on the Quran and Hadiths as primary sources. However, there is a significant ‘Shiite’ minority, primarily domiciled in Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto states¹¹. Although, it is quite difficult to give statistics on the number of Shiite Muslims in

Nigeria, but what is important to know is that, a large number of them is located in the Northern part of the country.

Islamic Movement was almost unknown in Nigeria until the 1980s, when Ibraheem Zakzaky introduced Shiite as a student at Ahmadu Bello University, and began propagating Shiite around 1979, at the time of the Iranian revolution which saw Iran's monarchy overthrown and replaced with an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini¹². Due to his outspokenness in the university and some other events, Zakzaky gained popular followers among those disenchanted with the political and religious establishment¹³. The leader of the group strongly believed that, the establishment of a republic along similar religious lines in Nigeria would be feasible.

A major variable in the Nigerian polity is the relationship between religion and politics which some consider as inseparable despite the constitutional provision and secularity. While some support the notion of the separation of religion from politics, others believe both concepts must work hand-in-hand if domestic issues are to be set straight. While the actual role that religion plays in politics has remained debatable, the nexus between the two concepts has been established for long¹⁴.

Meanwhile, it is important to state clearly that religion does not make people good or bad. On the contrary, it is being used as an instrument of oppression and deceit in Nigeria. For some years now or probably in 2015, there has been an ongoing tension between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the central government which has generated many issues on human rights violations, banning and labelling the movement as terrorist group. El-Zakzaky and his followers had several violent confrontations with the Nigerian government due to their radical views and rejection of state symbols such as the coat of

arm, national anthem and the institutions of state¹⁵. As a result of his anti-state postures, El-Zakzaky was detained in nine prisons within 1981-1998¹⁶. To avoid further violent extremism, the then Gsovernor of Kaduna State, Ahmed Makarfi who was once the national Chairman of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) appointed El-Zakzaky as a Special Adviser. The clash of interest that has in so many ways affected the national security of Nigeria and the possibilities of a subsequent formation of new terrorist groups are some of the critical issues raised in this study.

Two massacres occurred in Zaria in 2014 and 2015. Before the 2014 massacre, there was a clash between the Shiite group and the Nigerian Police in 2009 during the Alquds procession, resulting in the death of four Shiites¹⁷. In July 2014 during another Alquds procession, the Nigerian army attacked the Shiites in what the Army claimed as a reprisal and raided the Husainiyyah. Three of El-Zakzaky's sons and thirty-four others were killed with an unknown number of injured^{17,18}.

The Shiite leader revealed that his sons were killed through torture by the Nigerian Army. The Islamic Human Right Commission report of 2014 indicted the Nigerian Army for various human rights violation. This enabled the Nigerian Army to set up an investigation committee in 2014 and no prosecutions were made. After the killings, Sheikh Ahmed Gumi, the son of Abubakar Gumi, one of the respected leaders of the Izala movement, published an open letter condoling El-Zakzky over the death of his sons and at the same noting sthat El-Zakzaky deserved what befell him because of his un-Islamic practices¹⁹.

On December 12, 2015, the Nigerian Army carried out a controversial assault against the Shia Muslims, mostly members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria which sparked debate among scholars. It was reported that, the attack led to the massacre of 348 civilians and

many others²⁰. The leader of the movement Zakzaky, was also injured in the incident and was captured by along with his wife and several of other members.

Amnesty International and Human Right Watch in their separate reports wrote that, the Nigeria government buried the bodies of the victims without the permission of the members of the family²¹. This incident led to Zakzaky's detainment and several protests has been organized by the group to seek solidarity and support for their leader²². It must be stated clearly that this same issue has threaten the national security of the country. Many people are homeless and government infrastructure are being damaged.

On 2 December, 2016, El Zakzaky was ordered to be released from Department of State Service within 45 days. The judge also announced that the justification for holding him for his own protection is not sufficient. Hence, El Zakzaky and his wife were to be paid the sum of 50 million Naira²³. Since the release went to the deaf ear of the federal government, many protests were organized in Abuja, Kaduna, Kano and other part of the country. More than 15 protests have been organized by the group and those led to confrontations with the security forces of Nigeria. On 22 July, 2016 the protest claimed many lives both of the Islamic Movement, police officers and a young reporter, Mr Precious Owolabi who was serving the country under the NYSC (National Youth Service Corps) scheme. A Deputy Commissioner of Police also lost his life during the clash²⁴.

On 5th August 2019, a Kaduna High Court Judge ruled that, El-Zakzaky, and his wife must be allowed to seek medical treatment and that Zakzaky could lose his life at any time and without medical treatment, there is no way they could stand to defend themselves at the court. Seven days later, he and her wife boarded flight on their way to India for medical treatment. However, there were contradictory reports in the media as both the

Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the central government argued on plans to scuttle the medical treatment. Upon arrival from India, security agents of the central government whisked his entourage, without allowing the leader of the sect to speak to the media.

The above explanation evoked a lot of research and among them is the rise of the movement in the northern part of Nigeria. Secondly, the leader of this Islamic Movement has been granted bail numerous times by competent court of jurisdiction but all went to the deaf ears of the central government hence, this has led to many protests and counter-protest in Abuja and its environs by El Zakzaky's followers. It was until the life of a serving corp member and a Deputy Superintendent of Police was lost that subsequent actions were taken by the central government. While the government sees the group as a threat to national security by obtaining a court order proscribing the group as a terrorist organization, concerned stakeholders in the human rights community see the arrest and continued detention of the group leader, Ibraheem Zakzaky by the Nigerian Police since December, 2015 as a big blow to human rights protection in Nigeria.

Thirdly, the researcher noted that the federal government seems to be handling the Islamic Movement in a similar way they handled the Boko Haram terrorist group, which turned violent a decade ago when its leader died in police custody. Also, the Nigeria government have been using the "state terrorist" approach to subdue members of IMN. State terrorism in this sense State terrorism is used to describe military operations whose primary targets are civilians. The main distinction is that state actors are responsible for the violence. Terrorism by a state is motivated by the "opportunity offered by the damage to scare others" as much as it is by the devastation of its intended victims. What binds these crimes

together, therefore, is not just a desire for retribution, but also a broader campaign of intimidation.

The flagrant disobedience of the Nigerian government to disobey court orders and the various attacks on members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria are seen within the purview of using state terrorist tactics to instil fear not only members of the IMN but also among Nigerians as a whole.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

There are concerns that the current situation in Nigeria is likely to spiral out of control, as deadly battles have broken out between security forces and Shiite Muslims. Several rallies, marches, and demonstrations were held by the Islamist Movement of Nigeria (IMN) to demand that their leader, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, be released from prison. Despite a Federal High Court judgment from December 2016 stating that El-Zakzaky and his wife "shall" be freed from jail into an accommodation that must be supplied for them within 45 days, he has been in custody since December 2015. The couple remained in detention for years following the court's ruling. ElZakzaky's Shi'ite followers have protested their leader's arrest on many occasions. Nonetheless, they will be released on bail in August of 2019.

The government sees the group as an "enemy of the state", a threat to security and a violently aggressive group, unleashing mayhem against the Nigeria State, especially in Kaduna state and its environs. This position of government has pinned it against those who feel that the best approach to this security challenge is to allow the rule of law, due process and protection of the fundamental rights of Nigerians to movement and assembly to be respected as constitutionally provided for. This has brought to the fore, the

relationship between protecting the national security interest of the Nigerian government and sovereignty on one hand; and preserving and guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of Nigerians.

Anxieties among the public and the international community as a result of the Nigerian government's employment of extreme forms of terrorism and violence have had a profound effect on our economy. By labeling IMN a terrorist organization and spreading fear among its members, the Nigerian government has been utilizing the "state terrorist" technique to control the organisation. Despite the abundance of research on the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), not one of these studies has focused on the organization's fundamental concerns—state terrorism and the alleged controversial threat it poses to Nigeria's national security. This is the gap the research intends to fill in scholarship.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The study aims to examine the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), state terrorism and National Security in Nigeria. Specifically, the objectives of the study is to:

- i. investigate the nature or contentious issues of the crackdown between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the federal government that triggered conflict in the country.
- ii. investigate the implication of the continued crackdown of members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the detention of their leaders on national security and human rights violations in Nigeria.
- iii. examine the extent to which these issues affect governance in Nigeria.
- iv. strategize solutions these issues to enhance national security and human rights in Nigeria.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. what is the nature or contentious issues of the crackdown between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the federal government that triggered conflict in the country?
- ii. what is the implications of continued crackdown of Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the detention of their leader on the national security and human rights violations in Nigeria?
- iii. to what extent have these issues affected governance in Nigeria?
- iv. how can these problems be resolved peacefully without jeopardizing Nigeria's national security or its citizens' human rights?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study is significant, first because it is coming very timely at a time the IMN's activities are seen to be very germane to national security and solutions are needed urgently. Secondly, in a democracy like Nigeria, national security threats could manifest in form of terrorism, crime, insurgency, militancy, rebellion, insurrection and other concepts such as economic, energy, environment, food, cyber and political crimes. The findings of this research will be of immense benefit to Government agencies, Ministries, Non-Governmental Organizations and other government parastatals whose work revolve around peaceful relations among diverse entities.

Third, the findings will also provide up-to-date information to academics and decision makers to the already existing body of knowledge on these issues that led to the moody

relationship of the two entities. It will further explore the reasons surrounding government properties and its effect on governance in the polity. Fourth, the analysis and findings of this research work will encourage peaceful interaction between religious bodies and civil societies and the federal government with a view to encourage freedom in the country. Therefore, this study will contribute to democratic values and democratic development in the country. After exploring the issues and proffering solutions to them, it is anticipated that these issues will not repeat themselves, and if a similar issue repeat itself, the government and the parties therein will know the best way to go about it.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The central focus of this research is to examine the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), state terrorism and national security in Nigeria. The study will specifically investigate and analyze the activities of the Nigerian state, the Islamic Movement and its controversial effect on the national security of Nigeria between 2015-2021. The study will carefully examine the issue of prolonged detention of the leader of the movement El Zakzaky and its implication on the national security of the country and also investigate the extent at which these issues affect governance in Nigeria.

1.7 Limitation to the Study

The limitations of the study involve the difficulty in accessing official documents and publications on the subject. Poor record-keeping and bureaucracy in some offices restricted access to data. Additionally, the study was faced with the challenges of conducting interviews with resource persons because of their busy schedules and fears. The researcher will make efforts to compare documentary data with realities on ground in

the course of the field study. Accordingly, the validity and integrity of the research will not be affected by these limitations.

1.8 Operational Definitions of Key Terms

Conflict: Conflict is used to describe “a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just, goals”. Conflict is sometimes as a result of the struggle for power and material gain by leaders and followers alike. Conflict and violence can be categorized as either small or large-scale depending on the intensity. Large scale violence is difficult to control and its consequences are hard to predict.

Islamic Movement: For the purpose of this research, the term Islamic Movement can refer to Islam or Islamism in general, or to any of several religious or political organizations. It can also be seen as an Islamic revivalist movement, often characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life.

National Security: National security is defined as the protection of a countries security and its citizens, emphasizing the overall security of a nation or nation-state. A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war.

Security: Security is the degree of resistance to, or protection from, harm. It applies to any vulnerable and valuable asset, such as a person, dwelling, community, nation, or organization. Accordingly, security could be referred to as a measure that ensures peaceful co-existence and development at large. It is implied that with the existence of security,

there is absence of fear, threat, anxiety, tension, and apprehension over the loss of life, liberty, property, goals and values, among others. The term security has been used to mean protection against or safety from a future risk of severe deprivation, injury or death and requires rules, order and impartial adjudication and application. Security also connotes development in order to take care of the social and economic generations of threat.

Terrorism: For the purposes of this study, terrorism is defined as any violent act that causes fear among a nation's citizens. In order to achieve a religious, ideological, or political end-state, terrorism is defined as the unrestrained and illegal use of violence in a society to sow fear and disorder. Every act of terrorism involves violence. Thus, the violent actions that terrorists do are often what produce the fear, dread, and panic that are associated with terrorism.

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Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 Security

Although security has become an omnipresent aspect of modern societies, the concept of security in itself has drawn surprisingly little scholarly attention compared to similar concepts such as risk and safety. In everyday use, the word invokes the association of safety and the absence of threats, promising some measures of assurance and certainty of being free from harm as well as of development¹. There is no doubt that security is one of the most important concepts in social sciences, since it is related to the safety of states and their citizens and their survival.

Consequently, the concept of security implies the feeling of being safe and secure, the lack of threats, and the management of future risks. However, the concept of security does not only evoke such positive connotations as being safe and free from danger. Inherent in the concept is also the association of objects such as guns, security technologies and even wars which objects are not necessarily contributing to making society and the world more secure².

However, defining security is not an easy matter, since the term has had many different meanings to different people in different places and different times over the course of human history. The obvious consequence is that there are many different ways to think about security. Despite the importance of the concept of security as a central element in research programs, university courses, academic literature, and in practice, there exists no academic consensus definition of security, and there is an ongoing debate on whether such a consensus definition is achievable and desirable. It is for this reason that a scholar argued that the goal is to achieve a shared conceptual meaning of security³. By contrast, other scholars have claimed that security, like most concepts, does not have an agreed meaning because the concept is context-dependent; its meaning changes in accordance with changes in perceptions and discourses of threat and dangers⁴.

In order to present a definition of any given idea of security, in this case – it is necessary to first understand its nature and the main aspects the concept is supposed to convey. Etymologically speaking, the word “security” is said to have found its root from the Latin word “*Securus*” which means “freedom from anxiety”⁵. In the 16th century, a similar word “secure” crept in to English language which made the word known very well⁶. Security has to do with the process connected with assuaging any kind of threat to people and their precious values.

This is why a respected scholar on security studies asserts that, security is about freedom from threat and ability of states to maintain independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile while its bottom line is survival⁷. Another scholar equally submits that, security is most commonly associated

with the alleviation of threats to cherish values, especially those threats which threaten the survival of a particular reference object. In line with the above, it is believed that:

Security has to do with freedom from danger or threats to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest and enhance the well-being of its people. Thus, internal security could be seen as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies, which could undermine internal cohesion, and the corporate existence of a country and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as meet the legitimate aspirations of the people⁸.

Security has been defined as the condition or feeling of safety from harm or danger, the defense, protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threats to those values⁹. Security is the prime responsibility of the state. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria specifically states that, "The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government"¹⁰. It could therefore be inferred that security, be it classical, state-centric and traditionalist or non-traditionalist, is all about protection of assets including living and non-living resources against loss or damage.

Security need was the basis of the social contract between the people and the state, in which people willingly surrendered their rights to an organ called government who oversees the survival of all. In this light, security embodies the mechanism put in place to avoid, prevent, reduce, or resolve violent conflicts, and threats that originate from other states, non-state actors, or structural socio-political and economic conditions¹¹. Meanwhile, there are two major schools of thought to the concept of security – Traditional and Non – Traditional. Traditional School of Thought favours the maintenance of the Cold War conception of security. This school of thought defines security in this sense to mean safety from danger and from external attack or infiltration¹².

Traditional security paradigm is a realist construct of security in which the referent object is the state¹³. It equates security with peace and prevention of conflict through military means, that is, deterrence policies, non-offensive defense and the like. This is why security is seen from the lens of threat, use, and control of military force¹⁴. It explores the situations that make use of force more likely, the ways the use of force affects individuals, states, societies and the specific policies that states employ in order to prevent or engage in war. This school of thought is strongly tied to the military and that is why Barry Buzan regards security as underdeveloped and needed to be rehabilitated. The Cold War period gave the high-level domination to the conventional security doctrine to the extent that security rest on the belief that only a military system can efficiently deter attack and threat of force¹⁵. This assertion commemorates with the position of a scholar where he asserts that:

One of the themes of the new thinking is the idea that security policy should have political accommodation as a primary and persistent aim. The negative effect of identifying security almost exclusively with military was evident throughout the cold war. This approach can be described as strategic reductionism which is conceiving security in a technical and mechanistic military way as manifested in an obsession with military balance and the use of state-of-the-art technology¹⁶.

The second school of thought on the conceptualization of security is the non-traditional school. This school attempts to widen and deepen the definition of security. It argues that other issues like environment, political, economic and social threats endanger the lives and properties of individual rather than the concentration on the survival of the state. It does imply that a predominantly military definition does not appreciate the fact that the greatest threat to state survival may not be military but environmental, health, political, social and economic.

However, security in this sense is human emancipation oriented. It means that people/citizens must be liberated from those challenges, difficulties and constraints that may prevent them from carrying out what freely they would choose to do which includes epidemics, poverty, oppression, poor education, crises and so on. Today, politics, ecological issues, economic and demographic issues which are non-military tend to pose serious threats to people's security. From the foregoing, security is generally agreed to be about feeling of being safe from harm, fear, anxiety, oppression, danger, poverty, defense, protection and preservation of core values and threat to those values.

2.1.2 National Security

Nations of the world prioritize the safety of its territorial integrity, resources and its entire citizenry. This informs the belief that national security is the preservation of independence and sovereignty of a nation state. In reality, every country has a large number of interests to protect. These interests put together constitute the national interest which originates from values, good governance and protection of social and economic well-being of the entire citizenry.

There is no single universally accepted definition of national security. The varieties of definitions provide an overview of the many usages of the concept. The concept still remains ambiguous, having originated from simpler definitions which initially emphasized the freedom from military threat and political coercion to later increase in sophisticated and include other forms of non-military security as suited the circumstance of the time¹⁷. However, a typical dictionary definition, in this case from the MacMillan Dictionary, defines the term national security as, the protection or the safety of a country's secret and

its citizens, emphasizing the overall security of a nation and a nation-state¹⁸. It is on this basis that a scholar submitted that, “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war”¹⁹.

Another scholar examined the concept of national security from that of external coercion as freedom from external or foreign dictation. Thus, a secured nation-state is one that is able to protect and develop itself so that it can develop its core values, meet the needs of its people and provide them with the right atmosphere for self-improvement²⁰. National security in the words of former Nigerian president is the aggregation of the security interest of the individuals, political entities, human associations and ethnic groups that make up the nation. He posits that such mental well-being and freedom to pursue the attainment of legitimate objectives without hindrance, as affirmed as in section 14 (b) of 1999 constitution²¹.

National security is the measurable state of a nation’s capability to overcome multi-dimensional threats to its people’s apparent well-being and survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, and is extendable to global security by external variables²². Similarly, national security may be defined as shared freedom from fear and want, as well as the right to live in dignity. It is a common right that entails social and ecological health rather than the absence of danger.

The right to a sustainable environment, as well as the protection of cultural and religious belonging, are all part of the new paradigm in the conceptualization of national security, and all have serious implications for citizens’ physical security and the survival of nation-states, both individually and collectively. To that aim, national security is viewed as the ultimate blueprint for a state’s survival. Citizens and their means of sustenance, leaders and

their regimes and administration, state institutions, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, ethnic and other social groupings, the environment and ecosystem, and the environment and ecosystem against internal and external threats and assaults As this expert accurately states, national security should address a society in general, as well as the physical, social, and psychological quality of life both at home and within the larger regional and global system²³.

Meanwhile, the national Security of Nigeria is part of some constitutional provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As Amended). Chapter II Section 14, Sub-section 1, 2a and b, under the “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of the 1999 constitution (as amended) states:

The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of democracy and social justice (2) It is hereby, accordingly, declared that sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this constitution derives all its powers and authority; (b) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government²⁴.

The constitution recognizes that government exists primarily for the security of lives and property of citizens of a democratic state like Nigeria. Therefore, the provision of national security is the basis upon which the government of Nigeria derives its legitimacy from the people via the constitution.

Nevertheless, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), under section 215, sub-section 3, of Part III in Chapter VI of the same constitution, confers on the “President or such other Minister of the Government of the Federation as he may authorize in that behalf, may give to the Inspector General of Police, such lawful directives with respect to the maintenance and

security of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary, and the Inspector-General of Police shall comply with those directives or cause them to be complied with”²⁵.

The directives to comply with or ensure national security, is one that must be obeyed. Furthermore, the Armed Forces of the Federation (Army, Navy and Air Force), according to the constitution (Section 217, sub-section 2 a-c) shall be equipped and maintained to be adequate and effective for the purposes of

- a. Defending Nigeria from external aggression
- b. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air;
- c. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as maybe prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

This means the powers to curtail threats to national security are vested with the Nigerian Police and the Armed Forces of the Federation. In a democracy like Nigeria, national security threats could come from terrorism, crime, insurgency, militancy, rebellion, insurrection and other concepts as economic, energy, environmental, food, cyber and political crimes. Sovereign states (not only Nigeria), protect their national security that forms part of their domestic and foreign policy.

First, diplomatic, political, and economic measures are used in its enforcement. When this fails, military might is deployed to enforce and protect national security concerns. That was why the definition by

1. The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of democracy and social justice

2. It is hereby, accordingly, declared that (a) sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this constitution derives all its powers and authority; (b) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government.

All forms of aggression and insurrection, especially the perceived type posed by the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) against the Nigerian state with threat to peace, security stability and corporate existence of Nigeria politically, socially and economically, are threats against Nigeria's national security. This may have informed a former Secretary of Defense, United State Department of Defense (USDD) in 1979 to define national security as; "the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders"²⁶.

National security is seen as the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation's political independence and territorial integrity²⁷. National security is also seen as comprising the protection of the national interest, including national values, political and economic ways of life against internal threat and challenges²⁸. In line with the above view, Mandel defines national security as the pursuit of psychological and physical safety which is largely the responsibility of the national governments, to prevent direct threats primarily from abroad endangering the survival of these regimes, their citizenry or their ways of life²⁹.

2.1.3 Conflict

Conflict by definition is an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence. However, violent conflict is not inevitable and as such is an anomaly. Whenever people gather together in the family or other social and political groups there are bound to be conflicts which could lead to

struggle of various level of intensity, extending to violent combat which could lead to the destruction of the group. Conflict is the result of many social vices such as social disagreement, conflict of interest and fight between two individuals, groups, or organizations. It can occur between two individuals, groups of friends, within and between families, within ethnic groups and between organizations.

Conflict is a common phenomenon which has become present at one time or the other in every environment. This is because human beings have different backgrounds, interest, and worldviews³⁰. It is the way we respond to conflict that determines whether it would be positive or negative. Therefore, conflict is what we make it to be. Positive conflict is constructive and negative conflict is destructive³¹. In simple terms, a broad approach could indicate that a conflict is as simple as any social disagreement, while a highly restrictive definition would suggest casualties must occur. These different descriptions have given rise to multiple conflict disciplines, with direction from psychologists, international relations specialists and humanitarian organizations. Each source brings a different focus, be it conflict as a social process or a physical manifestation. It is these alternative approaches that require explanation and clarification to allow the best conception of conflict theories.

While relating the definition of conflict to competition, two prominent scholars discussed the complication in defining conflict and settled on examining the difference between conflict and competition. They tend to point out that, a broad definition of conflict can be used to explain actions at varying levels of analysis, while a more specific definition is more restrictive³². This showed that a conflict based on striving for success could actually be a form of social competition, while actual violence is real conflict.

The difference between conflict and competition is important, as it describes a level of intensity of the disagreement, where intensity refers to the substance of violent conflict - the number of dead. Conflict is defined as an activity which takes place when conscious beings (individuals or groups) wish to carry out mutually inconsistent acts concerning their wants, needs or obligations³³. It is an escalation of a disagreement, which is its common prerequisite, and is characterized by the existence of conflict behavior, in which the beings are actively trying to damage one another.

Conflict refers to some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising between individuals or within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. Conflict pertains to the opposing ideas and actions of different entities, thus resulting in an antagonistic state³⁴. Conflict also connotes different perceptions, which may not necessarily result in hostility. This way, conflict simply means 'a different perception' or view to an issue or situation.

Here, it may mean a different interpretation of a motive, or a different world-view. These include religion, customs, or values. Such differences may never result in direct and sharp confrontations³⁵. On the other hand however, different perceptions, values or world-views may transcend just 'differences' and result in the extreme connotation of conflict. Inter-faith violence is a critical example of such breakdown. Sometime ago in Nigeria, a splinter group of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in the Southwest emerged as a result of growing differences in perceptions, motives interests and values. But soon after, the split and differences led to direct clashes and breakdown of law and order. Conflict may also connote hostility or physical confrontation³⁶. When goal incompatibility or perception/value differences reach a crescendo, a manifestation of actual hostility or clashes is possible.

In general literature, conflict is interchangeably used with other terms. This is where it becomes pertinent to mention words or terms that represent synonyms of conflict. These include contrast, disharmony, discord, struggle, contest, strife, antagonism, controversy, clash, rivalry, contest, contention, brawl, fight, battle, feud, combat and war. In politics, it is not too dissimilar; however, conflict technically means an existing state of disconnect between two or more parties on a prevailing issue. It is however important to know that conflict does not always denote war. While all wars are a state of conflict, all conflict situations are not war situation³⁷.

2.1.4 Types of Conflict

Experience in human society has shown that there are degrees of variation in conflicts. Conflicts are in types. Psychology as a discipline has espoused on intra-personal conflict. Sociology identifies inter-personal as well as intra-group or intra-unit conflict, as well as inter-group conflict. Political Science and history have identified inter-ethnic or intra-state conflict as well as international conflict.

i. Intra-Personal Conflict

International conflict refers to a state of implosion in an individual shaped by the state of mind. It is however important to know that such human state is largely dictated by circumstances around him. Such situations are anger, depression, confusion, frustration, which could lead to aggression, erratic behavior, addiction and in extreme cases, suicide. This is the kind of conflict that has been described as “man against self” in which man continues to contend or battle with his mind and habits³⁸. Smoking, drug use, alcoholism, as well as lying are some

addictive habits that man may continually contend with; even when he desires to stop, he may find himself continuing it. This is intra-personal conflict or “man against self”.

ii. Inter-Personal Conflict

This type of conflict is described as “man against man” in the micro sense. This type of conflict may be direct opposition, as in exchange of blows, a gunfight or a robbery, or it may be a more subtle conflict between the desires of two or more persons. A boxing or wrestling match is a kind of game, but the act on the match depicts conflict. Conflict in this sense is a fight between people. However, conflict does not always translate to physical exchange of blows, malice or cold attitude to each other already underscores conflict. Conflict thus also means implicit hostility. It may not be obvious to the third party, but the disagreeing or unfriendly parties already understand that there is a state of discontent between them³⁹.

iii. Man Against Society; Man Against Nature

This is an interesting type of conflict. Man against society type of conflict arises when man stands against a man-made institution or practices. These may include slavery, human trafficking, child prostitution, human rights abuses, bullying, corruption, bad governance and so on. Man against man conflict may shade into man against society. Man against nature is the type of conflict that depicts a state of contention between man and his environment⁴⁰. Such forces of nature as global warming, climate change, rainstorm, famine, hurricane, desertification, resistant malaria, killer insects, and so on create a situation in which man battles with nature to overcome and master it.

iv. Inter-Group Conflict

This refers to the kind of disagreement or feud that takes places between two or more sectarian or religious groups, ethnic groups, communities, or interest groups. The contention between Christians and Moslems in Nigeria is a classic example of inter-faith conflict. Nigeria has been riddled with clashes between members of the two faiths since the 1980s. The Maitatsine riots in Kano, Bulumkutu crisis in Maiduguri, Sokoto university campus riots among others, are worse scenarios of this⁴¹. The Boko Haram Islamist terrorist onslaught against Christians and the Nigerian state since 2009 has however, become the worst in the annals of Nigeria's religious conflict. In terms of ethnic conflict, there have been: Igbo-Hausa feud that began after the military coup in January 15, 1966 and a counter-coup of 1966, culminating in the Civil War in 1967, Efik-Ibibio conflict, Tiv-Jukun debacle, Fulani-Birom clashes, and Itsekiri-Urhobo-Ijaw conflict in the Niger Delta. Intra-ethnic or inter-community conflicts in Nigeria include Ife-Modakeke, and Egba-Awori clashes.

v. Intra-State Conflict

This type of conflict is confined within the borders of a sovereign state. Such economic factors as land, uneven development, resource control and revenue-sharing formula could cause a conflict within a state. Social factors as value differences as had been the case in Sudan could also cause conflict. Socio-ethnic factors such as, real or perceived ethnic balancing or ethnic cleansing in the case of the Nigeria-Biafra episode and Rwanda genocide in 1994, could also be a factor. Political factors such as power-sharing, power equation or zoning formula in public administration, lopsidedness in political appointments, quota system, federal character and the likes are some of the reasons adjudged to be the causes of intra-state conflict. Other examples of intra-state conflicts are the Malian crisis, Ivorian crisis, Libyan conflict, conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic⁴².

vi. Inter-State Conflict

This type of conflict is also known as international conflict. This is a conflict between two or more states. In some cases, this type of conflict degenerates to a state of war. It is imperative to categorically say that, all wars are described as conflict. As such, all inter-state wars are same as international conflict. Inter-state conflict can be caused by territorial encroachment by another state, breakdown of diplomatic ties, and exportation of contrabands to another country and so on⁴³. For instance, in the 80s, Nigeria almost cut off diplomatic ties with Italy because hundreds of tons of toxic substances dumped at Koko were traced to the European country. Nigeria and Cameroon have had cases of hostilities on a number of occasions, over Northern borders and lately, the Bakassi Peninsula; but none ever resulted in full-scale war.

The United States and Cuba have been in a perpetual state of conflict since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 but the diplomatic ties was resumed during the administration of Barrack Obama⁴⁴. Examples of inter-state conflict that resulted in war include Iran-Iraq of 1980-1988, Britain-Argentina War of 1982 over the Falkland Islands, USA-Afghanistan War.

2.1.5 The Concept of Terrorism

The phenomenon of terrorism has been widely interrogated in the literature. Terrorism is the subject matter of this examination and ought to be offered a working definition for the purposes of quantifying the chosen indices of this scholarly appreciation. Thus, it is appreciable to offer definition of terms. Terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi clandestine individuals, groups or state actors for

idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons⁴⁴. Apart from its idiosyncratic or criminal motivation, terrorism is essentially political.

Terrorism in its most contemporary understanding is inherently political. Indeed, it is the political essence and characterization of terrorism that distinguishes it from other forms of violence⁴⁵. To say that terrorism is political, among other things, implies that it is related to power and influence. In this regard, a scholar opines that terrorism is also ineluctably about power, the acquisition of power and the use of power to achieve political change at all cost⁴⁶. Terrorism is thus the actual or threatened use of violence in an attempt to advance a politically motivated end.

Etymologically speaking, the word "terrorism" is said to have originated from the Latin verb "terrere," which indicates to make quiver or shake. In other terms, the term "terrorism" refers to an armed group's efforts to "terrorise" or make life difficult for others within a certain geographic area⁴⁷. Over time, however, the concept's definition in international politics has expanded beyond its purely literal sense. Terrorism is the intimidation of persons through the use of force and violence in order to achieve a certain goal or end. The Black's Law Dictionary describes same as 'the use of threat or violence to intimate or cause panic⁴⁸.' The threat of violence associated with terrorism is always with the purpose of terrorizing another, causing serious public disorder or inconvenience, and or extortion.

A threat to law and order on its own, is that communicated intent or violence, to inflict loss or diminish the equilibrium of law and order in the society and amongst individuals who the law is made to protect their co-existence. It is a global common knowledge that kidnapping and extortion are some of the major activities and strategies of terrorists. Along with terror and intimidation, there are other factors often considered crucial to delineating when actions taken

by a group or an individual constitute terrorism or not. These factors include but are not limited to violence, harm, and threats; randomness or indiscriminate violence; political motivation; the targeting of civilians, non-combatants and so-called innocents; and deliberate attempts to publicize the acts of terror⁴⁹.

There are several definitions that include some of these aspects, omit others, and combine several variables into one, but it will not be feasible to explore all of these definitions in this article or their advantages and disadvantages. For the purposes of this study and in light of the aforementioned definitions, the author believe it is necessary to state that the fundamental element of any definition of terrorism is that it is an act or a series of acts that involve the threat or use of force and violence in order to accomplish predetermined goals.

Just as it is difficult to provide a single definition of terrorism, it is also clear that any definition is problematic when considering who decides what it is and is not. Prior to this, Western governments avoided getting involved in the contentious debates surrounding attempts to define terrorism⁵⁰. As an alternative, many nations looked to multilateral treaties that catalogue terrorist threats and prohibit activities like hijacking, hostage-taking, and assassination. However, all of this changed after the events of 9/11. Many nations have since worked to update or enact anti-terrorist laws, with some working to construct formal definitions of terrorism in the law. When Canada passed its Anti-Terrorism Act in 2001, it was the first time in the country's history that terrorist acts were explicitly distinguished from other types of criminal behaviour under the law. Terrorism is defined as "acts undertaken, in whole or in part, with the purpose of intimidating the public or a segment of the public, with respect to its security... or compelling a person, a government, or a domestic or international organization to

do or refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, government, or organization⁵¹.

The definition goes on to include instances that are considered acts of terrorism, including those that result in deliberate death, bodily injury, damage to both public and private property, interference with and substantial disruption of critical services, among others. In addition to this legal definition, the Canadian government defines terrorism as "terrorist acts committed in whole or in part for political, religious, or ideological reasons with the intention of intimidating the public, or a subset of the public by the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness⁵². This shows a little distinction between the political and legal definitions of terror in Canada, but it indicates a deliberate attempt to preserve the usefulness of both a formalised legal term and a more expansive, loosely defined political one.

The Terrorism Act of 2000, which was passed in the United Kingdom contains a definition of terrorism as it is currently understood by the law in section one of the act. To advance a political, religious, or ideological cause, it defines terrorism as "the use of threat or action. designed to influence the government or an international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public". The definition goes on to specify who or what actions may harm and thus be classified as terrorism; it specifically mentions the use of firearms or explosives as actions that may fall within the definition; and it lists actions that take place outside of the United Kingdom as actions that may do so. The State Security Service, defines terrorism in accordance with the legal definition used in Britain as terrorist groups using violence and threats of violence to publicize their causes and as a means to achieve their goals⁵³. They frequently try to pressure or influence governments and government policies while opposing democratic procedures or even democracy itself. The

legal and political definitions of terrorism in both Britain and Canada offer some insight into how these definitions are developed for use in laws and policies defending the nations' status as nation states against violence committed by non-state groups.

While it is obvious that the definition of terrorism is wide and the discussions around it are divisive and will remain so for some time, it is equally obvious that any effort at definition is made far more difficult when nations and governments seek to do so. The notion of terrorism is prone to ideological interpretations and the attempt to cast the term in a particular, subjective light, making it even more complicated than a single conceptualization.

A respected scholar studied the dichotomy between a terrorist and a freedom fighter in his book *Bullet Kills the Terrorist and Insurgent, But Not His Ideas: The Imperative of Deploying Comprehensive Dosage of Non-Kinetic Measures in Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency Efforts in the North-East*. He said that: While one is not endorsing mass killing, barbarism, or unrestrained violence, one must note the long-standing logic that violence can be used by the people or any organization fighting for the people, to terminate injustice (especially political inequality), and struggle for the promotion of the common good⁵⁴.

Therefore, he came to the conclusion that the difference between a terrorist organization and a liberation organization is whether the organization using forceful actions and terror for political, economic, or other purposes is isolated from the masses (terrorism), or acting in the interests of the masses (freedom fighter)⁵⁵.

From the above definitions, we may infer that the concept of terrorism is debatable from the different definitions that have been looked at. This horrific crime has no one definition

that is accepted everywhere. Right- and left-wing political parties, religious organizations, revolutionaries, and other political organizations have all utilized it to achieve their goals. The researcher concluded by defining terrorism as acts of violence committed by state and non-state actors with the intent to cause fear, terror, or death as well as in the pursuit and promotion of ideology, politics, economics, religious, and social goals. This definition of terrorism encompasses both legal and illegal acts of violence. Its components consist of:

1. The use of or threat of using violence.
2. A constituted group or groupings
3. To fulfil a socio-political goal.
4. The intended audience of the violence is larger than the immediate victims, who are often civilians.

Kidnappings committed for financial gain as well as actions by people, including those with political goals, are excluded by these highlights and signposts. Organizations are necessary for a successful campaign to focus on the desired political outcomes. The precise political goals may vary, although they may include demanding regional autonomy or independence, changing government structures or leaders, or a combination of these political issues⁵⁶. Even while organization is essential for any hope of a successful campaign, individuals may work independently of a group, which gives rise to the "lone-wolf" phenomena. Certain operating styles are what define terrorism. Terrorists thrive on what may be described as a hit-and-run style of battle, using the elements of surprise aggressiveness, covert assaults, and severe militancy.

2.1.6 Types of Terrorism

From the definition of what constitutes terrorism, it is apt to state the different forms in which terrorism can manifest. Thus, the following are types of terrorism: though the list is not exhaustive:

i. State Terrorism

This is defined as terrorism used by states for repression of their own citizens, political opponents, and minorities, as well as against conquered people and enemies in war⁵⁷. It can equally be defined as the use of violence by states in the furtherance of political ends. State agencies, just as much as secret societies or dissident groups commit terrorist acts to produce or maintain political objectives⁵⁸. An example is the Odi massacre of 20th November 1999 when the Nigerian Military opened fire on defenseless and unarmed civilians in Odi, a village in Bayelsa state.

ii. State Sponsored Terrorism

These are acts of terrorism sponsored and launched by one country against another using violence and lethal force with a view to achieving long term political or strategic objective. The aim of the country, which sponsors and abets terrorism and insurgency, can range from destabilization and weakening of a government or central authority to the break-up of the existing social and political order, in the targeted country⁵⁹.

iii. Nationalist Terrorism

Nationalist terrorist seeks to form a separate state for their own national group, often by drawing attention to a fight for 'national liberation' that they think the leading government has ignored. Nationalist terrorism is quite difficult to define; this is because most groups agitating for one thing or the other insist that they are not terrorist⁶⁰. Examples of

Nationalist terrorist are the pro-Biafra Separatist group known as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) which is a proscribed terrorist organization in Nigeria.

iv. Religious Terrorism

These terrorists seek to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purpose, often targeting broad categories of foes to bring about sweeping changes. Religious terrorism is characterized by compliance with belief. Example of religious terrorism in Nigeria is Boko Haram.

2.1.7 Manifestations of Religious Extremism

Some political science and security studies scholars have traced the causes of terrorism to religious extremism, this fact cannot be relegated as the act of terrorism have been investigated, and scholars have realized that most of these activities are been championed by radical Islamic groups, for example, the hammers, the Taliban, the Al-Qaida and the Boko Haram in Nigeria that claimed to be fighting against western education and wants to spread Islam and establish Islamic state in the whole of Northern Nigeria. This is a conviction that the causes of terrorism in Nigeria have to do with religion, even though the workability and possibility of their intention are impossible, as it is an idea that will become a fleeting mirage.

However, the causes are been championed by an Islamic extremist. The Guardian News reported that religious extremism has become the main driver of terrorism in recent years, according to 2014 Global terrorism index; their report recorded 18,000 deaths in 2013, a rise of 60% on the previous year⁶¹. The majority (66%) of these were attributable to just four groups: Islamic state (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaida. This has really signified Religion as one of the root causes of

terrorism in Nigeria. It is a common belief that religious tension and religious fundamentalism cause terrorism, there is empirical evidence to support this argument with respect to Boko Haram, religion plays a vital role in their discourse⁶². The group holds extreme religious ideology, which they use as the basis to commit their heinous crimes.

Most of the Muslim in the Arab nation is Sunniah Muslim that believes in the supremacy of their doctrine, and sees other doctrine and religion as a peagan (Kafiri) that needs to be abolished; the same cause is now being championed in Nigeria by members of these Sunniah Muslim in Nigeria. Religion plays a serious role in fostering terrorist tendencies because of its penchant for labeling one group as superior and others as inferior based on their monopoly of access and ownership of a supposed supreme universal being⁶³. Religion is no doubt one of the route causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

2.1.8 Religious Motivations in Joining Groups

Religion, heroism, perceived injustice, identity, and belonging, among other factors, were key motivators for people to join terrorist groups. An author emphasized that joining a terrorist organization instills in people a sense of self-importance as well as revolutionary heroism⁶⁴. The European Institute of Peace concurred that motivations for joining groups are various, as evidenced by a poll performed in Somalia, which indicated that only 15% of those who joined al Shabab did so for religious reasons, with 13% being forced to join⁶⁵.

The institute explained further that, 27% of respondents, particularly those who were recruited locally, indicated they were motivated by the financial incentives⁶⁶. Others stated that ethnic/religious prejudice, social and political isolation, as well as bad governance institutions, led them to join the group, while others did not have an obvious response. In contrast, 21% were driven by a sense of belonging, while another 11% were motivated by a

sense of responsibility. A scholar went on to say that religious fanaticism is thought to be the most common manifestation of people's motivation to join organizations. He emphasizes that the indoctrination processes utilized for the moral reasons for their brutal actions are religious/ideological teachings targeted at terrifying the general people in order to enable them to attain goals they were not able to reach by traditional means⁶⁷.

Religion is crucial in the hands of Muslim terrorists for rationalizing their recruitment and membership in groups, and it alters the worldview of potential terrorists. In a study backed by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), it was found that religion has a crucial influence in motivating people to join organizations⁶⁸. Religion was a driving factor for 87 percent of respondents in the study to join al Shabab in Kenya, and 73 percent of respondents said they loathed people of different religions, while 49 percent said the government was to blame for the animosity⁶⁹. The Institution highlighted that culture, which includes belief systems, provides a collective identity for terrorists as well as a purpose for social action that supports and legitimizes terrorism⁷⁰.

The former leader of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), argued for the Nigerian Christendom, insisting that Boko Haram's fundamentalist theological ideology is principally pursued through indoctrination of the weak poor who are readily exploited politically⁷¹. The viewpoint is consistent with Karl Marx's thesis that religion is the opium of the masses

2.1.9 The Concept of Islam

Islam is a monotheistic religion teaching that there is only one God (Allah), and that Muhammad is a messenger of God⁷². It is the world's second-largest religion with over 1.9 billion followers or 24.4% of the world's population, commonly known as Muslims⁷³.

Muslims believe that Islam is the complete and universal version of a primordial faith that was revealed many times before through prophets including Adam, Abraham, Moses and Jesus and the Quran is said to be the unaltered and final revelation of God⁷⁴.

Islam is a verbal noun originating from the triliteral root S-L-M which forms a large class of words mostly relating to concepts of wholeness, submission, sincerity, safeness, and peace⁷⁵. In a religious context, it means “voluntary submission to God”. It is also a religion and social order which seeks power, state and governance of a polity in line with the external principles laid down in the Holy Quran and Hadith and demand every believer to actively participate and struggle to establish supremacy of the righteous moral conduct⁷⁶. The Merriam Webster Dictionary (online) define Islam as the religious faith of Muslims including belief in Allah as the sole deity and in Muhammad as his prophet⁷⁷.

Another literal meaning of the word Islam is ‘peace’ and this signifies that one can achieve real peace of body and mind only through submission and obedience to Allah. Such a life of obedience brings with it inner peace and establishes real peace in society because Islam is an eternal religion bestowed upon mankind. It is only through submission to the will of God and by obedience to its Law can one achieve true peace and enjoy lasting purity⁷⁸.

Indeed, the name Islam is given by Allah the creator to whoever follows the footstep of guidance laid by Him from the time of Adam till the end of time. This is to say all prophets from the time of Adam till the period of Muhammad were Muslims. Islam is the way of life (religion) that has been ordained for man in progression from the beginning and it came into perfection with Prophet Muhammad. Islam therefore is a way of life based on peace and submission. It is based on peaceful relationship between human being and his creator,

peaceful relationship with fellow human beings and peaceful relationship with other beings. It is also the way of life based on submission to the Will of Allah⁷⁹.

2.1.10 The Pillars of Islam

The Pillars of Islam are some basic acts in Islam, considered mandatory by believers, and are the foundation of Muslim life. They are summarized in the famous hadith⁸⁰. The Sunni and Shia agree on the essential details for the performance and practice of these acts, but the Shia do not refer to them by the same name, they are called the Ancillary of faith or seven pillars of Ismailism). They make up Muslim life, prayer, concern for the needy, self-purification, and the pilgrimage.

The First Pillar of Islam is the **Shahadah**, which is the assertion of Muslim faith, combining the themes of unity and mercy that are evident in the Quran. There are two Shahadahs:

- a. There is no god but God Allah (SWT)
- b. Muhammad is the messenger of Allah (SWT)

It is a set statement normally recited in Arabic. It is essential to utter it to become a Muslim and to convert to Islam⁸¹. However, the first *Shahadah* promotes the essential unity of the faith, proclaiming that there is no god but God. The Tawhid, which is the prayer that states "no god but Allah (SWT)" is a major component of the Islamic faith, for it asserts the monotheistic aspect of Islam, promoting unity of God as the source of existence. The Shahadah, or professing of faith is said five times a day during prayer⁸². It is the first thing said to a newborn, and the last thing to a person on their death-bed, showing how the Muslim prayer and the pillars are instrumental literally from the day a person is born until the day they die⁸³.

The Second Pillar of Islam is **Salat**, otherwise known as prayer. These prayers are a very specific type of prayer and a very physical type of prayer called prostrations. These prayers are done five times a day, at set strict times, with the individual facing Mecca. The prayers are performed at dawn, noon, afternoon, evening, and night: the names are according to the prayer times: Fajr (dawn), Dhuhr (noon), 'Aṣr (afternoon), Maghrib (evening), and 'Ishā' (night)⁸⁴. The Fajr prayer is performed before sunrise, Dhuhr is performed in the midday after the sun has surpassed its highest point, Asr is the evening prayer before sunset, Maghrib is the evening prayer after sunset and Isha is the night prayer. All of these prayers are recited while facing in the direction of the Kaaba in Mecca and form an important aspect of the Muslim Ummah. Muslims must wash before prayer; this washing is called purification. A Muslim may perform their prayer anywhere, such as in offices, universities, and fields. However, the mosque is the preferable place for prayers because the mosque allows for fellowship⁸⁵.

The Third Pillar of Islam is **Zakat**, or almsgiving or charity. By following this pillar, Muslims have to deduct certain amount of their income to support the Islamic community, and it usually about 2.5% of an individual's income⁸⁶. This practice is not found in the Quran but rather in the hadith. The tax is used to take good care of the holy places and mosques in the individual's specific Muslim community or to give assistance to those in need or who are impoverished. Zakat is obligatory for all Muslims who are able to do so. It is the personal responsibility of each Muslim to ease the economic hardship of others and to strive towards eliminating inequality. Zakat consists of spending a portion of one's wealth for the benefit of the poor or needy, such as debtors or travelers.

The Fourth Pillar of Islam is **fasting**. Fasting takes place during Ramadan, which is the holy month in the Islamic calendar. This means the month of Ramadan shifts 11 days each year. The fast occurs from dawn to sunset each day during which time believers are expected to prohibit themselves from any food, drink, sexual intercourse, or smoking. However, after sunset and before dawn, individuals can participate in any of the actions previously stated as they desire⁸⁷. The reason for fasting during Ramadan is to remind Muslims that all individuals are similarly needy upon the assistance of Allah and that there are less lucky individuals who need their assistance. Ramadan is a period of reflection when Muslims are called upon to recharge their faith, increment their charity, and make apology.

The fifth and final Pillar of Islam is the **Hajj**, or pilgrimage. During one's life as a Muslim, it is required to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. This ritual consists of making journey to Mecca wearing only two white sheets so all of the pilgrims are identical and there is no class distinction among them⁸⁸. Amid the hajj, every single Muslim man dresses alike in a straightforward fabric, again to emphasize their uniformity. Ladies wear a less complex type of their ordinary dress.

Pilgrims put the white sheets on when they enter the sanctuary area of Mecca and enter a state of "ihram" or purity. After a Muslim makes the trip to Mecca, he or she is known as a hajja (one who made the pilgrimage to Mecca)⁸⁹. The main rituals of the Hajj include walking seven times around the Kaaba, touching the Black Stone, traveling seven times between Mount Safa and Mount Marwah, and symbolically stoning the Devil⁹⁰. When at Mecca, the pilgrims go to the Ka'aba in the mosque and walk around it in a circle.

They then pray together in official ceremonies, and then they go out to perform the “standing ceremony” to remember the Farewell Sermon of Muhammad on the Arafat. Ability, physical strength, and economic needs can play a role in whether or not an individual is able to complete this pilgrimage. The reason for this journey is to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad, hoping to gain enlightenment as Muhammad did when he was in the presence of Allah⁹¹.

2.1.11 Nigeria

Nigeria is a country in West Africa. The name Nigeria was coined from Niger River which run through the country. This name was coined in the late 19th century by British journalist, Flora Shaw who was a mistress to Lord Lugard, the British colonial administrator. Nigeria gained independence from the United Kingdom on 1 October 1960 and later became a republic in 1963⁹². The country comprises 35 states and one federal capital territory which is considered the capital of the state. The constitution of Nigeria defines Nigeria as a democratic secular state⁹³. Nigeria is viewed as a multinational state as it is inhabited by 250 ethnic groups, of which the three largest are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba are the major ethnic groups recognized by the constitution. These ethnic groups speak over 500 distinct languages and are identified with a wide variety of cultures⁹⁴.

Nigeria is often referred to as the ‘giant of Africa’, owing to its large population and economy. With 186 million inhabitants, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and seventh most populous country in the world. Nigeria has the third-largest youth population in the world after India and China⁹⁵. Nigeria is divided roughly in half between Christians, who live mostly in the southern part of the country and Muslims, who live mostly in the

north. A minority of the population practice religious indigenous in Nigeria such as those native to the Igbo and Yoruba ethnicities.

However, Nigeria practices a federal republic modelled after the United States, with executive power exercised by the President. It is influenced by the Westminster System model in the composition and management of the upper and lower houses of the bicameral legislature. The president presides as both head of state and head of the federal government; the leader is elected by popular vote to a maximum of two 4-year terms⁹⁶. The president's power is checked by the Senate and House of Representatives, which are combined in a bicameral body called the National Assembly. The Senate is a 109-seat body with three members from each state and one from the capital region of Abuja; members are elected by popular vote to four-year terms⁹⁷. In furtherance to the above explanation, the research study shall examine the three arms of government and their functions in Nigeria.

2.1.11.1 The President of Nigeria

The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is the head of state and head of government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The President is doubled as the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. The Nigerian constitution emphasize that the President is elected in national elections which take place every four years⁹⁸. The offices, powers, and titles of the Head of State and the Head of Government were officially merged into the office of the Presidency under the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. This was also followed by the 1999 constitution. The current President, Muhammadu Buhari took office on May 29, 2015 as the 15th President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He is currently running its second term as the president of Nigeria.

2.1.11.2 The Functions of the President

The President has the powers entrusted by the Constitution and legislation, including those necessary to perform the functions of Head of State and Head of the national executive is thereof. The President of Nigeria is responsible for:

1. Assenting to and signing Bills.
2. Referring a Bill back to the National Assembly for reconsideration of the Bill's constitutionality.
3. Referring a Bill to the Supreme Court for a decision on the Bill's constitutionality.
4. Summoning the National Assembly or Parliament to an extraordinary sitting to conduct special business.
5. Making any appointments that the Constitution or legislation requires the President to make, other than as head of the national executive.
6. Appointing commissions of inquiry.
7. Appointing the Supreme Court Justices of Nigeria on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council of Nigeria and subject to confirmation by the Senate.
8. Calling a national referendum in terms of an Act of Parliament.
9. Receiving and recognizing foreign diplomatic and consular representatives
10. Appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives and other federal officers with the advice and consent of a majority of the Senate

11. Pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or forfeitures
12. Conferring honours.

2.1.11.3 The Legislature of Nigeria

Legislative power is held by the real government and the two chambers of the legislature: the House of Representatives and the Senate. Together, the two chambers make up the law-making body in Nigeria, called the National Assembly, which serves as a check on the executive arm of government. The National Assembly of Nigeria has two chambers which comprises of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives is presided over by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It has 360 members, who are elected for four-year terms in single-seat constituencies. The Senate, which has 109 members, is presided over by the President of the Senate. 108 members are elected for four-year terms in 36 three-seat constituencies, which correspond to the country's 36 states. One member is selected in the single-seat constituency of the federal capital⁹⁹.

2.11.4 The Functions of the Legislature

The Assembly has broad oversight functions and is empowered to establish committees of its members to scrutinize bills and the conduct of government officials. Since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, the Assembly has been said to be a “learning process” that has witnessed the election and removal of several Presidents of the Senate, allegations of corruption, slow passage of private member’s bills and the creation of ineffective committees to satisfy numerous interests. While the Assembly has made strong and often popular efforts to assert its authority and independence against the

executive, it is still viewed generally in a negative light by the media and many of the Nigerian people. The Assembly sits for a period of at most four years, after which time the President is required to dissolve it and call a new Assembly into session¹⁰⁰.

Furthermore, the Senate has the unique power to impeach judges and other high officials of the executive including the Federal Auditor-General and the members of the electoral and revenue commissions. This power is, however, subject to prior request by the President. The Senate also confirms the President's nomination of senior diplomats, members of the federal cabinet, federal judicial appointments and independent federal commissions. Before any bill may become law, it must be agreed to by both the House and the Senate, and receive the President's assent. Should the President delay or refuse assent (veto) the bill, the Assembly may pass the law by two-thirds of both chambers and overrule the veto and the President's consent will not be required. The present Assembly has not hidden its preparedness to overrule the executive where they disagree¹⁰¹.

2.1.11.5 The Judiciary

The highest judiciary arm of government in Nigeria is the Supreme Court of Nigeria which was created after independence and also practices Baron de Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers based on the United States system and also practices checks and balances. The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the Court of Appeals, the High Courts, and other trial courts such as the Magistrates', Customary, Sharia and other specialized courts¹⁰². The National Judicial Council serves as an independent executive body, insulating the judiciary from the executive arm of government. The Supreme Court is presided over by the Chief Justice of Nigeria and thirteen associate justices, who are appointed by the President of Nigeria on the

recommendation of the National Judicial Council. These justices are subject to confirmation by the Senate.

2.1.11.6 Functions of the Judiciary in Nigeria

1. **To Give Justice to the people:** The first and foremost function of the judiciary is to give justice to the people, whenever they may approach it. It awards punishment to those who after trial are found guilty of violating the laws of the state or the rights of the people. The aggrieved citizens can go to the courts for seeking redress and compensation. They can do so either when they fear any harm to their rights or after they have suffered any loss. The judiciary fixes the quantity and quality of punishment to be given to the criminals. It decides all cases involving grant of compensations to the citizens.
2. **Interpretation and Application of Laws:** One of the major functions of the judiciary is to interpret and apply laws to specific cases. In the course of deciding the disputes that come before it, the judges interpret and apply laws. Every law needs a proper interpretation for getting applied to every specific case. This function is performed by the judges. The law means what the judges interpret it to mean¹⁰³.
3. **Role in law making:** The judiciary also plays a role in law-making. The decisions given by the courts really determine the meaning, nature and scope of the laws passed by the legislature. The interpretation of laws by the judiciary amounts to law-making as it is these interpretations which really define the laws. Moreover, 'the judgments delivered by the higher courts, which are the Courts of Records, are binding upon

lower courts. The latter can decide the cases before them on the basis of the decisions made by the higher courts. Judicial decisions constitute a source of law¹⁰⁴.

4. **Protection of Rights:** The judiciary has the supreme responsibility to safeguard the rights of the people. A citizen has the right to seek the protection of the judiciary in case his rights are violated or threatened to be violated by the government or by private organizations or fellow citizens. In all such cases, it becomes the responsibility of the judiciary to protect his rights of the people.
5. **Guardian of the Constitution:** The judiciary acts as the guardian of the Constitution. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and it is the responsibility of the judiciary to interpret and protect it. For this purpose the judiciary can conduct judicial review over any law for determining as to whether or not it is in accordance with the letter and spirit of the constitution. In case any law is found ultra vires (unconstitutional), it is rejected by the judiciary and it becomes invalid for future. This power of the court is called the power of judicial review¹⁰⁵.

2.1.12 The Foundations of Islam and the Legacy of Prophet Muhammad

From the very beginning of Islam, Muhammad (SAT) had inculcated a sense of brotherhood and a bond of faith among his followers, both of which helped to develop among them a feeling of close relationship that was accentuated by their experiences of persecution as a nascent community in Mecca. The strong attachment to the tenets of the Quranic revelation and the conspicuous socio-economic content of Islamic religious practices cemented this bond of faith. In 622 CE, when the Prophet migrated to Medina, his preaching was soon accepted, and the community-state of Islam emerged¹⁰⁶.

During this early period, Islam acquired its characteristic ethos as a religion uniting in itself both the spiritual and temporal aspects of life and seeking to regulate not only the individual's relationship to God (through conscience) but human relationships in a social setting as well. Thus, there is not only an Islamic religious institution but also an Islamic law, state, and other institutions governing society. Not until the 20th century were the religious (private) and the secular (public) distinguished by some Muslim thinkers and separated formally in certain places such as Turkey¹⁰⁷.

This dual religious and social character of Islam, expressing itself in one way as a religious community commissioned by God to bring its own value system to the world through the Jihad ("exertion," commonly translated as "holy war" or "holy struggle"), explains the astonishing success of the early generations of Muslims. Within a century after the Prophet's death in 632 CE, they had brought a large part of the globe - from Spain across Central Asia to India - under a new Arab Muslim empire¹⁰⁸.

The period of Islamic conquests and empire building marks the first phase of the expansion of Islam as a religion. Islam's essential egalitarianism within the community of the faithful and its official discrimination against the followers of other religions won rapid converts. Jews and Christians were assigned a special status as communities possessing scriptures and were called the "people of the Book" and, therefore, were allowed religious autonomy. They were, however, required to pay a per capita tax called jizyah, as opposed to pagans, who were required to either accept Islam or die¹⁰⁹.

The same status of the "people of the Book" was later extended in particular times and places to Zoroastrians and Hindus, but many "people of the Book" joined Islam in order to escape the disability of the jizyah. A much more massive expansion of Islam after the 12th

century was inaugurated by the Sufis (Muslim mystics), who were mainly responsible for the spread of Islam in India, Central Asia, Turkey, and sub-Saharan Africa¹¹⁰.

Beside the jihad and Sufi missionary activity, another factor in the spread of Islam was the far-ranging influence of Muslim traders, who not only introduced Islam quite early to the Indian east coast and South India but also proved to be the main catalytic agents (beside the Sufis) in converting people to Islam in Indonesia, Malaya, and China. Islam was introduced to Indonesia in the 14th century, hardly having time to consolidate itself there politically before the region came under Dutch hegemony¹¹¹.

The vast variety of races and cultures embraced by Islam (an estimated total of more than 1.5 billion persons worldwide in the early 21st century) has produced important internal differences. All segments of Muslim society, however, are bound by a common faith and a sense of belonging to a single community. With the loss of political power during the period of Western colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries, the concept of the Islamic community (ummah), instead of weakening, became stronger. The faith of Islam helped various Muslim peoples in their struggle to gain political freedom in the mid-20th century, and the unity of Islam contributed to later political solidarity¹¹².

2.1.13 The Origin of Islam in Nigeria

Islam, the religion of the followers of the Prophet Muhammad, is the most recent of the entire religions regarded as celestial (based on revelation). A scholar writes that:

Of all the great religions of western Asia, Islam has generally been regarded as the worldliest and least ascetic. Several reasons may be adduced for this judgment, such as the condemnation of celibacy, the absence of priesthood with spiritual functions and above all that

preliminary compromise with exigencies of political life which...was reached in Islam during the lifetime of its founder¹¹³.

Islam is also the last to arrive in Africa but its numerical gains have been astronomical. With its origin in Arabia in the 7th century, it spread through the Arab world and Africa like wild fire and the estimate is that today in Africa, it has a larger following than any of the religions and is second only to Christianity or Catholicism in the world¹¹⁴. Prophet Muhammad's efforts to establish his new religion and the reforms he embarked upon brought him at the early stage into conflict with the authorities. He was not unprepared to match force with force in order to ensure the triumph of his new ideas or rather of Allah.

From this base, Prophet Muhammad fought three successful wars in 624 at Badr, in 627 at Ditch and in 630 at Mecca routing the armed resistance of the Arabians. He set up Mecca as the religious centre and Medina as the political. He instituted the pilgrimage to Mecca and in 632, shortly before his death, with an estimated forty thousand people; Muhammad made the pilgrimage himself for the first and last time from Medina to Mecca. After his death in 632, his followers continued where he stopped and "by conversion", commerce and conquest, the new faith spread quickly in all directions soon after its founding¹¹⁵. Today, the religion is fast claiming one-fifth of the world population. Africa has been associated with Islam from its very early days.

Prophet Muhammad himself had contact with Africans and Africa. It was an African-Barakah Um Ayam (died 637) who nursed the young Mohammed till manhood and whom Muhammad regarded as a second mother. His early African converts include Bidal Ibn Rabah (died 648) who was the first Mu'azzin (one who calls the faithful to prayer) and treasure of the Muslim community. Prophet Muhammad sent some of his 105

converts in 615 to take refuge in Abyssinia. Barely eight years after the death of Muhammad, Muslims conquered Egypt and by 670 AD, a lot of Northern Africa was under Muslim influence¹¹⁶. However, its downward movement to sub-Sahara was through “the agency of Islamized Berber traders; and by the 8th century West Africa was considered by many as a major centre of Islamic learning.

The first known contact of Islam with Nigeria was in the 11th century-barely 200 years after the foundation of the Hausa people in the 19th century. Some account says that in the middle of that century, Islam was accepted by a Mai of Kanem-Umme Jilmi who ruled between 1085-1095 AD¹¹⁷. An eminent scholar named Muhammad Mani converted him. His sons and grandsons continued their interest in learning and practicing Islam. They went on pilgrimage to Mecca and also developed contact through correspondence with Tunisia. This dynasty later migrated to Bornu, bringing the religion along. By 1349-1385, Kano also was Islamized and Katsina in 1492-1520. Other places like Zamfara, Gobir and Yauri followed suit write:

Islam gained access to Nigeria from two directions: from the north into Kanem-Bornu...and from the west into Hausa country, parts of the present Sokoto, Kaduna and Kano states of Nigeria. In both directions, Islam followed the Caravan trade routes that came from North Africa through the Sahara into the western and central Sudan¹¹⁸.

Thus, Islam is the predominant religion of Nigeria. It covers large portions of Northern Nigeria and a good part of the west. It is only in the East that its figure tapers into insignificance. It is estimated today that Islam accounts for about 50 percent of Nigerian population.

2.1.14 The Evolution and Development of Islamic Movements

The origins of Islam as a political movement started during the life and times of Prophet Muhammad and his successors in 622 AD. Furthermore, the struggle for political power can also be dated back to this time when the Prophet and his Companions migrated from Mecca to Medinah to establish political base in accordance with the divine will. It was in recognition of his prophet-hood, that he was invited to rule the city of Medinah. Subsequently, with the establishment of the Umayyad Dynasty; the territory of Islam got expanded through jihad¹¹⁹.

Although before that time, there were constant clashes and conflicts between the local Arab tribes of Aus and Khazraj in Medinah. However, after the arrival of Prophet Muhammad and his followers to Medinah, a charter was immediately drafted between the Muslims, and the non-Muslims. The belief was that, it was this document that made Prophet Muhammad the ruler, and also recognized him as the Prophet of Allah¹²⁰.

The laws were based on the revelations of the Quran and his actions (Sunnah) are considered by the Muslims to be Sharia or Islamic law, which Islamic Movements seek to establish today. However, at that time, there were many non-Arabs whom were either converted to Islam or ruled under Islamic government and traditions¹²¹. As a result, their pre-Islamic negative values, customs and traditions and other sophisticated kinds of culture, life, and beliefs affected the Muslims. This was as a result of social integration, inter-marriages and the practice of concubine and which became more prominent and dominant features in the social life of the Muslims.

Even though, the contemporary Movements are a continuation of the aspiration of Muslims for an ideal order, the current Islamic Movements are much wider than was the case in the past. Thus, the whole socio-political lives of the Muslims were greatly affected by the foreign influence¹²². Others include the Arab culture based on pre-Islamic period, Greek and Persians civilization, Indian culture and above all use of Arabic as official language. These and many more were some of the factors influenced or enhanced the evolution and development of Islamic movements across the world.

Today, most of these Movements are being led by the elites of the religion. Among which include: Tablighi Jam 'at faith Movement in India, Jam'at Islamic Movement in Pakistan, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islamic Revolution in Iran, Mahdi Movements in Sudan, Sokoto Jihad of Usman Danfodio¹²³. The Islamist Movement in Turkey, Al-Ittelhad –al Muhammadi) Rabmen emerged and was led by Tarikat (religious order) Sheikhs and professional men of religion, which was an off shoot of secular Republic of 1923 who lost their status and economic power when secular reforms abolished and religious institutions trying to stage revolts against the secular state in 1920-1930. However, with the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, the Islamist group formed converts and overt alliance which gave birth to the National Order Party in 1970 up to the present day¹²⁴.

Similarly, Egypt which has a longstanding tradition religious scholarship but the contemporary and the scholaristic approaches to religion are being criticize by the Islamist group that seek to return the country to what they believed are the original practices of Islam. They emphases for the strict adherence to the conservative mood dresses as well as the need for a comprehensive Islamic law to address the contemporary

social and economic problems. Consequently, the group (Islam Brotherhood) had challenged the legitimacy of the government in a context which the government no longer provides the required services as well as job security that were central to its social contract with the people; Islamic brotherhood offers concrete social services¹²⁵.

Furthermore, the Jama'at-elislami Movement in Pakistan was founded by Sayyid Abdul A'la Maudidi in 1941. Though the Movement initially was non-political, from 1978, the Jama-at active membership grew from 215 to more than 3,500 cutting across all people of different educational back ground mainly from universities, colleges and other institutions¹²⁶. Maudidi had achieved the visible and auditory support of many thousands including Army officers Ahmad. The history of Islamic Movement in Afghanistan was generally characterized with power struggle particularly so when the former Soviet Union forces occupied the country in 1979. Consequently, several Islamic resistance groups came up under the umbrella of Mujahedeen means (holy warriors) and fought against the occupation and finally succeeded in driven them out of Afghanistan in 1989¹²⁷.

Soon after the Soviet forces withdrawal, the Afghanistan backed government by the Soviet equally lost to the Mujahedeen as a result of lack of control by different factions. The Taliban under the leadership of Mohammed Mullah Omar which they represented a potentially huge force emerged in 1994 and wage war against some of the war lords. As a result, they took controlled of the two-third majority of the country and introduced Sharia under their control based on Islamic principles. The coming of Mullah was welcome by many Afghans, weary of conflict and anarchy, were relieved to see corrupt and often brutal war lords replaced by the devout Taliban¹²⁸.

Another Islamic Movement is the Hezbollah group which is alleged to be a radical Islamic Movement by the West include Israel stationed in Lebanon and enjoys political, economic and social backing from Syria and Iran. Soon after the Balfour declaration in 1948, which was intended to establish a homeland for the Jews state without prejudice to the National right of the indigenous Arabs gave birth to this resistance group now called Hezbollah in 1998¹²⁹. This was at the time when the Arabs were expelled from the homeland and resettled a sizeable number of them in neighbouring Lebanon. They have been fighting the western backed Lebanese government and Israel. As part of strategies to earn them more popularity, they introduced general welfare schemes in some certain areas where the Lebanon government failed in their responsibilities and also govern the areas under them accordance with the provision of Islam¹³⁰.

However, closely related to this Hezbollah group, is the Hamas Resistance Movement in Palestine that can be best described as child of circumstance. It was due to the deplorable condition caused by the frequent attacks and harassment by Israel as well as the inability of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to actualize the dreams of the Palestinians for many years that gave birth to this group¹³¹. The group was formed by late Sheikh Yasin under the leadership of Khalid Meshaal based in Damascus.

The group as part of their strategies, introduced social and economic welfare scheme to help address some of the social problems and made political landmark in the history of Islamic resistance movement¹³². As a result, no any meaningful development towards the realization of peace in the Palestine could be achieved without input from Hamas. The move by both Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and some part of the West to

achieved separate Palestine state side by side with Israel can never be realized if Hamas is not involved in the process¹³³.

In Sudan, they revolted against the foreign rule and were led by proclaimed Holy man Muhammad Ahmad. He belonged to the Samniyah Sufi order and advocated religious reforms and preached a return to the original Islam as presented by Prophet Muhammad. He further, declared himself as the promised Mahdi whose advent was expected according to common belief, and who was to redress the grievances of the people, and usher in a rule of justice and righteousness. Therefore, by the end of 1884, he had conquered the whole of Sudan and referred himself as Mahdi¹³⁴.

The other Movement which is closely located within the West African region is the Sokoto Jihad and was led by Sheikh Usman Danfodio. He declared a holy war (Jihad) on the then corrupt exploitive. The Jihad against the Hausa rulers became eminent and at a time when Hausas custom and traditions were deviating completely from the true teaching of Islam¹³⁵. It is against this development that he declared most part of the present day Nigeria and ruled accordance with Islamic injections. Some of the objectives of the Jihad are among others to;

- a. built a Muslim state by instituting Islamic society and political governance
- b. built Muslim individuals and their families to have faith
- c. Institutionalizing the Shariah.

2.1.15 A Brief History of the Shia in Northern Nigeria

Most of the scholars of Islamic movements in Nigeria tend to erroneously believe that the Shia came to Nigeria as a result of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. There has been a

passive Shia community in northern Nigeria since the early colonial period. Lebanese traders were the first Shia community in northern Nigeria and they constituted an exclusivist religious ensemble. The British colonial residential segregation policy separated the Lebanese settlements from the indigenous community. For instance, in Kano the Lebanese were settled at the Syrian Quarters far away from the local Hausa community¹³⁶.

Therefore, there was not much engaging cultural contacts and exchange between the host community and the Lebanese. The Lebanese came to Nigeria in the second decade of the twentieth century for trading purposes and devoted a substantial part of their time to trade. They served as Licensed Buying Agents (LBA) in order to expatriate companies in Nigeria. They did not engage in any missionary activities from the time of their arrival up to the post-colonial period. It was in the 1980s and 1990s that some of them who remained in northern Nigeria started to relate closely with locals with a clear intent of converting them to Shiism¹³⁷. The Lebanese were exposed to social life which presumably distracted them from any proselytizing campaign. They were the first to build cinemas, casinos and other social centres in northern Nigeria. During the colonial period, these institutions were perceived by the Sunni-Muslims as agents of social vices and moral laxity and therefore were harshly condemned by ulama (scholars) and moral watchdogs of the society.

The active Shia community in northern Nigeria represents the Iranian brand of Shiism, Ithna Ashariyya or the Twelvers, which infiltrated Nigeria as a result of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This brand of Shiism was promoted by a group of young Muslim political activists known as the Muslim Brothers (Yan-uwa Musulmi) under the leadership of

Malam Ibrahim el-Zakzaky¹³⁸. The root of the Muslim Brothers was the Muslim Student Society (MSS) which was an association of Muslim students in various Nigerian tertiary institutions. Former members of MSS under the influence of el-Zakzaky created the Muslim Brothers. At the initial stage, the Muslim Brothers was a Sunni-oriented Islamic organization largely influenced by the rhetorics and activities of the founders/leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ikhwan Muslim, of Egypt¹³⁹.

The Iranian Revolution impacted and changed both the philosophy and ideology of this movement. The leader of the movement, el-Zakzaky, visited Iran and embraced Shiism and subsequently he influenced thousands of his followers to renounce Sunnism and embraced Shiism¹⁴⁰. Those who were not comfortable with the Shia leaning of the movement broke away and formed an opposing group called Jama'at Tajdidil Islamy (JTI) in 1994 under the leadership of Malam Abubakar Mujahid¹⁴¹. With the break of JTI, the Nigerian media started to address the movement and followers of el-Zakzaky as the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN)¹⁴². IMN had a larger followership than JTI, hence, it engaged in a massive underground conversion campaign in different Muslim states in order to create space for itself and compete actively on the religious terrain of Nigeria. IMN adopted different strategies to win a following, which included proselytization in rural areas, efficient welfare packages and economic empowerment of the distressed members of the society¹⁴³.

Many observers have argued that the most potent weapon of the Shia is temporary marriage, mutu'a, which lured and tempted thousands of Sunni-youth¹⁴⁴. Now, in the 21st century, IMN boasts of having millions of followers in Nigeria with a modern organizational structure. The leader of the movement in Nigeria is Ibrahim el-Zakzaky,

who is ably represented by an amir (deputy) in each of the predominantly Muslim states of northern Nigeria¹⁴⁵. The amir is saddled with the responsibilities of coordinating the activities of the movement in a given state. There is a sub-structure in each state where the amir appoints leaders of centres, halaqa, to manage the affairs of members and activities of the movement at a local government level. (The) IMN has a clear political motive which is establishing an Islamic government in Nigeria similar to what happened in Iran¹⁴⁶.

There is an erroneous assumption that the IMN is the only promoter of the Iranian brand of Shiism in northern Nigeria¹⁴⁷. There exist other groups that promoted Shia ideology independent of IMN; one, there is Rasulul A'Azam Foundation (RAAF), and two; there is Darul Thaqaelyn Organization (DTO). RAAF was founded in 2003 by Nigerians who studied at the International Theological Centre Qom, Iran. Shaykh Muhammad Nura Dass, who spent sixteen years in Iran, is the chairman of RAAF, while Shaykh Saleh Sani Zaria, who spent five years at Ahlul Bait Institute in Ghana and an additional five years at Iran, is its Secretary General. The objective of this organization is to educate their members and spread Shia ideology in Nigeria using its school, Baqirul Ulum Theological Centre, as a catalyst. RAAF, at least for now, has no political motive and recognizes the Nigerian state. It avoids any informal assembly that antagonizes the Nigerian state, which is why its members do not participate in procession, Muzahara, an annual trek which is very popular and a trademark of IMN¹⁴⁸.

RAAF had an interactive session with Nigerian security agents (Nigeria Police Force and State Security Service) and media in April, 2016 and explained its position on the army/Shia clash in Zaria in December, 2015. RAAF disassociated itself from the

religious activities of IMN and condemned its leadership for portraying the Shia in a negative way¹⁴⁹. The leader of RAAF, Shaykh Nura Muhammad Dass, made it clear to the Nigerian security and media that their members are law-abiding citizens and they recognize the sovereignty of Nigeria and respect its constitution. Dass said that the leading Shia ulama in Iran have admonished them to respect the sovereignty, constitution and laws of their country¹⁵⁰.

Perhaps RAAF wants to construct a unique identity and does not like to be submerged in the shadow of IMN and that is why it discourages its members from participating in procession and other public celebrations often associated with IMN. However, DTO was established by Iranian nationals in Nigeria in collaboration with some indigenous Shiites such as Malam Isa Makama who withdrew their membership from IMN¹⁵¹.

2.1.16 The Sunni Literary Responses to the Spread of Shiism

There are two genres of Sunni reactive literature against the infiltration of Shiism in northern Nigeria. First, there are books/pamphlets written in either English or Hausa to counter the initially clandestine and later meteoric spread of the Shia ideology and Shiitization¹⁵². Second, there are books/pamphlets written in Arabic and translated into either English or Hausa by the Sunni ulama because of the role they could play in shackling the spread of Shiism in northern Nigeria. The choice of Hausa and English to write these books/pamphlets is strategic, since it is easier to communicate with and send a message to the target-audience in these languages¹⁵³. The majority of the target-readers at

least speak or understand Hausa, this being the most widely spoken language in the region.

English is the official language in Nigeria; therefore, a substantial number of Muslims could read and understand English. Perhaps English is chosen by the Sunni Muslims because of the number of western educated Muslims that have been embracing Shiism¹⁵⁴. However the books written in English could possibly be more appealing to them than, say, those written in Arabic. The main thrust of Sunni literary responses to the spread of Shia ideology borders on the condemnation of certain practices and beliefs associated with the Shiites¹⁵⁵.

Traditionally, the Muslims in northern Nigeria are taught to love and respect the Ah-lulbait (progeny of the Prophet), the sahaba (the companions of the Prophet) and wives of the Prophet without any preference or discrimination. The Sunni ulama, especially those who operate traditional Islamic schools, abstain from recounting the history of early intra-Muslim conflict which involved companions and wives of the Prophets, perhaps, to discourage their students from being judgmental and taking sides¹⁵⁶. However, when some people in northern Nigeria started embracing Shiism after the Iranian Revolution, Sunni scholars engaged in a kind of literary campaign against the Shiite ideology and the Shia community. One of the main themes of this reactive literature was the position of sahaba according to the teachings of Shia ideology¹⁵⁷. Most of the literature has unanimously concluded that Shiites disparage the closest companions of the prophet, namely: Abubakar, Umar and Uthman. The Sunni reactive literature alleges that Shiites treat and regard these companions as usurpers, saboteurs, and renegades.

In one of his books, an author asserts that, Shiites believe that the majority of the companions committed apostasy after the death of the Prophet (peace be upon him)...some even believe that most of the companions never accepted Islam in the first place, but they were acting hypocritically and deceiving the Prophet... It is a common belief within the Sunni community that all those who subscribe to Shiism treat the companions' contemptuously¹⁵⁸. To Sunni literature, the leading Shia scholars popularize the disdain and hatred of the companions and some of the wives of the prophet.

The author further argued that the notable Shia scholar and prolific writer, Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi, said that Abubakar and Umar were unbelievers. He claims that al-Majlisi lumped these two companions with Uthman and Mu'awiyya and described them as four idols who must be renounced and disowned. Abdul Hussain al-Rashti, who is another Shia scholar, wrote that Abubakar and Umar were the major cause for misguiding the umma (Muslim community)¹⁵⁹. Even though he did not cite any of the Shiite literature, he postulates that the Shiite in their literature accused Umar of homosexuality¹⁶⁰. The Sunni scholars popularized the views of Shia on companions, especially the ones that are regarded as disdainful and sneering. Presumably, the popularization of these views through writings is to discourage Sunni Muslims from embracing Shiism because all of the Sunni Muslims hold the companions, including Mu'awiyya, in high esteem. The Sunni have a strong belief that the characters and personalities as well as the deeds of the companions, especially Abubakar, Umar, Uthman and Ali are sacrosanct; therefore, could neither be questioned nor criticized. They consider anyone who shows them contempt to be their enemy¹⁶¹.

Most of these reactive literatures try to disconnect Shiism from Islam and connect it with other religions, basically in order to defend the Sunni fortress of northern Nigeria from the ever-increasing influence of Shiism. Shiism was founded by the Jews and Persians as a reaction to Islam's destruction of their civilizations and effectively wiping them off the map of the world the companions of the prophet under the leadership of the second Caliph, Umar bn Khattab, fought the Persian Empire in a series of battles, dispossessing it of its territories until they destroyed it completely¹⁶². The Sunni ulama, especially those who are inclined to Salafism, use this narrative of the Jewish and Persian connection to Shiism repeatedly in their public lectures, Khutbah (Friday sermon) and writings, in order to disabuse the minds of their followers from accepting or recognizing the Shia as part of Islam¹⁶³.

Moreover, these ulama discourage inviting Shiites to any forum organized to discuss either Islamic issues or problems facing the Muslim community¹⁶⁴. Symbolically, the followers of Sunni groups use their power of majority to push the Shia to the margins of the Muslim community. In one popular anti-Shia publication which is widely circulated within the Sunni community, the author opines Shia is basically and primarily a political party which should have nothing to do with Islam, or its doctrine and practices. The so-called Shia did not exist in days of Ali bn Abi Talib. However, the word Shia, in this context does not owe its origin to any difference of opinion among Muslims in matters of the faith and practice¹⁶⁵.

Most of the Sunni literary responses to the Shia ideology are replete with words such as heretics, apostates, and rawafids (rejectionists). There are Sunni ulama in northern Nigeria who called Shiites 'heretics' based on their understanding and interpretation of a

“true Muslim”. These ulama assumed the will to power and deployed their ideological/doctrinal yardstick to measure the religiosity or otherwise of “others”, especially those who differ from them in terms of theological worldviews and interpretation. In his pamphlet titled *The Shi’as are a Heretical Group* accuses Shiites of lies, misrepresentation of facts and distortion of the teachings of Islam. This pamphlet was a rejoinder to a paper written by an anonymous Shiite writer and distributed in Sunni communities of northern Nigeria. The paper was a kind of self-representation in which the author explained who the Shiites are¹⁶⁶.

The study enumerated the good qualities of those who identified themselves with Shia. Bin Uthman disputed those qualities and described the content of the paper as “a propaganda strategy devised by the heterodox Shiite apologists for selling false beliefs to people”¹⁶⁷. The pamphlet was also circulated and distributed to Sunni youth in order to insulate them from the rapidly infiltrating Shia ideology which competed for religious space and followership with dominant Sunni groups. The issue of *mutu’a* (temporary marriage) features prominently in most of the Sunni literature consulted in writing¹⁶⁷.

The Sunni ulama are unequivocal in their condemnation and refutation of *mutu’a*. *Mutu’a* was practiced during the period of ignorance (*jahiliyya*) and early years of Islam and subsequently outlawed by the Prophet. He argued that it was not Caliph Umar that prohibited *mutu’a* as suggested by Shiites¹⁶⁸. Shiites are accused of promoting social vices and promiscuity in Muslim society through *mutu’a*. Mansur tried to draw an analogy between *mutu’a* and prostitution; he said that *mutu’a* and prostitution are two sides of the same coin.

He outlined eleven similarities between the two practices to justify his claims and a number of them are mere repetitions¹⁶⁹. The major similarities, however, according to him, are that both practices are temporary, flexible, and devoid of mutu'al inheritance. Much of the Sunni literature written in northern Nigeria argues that Shiites used mutu'a as a powerful weapon to tempt, lure and convert "ignorant" Sunni youth into Shiism¹⁷⁰. The Shia have a large following of young people in Nigeria and a substantial number of them were enticed by mutu'a¹⁷¹.

This view seems to be a mere assumption because none of the authors were able to provide concrete fact to support his argument. It could be part of the reason that make the Shia popular among the youth in Nigeria but there is the need to conduct thorough research to establish the veracity of this claim. The late amir (deputy) of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Shaykh Mahmud Turi, posited that the followers of the Shia in Nigeria believe in mutu'a but they do not practice it as it was over-amplified by Sunni scholars¹⁷².

2.1.17 The Emergence and Evolution of the El-Zakzaky Shiite Movement

Nigeria had experienced radical Islamist movements from the Danfodio Jihad, and the Mahdiyya movement before its independence in 1960. However, the awakening of radical Islam in post-colonial Nigeria is traced to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a movement led by Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzaky who was inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979⁶⁷. El-Zakzaky and his followers had several violent confrontations with the federal government due to their radical views and rejection of state symbols such as the coat of arms, national anthem and the institutions of state¹⁷³. The followers abhor anything secular or Western and term them un-Islamic or haram. As a result of his anti-

state postures, El-Zakzaky was detained in nine prisons in 1981-1998¹⁷⁴. To avoid further violent extremism, the then governor of Kaduna State, Ahmed Makarfi appointed El-Zakzaky as a special adviser.

He embraced a nonviolent approach to Islamic evangelism. His new approach to Islamic evangelism gained more moral and financial support from Iran and El-Zakzaky was able to organize strong movement by encouraging supporters to pursue Western education, and engaging in charity work¹⁷⁵. These reforms have increased and motivated membership of the group, particularly among the socially and economically deprived Muslims (majority Shiites). Its condemnation of Boko Haram ideology and its vociferous criticism of the United State's (US) support for Israeli policies towards Palestine were also factors that have helped El-Zakzaky to recruit more than a million members and create a cult following around his personality¹⁷⁶. The Shiite headquarters and spiritual centre (Husainiyyah Baqiyyatullah) is situated some few meters from El-Zakzaky house in Zaria, Kaduna state, where he was born.

The Islamic Movement has numerous branches spread across Nigeria particularly in the North-West of Nigeria. El-Zakzaky headed the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni movement whose members are the majority of students and the alienated¹⁷⁷. Although Islam in Nigeria is characterized by sectarian disputes such as the Izala and Sufi schism, the splinting of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Izala and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria marked the beginning of the Sunni and Shiite sectarian contestations in Northern Nigeria¹⁷⁸. The Izala movement is the largest Sunnist group in Nigeria which is backed by the Saudi Wahabbist. The majority of other Sunni groups emanated from the Izala movement due to infighting¹⁷⁹.

They still adhere to one doctrine which is guided by the strict belief in the Quran and Sunna and the total rejection of innovations in Islam. The major cause of the rivalry between the Nigerian Sunnis and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria is that, the Sunnis see the Shiites as the major facilitators of Islamic innovations. More recent is the claim that the Sunnis' claim that the Shiites reject and insult the wife and companions of Prophet Mohammed¹⁸⁰. Apart from the Islamic Movement of Nigeria dispute with moderate Izala and other Salafiya sects, Boko Haram adherents hate and detest Shiites creed.

The Shiites are known for their long history of procession particularly during Al-Quds, Arba'een, and Maulud Nabi'y celebrations. Blocking of roads during prayers or religious occasions and, noise pollutions from all religions is a commonly 'tolerated nuisance' in Nigeria. But the Shiites procession makes movement for commuters difficult due to their large population¹⁸¹. The Pew Forum report state that, out of the 240.6 million of Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa, 78, 056 million Muslims populations which constitute 50.4 percent of Nigeria's population, the Shiites constitute about 4 million followers¹⁸². The rest are Sunnis of the Maliki school of thought except for minority groups such as Boko Haram which follow the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah of the Hanbali school of thought¹⁸³.

Irrespective of this divide, the Nigerian Muslims are to some degree bonded by the NSCIA (Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs) and JNI (Jama'atu Nasril Islam: Umbrella group of Muslim community in Nigeria). These bodies are headed by the Sultan of Sokoto (the spiritual head of the Sokoto Caliphate) who is the spiritual leader of Nigerian Muslims (Amirul muminin) The Sultan performs spiritual functions such as announcing the sighting of the moon for fasting during Ramadan periods. He also represents and advocates for interests the Muslims within Nigeria.

El-Zakzaky started Shiite activism back in the days when he was a student in the University of Zaria, Kaduna State, Northern Central Nigeria advocating strongly adherence that Shiite is preferred over and above the traditional Sunnis¹⁸⁴. Since then, El-Zakzaky has got very large following mostly Muslim youths. They always organized, annually, a large procession in the Streets of Kaduna City in an attempt to enlighten the Muslim populace in Nigeria on the preference of Shiite over the Sunnis. The annual procession usually obstructs normal social, economic, political and religious activities in the North¹⁸⁵.

In one of such processions particularly, in 2016 the presidency sent a troop of soldiers led by the then Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai to quell the large scale procession and in the process some of the protestants touched (pushed) the chest of the army chief that was considered frontal and disrespect for the organised military regiment. The resultant effect was a serious altercation that led into real exchange of bullets between the Shiite group and the military¹⁸⁶. The altercation and near skirmish exercise led to the death of over three hundred protestants including El-Zakzaky's two eldest sons and he (El-Zakzaky) and his wife were arrested and detained in the cell of the State Security Service¹⁸⁷.

The Government of Kaduna State of Nigeria under the leadership of a staunch Sunnis sect organized mass burial for the cadavers of the depleted Nigerians population before dawn¹⁸⁸. The protest and procession that led to the eventual application for proscription of the group in Nigeria took place in year 2019 in Abuja, when a throng of the survivals protested on the streets of Abuja obstructing vehicular and human traffics, and as well disrupting government activities within the central business district (CBD) of Abuja

demanding the unconditional release of their leader from custody else, Nigeria shall know no peace¹⁸⁹. The protest and demonstration of the group indeed annihilated completely all forms of social, economic, and political activities of Nigeria and Nigerians in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja¹⁹⁰.

The protesters and the demonstrators besieged the city centre of the Federal Capital Territory for about three days disrupting activities and services within and around Abuja. During this period of Shiite's cordon of Abuja, both the Senate President and Senate Vice President and other political stakeholders lamented bitterly the level of insecurity and lawlessness in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja¹⁹¹. Furthermore, during this period of near skirmish dimension in Abuja orchestrated by Shiite protest and demonstration, an Assistant Commissioner of Police (AC) and a Chanel's Television reporter were mobbed to death¹⁹².

These unwholesome and gruesome activities of the group led to the application in chambers by the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) based on the provisions of paragraph (c), of subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Act¹⁹³. By that application and the subsequent approval by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation, the Shiite movement led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky's and their activism was proscribed and labelled as a terrorist group in Nigeria.

2.1.18 Zaria Massacre: 2014 and 2015

Two massacres occurred in Zaria, both in 2014 and 2015. Before the 2014 massacre, there was a clash between the Shiite group and the Nigerian police in 2009 during the Al-quds procession, resulting in the death of four Shiites¹⁹⁴. In July 2014, during another Al-

quds procession, the Nigerian army attacked the Shiites and raided the Husainiyyah. Three of El-Zakzaky's sons and thirty-four others were allegedly killed with an unknown number of injured persons¹⁹⁵. El-Zakzaky claimed that his sons were killed through torture by the Army. The Islamic Human Right Commission Report of 2014 indicted the Nigerian Army for human rights violation. These enabled the Nigerian Army to set up an investigation committee in 2014. However, no prosecutions were made. After the killings, Sheikh Ahmed Gumi; the son of Abubakar Gumi, the great spiritual leader of the Izala movement, published an open letter condoling El-Zakzaky over the death of his sons and at the same saying that El-Zakzaky deserved what befell him because of his un-Islamic practices¹⁹⁶.

Before the December 2015 massacre, some Shiite members were reportedly attacked during their procession in the outskirts of the Northern state of Kano by Boko Haram in November 2015. A day after, El-zakzaky claim it was not a Boko Haram orchestrated attack; thereby, creating an impression that there is a collaboration among the security agencies and other Sunni groups. On 12 December 2015, the Chief of Army Staff's (COAS) convoy clashed with the Shiite procession in Gyallesu at Zaria. The clashed erupted into violence where the army fired several gunshots at the procession, and subsequently, the house of El-Zakzaky and Husainiyyah were invaded and destroyed by the army¹⁹⁷.

More than 300 people were reported dead including the wife of Zazzaky and top Shiite leaders including the leader of the Kano branch, Sheikh Mahmud Turi¹⁹⁸. After the killings, the Army accused the Shiites of trying to assassinate the COAS and claimed they had no option other than to fire bullets on the group. The group claimed it was doing

its peaceful spiritual duties and the Army descended on them¹⁹⁹. However, a short video footage went viral showing how the Army were pleading with Shiite members to pave the way for them to pass, but the members of the group were adamant. Similarly, a video was also in circulation showing how the Nigerian army laid siege on the Shiite leader's house and Husseiniyya²⁰⁰.

2.1.19 Religion in Nigerian Politics since Independence

Usually, there are three ways in which religion can influence politics, namely, by the direct involvement of religious men in politics or by fusing the two religion and politics as one and by subjecting politics or government to the doctrine or laws of religion, thereby carrying out politics or governance along the line of religious doctrine, ideals or laws²⁰¹. All these are obvious in Nigerian politics and this makes religion and politics inseparable. Religion and religious conflict have long been part of Nigerian politics and public life. In the 1950s, while Nigeria remained under the British rule, Islamic law particularly sharia was incorporated into the country's legal system.

In the late 1960s, religion was one factor in the internal conflict that eventually erupted into Biafra war (1967 to 1970), during which about 600,000 people were killed. At the end of the civil war, despite Gowon's declaration of no victor, no vanquished, the foreign missionaries who were working in the former Biafran enclave were expelled from the country and all the mission schools in the East Central State were taken over by the government. This immediately put the Church into a position of opposition to the government²⁰².

In addition, other measures imposed by the Federal Government clearly placed the people of the former Biafra in a very difficult position. These measures included the introduction of the federal character in civil service appointment, the quota-system in the admission process into tertiary institutions and the setting up of Pilgrims' Welfare Boards, specifically and exclusively for Muslims. Since the creation of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in the 1970s, the Northern political leaders have regarded it as the political owing for Christians²⁰³. Since the mid-1980s, however, tension between Christians and Muslims has become consistent feature of Nigerian politics. The reaction of the northern political leaders towards this development strengthened against the consciousness of the Christians for greater involvement in the political arena. They became aware of the inspiration and support which Islam provides for Muslim politicians and strived for a reciprocal situation among Christian politicians²⁰⁴.

In 1986, the then Muslim military ruler incorporated Nigeria into membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), provoking an immediate outcry from many Christians, who objected to it. In response, Nigerian Christians pushed the government to establish formal diplomatic relations with the state of Israel and this occurred in the early 1990s. Religion played an important role after the successful election and proper handing over of government by the former Head-of-State, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, to the then democratically elected president, Olusegun Obasanjo²⁰⁵. The two presidential contestants; Obasanjo and Olu Falae are not only Yorubas (from the southwest) but also Christians. It was held that Muslims from the north had been ruling for several years as military Heads of State, hence, it was time for a Christian, from the west, to take over the mantle of leadership²⁰⁶. Though the choice of

Obasanjo was more of ethnic than religion, religion was considered a major factor in deciding or voting for contestants to the presidency.

2.1.20 The Impact of the Islamic Movements of Nigeria (IMN) in the Nigerian State

In order to explain the consistent rise in support for the IMN and the socio-economic impact of this on the Nigerian state, one needs to look at the relationship the movement have set out to forge with particular sections of the Northern Nigerian society. As explained earlier, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria emerged from the 1980s onward as the champion of the poor, and the lower middle class. It developed socio-economic campaigns that voiced the concerns of the urban under-classes, artisans, merchants, and small shopkeepers²⁰⁷. From the early days of its founding, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria made ingenious use of the traditional religious networks and cultural resources. For example, Islamic Movement of Nigeria activists used the language of Islam in their everyday interactions corresponding with the daily vocabulary of local communities.

Their use of references to Allah, his Prophet(s), or other religious persona like Usman Dan Fodio, and their citation of passages from the Quran, resonated with the belief system of the largely uneducated and impoverished rural dwellers and the harsh economy induced migrants to towns and city centres²⁰⁸. This also reconfigured the traditional political culture, especially in relation to religious issues, social justice, and equality and was articulated through the movements 'Islam Only' socio-economic campaign, putting a greater emphasis on Islamic brotherhood.

The Islamic Movement of Nigeria activists combine different strategies and tactics to win people's hearts and minds. Actually, the grassroots activists live among the people. Their activism is a year round activity. They visit members on all social occasions and offer help in times of crisis, showing solidarity, compassion, and sympathy. These benefits include the supply of food, clothing, bursaries for school children, health care and medical aid, assisting people to find jobs, and reflecting the dire socioeconomic conditions of the urban poor²⁰⁹.

It appears that grassroots activists effectively combine social work and political activism. Due to their community work, the activists of Islamic Movement of Nigeria are viewed as compassionate people, sincerely caring about the problems of their local community and acting as spokespersons for that community when engaging with officialdom. Moreover, one of the most important characteristics of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria is that, it combines both modern and traditional means of communication. As it goes around preaching in Friday mosques, it also organizes seminars, conferences and workshops to spread its ideology. Its newspapers in English and Hausa also play very important roles in this respect²¹⁰.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of analysis of this study is the four theories employed to explain the variables. The theories are the frustration-aggression theory, the Social Contract Theory, Relative Deprivation theory, Structural Conflict Theory and Elite Theory. The Social Contract theory is the preferred theory to explain the variables in this research study. The reason is because the state is seen as an entity to protect the right and security of its citizens.

2.2.1 The Social Contract Theory

The Social Contract Theory is the preferred theory for the explanation of the variables of the research work. This is because the theory presents a typical version of the origin of the state from the liberal point of view. It also treats the state as a product of the mutual agreement of men and women created with a definite purpose, to serve certain social needs. Social contract theory, nearly as old as philosophy itself, is the view that persons' moral or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. Socrates uses something quite like a social contract argument to explain why he must remain in prison and accept the death penalty²¹¹.

However, social contract theory is rightly associated with modern moral and political theory and is given its first full exposition and defense by Thomas Hobbes. After Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are the best known proponents of this enormously influential theory, which has been one of the most dominant theories within moral and political theory throughout the history of the modern West. In short, the theory treats the state as an artificial contrivance. It postulates deliberate efforts behind the formation of the state. This implies the possibility of two life-patterns; one before the origin of the state, the other after the creation of the state²¹².

The state is not a natural institution, but an artificial device or instrument invented by men for their mutual benefit; it is intended to serve the interests of all individuals or all section of society. It regards the state as the product of the will of the society; hence, it is an expression of 'common will'²¹³. The idea of the creation of the state through a contract is found in a rudimentary form in ancient though both of the East and West. Some traces of the theory are also found in ancient Roman law. But all these references should not be

taken to mean to mean that the theory of the social contract has been prevalent from the ancient times. On the contrary, this theory was systematically formulated at a particular point of European history, in order to drop a curtain on the values of the feudal system and to introduce the new values of the capitalist²¹⁴.

2.2.2 Proponents of the Theory

Three scholars are regarded as the main proponents of the theory of the social contract. Of these, two of the proponents are from England while Rousseau belongs to France. This theory held the field in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some later thinkers, such made use of this theory to elaborate their own system of thought²¹⁵. The first proponents (Hobbes) was a tutor to Charles II of England. He sought to justify the absolute power of the sovereign in his famous work *Leviathan*. He condemned the Civil War of 1642 as he was in it the forces of disintegration. He sought to establish the absolute sovereign of the state as an essential condition of social solidarity.

The second proponents on the other hand, sought to justify the Glorious Revolution of 1688. He was an ardent advocate of constitutional monarch. In his *Two treatise of Civil Government*, he argued that if the monarch ever behaved in a despotic manner, the people had the right to remove him from authority. Brought up in the tradition of British conservatism, Locke was not the sworn enemy of monarch, but he sought to establish it 'in the consent of the people'²¹⁶. Rousseau had no such particular purpose to serve. Yet he was brilliant writer whose ideas not only inspired poets and men of letter but induced the revolutionary upsurge that shook the French polity to its foundations. He is regarded as the source of inspiration of the great French Revolution.

2.2.3 Outline of the Theory

The Social Contract theory of the origin of the state implies that there was a time when men lived or would have lived without any recognized civil law, without the state. This stage or life-pattern of men is described as the 'state of nature. Then the state was created through the voluntary agreement of all individuals who constitute the state²¹⁷. The three scholars have drawn different pictures of the state of nature, terms of the contract and the character of sovereignty which came into existence as a consequence of the birth of the state. It is important to note here that the whole theory of the contract is based on speculation. It seeks to trace the origin of the state through logic, not through historical or scientific evidence. Locke refers to a historical fact to illustrate the point, but illustration is no evidence²¹⁸.

2.2.4 The State of Nature

The state of nature denotes how men live or would have lived without the authority of civil law, state or political control. At this stage, there is no industry, no systematic production. Men live not only close to nature; they have to depend on the bounty nature for their survival. Their behavior is largely governed by their inner impulses, unrestrained by civil law, although a 'natural law' is supposed to have existed. Men have no recognized rights, although they enjoy some 'natural rights²¹⁹. As all these conditions are determined by logic or particular lines of argument, not on the basis of any scientific evidence, they do not lead to any uniform conclusion. Different authors have, therefore, given different version of the state of nature, and so on.

2.2.5 Thomas Hobbes

He lived during the most crucial period of early modern England's history: the English Civil War, waged from 1642-1648. To describe this conflict in the most general of terms, it was a clash between the King and his supporters, the Monarchists, who preferred the traditional authority of a monarch, and the Parliamentarians, most notably led by Oliver Cromwell, who demanded more power for the quasi-democratic institution of Parliament. Hobbes represents a compromise between these two factions. On the one hand he rejects the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, which is most eloquently expressed by Robert Filmer in his *Patriarchal or the Natural Power of Kings*, (although it would be left to John Locke to refute Filmer directly)²²⁰.

The view of another scholar is that a king's authority was invested in him (or, presumably, her) by God, that such authority was absolute, and therefore that the basis of political obligation lay in our obligation to obey God absolutely²²¹. Political obligation is subsumed under religious obligation. On the other hand, he also rejects the early democratic view, taken up by the Parliamentarians, that power ought to be shared between Parliament and the King. In rejecting both these views²²³. Hobbes occupies the ground of one who is both radical and conservative. He argues, radically for his times, that political authority and obligation are based on the individual self-interests of members of society who are understood to be equal to one another, with no single individual invested with any essential authority to rule over the rest, while at the same time maintaining the conservative position that the monarch, which he called the Sovereign, must be ceded absolute authority if society is to survive²²⁴.

To him, political theory is best understood if taken in two parts: his theory of human motivation, psychological egoism, and his theory of the social contract, founded on the

hypothetical State of Nature. He has, first and foremost, a particular theory of human nature, which gives rise to a particular view of morality and politics, as developed in his philosophical masterpiece, *Leviathan*, published in 1651²²⁵. The Scientific Revolution, with its important new discoveries that the universe could be both described and predicted in accordance with universal laws of nature, greatly influenced Hobbes. He sought to provide a theory of human nature that would parallel the discoveries being made in the sciences of the inanimate universe. His psychological theory is therefore informed by mechanism, the general view that everything in the universe is produced by nothing other than matter in motion²²⁶.

This extends to human behavior. Human macro-behavior can be aptly described as the effect of certain kinds of micro-behavior, even though some of this latter behavior is invisible to us. So, such behaviors as walking, talking, and the like are themselves produced by other actions inside of us. And these other actions are themselves caused by the interaction of our bodies with other bodies, human or otherwise, which create in us certain chains of causes and effects, and which eventually give rise to the human behavior that we can plainly observe²²⁷.

We, including all of our actions and choices, are then, according to this view, as explainable in terms of universal laws of nature as are the motions of heavenly bodies. The gradual disintegration of memory, for example, can be explained by inertia. As we are presented with ever more sensory information, the residue of earlier impressions 'slows down' over time. From his point of view, we are essentially very complicated organic machines, responding to the stimuli of the world mechanistically and in accordance with universal laws of human nature²²⁸.

In his view, this mechanistic quality of human psychology implies the subjective nature of normative claims. 'Love' and 'hate', for instance, are just words we use to describe the things we are drawn to and repelled by, respectively. So, too, the terms 'good' and 'bad' have no meaning other than to describe our appetites and aversions²²⁹. Moral terms do not, therefore, describe some objective state of affairs, but are rather reflections of individual tastes and preferences. In addition to Subjectivism, Hobbes also infers from his mechanistic theory of human nature that humans are necessarily and exclusively self-interested.

All men pursue only what they perceive to be in their own individually considered best interests - they respond mechanistically by being drawn to that which they desire and repelled by that to which they are averse. This is a universal claim: it is meant to cover all human actions under all circumstances – in society or out of it, with regard to strangers and friends alike, with regard to small ends and the most generalized of human desires, such as the desire for power and status. Everything we do is motivated solely by the desire to better our own situations, and satisfy as many of our own, individually considered desires as possible. We are infinitely appetitive and only genuinely concerned with our own selves²³⁰.

Even the reason that adults care for small children can be explicated in terms of the adults' own self-interest (he claims that in saving an infant by caring for it, we become the recipient of a strong sense of obligation in one who has been helped to survive rather than allowed to die)²³¹. In addition to being exclusively self-interested, he also argues that human beings are reasonable. They have in them the rational capacity to pursue their desires as efficiently and maximally as possible. Their reason does not, given the

subjective nature of value, evaluate their given ends, rather it merely acts as "Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired". Rationality is purely instrumental. It can add and subtract, and compare sums one to another, and thereby endows us with the capacity to formulate the best means to whatever ends we might happen to have²³².

From these premises of human nature, He goes on to construct a provocative and compelling argument for why we ought to be willing to submit ourselves to political authority. He does this by imagining persons in a situation prior to the establishment of society, the State of Nature. The justification for political obligation is this: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to their own interests²³³. He argues for this by imagining men in their natural state, or in other words, the State of Nature. In the State of Nature, which is purely hypothetical according to Hobbes, men are naturally and exclusively self-interested, they are more or less equal to one another, (even the strongest man can be killed in his sleep), there are limited resources, and yet there is no power able to force men to cooperate²³⁴.

Given these conditions in the State of Nature, he concludes that the State of Nature would be unbearably brutal. In the State of Nature, every person is always in fear of losing his life to another. They have no capacity to ensure the long-term satisfaction of their needs or desires. No long-term or complex cooperation is possible because the State of Nature can be aptly described as a state of utter distrust²³⁵. Given Hobbes' reasonable assumption that most people want first and foremost to avoid their own deaths, he concludes that the

State of Nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. It is the state of perpetual and unavoidable war.

The situation is not, however, hopeless. Because men are reasonable, they can see their way out of such a state by recognizing the laws of nature, which show them the means by which to escape the State of Nature and create a civil society. The first and most important law of nature commands that each man be willing to pursue peace when others are willing to do the same, all the while retaining the right to continue to pursue war when others do not pursue peace²³⁶. Being reasonable, and recognizing the rationality of this basic precept of reason, men can be expected to construct a Social Contract that will afford them a life other than that available to them in the state of nature. This contract is constituted by two distinguishable contracts. First, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the state of nature.

Second, they must imbue some one person or assembly of persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. In other words, to ensure their escape from the state of nature, they must both agree to live together under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constitute it. Since the sovereign is invested with the authority and power to mete out punishments for breaches of the contract which are worse than not being able to act as one pleases, men have good, albeit self-interested, reason to adjust themselves to the artifice of morality in general, and justice in particular²³⁷.

Society becomes possible because, whereas in the State of Nature there was no power able to "overawe them all", now there is an artificially and conventionally superior and

more powerful person who can force men to cooperate. While living under the authority of a Sovereign can be harsh (He argues that because men's passions can be expected to overwhelm their reason, the Sovereign must have absolute authority in order for the contract to be successful) it is at least better than living in the State of Nature²³⁸. And, no matter how much we may object to how poorly a Sovereign manages the affairs of the state and regulates our own lives, we are never justified in resisting his power because it is the only thing which stands between us and what we most want to avoid, the State of Nature²³⁹.

To this statement, morality, politics, society, and everything that comes along with it, all of which he calls 'commodious living' are purely conventional. Prior to the establishment of the basic social contract, according to which men agree to live together and the contract to embody a Sovereign with absolute authority, nothing is immoral or unjust - anything goes²⁴⁰. After these contracts are established, however, then society becomes possible, and people can be expected to keep their promises, cooperate with one another, and so on. The Social Contract is the most fundamental source of all that is good and that which we depend upon to live well. Our choice is either to abide by the terms of the contract, or return to the State of Nature, which Hobbes argues no reasonable person could possibly prefer²⁴¹.

Given his rather severe view of human nature, he nonetheless manages to create an argument that makes civil society, along with all its advantages, possible. Within the context of the political events of his England, he also managed to argue for a continuation of the traditional form of authority that his society had long since enjoyed, while nonetheless placing it on what he saw as a far more acceptable foundation.

2.2.6 John Locke

For Hobbes, the necessity of an absolute authority, in the form of a sovereign, followed from the utter brutality of the State of Nature. The State of Nature was completely intolerable, and so rational men would be willing to submit themselves even to absolute authority in order to escape it. For John Locke, the State of Nature is a very different type of place, and so his argument concerning the social contract and the nature of men's relationship to authority are consequently quite different²⁴². While Locke uses Hobbes' methodological device of the State of Nature, as do virtually all social contract theorists, he uses it to a quite different end. His arguments for the social contract and for the right of citizens to revolt against their king were enormously influential on the democratic revolutions that followed, especially on Thomas Jefferson, and the founders of the United States²⁴³.

His most important and influential political writings are contained in his *Two Treatises on Government*. The first treatise is concerned almost exclusively with refuting the argument that political authority was derived from religious authority, also known by the description of the Divine Right of Kings, which was a very dominant theory in seventeenth-century England. The second treatise contains his own constructive view of the aims and justification for civil government, and is titled "An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government"²⁴⁴. To him the State of Nature, the natural condition of mankind, is a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct one's life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others.

This does not mean, however, that it is a state of license: one is not free to do anything at all one pleases, or even anything that one judges to be in one's interest. The State of

Nature, although a state wherein there is no civil authority or government to punish people for transgressions against laws, is not a state without morality. The State of Nature is pre-political, but it is not pre-moral. Persons are assumed to be equal to one another in such a state, and therefore equally capable of discovering and being bound by the Law of Nature²⁴⁵.

The Law of Nature, which is on Locke's view the basis of all morality, and given to us by God, commands that we not harm others with regards to their "life, health, liberty, or possessions"²⁴⁶. Because we all belong equally to God, and because we cannot take away that which is rightfully His, we are prohibited from harming one another. So, the State of Nature is a state of liberty where persons are free to pursue their own interests and plans, free from interference and, because of the Law of Nature and the restrictions that it imposes upon persons, it is relatively peaceful.

The State of Nature therefore, is not the same as the state of war, as it is according to Hobbes. It can, however devolve into a state of war, in particular, a state of war over property disputes. Whereas the State of Nature is the state of liberty where persons recognize the Law of Nature and therefore do not harm one another, the state of war begins between two or more men once one man declares war on another, by stealing from him, or by trying to make him his slave²⁴⁷. Since in the State of Nature there is no civil power to whom men can appeal, and since the Law of Nature allows them to defend their own lives, they may then kill those who would bring force against them. Since the State of Nature lacks civil authority, once war begins it is likely to continue. And this is one of the strongest reasons that men have to abandon the State of Nature by contracting together to form civil government²⁴⁸.

Property plays an essential role in his argument for civil government and the contract that establishes it. Private property is created when a person mixes his labor with the raw materials of nature. So, for example, when one tills a piece of land in nature, and makes it into a piece of farmland, which produces food, then one has a claim to own that piece of land and the food produced upon it. This led Locke to conclude that America did not really belong to the natives who lived there, because they were, on his view, failing to utilize the basic material of nature²⁴⁹. In other words, they did not farm it, so they had no legitimate claim to it, and others could therefore justifiably appropriate it.

Given the implications of the Law of Nature, there are limits as to how much property one can own: one is not allowed to take more from nature than one can use, thereby leaving others without enough for themselves. Because nature is given to all of mankind by God for its common subsistence, one cannot take more than his own fair share. Property is the linchpin of Locke's argument for the social contract and civil government because it is the protection of their property, including their property in their own bodies, which men seek when they decide to abandon the State of Nature²⁵⁰.

The State of Nature is not a condition of individuals, as it is for the previous proponent. Rather, it is populated by mothers and fathers with their children, or families - what he calls "conjugal society"²⁵¹. These societies are based on the voluntary agreements to care for children together, and they are moral but not political. Political society comes into being when individual men, representing their families, come together in the State of Nature and agree to each give up the executive power to punish those who transgress the Law of Nature, and hand over that power to the public power of a government²⁵².

Having done this, they then become subject to the will of the majority. In other words, by making a compact to leave the State of Nature and form society, they make “one body politic under one government” and submit themselves to the will of that body²⁵³. One joins such a body, either from its beginnings, or after it has already been established by others, only by explicit consent. Having created a political society and government through their consent, men then gain three things which they lacked in the State of Nature: laws, judges to adjudicate laws, and the executive power necessary to enforce these laws. Each man therefore gives over the power to protect himself and punish transgressors of the Law of Nature to the government that he has created through the compact²⁵⁴.

Given that the end of "men's uniting into common-wealth" is the preservation of their wealth, and preserving their lives, liberty, and well-being in general, Locke can easily imagine the conditions under which the compact with government is destroyed, and men are justified in resisting the authority of a civil government, such as a King. When the executive power of a government devolves into tyranny, such as by dissolving the legislature and therefore denying the people the ability to make laws for their own preservation, then the resulting tyrant puts himself into a State of Nature, and specifically into a state of war with the people, and they then have the same right to self-defense as they had before making a compact to establish society in the first place²⁵⁵.

In other words, the justification of the authority of the executive component of government is the protection of the people's property and well-being, so when such protection is no longer present, or when the king becomes a tyrant and acts against the interests of the people, they have a right, if not an outright obligation, to resist his

authority. The social compact can be dissolved and the process to create political society begun anew²⁵⁶.

Because he did not envision the State of Nature as grimly as did Hobbes, he can imagine conditions under which one would be better off rejecting a particular civil government and returning to the State of Nature, with the aim of constructing a better civil government in its place. It is therefore both the view of human nature, and the nature of morality itself, which account for the differences between Hobbes' and Locke's views of the social contract²⁵⁷.

2.2.7 Jean-Jacques Rousseau

This proponent lived and wrote during what was arguably the headiest period in the intellectual history of modern France - the Enlightenment. He was one of the bright lights of that intellectual movement, contributing articles to the *Encyclopedia* of Diderot, and participating in the salons in Paris, where the great intellectual questions of his day were pursued. He has two distinct social contract theories. The first is found in his essay, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men*, commonly referred to as the Second Discourse, and is an account of the moral and political evolution of human beings over time, from a State of Nature to modern society²⁵⁹. As such it contains his *naturalized* account of the social contract, which he sees as very problematic. The second is his *normative*, or idealized theory of the social contract, and is meant to provide the means by which to alleviate the problems that modern society has created for us, as laid out in the *Social Contract*²⁶⁰.

He wrote his *Second Discourse* in response to an essay contest sponsored by the Academy of Dijon. (He had previously won the same essay contest with an earlier essay, commonly referred to as the *First Discourse*.) In it he describes the historical process by which man began in a State of Nature and over time 'progressed' into civil society. To him, the State of Nature was a peaceful and quixotic time. People lived solitary, uncomplicated lives. Their few needs were easily satisfied by nature. Because of the abundance of nature and the small size of the population, competition was non-existent, and persons rarely even saw one another, much less had reason for conflict or fear²⁶¹. Moreover, these simple, morally pure persons were naturally endowed with the capacity for pity, and therefore were not inclined to bring harm to one another.

As time passed, however, humanity faced certain changes. As the overall population increased, the means by which people could satisfy their needs had to change. People slowly began to live together in small families, and then in small communities. Divisions of labor were introduced, both within and between families, and discoveries and inventions made life easier, giving rise to leisure time. Such leisure time inevitably led people to make comparisons between themselves and others, resulting in public values, leading to shame and envy, pride and contempt. Most importantly however, was the invention of private property, which constituted the pivotal moment in humanity's evolution out of a simple, pure state into one characterized by greed, competition, vanity, inequality, and vice? For Rousseau the invention of property constitutes humanity's 'fall from grace' out of the State of Nature.

Having introduced private property, initial conditions of inequality became more pronounced. Some have property and others are forced to work for them, and the

development of social classes begins. Eventually, those who have property notice that it would be in their interests to create a government that would protect private property from those who do not have it but can see that they might be able to acquire it by force²⁶². So, government gets established, through a contract, which purports to guarantee equality and protection for all, even though its true purpose is to fossilize the very inequalities that private property has produced. In other words, the contract, which claims to be in the interests of everyone equally, is really in the interests of the few who have become stronger and richer as a result of the developments of private property. This is the naturalized social contract, which he views as responsible for the conflict and competition from which modern society suffers²⁶³.

The normative social contract, argued for by Rousseau in *The Social Contract* (1762), is meant to respond to this sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills that have been produced by the development of society. The distinction between history and justification, between the factual situation of mankind and how it ought to live together, is of the utmost importance to him²⁶⁴. While we ought not to ignore history, nor ignore the causes of the problems we face, we must resolve those problems through our capacity to choose how we ought to live. Might never make right, despite how often it pretends that it can.

The Social Contract begins with the most oft-quoted line from him: "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains". This claim is the conceptual bridge between the descriptive work of the Second Discourse, and the prescriptive work that is to come. Humans are essentially free, and were free in the State of Nature, but the 'progress' of civilization has substituted subservience to others for that freedom, through dependence,

economic and social inequalities, and the extent to which we judge ourselves through comparisons with others. Since a return to the State of Nature is neither feasible nor desirable, the purpose of politics is to restore freedom to us, thereby reconciling who we truly and essentially are with how we live together²⁶⁵.

So, this is the fundamental philosophical problem that *The Social Contract* seeks to address: how can we be free and live together? Or, put another way, how can we live together without succumbing to the force and coercion of others? We can do so, he maintains, by submitting our individual, particular wills to the collective or general will, created through agreement with other free and equal persons. All men are made by nature to be equals, therefore no one has a natural right to govern others, and therefore the only justified authority is the authority that is generated out of agreements or covenants²⁶⁶.

The most basic covenant, the social pact, is the agreement to come together and form a people, a collectivity, which by definition is more than and different from a mere aggregation of individual interests and wills. This act, where individual persons become a people is "the real foundation of society". Through the collective renunciation of the individual rights and freedom that one has in the State of Nature, and the transfer of these rights to the collective body, a new 'person', as it were, is formed.

The sovereign is thus formed when free and equal persons come together and agree to create themselves anew as a single body, directed to the good of all considered together. So, just as individual wills are directed towards individual interests, the general will, once formed, is directed towards the common good, understood and agreed to collectively. Included in this version of the social contract is the idea of reciprocated duties: the sovereign is committed to the good of the individuals who constitute it, and each

individual is likewise committed to the good of the whole. Given this, individuals cannot be given liberty to decide whether it is in their own interests to fulfill their duties to the sovereign, while at the same time being allowed to reap the benefits of citizenship. They must be made to conform themselves to the general will, they must be “forced to be free”²⁶⁷.

For him, this implies an extremely strong and direct form of democracy. One cannot transfer one's will to another, to do with as he or she sees fit, as one does in representative democracies²⁶⁸. Rather, the general will depends on the coming together periodically of the entire democratic body, each and every citizen, to decide collectively, and with at least near unanimity, how to live together, that is, what laws to enact. As it is constituted only by individual wills, these private, individual wills must assemble themselves regularly if the general will is to continue.

One implication of this is that the strong form of democracy which is consistent with the general will is also only possible in relatively small states. The people must be able to identify with one another, and at least know who each other are. They cannot live in a large area, too spread out to come together regularly, and they cannot live in such different geographic circumstances as to be unable to be united under common laws. (Could the present-day U.S. satisfy Rousseau's conception of democracy? It could not.) Although the conditions for true democracy are stringent, they are also the only means by which we can, save ourselves, and regain the freedom to which we are naturally entitled.

His social contract theories together form a single, consistent view of our moral and political situation. We are endowed with freedom and equality by nature, but our nature has been corrupted by our contingent social history. We can overcome this corruption,

however, by invoking our free will to reconstitute ourselves politically, along strongly democratic principles, which is good for us, both individually and collectively²⁶⁹.

In 1972, the publication of John Rawls' extremely influential *A Theory of Justice* brought moral and political philosophy back from what had been a long hiatus of philosophical consideration. His theory relies on a Kantian understanding of persons and their capacities. For him, as for Kant, persons have the capacity to reason from a universal point of view, which in turn means that they have the particular moral capacity of judging principles from an impartial standpoint²⁷⁰. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls argues that the moral and political point of view is discovered via impartiality. (It is important to note that this view, delineated in *A Theory of Justice*, has undergone substantial revisions by Rawls, and that he described his later view as "political liberalism"²⁷¹.

He invokes this point of view (the general view that Thomas Nagel describes as "the view from nowhere") by imagining persons in a hypothetical situation, the Original Position, which is characterized by the epistemological limitation of the Veil of Ignorance. Rawls' original position is his highly abstracted version of the State of Nature. It is the position from which we can discover the nature of justice and what it requires of us as individual persons and of the social institutions through which we will live together cooperatively²⁷².

In the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, one is denied any particular knowledge of one's circumstances, such as one's gender, race, particular talents or disabilities, one's age, social status, one's particular conception of what makes for a good life, or the particular state of the society in which one lives. Persons are also assumed to be rational and disinterested in one another's well-being. These are the conditions under

which, he argues, one can choose principles for a just society which are themselves chosen from initial conditions that are inherently fair²⁷³.

Because no one has any of the particular knowledge he or she could use to develop principles that favor his or her own particular circumstances, in other words the knowledge that makes for and sustains prejudices, the principles chosen from such a perspective are necessarily fair. For example, if one does not know whether one is female or male in the society for which one must choose basic principles of justice, it makes no sense, from the point of view of self-interested rationality, to endorse a principle that favors one sex at the expense of another, since, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, one might find oneself on the losing end of such a principle²⁷⁴. Hence he describes his theory as “justice as fairness.” Because the conditions under which the principles of justice are discovered are basically fair, justice proceeds out of fairness.

In such a position, behind such a veil, everyone is in the same situation, and everyone is presumed to be equally rational. Since everyone adopts the same method for choosing the basic principles for society, everyone will occupy the same standpoint: that of the disembodied, rational, universal human. Therefore, all who consider justice from the point of view of the original position would agree upon the same principles of justice generated out of such a thought experiment. Any one person would reach the same conclusion as any other person concerning the most basic principles that must regulate a just society.

The principles that persons in the original position, behind the Veil of Ignorance, would choose to regulate a society at the most basic level (that is, prior even to a Constitution) are called by Rawls, aptly enough, the Two Principles of Justice. These two principles

determine the distribution of both civil liberties and social and economic goods. The first principle states that each person in a society is to have as much basic liberty as possible, as long as everyone is granted the same liberties. That is, there is to be as much civil liberty as possible as long as these goods are distributed equally. (This would, for example, preclude a scenario under which there was a greater aggregate of civil liberties than under an alternative scenario, but under which such liberties were not distributed equally amongst citizens)²⁷⁵.

The second principle states that while social and economic inequalities can be just, they must be available to everyone equally (that is, no one is to be on principle denied access to greater economic advantage) and such inequalities must be to the advantage of everyone. This means that economic inequalities are only justified when the least advantaged member of society is nonetheless better off than she would be under alternative arrangements. So, only if a rising tide truly does carry all boats upward, can economic inequalities be allowed for in a just society²⁷⁶. The method of the original position supports this second principle, referred to as the Difference Principle, because when we are behind the veil of ignorance, and therefore do not know what our situation in society will be once the veil of ignorance is lifted, we will only accept principles that will be to our advantage even if we end up in the least advantaged position in society.

These two principles are related to each other by a specific order. The first principle, distributing civil liberties as widely as possible consistent with equality, is prior to the second principle, which distributes social and economic goods. In other words, we cannot decide to forgo some of our civil liberties in favor of greater economic advantage. Rather, we must satisfy the demands of the first principle, before we move on to the second.

From his point of view, this serial ordering of the principles expresses a basic rational preference for certain kinds of goods, that is, those embodied in civil liberties, over other kinds of goods, that is, economic advantage²⁷⁷.

Having argued that any rational person inhabiting the original position and placing him or herself behind the veil of ignorance can discover the two principles of justice, he has constructed what is perhaps the most abstract version of a social contract theory. It is highly abstract because rather than demonstrating that we would or even have signed to a contract to establish society, it instead shows us what we must be willing to accept as rational persons in order to be constrained by justice and therefore capable of living in a well ordered society. The principles of justice are more fundamental than the social contract as it has traditionally been conceived²⁷⁸.

Rather, the principles of justice constrain that contract, and set out the limits of how we can construct society in the first place. If we consider, for example, a constitution as the concrete expression of the social contract, Rawls' two principles of justice delineate what such a constitution can and cannot require of us. Rawls' theory of justice constitutes, then, the Kantian limits upon the forms of political and social organization that are permissible within a just society²⁷⁹.

2.2.8 Elite Theory

The second theory used to explain the variables in this research study is the elite theory. Studies on elites have been one of the largest subject in social sciences particularly in sociology and political sciences. This emphasis is mostly due to undeniable effects and roles of elites in societies developed or developing. Elite theories introduced not only

elites, but also new important subjects like power, and rose questions for example on oligarchical tendencies in democracy.

Elite theory is a theory of the state that seeks to describe and explain power relationships in contemporary society. The theory posits that a small minority, consisting of members of the economic elite and policy-planning networks, holds the most power and that this power is independent of democratic elections²⁸⁰. The theory is also seen in two ways;

1. Community or state affairs are best handled by a small subset of its members and
2. In modern societies such an arrangement is in fact inevitable.

Elite theory's origins lie most clearly in the writings of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and Max Weber. Mosca emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities out-organize and outwit large majorities, adding that “political classes”. Mosca’s term for political elites - usually have “a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority” over those they govern. Pareto postulated that in a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals; but in actual societies, elites are those most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections Mosca,

In the classical elitist literature, elites were often but not only defined through capacity, personality and skill. For instance, Pareto distinguished elites between those who resembled the lion, that is, domination by force and those who resembled the fox (domination by persuasion and skill), a typology that resembles Machiavelli’s political philosophy. A scholar made mention of material conditions, but also of the intellectual and moral superiority of elites²⁸¹.

Current elite theory defines ‘elites’ as actors controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating through power networks. The basic characteristics of this theory are that power is concentrated, the elites are unified, the non-elites are diverse and powerless, elites’ interests are unified due to common backgrounds and positions and the defining characteristic of power is institutional position. Pareto sketched alternating types of governing elites, which he likened, following Machiavelli, to foxes and lions²⁸². A scholar rooted elites “oligarchies” in the need of large organizations for leaders and experts, in order to operate efficiently; as these individuals gain control of funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational functioning, power becomes concentrated in their hands²⁸³. Another author held that political action is always determined by “the principle of small number that means, the superior political maneuverability of small leading groups.

Principal Elitist and Their Theories

a. Vilfredo Pareto

Pareto was the first to use the term “elite” and “masses” to indicate superior and inferior groups in society. The theory of elites was presented systematically by Vilfredo Pareto in his monumental work – *The Mind and Society*. His system is the grandest of all the classical elitist doctrines. Pareto’s elite can be much wider and more comprehensive than the political bosses whom the proponents study, sometimes wider even than Marx’s ruling class. Pareto’s elite theory is part of a much more general sociology in which social activity is explained by reference to certain fundamental psychological factors.

Accordingly, elites are seen by Pareto not as the product of economic forces nor as building their dominance on their organizational ability but as the outcome of what Pareto believed to be human attributes constant throughout history. In a democracy, Pareto's elite is broad enough to include the rival leaderships of the political parties. Only those totally opposed to the regime and unwilling to compromise by participating in it can be counted as outside the elite. Interest groups such as unions, and employers who also play the democratic game by competing for a share in the national product, are all part of the one elite. Pareto's picture of the elite under democracy is not, then, of a cohesive group of businessmen, politicians and bureaucrats acting in collusion²⁸⁴.

b. Gaetano Mosca

He postulated that the people are necessarily divided into two groups: the rulers and the ruled. The ruling class controls most of the wealth, power and prestige in society and exercises all power. Whatever form of government might be adopted. The rules are not competent to replace it. This view point is deducible from his famous passage regarded as the most concise statement of the general elitist position, the passage reads:

Among the constant facts and the tendencies that are to be founding all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies... two classes of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism²⁸⁵.

Accordingly, neither one man nor the mass of the people can rule. The single rule needs the backing of advisers and administrators, propagandists and police. On the other side the people can only act politically under the direction of a small group of leaders.

c. Robert Michels

His foremost disciple, extended his master's theories further. Michel propounded his famous "Iron Law of Oligarchy" which implied that every organization whatever its original aims-is eventually reduced to an "Oligarchy", that is the rule of the chosen few.

To him:

Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy. If laws are passed to controlled the dominion of the leaders, it is the laws which gradually weaken and not the leaders²⁸⁵.

Accordingly, no mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the leaders to the public, no ideology which enshrines the principle of majority will can prevent the elite from imposing its supremacy over the rest of society.

d. James Burnham

James Burnham presents an economic approach to elite domination. This is as opposed to Pareto, who adopted a psychological approach. Burnham's classical elitist thesis is presented in one of his major works – "The Managerial Revolution". His contention in the Managerial Revolution was that the capitalist system was in decline and would be replaced by a society controlled economically and politically by a managerial elite. His first assumptions are derived from the elitists-that politics is always a matter of struggle between groups for power and status and that in all societies a small group will inevitably control ultimate decision making.

Social change occurs as a result of a shift in the composition of the elite – an old elite replaced by a new one. An egalitarian, classless society is inconceivable in the conditions of advanced industrialized societies with their need for technical training and expertise. The failure of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia to establish such a society was proof to Burnham that a new a new class of rulers must inevitably arise.

The Law of Circulation of Elites

One of the proponents of this theory is Pareto. Pareto says that people are always governed by elites except short period of time. He rejects a linear progressive evolutionary interpretation of history and social change. For him, history is the replacement of certain elites as once ascends another descend though to us it may often appear under another form. To Pareto elites are those people who possess in marked degree qualities of intelligence, character, capacity, of whatever kind.

More precisely if we grade every individual regardless of any ethical judgment, according to their branch activity and occupation in the society, we find at each grade level there will be a certain amounts of individuals that consists of a class. In this class hierarchy, people who are in the class which is on the top of the other classes are called, 'elite'. Then, Pareto classifies social classes by taking elites as a stick yard. Elites represent the higher stratum, the others, namely non-elites are thought as the lower stratum. He further emphasizes and divides it into subgroups, because for him, there is no one elite stratum²⁸⁶. There are various strata in it and all of them constitute the elite stratum. The main strata in elite stratum are:

- a) Governing elite that consists of rest of the individuals who directly or indirectly have a considerable role in government;

- b) Non-governing elite that consists of rest in the elite stratum;
- c) Political elite that effectively and particularly, exercise political power.

Pareto examines structure and change of elites rather than non-elites. This change is called the law of circulation of elites by Pareto. He says 'elites' or aristocrats do not last. They live or take position in a certain time. He further explained that history is a graveyard of aristocracies. Rising and declining of the elites take place at the same time. Generally, there are two signs that show elites are declining:

1. Declining elite becomes softer, milder, more humane and less apt to defend its own power; and
2. Elites loss its rapacity and greed for the goods of others, but rather tends as much as possible to increase its unlawful appropriations and indulge in major usurpation of the national patrimony

The circulation of elites in ruling class is clearer than general circulation of elite. Governing or ruling elite is always in a state of slow and continuous transformation. The transformation is basically based on change in residues of ruling elite. Ruling class follows various ways to protect itself from the threats of non-elites such as using force; death; capital punishment, financial ruin, exclusion from public offices and exile.

2.2.10 Structural Conflict Theory

The structural theory attempts to explain conflict as a product of the tension that arises when groups compete for scarce resources. The central argument in this sociological theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured or organized. It describes the condition of the society and how such condition or environment can create conflict. Structural conflict theory identifies such conditions as social exclusion,

deprivation, class inequalities, injustice, political marginalization, gender imbalances, racial segregation, economic exploitation and the likes, all of which often lead to conflict²⁸⁷.

Structural conflict theory is most commonly associated with Karl Marx. According to him, conflict is a basic structural condition of society. In other words, conflict is an inherent part of human relations. It is a natural phenomenon which contributes to social evolution¹²⁵. Structuralists maintain that conflict occurs because of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies or because of domination of one class by another. The main argument of Marx who is one of the proponents on this theory is that conflict occurs as a result of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies divided along class with the privileged dominating the less privileged. To this extent, the warring issue between the federal government and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria is as a result of injustice and breach of human rights which have resulted in frustrations and recourse to violence and conflict. This is strictly an alternative to structural functionalism.

To the structural conflict theorists, the functionalists had no sooner gained leadership in social science and sociological theory, than it came under increasing attack. The attack was multifaceted as this show cases conflicts in society as a structural response to the poorly organized economic various and resources of the people in society. This research work aligned with the Dahrendorf. His major work, class and class conflict in industrial society in 1950 is most influential on this issue, although aspects of social systems could fit together rather neatly, there also could be considerable conflict and human tension among them²⁸⁸.

In Nigeria, there has been over concentration of power and apparatus for the distribution of the resources of the nation at the center. The federal government seems not to recognize the various interests of the federating component units. The theory however, is deficient in its on-sidedness of looking at causes of conflict. It, for instance, does not see the bright sides of racial or ethnic diversity and the strength that a society may derive from pluralism. It only sees the flaws. The structural theory thus makes sense only when conflicts are viewed from the broadest possible perspective, and only if the observer opts to ignore alternate causes of the conflict.

2.2.11 Relative - Deprivation Theory

Another theory used to explain the variables in this research work is the relative deprivation theory. The Relative Deprivation theory is a theory used in social sciences to describe feelings or measures of economic, political, or social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute²⁸⁹. The theory is inextricably linked to the similar terms' poverty and social exclusion or marginalization. The concept of relative deprivation has important consequences for both behavior and attitudes, including feelings of stress, political attitudes, and participation in collective action.

One of the proponents refers to Relative Deprivation as 'the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction, and this disposes men to violence'²⁹⁰. Relative Deprivation is the discrepancies between what people want, their value expectations, and what they actually gain, their value accruing capabilities. He states that: 'the intensity of relative deprivation varies strongly in terms of the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities'²⁹⁰. He contends that people are more likely to revolt when they lose hope of

attaining their societal values, and the intensity of discontent/frustration ‘varies’ with the severity of depression and inflation’²⁹¹. He further asserts that relative deprivation, ‘is the obvious basis for mobilizing oppositions’ against the state, that is, the higher the degree of frustration, the greater the political instability.

In short, the intensification of Relative Deprivation with regard to political participation, prosperity, collective/communal values and societal status can lead to a ‘decline in ideational coherence’ which consequently leads to a breakdown in the social order and to violence. The state’s centrality in people’s lives, its relationship to ongoing conflicts in society, people’s expressive relationship to it, all depend on its cohesion’²⁹¹. Another scholar speaking of how people perceive themselves, states that: ‘the answer lies in the issue of identity, in variations in the degree of expansiveness and restrictiveness, with which people and organizations relate to one another’.

The theory of relative deprivation also assumes that individuals or groups feel relatively deprived when there exists a discrepancy between their expectations and outcome. The individuals or groups are able to identify the discrepancy due to the existence of a reference point for comparison. In that, there are some persons who have what they requires, and they know getting what they want is realistic, but it can only be taken by force or violence. This is also reflected in Walter Runciman’s four preconditions of relative deprivation of object X by person A. These preconditions includes:

- a. Person A does not have X
- b. Person A knows of other persons who have X
- c. Person A wants to have X
- d. Person A believes obtaining X is realistic¹³³.

He distinguished between egoistic and fraternalistic relative deprivation. The former is caused by unfavorable social position when compared to other, better off members of a specific group (of which A is the member) and the latter, by unfavorable comparison to other, better off groups. Egoistic relative deprivation can be seen in the example of a worker who believes he should have been promoted faster and may lead that person to take actions intended to improve his position within the group; those actions are, however, unlikely to affect many people. Fraternalistic can be seen in the example of racial discrimination and are much more likely to result in the creation and growth of large social movement, like the American Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s²⁹².

Deprivation Theory is that people who are deprived of things deemed valuable in society, money, justice, status or privilege, join social movements with the hope of redressing their grievances. That is a beginning point for looking at why people join social movements.

2.3 Review of Empirical Studies

2.3.1 Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), National Security and Human Rights in Nigeria

Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), National Security and Human Rights in Nigeria Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) has accused the government of Nigeria of human rights abuses¹³⁷. The group's leader, El-Zakzaky who was arrested on December, 2015 has been in detention since. Several court orders for his release on bail has not been heeded or complied with by the federal government²⁹³. On Monday August 05, 2019, a

court in Kaduna granted Ibrahim Zakzaky permission to travel to India for medical treatment.

A week later, he was returned back to what the government called “protective custody along with his wife. He faces charges of culpable homicide and unlawful assembly along with his wife. Protestation against his “unlawful” and continuous detention by the government against court orders of his release has trailed his arrest since 2015. In 2018, Amnesty International reported that 45 people died and 122 were injured in clashes between the Nigerian Army and the Shiites protesters in the capital city of Abuja²⁹⁴. On July this year, several people, including a senior Police Officer, and a journalist (Youth Corp Member), were also killed during clashes between IMN members and security forces²⁹⁵. A blame game has continued to undermine the true position of the law, rule of law, due process, national security and human rights with respect to this issue.

The government obtained a court order in 2018 and proscribed the group as a terrorist organization whose practices undermined national security, peace, unity and corporate existence of Nigeria. For the part of the group, the established family consciousness and solidarity have propelled an unabated resolve to protest against the injustices meted out against them and the continued detention of their leaders. In a statement in July, 2019, the President of the media group of IMN, Ibrahim Musa, the group, in justifying its continued protest against the fundamental rights abuses of its members noted:

...it is not possible under every logical reasoning to exonerate President Muhammadu Buhari from the genocide perpetrated by the Nigerian Army under his command as Commander-in-Chief, where over 1,000 unarmed members of the movement including men, women and children were killed on 12th–14th of December, 2015. The government has declared illegally burying 347 members of the movement in a mass

grave at Mando Village in Kaduna after the mass murder, in violation of Geneva Convention, and every known law in the country...²⁹⁶

The Federal Government of Nigeria through the Senior Special Adviser on Media and Publicity, Garba Shehu has maintained that El-Zakzaky is standing trial in Kaduna, and “government at the centre can be said to be clear of any alleged violations of court orders trumpeted every day²⁹⁷. While the IMN has continued to also call for the implementation of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry whose report called for the arrests and prosecution of soldiers that perpetrated the killing of peaceful protesting members of IMN in Zaria in 2015; government has insisted that the group existence and activities are serious threats to national security, as such, members’ fundamental rights cannot be guaranteed.

2.3.2 Causes of the Issues between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Federal Government

To have a comprehensive understanding of the issues between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Federal Government of Nigeria, it is imperative to know the causes of the crises between both parties. Therefore, the research work will give three account of the causes of the crisis from the statement of the Nigerian Army, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and an eye witness explanation of the issue.

The Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Nigeria Army who is controlled by the Federal Government gave conflicting account about what happened between them. On 12 December, 2015, the Nigerian Army statement alleged that members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria. “On the orders of their leader, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky” attempted to assassinate the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Tukur Buratai, who was en route to a military ceremony in the city of Zaria. The statement said hundreds of armed sect members barricaded General Buratai’s way, spurned warnings to disperse, and then

started pelting his convoy with what they termed as “dangerous objects”. It said, troops responsible for the army chief’s safety had to protect him by clearing the barricades forcefully, but did do in accordance with the army’s rule of engagements and code of conduct²⁹⁸.

The Islamic Movement of Nigeria rejected the army’s account, particularly the alleged assassination attempt. A statement on its website said “unarmed members were gathered for a ceremony at their religious center, Hussainiyyah Baqeeyatullah, when soldiers attacked them, killing an unspecified number of people. A third account by local residents said the Islamic members, brandishing clubs and chanting Allah Akbar (God is Great), blocked a major road linking Zaria and other major cities of northern Nigeria and stopped the army’s chief’s envoy on the ground that their leader was about to make a speech at the religious center. After they rebuffed soldiers’ order to disperse, troops charged through their defense, stormed and seized the Hussainiyyah compound which has become a source of violent resistance, killing about ten members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria in the process²⁹⁹. From the above, it is clear that the statements from the three account in consideration are conflictual in nature. This is how this has been handled right from the inception of the crisis.

2.3.3 The Implication IMN and Governance in Nigeria

Security is tied to both social, political and economic growth and development of Nigeria. The negligence of the security sector is responsible for the non-performance of democratic governance and its attendant violent crimes, such as armed robbery, ethnic crisis, electoral violence, kidnapping, police brutality. Good Governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resource and guarantee

the realization of human rights. Good governance accomplishes this in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due respect and regards for the rule of law. The true test of good governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights.

The key question is, are the institutions of governance effectively guaranteeing the right to health, quality education, fair justice and personal security? It is important to also state that good governance is all about effective and transparent leadership that produces results which together transform the socio-economic conditions of a nation. The objective of good governance is human development with equity and social justice. Therefore, the goal of governance should be to develop capacities that are needed to realize development that gives priority to the poor, advances women, sustains the environment and creates needed opportunities for employment and other livelihoods³⁰⁰.

However, constitutionalism and sanctity of the rule of law principle is germane to effective governance, and security of life and property. Rule of law is one of the attractions of democracy. It symbolizes a meaningful and broad competition for public positions through periodic, free, and fair elections, and as determined by the constitutional arrangement of the country. The rule of law, underpinned by an independent judicial system, implies a functional legal framework that helps to ensure settlement of conflicts between the state and individuals on the one hand, and among individuals or groups on the other. It also helps to ensure respect for property rights and contracts, while preventing the government and influential individuals from acting capriciously³⁰¹. Also, in its oversight functions, the judiciary serves as a check on the excesses of the other arms of government, especially the executive.

Since the inception of democratic governance in 1999, the federal government of Nigeria has done little, if not nothing, to improve on human rights and the protection of its citizen's life and property as one of their cardinal responsibilities. Instead, they turn to be a threat to the wellbeing and corporate existence of their citizens as part of their mandate and statutory responsibility as contained in the constitution. The aforementioned issues such as killings, violations of human right and rule of law, proscription of the movement and the international dimension to the issue have to a large extent affect the issue of governance in the country³⁰².

The use of excessive force by the Nigeria security agencies is indeed a bad idea. For instance, bloody sectarian clashes claimed hundreds of lives in late 2008 and 2009, while the government failed to investigate, much less hold accountable, members of the security forces were implicated on numerous incidents of extra judicial killings, torture, and extortion³⁰³. On July 30, 2009, the police in the northern city of Maiduguri brazenly executed the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf in police custody, the following day his father-in-law Baba Mohammed, and a former state government official suspected of funding Boko Haram were also reportedly killed in police custody. The government promised to promptly investigate these killings, but to no avail³⁰⁴.

Similarly, in November 2008 the police and military were credibly implicated in more than 130 unlawful killings while responding to the election related violence in Jos. The government has still not held members of the security forces accountable for past crimes, including the massacre of more than 200 people by the military in Benue state in 2001 and military's complete destruction of the town of Odi in Bayelsa state in 1999. Good governance policies should empower individuals to live with dignity and freedom.

Secondly, the escalating crisis between members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Federal Government of Nigeria appears to have come to a head following a violent clash between members of the sect and the security agencies of the country. The resultant killings and denial of medical care by the Nigeria state could be seen from the lens of breach of human rights. It is imperative to emphasize that human rights strengthen good governance framework. They require going beyond the ratification of human rights treaties, integrating human rights effectively in legislation and state policy and practice, establishing the promotion of justice as the aim of the rule of law.

One of the charge brought against the Islamic Movement in Nigeria is that the organization is an extremist group and that it is a threat to the Nigerian state due to the perennial clash with the state security agencies. The proscription of the movement is a flagrant infringement on its freedom to practice the religion of its choice. The 1999 constitution is exceptionally clear on this assertion. To this extent, the Federal Government of Nigeria have failed to ensure justice for the killings of hundreds of members of the movement since 2015, and the continuous killings and use of excessive force by the security to deter the rights is another fact to reckon with. In addition, the “political detention” of the group by the federal government is also one of the reasons why the continuous clash between the two parties may not end as expected³⁰⁵.

The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) want justice for its leader, but the Federal government is reluctant to release the prisoner. Indeed, the military are state agents and whether or not they acted based on directives from the government is irrelevant; what is more important is the failure of the Nigeria state to properly bring to book men of the Nigeria armed forces responsible for the mass killing in Zaria in 2015. More importantly,

the Nigeria president should be seen as the chief culprit since, as Commander-in-Chief of the nation's armed forces, the buck stops at his desk.

2.3.4 Iran and the Period of Islam Only: The Dynamics of a Relationship

The evolution of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria cannot be meaningful without going back to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In the beginning of the revolutionary movement Zakzaky and most of his contemporaries were committed, struggled and operated on the common belief and conviction for the attainment and practice of Shari'a on the singular platform of what Elzakzaky himself constantly referred Muslim Brothers in Nigeria, even though the general ideology of the Muslim brothers has been that of Islam, but there was quantum of paradigms regarding their understanding of what an Islamic struggle in a secular system should look like³⁰⁶.

The first are those who believe that Muslim brothers must decisively pursue their interest independent of participating in the affairs of the Nigerian state (that is to say it stands outside and independent of the Nigerian state). The second were those who believe that Muslim brothers should join the system with the aim of bringing about gradual revolution in favor of Sharia. The third were yet others who had the belief in maintaining Islamic Traditional Sufism. These are adherents of Abdulkadir Assufy's school of thought. This period reigned until when Elzakzaky returned from an open declaration (famously known as Funtua declaration) was made at a gathering of the Muslim Brothers in Funtua, that, Islam only³⁰⁷.

The implication of "Islam only" Funtua declaration at that time was that ElZakzaky (of course alongside some others) does not recognize any authority apart from that of Allah

and Shari'a is the only recognized source of constitution. Many of the Muslim Brothers in struggle had complied with Elzakzaky's proposal while some out rightly didn't, this particular period was immediately followed by a series of actions and utterances leading to the suspicion of Elzakzaky by many of the Muslim brothers, of, following the footsteps of the Iranian Shi'a sectarian ideology rather than the mainstream Islam that was devoid of any sectarian inclination which they had all earlier believed in³⁰⁸.

2.3.5 The Imagined Organizational Structure of the IMN in Nigeria

Being that the IMN is not a formal organization with written down constitution and modus operandi, there isn't any written document or constitution that is guiding its operation more so that it's not directly registered with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). However, this study for the first time puts forward a somewhat imagined organizational structure of the IMN based field work data. The organizational structure is never a claim of the exact structure of the group, but a representation of the supposed structure which will serve as a starting point for improvement by subsequent studies on the group.

The structure of the group is a caricature of Hasanul-Banna's Egyptian Islamic group-the Muslim Brotherhood and a loose replica of the Iranian Islamic Republic's religious clergy hierarchical order. The supposed reason for such a hybrid outlook is not without the fact that the IMN (as discussed above) is an evolutionary product of mainly these two politico-religious discourses. So while the concept of Imam is used to refer to a supreme leader based on the theory of Velayet-e-Faqih in the politico-religious spectrum of the Shi'a creed, the Sunni use the term Khalifah; to further prove that the IMN structure is a

hybrid, the terms of Daurah and Halqah were major practices of the Hasanul-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt³⁰⁹.

The group like many other Islamist Movements, runs a centralised kind of hierarchy where Imam as in the Iranian Shi'a clergy system, is the supreme leader of the group. He has absolute power which is not subjected to any form of checks or balances. Being that since the full pledge operation of the group as IMN after the breakaway of the last Sunni faction, the organization and determination of modus operandi and approach of the group has been the prerogative of its first and ever self-appointed Leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, the determination of ideological direction, activities and decisions and final directives of the group remained with its founder Elzakzaky. This however does not mean that communication and power relations in the organization is strictly top down, rather it is both ways depending on the sensitivity of the matter³¹⁰.

Directly below the leader, is his deputy who also was there by virtue of the fact that he was among the few charismatic members of the MSS that endured together with El-Zakzaky up to the IMN. The function of the deputy Imam is not designated as such, but by tradition, he assists the supreme leader and is still the intermediary between the leader and the Majlis Shura in which he is a member. The deputy leader may be a passive one in terms of actual functions of a deputy, but he is an active one because he sits at the helm of day to day activities of the group on behalf of the leader. In the circle of leadership of the IMN, Majlis Shura (Consultative or Advisory Council) is the next in terms of ranking after the deputy.

The Majlis Shura which originated during the reign of the four Caliphs of Islam as successors of Prophet Muhammad (saw), has become for contemporary Islamist

Movements a mechanism for authority legitimation and pledge of allegiance³¹¹. For the fact that Majlis Shura are chosen out of consideration for their knowledge depth and wisdom, their traditional function among other roles, is to serve as consultants and advisers to the leader. However, slightly on the contrary, the role of Majlis Shura of the IMN is normally the day to day administration and supervision of the field activities of the IMN as well as the linkage between the mass of the movement and its leadership. In fact, many members of the Majlis Shura of the IMN are not deeply knowledgeable as one would expect.

Directly below the Majlis Shura is the Specialized Organs of the IMN. The specialized organs are the heart of the IMN because they perform all the functions for which the group is committed. There are about eight standing (specialized) ancillary organs of the IMN. Their major function is to provide services to IMN members in all aspects of human life. The evolution of these specialized organs have great deal of relationship with the IMN's vocal and active opposition and lamentation against the failure of the Nigerian state to carry out its social contract responsibilities. For these and many other similar reasons, the specialized organs of the IMN were specially designed to replace or at least to supplement the functions of the Nigerian state. The ISMA Medical Care Initiative, for example, provides health care services to IMN members; the Hurras function as security operatives of the IMN; the Business Forum is charged with responsibility of ensuring economic well-being of the IMN members as well as business and entrepreneurial innovations; Information and Publications does the job of information generation and dissemination³¹².

Others are Martyrs Foundation whose responsibility is to manage the affairs of those who lost their lives in the cause of the group's struggle and to handle the affairs of their families which they left behind, there is also the Sisters Forum, this organ is headed by the wife of the IMN leader. The function of this organ is to coordinate the affairs of women members of the IMN in such a way that those with potentialities of interest to the IMN are identified and assigned responsibilities of different dimensions. As mentioned earlier, the IMN is structured in such a way that it has coordinating centres in all the thirty-six states of the Nigerian federation.

These state centres are called Daura. The major function of each Daura is to coordinate and direct the affairs of the IMN on behalf of the leadership of the group. The Dauras (plural of Daurah) are linked to the specialized organs of the IMN for harmonized operation and directly answerable to the Majlis Shura and the IMN leader in that order. The last layer in the IMN organizational hierarchy is the Local Government centres known as Halqah. Each of the 774 local governments of Nigeria is coordinated by a Halqah in the same manner that the Daurahs are in the states. All Halqahs (plural of Halqah) are answerable and report to their state Daurah.

2.3.6 IMN Prolonged Problem and Its Implications for Nigeria's Internal Security

Implications for Nigeria's internal security The Nigerian state, as noted in 2012 by Shehu Sani, a civil rights activist and a former Senator, may face greater violence if the same measure of cruelty and extra-judicial killings meted out to Boko Haram is extended to the

members of Shiite movement that are better informed and organised. And the report that the initial followers of El-Zakzaky who parted ways with IMN resorted to violent campaigns should elicit strategic concerns. That makes the concerted repression of IMN very precarious. Already, the fierce clash between the police and Shiites that locked down some parts of Abuja, Nigeria's capital, in April 2018 displayed the desperation of the group for the unconditional release of El-Zakzaky³¹³.

The country may be playing with fire if he dies. Recently, his rumoured death in detention forced government to bring him up on a national television to defuse tension. The refusal of government to obey court orders on his release, the extra-judicial execution of IMN members and the last-ditch effort to prosecute him are palpable conflict triggers or drivers. If the court eventually acquits El-Zakzaky of the criminal charges levelled against him, the Nigerian state would be relieved of imminent insurrection, but if on the contrary, the country may be in for sectarian violence with active support from allies in the Middle East.

Given the fact that the use of force has been unable to stamp out extreme radicalization and international terrorism, Nigeria government should consider the option of dialogue in resolving the conflict. The success recorded so far in negotiating the release of some of the Chibok girls and the ongoing talks with the bandits in Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto States indicate that constructive engagement may be the most realistic way to go. In this context, Muslim leaders in Nigeria may play a key role in persuading members of jihadist groups, including Shiites, to sit at the negotiating table.

2.3.7 New Generators of IMN radicalization

The return to civilian rule in 1999, which to a certain degree opened up the political space to various groups to engage and criticize the government of the day, witnessed the unprecedented emergence of several ethnic and religious-inspired activist and violent groups in Nigeria's political landscape, most notably Boko Haram³¹⁴. Such developments coincided with particular political events globally, especially those emanating from the post-9/11 global security challenges and also the contemporary globalization of Islamism, especially extremist variants³¹⁵. These local and international political developments had spawned contextual conditions favorable to and thus exploitable by, Islamist in Nigeria, especially in the north.

Additionally, while northern Nigeria has historically been economically and educationally disadvantaged compared to the south of the country, by 1999 the significant gap in opportunities within these two regions of the country became more pronounced, with an unprecedented rise in socio-economic inequality and poverty³¹⁶. This disparity has continued to the present. The IMN re-emerged within this context as an important Shi'a Islamist organization in northern Nigeria by 2004, after having lost significant influence in the latter part of the 1990s.

It was also in these prevailing conditions that Zakzaky had rebuilt the IMN into a larger mass-movement by 2004 which took on a deeper Shi'a zeal, including celebrating more Shi'a customs such as Ashura, as well as further moving into the orbit of Iran, which appears to have played a key role in this development by the provision of financial support³¹⁷. The re-awakening of the IMN as a prominent Islamic group in northern Nigeria appears to have signaled a heightened level of the distrust and rivalry that currently exists between the Sunni religious establishment, on the one hand, and the IMN

and wider Shi'a community in Nigeria, on the other. Sunni dominated northern political elites and their religious establishment, as a result of the re-emergence of the IMN in 2004, have sought to use the cohesive apparatus of the Nigerian state to significantly weaken if not eradicate the IMN, and also Shi'a Islam in Nigeria³¹⁸.

This has deepened the fear and rivalry between Shi'a and Sunnis, particularly in respect of political and religious dominance of northern Nigeria. Consequently, from a Shi'a/IMN perspective, it is believed that although constitutionally the Nigerian state is secular, there is indeed a tacit war waged against Shi'a Islam in Nigeria³¹⁹. In addition, concerns over IMN activities by the Sunni elites in the north have been reinforced by allegations that Hezbollah was providing the IMN with military-style training camps mainly across northern Nigeria³²⁰. Such alleged links with Iran and Hezbollah as well as increased violent confrontation with the security agencies by the IMN, therefore, seem part of the reason why the Nigerian government refuses to release Zakzaky from his current incarceration and allege the IMN supports terrorist activities in the country³²¹.

However, the IMN has consistently denied any link between Zakzaky and terrorism and has published numerous articles on the group's official website geared to debunk such claims. In particular, the IMN accuses the Nigerian government of failing to provide any credible evidence to support its claimed link to terrorism³²². Furthermore, the IMN and Shi'a Muslims in Nigeria argue that there is nothing historical in their Islamic belief that associates that sect with "aggressive" violence. Rather, the IMN and Shi'a Islam support the use of "defensive" violence (jihad), citing the Iranian sponsored Hezbollah in Lebanon as a key example³³³. In a 2018 web post, the IMN notes that Shi'a Islam is fundamentally at odds with Sunni Islam in terms of the use of violence against any

perceived level of intimidation by a nation-state or group. The group cited an example of an allegation leveled against them by the Nigerian security agencies that they killed a police officer during one of their demonstrations against the continuous detention of their leader. They argued that:

Shiism differs in many ways with the Orthodox Sunnism. One of their areas of difference is ‘Taqlid’. In other words, looking up to a jurist in every issue, from social, political, economic to even bloodletting. Any action that would lead to bloodshed must be justified by a verdict from that religious authority. This is to say, that an adherent of this school of thought will never attack anybody, unjustifiably. Among the conditions of Taqlid is, the jurist must be alive and when dead, a person is expected to switch to another. It’s a Google age, just search for the concept of Taqlid to read more. For over four decades of its existence, the Islamic movement in Nigeria under Sheikh Zakzaky’s leadership has never resort [sic] to violence amidst series of persecution of its members across the country. If members of the movement are violent, they don’t have to kill a policeman who is also a Nigerian suffering like other countrymen courtesy of bad governance. If the members of the Islamic movement are violent, they know where the masterminds of the attacks dine and wine. They know where and how to get them, but it is not in their character³³⁴.

However, claims by the Nigerian state regarding the IMN as a “national threat” has been widely reported by some media, notably confrontations between the IMN and Nigerian security agencies. This includes clashes in 2014 that resulted in a significant number of IMN members being killed. This clash was triggered when three of Zakzaky’s sons were allegedly shot dead by the Nigerian military³³⁵. Moreover, on 12 December 2015, the IMN engaged in another large-scale violent confrontation with the Nigerian military, dubbed by the Nigerian media as the “Zaria massacre”. This resulted in hundreds of

deaths, including the alleged killing of some 347 IMN members the following day in a pre-dawn raid by the security services. These deaths reportedly included women and children who were asleep at the time³³⁶.

Following the raid, Zakzaky, along with his wife, was arrested and in April 2018 charged for unlawful gathering, criminal conspiracy and culpable homicide. Since Zakzaky's incarceration, there have been clashes between IMN members and the security agencies in the cities of Kano and Kaduna. This continued in 2018, including two clashes within days of each other in Abuja, signaling the first clash between the IMN and security forces in Nigeria's capital. Both events occurred when IMN members protesting against the ongoing detention of Zakzaky without trial escalated into violence³³⁷. In all of these protests that have turned violent, the IMN, as earlier noted, argues that their strand of Islam forbids violence except on some specific conditions. They have also accused the Nigerian security agencies of trying to undermine their peaceful protests as a means of blaming them for whatever violence that may emanate from such protests. They stated that:

Security operatives are currently actively spreading misinformation and wild rumors with a view to breaking our will and resolve, and also to cause confusion so that they could seize the opportunity to turn our peaceful protests violent. Credible reports have confirmed that hoodlums and security operatives have already been commissioned by the authorities to massively infiltrate our Free Zakzaky campaign activities to wreak havoc in our name and thereby instigate members of the Islamic Movement into misconduct, which they will then capitalize on to paint the Movement black. They will pretend they are working to free our leader while in fact they mean evil. By this evil plot, the hoodlums and security

operatives will carry out series of attacks and subsequently attribute same to the “members” of the Movement so that they could achieve what they have so far failed to do, which is associate the peaceful campaigns to free Sheikh Zakzaky in Abuja as well as in all other parts of the country with violence in order to swing public opinion against the Movement and justify the continued illegal and contemptuous detention of our leader. Among other evil schemes, they plan to foment trouble by burning tyres and properties in the course of our peaceful processions. They also hope to achieve their mischievous aims by provoking us to wreak havoc and attribute same to a supposed reaction of members of the Islamic Movement³³⁸.

While it is difficult to ascertain whether the Nigerian state has infiltrated the Free Zakzaky campaign activities to wreak havoc on the IMN, protests by the IMN have led to a heightened level of concern by the Nigerian state which has increasingly employed its security forces in a bid to counter the IMN. The IMN has been banned by the Kaduna state government and the Nigeria security agencies. This ban by the Kaduna state government and the security agencies as however, not stopped this group from protesting against the continuous detention of its leader. Also, the IMN has persistently stated that the group cannot be banned by fiat by the Nigerian state and/or its security agencies. They note that:

We will like to also remind the Police that the Islamic Movement is not an organization that can be banned by fiat, because we are exemplifying Islamic teachings in our day to day life. We are not the criminals that the Police want the public to believe, we are practicing Muslims. Our only crime before the vicious Kaduna state government and its supporters is that we demand justice to our incarcerated leader, Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky, his wife and the hundreds under illegal detention for almost three years. On these we will not

relent on our efforts until the killers of the at least 347 members of the Islamic Movement admitted by the state government to having buried them in a mass grave are brought to book³³⁹.

In addition to the IMN alleging that the Nigerian state accuses their organization for acts it does not subscribe to, they also blame the Nigerian government for oppressing IMN as a result of Saudi Arabia's request to eliminate Shia Islam in Nigeria. They note that:

The naked truth is that the federal government decided to suppress the Islamic Movement on the behest of Saudi Arabia, an agent and ally of the West, killing over a thousand civilian souls and destroying properties worth billions of Naira in its wreck³⁴⁰.

They also allege that the crown prince of Saudi Arabia in an interview with US based Time Magazine specifically stated that his country took responsibility for the massacre that have happened to the IMN in their bid to further promote Wahhabism in Nigeria.

The IMN alleged that:

Last week, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad Bn Salman also known as MBS during his interview with the American Time Magazine declared that they have succeeded in altering what he termed as; "attempt to over throw government by Al-Zakzaky in Nigeria ..." Saudi Arabian officials took the responsibility of killing members of Islamic Movement in Nigeria. They have the guts because they served as paymasters in crushing the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. Thus, the President of Nigeria, Buhari took the advantage of his hatred toward Islamic Movement to pull the trigger on them. Aftermath of Zaria Massacre, Nigerians bear witness of many Saudis government officials, Scholars and securities in the presidential house. In a courtesy visit paid by the Nigerian President in 2016, the President said it clearly to an Arabian TV owned by UAE; they wouldn't fold their arms to see Iranian influence in Nigeria. Afterwards, those scholars hold the view of

Wahhabism in Nigeria, extolled the Nigerian government for killing 1000+ belong to Islamic Movement. Prior to that, the King of Saudi Arabia called the Nigerian President through phone [and] congratulated him for killing the Shiites. He labelled it as “fighting terrorism in Nigeria”³⁴¹.

Overall and based on IMN web posts it can be deduced that the organization attempts to frame their organization as a victim of injustice and gross human rights violations as perpetrated by the Nigerian state, supported by external actors notably Saudi Arabia and Israel. Although there are no verifiable reports that suggest Israel or Saudi Arabia, or its crown prince are responsible for the current conflict between the IMN and the Nigeria state, this group appears to suggest that external actors dictate to the Nigerian state steps that it should use to eliminate IMN and Shia Islam in Nigeria.

However, available evidence in this period of numerous clashes between members of IMN and the Nigerian state does appear to suggest that there have been increased efforts by the state security forces to repress the IMN as well as Sunni-motivated intimidation and rivalry, leading to a deeper rejection by the IMN of the secular nature of the Nigerian state and Sunni establishment in the north. Combined with intensified support for an Iranian-style Shi'a revolution in Nigeria and deepening ideological links with Iran, this portends significant threat to Nigeria. Together, these events and developments represent new generators responsible for the radicalization of the IMN.

2.4 Summary of Gap in the Literature Reviewed

From all the literature reviewed above, it can be clearly seen that there is no doubt quite abundant literature on Islamic ideas, Islamist movements and national security. The literature on IMN and national security has been able to extensively address general

theoretical and conceptual issues but has left gap for its application on the activities of IMN. The literature on Islamic ideas and movements have succeeded in capturing issues on a general level but not specifically on IMN.

Similarly, evidence from all these specific literature shows that the IMN has only been studied from either religio-sectarian perspective, international influence, vi-a-vis completion for public space in Nigeria, or as a mere religious group which seeks to establish Islamic government in Nigeria, but there is no study which looks at the problem of Nigerian national security from the angle of the implication of IMN activities which are interpreted as the group's strategies for resilience. This research fills such gap.

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Chapter Three

Methodology

3.1 Research Design

The overall framework for connecting conceptual research concerns to relevant and feasible empirical research is known as research design. In basic terms, research design is a set of methodologies and processes that the researcher will employ to gather and analyse the data. The research study intends to adopt the historical and descriptive methods of research design. The historical research is an attempt to understand a phenomenon by determining its processes of growth and dynamics of internal change. The purpose of historical research is to trace the influence of the past on current occurrence. Descriptive research on the other hand systematically describes facts, qualities or characteristics of a given population, event or area of interest as factually and accurately possible, in order to provide answers to questions asked by the problem under investigation. For this reason, descriptive research design is a critical investigation of events, their development, experiences of past.

3.2 Population of the Study

The study's population is made up of a group of people or a collection of products and things about which the researcher is curious¹. As a result, the term 'population' refers to all situations or persons that meet a given criteria². It is important to understand that the population of the study is not arbitrarily chosen. It is determined by the problem under investigation. The population of the study are members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Political Analyst, and security agencies. Due to the clamp down on members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) it will be difficult to identify one.

3.3 Sample and Sampling techniques

The samples for this research were respondents derived from the population of the study. Hence, the sample size of the study are North central states and North West states. Specifically, these states include Kano, Abuja, Kaduna, and Zaria. The reason for the choice of these states is because they are considered as the stronghold for Islamic Movement in Nigeria. However, Zaria was the epic-center of the Massacre in 2015.

3.4 Research Instrument

The research used secondary sources of data. The secondary sources of data for the study include written literature from public and institutional libraries. It will cover relevant books, journals, newspapers, magazines, periodicals, seminar and conference papers as well as published and unpublished materials. The University of Ibadan and Lead City University Libraries will be very useful.

3.5 Method of Data Collection

Sources targeted for this study are newspapers, magazines, books from library, documents from government agencies, specific topic related articles, literature, annual reports, published statistics from research organizations, and so on. The thesis will consider the research of relevant authors and observers on the research interest to have a clear knowledge of the boundaries that this thesis shall be playing out within the political system.

3.6 Reliability of Research Instrument

The consistency of the findings of the study is founded on the significant research and examination of the information gathered.

3.7 Validity of the Research Instrument

The interview will be used to gather reliable information. It will also be used as a measuring instrument in this research was to ascertain its validity and reliability. The researcher consulted experts and practitioners by giving them the instrument to review the relevance of the questions on the subject matter to ensure that it will test what it is designed for.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

Secondary data gathered were analyzed and presented using qualitative descriptive analysis. Historical and descriptive analytical explanation is given to the secondary data obtained for the study. Thus, the use of this method of analysis is conversant with the straightforwardness with which it summarizes, exposes and interprets relationships within a specific data by qualitative description.

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Chapter Four

Results and Discussions of Findings

4.1 Presentation of Research Questions

4.1.1 Research Question One: What are the Contentious Issues of the Crackdown Between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and The Federal Government that Triggered the Conflict in the Country?

To have a comprehensive understanding of the contentious issues between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the Federal Government of Nigeria, it is imperative to know the causes of the crises between both parties. Therefore, this research work will give a three account of the causes of the crisis from the statement of the Nigerian Army, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and an eye-witness explanation of the issue.

The Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Nigeria Army who is controlled by the Federal Government gave conflicting account about what happened between them. On 12 December, 2015, the Nigerian Army statement alleged that members of the Islamic

Movement of Nigeria “on the orders of their leader, Ibrahim El-Zakxaky” attempted to assassinate the former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Tukur Buratai, who was en route to a military ceremony in the city of Zaria. The statement said hundreds of armed sect members barricaded General Buratai’s way, spurned warnings to disperse, and then started pelting his convoy with what they termed as “dangerous objects”. It said, troops responsible for the army chief’s safety had to protect him by clearing the barricades forcefully but did do in accordance with the army’s rule of engagements and code of conduct¹.

The Islamic Movement of Nigeria rejected the army’s account, particularly the alleged ‘assassination’ attempt. A statement on its website said “unarmed members were gathered for a ceremony at their religious center, Hussainiyyah Baqeeyatullah, when soldiers attacked them, killing an unspecified number of people². A third account by local residents said the Islamic members, brandishing clubs and chanting Allah Akbar (God is Great), blocked a major road linking Zaria and other major cities of northern Nigeria and stopped the army’s chief’s envoy on the ground that their leader was about to make a speech at the religious center. After they rebuffed soldiers’ order to disperse, troops charged through their defense, stormed and seized the Hussainiyyah compound which has become a source of violent resistance, killing about ten members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria in the process³.

From the above, it is clear that the statements from the three account in consideration are conflictual in nature. This is how this has been handled right from the inception of the crisis.

4.1.1.1 The Issues that Emerged From The Crisis?

Several issues emerged from the crisis between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the Federal government of Nigeria. Some of the issues include Killings, Violation of human rights and rule of law, proscription or banning of the Islamic Movement, and International and regional dimension of the crises. Let us discuss them one after the other

1. Massive Killings and Detention of IMN Members and Innocent Citizens.

Since the inception of the crisis between the two parties, a number of killings and detentions have occurred between members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the security apparatus of the federal government. On 12 December 2015, the Nigerian Army in Zaria, Kaduna State, carried out an assault against mostly members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). The attack left at least 348 civilians killed and some others injured. The leader of the movement was injured in the incident and was captured along with his wife and hundreds of other members⁴. Amnesty International report also affirms that some of the injured bodies were burned alive⁵. Similarly, the Human Rights Watch Report also alleged that the Nigerian government buried the bodies without family members' permission⁶.

However, subsequent killings and detentions have manifested between both the parties involved and an extension of these killings have been shifted to the innocent citizens who are now victims of the crisis. Most of the innocent citizens do fall victim during "peaceful protest of the movement". For instance, on July 22, 2019, the Nigeria police fired unlawfully on a protest by the Islamic movement of Nigeria in Abuja. Accordingly, eleven protesters, a journalist and a police officer were killed, while dozens of others were wounded or arrested⁷. Recently, a leading media outlet published an article listing the names of students, adults as well as pregnant women that have been killed since the

inception of the crisis. Most of the killings are done with the use of ‘excessive force’ from the security agencies of the government such as the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the Nigerian Army (NA). Since the tragedy on December 12, 2015 in Zaria, around 1,886 children have lost both parents, and 200 people have been detained.

Moreover, the Nigerian authorities have used “excessive force” against members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria protests since 2015. On December 12, 2015, the Nigerian Army used excessive force against the group’s street procession in Zaria and Kaduna state which was allegedly to clear the way for the army’s chief convoy. In an ensuing three-day crackdown, the army killed 347 members of the group. In September 2016, a Kaduna state judicial commission of inquiry recommended prosecuting soldiers involved in the Zaria killings. State prosecutors ignore that recommendation.

2. Gross Violations of Human Rights and Rule of Law

The federal government under the current administration is fond of disobeying court orders with often damning consequences to follow. Abuja, the capital city of the country have on different occasions witnessed violent protest by the Shiite group demanding the release of their leader whom a federal high court and other appellate courts had already granted bail but not released by the government⁸. Whereas, continued disobedience of court orders is a violation of the rule of law and could lead to more violent protests by the aggrieved Shiites, the rate of gross human right violations cannot be overemphasized as well.

The government should punish an offender only following a guilty verdict by a court and any accused should be presumed innocent if not, to protect the rule of law. From 2015 to

date thousands of fundamental human rights of the members of the movement have been violated. Indeed, the Nigerian constitution has never been silent in outlining the fundamental human rights of its citizens. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in respect to these rights states that; *“Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life, save in execution of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria”*⁹. The Federal Government violated this section with the killing of over 1000 members of the Islamic Movement and other Nigerians. The use of ‘excessive force’ by the security agencies of the government justify this statement.

In most cases, members of the movement who are victims of being injured by bullets from the security agencies are denied medical care because they (security) do go after them after the protest. For instance, on July 22, at about 12:30pm, thousands of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria marched towards the Federal Government Secretariat to register their grievances. As they approached the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nigeria Police force opened fire and threw gas at the protesters. At least 30 members of the group were injured¹⁰. The Human Rights Watch confirmed that in many cases, hospital staff would not treat gunshot wound unless the victim first presented a police report to ensure the police are notified of gun incidents. While confirming this in the same report, a 26 year old University of Abuja have this to say:

A bullet hit my left leg, and I was carried away by my brothers in the movement. He said he participated in the march with his friends until the police opened fire on the group. He said he went to the University hospital’s emergency room but left when police arrived to arrest protesters. “We have changed our location twice because we are afraid

of the police. The bullet is still in my leg; I think my leg is broken. I feel much pain all over my body¹¹.

Secondly, every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of person and accordingly no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. Thirdly, no Nigerian shall be discriminated upon on the basis of his community, ethnic group, sex, place of origin and politician opinion. In the determination of a person's civil rights and obligations, every person shall be entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by the court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in like manner as to secure its impartiality¹². Minority Shiite and the Members of the Islamic Movement were discriminated by this current governments including rights to fear and equal hearing as witnessed in 2015 Kaduna State judicial court of inquiry and the recent presidential committee on human right violations by the Nigerian Army.

In addition to that, Section 39 of the same constitution assert that, every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions. Without prejudice to the generality of this sections, every person shall entitle the right to own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of information. Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom (either alone or in community with others in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or beliefs in teaching, worship and practice¹³.

The rights of the members of the Islamic movement to religion has been taken away by the government that is why they are hunted and killed. They also do not have the right to freedom of expression and neither do they have right to peaceful assembly or association despite conducting their assembly in the most peaceful way. Hundreds of innocent lives

have been killed by the military and the police for assembling and other rights. These rights are every free citizen's legal entitlements to enjoy without the fear of the government or other fellow citizens.

However, the continuous detention of the leader of Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Ibrahim Zakzaky, and his wife, for almost years without trial is a sour point in the human rights rating of the President Muhammadu Buhari administration. December 14, 2020, makes it two years since the Muhammadu Buhari administration detained the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), without trial even against court orders. Unfortunately, the case of El-Zakzaky and wife has however become one of the worst cases of human right abuses being recorded against the administration of President Buhari¹⁴.

The leader of the movement and her wife had been in detention since December 14, 2015, following a clash between his followers and the Nigerian Army in Zaria, Kaduna State. Many of his followers, who were equally arrested during the incident, are also in prison custody facing different charges. It is now over two years that the Islamic leader and his wife have spent in detention without trial despite a court order for their release. An Abuja Federal High Court had on December 2, 2016, declared their continuous detention without trial illegal. Counsel to the Shiite leader, Femi Falana, had approached the court to demand the release of the duo several months after their arrest without being charged to Court, arguing that their continuous detention was unlawful and a violation of their fundamental rights¹⁵.

3. International Reactions, Emerging Evidence and Regional Dimensions

While Amnesty International urged the Nigerian government to investigate the event, Human Rights Watch claims that about 300 members of the IMN were killed¹⁶. Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) avers that there is evidence of mass burial of the killed Shiite members by the Army. Several protests against the crackdown on the movement and as well as the detention of El-Zakzaky erupted by Shiites in other countries such as Iran, India, and Pakistan¹⁷. On 14th December, Iranian foreign ministry summoned the Nigerian ambassador in Tehran to receive Iran's protest letter, while Iranian President called on the Nigerian government to conduct investigations into the killing, the Iranian lawmakers suggest that the killings are covertly supported by US and Israel¹⁸.

In a contrary reaction, King Salman of Saudi Arabia applauded the Nigerian president for the killing of the Shiites. He said it was a fight against terrorism and pledged his support in helping Nigeria's counterterrorism¹⁹. The differing opinion of Iran and Saudi Arabia is not surprising because of the existing Shiite and Sunni divides in the Middle-East. It is fair to argue that Nigeria may be caught in between the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is also evident in Nigeria's decision to join the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance²⁰. This cooperation includes Saudi Arabia and 34 other countries with the exclusion of countries which practice the Shiite brand of Islam. By this arrangement, Nigeria can give military assistance to any of the countries under the Islamic Military allowance on any event of aggression.

Over time, the cold war between Iran and Saudi-Arabia could escalate to North and West Africa because sub-state groups within these regions may be armed against their home countries due to ideological solidarity from Iran and Saudi-Arabia. Both countries have

attracted accusation and criticisms for supporting violent groups across their national boundaries²¹. The grievances of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the sympathy and solidarity of Iran provides a fertile ground for the Islamic Movement of Nigeria to turn into a violent oppositional group against Nigeria such as the Iranian-sponsored Houthi which rebels against the Yemeni state.

4. Proscription or Banning of the Movement

The proscription or banning of the movement by the federal government is also another issue between the federal government and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria. El-zakzaky was arrested in the aftermath of the December 2015 Zaria confrontation. He has remained in detention ever since his arrest. On the 26th of September 2016 his followers troop into the Nigerian capital to protest the continued detention of their leader. There were claims by the members of the group that they were meted with police brutality and stopped from entering Abuja²².

On 7th October 2016, the Kaduna state government announced the banning of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria as a movement, declaring it as an unregistered organization whose doctrine is repugnant to the constitution of the Nigerian state. This decision was based on the recommendation of the Commission Inquiry Report²³. After the ban, a member of the commission, Jibrin Ibrahim, released an article titled; “Proscribing the Islamic Movement in Nigeria: A plea for second thoughts”.

In this article, he expressed his individual opinion by advocating the religious rights of the movement; he rather suggested that the group must be forced to act within the confines of the Nigerian laws²³. The Ashura celebration of the Shiites coincided with the

outlawing of the group. On 12 October 2016 during the Ashura celebration which is an event that commemorates the death of the grandson of Prophet Mohammed, Shiites processions were attacked by a mob (which may appear to be Sunnis) in five States. There was an attack on the Shiites in Tudun Wada area of Kaduna metropolis, where a school belonging to the sect was destroyed²⁴.

In Funtua, Katsina states, 9 members of the group were killed. At the Kofar Mazugal area of Kano city, there was a clash, but no casualty or damage was recorded. More so, there was an attack on the Shiites in the Angwan Rogo area of Jos metropolis, but there was a timely intervention of by the police²⁵. Subsequently, the Shiite group accuses the Nigerian forces of collaborating with irate mobs while the Nigerian forces blame the Shiites of provoking public annoyance by impeding the smooth moment of the public. The Nigerian forces also accuse the Shiites of carrying illegal weapons.

4.2 Research Question Two: What is the Implications of Continued Crackdown on Islamic Movement Of Nigeria (IMN) and the Detention of Their Leader on the National Security of the Country?

The safety and well-being of the people should be the top priorities of any responsible government. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), sets down the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter II, Sections 14, Subsections 1 and 2. Also, the constitution established that the people, not the government, had the right to exercise sovereignty²⁶. In addition, Sections 33–46 of Chapter IV of the constitution provide the protection and maintenance of the inhabitants of Nigeria's most basic rights. However, the constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties of Nigerians were limited by Section 33 of the constitution, which was justified

in the name of national security, peace, orderliness, and the maintenance of Nigeria's corporate existence²⁶.

Against this, it follows that national security must "comprise the personal and communal condition of being protected from a broad variety of significant and widespread dangers including, but not limited to, all kinds of violence, injustice, and violation of human rights²⁷. Therefore, protecting the freedom of its citizens requires a commitment to upholding their rights. Putting these rights at risk undermines both national security and people's autonomy. Prolonged wars; cruel treatment of victims of terrorism attacks; human rights abuses; discrimination; marginalization; and bad governance all contribute to the growth of insecurity, extremism²⁷.

It is better to resolve conflicts by compromise and other means that foster trust, mutual support, understanding, and love rather than through force. As a result of governmental measures designed to restrict their activities, Nigeria's estimated three million Shiites are seen as outcasts. Inference: Terrorists, particularly well-known ones, mingle freely among the Nigerian population. This unfair characterization threatens Nigeria's current state of stability. Some people and organizations see the federal government's assault on the Shia Muslim group as a theological fight for dominance between the Sunni Muslim group supported by Saudi Arabia and the Shia Muslim group supported by Iran. This threatens the religious peace and stability of a nation like Nigeria, which is home to many different faiths. If not well managed, the 2015 military raid on Sheikh Zakzaky's home, in which three of his sons and his eldest sister were killed, his continued incarceration, and the proscription of the IMN as a terrorist organization are all capable of undermining

Nigeria's corporate unity and existence²⁸. Forcefully enforcing adherence to socially-accepted principles and standards by the use of armed force.

There were about 700 casualties in a 2009 battle between the Boko-Haram group and the Nigerian military in the city of Maiduguri, Borno State. Mohammed Yusuf, the group's leader, was detained and then executed by police outside of any legal process. Over 3,340 events or assaults, 37,530 fatalities, and 2.4 million persons displaced were reported by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) by the end of 2018. As a result of the Boko Haram group's assaults, 7 million people are now in danger of hunger in a very powerful insurgency battle that has been going on for a long time²⁹. Hopefully, we have learnt our lesson from the past and won't make the same mistakes again. Even if IMN members are highly educated, a Boko-Haram-style insurgency can be prevented if national security is used as an excuse to undermine the basic rights of members and to commit continual murders and destruction of their property.

4.3 Research Question Three: How these Issues affect the Security and Governance of the state?

Security is tied to both social, political and economic growth and development of Nigeria. The negligence of the security sector is responsible for the non-performance of democratic governance and its attendant violent crimes, such as armed robbery, ethnic crisis, electoral violence, kidnapping, police brutality. Good Governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resource and guarantee the realization of human rights. Good governance accomplishes this in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due respect and regards for the rule of law³⁰.

The true test of good governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights. The key question is, are the institutions of governance effectively guaranteeing the right to health, quality education, fair justice and personal security? It is important to also state that good governance is all about effective and transparent leadership that produces results which together transform the socio-economic conditions of a nation. The objective of good governance is human development with equity and social justice. Therefore, the goal of governance should be to develop capacities that are needed to realize development that gives priority to the poor, advances women, sustains the environment and creates needed opportunities for employment and other livelihoods³¹.

However, constitutionalism and sanctity of the rule of law principle is germane to effective governance, and security of life and property. Rule of law is one of the attractions of democracy. It symbolizes a meaningful and broad competition for public positions through periodic, free, and fair elections, and as determined by the constitutional arrangement of the country. The rule of law, underpinned by an independent judicial system, implies a functional legal framework that helps to ensure settlement of conflicts between the state and individuals on the one hand, and among individuals or groups on the other. It also helps to ensure respect for property rights and contracts, while preventing the government and influential individuals from acting capriciously³². Also, in its oversight functions, the judiciary serves as a check on the excesses of the other arms of government, especially the executive.

Since the inception of democratic governance in 1999, the federal government of Nigeria has done little, if not nothing, to improve on human rights and the protection of its citizen's life and property as one of their cardinal responsibilities. Instead, they turn to be

a threat to the wellbeing and corporate existence of their citizens as part of their mandate and statutory responsibility as contained in the constitution³³. The aforementioned issues such as killings, violations of human right and rule of law, proscription of the movement and the international dimension to the issue have to a large extent affect the issue of governance in the country.

The use of excessive force by the Nigeria security agencies is indeed a bad idea. For instance, bloody sectarian clashes claimed hundreds of lives in late 2008 and 2009, while the government failed to investigate, much less hold accountable, members of the security forces were implicated on numerous incidents of extra judicial killings, torture, and extortion³⁴. On July 30, 2009, the police in the northern city of Maiduguri brazenly executed the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf in police custody, the following day his father-in-law Baba Mohammed, and a former state government official suspected of funding Boko Haram were also reportedly killed in police custody. The government promised to promptly investigate these killings, but to no avail²⁸. Similarly, in November 2008 the police and military were credibly implicated in more than 130 unlawful killings while responding to the election related violence in Jos. The government has still not held members of the security forces accountable for past crimes, including the massacre of more than 200 people by the military in Benue state in 2001 and military's complete destruction of the town of Odi in Bayelsa state in 1999. Good governance policies should empower individuals to live with dignity and freedom.

Secondly, the escalating crisis between members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Federal Government of Nigeria appears to have come to a head following a violent clash between members of the sect and the security agencies of the country. The resultant

killings and denial of medical care by the Nigeria state could be seen from the lens of breach of human rights. It is imperative to emphasize that human rights strengthen good governance framework. They require going beyond the ratification of human rights treaties, integrating human rights effectively in legislation and state policy and practice, establishing the promotion of justice as the aim of the rule of law³⁵.

One of the charge brought against the Islamic Movement in Nigeria is that the organization is an extremist group and that it is a threat to the Nigerian state due to the perennial clash with the state security agencies. The proscription of the movement is a flagrant infringement on its freedom to practice the religion of its choice. The 1999 constitution is exceptionally clear on this assertion. To this extent, the Federal Government of Nigeria have failed to ensure justice for the killings of hundreds of members of the movement since 2015, and the continuous killings and use of excessive force by the security to deter the rights is another fact to reckon with. In addition, the “political detention” of the group by the federal government is also one of the reasons why the continuous clash between the two parties may not end as expected³⁶. The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) want justice for its leader, but the Federal government is reluctant to release the prisoner. Indeed, the military are state agents and whether or not they acted based on directives from the government is irrelevant; what is more important is the failure of the Nigeria state to properly bring to book men of the Nigeria armed forces responsible for the mass killing in Zaria in 2015. More importantly, the Nigeria president should be seen as the chief culprit since, as Commander-in-Chief of the nation’s armed forces, the buck stops at his desk.

4.4 Research Question Four: How Can These Problems Be Resolved Peacefully Without Jeopardizing Nigeria's National Security?

The crisis between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Federal Government of Nigeria is a domestic crisis that need urgent actions and realistic solutions. The Federal Government of Nigeria led by President Muhammadu Buhari stands accused of abusing human rights and oppressing a minority group after numerous clashes with the group during protest which have killed many, that is, members of the movement and innocent citizens. Ibrahim Zakzaky, the founder and leader of the Shiite Islamist Movement of Nigeria (IMN), has been in jail since December 2015 and several court in the country have ordered its release but the Federal Government from its reactions have not intention to release the Islamic cleric. Thus, the possible solutions for the crisis between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Federal Government are:

1. The federal government should allow the rule of law to prevail. Since the many courts of competent jurisdictions have ordered the release of the Islamic cleric, the federal government should comply with these judgments.
2. The Federal government should completely avoid the use of excessive force any time the Islamic Movement of Nigeria go on a protest for the release of their leader, Ibrahim Zakzaky. Doing this will douse the tension between them and peace will reign.
3. The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) should practice their religion in accordance with democratic principles. This will drastically reduce the hatred between the movement and the Sunni Muslim in the country.

4. The federal government of Nigeria should desist from using 'excessive' force anytime there is a protest by the members of the movement.

4.5 Discussion of Findings

The findings of the research shed light on the contentious issues surrounding the crackdown on the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and its implications for the country's security and governance. These findings reveal a complex web of conflicts, human rights violations, and international dimensions that have deeply impacted the nation. Firstly, the research highlights the conflicting accounts between the Nigerian Army and the IMN regarding the trigger for the conflict. These conflicting narratives have contributed to the deep mistrust and tension between the two parties, making resolution more challenging. Secondly, the research underscores the grave human rights violations, including the killings of IMN members and innocent citizens, as well as the detention of their leader, Ibrahim Zakzaky, without trial. These violations not only undermine the rule of law but also fuel grievances and radicalization, posing a threat to national security.

The international and regional dimensions of the crisis, with Iran and Saudi Arabia taking opposing stances, add a layer of complexity to the situation. This highlights Nigeria's vulnerability to being drawn into broader geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, the proscription of the IMN as a terrorist organization raises concerns about religious freedom and the abuse of power by the government. In conclusion, the findings emphasize the urgent need for a peaceful resolution to the crisis, which includes respecting the rule of law, addressing human rights violations, and promoting dialogue between the government and the IMN. Failure to do so not only jeopardizes national security but also undermines the principles of good governance and human rights that are essential for a stable and prosperous Nigeria.

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Chapter Five

Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Findings

Northern Nigeria continue to suffer from waves of violence, security and armed conflict.

Amnesty International reports that by the end of 2015, over 2 million people had been

displaced by the conflict between the military and the armed group Boko Haram. Over 1000 members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (ISM) have been killed in the last five years owing to protest and a call for justice for the leader of the movement.

Chapter one of this research study centers on the background to the study. The chapter started by examining the wave of Islamic movement around the globe. It further explained that the formation of Islamic Movements is affected by objective factors like the western colonization, intellectual decline and dictatorship, fall of Ottoman Caliphate, hasty secularism in Islamic society, and domestic corruptions, that is, legitimacy crisis, identity crisis, and unfair distribution of wealth, corruption and suppression. Additionally, the movement is also influenced by subjective and intellectual factors like Islamic reformist instructions and religious orders concerning fighting against oppression, paganism, and blasphemy, and attempting to establish a society bound together by religious values. Therefore, all these movements stress on returning to Islamic values and reviving the original Islam as the only way out of the current crises in Islamic societies.

However, the chapter further explained that there exist a lot of Islamic Movements in the world among them are Hezbollah, Hamas and others to mention few. Sometimes, these religious movements are formed through the political party like the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan. The Islamic Movement in Afghanistan is a former faction of the Afghan Northern Alliance in Afghanistan formed through political party in 19783. The movement was led by Ayatollah Muhammad. During the 1980s, the movement was part of the 'Tehran Eight', an alliance of Shia mujahedin factions supported by Iran that fought against the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government and Soviet troops. The movement joined the Hezb-e Wahdat, which was intended as a united

Shia political front, but soon bolted out of it. Their activities revolve around challenging the constituted authority with the intent to change the polity to a religious one.

Shia Islam was almost unknown in Nigeria until the 1980s, when Ibraheem Zakzaky introduced Shia Islam when he was a student at Ahmadu Bello University, and began propagating Shia Islam around 1979, at the time of the Iranian revolution which saw Iran's monarchy overthrown and replaced with an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini. Due to his outspokenness in the university and some other events, Zakzaky gained a following among those disenchanted with the political and religious establishment. He, that is, Zakzaky believed, that the establishment of a republic along similar religious lines in Nigeria would be feasible.

Chapter two of this research work focused more on the review of relevant literature and theoretical framework. The chapter begin by examining the concept security, national security, conflict and terrorism. security in this sense is human emancipation oriented. It means that people/citizens must be liberated from those challenges, difficulties and constraints that may prevent them from carrying out what freely they would choose to do which includes epidemics, poverty, oppression, poor education, crises and so on. Today, politics, ecological issues, economic and demographic issues which are non-military tend to pose serious threats to people's security. From the foregoing, security is generally agreed to be about feeling of being safe from harm, fear, anxiety, oppression, danger, poverty, defense, protection and preservation of core values and threat to those values.

Another scholar examined the concept of national security from that of external coercion as freedom from external or foreign dictation. Thus, a secured nation-state is one that is able to protect and develop itself so that it can develop its core values, meet the needs of its

people and provide them with the right atmosphere for self-improvement. National security in the words of former Nigerian president is the aggregation of the security interest of the individuals, political entities, human associations and ethnic groups that make up the nation. He posits that such mental well-being and freedom to pursue the attainment of legitimate objectives without hindrance, as affirmed as in section 14 (b) of 1999 constitution.

National security is the measurable state of a nation's capability to overcome multi-dimensional threats to its people's apparent well-being and survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, and is extendable to global security by external variables. Similarly, national security may be defined as shared freedom from fear and want, as well as the right to live in dignity. It is a common right that entails social and ecological health rather than the absence of danger.

The Social Contract theory is an assumption and its proponents are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. They gave various explanation of the state which human being lived and also gave different version of how the social contract should be. The Social Contract theory of the origin of the state implies that there was a time when men lived or would have lived without any recognized civil law, without the state. This stage or life-pattern of men is described as the 'state of nature. Then the state was created through the voluntary agreement of all individuals who constitute the state. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have drawn different pictures of the state of nature, terms of the contract and the character of sovereignty which came into existence as a consequence of the birth of the state. It is important to note here that the whole theory of the contract is based on speculation. It seeks

to trace the origin of the state through logic, not through historical or scientific evidence. Locke refers to a historical fact to illustrate the point, but illustration is no evidence.

Chapter three of the study explained the methodology used in carrying out the research work. The chapter also explained the research designed, the sources of data, method of data collection and method of data analysis. The research used the descriptive method of data analysis. Chapter four of this research work is the main crux of the study. This chapter examines causes of the issues that led to the sour relationship between the federal government and Islamic Movement of Nigeria (ISM) on three accounts, that is, statement from the Nigerian Army, The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (ISM), and the eye witness account. On 12 December, 2015, the Nigerian Army statement alleged that members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria. "On the orders of their leader, Ibrahim El-Zakxaky" attempted to assassinate the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Tukur Buratai, who was en route to a military ceremony in the city of Zaria.

The statement said hundreds of armed sect members barricaded General Buratai's way, spurned warnings to disperse, and then started pelting his convoy with what they termed as "dangerous objects". The chapter also looks inward to the issue of kidnapping for ransom in the region and its implication on Nigeria national security. The Islamic Movement of Nigeria rejected the army's account, particularly the alleged assassination attempt. A statement on its website said "unarmed members were gathered for a ceremony at their religious center, Hussainiyyah Baqeeayatullah, when soldiers attacked them, killing an unspecified number of people. The chapter also considered the issues between the two warring entities such as killing, Killings, Violation of human rights and rule of law, proscription or banning of the Islamic Movement, International and regional dimension of the crises.

Chapter five of this study conclude with a summary of the research work. The research study concluded that the federal government of Nigeria and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria need to embrace peace for effective governance in the state. However, the study also concluded that the only solution to the contentious issues between both parties is to:

- 1) Identify what the parties involved want;
- 2) Give the parties involved what they want for peace to reign.

In view of this, the federal government of Nigeria should release the leader of the Islamic movement and give the movement the freedom to practice their full religion. Making this decision will add to the democratic value of Nigeria. Also, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria should also practice their religion in such a way that will embrace peace in the state, that is, it must be in line with democratic values.

5.2 Conclusion

It is important to note that the deadly terrorist group in Nigeria, Boko Haram, escalated due to the killing of its leader and some similar extra-judicial killing and disproportionate use of excessive force by the Nigerian security agencies. There are some factors that may motivate Shiites to violence. These factors include; their violent antecedent, violation of their human rights by the Nigerian Army, perceived anti-Shiite decisions by Governor el-Rufai's, international support from Iran and the slow reaction and passivity of federal government in addressing the crises. The Shiites have shown some indications of adopting a violent strategy against the Nigerian state. The research study argue that these factors mentioned above have helped in forming a narrative about Shiite repression.

Moreover, the collective decisions of the Shiites movement to reject the decisions of both the Federal and the Kaduna state governments, as well as the protest for the release of their leader, also mirrors the theoretical position of using situation and events to justify actions and outcomes. So far, the response of the movement after the December 2015 event has been violent. It is on this basis that this research study conclude that the actions and inactions of the Nigerian government regarding the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) may further degenerate into an endless violence which might be the reason for another terrorist group to emerge in the up north. In addition, the study also conclude that, the only way to broker peace between the two entities is to identify the problematic issues and play along with what the parties want. This must be done in line with democratic values. The Federal government should also desist from plans to kill the leader and embrace the rule of law.

5.3 Recommendations

The issues between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the Federal government of Nigeria should not be seen as a simple issue because if not properly handled, another terrorist group is on the making. Nigeria is our country and we have no other country we can call our own if the country is destroyed by violence between the federal government and the Islamic movement. Based on the opinions and findings in the preceding paragraphs, the study hereby make the following recommendations:

- 1) The Islamic Movement and the Federal government should resort to peaceful dialogue rather than reckless destruction of lives and property. This is because the

cost of violent can serve as hindrance to governance which the country need for its development.

- 2) Nigeria is made up of about 450 ethnic groups and thousands of language groups. The enormous advantages accruing from this diversity should be harnessed rather than used as source of disunity.
- 3) The federal government should allow the rule of law to prevail. This will to a large extent reduce the violence between the two warring parties.
- 4) The Nigeria government should also promote human rights in the country. This will go a long way in reducing the tension between the two warring entities.
- 5) The federal government should desist from plans to kill the leader of the movement.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

The confrontation between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the Federal Government of Nigeria is always marred by violence and destruction of lives and properties. The primary aim of the researcher is to investigate on the causes and issues that emerge therein. The analysis of this study indicate that the causes of the issues between them stem from the use of excessive force by the Nigerian Army in 2015 and the issues the emerge after that ugly event are killings, violations of human rights and the rule of law, proscription or banning of the Islamic movement by the federal government of Nigeria and others. The aforementioned issues have continued to threaten the national security of Nigeria and a possible terrorist group is about to emerge. To a large extent, most of these factors are product of lack of education, good governance and the failure of the federal government to use democratic means to stop the violence. Thus, this study has contributed to knowledge by

looking at the issues between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the federal government of Nigeria. It also provided some solutions to the issues discussed therein.

5.5 Suggestion for further research

The study aims to examine the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), state terrorism and National Security in Nigeria. Thus, there is a limited research on the emerging issues and the solution for a peaceful development. Therefore, there is need for more studies to be done in this area or from another angle in relation to the topic. Future studies can have advantage by conducting research on the implication of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria on national security of the country. Thus, if the relationship between the two entities is marred by violence, what will be its implication on the national security of the country?

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Appendix

Interview Questions

1. Are you aware of the problem / confrontation between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and the Federal Government?
2. Do you think the situation was handled effectively by the Federal Government?
3. In what ways did the judiciary escalate or otherwise, the situation?
4. How (if any) did this confrontation degenerate to security problems?
5. Do you think there is any link between the activities of the Islamic Movement and the national security of Nigeria?
6. Do you really think the crackdown on IMN leaders and the members is a threat to national security?
7. Some have labeled the IMN as a state security threat. What specific actions or activities by the IMN have raised concerns about national security in Nigeria?
8. In your own way, kindly explain how the Federal Government infringed on the human rights of the IMN leader?
9. Do you think the response of the government on members of IMN affect the governance of Nigeria?
10. What are the key challenges and potential solutions in addressing the intersection of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, state terrorism, and national security in the country?
11. To what extent has the international community been involved or concerned about the IMN's activities and their impact on national security in Nigeria?
12. In your own opinion, how will you explain the action of the government in 2015 when the killings happen?
13. How do you think the contentious issues between the government and IMN can be solved?

Appendix









Do No



Bio data

A. Personal Data

1. Full Name: Joel Ikechukwu Ojiakor
Address: Road A1, Oluyole Estate, Oluyole, Ibadan
E-mail: ikechukwuebuka@yahoo.com
Phone No: 07068144814 and 08027384599
Nationality: Nigerian
Name and Next of Kin: Mrs Uche Nkeonye Ojiakor
Date & place of birth: May 10, 1972, Onitsha, Anambra State, Nigeria.

B. Educational Background:

1. BSc Banking and Finance
2. Masters of Art in Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Ibadan

C. Working Experience:

1. UBA Plc
2. IBEDC

Signature

Date

The University Compliance Certification

This is to certify that this project by Joel Ikechukwu, OJIAKOR LCU/PG/001382 in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Environment, Social & Management Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan is in full Compliance with the approved university.

Name

Date