

Counter Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria: Case Study of the Boko Haram

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Certification

This is to certify that Bashir Omolaja BOLARINWA with matriculation number LCU/PG/000309 carried out this research work titled “**Counter Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria: Case Study of the Boko Haram**” in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan, Oyo State, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy Degree (PhD) in Finance and that this has not been previously submitted and that this work has not been previously submitted.

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Dedication

This research work is dedicated to God Almighty for his love, mercy and grace.

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“Even though the above-mentioned institutions and persons have assisted in the process of this research work, I alone stand responsible for the errors, if any, found in the work”.

Abstract

This study investigated counter terrorism strategies in Nigeria using Boko Haram as case study. The aim and objectives of the study is to identify the contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria; highlight different concepts of counterterrorism strategies; investigate the dynamics of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria; and interrogate the effectiveness of counterterrorism in Nigeria. Terrorism is commonly understood to refer to acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims. Data collection techniques employed was descriptive and exploratory. Both interview and questionnaires were administered to discover the relative incidence, distribution, and interrelations of sociological and psychological variables. The population of the study comprises One Hundred and fifty (150) participants. In analysing both interview and questionnaire, the researcher which allowed for a representation of any age group, gender, and expertise with counterterrorism methods, were met by 40Members or citizens of the communities, 30 Members of the Security, 20Agencies, Repentant Boko Haram members and commanders, 20 Victims of Boko-Haram, 20 Internally Displaced Persons, and 20 Scholars/Academicians. It was concluded that counterterrorism operations of the Nigerian forces also brought to the fore the need for collective efforts among the internal security forces and within the regional forces. Recommendation were made that the Nigerian counterterrorism policy must outline the measures for fighting the threat of Boko Haram in the country future research which could be carried out to determine if the Nigerian counterterrorism policy meets the aim for which it was established.

Keywords: Counterterrorism, Boko Haram, strategies, investigate

Word Count: 242

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

Terrorism has become a threat to global peace and security in the 21st century which is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government or its citizens to further certain political or social objectives¹. Dynamics of counterterrorism strategies are meant to be understood because, the act of terrorism affects national boundaries in terms of accomplishment, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetuation domicile as asylum².

In the past, the newsier events that dominated the media were what we watched and read about. Terrorists have been conducting their murderous operations in the modern era with the aid of technological advancements that have gone beyond the development of new weapons of mass destruction, boosting their destructive capability and so escalating the threat of terrorism³. Terrorism puts a community's survival in danger by causing economic crisis, instability, and threats to the tourist, energy, aviation, maritime, and civil transportation sectors⁴. Instead, the terrorism issue has persisted, keeping people in constant fear and robbing them of their freedom and security. Thus, the threat posed by terrorism, extremism, and radicalization is raising worries throughout the entire world⁵.

The government as a result implemented measures to combat Boko Haram terrorism. The Nigerian government revised the country's security framework, enhanced its information collection capabilities, increased budgetary support for the military and other security services, and placed a focus on security cooperation between domestic

security agencies and with surrounding nations⁶. The cult flatly refused to engage in conversation with the government team after the Nigerian government established an administrative panel to mediate with them. The creation of a Multinational Joint Task Force (JTF) charged with jointly battling Boko Haram terrorists is one of the other foundations of Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy⁷. The task force, which is based in the Chadian capital city of N'Djamena, is made up primarily of military personnel from Nigeria and its neighbors Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. In addition, as part of its anti-terrorism policy, the Nigerian government enforced a curfew, proclaimed a state of emergency, and temporarily outlawed GSM services in the impacted states⁸. A legislative foundation for counterterrorism measures was established with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011 and the Anti-Terrorism Amendment Act of 2013. President Goodluck Jonathan gave the military and other security services the mission of creating antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs to safeguard the Nigerian populace and other Nigerian stakeholders. This task was coordinated by the Nigerian National Security Adviser⁹. Security forces found it difficult to combat Boko Haram terrorism because it was unfamiliar to Nigerians and the country's judicial system, and because the war against Boko Haram required an asymmetrical approach rather than relying solely on the use of force and military hard power. This misguided strategy allowed Boko Haram to expand, use hit-and-run guerrilla combat techniques, and commit additional crimes¹⁰.

Reviewing and documenting Nigeria's Boko Haram counterterrorism strategy from 2009 to 2022 would help shape current and future policy, perhaps ensuring a successful outcome. The country now lacks adequate literature on how to create and implement a counterterrorism strategy against Boko Haram. The relative youth of Boko Haram's terrorism and policies, as well as the absence of quantitative data on the organization of

the group, may be contributing factors to this deficiency. This qualitative study was carried out by the researcher as a contribution to the field's body of knowledge. The researcher conducted interviews with Department of State Services and Military retirees, significant local leaders, and former National Assembly members who were involved in the policy's development. The researcher did this to better understand how counterterrorism policy was being implemented to combat Boko Haram terrorism¹¹.

International terrorism affects every nation, so the world community cannot ignore terrorism-related acts any longer. People in the nations that are purportedly harbouring terrorists, whether they are innocent or not, are also terrified. They are terrified of conflict, bombs being dropped on them, and missiles being fired at them from distant locations by troops they cannot see¹². They are frightened of being killed because they stand in the way of their countries being destroyed because they have lost their equality. The aforementioned qualification applies to the experiences and changes the globe is going through, which have an impact not just on people but also on countries in both positive and negative ways. One of the main elements of the current theory in global politics and security is the emergence of international terrorism in a more lethal and impersonal manner¹³.

The influence of terrorism on international security is due to the development of contemporary, sophisticated technology, which has made the globe into a global village. State and human security in the international system continue to be challenged by international terrorism. In addition to the feeling of unease that terrorism instills in its victims, these negative effects include unemployment, the inability to pay workers' wages, debt burdens, and generalized discontent. This is the impact that crime has had on residents of inner cities. The Boko Haram sect is believed to have killed over 5,000 people in various attacks since 2009, according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI)¹⁴.

Considering the effectiveness of counterterrorism in Nigeria the some of the program has only been focused on practical issues relevant to the challenges that Nigeria is facing right now the origins of the sect, Xan Rice wrote that “in northern Nigeria, Sharia law was already in place before Boko Haram launched in 2002. But it was applied mildly and failed to check the unbridled corruption, inequalities, and unfairness. Poverty levels were high and growing, and for most youthful people there were not many job prospects. Boko Haram was founded on beliefs, but poor governance was the catalyst for it to spread. If there had been appropriate governance and a functioning state, Yusuf would have found it very difficult to succeed”¹⁵¹⁶. It was further revealed that before Yusuf’s execution, Boko Haram had a microfinance system, operated a farm and its own ruling councils and emirs, the followers stretched far beyond Maiduguri and Borno state, across northern Nigeria, as well as into neighbouring Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Ahmad Salkida, a journalist with close links to the sect reported in an interview days before the death of Yusuf that he was growing increasingly militant and said: “Democracy and the current system of education must be changed otherwise this war that is yet to start would continue for long”¹⁷.

The Nigerian government acknowledges that its security forces intercepted approximately 200 rocket launcher grenades delivered by terrorist gangs at the Nigerian borders before and after June 2012, which contributed to the deterioration of the security situation since that month. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) currently used by the Islamic Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria are expected to be replaced by the new weapons, which are explosive projectile arms used to attack targets from a distance. According to Nigeria's security agencies, the IEDs were supplied to the terrorists in Nigeria by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb with the help of terrorists in Iran, Yemen, and Syria. Because of the group's existing and rising trends, as well as the

repercussions of its actions on the security and sustainability of Nigerian States, this thesis is restricted to the activities of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. In addition to the introduction, the thesis is divided into four sections: identifying the causes of terrorism in Nigeria, highlighting various counterterrorism concepts, examining the dynamics of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria, and evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism in Nigeria¹⁸.

The government's attention must change from "winning syndrome" to total peace in order to solve the current problem of terrorism in Nigeria, particularly as it relates to Boko Haram. The techniques for counterterrorism must be researched in order to comprehend the approach to total peace. And for the latter, everyone must be on deck. Islam does not support either revolt or terrorism, as Boko Haram claims. In truth, both offenses are crimes deserving of harsh punishment. Continue to refer to Boko Haram as a faceless organization while dozens of its members are being held in government detention will be a grave error. At least those individuals were detained and arrested for belonging to the terrorist organization. In response to the issues posed by terrorism in Nigeria, the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 as revised in 2013 was signed into law¹⁹. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is designated as Nigeria's management office by the Act. A further responsibility from the Act is for ONSA to "guarantee the smooth operation of Strategies and build capacity for the successful performance of the functions of appropriate security, intelligence, law enforcement, and military services." The Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) was formed in 2012 to coordinate Counter Terrorism programs in Nigeria in accordance with the mandate. The National Security Adviser's Office is where the Center is housed. The Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) which is headed by a Coordinator, has pioneered key

initiatives since 2012. These include, providing leadership and strategic guidance to security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies²⁰.

The Centre's relationships with relevant partners transcend state actors, to include Civil Society Organizations, International Partners, Counter-Terrorism platforms like the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GTF), Global Communities Engagement and Resilience Fund, Hedayah (based in Abu Dhabi) and the United Nation and its entities. Following the unveiling of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) and the development of the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in the country, the role of the Centre has been enhanced and tremendously appreciated as a value-adding entity among its strategic partners. This growing profile has meant increased interest in the running of the Centre, both at home and abroad²¹.

This chapter provides background information on the creation and execution of Boko Haram's counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria from 2009 to 2022. A summary of the theoretical frameworks, the research challenge, the study's objective, the research questions, the study's importance, and its implications for social change are all stated in the chapters. Also given are some of the study's common words and concepts.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Nigerian government has used several strategies to tackle terrorism at various points in time. Projects and programs designed to counterterrorism were express around community resilience against terrorism, enhance irregularities among law enforcement agencies, and strengthen judicial institutions due to the complexity of the security situation in Nigeria combined with the economic, political, and social strife. Therefore, in a Nigeria that is becoming more interdependent and networked, strategy and the

significance of joint actions to resist terrorism have become vital. Historically, numerous anti-terrorism programs and plans have been implemented by succeeding Nigerian administrations. For instance, the government, then led by General Ibrahim Babangida, declared that it would strategically address the 1983 and 1987 terror episodes, which began in Kafanchan and spread to Kaduna, Zaria, Funtua, Malumfashi, and Katsina. The Nigerian government's major priority has been the fight against terrorism²². The counterterrorism project in Nigeria, meanwhile, was initially intended to strengthen the criminal justice system's capacity for effective rule-of-law-based investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of terrorist cases; to encourage interagency cooperation on counterterrorism issues; to strengthen the country's legal framework against terrorism; and to reinforce. However, as more and more factors that contribute to terrorism in Nigeria are being identified daily, While various concepts of counterterrorism strategies were employed in an effort to lessen the dynamics of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria, counterterrorism strategies adopted by Nigeria had not been successful because terrorist attacks have numerous economic and social repercussions that harm infrastructure, cause biological loss, environmental damage, undermine public confidence in the market and government, cause social unrest, and cause failure of the banking, trade, and supply systems²³.

Identify the contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria's counter-terrorism operations that keep failing considering the strategic and tactical imprecision due to poor intelligence and rivalry among security agencies involved in the operations. However, evidence suggests that corruptions in counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria are also one of the contributing factors.

Specifically, to find solutions to recurring situation in Nigeria the research work examines the conditions necessitating the emergence and persistence of the terrorist

activities and the strategies applied. The thrust of this research work also most of the circumstances that led to these terrorist activities which are not unconnected with frustration caused by high rate of poverty, unemployment, weak governance, religious fanaticism among others. Hence, despite massive expenditure by the Nigerian government over the past decade, counter-terrorism operations by security forces have achieved limited success and the country is still ranked on the Global Terrorism Index as one of the states most affected by terrorism. Is the problem one of bad policy, strategy, and tactics, or is corruption in the leadership ranks of the security forces also to blame

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The specific objective of this study is to investigate different counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria using a study of the Boko Haram

Other objectives of this study are to:

- i. identify the contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria
- ii. highlight different concepts of counterterrorism strategies
- iii. investigate the dynamics of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria
- iv. interrogate the effectiveness of counterterrorism in Nigeria.

1.4 Research Questions

The research shall be guided by the following questions:

- i. What are the contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria?
- ii. What are the different concepts of counterterrorism strategies?
- iii. What have been the dynamics of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria?

- iv. To what extent have counterterrorism strategies been effective in Nigeria?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This research work is particularly significant in this turbulent and upheaval hour of security misfortunes and miscarriage of national development and several sabotage and elusive actions taken to contain terrorism in Nigeria. Thus, it is important to critically examine the measure put in place by the new administration in government to combat the terrorist activities in the country. Simply put, the study intends to assess the nature and character of counter-terrorism since the inception of the new administration in Nigeria and in turn examine and evaluate the failure of past government leadership to maintain social order in the face of the use of repressive force and the institutional inefficiency that has undermined the state capacity in containing terrorism in Nigeria.

This research also will enlighten the populace and other researchers about whether counter-terrorism funding is being used wisely, and whether the operations themselves are effective.

1.6 Scope of the Study

Periodically, the research work covers the counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria from the era of President Umar Yar'Adua (2007-2010), Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), and Muhamadu Buhari (2015-2021). Geographically, the study covers North-eastern Nigeria in general and Borno State in particular.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

In this research, funds are the significant limitations that might face researchers during the research survey. This research work might be limited by the essence for which the data to be used for this study's context will be initially gathered.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

Almajiri: A system of education in which students receive their education at home or while travelling

Antiterrorism Awareness: The fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat's existence and the necessary precautions to lessen its vulnerability.

Antiterrorism Measures: Defensive steps used to lessen the impact and exposure of a terrorist assault on people and property.

Antiterrorism: The safeguards and defences put in place to prevent or discourage terrorist attacks. Additionally, it contains backup plans to lessen the impact of the attack should it materialize.

Boko-Haram Group: Boko Haram (which translates loosely as 'Western education is forbidden' in Hausa) was created in 2002 by the now-deceased Islamist cleric, Mohammed Yusuf, though forms of the group have existed under a variety of names since the late 1990s. Boko Haram members aspire to create an Islamic state in Nigeria, and willing to kill Christians and Muslims they deem to be insufficiently pious in order to achieve it.

Boko-Haram: An expression that derives from the Hausa word "Boko," which connotes Western or non-Islamic education as forbidding and un-Islamic, is a terrorist organization..

Bombing: It is a violent bombarding that causes multiple deaths. The process of averting a terrorist attack or, in cases when it is not possible, minimizing its effects.

Crisis: Any incident or threat to a nation's resources, citizens, or security that necessitates security measures to achieve both national goals.

Development: The majority of the population who are familiar with their environment is the target of the societal participation process of social change in terms of both material and social advancement.

Insurgency: This is synonymous to insurrection. It can be equally equated to an act of terrorism, because they both involve violent acts.

Martyrdom: This is a religious belief among the Muslim that if they partake in violence that results in several deaths of others that they will make heaven or paradise as well as being rewarded with virgins.

Strategy: This refers to a plan of action intended to attain a specific goal. This is the art of using similar techniques in politics or business.

Suicide: This is an act of taking one's life by oneself.

Terrorism: This is an act of violence by a group of individuals in the country against the government and individuals. They always have an ideology. Sometimes the group goes to the extent of forcing the government to do certain things in the country. However, terrorism itself is not new. Terrorism is just another step along the spectrum of violent leverage, from total war to guerrilla war.

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Chapter Two

Literature Review

This chapter addresses a review of literature pointing out areas of agreement and disagreement some of the scholars. Hence, a gap in knowledge is created where this study is interested to fill. This chapter will be classified into the following headings:

- Conceptual Framework
- Theoretical Framework
- Empirical Studies
- Conceptual Framework/Model
- Summary of Literature Gap

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Concept of Terrorism

The systematic use of violence and intimidation to force a society or government to comply with particular political objectives is known as terrorism. Terrorism was defined as follows in Article 2 of the proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism:

Any person who, through any means, willfully and maliciously causes: death or serious bodily harm to any person; serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility, or the environment; or damage to property, places, facilities, or systems mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of this article commits an offense under the terms of this Convention¹.

The Terrorism Act, which was enacted in the United Kingdom, defined terrorism as the use or threat of force when the use or threat is intended to influence the government or intimidate the general public or a segment of the general public and is made to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause. According to the Act, an action is considered to fall under this subsection if it results in serious violence against a person, serious property damage, endangers the life of a person other than the one who is committing the act, poses a serious risk to the health or safety of the general public or a specific group of the general public, or is intended to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system².

Terrorism is commonly understood to refer to acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims. In legal terms, although the international community has yet to adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism, existing declarations, resolutions, and universal “sectoral” treaties relating to specific aspects of it define certain acts and core elements. In 1994, the General Assembly’s Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, set out in its resolution 49/60, stated that terrorism includes “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes” and that such acts “are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them”³.

The idea of terrorism is challenging to define. It still sparks discussion among academics and industry experts. There is no agreed-upon definition of the phenomena that depicts various views; therefore it continues to be a poorly understood notion due to its complexity. The fact that the phenomenon is ever-evolving makes it more

challenging to define what constitutes terrorism. The issue arises from national political perspectives that exploit terrorism to justify national ideological goals.

It is challenging to identify the phenomenon that genetically corresponds to violence, crime, the use of force, or military force. Understanding the precise definition of terrorism would be subjective because it has diverse connotations for various people, organizations, academic fields, and political stances. They went on to say that the majority of people or nations describe terrorism primarily in terms of religious causes, hatred and heinous groups, non-state actors, and state-sponsored terrorism⁴. Because of one's sympathies with or hostility to a certain group or person, it is arbitrary to label someone or an organization as a "terrorist." Few people agree to be called terrorists since they frequently regard themselves as freedom fighters, which contribute to the lack of agreement on the description.

Despite this peculiarity, it has evolved over time into dynamism in its definition and its meaning, starting from the period of the French Revolution to the present-day era of small violent non-state actors⁵. As a result of the aforementioned, industrialized countries use the phrase to define, denounce, and refer to kidnappings, violence, killings, and bombs as terrorist acts. The United States Department of State, on the other hand, defines terrorism as a deliberate, calculated act, either alone or in a specific group, against unarmed people and non-combatant military personnel. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1566 at its 5053rd meeting, which defines terrorism as criminal acts committed against civilians with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, inciting violence among the general public or a particular group of people, coercing a population, intimidating a government, or securing the neutrality of an international organization for taking action on offenses related to terrorism abroad⁶.

Violence is a defining characteristic of the phenomenon of terrorism, and it is also challenging to define because it uses force. Understanding the precise definition of terrorism would be subjective because it has varied meanings to different people, governments, academic disciplines, and political perspectives. They continued by saying that most individuals or nations describe terrorism primarily in terms of religious causes, hatred and heinous organizations, non-state actors, and state-sponsored terrorism. Because of one's sympathies with or hostility to a certain group or person, it is arbitrary to label someone or an organization as a "terrorist." Few people agree to be called terrorists since they frequently regard themselves as freedom fighters, which contribute to the lack of agreement on the description.

Extremism, insurgency, and terrorism are sometimes used synonymously. Although the three are similar, their definitions are different. Terrorism, on the other hand, is defined by the UK government as "an action or threat intended to influence the government or terrify the people." They assert that it serves to advance a cause that is political, religious, or ideological⁷.

Contrary to assassination, the immediate human victims of violence are typically selected randomly (Target of Opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Terrorism is a method of repeated violent action, employed by (Semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons. An coordinated violent attack on a target with the intent to overthrow a duly established authority and instill fear among the public in order to promote certain social and political goals is referred to as terrorism⁸.

Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence or the threat of it by individuals or subnational groups to achieve a political or social goal by intimidating a sizable

audience outside of the immediate victims. Terrorism is planned, politically motivated violence committed by subnational groups against non-combatants with the goal of persuading a target population. Terrorism involves political objectives and motivations; it involves acts of violence or threats of violence intended to instil terror in a target population that is larger than the direct victims of the action. The violence is conducted by a recognized organization. A non-state actor is either the violent act's perpetrator, the victim who needed assistance, or both. The primary goal of terrorism is to advance political or social objectives by the deliberate use of violent acts to instil fear in society. However, any contemporary account of terrorism must include both the threat of violence and the realization of a political or social goal. A terrorist cannot compel a political decision-maker to comply with their demands without using violence or threatening to use it. Additionally, a violent act is a criminal rather than a terrorist act⁹.

Terrorism is a psychological weapon that is concealed behind an ideological goal, such as the demands made by Boko Haram, which imposes and upholds Islamic law in northern Nigeria. It might also be the kind of activity carried out by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), whose efforts intended to stop the exploitation and destruction of their land and environment and to receive a fair part of the oil income. It could also be the (unfavorable) attitude of top officials or government agents who deny their subordinates of their legitimate rights in order to obtain an advantage. Due to its inherent use of force to further its own goals by coercing others to comply with demands or submit, terrorism is political by nature¹⁰.

Nigeria has seen a variety of individuals, organisations, locales, and times commit acts of terrorism. Even though some of the casualties are not the terrorists' primary objectives, they nonetheless attract others' attention. The way various societies are set up and structured is what has allowed terrorism to flourish. For instance, a society

where the police frustrate residents with legitimate concerns or where the government ignores complaints is more likely to have terrorist activities turn violent as people find ways to solve their perceived problems. The common perception of the government is that the only language it hears and responds to when addressing problems is violent language. To argue that the 21st century is very different from the past is now virtually a cliché. In actuality, a lot of what we have learnt from the past does not apply to the unprecedented ethical and political problems that humanity is currently facing. Today, failing or failed states as a breeding ground for terrorism are what cause the most concern among world leaders, as opposed to earlier worrying about aggression by conquering states¹¹.

For instance, nearly one in six people on the planet currently reside in nations that are either actively engaged in civil war or are at a high risk of doing so. Although the main victims in war zones are women, children, and other non-combatants, wealthy nations are frequently also affected. This is demonstrated by rising refugee flows, widespread famine, the growth of drug lords, disease outbreaks, and the export of terrorism, all of which arise and spread from chaotic regions, even if they seem cut off from the rest of the globe. The consequences of this new global disorder of the twenty-first century show that the issue of weak and failing states is much more serious than previously believed. The word "Africa" is often used as a worst-case scenario when discussing any issue, including poverty, disease, ethnic cleansing, unemployment, and environmental calamities. Some even use the term "Africa" as if it were the name of a single nation, ignoring the fact that it is actually a continent made up of 54 independent states. But in a certain sense, they are right because the majority of the continent's countries are extremely impoverished, subject to unjustified wars, plagued by corruption and bad administration, unable to provide for the fundamental necessities of their populations,

and ruled by autocratic tyrants. Given that, the area is the "hotspot" of terrible things happening throughout the world, including recurrent conflicts, human rights abuses, terrorism, and a lack of justice. Libya, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Darfur, and other nations. Additionally, there are numerous ongoing conflicts in Angola, Algeria, Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, and they continue to be political catastrophes of the world as they become more chaotic every day, raising concerns that they could serve as a "safe haven" for terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.

Terrorists have sought shelter or operated in many different countries throughout the world. They have the capacity to launch an attack in any nation where doing so advances their goal. In a similar vein, operations perform better in failing or weak states. They may carry out their operations with little to no interference thanks to the breakdown of authority, law, and order. Terrorists are drawn to weak and failed regimes for a variety of reasons.

2.1.2 Terrorism: Historical Perspective

Terrorism has a long history of being a tool for spreading fear. Looking at terrorism historically provides insight into the acts that have been labelled as terrorism around the world. For a long time, terrorism has a religious component. Between 60 and 70 A.D., Jewish fanatics instigated a revolt against Rome while a radical Shiite Islamic sect known as the assassins undertook a campaign to purify Islam (1090 to 1275 A.D).The Thugees, an Indian Hindu gang, are a third group. They terrorized travellers by strangling them in accordance with tradition and then offering them to the goddess of destruction, Kali. The organization started operating in the seventeenth century and didn't end until the middle of the nineteenth. These demonstrate that there has long been a connection between religion and terrorism and that the French Revolution (1793–1794) played a significant role in ushering in the contemporary era of terrorism. In

order to maintain control and stifle opposition, the French government supported terrorism.

The Anarchist Wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, the New Left Wave, and the Religious Wave are the four waves of contemporary terrorism, listed in chronological order. The assassination of state officials during the Anarchist wave, which ruled Europe from the late 19th century to the 1920s, marked the replacement of state authorities and government structures with ideological groupings. During this time, there were numerous political killings in Europe. In Russia, Narodnaya Volya (The People's Will), an ideological group, assassinated Czar Alexander II and several Czarist officials in 1881. The 1920s to the 1960s saw the rise of the anti-colonial movement. As the name suggests, the main characteristic of this era of terrorism was the struggle for national self-determination against colonial power. This wave was dominated by colonial nations in Europe, Africa, and Asia, which targeted law enforcement, judges, troops, and relatives of colonial masters' state officials¹². An example is the Basques Fatherland and Liberty in Spain.

The third wave, New Left wave emerged in the 1960s and contended against observed global injustice perpetrated by the West. The conduits of nationalism and radicalism were utilised during this period. Groups in this wave employed tactics such as hostage-taking, target assassination, guerilla warfare, and kidnapping.

The organizations included, among others, the Japanese Red Army, "provisional" IRA (Irish Republican Army), and Italy Red Brigades. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Shining Path of Peru are two such instances. Later, it divided into the "officials" and "provisional" groups in late 1969. The "provisional" fought a violent, 35-year battle for Irish unification before calling it quits in 2005. Their experiment

inspired the fight for independence in other colonies, having an impact beyond the borders of Ireland¹³.

The religious wave is the most recent trend that is now popular. Islamic radicalism has engulfed this period. The quest for a Christian state is what distinguishes it, and it first emerged in 1979. It was, in fact, a matter of religious autonomy. The modern era has been characterised by the rise of political Islam and the advent of Islamist terrorism. Religious terrorism first emerged in the modern era as a result of the 1979 Iranian revolution that established an Islamic Republic. In agreement with Hoffman and in more detail, attributed the emergence of this wave to the 1979 Iranian Revolution as well as the Soviet Union's decision to provide military aid to Afghanistan's secular and pro-communist government in 1979, a move that was met with stout opposition from Islamist supporters. In essence, a form of self-defense known as jihad was created out of animosity for the West and the Marxist East.¹⁴ This phase has added the feature of terrorists working outside of a single state but connected to internationalist religious networks, with the primary objective of opposing secular governments.

Shiism and militant Islamism have risen as a result of this revolution in nations like Malaysia, Nigeria, and Lebanon. For instance, Al-Qaeda maintains networks in more than 50 nations. This was made clear by the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, as well as the World Trade Center in 1993. In addition, during this time period, Islamist militants took over 90% of Afghanistan, and a US military base in Saudi Arabia was bombed in 1996. Currently, Africa is home to affiliates of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), for instance, which is active in several regions of North and West Africa Al-Shabaab, which asserts to have ties to Al-Qaeda, operates in Somalia and some areas of Kenya and continues to pose a threat to East Africa. The Maitatsine riots of the 1980s and the recent Boko Haram

upheavals in Nigeria are two examples of how this wave's effects are visible there. The declaration of Boko Haram's membership with ISIS is further evidence that this wave of Islamic radicalism has crossed international borders and that Boko Haram is part of it. In 2016, ISIS participated in the organizational restructuring of Boko Haram. The Boko Haram group is united by this wave, which is shown in the sect's efforts to establish Sharia law over Northern Nigeria and, ideally, the entire country. This is because the main goals of this wave's programs are the enthronement of Sharia law and the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Understanding terrorism's past makes it more important to comprehend it as a global phenomena.¹⁵

Globally, there has been a rising tide of terrorism. This has grown into a diverse body of literature. These studies have addressed a variety of topics, including definitions, underlying causes, traits, operational procedures, counterterrorism, actor roles, etc. The purposeful killing of innocent people in the name of a political cause can be committed by an individual, a group, or an entire nation. He also sees terrorism as a "illegal response to a legal grievance." His first claim demonstrates the possibility of a single terrorist, a group of terrorists, or even state terrorism. Guerrilla warfare, political assassinations, political rioting, bombings, hijackings, suicide bombings, and kidnappings are examples of illegitimate responses. The modus operandi of Boko Haram makes such unlawful conduct clear. Other criminal networks may as well use all of these vices. The goal of terrorism, which is to change the social and political order, sets it apart from other crimes and qualifies it as a political organization. This illustrates the three reasons that Boko Haram, which despises Western education, opposes modern education, and resorts to violence, aims to build the Islamic caliphate¹⁶.

Similar to the situation described above, Boko Haram was exploited politically since the organization despises Western ideals and culture, is opposed to the Nigerian state's

secularism, and thinks that corrupt ruling elites are the driving force behind democracy¹⁷.

The parallels and contrasts between terrorism and other forms of violence should be highlighted. Terrorism will be analyzed side by side with some of the other forms of political violence in order to have a strong juxtaposition. Compared to terrorism, political violence implies a broader understanding. Terrorism is a type of political violence because it encompasses all violent confrontations aimed at accomplishing socio-political and economic goals. Political violence includes rioting, intergroup violence, militancy, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and terrorism. Political violence is any type of violence used to further a political agenda. Political grievances, a broad word that covers a range of grievances, from single-issue matters to wider societal marginalization, are the root of all types of political violence, including low-level riots, communal violence, terrorism, and insurgencies. Therefore, almost all manifestations of political violence are the result of political resentment. One key distinction between terrorism and other types of political violence is that the former consistently carries out attacks with the aim of grabbing attention through shock and awe¹⁸.

It is crucial to make each form of political violence distinct from terrorism in order to understand how each one compares to terrorism. Even while signals sent during riots may contain both clear and ambiguous information, they are typically nonetheless delivered to the intended audience. Through media ranging from the symbolism of targeted targets to paper manifestos, YouTube videos, and other online platforms, terrorism is frequently accompanied by extremely straightforward political statements. ISIS and Boko Haram frequently use these communication channels to spread their messages.

The term "insurgency" describes the use of violence "by an organized and predominantly indigenous group using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political methods to achieve political goals." This definition's "irregular warfare" is what sets it apart, and it includes guerilla tactics used in conjunction with guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is when fairly armed groups launch incredibly mobile, hit-and-run attacks on the enemy in an effort to harass him and gradually weaken his will and ability¹⁹.

Militancy is the use of force by an individual or group that takes a belligerent stance in support of a particular ideology or cause. Psychologically, these people do hold an aggressive approach toward others. The justification of using force in pursuit is a popular tactic among militant groups. They enlist new members through conscription, enlistment, and volunteerism. These characteristics all resemble those of terrorists. One significant difference, though, is that while terrorists also have a religious or ideological objective, militants' hostility may be motivated by economic, social, or even political factors. Therefore, while the demands of terrorists are frequently far from being fully taken into account by the government, the demands of militants are primarily driven by exclusive politics and might be met within the environment of politics that government can meet. This is due to the fact that complying with their requests would amount to the government reducing one of its primary responsibilities, the impartial maintenance of law and order. This is why Boko Haram is referred to as militants and terrorists whereas armed Niger Delta agitators are not²⁰.

It appears that terrorism and other types of political violence are distinct from one another. Political violence's components are still intertwined, nevertheless. The perpetrators are quick to change their appearance. An innovative way to evaluate terrorism in connection to other forms of political violence has been to use a spectrum

of political violence, from rioting through terrorism and insurgency. One of the reasons for this is that if the government, for instance, ignores requests relating to protests, a group could turn militant or terrorist. For instance, the IRA initially engaged in protests before adopting a deadly strategy. The fact that perpetrators commit comparable crimes in order to plot their futures is another aspect that encourages the switching between these political violence components. As evidenced in the United States, India, United Kingdom, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Kenya, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, and Turkey among other countries, terrorists and other criminals are also involved in other crimes such as drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, kidnapping, robberies, tobacco fraud, medical insurance fraud, visa fraud, and money laundering. Nigeria is open to anyone. In this context, the term "other criminals" refers to several types of political violence. Although the United Nations Security Council's definition did not distinguish between state terrorism, non-state terrorism, and international terrorism, doing so is still useful²¹. By claiming that it is state-inflicted violence against its citizenry, terrorism categorizes it as political terror. The activities of the "death squads" in Brazil between 1969 and 1972 serve as one example. Another instance cited is the French Revolution (1789–1799), which propelled Maximilien de Robespierre to prominence as a supporter of democratic reforms and an opponent of the French monarchy. He planned the assassination of King Louis XVI and later destroyed both moderate and political extremist groups, ushering in a period of horror. A state, however, might also support terrorism against people who are not its citizens. As an illustration, consider the Pan Am 103 flight that Libyan terrorists attacked over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. Most often, resentful citizens who feel excluded from or alienated from their states commit non-state terrorism. The Maitatsine violence of the 1980s and the

ongoing terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria serve as two good examples. International terrorism, according to Johnmary:

“demonstration of terror within and across a sovereign state with the goal of reaching foreign concession and attaining specific goals. Such terror could be organized [sic] within a country, it could be unleashed against neighbouring [sic] state(s) and it could be targeted at the gathering or institutions of multinational states”²².

One notable instance occurred in 1968, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine commandeered an Israeli El Al flight and forced it to land in Rome in order to exchange the hostages they had taken for Palestinian terrorists detained in Israel. There are several fundamental motivations for terrorists that guide their behaviour. Even though many terrorist organizations attempt to take part in political activities like lobbying, negotiation, and bargaining, they rarely exhaust these possibilities before turning to terrorism. Poverty, economic exploitation, a disregard for health and education, and religious indoctrination are some of the core causes of terrorism. However, culture should also be taken into account because it can lead to terrorism if a society's established culture is corrupted by a foreign culture. This is a contributing factor to terrorism because of the Middle East's perception of American cultural hegemony as a result of globalization. These opinions show that the majority of terrorists are from the lowest social classes. However, terrorists leave their comfortable lives behind and wage jihad while coming from comfortable origins. He also argued that because many people think the Western way of life is bad, they are not exposed to it in a favorable way. The lack of basic necessities does not always lead to terrorism; as a result, it is not a tool of the oppressed but rather of the rich. The development of terrorism is the result of repeated exposure to extreme behaviour and socialization. This

supports the idea that terrorism can arise when people are denied access to particular benefits, but it also supports the idea that some terrorists decided to live this way even while their standard of living was normal or even quite pleasant. The study acknowledges that socialization, which includes religion (in this context) as its core, is a spice that is added to these processes²³.

The rise of Boko Haram leaders and foot troops can be attributed to the combination of these underlying factors. The economic and political morass in Northern Nigeria, as well as its history of close ties to Islam, is cited by Boko Haram's growing number of adherents as contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria. These ideas regarding the underlying reasons for terrorism also apply to Boko Haram. Members of Boko Haram come from disgruntled youths, unemployed graduates, and even those who are wealthy by Nigerian standards. Commenting on the connection between addressing the causes and reducing terrorism, it was suggested that even if Boko Haram is defeated, failing to address problems like social inequality, corruption, and poor economic management may cause the rise of new organizations. According to the aforementioned need to assess if Nigeria's anti-terrorism measures are actually tackling the underlying causes of Boko Haram's terrorism and to recommend preventive measures²⁴.

2.1.3 Types of Terrorism

Based on their goals and objectives, targets, operation size, strength, and the area they operate in, terrorist groups vary. Scholars in political science, security, and strategic studies have been able to distinguish between various terrorist groups because of this. Terrorism comes in three different forms. They are domestic terrorism, international terrorism, and transnational terrorism.

- **State Terrorism:** Is, in essence, the use of terror and violence to maintain government control, even in the most primitive of communities. The internal opposition is frequently the object of this. It frequently entails repression of opponents of the existing quo. A terrorist act committed against a state or government by a state or government is one of the types of terrorism. It is possible to date this back to the time of the French Revolution. The French monarchy was severely suppressed by people who were against its government at this time. The Soviet Union's Stalinist regime, German Nazis, and Liberian Samuel Doe all carried out similar actions. State terrorism under the Abacha government in Nigeria is a good example.
- **Domestic Terrorism:** This is a terrorist incident or organization that works in a specific area. This refers to rebel or revolutionary group actions within a single state. Essentially, this is done to exact retribution or to inflict intentional chaos in an effort to alter the current situation. These terrorist organizations have overthrown their government, and their actions are restricted to a single state, such as Boko Haram, which operates in Nigeria.
- **International Terrorism:** This is a terrorist act that crosses international borders, committed by a terrorist organization whose activities are transnational in nature belong to this group. It is a terrorist act when it is carried out across borders by citizens of more than one state; in other words, it transcends the border. Therefore, international terrorism refers to the use of terror by a group or agents supported by a government against citizens of another state, either on that state's territory or on the territory of neighbouring states. Examples include cyber terrorists and the Al-Qaeda organization, whose operations span international borders and recruit individuals from many countries²⁵.

Terrorists and the left and right, which they perceive as political ideologically-based groups. Another is religious terrorism, which they defined as being committed by a group with strong religious motivations. Groups like Boko Haram fit under this description. Third, criminal Terrorists commit terrorist acts to further criminal activity and make money from it²⁶.

2.1.4 Features of Terrorism

There are at least four characteristics that stand out as universal to all acts of terrorism, according to a detailed examination of the phenomenon:

- **Objectives:** Some of the goals include to raise awareness of the group's presence and cause on a national or international scale, to compel the public into supporting their demands, to undermine and discredit those who disagree with them, and to incite harsh measures in order to win support. to undermine internal security and undermine internal culture and values.
- **Actors:** Typically, both state and non-state actors, including organizations and people, are responsible for terrorism.
- **Targets:** Terrorists may target both people and property, with a particular emphasis on targets that generate the most media attention, such as famous landmarks and influential people.
- **Methods:** Terrorists utilize violent acts like bombings, kidnappings, executions, and hostage-taking to terrorize the populace they are targeting. All of the aforementioned techniques are used by Boko Haram militants, including bombing and hostage-taking. A current example is the kidnapping of the schoolgirls from Bichi and Dapchi²⁷.

2.1.5 Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

Since the beginning of the year 2000, there has been terrorism in Nigeria. With their deadly operations of kidnapping, suicide bombing, hijacking, hostage-taking, and sporadic gunshots on many villages in the northeast, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa state, they have killed and displaced many Nigerian citizens. The group known as Jama'atahl al-Sunna is-da wa-lqital has been active in Nigeria since 2002 and 2003. Its common name is Boko Haram. Factors including bad governance, religious extremism, the proliferation of light weapons and small arms, political avarice, and foreign influence can all be linked to the rise of terrorism in Nigeria. The factors that are discussed below are listed in order.

2.1.5.1 Bad Governance

It was correctly asserted that there is a correlation between poor governance and a sharp rise in the rate of armed crime, as well as a correlation between poor governance and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria. Since 1999, Nigerian state has been plagued by poor governance; this bad governance has been characterized by a selfish government that does not prioritize the needs of the people and does not make what is known as altruism prevails. The selfishness of this government permeates all three branches of government. While the legislative and judicial branches of government are always at the mercy of the administration and rule in favour of the executive head that appointed them, the executive head only rules in favour of itself, its party, and party godfathers.

In Nigeria, none of the government's branches are actually trying to improve the lives of the general populace, which has the unfavourable impact of increasing poverty and crime. According to the utilitarian philosophy's founder, every government is its

executive, and the legislature should rule and enact laws that would promote the greatest happiness for the largest number of people.

The Nigerian government failed in this, just as they had failed to provide the bare minimum for survival, which would have improved citizens' livelihoods and ensured a good level of life for all. In an underdeveloped society, where people lack access to social amenities, employment, education, food, shelter, and clothing, people are frustrated and seek out any means necessary to survive. Because of this, people are more susceptible to being brainwashed and purchased cheaply by terrorist organizations to use as weapons of terror in their country. In Nigeria, youth unemployment, pervasive joblessness, failing economies, government corruption and repression, and religious sectarianism are social issues and factors contributing to Boko Haram terrorism²⁸.

A nation that is underdeveloped lacks security and eventually equates security with progress. The inability of the Nigerian government to develop the nation has resulted in a security dilemma for the state (country), as crimes including armed banditry, kidnapping, terrorism, Fulani herdsmen, yahoo, and drug trafficking are now relied upon by the populace to survive. Because an idle mind is the devil's factory, the Islamic sect Boko Haram is recruiting more and more youths from Nigeria to serve as its fighters. Boko Haram in Nigeria will gradually disappear the day the government begins providing its people with economic relief.

The inefficiency of the Nigerian military and its failure to win the battle owing to low morale are two further actions by the Nigerian government and military leadership that have called for the continuation of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The Nigerian military is now rendered ineffective because it is like a canine with no teeth. Even though they are soldiers, the military is not secure, despite the fact that they

should be since they are responsible for protecting their nation from both internal unrest and foreign assault. The military, however, also needed to be secure in order to fulfill its duty. By providing them with enough military hardware (weapons and ammunition) to conduct operations, they needed to be guarded. Soldiers' allowances and pay must be paid as and when due, and they shouldn't be forced to fight for longer than necessary. The soldiers' morale will undoubtedly increase as a result, as they will feel secure and ready to battle at any moment²⁹.

Soldiers fighting in some areas of Borno and Adamawa bemoaned the reduction in allowances and the length of time they were forced to spend in the conflict without seeing their families. They said that 9,000 pounds had been taken out of their January allowances and that some troops had served for up to five years without making contact with their loved ones. It is quite regrettable that the Nigerian military now lacks weapons and ammunition despite paying soldiers fighting Boko Haram constant allowances. Additionally, they lack the knowledge essential to wage the fight successfully. Given how many soldiers are dying in the conflict, morale among the troops fighting Boko Haram is currently at an all-time low. In Nigeria, when soldiers are not protected, the nation as a whole is not secure.

2.1.5.2 Religious Extremism

Since the act of terrorism has been investigated, scholars have realized that most of these activities are being championed by radical Islamic groups like the Hammers, the Taliban, the Al-Qaida, and the Boko Haram in Nigeria that claimed to be fighting against western education and wants to spread Islam and establish an Islamic state. This fact cannot be discounted as the act of terrorism has been investigated. This assumption that religion is a factor in the rise of terrorism in Nigeria persists despite the impossibility of their stated goals and the fact that they represent a transient mirage.

However, Islamic radicals are promoting the causes. According to the 2014 Global Terrorism Index, religious extremism has taken over as the primary cause of terrorism in recent years. Their survey noted 18,000 deaths in 2013, an increase of 60% from the year before. Only four organizations can be held responsible for the bulk (66%) of these: the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaida, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. This has clearly indicated that one of the main reasons of terrorism in Nigeria is religion³⁰.

There is empirical evidence to support the claim that religious conflict and religious fanaticism lead to terrorism, and Boko Haram's use of religion plays a significant role in their ideology. The organization practices an extreme kind of religion, which they claim as justification for their horrible murders. Members of these Sunnii Muslims are now advocating for the same cause in Nigeria. The majority of Muslims in Arab countries are Sunnii Muslims who believe in the supremacy of their doctrine and regard any other doctrine and religion as heathen (Kafiri) that has to be eradicated. Because religion has a tendency to define some groups as superior and others as inferior based on their exclusive access to and ownership of a purportedly supreme global being, religion has a significant impact on the development of terrorist tendencies. Without a question, one of the main reasons of terrorism in Nigeria is religion.

For many terrorist organizations in Africa, religion has emerged as their primary source of inspiration. Those who support a radical interpretation of Islam are disproportionately targeted among the groups and people who have been religiously motivated to engage in terrorist attacks. The importance of extreme-right Christian organizations is also emphasized, though.

In the time frame typically attributed to the rise of the new terrorism, the prevalence and importance of terrorist organizations driven by religion are noteworthy. Trends in the percentage of terrorist organizations with a religious motivation relative to all terrorist organizations provide evidence for this notion. According to this literature, numbers increased from under 4% in 1980 to 42% by the mid-1990s³¹.

2.1.5.3 The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Another reason for terrorism is Nigeria's growing manufacture and distribution of weapons. Without access to and use of weapons, no terrorist act could be easily supported. Weapons used by Boko Haram in Nigeria include A.K.47 rifles, bombs, knives, cutlasses, rocket-propelled grenades, sub-machine guns (SMG), and larger weapons such general-purpose machine guns (GPMG), as well as armored vehicles. With the aforementioned weapons, a terrorist act can be readily carried out. Small arms and light weapons, which the Islamic sect Boko Haram ultimately uses to fight their unjust course and inflict terror on society, have dramatically increased in number in Nigeria due to the country's unguided borders and the availability of illegal routes for the importation of illegal weapons. In a world without arms proliferation and control, terrorists cannot thrive. "The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is increasingly and dangerously becoming the causes of transnational organized crime in Nigeria," claimed LT. Col. Sagir, "with Boko Haram's insurgency, the escalating Niger Delta crisis and kidnapping, the communal crisis, and armed robberies in the South East serving as hubs or impetuses for arms trafficking." Some border towns, especially those in the North Eastern Plank, act as hubs for the trafficking of weapons as well as centers for stolen commodities, drugs, and hostages taken by criminals, terrorists, and their allies.

Terrorists like Boko Haram are notorious for engaging in illicit arms trafficking. Their allies in other nations provide them with weapons, which are then transported illegally to Nigeria via unmanned, unauthorized pathways in the bush. This article highlights Boko Haram's arms smuggling operations within and across Nigeria's borders as a way to indicate how other terrorist organizations may be trafficking arms in Africa. Of particular concern are the increasingly sophisticated arms and weapons used by Boko Haram militants in recent attacks in Northern Nigeria as well as evidence in seizures made by security forces in Northern Nigeria³². One of the reasons for terrorism in Nigeria is, in fact, the widespread usage of light and small weaponry.

The availability and use of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) weapons, which are also known as weapons of mass disruption, have continued to support terrorism. Some contend that media trends have encouraged terrorists to become more brutal and spectacular because to the audience's growing desensitization. Given as a point of departure from the study above is the idea that social and political injustices serve as the catalyst for terrorist actions. When people have had their rights or land taken away from them or denied these rights, they may turn to terrorism in an effort to right what they see as a social, political, or historical injustice³³.

2.1.5.4 Foreign Influence (Islamic Mission)

Another factor contributing to terrorism in Nigeria is foreign influence. Operating in North-Eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist organization with the mission of overthrowing the Nigerian government, establishing a Sharia state, and eradicating Western influence. The organisation has allies in more nations, one of which they are devoted to. Previously affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the group pledged its allegiance to Daesh (also known as ISIL) on March 12, 2015, after receiving a promise from Boko Haram. The organisation split into two

sections in August 2016: Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA). Boko Haram is a terrorist organization with ties to Isis that is centered in northeastern Nigeria. They don't only act on their own volition; they collaborate on projects with partners in another nation and receive guidance from their headquarters there³⁴.

Nigeria is one of the targeted nations where the mission is expected to be finished, which is why aid in the form of supplies, money, and weapons are sent to Boko Haram. The mission of Islamization is expected to be completed in most countries, particularly in Asian and African countries. Through the unmanned clandestine pathways hidden in the undergrowth, these weapons are brought in illegally. In addition to the obviously criminal actions of kidnapping for ransom and robbing banks, there are other open activities in which a sizable volume of money is transferred between funding groups and terrorist organizations. No terrorist organization can function effectively without money and the necessary supplies. Terrorism is an act that necessitates a sizable sum of money to keep the terrorist organization operating and achieving its goals in any nation where it is established.

2.1.5.5 Political Greed

Politics and politicians are inciting some form of terrorism. For instance, certain politicians in Nigeria have started funding terrorist groups like Boko Haram. Politicians conceal themselves behind religion, align themselves with the terrorist organization as an Islamist, and assert that they are fighting for the same causes as the terrorist organization. They end up funding terrorist actions in Nigeria in an effort to topple the opposition government, which has become unstable. During elections, politicians arm political thugs and use them to obstruct the voting process. Most of the time, these thugs keep their weapons because they end up utilizing them to terrorize the community.

Most of these thugs who own those weapons eventually submit to the terrorist group in order to support the terrorist deed in northern Nigeria.

Another problem is that Nigerian politicians, while in positions of authority, neglect to provide the populace with the necessities of life that will improve livelihood and ensure a good standard of living. Citizens who are unemployed and idle are forced to acquiesce cheaply and become easy prey to the demands of the terror group to fight for the group. The majority of research on Nigerian politics as the root of insurgency has focused on how dishonest politicians have exacerbated economic hardship and inequality, which has led to grievances in Northern Nigeria. Politicians are also perceived as being too far from the general public because they are not always present to handle the problems and difficulties that the populace faces. As some residents end up taking the law into their own hands by engaging in a series of criminal acts to survive, most citizens tend to address their problems on their own. Another factor contributing to terrorism in Nigeria is the enormous divide between the nation's government and its citizens. People frequently feel like they are not being heard by government representatives. While some people are able to handle this in a civilized way, others resort to violence and use terror to manipulate the government into giving them what they want.

2.1.6 Contributing Factors to Terrorism

Corruption: All facets of the Nigerian economy are corrupt, including government (both private and public). Officials in the ruling government are too preoccupied accumulating money at the expense of society to carry out their duty. Nigeria has been ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International (2012), ranking as the most corrupt of the countries evaluated.

Unemployment: The rise of terrorism was a result of unemployment. This has developed into a significant problem for the nation and has left many of our graduates jobless for an extended period of time. Frustration sets in and this encourages them to engage in activities that are harmful to society. Due to the high prevalence of unemployment in Nigeria in 2014, a stampede that involved 500,000 unemployed youngsters applying for roughly 5000 open positions at the Nigeria Immigration Service resulted in the tragic deaths of 16 job seekers. In 2014, the World Bank reported that 80% of those under 24 were unemployed.

Poverty: The Nigerian society is still plagued by the vicious cycle of poverty to the point where the majority of people cannot afford three square meals every day. Since 1970, the majority of Nigerians' living conditions have only slightly improved. In 1980, poverty affected 25% of Nigeria's population; by 2010, that number had risen to 72%³⁵.

Weak institutional structure: As a result of the institutional structures that are in existence at all three levels of government in Nigeria, policies are implemented in a haphazard manner and as a result, the government is unable to supply the society with public goods, making Nigeria a weak state. The term "weak state" refers to nations whose governments are so weak that they are unable to offer their citizens essential public services like security, healthcare, and legal representation. It has been challenging for the Nigerian government to respond to violent upsurges and natural disasters because of the state's fragile structure.

2.17 The Effect of Terrorism in Nigeria

Since 2009, the Nigerian terrorist attack has caused great damage to the nation and posed significant security risks. Quite a few Nigerian residents have met an early death as a result of terrorist acts like bombings, random shootings of civilians, house-

bombings, kidnappings, and hostage-taking. Tens of thousands of Nigerians have been slain by Boko Haram since the insurgency began in 2009. Nigerian citizens numbering in the thousands have been displaced. Due to the people's inability to carry out their everyday duties, particularly the farmers who have even resorted to famine and hunger in Nigeria, the social and economic lives of Nigerians have been put in danger³⁶.

In addition, numerous schools have been shot down, killing numerous teachers. Many Nigerian kids have dropped out of school as a result of these actions. Large-scale destruction has occurred as a result of reported violent attacks, particularly in Borno state. More than 20,000 people have died as a result of these attacks to date, and 2.3 million more have been uprooted from their homes. The majority of the internally displaced people are now residing in Yobe and Adamawa, two neighboring states. The already subpar health care and education systems have been severely undermined by Boko Haram's targeted attacks on schools and medical facilities. Over 57% of schools in Borno are unable to open due to destruction or being in regions that are still dangerous, and nearly 1,400 schools have been destroyed during the eight-year insurrection by the armed organization.

The educational experience of Nigerian youngsters, particularly those from the country's northeast, has been severely hindered, which has increased the country's illiteracy and ignorance. Due to the lack of interest from foreign investors in the Northeast and Nigeria as a whole, the tourism businesses in the afflicted areas have been negatively impacted. Due to the acts of terrorism that were destroying the Nigerian state at the time, the United States of America warned its nationals not to travel to invest in Nigeria.

Due to terrorism, the enduring humanitarian crisis, high unemployment rate, and endemic poverty are now devouring the Nigerian state, and the government of Nigeria's

efforts to contain the problem have only partially succeeded. Government officials and government-owned property have been targeted in the past, especially in Borno state, which has had an impact on Nigerian governance. In Nigeria's Borno state, military bases are often attacked. As many as 100 troops may have been murdered in terrorist attacks on an army post last Sunday. The attacks were carried out by the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWAP), a breakaway section of Boko Haram that is affiliated with the Islamic state³⁷. The budget for security in Nigeria has increased or has been rising during the past few years, while funds allocated for internally displaced people (IDP) have also increased significantly during this time. This funding, which could have gone toward better development initiatives, is now being used to combat terrorism in Nigeria. The national legislature passed the anti-terrorism legislation in 2011 and again in 2013, and the federal government of Nigeria allocated a sizable amount of money to security in the budget to stop the Boko Haram offensive. Two billion dollars were spent under former President Goodluck Jonathan's government to combat the threat of the Boko Haram insurgency, and similarly in 2014, a sizable sum was spent to end the conflict. The government of President Muhammadu Buhari has pledged to spend \$1 billion of the surplus crude oil in 2017 on the war against Boko Haram in Nigeria's northeast. Because of how destructive the effects of terrorism have been on the Nigerian state, this act requires immediate attention and a response before it reaches its peak³⁸.

2.1.8 Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a Hausa word that translates to "education is banned." The name was not chosen by the group's founders or leaders, therefore it is a media invention. In honor of its founder, the sect is also known as Yusufiyah, which translates to "Yusuf's movement." Additionally, the moniker Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad,

which refers to followers of the Prophet, is associated with the Boko Haram organization. Scholars disagree on the exact year that Boko Haram first appeared; some assert that it did so in 1995 under various leaderships, including that of Abubakar Lawan. Others asserted that it first surfaced in 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf met with a few disgruntled students from the Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Bayero University Kano, Kano, University of Maiduguri, and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University³⁹.

The majority of the group's members are from all of Nigeria's northern states. They include young people without jobs, college professors, students, immigrants from nearby countries, and a few social elites. The dropouts from the sect's established Quranic School are also a part of the group. It is instructive that some politicians from northern Nigeria have been charged with belonging to the gang. There is a group leader. Mohammed Yusuf, the group's original leader, is believed to have been assassinated by the Nigerian police in July 2009 while being held in custody. Mallam Sanni Umaru took over as Boko Haram's acting leader after his passing⁴⁰.

Since then, the group has gone through its identity and ideological phases, and numerous people have contested its leadership. The sect's current head, Mallam Abubakar Shekau, has purportedly been murdered by Nigerian security forces multiple times. When it began preaching in 2002, it used nonviolence. Sharia law implementation was its goal. Contrary to the widely held belief in the media that Boko Haram just despises Western education, the sect's worldview is wholly opposed to Western civilisation. According to the group, Western education is a byproduct of Western culture, which corrupts Muslims and society as a whole and prevents the establishment of an Islamic political order.

The group isolates itself from public and commercial institutions that it sees as vehicles for Western culture.

The group also sees government officials as promoters of Westernization or Western culture, which portrays the West as a major force in the spread of Western ideas and makes it difficult for Muslims to observe daily prayers. Government officials are viewed as unbelievers and infidels by Boko Haram. However, other than the general populace, which supports the government, it has no negative relations with government authorities. The religion forbids people from associating with politicians and security personnel since they are responsible for society's crimes and atrocities. The group also sees government officials as promoters of Westernization or Western culture, which portrays the West as a major force in the spread of Western ideas and makes it difficult for Muslims to observe daily prayers. Government officials are viewed as unbelievers and infidels by Boko Haram. However, other than the general populace, which supports the government, it has no negative relations with government authorities. The religion forbids people from associating with politicians and security personnel since they are responsible for society's crimes and atrocities.

Scholars have explored reasons for individuals' engagement in terrorism, and they have come up with different explanations to justify terrorism behaviours. Some viewed motivation for terrorism as a product of psychopathological syndrome. This means that those who engage in terrorism have some level of insanity or abnormal personality traits. However, individual terrorists have senses like any other human being and therefore the reason of psychopathology may not suffice as it will produce disappointing outcomes. Given the disappointing outcome of the psychopathology justification for terrorist activities, some scholars have concluded that terrorist behavior

is a combination of some factors ranging from personal, to socio-environmental factors⁴¹.

According to the aforementioned thesis, factors that may contribute to terrorist behavior include a poor upbringing by the parents, poverty, a lack of education, relative deprivation, and socioeconomic conditions. The behavior of terrorism, which is defined as ideological, personnel, and mandatory, may be motivated by a variety of factors. The motive for terrorist behavior may be influenced by a person's belief system. Others may engage in terrorist actions for their own personal gain, such as financial gain, vengeance, or the advancement of societal principles⁴².

Although the body of knowledge on Boko Haram is still expanding, there are now more than 100 scholarly works, including journal articles, book chapters, novels, and monographs. For a dispute that only started in roughly 2002 and gained popularity in 2009 because its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed by Nigerian police without due process, this is a remarkable quantity of output. However, there is still a lot we don't know about this gang. The research findings on the Boko Haram insurgency help us better understand the organization, including its ideologies, goals, motivations, financial backers, membership size, affiliations, and range of support. However, the poor and ineffective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies employed in the conflict demonstrate that much of the information on Boko Haram is, at best, speculative, and, at worst, misleading. It is also possible that the Nigerian government ignored the intelligence assessment on purpose and lacked political will to take action. It's interesting to note that numerous research on Boko Haram attempt to understand the motivation or underlying causes. What is Boko Haram, asks Andrew Walker is very instructive⁴³.

Still, as an effort to explain what Boko Haram is, other studies have shown light on its connections to other regional and transnational terrorist organisations, particularly al-Qaeda affiliated networks. These studies often try to analyse Boko Haram as a domestic terrorist organisation (focused on Nigerian interests) or as a foreign terrorist organisation (with focus on foreign targets or having the potential to attack foreign interests). The global-local nature of Boko Haram is also regarded in the context of a global upsurge in Islamic revivalism and/or a specific Islamic reform movement in northern Nigeria. The interreligious perspective has also been the subject of some research, particularly the contention that Boko Haram is an anti-Western organization born out of a fight between Muslims and Christians. The Nigerian government's counterterrorism strategies and practices regarding the Boko Haram rebels have also drawn a lot of attention, and numerous studies have provided policy ideas and solutions that the government might use⁴⁴.

The five theories that Boko Haram uses to explain their rhetoric are: the relational/vengeance theory, the human needs/socioeconomic theory, the political feud theory, the Islamic theocratic state/global Islamic revivalism, and conspiracy theories. These five major categories can be used to group discussions about Boko Haram. The subjects chosen for review will therefore fit within these theories. It is also crucial to understand that these theories dovetail into one another and are not in any way mutually incompatible. For example, discussing the religious aspect of the insurgency would be impossible without mentioning its socioeconomic angle. In a same vein, it is impossible to only concentrate on counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency strategies without also considering theories regarding the causes of the insurgency.

There is little debate over the fact that the Boko Haram conflict necessitates multifaceted solutions due to its complex causative factors. The only distinction is that

a lot of Boko Haram analysts believe some aspects to be more important than others. Others find the political explanation more credible, while others place greater stress on the religious component and many others on the socioeconomic angle. More detail on these various viewpoints will be included in the following section of this review. Although each viewpoint has a significant impact on the overall logic of this thesis, my concern is most directly impacted by the human needs/socio-economic theory.

The socio-economic theory fits into the category of development when constructed broadly. It is remarkable, then, that this strategy is largely advocated in the literature on Boko Haram a notion that is somewhat unexpected for what is thought of as an Islamic fundamentalist fight. As a result, the logic behind my research reflects evolving ideas about conflict mediation and resolution. While a development-oriented approach to security issues or conflict resolution may have been incorporated into the framework of the United Nations and other policy-driven organizations as of the late 1990s, the idea is still very novel and less frequently used (assuming it has been accepted) to combat terrorism, specifically terrorism with religious underpinnings⁴⁵.

2.1.8.1 The Religious Perspective

This section examines the controversy surrounding Boko Haram's anti-Western and/or anti-Christian position, as well as Boko Haram's role in the worldwide Islamic revival and its historical role in Islamic reform in northern Nigeria. In the same breath, it takes into account the controversy surrounding Boko Haram's affiliation with transnational terrorism: Is Boko Haram a transnational or local terrorist group? It is challenging to define the regional and global limits of religious fanaticism like that practiced by Boko Haram. Islamic reform efforts in northern Nigeria gave rise to Boko Haram. According to Loimeier, Boko Haram has a strong connection to the distinct political, religious, and economic development of northern Nigeria. The northern region is thus distinguished

by a lengthy history of religious conflict between several Islamic sects and variants that have emerged to challenge the preeminent Islamic authority (such as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Izala, and Maitatsine).

Although some observers only consider such a tie on theological grounds alone without any operational or strategic cooperation, Boko Haram has been labeled as an offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and more especially of the Izala. In terms of removing Boko Haram's religious ties to the earlier Islamic reform movements, this group prefers to analyze the insurgency primarily in the perspective of its socio-economic environment. However, Boko Haram is a part of a vibrant tradition of Islamic reforms that have shaped northern Nigeria's history.

Boko Haram and the Jihad of Dan Fodio are usefully compared, and there is also a strong comparison to be made between Boko Haram and the Maitatsine revolt in the 1980s.

The fight between a traditional Muslim sensibility and modernity dominated by Western ideas, and eventually a push to restore the lost Muslim hegemony, has been seen in Boko Haram as another form of worldwide Islamic revivalism. Despite our best efforts, it is impossible to deny the impact that Boko Haram and other Islamic reform movements in Nigeria have received from global Islamic activities in the Muslim world. The Shiite government of Iran during the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, for instance, had a significant intellectual and material influence on the IMN. The Salafi-Wahhabi government of Saudi Arabia provided theological and material assistance to the Izala as well. Even though IMN and Boko Haram both want to create an Islamic state, Boko Haram's ideology leans more toward the Salafi-Wahhabi philosophy. The methods used by these groups to achieve their goals differ from one another, and⁴⁶.

Boko Haram's use of violence to achieve its objectives alienates it from other Salafi-Wahhabi organizations, most notably the Izala, and positions it against non-Muslims in the north. Many people came to the conclusion that Boko Haram is a Muslim insurgency against Christians as a result of its indiscriminate attacks on churches and Christians during the early stages of the insurgency. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and other global Christian lobby groups pushed for the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. However, there is sufficient data to refute this assertion. The state, Christians, and Muslims have all been targets of Boko Haram attacks, and it's possible that more Muslims than Christians have been impacted⁴⁷.

The anti-Western position of Boko Haram and, hence, its designation as a transnational terrorist organization with a goal of undermining Western interests have also been debated. Almost all perspectives in the literature concur that Boko Haram is a transnational terrorist organization and that it has an anti-Western stance, yet many of these studies come to the conclusion that Boko Haram prioritizes local interests over its transnational purpose. For instance, according to Forests, while Boko Haram shares a doctrinal position with other local terrorist networks and al-Qaeda affiliates, the extent of their tactical and strategic cooperation is unknown⁴⁸.

2.1.8.2 The Political Perspective

Here, the power dynamics in the struggle between a Fulani-Hausa hegemon and Kanuri particularism, as well as between the north and the south, are the main focus. Between conservative authority/elitism and popular radicalism/populism, there appears to be a battle for power that resembles a class struggle. Boko Haram can be seen as opposition to northern Islamic and political figures who have utilized sharia, religion, and Islam to oppress the talakawas (the poor masses). The native authority's monopoly on power is being contested. The Fulani aristocracy and the Hausa ethnic class appear to be married

for political convenience, albeit this union is uneasy and not without its problems. There also appears to be a balance of interests between the traditional, bureaucratic authority and the commercialist, popular power. In other words, the wealthy Hausa commoners who make up the Fulani authority's talakawas, or non-Aristocrat partners, are employed as propaganda tools by the Fulani elite. Therefore, Boko Haram's attacks on politicians and religious academics in Kano and Maiduguri may have been motivated by their alleged involvement with the Sokoto traditional authority⁴⁹.

According to the majority of analyses, Boko Haram is a historical development of Islamic extremism or, to put it more politely, Islamic reform groups in Northern Nigeria. The start of this change has primarily been attributed to Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio's struggle in the nineteenth century. Dan Fodio's initial goal was to purify Islam of the innovations and impurities used by the Hausa rulers of the time, but numerous studies have underlined that in the end, there was political gain for the Fulani ethnic minority group, to which Dan Fodio belongs. Sokoto became under Fulani authority as a caliphate. To protect northern interests from competition from other regional powers and to avoid the inherent internal contradiction in the promoted concept of "one north," the Fulani have shared their hegemony with the numerically superior Hausa ethnic group since Nigeria's independence from the British colonial government. This has been done for political convenience.

However, the reality of a heterogeneous region, different in religion, race, and language, undermined the idea of one north. In other words, the notion that Islam and Hausa are the only two languages spoken in northern Nigeria presents a false reality. In response to challenges from minority groups following the Nigerian civil war of 1967–1970, the military government of Gowon divided Nigeria's three major regions into twelve states.

The country will thereafter become even more divided as military governments succeed one another. Nigeria currently consists of 36 states, six geopolitical zones with each having six states, and one federal state. Following the oil boom in the 1970s, the central government has consolidated its power and redistributed it throughout the states, giving it considerable authority. However, the early 1980s drop in the price of oil and the subsequent Structural Adjustment Programme (an austerity-based economic policy imposed as a loan condition by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank), which were overseen by the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, created circumstances that will severely hamper the ability of the government to fulfill its social welfare and governance duties to the people⁵⁰.

Therefore, it is not surprising that many opinions on the cause of Boko Haram point to governance. For instance, refutes the commonly stated link between violence or extremism and Salafi-Wahhabi radicalism. He comes to the conclusion that Boko Haram is more of a local issue and that the excessive use of force by the Nigerian government—which proponents of the Global War on Terror [GWOT] have come to support since 2001 in their promotion of moderate (Sufi) vs. radical (Salafi-Wahhabi) Islam—rather than Salafi-Wahhabi ideology—is what radicalizes people. Regarding an appropriate answer, The securitization (or militarization) of the fight against Boko Haram is something Anonymous opposes. "Radical violence is more of a political problem requiring sensible political answers rather than a crime or security challenge that could be remedied by robust law-enforcement measures and security operations," he argues.

Critics have criticized the northern political and religious elites for having equivocal views on the Boko Haram problem.

While some experts contend that the Northern Muslim authorities, particularly the Sultan, have always maintained a strong opposition and condemnation of Boko Haram, others contend that the region's political and religious elites have at worst weakly criticized the movement. The need for the traditional authority to maintain its neutrality provides a helpful justification for the equivocal stance of the northern Muslim religious leadership. It is significant to note that both Abubakar Shekau's Boko Haram and President Goodluck Jonathan's federal administration pleaded with the Muslim traditional ruler to mediate the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. Among other humble and sincere requests, the sect requested to the Sultan to get involved in negotiating the release of its incarcerated members and detained Boko Haram family members.

Different theories have been put up regarding why the northern conservative authority failed to exert firm control over the fight between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state during the early stages of the conflict. Having to choose between appearing to support a terrorist organization or an unpopular administration without endangering the power of the traditional northern elites. Because of this lack of moral authority, Adegbulu believes it is plausible to believe that both the northern elite and the FG were motivated by political gain. However, does this? Hill's analysis omits this significant point. The unitary authority of the Sultan and the traditional Muslim establishment, on the other hand, is allegedly under threat from Boko Haram's actions and its brand of Islam (Salafism), according to Hill. Therefore, the traditional authority has a greater stake in seeing Boko Haram vanquished. The notion that Boko Haram reflects Kanuri particularism first surfaced in this context. As such, Boko Haram may show an underling ethnic conflict for hegemon authority between the Fulani-Hausa ethnic group in the northwest, who represent the Sokoto Empire, and the Kanuri ethnic group in the

northeast, which represents the old Borno Empire. Some analysts have disputed the way that Boko Haram has been portrayed as being bipolar.

Elites in the north were more outspoken in their condemnation of the federal government's declaration of a state of emergency, which they mistook for a purposeful anti-north and anti-Muslim agenda by a southerner and Christian-led administration. However, it is also suspicious that the Muslim authority would turn around in late 2014 or early 2015 and criticize the government for not doing enough, especially calling for a popular uprising against the group. It is clear that the Nigerian military violated human rights gravely in its fight against Boko Haram, especially during the State of Emergency period (Emir of Kano, Sultan). Therefore, we must pose challenging questions, such as: Did the northern elite gain anything from Boko Haram's insurgency? This can be seen in the context.

To overcome the threat posed by Boko Haram, the traditional Muslim leadership either holds the key or will play a significant role. This sentiment is expressed when he claims that Boko Haram would ultimately be destroyed (after being militarily vanquished) only when it is assimilated into the northern Nigerian mainstream Muslim organization. Their calls for a dynamic strategy involving government collaboration with various stakeholders, including Islamic religious leaders, are similar in that they both stress the importance of recognizing, classifying, and keeping an eye on religious groups that may be radicalizing. I agree with this idea, however it's important to remember that the council of ulamas did alert the government and its security services to the actions of Boko Haram and other organizations, but they disregarded their warnings. As a result, knowledge is not as important as information processing, and the government must safeguard these courageous religious leaders, some of whom have been killed by Boko Haram for speaking out against the sect. Additionally, this suggestion disregards the

conflict that exists within the Muslim communities in the north, where there is no single leadership for Muslims. The Qadriyya and the Tijaniyya are two branches of the Sufi Brotherhood, the major religious organization to which the orthodox Muslim leadership belongs. The Salafi-Wahhabi movement, including the Izala, is likewise divided. The Boko Haram organization has divisions as well. The likelihood of such integration therefore remains dim, especially as sharia continues to be a need for political and economic advancement in the Muslim north. In order to properly address the core issue of sharia in Nigeria's public realm, a vote of the local populace is required.

2.1.9 The Socio-Economic Perspective: Greed versus Grievance

A few attempts have been made to compare the Boko Haram insurgencies both generally and especially with the idea of amnesty. Some of the arguments made are that because Boko Haram, unlike the Niger Delta insurgency, is motivated by Islamic fundamentalism, it cannot be persuaded by the promise of amnesty; amnesty can be granted, but it must be conditional and cannot interfere with the possibility of bringing criminal charges against those responsible for the terrorist acts and providing justice for victims. In accordance with other studies, amnesty has the potential to be a non-kinetic strategy for achieving peace, particularly a state of peace that allows for the development and negotiation of a more long-term solution. Recognizing the potential for communication, however, ignores the potential for negotiation and the potential for a peaceful resolution through dialogue.

There is little doubt that using disproportionate amounts of force has been the primary strategy used to combat the Boko Haram insurgency. Almost every study on the subject criticizes the use of force by the Nigerian government. The majority of studies blame the government for radicalizing the organization.

A key factor in the group's transformation from a social movement to a terrorist organization has been the state's excessive use of force, particularly its extrajudicial killing of the charismatic group's founder and leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and over 700 sect members, including the destruction of its worship center. While this is assumed, there is a second, quickly increasing argument that oddly also implicates the Nigerian state: the blatant lack of governance⁵¹.

Particularly when it comes to the possibility of a successful counterterrorism response, the socio-economic background of the crisis appears to be at least as essential as the theological explanation. Although some analysts lump the economic aspect under the religious factor, more analysts are beginning to accept this truth. While some strive to strike a careful balance between the greed and grievance arguments, Boko Haram is motivated by greed. While Boko Haram's grievances and most of its publications since 2009 may not explicitly mention poverty and socioeconomic conditions, there is ample evidence to support the claims of many other experts that Boko Haram does articulate real grievances that are Boko Haram is currently in a vulnerable situation (that is if we consider the fact that it has lost ninety per cent of its controlled territory to the government forces as well as a tangible reduction in its rate of attacks). Force has been preferred by the government force and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which is made up of the armies of Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. This strategy has so far been successful in halting Boko Haram's advancements. But the warning is too serious to ignore: if fundamental factors like social injustice, corruption, and poor economic management remain unchanged, Boko Haram will resurface. Similar opinions are expressed in other studies that characterize the security danger posed by Boko Haram⁵².

The majority of studies includes as a prerequisite that the government must improve governance in order to fulfill its fundamental duties, such as providing for infrastructure, healthcare, and social welfare, since this will strengthen its relationship with the people and provide it legitimacy. Although some academics see socioeconomic circumstances as a symptom rather than the primary complaint, many more do, and they advise addressing the core reasons, which is socioeconomic. In their efforts to create a development framework or architecture that will handle the Boko Haram situation, some studies stand out⁵³.

These studies have received attention because they acknowledge the importance of people and/or civil society organizations as well as human rights in the context of development and security. For instance, a counterterrorism strategy guided by intelligence that is less likely to violate human rights than a military strategy will ultimately regain the confidence of the populace in the government and its security system. For a comprehensive and multifaceted counterterrorism strategy that includes, among other things, community resilience against terrorism or citizen participation, the crucial organizations that can aid in bringing about the necessary political change are those of civil society and the general public⁵⁴. A more extensive variety of citizen-government cooperation, as well as a holistic community strategy that includes the government, civil society organizations, and tribal and religious leaders as stakeholders. The "rights-sensitive approach" is claimed by a development framework using the ideas of Critical Terrorism Studies. He correctly notes that although the Nigerian constitution mentions a few fundamental economic, social, and cultural rights, these rights are only ornamental and not subject to the rule of law. In essence, even though it has ratified a number of international human rights instruments, the government is not required by law to respect these rights. Similar studies present development as a preventive measure

and as a requirement for a long-term solution, presenting it as a basic human right and attempting to demonstrate how development can⁵⁵.

The notion of using development as a potent weapon against terrorism, in this case, the Boko Haram insurgency, is already gaining popularity. Some academics have attempted to undermine the link between poverty and unfavorable socioeconomic conditions and terrorism in Africa by contrasting it with other regions where poverty is common but terrorism does not seem to exist. In the case of Boko Haram specifically, its theological beliefs, particularly its Salafi-Jihad traits, seem to rule out any possibility that it may be motivated by anything other than a fundamentalist urge to impose a sharia state in Nigeria. Therefore, it is extremely intriguing that a development crisis is engulfing the world behind the curtain of a religious conflict. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that a large majority of research on Boko Haram advocate a developmental strategy. It is rather intriguing that some of these suggestions offer a broad view of development that encompasses criminal justice, institutional reforms, and human rights in addition to just meeting fundamental economic requirements.

However, the majority of these research' suggestions are essentially hypothetical. They provide no factual or historically sound solid evidence. The Boko Haram problem provides its own peculiarities, while significant lessons can be derived from previous crises and counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorism techniques (such as the Niger Delta amnesty, in all its flaws) can be learned from others. Therefore, it is crucial that an empirical study be conducted to investigate the likelihood of success for the development techniques being advised. It is essential to note that, although having mixed results, the Nigerian government has already tried several of these strategies. As a result, it will provide practical and first-hand knowledge regarding the application of development to the Boko Haram problem and, by extension, the ethno-religious crises

that have come to characterize northern Nigeria, thus offering a useful contribution to the literature. In order to explore the idea of a human rights approach to development, my study will go beyond Yusuf's fundamental idea of a rights-sensitive approach and the call for public participation made by many others. This goes beyond growth because.

2.1.10 Boko Haram Ideological Factor

The Boko Haram terrorist organization's ideology was influenced by the preaching and teachings of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf. Sheik Jafar Mohammed taught Mohammed Yusuf, a famous Islamic scholar and preacher, in Kano state, Nigeria. However, he was assassinated the night before the 2009 general elections in Nigeria. He had doctrinal disagreements with his master, Sheik Jafar Mohammed, prior to his passing. Mohammed Yusuf believed that the Nigerian state was an extension of Western culture and civilisation, which led him to strongly oppose the philosophy and values of Western culture. He and his supporters distanced themselves from the government as a result, and they defied established authority by breaking the law of the state. Mohammed Yusuf held the view that it would be better to perish than to surrender to the corrupt administration. In light of this, the gang grew resentful of the Nigerian government and occasionally engaged in combat with the security forces⁵⁶.

Because they disobeyed the new law passed by the Borno State administration, some Boko Haram members were killed in the deadly incident that occurred in July 2009. All motorcycle riders are required by the new law to utilize crash protection, but Boko Haram refused to follow it because they believed it to be unconstitutional. A violent confrontation between the government security forces and the Boko Haram group resulted from the attempt to execute the law. Security forces apprehended several of its members and stopped some of its members, but the organization later mobilized in a

retaliation attack that resulted in the deaths of some security personnel and innocent bystanders. As Boko Haram members poured terror on the populace in Maiduguri, Borno state of Nigeria, this violence quickly extended to other regions of the nation⁵⁷.

In reaction to their assaults, the Nigerian authorities cracked down on the group by seizing their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and killing him along with some of their adherents. People turn to terrorism in order to exact revenge on behalf of their fellow followers. In the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, this is obvious. Some Muslims in the northeast shaved their beards to avoid being killed or arrested by the security forces as Muslims were being mistaken for Boko Haram members as a result of the massive crackdown on sect members by the government forces that led to the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 and the killing of many of the group's prominent members. Following the horrifying execution of sect members by the security forces, key figures in the Boko Haram organization were determined to retaliate against the government and render the nation unruly. Abubakar Shekau, Mohammed Yusuf's deputy, was said to have promised to deploy guerrilla tactics against the government and to get revenge for the slaughter of their members⁵⁸.

As a result of the perceived injustice against their followers, Boko Haram turned violent. Some joined the group due to the financial incentives. Abdul Rasheed Abubakar, who was detained by the police, admitted that he joined the gang as a result of cash incentives. He stated that the organisation had promised to pay him US\$500 before he could receive bomb specialist training in Afghanistan and another \$3500 if he could return for additional instruction. Mohammed Manga, the perpetrator of the suicide explosion at the Nigerian police headquarters, admitted to obtaining 4 million Naira, or around \$25400, which he later left to his family. Some sect members were drawn to the group because they liked the money collected during the cult's bank

robberies. The group thought that by robbing banks, the government would reimburse the depositors who had stolen government money.

The Boko Haram cult had a chance to recruit followers because of the deteriorating state of Nigeria. The Nigerian government's inability to provide for fundamental human needs, good political outcomes, and effective governance offer the cult with opportunities to brainwash impressionable individuals and attract them into their organization. A scenario of lawlessness marked by severe violence directed against the state resulted from the public's perception that the government has lost legitimacy as a result of its seeming failure. In Nigeria, there is a high level of corruption as politicians and civil workers plunder public funds at will to enrich themselves and oppress the underprivileged. Different regimes became unresponsive to civilian demands). The change from a military to a democratic government in 1999 did not improve the situation as it led to higher unemployment and poverty rates in Nigeria⁵⁹.

Nigerian citizens, according to a World Bank report, are in extreme poverty. The army of unemployed youngsters' broad discontent led to disaffection and treason among the populace. Religious organizations and non-state actors took advantage of the dismal economic conditions to indoctrinate the underprivileged masses while intervening to lessen their pain and using it as a tool to further their own objectives. These people used the porousness of Nigeria's borders to bring weapons into the nation, arming the political thugs and intimidating their rivals. The people of the country are currently experiencing extreme economic stress and hardship as a result of this predicament. By promising them economic and social reliefs, Boko Haram was able to deceive the gullible northern Nigerians in this situation. As was previously argued, some destitute people have financial aspirations. This stance was confirmed by the Presidential

Committee's report on the threat posed by Boko Haram, which underlined the problems of poverty and unemployment as drivers of group recruitment⁶⁰.

The development of the group in Nigeria was greatly aided by insufficient security and the uncoordinated character of the local security apparatus. Early warnings and information about the group's possible threat were sent to the police and the government by some Islamic clerics and community leaders, but they went unheeded. The avoidable conflict between the security forces in July 2009 was brought on by a failure to heed warnings. The Department of State Services provided the federal government with security intelligence, but it was not utilized Mamman Nur, who planned the attack of the United Nations in August 2011, was the subject of an intelligence report presented to the government that was given lighthearted treatment. They asserted that Mamman Nur was detained by the Department of State Services on the basis of security information but was promptly freed by the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. Nigeria's security system appears to be poor, which has led to the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism there. To prevent terrorist acts from happening, there was ineffective intelligence cooperation⁶¹.

The effects of globalization have been dramatic, particularly on conservatism, in the country's north, which is a region with a high Muslim population. Globalization's new waves of immigrant cultures led to new social developments in Nigeria's north that had a negative impact on the nation's traditional fundamental values. The new era of technology, as witnessed in video and film, pushed media liberalization and put the region's predominately Islamic culture under pressure. This heightened the northeastern region of Nigeria's disdain for Western culture, which in turn led some Muslims to join the Boko Haram sect and inspired the call for the establishment of an Islamic state. The pattern explains why the group despises Western culture and believes it to be the root of

social vices in society. The group's connections to overseas terrorist organizations like the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Shabaab in Somalia, where some Boko Haram members received bomb-making training, were further facilitated by globalization. Numerous extremist and radical Islamic preachers responded to this development by expressing their disdain for it⁶².

2.1.11 The Boko Haram Terrorist Group

Boko Haram, formerly known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, is a radical Islamic fundamentalist group that identifies as the Nigerian Taliban and is comparable to the Taliban in Afghanistan in terms of their ideological stance against anything western and their adherence to a strict interpretation of the Koran. It should be noted that the terrorist organization's original by line in Arabic, "People Committed to the Propagation of Western education is a sin when crudely translated into Arabic. This group is fighting for the imposition of Islamic authority in the northern states of Nigeria where Sharia law is already in effect. They believed that by toppling the government, they could bring about their particular brand of Islamic governance. Since then, they have been attacking primarily Christians and churches in northern Nigeria with lethal and well-planned attacks. Since 2001, a new generation of young and courageous Muslims, the majority of whom are educated and from the semi-middle class, have aggressively embraced a stricter interpretation of Islam, rejecting everything associated with Christianity and western education and culture, and have carried out high-profile terrorist attacks, especially in the northern states of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Plateau, and Kaduna, as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). They also killed prominent politicians, released detainees from jail, and launched the first suicide bombing attempt at the Abuja police force headquarters.

Boko Haram's actions, according to Professor Martins Crenshaw, a recognized specialist on terrorism, show a bold come-get-us mentality, and the fact that some of the bombers, as reported by the Nigeria Vanguard Newspaper, are of Somali descent suggests that they have an active cell in Nigeria. He asserted that the terrorist organization operating in Nigeria is a branch of Al-Qaeda, which has assisted them with financing and logistical support. They do this with impunity, which is why they are so ruthless in their destruction of the nation. He added that various documents were taken from the late Al-Qaeda leader's home in Abotabab, Pakistan, last year when the Seals, a special division of the American Marines, attacked the premises. He promised them assistance in the form of money, training, and other things in return. He made a point of connecting them to Al-Qaeda cells in North Africa. In a similar way to how Ken Sarowiwa, the head of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), was killed, Boko Harm's audacity in committing out terrorist attacks in Nigeria was bolstered by his passing. The group left more resentful, hostile, and daring. The organization was not neutralized or disbanded when their leader Yusuf Muhammad passed away in police custody in 2009; rather, they were revitalized.

2.1.12 Dynamics of Counter-Terrorism

Counter-Terrorism means all the tactical and strategic methods used by a government to combat terrorism against its citizens in general. It includes COIN and the Egg Breakers or intelligence gathering in general. Counter-terrorism is never in isolation but always a multi-level approach and quite complex. It also includes black propaganda and counter-espionage. Anything done or used to hunt a terrorist down or prevent him from doing his dastardly deeds is counterterrorism. Counter-terrorism (also spelt counterterrorism), also known as antiterrorism, incorporates the practice, military

tactics, techniques, and strategies that government, military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism⁶³.

Counter-terrorism strategies include attempts to counter the financing of terrorism. If terrorism is part of a broader insurgency, counter-terrorism may employ counter-insurgency measures. The United States Armed Forces use the term foreign internal defence for programs that support other countries in attempts to suppress insurgency, lawlessness, or subversion or to reduce the conditions under which these threats to security may develop. Most counter-terrorism strategies involve an increase in standard police and domestic intelligence. The central activities are traditional: interception of communications, and the tracing of persons. New technology has, however, expanded the range of military and law enforcement operations⁶⁴.

2.1.13 Dynamics of Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria

The Nigerian government's adoption of policies and the emergence of bilateral and multilateral ties are both results of the Boko Haram threat. The 7th Division of the Nigerian Army was established in Maiduguri, Almajiri schools were established, the military command center was moved to Maiduguri, the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSMC) services were banned and then reinstated, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was established, and an administrative panel was established to negotiate with Boko Haram, among other things. Others are creating a committee to address the spread of light weapons, the CVE Program, the implementation of NACTEST, and legal frameworks like MLPA 2011, MLPA 2012, TPA 2011, and others⁶⁵.

The MNJTF established by the LCBC, the US DOD training 650 Nigerian soldiers in combat operations, the UK listing of Boko Haram as a proscribed terrorist organization

in 2013, the US labeling of Boko Haram as an FTO in 2014, and the UN and EU designating Boko Haram as a terrorist organization all fall under the category of bilateral and multilateral actions. Providing help through USAID, placing a \$7 million bounty on the head of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, and Nigeria's recent membership in the coalition of Muslim nations led by Saudi Arabia are other sorts of assistance that have been provided⁶⁶.

Negotiations between the terrorists and the Nigerian government have been rejected. Reason for Existence because the group is cell-like (splintered) and the former's demand to Islamize Nigeria is unjustified morally, no ground for dialogue exists. A splinter organization called Ansaru confirmed the sect's state of disintegration. Equally valued actions include the reinforcement of troops, the targeting of the movement's leadership, the establishment of an international joint task force, the proclamation of a state of emergency, the suspension and reinstatement of GSMC services, and the imposition of a curfew. They concluded that Nigeria's government has been reactive rather than proactive in its efforts. They offered alternatives including treating the organization more like terrorists than like liberation fighters like the insurgents in the Niger Delta. After all nonviolent attempts to draw the government's attention to their predicament were unsuccessful, the Niger Delta insurgents turned to violence. Because of the severe environmental damage caused by oil exploration, other economic activities in the area were impacted, which raised the region's poverty level⁶⁷.

Align with the fact that intelligence is a strong pillar of counter-terrorism. Making an assessment on the level of intelligence, Solomon observed that:

“even within this narrow counter-terrorism [sic] lens, Abuja’s approach to Boko Haram is problematic. It is indeed hard to fight an organization [sic] when one does not know even its name let alone its organizational [sic] structure. This

*also points to the human intelligence assets the Nigerian State has on the sect*⁶⁸.

This illustrates how poorly the Nigerian security establishment gathers intelligence and the necessity of doing away with prejudice in their activities. In an interview with a security agent, he also made a similar observation on intelligence, saying that security personnel "react to but do not prevent" violence, of which Boko Haram terrorism is one example. He goes on to say that violent conflict—such as the Maitatsine riots in the 1980s to the current Boko Haram crisis—is caused by a lack of quick action to information about potential for violence. This proves that sponsors are one of the main sources of funding for terrorist organizations. In numerous courts across the nation, terrorists and a number of their backers who have been apprehended are being prosecuted. Regarding the arrests made in connection with terrorism, but criticized the granting of bail requests to suspected terrorists while threatening the nation's security position. This is evidence that there is "little faith that insurgents will be adequately punished or effectively incarcerated" due to the country's "poor judicial and penal institutions, which also suffer from varied degrees of corruption." Therefore, there may be some concerns with the prosecution of Boko Haram suspects.

Low enrollment rates have been a problem in Northern Nigeria, particularly at the basic school level. Ruquyyatu provided an explanation for this, blaming the situation on the pervasive influence of Islamic education¹⁰ because few parents have embraced Western education. In terms of history, the British finally established control over all of Northern Nigeria in 1902. The British worked diligently to keep Islam alive in Northern Nigeria, especially by forbidding Christian missionaries from bringing Christianity and Western education to the area. This did not, however, imply that the Western

educational system was totally unwelcome in the North. In the 1910s and 1920s, Western education eventually and mysteriously made its way to Northern Nigeria. As a result, the British founded Katsina College, the first higher-educational Western institution in the North⁶⁹.

However, there was remained ambivalence toward Western education in the Muslim-dominated North. After gaining independence, when they saw that the South was economically far ahead of them and that Western education was a means of gaining access to political and administrative positions, they began to embrace it. The North has been labeled a "less-developed education area" by the federal government since the South continues to have a significant educational advantage. Although the government takes this into account when implementing policies and admitting students to higher education, the marginal impact of this divide is the North's persistent economic marginalization⁷⁰.

They would much rather let their kids grow up to be Almajiris, who are dependent on their teachers and eventually turn into begging on the streets. This turns them into potential recruits for terrorism as well as other vices. Since this was seen as one of the solutions to the rising number of Boko Haram members, the government constructed schools for the Almajiris to provide them with a Western education. More generally, the government's confrontational strategy hasn't produced the desired effects. He proposed a long-term fix in the form of a national convention where ethnic group representatives and other stakeholders would come together to talk about Nigeria's issues. He added that poor governance was one of the elements that contributed to the rise of Boko Haram and advocated for all levels of government to provide youth with employment opportunities⁷¹.

All comments were divided into local, state, federal, and international categories by Boko Haram. He criticized the legal systems' infringement of human rights, arguing that they go against an acknowledged worldwide standard. Examples of these violations include the death sentence and the ability to search a suspect's home without a warrant. Overall, he claimed that the military and government of Nigeria were corrupt, which made it difficult to fight terrorism. Amy's assertion is supported by the continuing arms deal case brought against several officials and military personnel who have not been able to account for more than \$2 billion intended for the acquisition of arms, suggesting a more balanced and coordinated strategy to combat the group⁷².

The Nigerian military has been accused of being ineffective, complicit, and brutal, which has prevented them from defeating terrorists and instead puts its level of cruelty virtually on par with that of the terrorists. Based on field research done in the North East region of Nigeria, it has been claimed that the military has been ineffective in defending potential target communities from attacks, incapable of avoiding collateral damage during combat operations against the sect, and hostile to civilians through illegal detention, harassment, property destruction, sexual violence, uncontrolled targeting of young men, torture, and being overly aggressive in the use of force resulting in injury and death. In addition, he urged that USAID provide humanitarian aid and that a US embassy be established in Kano. However, Campbell expressed skepticism about effectively combating the Boko Haram threat when he claimed that other violent religious groups in Nigeria frequently vanished only to reappear with new identities. He attributed this to not effectively addressing the root causes that led to the emergence of these groups.

Both the TPA 2011 and the TPA 2013 outlaw all acts of terrorism and financing for terrorism, as well as specify the consequences for specific offenses. The MLPA 2011

and MLPA 2012 forbid financing of terrorism and establish a framework for cooperation with financial institutions to engage with government authorities tasked with stopping it. By enhancing security against terrorism, identifying prospective terrorist acts through early warning systems, and mitigating terrorist attacks through the use of relevant institutions, the NACTEST aims to stop the recruitment of terrorists and the financing of terrorism in its tracks.

Due to the lack of studies on the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies against the threat posed by Boko Haram to peace and security, the implementation of the NACTEST and these actions must be evaluated on an equal footing. These documents also act as official law for some of the other current policies, extending their reach and influence. It further justifies the need to review these policy documents in order to have a comprehensive understanding of Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts⁷³.

2.1.14 Global Perspective of Counterterrorism

The strength of any counter-terrorism move lies in the model applied. Any counter-terrorism policy adopted by any state or international body is always a ratio between the use of hard and soft power. Crelinsten described hard power as the state assuming its monopoly in the fight against terrorism through engaging its military, police and law courts while soft power takes persuasive form through economic reforms, public education, communication and advocacy as well as diplomatic initiatives⁷⁴. Commenting on the nexus between hard power and the Nigerian government initiatives, that relying on hard power to fight Boko Haram has brought forth the solution to the plights of the areas affected by Boko Haram's activities. Counter-terrorism models can also take the form of military and non-military action. The military model encompasses peacekeeping operations, utilizing the threat of military intervention as a tool for deterring states from supporting terrorism, military aid to equip the military and use of

the military to distribute humanitarian aid. Non-military model revolves around persuasive methods like addressing the idea that causes terrorism and deradicalisation initiatives. The techniques and approaches used by nations to combat terrorism should take into account the root reasons, which are similar but can occasionally differ among nations. Whatever strategy a country or organization chooses, obtaining intelligence is very quick. The UN's policy is global in scope and has a universal viewpoint. The UN model, also known as the "5Ds," is supported by a pentagonal frame and consists of preventing individuals from engaging in or supporting terrorism, denying terrorists access to weapons, discouraging states from supporting terrorism, enhancing state capacity to combat terrorism, and defending human rights. This demonstrates that the disease of terrorism has spread globally and that there needs to be a fairly standard strategy for combating it everywhere. It is difficult to create a one-stop counterterrorism policy because terrorists refuse to embrace the label of terrorists and because different nations have different opinions on terrorist acts. The UN paradigm is largely or fully reflected in counterterrorism literature. These authors' opinions have primarily focused on the definitions of counterterrorism, counterterrorism strategies, reasons for selecting counterterrorism strategies, counterterrorism laws, and the roles of the state in counterterrorism.

A multilateral strategy based on the notion that while the UN should cooperate with regional organizations like the African Union, European Union (EU), and Commonwealth, among others, the 5Ds are good. He believed that each of these regional entities' strategies should complement rather than conflict with the 5Ds.

This shows that one of the laws of terrorism is international cooperation. An integrated method which he developed from the UN policy. This was divided into three categories: law enforcement (deny, develop, and defend), human rights, and the military (deter,

develop, and defend) (dissuade, develop and defend). He came to the conclusion that the foundation of any counterterrorism strategy should be human rights. Instead of "approaches," choose "kinds of counter-terrorism." Coercive counter terrorism, proactive counterterrorism, persuasive counterterrorism, and defensive counterterrorism are the four types he provided, each of which reflects a method but has a distinct name⁷⁵.

In order to combat terrorism, he developed a soft strategy that emphasized the "war of ideas" and included three components: deradicalization, counter-radicalization, and radicalization. But he came to the conclusion that this strategy cannot be the only solution to the problem of terrorism. Model but provided a variety of values that society must uphold to deal with terrorism. According to his perspective, "societies that are carrying the weight of terrorism, whether local or international, deal by passing and enforcing laws, devising and executing policies, making political judgments and moral choices and acting on them" Primoratz's perspective presents an ambiguous stance because he did not say if the activities will adopt a soft or a hard approach. This could lead to uneven and imbalanced policymaking, possibly favoring local interests⁷⁶.

The necessity for nations to stop terrorism in its tracks before it enters the guerrilla stage. However, if it wasn't stopped at this point, he suggested taking measures to halt it in its early guerrilla stage. He proposed that this would be possible by taking steps such as gathering intelligence, bringing the war to the terrorists' homes, crippling the terrorists logistically, improving living conditions for the local populace to discourage them from sympathizing with terrorists, and rendering the terrorists politically ineffective. School of thought consistently supports combining a soft and hard approach while also defining the stage of counterterrorism at which each participant should join. By using the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study and gathering information from

primary and secondary sources, a community-based strategy was chosen. They came at this conclusion on the basis that Muslims are responsible for terrorism in the UK, necessitating their inclusion in the entire counterterrorism policy-making process. This model has a softer approach, yet it does not allow for any military action, possibly because it relates to battling terrorism on British soil. It is admirable to want to forge close ties with the Muslim community, but doing so risk alienating Muslims who may wonder why they should be involved given that they disagree with the government's use of an objective scale⁷⁷.

He disagreed with depending solely on military action because terrorists work in groups (and occasionally cells), so he offered intellectual solutions as a supplement to military action. He claimed that long-term initiatives in education, the provision of social services, and the use of the media to advance admirable societal values can all help achieve this. According to a similar perspective, no matter how effective a pure military reaction may be, it is equivalent to crying over spilled milk; he was therefore in favor of addressing terrorism's core causes in order to stop its formation. The military may still be required in order to tackle those that have metamorphosed from the original problems because eliminating the root causes may not completely ensure final eradication⁷⁸.

Due to the controversy surrounding global terrorism, counterterrorism has become an international issue. This resulted in varied counterterrorism policies being adopted by various nations. There will be a review of counterterrorism regulations in Kenya and Algeria. This is supported by the fact that some aspects of terrorism in Kenya and Algeria resemble Boko Haram's operational strategy. An excellent illustration is the local and international links of terrorist organizations in Kenya and Algeria. Since 1975, Kenya has experienced a number of terrorist strikes. Among these are the August 7,

1998, bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi and the suicide bombers who crashed their car into a hotel in Kikambala⁷⁹. The most recent attacks since 2011 have been carried out by Al-Shabaab. About 25% of the group, according to a 2014 study from the British Broadcasting Corporation, are from Kenya. About 145 Kenyans were killed in an Al-Shabaab raid on the Garrisa University College, predominantly students⁸⁰.

Kenya's response has been both forceful and tactful, as evidenced by both its military and civilian responses. The Kenyan government's policies are reflected in institutional development, training, and bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the US and UK. The military strategy includes the establishment of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in 1998, whose members have been stationed at the Somalia border, pre-university military training for Kenyans to help them become accustomed to basic defensive principles in times of attacks, the building of a perimeter fence along the Somali border, and an increase in the defense budget. Additionally, the Joint Terrorism Task Force was created. The non-military strategy used by Kenya includes local security policy, also referred to as the "Nyumba Kumi initiative," which involves involving the local population in intelligence gathering by reporting suspicious characters and individuals, engaging Muslim clerics to spread messages free of Islamic extremism, freezing the assets of Al-Shabaab sympathizers, and preventing money laundering⁸¹. Other actions taken by the Kenyan government include the formation of the National Counter-terrorism Centre, cooperation between the National Security Intelligence Service and US Anti-Terrorism Assistance, and the 2003 passage of the Terrorism Suppression Bill into law. The Kenyan government has focused on implementing its anti-terrorism policies in regions with a predominance of Muslims. Allegations of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination have been made in response to this. Additionally, according to Amnesty International, there have been reports of torture and intimidation of detainees'

family members as well as reports of torture and detention without charge. Allegations of discrimination may be challenging to prove because it's possible that some arrests were made because of their involvement in terrorism rather than because of personal beliefs⁸².

Because of its history, Algeria has been one of the terrorism hotspots. The Islamic Liberation Front, the Armed Islamic Group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and its successor Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), among other political groups and organizations, have all been connected to terrorism. Most of these organizations developed into Al-Qaeda affiliates before becoming what is today known as (AQIM). This clarifies how GSPC in the 1990s and AQIM afterwards contributed to Algeria's expertise in counterterrorism. AQIM now operates in Mali and Mauritania in addition to Algeria.

Algeria lacks a thorough counterterrorism policy, and the core idea is not immediately clear. Algeria has, nevertheless, adopted policies that reflect both strong and soft methods. The establishment of a military intelligence service, the creation of an interdepartmental task force charged with combating terrorism, the extension of the pretrial detention period, the lowering of the criminal responsibility age to 16 years, and a broader application of the death penalty are all examples of the hard approach. Additionally, since 2009, there has been a military crackdown on terrorist hideouts. This was demonstrated by the stationing of approximately 4,000 soldiers at the Tunisian border and the stationing of 50,000 and 75,000 troops, respectively, at the South Eastern and Libyan borders⁸³.

The soft strategy involves encouraging remorseful Islamist militants to speak out publicly, offering terrorists amnesty, and preventing the next generation from turning into terrorists by providing them with jobs in the public sector, bonuses, houses to live

in, and even enlisting some of them in the military. Keeping an eye on the imams' sermons and emphasizing the need to stop extremism in religious schools' curricula. The Algerian government has also passed legislation to prevent and prosecute the financing of terrorism and money laundering, lengthened the period of incarceration for terrorist suspects to 12 days, and worked with other nations to share Deoxyribonucleic Acid data⁸⁴.

In order to stop religious radicals from carrying out terrorist attacks, Algeria's counterterrorism operations essentially combine a hard (military) and soft (religious) strategy. In 2015, 27 cases involving terrorism were scheduled to be heard by the Algiers Criminal Court. In addition, 41 alleged terrorists appeared in Algiers Criminal Court in February 2015 to defend themselves against the charges. According to the Algerian Ministry of National Defense, its operations resulted in the deaths or detention of 157 terrorists in 2015, as well as the seizure of terrorists' tools, weapons, ammunition, and drugs⁸⁵. 9,000 terrorists have been pardoned as part of the amnesty program, according to the 2015 nation reports on terrorism published by the US Department of State. Algeria's hard and soft tactics have produced achievements, but the identification of 62 terrorist incidents in 2015 is a glaring sign that more has to be done in the country's counterterrorism campaign.

Similar to Kenya and Algeria, Nigeria has embraced military strategies such troop deployment, the establishment of the 7th Army Division, and the move of the military command center to Maiduguri⁸⁶. The establishment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps and the CVE program are two examples of non-military methods. Nigeria has worked with foreign partners as well. But there have also been instances of illegal military detention, malnutrition in IDP camps, and other problems. Successes were however noted in the areas of some Boko Haram militants being killed and

arrested. Nigeria has also given its troops training in counterterrorism operations⁸⁷. Reviewing these research has shown that counterterrorism does represent soft, harsh, or a combination of both tactics. Nigeria's counterterrorism strategies include both hard and soft components, but it is important to understand how much of each type there is because it will help this study conduct an objective evaluation.

Because terrorism contexts differ across the globe, so do counterterrorism approaches. The methods used to combat terrorism will differ due to the diversity of the forces that support it. The methods used to combat terrorism may differ from one nation to the next and may include anti-terrorist legislation, counterterrorism organizations, resources, and individuals. This stance has backed the use of counterterrorism as a form of response to terrorism. This view holds that the government can only combat terrorism after comprehending the causes of it; policymakers must be aware of the causes of terrorism before developing or enacting counterterrorism measures. The use of both hard and soft tactics, including military action, intelligence collection, preventive measures, and police investigation, should be included in counterterrorism efforts, he continued. The argument is further supported by evidence that, while a soft approach to counterterrorism is essential, military action is only ever required when terrorists reject the soft approach⁸⁸. However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

In the analysis of counterterrorism, it should be noted that counterterrorism should be comprehensive, comprising intelligence collecting, prevention, detection, and hardening of terrorist targets. These counterterrorism tactics have been implemented by the federal government of Nigeria. The notion that counterterrorism and anti-terrorism cannot be distinguished will thus be used in this study because it accurately describes the situation in Nigeria. In his definition, he stated that antiterrorism involved the use of

legal instruments, political and economic measures, and other peace-building mechanisms to prevent and counter terrorism while counterterrorism was a security task carried out by the security forces of a country or international authority. Consequently, the terms "counterterrorism" and "anti-terrorism" will refer to these⁸⁹.

However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another. The methods used determine whether a government's counterterrorism effort is successful. The strategy combines the use of hard power and soft power. While hard power encompasses the use of the military, law enforcement tactics, and legal processes, soft power includes the employment of public awareness campaigns, education, economic reforms, good governance, and advocacy projects. In the fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, the deployment of both soft and hard powers has been beneficial. The military's counterterrorism strategy will include the use of force, peacekeeping missions, military aid to the civilian population, and military support for military equipment. However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

Because it uses persuasion to address the root causes of terrorism, the non-military measure differs from hard power. The numerous ways that terrorism manifests itself, despite the fact that its causes may be the same across states and countries, may influence the various counterterrorism methods. Relationships with allies, financial support, and deradicalization efforts could all be part of it. However, intelligence is sacred regardless of the model used because counterterrorism is intelligence-driven⁹⁰.

However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

The UN's strategy for combating terrorism is based on the five Ds: developing, denying, deterring, discouraging, and defending. The deterrent strategy makes it impossible for a state to sponsor terrorism, whereas the model's goal is to discourage people from engaging in or supporting terrorism. Building state capacity to combat terrorism is the idea behind developing, while defending strives to uphold human rights. In support of the UN's coordinated counterterrorism strategy because they thought terrorism had spread to be a worldwide menace. However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

The unified counterterrorism strategy fails globally due to terrorists' resistance to acknowledge that they are terrorists and variances in how terrorism is viewed across national boundaries. Some counterterrorism specialists, however, advocate using the United Nations model across nations because it is all-inclusive. Accordingly, a multilateral strategy is founded on the principle of the 5Ds and the significance of cooperation among the regional entities. They proposed that each strategy should adhere to the 5Ds' guiding principles and not the other way around.

However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

Although the soft approach to counterterrorism, which will include the elements of radicalization, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization, as well as the multilateral approach, an integrated approach based on the principle of the UN strategy, which will comprise the military, law enforcement, and human rights, and the concepts of coercive, proactive, persuasive, and defensive counter-terrorism, is acknowledged, it is submitted that this model cannot adequately address terrorism. The employment of a soft or strong approach was discussed, but it was made clear that any society plagued by

terrorism had a responsibility to pass and uphold laws, create and implement policies, and must muster political will to combat terrorism⁹¹.

However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

Before turning to guerrilla tactics, terrorism must be suppressed at the beginning. If this cannot be done, the author suggested counterterrorism measures that could lessen its activities in the early stages of guerrilla tactics. The counterterrorism measures include gathering intelligence, taking military action, cutting off the terrorists' access to logistics, and preventing the public from supporting the terrorists. However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

This stance is in favor of using both soft and harsh power to combat terrorism. After concluding that Muslims are the root of terrorism in the United Kingdom, a community-based approach to analysis of terrorism in the country will incorporate Muslims in the decision-making process. However, this strategy opposes taking any military action against terrorists on British soil. The Muslims may become uneasy about this strategy because they may wonder why it is being assumed that they are terrorists. However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another. However, given that terrorism is a worldwide problem and will thus require a military strategy to deal with the extreme terrorists, drawing the conclusion that the causes of terrorism may be completely handled may be challenging. Due to terrorism's emergence as a worldwide menace, the globe is currently battling it. This has influenced the creation and use of various counterterrorism policies in various nations throughout the world⁹².

However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

It is important to research the counterterrorism initiatives in Kenya and Algeria because they have resulted in the use of various tactics. These two nations' terrorist actions are comparable to those of the Boko Haram terrorist organization in Nigeria. Since 1975, Kenya has kept track of a few terrorist incidents carried out by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group. Terrorist group Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the US Embassy bombing in Nairobi and the hotel suicide attack in Kikambala on August 7, 1998. Many of the Al-Shabaab terrorist operations had been stopped by the troops in a joint Kenyan-Somaliland operation. However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

According to a 2014 British Broadcasting Corporation assessment, 75% of the terrorist organizations Al-members Shabaab's are foreigners from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries, making up around 25% of its membership. Other attacks carried out by the Al-Shabaab group included the attack at the Garrisa University College, where about 145 people died, mostly students, and the attack on the West Gate Shopping Mall on September 21, 2013.

However, he pointed out that anti-terrorism measures taken in one nation might not be successful in another.

The Kenyan government has used both soft and strong techniques in its counterterrorism strategy. Kenya's government has used both military and non-military methods. The Kenyan government's counterterrorism strategy includes legislation changes, government force capacity improvement, and bilateral and global partnerships. The Kenyan military established the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in 1998, deployed to

guard the border with Somalia, pre-trained Kenyan youths to make it easier to access manpower during attacks, began construction on the perimeter fence to provide physical security at the Somali border, and increased budgetary provisions for defense. The Joint Terrorism Task Force was also established by the government.

The Kenyan government's non-military paradigm includes the creation of local security policies that encourage community members to participate and provide information on dubious characters in their neighborhood. Using Muslim preachers to spread messages devoid of extremism or violence, as well as seizing all of the assets of people who support Al-Shabaab in order to prevent money laundering. The government also made sure that the National Security Intelligence Service and the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance worked together. The National Counterterrorism Centre was formed by the Kenyan government, which also enacted the Terrorism Suppression Act in 2003.

The Kenyan government has been accused of concentrating its anti-terrorism efforts primarily in regions with a higher Muslim population. There have been allegations of human rights violations committed by the government, including incarceration without charge or trial, interrogation of suspects without cause, torture of detainees, and denial of access to family members. Because the arrests were only made as a result of the suspects' involvement in terrorist operations, it might be difficult to prove the claim.

Terrorism has also occurred in Algeria in the past. Algerian authorities have recognized groups including the Armed Islamic Group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the Islamic Liberation Front, and its offshoot Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as terrorist organizations. Since a number of these groups are affiliated with the group formerly known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the assertion that GSPC and later AQIM developed the know-how of counterterrorism must have been based on this information.

The counterterrorism policies of Algeria include hard power and soft power tactics. The development of a military intelligence service, the increase of the imprisonment time, the lowering of the criminal liability age to 16, and the creation of an interdepartmental task force with the mandate to combat terrorism were all components of the hard methods. Additionally, it involves a rise in the use of the death sentence, a military offensive against terrorists, and an apparent military deployment of roughly 4,000 soldiers to guard the borders with Tunisia, 75,000 at the Southeast frontier, and 50,000 in Libya⁹³. The deradicalization of remorseful Islamist militants and their encouragement to publicly condemn terrorism are components of the Algerian government's soft power strategy, as are the granting of amnesty to terrorists, the provision of employment opportunities for unemployed youth in government to deter them from terrorism, and the enlistment of young people in the military.

The monitoring of speeches by Islamic clerics to stop extremist behavior in society and the adoption of anti-terrorism laws for the prosecution of terrorist suspects are further components. The Algerian anti-terrorism law also outlines how to cooperate with foreign nations and extends detention to 12 days.

The military killed or caught roughly 157 terrorists, took weapons, ammunition, and drugs from them. The Algiers Criminal Court prosecuted around 62 terrorism charges and, as part of the amnesty program, pardoned 90,000 militants. Although the Algerian counterterrorism strategies have produced notable results, there is still work to be done⁹⁴.

The Nigerian government has used both soft and hard power strategies, just like Algeria and Kenya. The Nigerian government created the 7th division of the army, sent the military commanders to the battle zone, and sent troops to the northeastern region experiencing the crisis as part of its military plan. Security personnel have received

training in counterterrorism activities. The Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 and improved cooperation between Nigerian security forces and foreign security agencies, as well as increased budget for security operations, are examples of non-military tactics that have been adopted. Despite the government of Nigeria's commendable accomplishments in combating terrorism, Nigeria has nonetheless been accused of violating human rights in ways such as arbitrary killings, indiscriminate incarceration, and unlawful rationing of IDP camp residents.

2.1.15 Dynamics of Counterterrorism Policy Process in Nigeria

The extents of policies made by any state policies determine its sustainability or failure. A policy is a tool through which a state is steered. The Nigerian constitution of 1999 described security and welfare as the core responsibilities of the country. The development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram is potentially a path to active counterterrorism effort, peace, and security, and reduction of the threat of terrorism. Effective counterterrorism strategies provided a framework for tackling the terrorist and extremist threat that serves as an institutional system that brings all key stakeholders in government and civil society organizations together in a collaborative approach to take preventive, repressive and restorative measures for combating the threat of terrorism. A strategy is a comprehensive approach premised on the anticipated threat situation rather than reactive to address terrorism.

Nigeria practices a presidential system of government where the three arms of government are involved in the policy process. The executive arm executes, enforces and coordinates government policies to ascertain that they are implemented as designed or planned. The executive arm comprises security agencies, public servants, and civil servants. The legislature (National Assembly) makes the law and may overrule any decision from any of the security agencies by repealing laws, and this may affect

implementation. The judiciary interprets policies especially when it comes to their specific application. The National Assembly plays a significant role in the deployment of the troops and funds allocation for counterterrorism operations as prescribed by the Nigerian constitution⁹⁵.

The government can terminate or modify a policy that has or has not achieved its purpose. A policy can be to come to an end abruptly due to an evaluation outcome or modification of the system. Consequently, the policy cycle goes on in that form. Scientific researchers who consult for the government, courts and the parliament and international watchdogs can conduct the monitoring and evaluation. The oversight function of the legislature - National Assembly is a good example. The Nigerian government has made many commendable policies, but the issue is usually with successful implementation. The challenge associated with this is a lack of political will for policy implementation, inadequate workforce, ethnocentric dispositions, corruption, scarce resources, misplaced priorities, as well as the multiplicity of policies to tackle similar issues. In policy process, the policy statement is significant because it described the intention of a government which may be in the form of presidential orders, administrative rules and statutes, regulations, legislative statutes, and court opinions. Policy process involves a combination of inputs from the three arms of government; the legislature, executive, and judiciary⁹⁶.

The manifestation of the Boko Haram terrorist made the Nigerian government to make some policy decisions to fight the sect. These measures which were carried out by the government were implemented, monitored and evaluated for the purpose of modifications to suit current situations that bring to the fore the importance of making a holistic review of the functions of the arms of government in the policy process so as to have an in-depth understanding of the counter-terrorism policy process in Nigeria. The

three arms of government are essential in the policy process. The Nigerian federal constitution of 1999 section 305 allows the president to make some orders which may or may not need the consent of the National Assembly. For example, the president can declare a state of emergency anywhere if he discovers a threat to the security and peace of the country, but this declaration must secure the approval of the two-thirds majority of the parliament, however, if such proclamation fails to receive the support of the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, it ceases to exist⁹⁷.

The constitution permits the state of emergency for the first six months, but if the situation remains or peace is not restored, it can be extended by the president for another six months but requires the approval of the National Assembly. In May 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states which was extended two times but rejected by the National Assembly for the fourth time. The continued attacks by Boko Haram after the 18 months of the emergency rule necessitated the request for the extension of the emergency rule. The non-approval of the emergency rule by the National Assembly was a result of an evaluation of the earlier ones through an oversight function⁹⁸.

The policy of the suspension of telephone communication through the military in the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in a bid to decimate Boko Haram was a delegated policy. This was a policy made, executed, monitored and evaluated by the military. The drafting of the National Counterterrorism Strategy policy documents had input from the security agencies, the National Defence Council and National Security Council and the Ministry of Justice. In this situation, the three arms of government were involved in the monitoring and evaluation. Policies such as relocation of the military command centre, deployment of troops, and the establishment of internally displaced persons (IDP)

camps were strictly through presidential directives as well as administrative rules and regulations.

The legislature played significant roles in the making of laws, the passage of the annual budget, ratifying of international treaties, approval of the declaration of war and state of emergency, and endorsement of foreign loans. The Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 and its amendment of 2013 were passed by the legislature. The need to make Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011 and 2013 became pertinent from the need to tackle Boko Haram terrorist group with inputs from the security agencies, National Defence Council and National Security Council and Ministry of Justice before they were sent to the National Assembly for passage. A critical examination of the counter-terrorism policies in Nigeria shows that they were made in response to the Boko Haram menace.

2.1.16 Counterterrorism Policy towards Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

Defeating the danger of terrorism and making it impossible for terrorists and their allies to carry out terrorist actions are the two basic goals of counterterrorism policy. The Nigerian government has implemented a number of counterterrorism measures. While some strategies have been effective, others have not. The tactics could be divided into two primary strands, tactical and strategic, and involved the creation, use, and coordination of tools of state power such the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational⁹⁹. The terrorist organization Boko Haram no longer has a safe haven in Nigeria's northeast since it is unable to hold onto any territory there. A large number of its members, including its leadership, have died. To combat terrorism, the neighborhood has banded together with the security forces. The local populace freely provides information to law enforcement, military, and intelligence organizations. Those who provided covert support to the terrorist organization have come to see the consequences of their actions and are now working toward a solution.

The establishment of the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC), whose major duty is to create a comprehensive framework for the country's counterterrorism engagement, has enhanced the strategic counterterrorism policy of the Nigerian government bringing disparate and conflicting ideas into harmony.

In order to solve concerns with terrorism investigations, prosecutions, delayed trials, witness protection, and judge protection, the government overhauled Nigeria's criminal justice system. The Anti-Terrorism Act was published by the National Assembly in 2011 and updated in 2013. At the sub-regional, regional, continental, and international levels, the Nigerian government improved its bilateral and multilateral ties with allies. The Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU), with its headquarters in Abuja, was created as a result of collaboration between Nigeria and her close neighbors Niger, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon. The intelligence services of these five nations were able to exchange timely information relevant to tactical operations needs through this method.

The Multi-National Joint Task Force, which is now led by a Nigerian military general, was established as part of the Nigerian government's tactical counterterrorism policy. To combat the terrorist organization, a new division of the Nigerian Army (7th Division) was formed, with its headquarters in the northeastern city of Maiduguri. As a result, sizable troop contingents and military hardware were transferred to the Northeast Theater of operations. The administration urged security forces from different agencies to train together. To promote the fast interchange and sharing of real-time, useful intelligence for tactical operations, the government formed special intelligence cells. Through the collaboration of security and defense services, intelligence gathering and dissemination were combined¹⁰⁰. In May 2013, the government declared a six-month state of emergency in the three (3) worst-affected northeastern states, Adamawa, Borno,

and Yobe, to facilitate military counterterrorism operations. In November 2013 and May 2014, the state of emergency was extended for additional six-month periods; however, the National Assembly rejected the request to extend it. In order to communicate with the terrorist organization, the Nigerian government established the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the Northeast. The Committee on Proliferation of Small and Light Weapons was also established by the government to remove firearms from circulation that were in the hands of criminals. In order to address the region's economic difficulties, the administration has established the Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE). More recently, President Muhammadu Buhari ordered the Military High Command to move to Maiduguri in order to take charge of the counterterrorism operations; the order has been carried out. Additionally, the Nigerian government formed the Chief of Defence Staff's Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU).

With regional, continental, and international authorities, the administration has encouraged international cooperation and accords. One of the actions taken was the government's active engagement in the endeavor to rectify the flaws of both the 2002 implementation of the 1991 AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the overall international counterterrorism campaign. To work together and collaborate with the US under the auspices of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, the Nigerian government solicited the assistance of several West African nations (PSI)¹⁰¹. The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) is a project of the US State Department that seeks to fight transnational terrorism, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of weapons into the African nations of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.

The majority of the international laws pertaining to counterterrorism have been domesticated at the regional level by the countries in the West African sub-region under

the supervision of ECOWAS, the sub-regional authority. The sub-regional group also convened a number of meetings to coordinate its response to terrorism in West Africa. In order to maintain cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism, Nigeria engaged into bilateral agreements with all of its neighboring countries, including Chad, Benin Republic, and Niger. At the moment, there are cooperative border patrols among these nations, especially along

In order to gather and exchange security intelligence to support the Boko Haram counterterrorism operations, the Nigerian government entered into partnerships with other African nations. The governments of Algeria, Niger, Chad, Benin, Cameroon, Togo, and Mali, among others, have signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) and agreements with Nigeria's Security and Intelligence Services. Nigeria joined the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), a group created to combat terrorist and co-chaired by the United States and Turkey, in its inaugural year. The GCTF brings together a wide range of countries to discuss and exchange anti-terrorism tactics. Nigeria is currently collaborating with international organizations including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union, European Union, UK's DFID, and the United Nations (UN) to explore the global implications of the terrorist issues the nation is facing. Through bilateral and international cooperation, Nigeria has benefited from advice and assistance in capacity building as a result of these dialogues and collaborations, which have contributed to a better understanding of terrorism¹⁰². Terrorist attacks by Boko Haram continue to rise in spite of these measures. The terror group's members are now more dispersed because they were expelled from Sambisa Forest and other locations where they had previously resided. The group or terrorist organization, however, is structured into little cells in order to carry out terror strikes. Even with the improvement in security emplacement both in the air and on the

ground, the Nigerian government is currently having difficulty preventing or thwarting any terror strikes in the northeast of the country. Due to the country's open borders and the terror group's capability to create and utilize improvised explosive devices that are challenging to detect, the Boko Haram group has easy access to weapons. Technology advancements have helped the group recruit members and train them for terrorist actions while disseminating its ideology. As a result, the government must develop a comprehensive strategy to combat Boko Haram terrorism, and the security forces must be aware of the knowledge and resources needed to safeguard the nation.

To defeat the Boko Haram terror campaign, the counterterrorism strategies must be coordinated and integrated through a joint effort that takes both a long-term and short-term perspective. Since terrorism mostly stems from false information, exclusion, political alienation, and homicidal ideology, the long-term strategy will focus on excellent governance and representative democracy that will ensure political inclusion. The short-term strategy must stop Boko Haram terrorist networks from attacking, restrict the organization's access to weapons, forbid help from other terrorist organizations or rogue governments, and deny the group any territory inside the nation.

A specific set of responsibility criteria must serve as the foundation for the counterterrorism policy that will be coordinated and implemented. The goal of the counterterrorism strategy is to offer a comprehensive framework that combines the soft and hard power strategies. The coordination of the strategies will define each person's role and responsibilities, as well as those of the security organization involved in the counterterrorism effort, in order to deliver effective counterterrorism operations. The counterterrorism policy would include detailed expectations on intelligence gathering, target protection, coordination among government agencies, the involvement of non-

governmental groups and the media, as well as the government's role in investigating and prosecuting terrorist offenders¹⁰³.

The strategy should be all-encompassing, entailing the adoption of a comprehensive counterterrorism law, the growth of the security forces' counterterrorism capabilities, the bolstering of the multinational troops, and the government's provision of basic needs for the Nigerian populace¹⁰⁴. The counterterrorism strategy must increase the ability to identify, postpone, react to, and stop terrorist actions as well as terrorist communication. The counterterrorism strategy for the nation will be risk-based. A flexible counterterrorism strategy must offer comprehensive information that takes attack likelihood and defense strategies into account.

2.1.17 Counter-Terrorism Tactics under Goodluck Jonathan's Administration, 2011 – 2015

Nigeria's former president, Goodluck Jonathan who took-up position as “acting president” in 2010, became Nigerians president after winning the 2011 general election. As part of his agenda for a better and prosperous Nigeria, his counterterrorism tactics was clearly articulated. Jonathan's counterterrorism tactics were expressive under political, developmental and military tactics.

The political tactics of Jonathan was birthed with the popular understanding that in the north, Boko Haram was an expression of existing “unequal power and resource distribution at the national level”, believed not to be in the interest of the Northern region. Boko Haram issue was then perceived as an manifestation of legitimate grievances of the Northern youths in Nigeria. With this understanding by the Jonathan administration, they developed a technique to negotiate with the group so as to reach a compromise by way of an “Amnesty Program”. The issue of dialogue was premised on

the fact that the technique was effective when it was applied to the issue of the Niger Delta crisis, so there is a believe that it would also prove effective when applied on Boko Haram crisis. In April 2013, the government set up a 17-member Committee on “Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North”; this committee will identify and constructively engage key leaders of Boko Haram, and develop a workable framework for amnesty and disarmament of members of the group.

The Jonathan political tactics failed for three main reasons. Firstly, the growing skepticism among the Nigerian elites surrounding the desire of the government to handle the crisis owing to previous federal government failure to adhere to agreements reached between other groups.

Secondly, there was disappointment among the Northern politicians when the 2011 general election did not work in their favour. This election “did not favour the power rotation arrangement in the then-ruling PDP political party which was against a northern candidate”.

And thirdly, the fragmentation of Boko Haram into different factions, this led to a loose network of the Boko Haram, and it became hard to identify who to start a negotiation with, because the sect were in different faction, and each faction commanding their different numbers of followers.

The developmental tactics of the Jonathan-led administration was a socio-economic approach. This approach was to address the perceived root causes of terrorism in Nigeria (Poverty, illiteracy and Unemployment). The primary targets of this tactics were the army of Almajiri youth (this youths were Islamic “students who were destitute and vulnerable to criminal activities while pursuing their Islamic education”) to be properly educated and socially empowered. In 2012, this tactics spawned the

establishment of the “Madrassa-Model of Almajiri Islamic Education”, which is now popular in Northern Nigeria. The main objective of the transformation of the “Madrassa-Model of Almajiri Islamic Education” was to empower, re-orient the northern youths and also correct the thoughts process of the youths about the believe that “Western Education is a taboo”. Despite the tremendous outcome that the program promised, poor implementation was the ‘cancer’ that mitigated its success.

The military approach under the Jonathan-led government was the primary counterterrorism approach the military method was headed by a “Joint Task Force” (JTF), made up of the “Nigerian armed forces”, and the “Multi-National Joint Task Force” (MNJTF) that include countries in the Lake Chad region (Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin), and the “Civilian Joint Task Force” (CJTF) made up of indigenous “vigilante group” that were involved in “grassroots military operations”. The establishment of the JTF and the declaration of “a state of emergency in three states in north-eastern Nigeria (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) was a total declaration of war on Boko Haram”.

This approach was expected to be a great success following Nigeria's military prowess and records of multiply “successful peacekeeping missions in Africa”. Unfortunately, the reverse was the case. The Nigerian “military displayed gross incompetence in confronting the terrorists”; and this led to loss of huge number of military men and women. According to the Premium Times Report, January 10, 2016, the incompetence of the military attitude is attributed can be connected to different factors. First, the high level of “corruption that has bedeviled the defense budget for the purchase of weapons, this had a substantial negative effect on the military operations. The corruption also extended to unpaid salary of soldiers, obsolete weapons and lack of weapons.

According to the same report by Premium Times, about \$2.1billion earmarked for the operation and purchase of weapons was diverted by military chiefs and politicians.

Another cause of failure of the Nigerian military in the fight against terrorism under the Jonathan led government was the growing of the United States and some other international bodies who criticized the level of abuse of human rights in the country against civilians and victims by the Nigerian soldiers. This led to an arm sanction against Nigeria. The sanction by the United States made it difficult for the Nigerian government to purchase arms to enable it fight the terrorist.

2.1.18 Counter-Terrorism Tactics under the Buhari Administration

Buhari emerged as Nigeria's president in 2015 following his strong campaign message on the issue of insecurity and the fight against corruption which was seen as the 'cancer' mitigating the growth of Nigeria's economy and security challenges. The campaign mantra greatly worked in his favour. His record as military General in the Nigerian army boosted his campaign to earn him the seat of the president. In 1984 when he became the military head of state in Nigeria he successfully fought similar group of militias; also his “anti-corruption” crusade during the popular “War Against Indiscipline” (WIA) in Nigeria thoroughly advocated during his military administration was leverage for him to garner support and votes from Nigerians. Owing to the observation that corruption was deterring the progress against terrorists. his reliability and antecedent were perceived as being important and a reliable ground to defeat insurgency in the country.

In May 2015, Buhari emerged the president of Nigeria for four-year tenure. His tactics against terrorism was clearly military. Thus, his counterterrorism tactics is principally

military based. Buhari's military tactics against terrorist was built on two levels; “the diplomatic/multilateral” tactics and “internal military restructuring”.

When Buhari came into power, he saw the need to rebuild Nigeria's international image that was soared by previous administration; also to seek international cooperation and support to fight terrorism. According to Vanguard Newspaper June 11, 2015 report, the president Buhari traveled to Cameroon, Niger, and Chad “in other to strategize the building up of the capacity of the MNJTF to wage an effective campaign against Boko Haram”. Following another report, in June 2015, the president held a meeting of the “Lake Chad Basin Commission” (LCBC). During the meeting President Buhari on behalf of Nigeria donated \$100million to revitalize the “joint military operations”, with Nigeria leading at the front of the operation.

Also President Buhari sort for support from other countries in the West to cooperate with Nigeria on the fight against terrorism, following their frustration with former president Jonathan's administration. In Germany at the meeting of G7 in June 2015, Buhari took advantage of the meeting to involve world leaders for support and cooperation in fighting Boko Haram. In June, Buhari visited Washington on President Obama's request for discussions on rebuilding US-Nigeria relations on counter-terrorism. According to Reuter's report in June 16, 2015, the visit tremendously improved the bilateral relations between Nigeria-US and Washington pledged \$5million to Nigeria for the fight against Boko Haram. America offered to support Nigeria by way of technical training of personnel, and intelligence sharing.

Following the gross ineffectiveness of the military to effectively seize the war under the “Jonathan's administration”, Buhari sacked the heads of the Nigerian Armed Force, the National Security Adviser and replaced them with new authorities and personnel that he considered fit to do the job.

According to the President during his introductory speech, President Buhari broadcast the repositioning of the “operational base of the military” from the country’s capital to the epicenter of the crisis in Maiduguri, Borno State capital. Also the president upgraded “welfare packages and ensured prompt payment of the salaries and entitlements” for soldiers, this he believe would encourage the soldiers to put in their best and dedication.

Despite Buhari's bold counterterrorism tactics to ensure peace is restored in the country, the group continue to launch more attacks and outweighs the President’s tactics; owing to the fact that compromise proposal did not work out well. Former president Jonathan during his tenure, he open dialogue with Boko Haram on the foundation that if the latter lays down its arms, “it will grant it amnesty” but this met a brick wall because members of the sect remain faceless. “Boko Haram is not a registered organisation with a physical address and their press statements are usually sent to the media with hardly any trace”. There have been lack of will on the part of the group to negotiate, because they have splitted into smaller other groups. In March 2016, a statement issued by Abubakar Shekau the leader of a faction of Boko Haram “revealed that the sect is not willing to negotiate at all”. During the cause of the crisis, President Buhari accepted a swap negotiation with the group, this involve the swap of over 200 girls that were kidnapped from Chibok Local Government Area in April 2014.

Other challenges mitigating the success of Buhari’s counterterrorism tactics is the limited adherence to judicial orders. There are a hand full of individuals suspected to be terrorist, children and women, young men as well, detain in undisclosed places without being charged to court; which include the unlawful arrest and detention of leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and his wife Malama Zeatudden, former National Security Adviser to former President Goodluck Jonathan, Col.

SamboDasuki (rtd.) even with several court orders releasing the duo; unlawful arrest and detention without trial of Jones Abiri a Journalist suspected to be a militant, using the military force to arrest and detain 249 people suspected to be Boko Haram terrorists that include 34 children and 46 women.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The application of theoretical explanation fostered the understanding of the dynamics of terrorism and criminality in Nigeria. This study, therefore, apply these theories:

2.2.1 Systems Theory

Systems theory is not just used in the study of public policy, a subject of political science. Because general systems theory is interdisciplinary, it can be applied to phenomena studied in a variety of conventional scientific fields. It also applies to any system made up of interconnected parts and is not limited to material systems. In David Easton's books, the conception of systems theory is emphasised. A Framework of Political Analysis and An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, both published in 1957 (1965). This might be viewed as the moment the idea was put into practice in politics.

The political system is susceptible to a number of external influences, such as those from the environment or internal political events. The political system is a part of the environment in and of itself. The environment contains a plethora of social, economic, and political phenomena that act as forums for the presentation and eventual resolution of problems. In essence, the ecosystem is made up of several systems that live side by side.

These include the political, social, economic, and international systems, each of which has a set of related systems that, in some circumstances, can stand alone. Systems theory is predicated on the idea that all phenomena may best be understood by examining them as a component of a systemic whole rather than by studying them in isolation¹⁰⁵.

According to systems theory, the political system, one of the systems in the environment, produces public policy. He goes on to say that the term "system" denotes a recognizable group of social organizations and activities that work to transform requests into authoritative choices that need backing from the broader community. He goes on to claim that the word "system" also refers to how components of a system interact and how a system can react to forces coming from its environment in order to protect itself¹⁰⁶. According to a systems perspective, society is thought to be made up of a number of interconnected subsystems, the system of governance being one of them. Public policy can be based on this paradigm because the government is the main subsystem. A different approach to look about public policy is as a political system's response to environmental factors acting on it. This indicates, without a doubt, that the political system has the power to translate environmental and internal forces into public policy. Frequently, state institutions are used for this. This is supported by the fact that public policy operates in a context where it serves as the political system's response to demands emanating from that context¹⁰⁷. In the instance of Nigeria, the political system's response to the threat (including bombings and kidnappings) posed by Boko Haram was to implement counter-terrorism measures, such as a state of emergency, the deployment of troops, and other measures. Given that security is a major concern in governance, these responses may have helped the government maintain itself and keep the wheels turning. The issues that arise in society are translated into input (demands

and supports) that the political system's decision-makers can use to process them. The executive arm implements the outputs that the policymakers create in order to address social issues, but these sometimes lead to new demands because of flaws in the earlier outputs.

In line with this, the policy maker bases decisions on inputs from the outside world, such as community needs and issues. He goes on to say that decisions are made on how to solve issues or meet requirements through deliberation, compromise, and agreements; in other words, a policy (output) relating to the subject of the argument is made. The outcome of the adopted policy also provides the system with feedback. In other words, the feedback acts as a yardstick to evaluate governance. The feedback acts as the study's fulcrum as it aims to measure the effectiveness of the Nigerian government's efforts in combating the threat posed by Boko Haram. His diagrammatic presentation of systems theory, titled "A Simplified Model of a Political System," is as follows:




Figure 1: A Simplified Model of a Political System

Source: Systems Theory and Public Administration in South Africa¹⁰⁸.

Environmental forces, also referred to as inputs, have an impact on the political system. These can also be seen as transmissions from the environment to the political system's conversion stage. They may take the form of requests for resources, changes in policy, or support for or opposition to the acts of people in the political system. Any situation or occurrence that exists outside of the political system's borders is referred to as the environment. A society's values are determined by a complex of interconnected structures and activities known as the political system.¹⁰⁹ The system transforms inputs from the environment into outputs by acting on them through its structure and activities. Public policy is made up of the values that are authoritatively allocated as outputs. Services, material products, and behavioural regulation declarations, actions, and gestures that communicate to the public the outcomes of their requests are made available to the environment. Demands occur when individuals or groups take action to influence public policy in response to environmental conditions.

The feedback is a de facto component of the systems theory even though it is not shown in the graphic. The signals, demands, and requests that are unavoidably fed to the political system must be read, understood, and properly addressed. In order for the system to successfully achieve people's goals, decisions regarding these messages must be communicated through acceptable feedback mechanisms. He contends that feedback is essential and that the availability, quality, and flow of information and other influences to a system's actors and decision-makers determines its resilience to stress. He continues by saying that for a system to remain resilient over time, it needs to get sufficient feedback regarding its prior performance, which in turn shapes its future behaviors. According to Easton's idea, the feedback generates new demands that

compel the flow to complete its cycle once more. A new input and output that arise from an old input are intersected to form the feedback (the link that makes some outputs turn back to input). The evaluation of the effectiveness of governmental bodies is based on the input. Because they affect how the government tackles counterterrorism strategies in regard to the Boko Haram threat and the Nigerian state, the input has to do with Boko Haram's ongoing issues. An event where the government violently intervened to recover Northern Nigerian regions that Boko Haram had taken over. The surrounding area represents the international community, social institutions, and religious groups as well as the Nigerian populace. The political system of Nigeria is made up of the government and its institutions. Outputs are the measures that have been taken in response to the threat posed by Boko Haram. Among them are NACTEST, which announced the TPA 2011, TPA 2013, MLPA 2011, and MLPA 2012, among others. Demands include rallies, reports, public sentiment, and pressure group attitudes that have become stronger as a result of the obvious insecurity. Demand is included in the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 as one of its components because it is the responsibility of the government to enact laws that promote federation-wide peace, order, and good governance. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government to act. The basis for the support is citizens' duties to the state. For instance, a curfew has frequently been issued due to the violent operations of Boko Haram, and civilians have complied by staying indoors during those times and in those places. The several monitoring and assessment criteria utilized by independent bodies, academic research, and newspaper opinion polls, among others, constitute the feedback systems. Removing and resuming GSMC services in the impacted areas is a prime illustration of the feedback effect. The government's opinion that the withdrawal may have a negative impact on people in the North East's socioeconomic situation may have contributed to the restoration. The

legislative framework changes are unmistakable proof that the environment's response made the changes necessary. A state's response to requests improves the support the political system receives from the environment, which influences its output. A strong feedback mechanism ensures the political system's continuous stability. These requirements cover social, economic, and security infrastructures, assuring the political system's stability.¹¹⁰.

Commenting on the utility of the systems theory, the positive side of the systems theory makes enquiry into policy formation and significant aspects of the political process. That is, it explains how the political system is able to convert demands into public policy and preserve itself over time. A further strength of this theory was captured that the value of the system theory is found in the continuous feedback implied by utilizing the effects of policies as additional inputs to the system. He concluded that this paves the way for determining if a specific policy indeed has the effect intended by the policy maker which is a focal point of this study. As forth captured a shortcoming of the systems theory when he opined that it is more apparent as it is real and that it is poor in coping with complexity and dynamism. A weakness of the systems theory in the conversion of inputs to outputs by highlighting its unclarity. Partially, what this portrays is that the political system's insensitivity to issues of poor economy, corruption, social infrastructure, resource control and dictatorship may lead to the breakdown of the rule of law and consequently the political system¹¹¹.

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria requires the government to provide political, economic, social, and public safety and order services for its people. These commitments, meanwhile, are hardly ever fulfilled because doing so serves the interests of the ruling class. As a result, there is no openness and requests and suggestions are rarely taken into account. This is a result of corruption, long-term military control that

cut off Nigerians from the democratic system, ineffective bureaucracy, and tensions between different ethnic and religious groups. These appear to be the results of shoddy state institutions. Similar to this, it is believed that the breakdown of the structural balance between input and output is the reason why the Nigerian state is progressively slipping into failed status. He also said that because there is no longer any faith in the government, the political system is no longer supported by the populace and is even not the object of demand. As a result, there is little citizen participation in politics, raising concerns about the acceptance and effectiveness of the government's initiatives. The conquest of territory by Boko Haram is an illustration of the unfavorable consequences this has had. The fact that this idea has been criticized does not make it any less useful for our investigation. State fragility theory has been adopted as a complement to systems theory in response to criticism of how inputs are transformed into outputs. Examining the functions of the institutions involved in the conversion process will be possible thanks to this possibility. Transparency in the political system is obviously important, even when the entire process may not be made public for security concerns. These regulations were a result of environmental conditions. This study's second main focus is to offer proactive measures, and the feedback system has revealed the need for policy reform and adoption of new policies to end Boko Haram's reign of terror.

The Significance of System Theory to Counter Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria

Systems theory is the interdisciplinary study of systems, i.e. cohesive groups of interrelated, interdependent components that can be natural or human-made. Every system has causal boundaries, is influenced by its context, defined by its structure, function and role, and expressed through its relations with other systems. A system is "more than the sum of its parts" by expressing synergy or emergent behaviour. General systems theory is about developing broadly applicable concepts and principles, as

opposed to concepts and principles specific to one domain of knowledge. It distinguishes dynamic or active systems from static or passive systems. Active systems are activity structures or components that interact in behaviours and processes or interrelate through formal contextual boundary conditions (attractors). Passive systems are structures and components that are being processed. For example, a program is passive when it is a disc file and active when it runs in memory. In addition, it is not confined to material systems but applies to any whole consisting of interacting components. Systems theory also portrays public policy as an output of one of the systems in the environment which is the political system. Finally, system theory is a fundamental notion of general systems theory is its focus on interactions. The center in relationships lead to sustain that the behaviour of a single autonomous element is different from its behaviour when the element interacts with other elements.

2.2.2 State Fragility Theory

A political entity has the status of a state when it has a populace, a territorially distinct government, and the ability to interact with other states. These characteristics give a state sovereignty. On the characteristics of a fragile state, there is little agreement. This is due to the fact that fragility's degree is still a relative concept. However, there is consensus regarding the obligations of sovereign governments to carry out fundamental security tasks, ensure the socioeconomic well-being of their populations, and play regulatory and diplomatic roles.¹¹² A state can record either success or failure in relation to the accomplishment of its obligations. Fragility refers to a condition marked by declining capability and poor development and security outcomes. When a state cannot provide fundamental human security or establish the public goods and conditions required for advancements in human development, it is considered to be fragile. A state may not always be unable to carry out its obligations, but it may lack the

ability or the wherewithal to do so. This effectively captures the state's fragility and the government's shortcomings in providing the core governmental services to its citizens. State fragility has both causes and effects, and both are mutually exclusive since they create a vicious cycle. The causes of the state's fragility and its effects are one and the same. Fragile governance, economic disparity, poverty, violence, political instability, the permeability of borders, and poor state institutions are among the causes of a state's fragility. Effective state institutions are essential for addressing these causes and consequences of state fragility. In order to keep a state's fragility and intrastate conflicts under control, state institutions must be consistent. Institutions of the state include the legislative and executive branches as well as the judiciary, police, and non-governmental organizations.¹¹³ The entirety of state fragility theory implies that there is a distinction between a fragile and resilient state, which depends on how strong or weak state institutions are.

Understanding how weak the Nigerian state is by comparing it to other states provides a foundation.

The most widely accepted state fragility rating is that undertaken by the Foreign Policy Failed State Index and the Fund for Peace. Nigeria's position is shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Nigeria's Positions in the Failed State Index (2005 to 2015)

Year	Position	Number of Countries Rated
2005	54	76
2006	22	146
2007	17	177
2008	18	177
2009	15	177
2010	14	177
2011	14	177
2012	14	177
2013	16	178
2014	17	178
2015	14	178

Source: Fund for Peace (2015).

Failing state structure, violence and poverty are what Nigeria have been suffering from. The indicator for this rating in Table 2.1 is premised on social and economic indicators as well as political and military indicators¹¹⁴. Social indicators include mortality, IDP camps and challenges, violence and human capital development amongst others. The economic indicators include inter alia ratio of rich to poor, unemployment rate, access to services, and inflation. The political and military indicators include corruption, policing, small arms proliferation, militancy, Public service provisions, international assistance, legal action, procedures, etc. Nigeria has not performed well in terms of measuring up to the standard in having the sub-indicators appropriately accounted for, which makes these indicators for determining the state fragility there clear. This accounts for the country's ranking to be consistently rated less than twenty in 9 years out of 11 years ratings.

Nigeria has spent more than ten years remaining within this range. This is further justified by the ethno-religious bloodshed and political revolutions that have

confounded the nation since independence. Over 50% of Nigerians live below the poverty level of \$1 per day, with the North West and North East suffering the most. Health, education, water, sanitation, and other social necessities have all been negatively impacted by the appalling level of basic utilities provided.¹¹⁵ Since gaining its independence in 1960, the nation has experienced numerous wars and bloody battles, of which the Boko Haram insurgency is one. In Nigeria, there is also a lot of corruption. Nigeria's current issues are inexorably the result of underdeveloped state institutions, and their persistence weakens state institutions further. Violence is linked to Boko Haram. The majority of nations have a history of conflict, but whether that conflict will reveal a state's fragility depends on its capacity to deal with it quickly. These previously mentioned details about how the Nigerian government has failed to uphold its obligations to its population further demonstrate that Boko Haram is a result of the country's internal, political, socioeconomic, and to some extent, religious issues. In essence, the causes of Boko Haram's emergence and the state's institutions' inability to contain the sect are also to blame for the group's persistence. This explains why unstable states provide terrorist organizations with an ideal environment for their operations. The actions of Boko Haram and their operations in Northern Nigeria show this to be the case.¹¹⁶

Nigeria has no trouble coming up with admirable plans; the issue is almost always in the execution. These barriers to the efficient execution of policy depend on underdeveloped governmental institutions. The \$180 million Halliburton corruption scandal, which featured Nigerian state officials accused of receiving the money from a foreign consortium in order to gain a contract to build a liquefied natural gas facility, is an illustration of Nigerian institutional performance. Sadly, while the international collaborators have faced legal action in their home nations, the matter was quietly

dropped in Nigeria, where it is assumed that individuals allegedly engaged are still free to roam the streets.

The most recent is the concern over money set aside in the budget to buy weapons for the Boko Haram conflict. Military officers in active duty and in retirement, as well as their civilian collaborators, mishandled more than \$2 billion. These instances demonstrate how inadequate anti-corruption institutions are. It is also evident that the arms deal scandal has severely hampered the implementation of policy and is a major sign of weak institutions. According to systems theory, the functions of state institutions are reflected in the political system. The theory of state fragility appears to be relevant for determining whether institutions tasked with carrying out counterterrorism programs are weak or not. In order to get a more thorough understanding of why and how Nigeria's counterterrorism policies have fared, the explanation for its implementation in this study as well as the reasons systems theory have been explored.

2.2.3 Frustration-Aggression Theory

The Dollard-Berkowitz Cognitive Neo-association Model and the frustration-aggression hypothesis both provide examples of how frustration can lead to aggression. According to this view, the presence of frustration is a necessary precondition for the occurrence of aggressive behavior. In a different way, frustration precedes aggression. Baron and Richardson stated in 1994 that aggression is an action taken with the purpose to injure and can take both physical and non-physical forms, in contrast to frustration, which is considered as the obstruction of continued goal-directed behavior. A goal

reaction in this context refers to the last operation that reinforces an ongoing behavior sequence, while frustration is the obstruction of that response.¹¹⁷

Aggression of some kind is always a result of frustration. It also takes into account the response to such blockage. This implies that being frustrated entails having one's access to reinforcements prevented by a third party or by external factors, as well as having a frustrated reaction to this obstruction. One of the many possible reactions to frustration is the encouragement of some form of aggression. Frustration can lead to angry or aggressive behaviour in some cases. Nigerian political figures who operate behind the scenes may be frustrated by their inability to gain access to power, their failure to impose Islamic rule in northern Nigeria, or even youth unemployment as causes of violent attitudes like those brought on by the Boko Haram fundamentalist religious sect in that country's north. Whatever the cause, they have experienced some level of dissatisfaction in not being able to achieve their intended outcomes. The two theories' introduction is important since the second supports the first in a positive way. The mindset of some political and economic opportunists has provided a platform for acts of terrorism.

The theory's proponent highlighted key situations where a person or group will engage in conflict. According to them, attempts made by an individual to get desired outcomes, such as power, riches, social position, security, equality, and freedom, are thwarted or blocked, which results in frustration and conflict. Conflict has also been linked causally to increased expectations that aren't met. According to this viewpoint, friction or conflict results from unmet expectations among people who have previously suffered hardship or servitude but were suddenly promised better material circumstances or freedom.¹¹⁸

When people's hopes and dreams are not realized, the frustration-aggression theory explains why they become angry and aggressive. The Frustration Aggression theory, developed by John Dollard and his research collaborators in 1939, has since been expanded and qualified, but it still provides what seems to be the most common justification for aggressive behavior resulting from unmet demands. People tend to confront individuals they believe are to blame for thwarting their goals when expectation and achievement do not match. According to Ted Robert Gurr's relative deprivation thesis, "the bigger the disparity, however slight, between what is sought and what seems attainable, the higher the odds that rage and violence will result," this is the main reason it addressed. The fundamental justification offered by the frustration-aggression theory is that whereas realists and biological theorists consider that violence is a given as a natural reaction or ability, it is actually the result of vexation. The feeling of dissatisfaction may cause such a person to express his or her rage through violence that will be directed at those he or she holds responsible or those who are directly or indirectly related to them in a situation where the lawful desires of the individual are denied either directly or indirectly as a result of the way the society is structured. This idea is relevant to this study because the Boko-Haram terrorist group's attacks on the government and citizens of north-eastern Nigeria are evidence that frustration breeds hostility. Youths now take the law into their own hands by planting bombs, killing, and committing other violent acts of terror, as well as generally causing trouble for those they believe are to blame for their woes. This is because they have held up and seen that politics in the north east have been apprehended by a group of corrupt, fake Muslims, poverty has overtaken its people, and western education has become the norm..

Another fundamental tenet of the frustration-aggression theory is that all violence, whether it be domestic or international, has its origins in the frustration of the accomplishment of one or more actors' goals. That is, the irritation that results from not achieving one's own or a group's goals. Since the supply of essential human needs has always been insufficient to meet demand, every human conflict can be attributed to the impersonator's inability to meet its needs. Another fundamental tenet of the frustration-aggression theory is that all violence, whether it be domestic or international, has its origins in the frustration of the accomplishment of one or more actors' goals. That is, the irritation that results from not achieving one's own or a group's goals. Since the supply of essential human needs has always been insufficient to meet demand, every human conflict can be attributed to the impersonator's inability to meet its needs¹¹⁹.

Looking at the Boko Haram terrorist assaults in Northern Nigeria, one can say that the lack of access to a western education, poverty, the creation of unemployment, and societal injustices may have been the causes of terrorism in that region of the country. In this situation, hostility may arise as a result of being exposed to a circumstance that is so irritating as to make one feel unworthy and hopeless. Members of Boko Haram encounter difficulties, inconsistencies, and difficulties as a result of their failure to meet necessities of life including food, clothing, and shelter. He went on to say that "economic causes, including unemployment, resource waste, social impotence, and widespread corruption, are responsible for fostering the current period of violent unrest in Nigeria."¹²⁰.

It is crucial to remember that dissatisfaction can have other effects besides violence, thus it is not a given that frustration always results in aggression. However, the Frustration-Aggression theory was eventually dismissed, and the social learning and social identity theories went on to develop as a result of the lack of sufficient links

between aggression and other perceptions of human behavior. The main focus would be on the deprivation-frustration-aggression theory, with social learning and social identity theories serving as complements due to the limitations of the deprivation-frustration-aggression hypothesis. According to the deprivation-frustration aggressiveness theory, frustration from deprivation leads to aggression.

2.2.4 Linkage Theory

Linkage theory is associated with James Rosenau. Rosenau adopted the Linkage theory for explaining how a country's domestic issues or politics influence or are influenced by events in the international system. Rosenau explores linkage politics in his book "Linkage Politics; Essay on the Convergence of national and International Systems". The Linkage politics is a theoretical perspective which stresses the interdependence and interconnection between domestic and international systems. Here, the Linkage theory assumes the effect of insecurity in one country in West Africa is intrinsically linked to the other¹²¹. The imprint of the Boko Haram menace remains bold in the borderless West African States.

2.2.5 Conspiracy Theory

It is first necessary to define some key terms since many arguments about conspiracy theories originate with disputes over what counts as a conspiracy theory and what does not. First, we identify a conspiracy as a secret plot by two or more powerful actors. Conspiracies typically attempt to usurp political or economic power, violate rights, infringe upon established agreements, withhold vital secrets, or alter bedrock institutions. This definition goes beyond simple criminal conspiracies, such as

conspiring to rob a corner shop. Conspiracies such as the Watergate scandal do happen, but because of the difficulties inherent in executing plans and keeping people quiet, they tend to fail. When conspiracies fail or are otherwise exposed the appropriate experts deem them as having actually. Conspiracy theories are attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors¹²².

Other theories are:

2.2.6 Structural Theory

According to systems theory, the functions of state institutions are reflected in the political system. The theory of state fragility appears to be relevant for determining whether institutions tasked with carrying out counterterrorism programs are weak or not. In order to get a more thorough understanding of why and how Nigeria's counterterrorism policies have fared, the explanation for its implementation in this study as well as the reasons systems theory have been explored.¹²³ State is the primary player in structural theories of revolution, to elaborate further on this notion. The catalyst for popular revolutions is its standing. The key components that push a society into revolution are widespread discontent, elite disengagement, and a chronic crisis. The three most well-known proponents of the structural theory are Jacques Lacan, Roman Jakobson, and Levi-Strauss. According to the supporters, a particular cultural domain can be comprehended through a structure that is unique from both the organizations of reality and those of ideas. According to the structural hypothesis, behavior and structure are connected. People in this situation go through the process of socialization and grow reliant on the current social structures, but social structures are also being changed by their actions. This implies that social institutions serve as both a medium and a product for human activity. Giddens' fundamental justification for this

theory is because it unites two major schools of social thought. Structure is prioritized in the structural school, whereas the human actor is the main concern in the phenomenological approach. However, relative deprivation would be used for this study's purposes. According to the relative deprivation theory, "individuals' decisions to participate in collective action are motivated by sentiments of deprivation and frustration"¹²⁴. Sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer is credited with developing the relative deprivation theory. In other words, the transition in sociology from an emphasis on social reform to theory is exemplified by relative deprivation theory. According to Turner, sociologists employ the theory of relative deprivation to explain the genesis of social movements. A social movement is an intentional, voluntary effort to bring people together who work together to gain group influence and either make or stop change. According to the fundamental tenet of relative deprivation theory, people or groups experience deprivation when their existing circumstances are unfavorably compared to those of others. In sociology, the relative deprivation hypothesis is a perspective on social change and movements that holds that people participate in social movements to obtain opportunities, status, or income that they perceive other people to have but lack themselves. Political violence may result from this circumstance. Relative deprivation theory has gained popularity among professionals, which is an important point to note. The relationship between social movements and relative impoverishment has, however, drawn criticism from academics. There is a lot of indirect evidence connecting social movements to perceptions of relative deprivation. Experiences of relative deprivation may or may not always result in the formation of social movements and collective identities, whereas feelings of absolute deprivation unquestionably lead to feelings of discontent and ultimately efforts to impact social change. The relative deprivation theory's lack of individual attention is another drawback. Critics claim that

when employing relative deprivation, sociologists frequently just look at individual and societal relative deprivation while ignoring self-references.¹²⁵

2.2.7 Greed and Grievances and Human Security Theory

Theory can be seen as a 'set of carefully and logically used laws that are used to classify, clarify, explain and predict phenomena, a theory gives explanations to facts'¹²⁶. Collier Paul and Hoeffler Anke's (2000) and Mahbubu IHaq's (1994) theories of greed, grievances, and human security theory, respectively. To explain the origins and motivations of the violent uprising that sparked civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler created a theory. Their statistical evidence, they claimed, "pointed towards economic incentives as being the fundamental reasons of the emergence of violent rebellion." It was also examined using 1,000 fatalities annually as the baseline for civil war. Despite the criticism leveled at Collier and Hoeffler's greed and grievance hypothesis, which contends that "it is impossible to impose the type of generalization of civil wars that they attempted in their work" and that "civil wars are caused by a highly complex social process that greatly depends on the historical and regional context," the criticism is nonetheless valid. Therefore, it is crucial to research the origins of civil wars within the context of particular occurrences.

However, the avarice and resentment of Collier and Hoeffler are crucial in demonstrating the reasons behind terrorism in Nigeria. Violent rebellion and civil conflicts, according to Collier and Hoeffler, are mostly caused by economic incentives. The failure of the Nigerian government to provide its citizens with the necessities of life and the political class's greed in amassing wealth for themselves, which has widened the gap between the rich and the poor, are in fact the main causes of terrorism in Nigeria. This fact is never minimized in the case of Nigeria. Since they are being won over cheaply to fight for the lethal groups in Nigeria due to their inability to

support themselves, the poor are now easy victim to the incentives presented by terrorist organizations. According to Collier and Hoeffler, states that are prone to civil war typically depend heavily on the export of primary commodities, have a high proportion of young men who are unemployed and lack education, and experience a dramatic and abrupt downturn in their economies. This is particularly true of Nigeria, where there is a high proportion of youth unemployment and illiteracy who end up serving as tools for the murderous Boko Haram organization.

The human security hypothesis and its authoritative definition were first given by in ‘‘connection with the immediate post-cold war period and the new development agenda when he drew attention to the concept in the United Nation development program (UNDP) human development’’. ‘‘The concept of human security represents a departure from orthodox security studies, which focus on the security of the state. The subjects of the human security approach are individuals, and its end goal is the protection of people from traditional (Military) and nontraditional threat such as poverty and disease’’. It is an expansion of thought from just the security of the state to seeing individual welfare in all ramifications of life as being paramount in a state. This could be actualized by guaranteeing freedom from fear and freedom from want, where citizens’ lives are protected in terms of political, social, economic, environmental, and another aspect of life protection. That is what is also expected of the Nigerian government, to protect her citizens in all ramifications of life. This is to be done through the provision of basic needs of lives, and most importantly, economically reviving of those victims of terror attack in Nigeria, having lost all their belongings in the crisis, so that they can live a comfortable lives again as citizens, and not ends up being a tool in the hand of the deadly group Boko Haram. An idle hand is the devil's workshop.

2.2.8 Social Learning Theory

The social learning hypothesis was first put forth by psychologist Albert Bandura (1962). The social learning theory contends that rather than being innate or driven, violence is something that is learned through socialization. Aggressive traits are picked up through interactions in the home, classroom, and wider community. Social contacts promote focus and let repressed animosity toward economies out. This concept is vital, especially when an ethnic or religious conflict is at play. Social learning theorists have made an effort to understand how interpersonal interactions relate to sectarian hatred. To comprehend the psychological and cultural perspectives that contributed to the terrorist assault in Nigeria, he looks at them.¹²⁷

Social learning theory proponents assert that conflicts frequently spiral out of control as a result of the psychological, theological, and other cultural inconsistencies that form their basis. In terms of Islamic jihads and comradery with transnational Islamic extremists, other jihadists are motivated by religious authority. To put it another way, the terrorist acts carried out by Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Mali, and other Middle Eastern nations serve as an inspiration for people to research their operational tactics, which are then imported for use in domestic uprisings. Another intriguing theory is the social identity hypothesis. Henri Tajfel, a psychologist, developed this in 1998; it provides insight into the Northern Ireland conflict. The key principle of the philosophy is that we create our social connections. We transmit to our groups the essential human need for a sense of positive self-worth and self-esteem. The way things are arranged around us also depends on social comparisons between various groups. The concept of in-group and out-group is essential to this study. The social identity theory has helped social psychologists better understand how individuals differ in groups and how this difference manifests itself in observable patterns of group behavior. For instance,

family groupings' organizational structure places a great emphasis on ethnic identities. People in similar circumstances, such as extreme poverty, unemployment, societal injustices, and marginalized groups, may band together to fight a common enemy. Kinship groups are necessary for the development of in-groups and out-groups. This concept is particularly important when considering racial strife or social injustice. People are motivated to achieve their life goals and certain social expectations, but when these expectations aren't realized, anger sets in and can lead to aggression. Several investigations have been done on the level of security in the area. However, they had hinted in their response to past works on terrorism and the securitization of West Africa, an investigative focus away from the topic of indiscriminate use of brute force or simple combatant/battlefield-focused method taken to curtail the problem of terrorism in West Africa. It is crucial to critically analyze the idea of terrorism and other pertinent terminology in order to clarify concepts and reduce uncertainty, which is one of the requirements and characteristics of this project task. While the term "brigandry" suggests no political reason, the adjective "terrorism" does acknowledge the political incentive of those who engage in terrorism. When a rebellion has little backing, such as after it persists near the end of an armed struggle when the majority of its friends have conceded defeat, it may be referred to as brigandry, and those who take part as brigands. Terrorism has existed throughout history but only occasionally has any strategic significance in international affairs. At times terrorism was considered a secondary problem within a conflict between great powers. At other times, the insurgency has been strategically significant by threatening regional stability, and drawing subversives into direct conflict, ultimately causing complete disaster. To say that security challenge is the main issue threatening the survival of Nigeria is saying the obvious. In the last few years, the security situation has taken the turn for the worse.

Bombing, killing, mass murder, abduction, kidnapping and other crimes against humanity are on the increase in the country. The news of bomb explosions with indiscriminate killing by unknown gunmen is daily making the headlines of print and electronic media both domestic and international. Security, therefore, seems to have virtually collapsed as crimes become a permanent fixture of daily life in Nigeria while the state seems to “watch with a sense of helplessness, fear, foreboding and paralysis”¹²⁸.

2.2.9 Critique of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Theories

The extensive discussion of the concepts of new and old war can be used to derive conclusions about the parallels and distinctions between terrorism and insurgency, as the preceding section demonstrates. There are undoubtedly new forms of warfare, but they do not always fall under the umbrella term "warfare," rather they signify an increase in the severity of the actions of war. As a result, this study adopts the perspective that terrorism is an insurgency technique rather than a type of warfare. However, it does acknowledge the various perspectives, which eventually supports the various CI theories. More specifically, the discussion of CI and CT highlights the distinction (or lack thereof) between terrorism and insurgency. In this study, CI will stand in for soft power strategies, whereas CT will represent hard power strategies. CT, however, is utilized as the umbrella term.

There isn't a single counterterrorism theory (CT). However, the authors of *Theoretical Treatise on Counter-Terrorism Approaches* (2007), a project of the European Commission (EC), describe five major viewpoints that contribute in theorizing about CT: policy, international relations, hard power versus soft power, communications, and economic perspectives. These viewpoints provide broad and general frames for talking about almost all of the CT theory. Such broad classifications, therefore, run the risk of omitting crucial CT strategies that can stand alone as an analytical theory. The assertion

that terrorism has political motivations is a crucial place to start. Many definitions of terrorism emphasize the notion that terrorists espouse political objectives. This theory serves as the foundation for the claim made by certain academics that terrorists are logical decision-makers. In contrast, the new terrorism or new war experts portray modern non-state violent actors as irrational and deprive terrorists of any logic. Significantly, how we perceive terrorism affects how we plan our response. For instance, the logic of the war on terror is supported by many new war or new terrorism scholars. A war strategy is only one of numerous CT techniques, though. Using a military strategy, political solutions, the employment of law enforcement and judicial control, and educational methodologies are only a few of the six theoretical ways to combating terrorism (that involves counter-narrative and other countering violent extreme [CVE] approaches)¹²⁹.

Fundamentally, a war approach methodology poses a real risk of escalating violent conflict because there is little doubt that the government's response to a terrorist threat or actual act can intensify and prolong violent conflict (a response that a terrorist or insurgent group may have sought to provoke). The Just War principle may have provided guidance in conventional armed combat, particularly in earlier conflicts, but it is very difficult to apply the notion nowadays. To better understand terrorism, there will need to be major theoretical and conceptual change. It's possible that today's terrorist organizations won't adhere to the theory of civilian or non-combatant immunity. Attacking civilians on purpose is one of the main characteristics of terrorism. The distinction between insurgency and terrorism, as well as the idea of "winning hearts and minds," depend on the targeting of civilian lives and property. Insurgents depend on local support to win, whereas terrorists don't necessarily need to win over people's hearts and minds as evidenced by their attack on local citizens¹³⁰.

To develop a suitable CT or CI, this differentiation is crucial. For instance, it is crucial for governments battling dangerous armed groups to win over the local populace by addressing the underlying issues (basic needs) and encouraging coexistence between the local populace and the armed forces. He contends that such a strategy will aid in physically and politically isolating militants. This strategy will be more effective against insurgency than terrorism and is probably what the new terrorism experts mean when they reject the need to change people's views¹³¹. A new war supporter believes that in the fight against terrorism, civil society structures may be more effective than bureaucratic government and military structures. This argument for coordinating CI between the military and civilians is very similar to Kiras'. The concept of legitimacy, which refers to the need for those battling terrorism to "maintain the moral high ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy, and social justice," serves as the foundation for the significance of civil society structures in the fight against terrorism"¹³². States frequently take proactive and defensive actions, particularly when using the war strategy. These actions can take the form of pre-emptive strikes against terrorists' strategic locations as well as initiatives to fortify potential targets in an effort to prevent or reduce the harm caused by an attack. The expected positive outcome of such a strategy, however, may be undermined by unforeseen repercussions in the form of collateral harm, which might result in the intensification of terrorism. Therefore, it is feasible for states to respond in a way that is out of proportion and will help the terrorists. The risk is greater when a state is in charge (and when a war strategy is used) than when civil society is in charge or when local people and the government are working together. Responding states can isolate terrorist organizations from the community, deny them public support and recruit, promote defection, and ultimately

win the "hearts and minds" of the local population a requirement for CT/CI victory by involving civilians and civil society organizations¹³³.

Taking care of basic needs is a further means of achieving such success (or root causes). This entails addressing the preexisting conditions, which are primarily concerns of deprivation, such as poverty, inequality, social injustice, and political marginalization, which terrorists may use as justification for their violent activities. Even if the majority of academics concur that these issues do not always result in terrorism, they must nonetheless be addressed. It is imperative to address the underlying problems or root causes in order to ensure progress and equality as well as, more importantly, to eliminate the motivations for violent conflict¹³⁴. The literature on CT and CI can be divided into two categories based on the information presented above: a war model (hard power) and a non-war model (soft power). While a soft power strategy involves a variety of political solutions, including diplomatic and conciliation efforts, a hard power strategy entails a military solution or punitive tactic. Depending on how we define terrorism and, consequently, the terrorists, either strategy may be preferred. The distinction between CT and CI and between hard power and soft power is similar. While soft power is more closely related to CI, hard power is more closely related to CT and involves activities that include the offensive actions required to prevent, discourage, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism: State-building and CI, which concentrate on gaining the support of the local populace and advancing good governance, are examples of population-centric tactics¹³⁵. The hard power measure is intended to be a war paradigm and can be applied both offensively via the employment of airstrikes and other types of fighting and defensively through the use of preemptive attacks. This strategy has drawn criticism for its propensity to be overt and disproportionate, frequently causing a backlash that undermines the legitimacy of the

government and, occasionally, shifting public opinion in favor of the rebels. The claim that states' excessive reaction is counterproductive, however, is not always true.

For example, non-military tactics like political, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic measures will be most successful in the early stages of an insurgency.

However, generally speaking, a soft power strategy is more likely to be successful in CT/CI than a military strategy. For instance, a military strategy will be inappropriate in that circumstance and at that point if greed, rather than a clear political objective, is what motivates the insurgency. When an insurgency has turned into common criminal conduct, it is preferable to deploy law enforcement (police) rather than an armed fighting strategy. However, in cultures where real grievances exist, law enforcement and intelligence measures may not be sufficient in preventing and resolving violence. In such a situation, an economic strategy may be more effective because "companies founded and jobs produced are as much 'indicators of success' as insurgents killed or intelligence delivered"¹³⁶.

However, an economic strategy goes beyond just reducing relative hardship. Notably, increasing research shows that poverty and inequality do not always lead to conflict, contradicting the relative deprivation or grievance-frustration thesis, which has received minimal support in the literature. The fact that conflict players frequently exploit it in order to further their own specific objectives ensures that it remains relevant as an analytical concept of conflict. According to proponents of the new war and new terrorism, economics is a more significant factor than politics in determining why conflicts occur because violent conflict players use economic conditions for their own selfish interests. By focusing on the terrorist group's financial sources, such as by freezing the assets of terrorists and those who support them and by making it impossible for them to resell their stolen goods on the black market, the state may also

weaken the terrorist group's financial capabilities. However, the success of economic sanctions and other CT policies designed at reducing the terrorists' financial clout necessitates multinational cooperation. Further, restricting movement and goods through the denial of visas may be less effective because some terrorist organizations, particularly those operating in developing nations and unstable states, do well to avoid conventional banking or profit from the underdeveloped and weak financial institutions in those regions¹³⁷.

Both the message and the messenger's trustworthiness and character are crucial. It is equally crucial to target particular audiences with the communications. The counter-narrative shouldn't ignore the history, myth, and, most importantly, the real grievances that the violent extremist organization (VEO) has used to frame its violent campaign¹³⁸.

2.3 Empirical Review

The formulation and implementation of well-articulated counterterrorism policies have high-level performance and effectiveness consequences for counterterrorism initiatives, according to recent studies of counterterrorism methods. This serves as rationale for the analysis on Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy including Boko Haram from 2009 to 2015.

Research also supports the idea that counterterrorism should be comprehensive, spanning prevention, detection, intelligence collecting, and target hardening for terrorists. Therefore, the actions taken will determine whether a counterterrorism plan is successful. Hard power and soft power should both be used in the strategy. While hard power encompasses the use of the military, law enforcement tactics, and legal processes, soft power includes the employment of public awareness campaigns, education,

economic reforms, good governance, and advocacy projects. The strategies used by both soft and hard powers to combat Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria are clear. The military strategy for combating terrorism includes the employment of military action, peacekeeping missions, military aid to the civilian population, and military support for military equipment¹³⁹.

Security of its residents and any nationals residing in its territory is the first responsibility of any competent government. According to the Nigerian Constitution, it is the duty of the government to guarantee the safety and wellbeing of its citizens. Although the Nigerian government has passed several laws to address the nations numerous security issues, they seem ineffective and insufficient. Right from 1966 when the Nigerian Civil War started, the Federal Government of Nigeria has been proactive in protecting lives and properties of its populace from all forms of crimes. After the bombing on June 16, 2011, of the Nigerian Police Headquarters, Abuja, the President of the Federal Government of Nigeria gave an order to the Inspector General of Police to reappraise the activities of Boko Haram and curtail the menace nationwide. More aggressively, Boko Haram continued to commit atrocities and wanton killing of innocent individuals as well as the destruction of lives and properties in Borno, Bauchi, Kaduna, Niger, Yobe states, and the FCT of Nigeria. The Federal government of Nigeria took some actions to address this security challenge¹⁴⁰.

The Nigerian government increased the security forces' overseas training and retraining, particularly for the military and police in antiterrorism operations and bomb detection. To combat the terrorism of Boko Haram, the federal government offered cutting-edge technology. The federal government started a campaign to increase the number of employees in all of the nation's security services. The Joint Task Force's deployment to Nigeria's North-eastern state was increased by the federal government. The government

also instructed the security forces to begin prosecuting those responsible for the extrajudicial assassination of Mallam Mohammad Yusuf, the previous Boko Haram leader. Due to allegations of excessive use of force and violation of the rules of engagement, the government was asked to order the departure of security forces, particularly the military, from the impacted state in the northeast of the country. However, the administration refused¹⁴¹. Other actions included Nigeria's request for the United Nations and other international organizations to understand that the allegations of extrajudicial killings by Nigerian troops stationed in the north-east were being investigated and those found to have been involved would be charged and prosecuted. An eight-member committee was formed by the federal government to look into any instances of insecurity in the impacted north-eastern region of Nigeria. In order to communicate with the terrorist organization Boko Haram, the government established a team in April 2012. However, the Boko Haram group shunned the team. Because of their alleged incompetence and to reassure Nigerians that the government was in control of the situation and that the terror group would be decisively dealt with, President Jonathan dismissed the Minister of Defence and Minister of State for Defense, the National Security Adviser, as well as some Military Service Chiefs. Three north-eastern states Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe were placed under a State of Emergency by the Nigerian federal government in May 2013¹⁴². The terrorist organization Boko Haram is continuously expanding despite these attempts. The terrorist organization's members are now more dispersed because Nigerian soldiers drove them out of Sambisa Forest and other locations they had previously controlled. Additionally, the terrorist group is structured into tiny cells that conduct terror strikes. Even with the improvement in security emplacement both in the air and on the ground, the Nigerian government is currently having difficulty preventing or thwarting any terror strikes in

the northeast of the country. Due to the country's open borders and the terror group's ability to create and use undetectable homemade explosives, Boko Haram has easy access to weapons. Technology advancements have helped the group recruit members and train them for terrorist actions while disseminating its ideology. As a result, the government must develop a comprehensive strategy to combat Boko Haram terrorism, and the security forces must be aware of the knowledge and resources needed to safeguard the nation.

A specific set of responsibility requirements must be included in the counterterrorism policy, which also needs to be coordinated. The counterterrorism strategy shouldn't be characterized by ad hoc tactics, but rather by a comprehensive framework that combines both soft and hard power strategies. It must go beyond simple responses that just treat the symptoms of Boko Haram terrorism in order to create the capacity to respond to it¹⁴³. The Nigerian government's first strategies must be supported by the constitution, and all actions taken to combat Boko Haram must be motivated by the constitution. The synchronization of the approaches will define the roles and duties of each person and security organization involved in the counterterrorism activities for active operation. The counterterrorism policy will also include guidelines for obtaining intelligence, protecting targets, coordinating efforts among government agencies, utilizing non-governmental organizations and the media, and investigating and prosecuting terrorists¹⁴⁴.

Boko Haram, an Islamist fundamentalist who believed that western education was impermissible, is credited with starting the insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. In their initial assault, Boko Haram claimed numerous lives and destroyed property worth millions of dollars in the Northern region of the country in September 2010. Northern Nigeria had a wave of insurgency-related violence that was mostly directed at

government employees, security forces, Muslim politicians, traditional Muslim religious leaders, and Christians.


There have been more indications of international cooperation between Boko Haram and terrorists outside of Nigeria since August 2011, including in the border region of Borno State, northern Mali, the Sahel, Somalia, and other Muslim-majority nations. These linkages have allowed Boko Haram, which was referred to in 2009 as a "machete-wielding mob," to match and even surpass some al-Qaida affiliates' capabilities while also blending al-Qaida ideology into the locally motivated reasons for the conflict in northern Nigeria¹⁴⁵. For instance, 100 Boko Haram militants bolstered MUJAO's positions in the fight for Gao in Mali, and Boko Haram assisted MUJAO in a September 2, 2012, vice-consul execution-related raid on the Algerian consulate in Gao. Additionally, Boko Haram assisted MUJAO, AQIM, and Ansar Eddine in their January 8, 2013, attack on Kona, central Mopti region.

At least 19 persons were killed at an Abuja bus stop on May 1, 2014, in a vehicle bombing. 2014's summer has been particularly violent, with bombings, killing sprees, and mass shootings occurring almost regularly. Human Rights Watch estimated in July 2014 that 2,053 individuals had been killed in 95 distinct Boko Haram-related incidents in just the first half of 2014, but the actual figure is probably substantially higher. The fact that our borders are open and Boko Haram has taken use of nations like Chad, Niger, and Cameroon as locations for habitation, training, transit, attack planning, and recruitment may not be unrelated to their unprecedented actions. In addition to other violent ties, Boko Haram appears to have a "diplomatic" presence in Saudi Arabia. A team from the Nigerian government led by General Muhammed Shuwa and National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki met with a Boko Haram faction commanded by Abu Muhammad in Mecca in August 2012. However, President Jonathan has ruled out

further discussions with this group on the grounds that "there can be no dialogue" with Boko Haram due to its "faceless" nature"¹⁴⁶.

Al Qaida has played a significant role in inciting conflict in Iraq amongst various sects and ethnic groupings. In that latter capacity, it operates against the local populace and, unlike insurgencies, is unable to solicit local support. It is a fact that this kind of terrorism lacks local support, whether it is targeted at the local populace, the local administration, or a foreign occupation. That explains why terrorist movements are far shorter-lived and less successful than insurgencies and makes dealing with terrorism significantly easier than dealing with insurgencies¹⁴⁷.

2.4 Conceptual Framework/Model



2.5 Summary of Literature Gap

Studies have demonstrated that terrorism cannot be defeated solely by military means. Coercive counterterrorism tactics have frequently had unfavorable effects by inciting greater violence and triggering humanitarian crises. Non-military methods are becoming accepted as a more viable means of eradicating terrorism's fundamental causes and achieving a durable peaceful end. Political negotiations and grassroots development define the strategy. Programs for deradicalization, disarmament, recovery,

and reintegration are also included. In order to combat terrorism, Nigeria established a non-military strategy in 2015. This came after complaints about its primarily military-based strategy. The plan was to add to its overexerted weaponry in the northeast. This study was particularly concerned with the de-radicalization strategy implemented by the Nigerian government to combat Boko Haram. The program's conception and execution have drawn harsh criticism for its structural weakness and role in the issue of violent extremism. With a focus on the issues and difficulties encountered in the de-radicalization and reintegration programs for former terrorists in the country's north-eastern region, this study seeks to determine what steps might be made to strengthen the de-radicalization process.

Beginning in 2013, Nigeria adopted a conciliatory stance toward the violence in the region of the north east. The Boko Haram commanders were the subject of negotiations by the Goodluck Jonathan administration to establish a framework for amnesty and disarmament.

But the leaders of the group refused the amnesty, frustrating the movement. Despite the rejection, a news organization called "Countering Violent Extremism" was established. "National Security Corridor" was its codename. Its goals were to address the underlying factors that lead to Boko Haram recruitment and provide a procedure for rehabilitating group members who leave. The Buhari-led administration changed the nation's security architecture in an effort to fulfil its commitment to eradicate terrorists in the north-eastern region. Redesigning the national security corridor was one of them. A new de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program was also the result of it. The "high-risk" and "low-risk" types of defectors were discovered by the program, code-named "Operation Safe Corridor." High-risk defectors, who are thought to be the toughest combatants, would still face charges after leaving. Those with a less violent

history were classified as low-risk. They were to go through a rigorous de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program. The workout was broken down into a 52-week schedule. It comprised basic education, career training, and deradicalization therapy. Before being reintegrated into society, religious re-education was also incorporated. The Bulumkutu Rehabilitation Center in Maiduguri, Borno State, and a camp in Mallam Sidi, Gombe State, respectively, are where the program is carried out.

There are male defectors at the Mallam Sidi camp. Women and children are housed in the camp in Maiduguri. 601 repentant terrorists have graduated from the Mallam Sidi camp as of the time of the research (2019–2020), whereas 1,935 have been freed from the female camp in Bulumkutu.

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Chapter Three

Methodology

This chapter is about the research design of this study. The chapter discusses research design, study population, sampling techniques, research instrument, method of data collection, and method of data analysis

3.1 Research Design

The research design adopted for this study was descriptive and exploratory. In survey research, data are collected from a population sample to discover the relative incidence, distribution, and interrelations of sociological and psychological variables. This type of research usually focuses on people, their vital facts, and their beliefs, opinions, attitudes, motivations, and behaviour. Survey research allows for an accurate description of an existing phenomenon. The utilisation of a descriptive methodology allowed us to gather and analyse information from an exploratory perspective.

The exploratory study tends to be more suitable for investigations that seek to gain familiarity or new insights on phenomena and to find out more about issues where there is little empirical documentation or one shrouded in secrecy and silence though suspected to be affecting many members and aspects of society. It is also applicable to subjects that are relatively new, understudied and hitherto unknown or poorly understood. The choice of this design is informed by the fact that the subject matter, the Dynamics of counterterrorism in Nigeria, is highly understudied. The concept of counterterrorism and Boko-haram are primarily misunderstood and neglected by the authorities.

3.2 Population of the Study

The sampled population for this study were people (indigenes and settlers/migrants) who have lived in the communities for over fifteen (15) years were well versed in the

history of the communities and practically experienced any violent conflicts in their respective communities for both quantitative and qualitative studies. The population of the study comprises One Hundred and fifty (150) participants. The people that participated include scholars, security personnel, repentant Boko Haram members and commanders, citizens in the war-torn/terrorised communities and Internally Displayed Persons (IDPs). Adult members (i.e. citizens in the war-torn/terrorised communities and Internally Displayed Persons) were selected for focus group discussion (FGD), and the selection was based on homogenous factors (i.e Age and sex).

Scholars, security personnel, repentant Boko Haram members and commanders were selected for in-depth interview (IDI) as a filter for biases, falsehood, and exaggeration from the data elicited from the communities. This was based on the fact that scholars and security personnel are more likely to present balanced accounts and arguments of the issue under investigation than indigenes of the communities whose responses may be embellished with popular opinions held by their communities on the issues.

Specifically, the population earmarked for this study include 150 participants and they include the following:


- i. Members or citizens of the communities
- ii. Members of the Security Agencies
- iii. Repentant Boko Haram members and commanders
- iv. Victims of Boko-Haram
- v. Internally Displayed Persons
- vi. Scholars/Academician

3.2.1 Study Location

A local government official and the state's information commission told Reuters that Boko Haram insurgents have taken over several communities in Nigeria's including

Borno, Zamfara, Kaduna, Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, Yobe, and Maiduguri, by giving villagers money and enlisting them into their forces to fight the government. Borno state is a state in the north east geopolitical zone of Nigeria bordered by Yobe to the west, Gombe to the southwest, and Adamawa to the south while its eastern border formed part of the north border with Cameroon, its northern border forms part of the national border with Niger, and its northern eastern border forms all of the national border with Chad, being the only Nigerian state to border three foreign countries, the state consists of 27 local government areas with a population of an estimate of 5 million.

The presence of the Islamist group in Niger state, which borders the federal capital territory, could signal a worrying spread at a time when the military claims its counter-insurgency efforts are effective. The Islamist group is typically concentrated in the northeast of Africa's most populous nation. Since 2009, Boko Haram has launched an insurgency under the slogan "Western education is forbidden." More recently, its spinoff, Islamic State West Africa Province, has joined the fight. According to a United Nations estimate, the violence has resulted in up to 350,000 deaths and millions of displaced people. According to the official website of Niger state, Shiroro is 4,700 square kilometers in size and home to 331,000 people. Muhammad Sani Idris, the information commissioner for the Niger state, revealed that Boko Haram fighters had entered the state after first being mistaken for armed robbers. The state administration and security agencies, according to Idris Bada (a Member of the Security Agencies), have managed to stop the spread, he claimed. The army reported last month that about 6,000 Boko Haram fighters had lately turned themselves in, attributing the development to the military's counterinsurgency operations.



3.3 Sample and Sampling Technique(s)

This study targeted Territory where Boko haram insurgency was found in Nigeria. Data were collected through e-mail Whatsapp, Phone interview and so on by conducting in-depth interviews with those who were involved in the development and implementation of the counterterrorism strategies towards. This was in tandem with the protocol of qualitative research that necessitates a robust data collection process and answers questions such as how and why of a decision-making process. This qualitative approach provided a wide range of perceptions from these people as it supported a naturalistic study that seeks an in-depth understanding of social phenomena.

3.4 Description of the Research Instrument(s)

The researcher used the interview instrument as the primary source of data gathering through self-designed questionnaire. Interviews are used to get participants to express their perceptions and experiences. This instrument allowed the researcher to connect with participants and enabled them to have a robust and broad discussion on the

phenomenon of study. The researcher developed and conducted the open-ended interview questions. This approach was flexible because it allowed the researcher to follow the participants' line of thought while still beginning with a prearranged question framework.

The approach also allowed the researcher to observe the participant's nonverbal conversation. The duration of each interview was a minimum of one hour. In every interview, the researcher asked questions from the participants and audio recorded their descriptions. The researcher replayed the recorded responses to have a clear understanding of the participants' responses. The open-ended interview questions which were developed based on researchers experience and searched literature are in the appendix

3.5 Validation of the Research Instrument(s)

Because the researcher serves as the primary tool for inquiry and research in a qualitative research study, credibility is a problem. The researcher had a significant hand in every aspect of the qualitative research, including the interviewing and data collection as well as the interpretation, which was subject to prejudice. Through a strict and organized approach and self-aware study methods, the researcher maintained reliability. For qualitative research to be reliable and beneficial, the procedure must be rigorous. Credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability are necessary to provide reliability and validity. For findings and conclusions to be accepted as reliable, the methods used must be demonstrated to be rigorous. The techniques employed should be rigorous and may include categories, member verification, peer debriefings, and outcomes confirmation. To increase credibility, the researcher employed categories, triangulation, and member checking.

3.6 Reliability of the Instrument(s)

When there is sufficient, rich evidence to support the findings of a study, it is credible. The results of a qualitative investigation must be internally consistent and accurate with reality.

Any credibility issues arise when a researcher is prejudiced. In gathering the data for this study, the researcher was impartial.

To ensure that the results were legitimate, the researcher recorded and examined the participants' responses. The researcher used a variety of techniques to support or triangulate the results. The researcher cross-checked the data against the accessible records as well as the information provided by one interviewer with that of another. The case study gave the participants the opportunity to accurately voice their opinions regarding the conception, development, and application of the counterterrorism policies aimed at Boko Haram terrorism from 2009 to 2022. We only contacted and interviewed those who had knowledge of the study's phenomenon. Since the researcher's goal was to gather information about the process of developing and implementing counterterrorism plans against Boko Haram terrorism, meticulous analysis was not a problem.

3.7 Administration of Research Instrument and Method of Data Collection

Data were gathered through interviews and crisp, clear recordings. The voice recorder on the researcher's phone was used. The researcher scheduled meetings with the people who had been chosen, and she asked for a minimum of an hour from each of them. The interview location was left up to the participants, who were free to choose among their homes, workplaces, or favorite eateries. Interview subjects with extensive understanding of the study's subject were given open-ended questions. Each participant's interview was launched with the procedure questions. The follow-up

questions allowed for an in-depth discussion of the case study and provided clear guidance for how to conduct the interviews.

However, not every protocol question was asked of every participant; only those that were pertinent to each person's experience and involvement in the counterterrorism strategy against Boko Haram were. This procedure resulted in a lengthy discussion. To further explain and throw light on the topic of discussion, the researcher did Skype interviews, sent emails, and personally interacted with the participants in person.

In Yobe State and the Federal Capital Territory, the researcher conducted her research.

The researcher will be able to connect with many of the participants thanks to my background as a participant observer. Due to their comprehensive awareness of the counterterrorism strategy against Boko Haram and their ability to see the research from the viewpoint of a student seeking information, the researcher carefully chose the research participants. Threats to the researcher's legitimacy and moral dilemmas were addressed.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

In this study, content analysis was the method of data analysis. Using content analysis, the researcher created relationships and meanings from the data protocol framework. Summative content analysis, direct content analysis, and conventional content analysis are the three methods used in content analysis. A theory is defined at the beginning of a direct content analysis, and code is defined both before and during the analysis of data. The pre-list of codes was generated with the aid of the proposed theory and pertinent data. In order to code the data, the researcher used NVivo and direct content analysis. The case study's collected data were analyzed using standard content analysis techniques derived from open-ended questions and interpreted using the data protocol framework. The information the participants gave.

Chapter Four

Results and Discussion

Introduction

In order to develop strategies that would effectively lessen the impacts of terrorism and put an end to it in Nigeria, the study's main objective is to examine the tactics used by Nigerian counterterrorism agents and agencies. Understanding the strategies used by these agents and the counterterrorism agencies in the overall attempts to establish efficient strategies to stall terrorism in Nigeria fills a gap in existing research on counterterrorism. This is due to the global imperative to manage and eradicate terrorism. The researcher uses a thematic qualitative research strategy as the main method for this investigation in order to uncover the participants' mental perceptions about the topic. In this chapter, the study environment, participant demographics, participant recruitment, data collecting, data analysis, and procedures for guaranteeing reliability are all described.

4.1 Data Presentation

The findings presented in Chapter 4 are consistent with the primary research question, which is: What tactics are used by Nigeria's counterterrorism authorities to neutralize terrorists, deradicalize them, and maintain the peace, and how effective are they?

Four major themes and seven subthemes on participant experiences surrounding their roles in counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria were developed in line with the research question following the thorough analysis of participant interview transcripts, development categorization of nodes, and development of the main themes summarizing the concept of participant experience.

Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist nightmare



Boko Haram leader
Abubakar Shekau



Founded	2002
'Boko Haram' means	'Western education is a sin'
Aim	Establish an Islamic Caliphate in northern Nigeria

Type of target


- Police barracks (for weapons, explosives)
- Prisons (to release fighters)
- Banks (for money)
- Construction sites (for explosives)
- Villages (for forced conscripts, to establish bases)
- Markets ('un-Islamic')
- Schools ('un-Islamic')
- Churches ('un-Islamic')
- Mosques ('not jihadist/salafist enough')

Type of attack

- Suicide attack (including using children)
- Car bomb
- Kidnapping
- Armed ambush
- Targeted assassination



13,000+ people killed
1.5 million displaced
 by Boko Haram attacks since 2009



Source: Nigeria Watch, Nigeria Security Network, Nigeria Security Tracker, NigeriaCOIN



4.1.1 Demographic Data of Respondents

The researcher uses the telephone to conduct interviews with certain participants who are now engaged in fight with terrorists in the north-eastern region of Nigeria, where there is a high presence of terrorist activities, due to the risk of traveling to areas with intense terrorist activity. Some participants voluntarily agreed to have phone interviews. The researcher's follow-up method with participants comprised phone calls, emails, and in-person visits that allowed participant transcript reviews and data interpretation checks.

The demographic of interest for this study included participants who are security strategy policymakers, commanders of troops directly involved in the war against terrorism, as well as former terrorist group leaders and victims of terrorism in Nigeria.

The researcher's participant criteria, which allowed for a representation of any age group, gender, and expertise with counterterrorism methods, were met by 40 Members or citizens of the communities, 30 Members of the Security, 20 Agencies, Repentant Boko Haram members and commanders, 20 Victims of Boko-Haram, 20 Internally Displaced Persons, and 20 Scholars/Academicians. Participants came from a variety of geographical places, ethnic and religious movements, and military formation commanders who had engaged in combat with terrorists in northeast and southern Nigeria. The individuals' combined years of experience, excluding the victims, ranged from 18 to 30. The region did not know any of the participants before the interview.

Table 4.2.1: Participant demographics Table

S/No	Participant	No Stipulated	No Interview	No Useful
1	Members or citizens of the communities	40	35	33
2	Members of the Security Agencies	30	20	18
3	Repentant Boko Haram members and commanders	20	15	12
4	Victims of Boko-Haram	20	16	14
5	Internally Displaced Persons	20	14	10
6	Scholars/Academicians	20	9	6
	Total	150	109	93

Source: Field Survey 2022




Figure 4.1: Initial word frequency query for participant interview transcripts

4.1.2 Demographic Data of Respondents

Participant Statistics the demographic of interest for this study included security strategy decision-makers, commanders of troops directly involved in the war against terrorism, former terrorist group leaders, and victims of terrorism in Nigeria. The set participant criteria, which allowed for a representation of any age group, gender, and expertise with counterterrorism techniques, were met by ten counterterrorism agents, three former terrorists, and two victims of terrorism. Two participants who are now fighting terrorists in the northeastern portion of Nigeria, where there is a high concentration of terrorist activity, were interviewed by the researcher over the phone. One more participant was voluntarily interviewed over the phone. Telephone to make the interviews convenient and comfortable for the participants, these personalized settings provided much-needed privacy by removing all types of interruptions and diversions. Telephone calls, email exchanges, and in-person meetings that enabled participant transcript reviews and data interpretation checking were included as part of my follow-up processes with participants.

4.2 Answers to Research Questions

Re-statement of the Research Questions

The research was guided by the following questions:

- i. What are the contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria?
- ii. What are the different concepts of counterterrorism strategies?
- iii. What have been the dynamics of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria?
- iv. To what extent have counterterrorism strategies been effective in Nigeria?

Table 4.2.2: Emergent, Node Source and Guide for Interview Table

Emergent themes	Nodes Sources	Guide	References		
Measuring the performance of counterterrorist agents	Measuring counterterrorist's Performance	Contributing factors to terrorism	7	19	
	Counterterrorism mitigation Barriers		7	17	
	Stakeholder cooperation	Different concepts of counterterrorism strategies	6	23	
	Setting clear expectations		4	7	
	Understanding roles and Obligations		5	18	
	Using Available Resources	Dynamics of counterterrorism strategies	6	14	
	Working with unclear mitigation policies		5	9	
	Government interventions	Experience with policymakers and Public administrators		6	13
	Corruption Issues	Distortion of effective policies and strategies through corruption	Counterterrorism strategies effectiveness	6	14
	Understanding Terrorism Framework	Training and Development		6	17
Staying Current with Counterterrorism Advancements			3	8	

Source: Field Survey 2022

The Four Major Themes:

From the table above the four major themes were used in line with the research question which includes: The contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria measuring the performance of counterterrorism agents, government interventions (Dynamics), Corruption issues and understanding the terrorism framework. Nine subthemes emerged under measuring the performance of counterterrorism agents and understanding the terrorism framework. Collectively, the nine subthemes include counterterrorism mitigation barriers, stakeholder cooperation, setting clear expectations, understanding roles and obligations, using available resources, working with unclear mitigation policies, and staying current with counterterrorism advancement.

The applied theoretical framework combined critical and resource dependency theories to aid the provision of answers to the central research questions, by recognizing stakeholders' perspectives in relation to the social and tactical premises surrounding the application of effective counterterrorism strategies against terrorists operating in Nigeria.




Figure 4.2: Patterns of Boko Haram’s violence and Associated Fatalities, 2009-2017 [Adapted from ACLED]

Table 4.2.3: Nigerian Military Expenditure from 2015-2020 (in Billions Naira)

This map explains Nigeria's military expenditure for six years

Year	Expenditure
2015	397
2016	444
2017	495
2018	654
2019	669
2020	975

Table: Dataphyte • Source: Sipri • Created with Datawrapper

Emergent Theme One: Contributing Factors to Terrorism in Nigeria?

Research Question One: What are the contributing factors to terrorism in Nigeria?

Emergent Sub Theme One: Corruption

Theme 1 corruption emerged as an offshoot of mental conversations where participants described their experiences with working in a society where corruption is common, and most public officers are involved in one way or the other. Participants are all of the opinions that the entire country would have been a better place if resources allocated to developing the nation are used judiciously. They all refer to the diversion of funds meant to equip counterterrorist agents, to private bank accounts, not minding the implication of this act on those who directly engage terrorists, as well as citizens in locations affected by terrorism. Participants believed that corruption of public officers is one of the main issues directly responsible for the inability of counterterrorist agencies to match up with terrorists in terms of firepower and strategies.

They also reported that some soldiers within the ranks have been compromised and form a part of the strength that terrorists rely on to defeat counterterrorism attempts. All the participants' descriptions centred on how various security agencies do not disburse exact funds provided for them from the national budget, for tools to fight terrorism. These tools, according to them include weapons, troop allowances, portable drinking water and other supplies of necessity, amongst others. As participants reported their experiences, they specified that physical interaction of operatives with the government may eradicate corruption where it relates to projects such as terrorism mitigation.

The data show that participants shared their distinctive sets of experiences about the social culture of amassing wealth from public funds in Nigeria by public officers and the impact of the rippling effect on the performance of counterterrorist's.

The participant (P1) stated:

We had a case where money was said to have been released to the military for the acquisition of new armoured personnel carriers as well as tanks for effective performance while engaging terrorists. When they arrived, we realized that they were refurbished vehicles that had been abandoned in Nigeria for a while. They did not last long as the refurbishing itself was poorly done because the contractor wanted to make huge profits. I am sure you saw it in the news. Tanks were being pushed by personnel instead of functioning to move troops around. Why would the government want to place us in such a compromising position? This is the reason military bases in North East Nigeria have been run over by terrorists a number of times.

One participant shared a different perspective highlighting the importance of factoring in a budget for ex-terrorists, to ensure that they are empowered and positively engaged, as a form of encouragement to keep away from terrorism. She however stated that past experience shows that the empowerment program for former terrorists is the centre of corruption in Nigeria as politicians and public administrators in charge of the program aimed at rehabilitating former terrorists see this as an opportunity to make wealth off the program. The participant felt that mitigating terrorism should also involve the use of well-funded former terrorists within communities that are prone to terrorism, to manage ex-terrorist's empowerment programs and eliminate the direct involvement of government middlemen.

The participant (P6) stated:

The amnesty programs that involved former militants' rehabilitation would have been a good idea but it was destroyed by corruption. The politicians and their contractors who

also front for them used this as an opportunity to enrich themselves. They now have houses all over the world while some former militants are still here languishing in poverty without any skill. This is a recipe for a return to militancy in the areas where the amnesty programs were established. Some of these politicians won the support of one or two ex-militant leaders who encouraged them to deviate from the original focus of the amnesty program by taking part in the corrupt practice themselves. This is why you see some ex-militant leaders owning universities outside Nigeria.

In sharing practical knowledge about personal experiences of corruption hindering the success of mitigating terrorism in Nigeria, a participant acknowledged that some top-performing ex-militants should be engaged by the government to manage other former militants rather than placing politicians in positions they see as viably conducive to amass wealth for themselves.

The participant (P6) stated:

Some ex-militants are very educated and can run some of the agencies in Nigeria successfully. We have Master's degree holders amongst us who were giving us the strategies that we used in defeating the military, which made the government succumb to negotiations with us. Those are the kind of people that should be managing the development of ex-militants and not politicians with different motives.

Follow-up sessions aimed at getting clarification on interpretation did not provide any new information. Participants believed that government interventions should allow ex-militants to take charge of their direct subordinates who are more likely to contribute positively to the overall national terrorism mitigation effort. This can be achieved once corruption is controlled, by excluding politicians and public officers from being in control of finances meant for the rehabilitation and empowerment of former terrorists.

In line with critical theory, participants showed that meaning acquired during the critique of social and cultural norms of public office holders and the Nigerian society, helped them develop functional strategies aimed at driving performance.

Emergent Sub Theme 1: Unemployment:

Terrorist activities sprung up as a result of unemployment. This has become a serious issue in the country and has led to joblessness of our graduates for a long time, frustration sets in and this encourages them to involve in activities that are detrimental to society.

The participant (P6) stated:

Some of these politicians won the support of one or two ex-militant leaders who encouraged them to deviate from the original focus of the amnesty program by taking part in the corrupt practice themselves. This is why you see some ex-militant leaders owning universities outside Nigeria.

In sharing practical knowledge about personal experiences of corruption hindering the success of mitigating terrorism in Nigeria, a participant acknowledged that some top-performing ex-militants should be engaged by the government to manage other former militants rather than placing politicians in positions they see as viably conducive to amass wealth for themselves. All these are due to the high rate of unemployment in the country. Lack of jobs drives youths to engage in all sorts of activities that cause insecurity. Lack of employment makes the youth available to be used to cause any kind of havoc. Tackling unemployment will go a long way in reducing the rate of insecurity.

Emergent Sub Theme 1: Poverty: The vicious cycle of poverty continues to ravage the Nigerian society to the extent that the majority of the citizens cannot afford three square meals per day.

Participant (P3) asserted: Everyone knows what happens in this country Poverty breeds a high rate of state insecurity which borders on ethno-religious conflicts, indigenes and settlers divide, armed robberies, abductions, kidnapping and other criminal activities in Nigeria.. Monies allocated for almost everything reduce as it goes down the channel. When government disburses money, it reduces the budget. It also reduces when it gets to the supervising ministries. It further reduces when it gets to the Agency and reduces as it trickles down to the end-user of the product. By the time the receiver gets it, it is not sufficient for its purpose, as such they begin to manage the funds and even have to cut off very important items. This leaves the people at the bottom, at the receiving end always, while others at the top who do not understand what goes on in the field enjoy the money allocated for use in combating terrorism. Counterterrorism agencies should be allowed to interact and participate in decisions at the policy level when security matters are concerned.

The perception of the participant suggests the adoption of the supportive situation leadership style that incorporates shared decisions to drive behavioural change. Another participant shared details of newspaper publications pointing at the extent of corruption that affects counterterrorism agencies and their operatives. The participant (P4) stated:

It is so sad to see that those who we are protecting are the same people who are responsible for our not being able to defeat terrorists. I am sure you are aware of all the money that was stolen by the Jonathan government and his National Security Adviser, as exposed and declared by the present Nigerian government. Look at the amount of money the Petroleum Minister in that same government stole. You are aware she is in court in London because of the billions of dollars she stole. Money that is meant to equip operatives and provide sophisticated tools to eradicate terrorists in Nigeria.

The initial response provided by this participant required a follow-up session to clarify the meaning. The participant reaffirmed that from his knowledge of the strategies required for terrorism, a huge amount of funds is required for it to be actualized. He confirmed that the amount of money released to these agencies for training and equipment cannot equip them with the required knowledge and tools to win the war against terrorism in Nigeria.

This response aligned with resource dependence theory which highlights the relationship between organizations and the resources that they need to operate. If these resources can be assigned to the agencies, and used strictly for the acquisition of tools for the operatives, as well as for developmental training programs to update them on current strategies and operational standards rather than using control mechanisms and manipulation, positive impacts may emerge. A participant was worried that the practice of corruption in Nigeria is as old as the country itself and will take strict sanctions against perpetrators, to end the practice.

The participant (P4) stated:

We can keep talking about money for weapons meant for terrorism combat reaching us. This will continue for another decade as nobody cares what happens as long as they are not directly affected by terrorism. We have had this issue talked about for too long. Cases of corruption and diversion of funds meant for the military have been in court for long, without results. As usual, the cases will end silently and we will still be in the same situation. It is believe very strict sanctions should be placed on these public officers who steal, and place the lives of thousands of citizens on the line while their families are enjoying affluence abroad. We should borrow a leaf from China and apply its laws for corrupt public officers.

Again, a participant refers to 'production goals' which points to the extrinsic motivation for using superior control to ensure performance. Participants believed that interventions and sincere injection of funds would provide an opportunity to develop mitigation plans to help encourage productive behaviour by operatives. One participant shared an experience involving the risk of operatives using obsolete equipment that could have been upgraded if funds were provided for that purpose.

Emergent Theme 1: Weak institutional structure: The institutional structures that are put in place in all the three levels of government in Nigeria are so weak that policies formulated are haphazardly executed, therefore, the government cannot provide the society with public goods and this qualifies Nigeria to be regarded as a weak state.

All seven participants gave responses with 13 references, as revealed in table 2. During the researcher's interview,

One participant (P1) described Smugglers use the porous coastal borders of the country to sell arms. The corruption and weak judicial systems only help smugglers to sell even more guns. They provide pistols, shotguns, assault rifles, grenades, and explosives against the people and military forces. The uncontrolled circulation of arms and ammunition poses a danger to peace and the country's long-term social and economic development. It has also led to the displacement of several Nigerians from their communities and ancestral lands.

One participant (P2) This feelings about his role in an ensuing way: My role in terrorism mitigation is to make sure that my operatives are highly motivated to enable them to carry out their tasks. Their motivation is expected to come by way of providing sophisticated weapons to beat those being used by insurgents. This is only possible if the government provides us with such equipment.

Another participant (P2) describing his role in curbing terrorism stated: My job is to ensure that logistic support is given to troops assigned to fight terrorism. This way, one is sure that the counterterrorist operatives are focused on the task assigned to them. Unfortunately, these supplies have not been regularly made to operatives, leaving them with no choice but to continually revolt.

A third participant (P5) stated:

My job is operations related and I am to ensure that operations are carried out according to the training and briefing given to operatives before and during operations. Unfortunately, this is very difficult to enforce since operatives get unruly in most cases, due to inadequacies resulting from a lack of proper care and support.

A fourth participant (P3) recounted his experience with counterterrorist agent's performance when he stated that:

Soldiers are poorly taken care of. Imagine a hungry soldier asked to engage terrorist's in their stronghold. What do you expect will be the outcome? It is either the soldier is killed or captured, with useful information being collected from them without pressure, as such soldiers would be at the mercy of terrorists. The fact that they keep being captured and slaughtered, and their murder is widely publicized is enough reason to demoralize them and reduce their productivity in terms of achieving success in combating terrorism.

As participants described their experiences with counterterrorism strategies, they unanimously stated that their roles required more productive actions aimed at ensuring effective performance by operatives through the provision of essential items that will enhance their performance. Motivation that includes an external monitoring force with persons acting to fulfill the demands of an external source. For participants who are

counterterrorist agents, the ability to provide adequate working conditions to boost the morale of operatives serves as the external stimulus for their performance.

Some participants affirmed that their role activities required active collaboration and engagement with operatives, to drive performance.

A fifth participant (P5) described her experience with the performance of counterterrorist operatives through actively engaging with them in the following way: For myself, I believe that the soldiers are not focused enough in their mission. And I don't see any form of counterterrorism it is more political as a contributing factor of not countering the terrorist

They keep complaining about the poor standard of living within operational areas and the lack of care by the military authorities. Most times, the soldiers go on social media to revolt against their authorities. This issue affects their performance in negative ways.

Emergent Theme Two: Concepts of Counterterrorism Strategies

Research Question Two: What are the different concepts of counterterrorism strategies?

The Concepts of Counterterrorism Strategies will be base on three premises which are: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare. Prevent aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

Emergent Sub Theme Two: Measuring the Performance of Counterterrorist Agents

Sub Theme 1 measures the performance of counter-terrorism agents emerged as the most significant role activity for participants, resulting from their experiences with the counterterrorist strategies. Performance is a vital indicator used in the evaluation of employees in any organization. The military and other law enforcement agencies are

also part of this workforce community, and also require this form of appraisal in their counterterrorism roles. For performance appraisals related to counterterrorism operations, leadership must align the relationship between the organization and the scope of responsibility, in order to facilitate organizational success. Amongst other issues, lack of personnel morale, logistic support, and adequate working tools hinder counterterrorism operatives from meeting their expected goals while engaging terrorists, and leads to a reduction in the output of productivity thereby, leading to failure in the ability to defeat insurgents who are better equipped. Asked to describe their experience in counterterrorism strategies, all participants believed that managing operatives through equipping them with effective and adequate tools, boosting their morale and providing relevant logistic support were all important role activities in achieving effective performance.

Each participant understood the facts about ensuring operatives are motivated and its importance in counterterrorism operations. This understanding supports view that leaders have an obligation to protect the interests of their employers and employees that they supervise. In the counterterrorist operational setting, it also follows that commanders must protect the interest of their operatives while guarding the military and the government as their principal employers. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, commanders are careful to do this, so as not to lose their positions. In the past, cases occur where commanders have been tried and sanctioned when they appear to tilt toward the welfare of the operatives, and seemingly question authorities about issues concerning the poor morale of soldiers.

A participant (P2) stated: that adequate working conditions to boost the morale of operatives serve as the external stimulus for their performance. Some participants

further affirmed that their role activities required active collaboration and engagement with operatives, to drive performance.

Training is needed for Prevent strategic leads many forces maintain the role of force strategic lead for Prevent, and in our view all forces should have a senior officer in this role. This individual reports to the chief officer responsible for counter-terrorism in their respective force. There is no Prevent guidance or training that is specifically tailored for those undertaking the role of force strategic lead on Prevent. We found very mixed levels of knowledge and a range of approaches in use, particularly in newly appointed staff. Some were unaware of their responsibilities. Officers and staff told us that training for safeguarding staff is particularly valuable because it links the Prevent duty with other strands of vulnerability. We were also told that vulnerability to radicalization was not always an explicit theme in safeguarding training.

A fifth participant (P5) Effective communication and information sharing is vitally important to achieving the objectives of Prevent. Overwhelmingly, the dedicated Prevent staff we interviewed told us that they have no access to the ICT systems and devices they need to do their job. We were surprised that, in some fixed intelligence management units (FIMUs), there were no staff who could access the PCMT. This is usually because the dedicated Prevent officer(s) didn't work in the FIMU or in a nearby office. This should be remedied to allow FIMU officers access to PCMT data, which would be useful during initial assessments of Prevent referrals. It would also make sure case updates recorded on the PCMT are available for later assessments

A fifth participant (P5) described her experience with the performance of counterterrorist operatives through actively engaging with them in the following way:

For myself, I believe that the soldiers are not focused enough on their mission.

They keep complaining about the poor standard of living within operational areas and the lack of care by the military authorities. Most times, the soldiers go on social media to revolt against their authorities. This issue affects their performance in negative ways.

A participant (P2) stated: Some interviewees told us that they don't get feedback on referrals, and so were unsure whether they had acted appropriately. One officer commented that, "referral is a one-way street". We were told that a lack of feedback could create unconscious bias towards the subject of the referral. Forces should provide feedback on Prevent referrals where practicable, as this would help build confidence and encourage further referrals.

I am very careful with challenging the decisions of my superiors. If you understand the military well, you would know that an order is an order, and that no matter the situation you find yourself in, as a soldier you must obey these orders without complaining. The ones who complain are looked at as undisciplined soldiers. Just a few of them complain while others operate under the same conditions they complain about. I do not mean that these conditions are conducive or that they do not negatively affect our operations but soldiers were trained to work under any condition, as such, they have no right to complain.

Participants all agreed that various ways of assessment can be used to identify individuals engaged in unproductive activity however, in this case, measures to also weigh the performances of authorities must be enforced, to ensure that positive results of operatives are attained. Participant (P1) stated:

The truth is that the operatives cannot perform productively under these terrible conditions. At times, they have no water and no food for days. The weapons they use

are old and cannot be compared with what the terrorist have. You can see the number of times that we have had mutiny by operatives in operational locations.

Their condition is bad and needs to be looked into. I do not understand why they cannot be taken care of with all the resources allocated to the military.

During interviews, probing questions were asked, to further prompt stronger descriptions to aid in providing clear and brief answers to the research question of lived experience about the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency. In a situation, the researcher asked 'can you tell me more about the failed operations you have carried out and why you think they failed'? *To provoke a deeper response, participant (P1) answered:*

Without all the needed equipment and logistic support, no Army can function well in any part of the world. Our operatives are victims of circumstances. On paper, we see that a lot of money has been given to authorities to provide all we need, to be effective but we do not get to see these things physically. We still have to operate under these harsh conditions and subject ourselves to the superiority of these terrorists.

Participants expressed a level of conviction as regards their preparedness to engage terrorists' once logistic support is adequately provided. However, one participant reported that, based on his experience within operational areas for over five years, the terrorists were more sophisticated in their strategies.

One participant (P2) stated:

Without authorities providing adequate care for soldiers, the authorities are not in a position to monitor the performance of operatives. We have had cases where soldiers shot at their commanders for failing to provide logistic support, whereas, the commanders live in luxury. They cannot give instructions and orders from their

comfortable homes while soldiers suffer in operational areas, and expect that they will get results. When asked about daily interactions with operatives during field operations, some participants indicated some concerns about fear of the unknown, coming from friendly forces.

Participant (P1) mentioned that: We have had cases of soldiers turning their weapons to their superiors in the past. Everyone is being careful not to be the next victim of friendly forces attacks. If this is the situation, you can imagine that soldiers have gone out of hand. This all comes down to a lack of care against operatives. Every day we have the opportunity to interact, it is the same complaints, frustration, and anger.

The results of this study support these statements, as all participants agreed that the essentiality of providing adequate logistic and moral support to counterterrorism agents in the fight against insurgency is unquestionable. During member checking, all participants provided a recap of their feelings about the importance of operative's comfort, adequate kitting and reassurances, to stir up good performances in their role activity, engaging terrorists in Nigeria.

Viewing the data from a resource dependence theoretical perspective, a part of the theoretical framework for this study is shaped by the provision of resources to operatives of supervising organizations involved in counterterrorism. This is required to provide the logistic and technical support as well as all other tools needed to boost the operative's morale, for effective performance. Measuring the performance levels of operatives in combat areas indicates that this role activity is essential for the effective building of morale levels and ensuring that counterterrorist's strength is not compromised.

Additionally, drawing from the extrinsic motivation theoretical perspective, operational commanders' interests in mitigating operatives irrational behaviour during counterterrorism operations stems from an obligatory function within the organizations, to create a conducive and morale-filled work environment. Though the zeal of these commanders is a vital tool in such operations, unfortunately, it would have no effect as long as the tools to complement the zeal are unavailable.

From these perspectives, the consequences of ignoring the importance of an operative's welfare could be averted by offering the government of Nigeria a useful method of identifying and dealing with individual cases of negligence by supervising authorities, as regards the provision of welfare for security forces involved in counterterrorism operations. Participants showed elements of discouragement, distrust for, and neglect by authorities, as well as a tint of disorganization resulting from the loss of total command of troops as a result of the poor standard of their welfare.

Emergent Theme Three: Concepts of Counterterrorism Strategies

Research Question Three: What have been the dynamics of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria?

The rising insecurity in the northwest—vicious attacks on local communities and kidnapping of people by criminal groups in the region—is being described by state officials as banditry. However, further evidence suggests that the government is simplifying the dynamics. In actuality, north-western Nigeria has become the safe haven of increasingly active terrorist groups, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM); Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb; a splinter of Boko Haram popularly referred to as the Islamic State in West

Africa Province (ISWAP); and the Fulani herdsmen of West Africa once rated the fourth-deadliest terror group in the world.

Understanding terrorism framework revealed that understanding of terrorism framework and the mode of operation of terrorists operating in Nigeria is vague. Understanding terrorism framework is the first step toward gaining victory in the fight against terrorism. Participants believed that the training they had in combat engagement is not sufficient to engage terrorists who have foreign training from well-experienced fighters from the Middle East and North Africa. Participants recognized the need to increase their knowledge to gain enough experience in terrorism and counterterrorism studies so as to understand the strategies of terrorists, and also understand how to develop new strategies to diffuse the tactics of these insurgents in Nigeria.

Participants also believed that an understanding of the motives of terrorists will determine the way each of the various sects with motives that differ from each will be confronted. As participants recounted their experiences, they indicated that the prevalence of terrorism in Nigeria is on the increase, and more sects with different motives are being developed across the country. One participant (P7) mentioned that:

All the different regions in Nigeria have terrorists that have their peculiar motives for terrorism so once you move from one region to another, you experience a different form of terrorism. It is important to know what the motives are to enable you as a counterterrorist work out a strategy to engage the terrorist, with the aim of stopping it.

Similarly, a participant described how an understanding of various approaches to combat terrorism may work in Nigeria. The participant (P6) stated:

With the different kinds of terrorists we have in Nigeria, one needs to understand each of them to know how to handle them. You cannot face terrorists that need development

in their region through combat. I believe the solution to that kind of terrorism will be the development of their region through a well-planned structure, to ensure that the plan for development works. In the same way, if a group wants to practice a particular religion I think the government should allow them to practice it freely after given some conditions. In this case, dialogue may be the solution rather than combat.

Some participants recognized the fact that technological advancement had changed the process of counterterrorism and that new ideas should be sort to solve the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. As an example, one participant (P2) stated:

The same military tactics we were trained in many years ago while we were being recruited into the military is the same that is still being put into use against terrorists at this time. While terrorists apply modern guerrilla warfare tactics, our operatives apply the old obsolete jungle warfare that has been in existence since the British were in Nigeria, before our independence in 1960. Participant's knowledge about the tactics being used for training and in use by counter terrorists was based on experience at military training centres and mission areas, as well as length of service in the military.

One participant (P1) recalled that:

Being around military training facilities for over 25 years, I am experienced with the form of training given to recruits as well as officer cadets being drafted into the military. This is the same tactic that is applied against terrorists now. What we need are more sophisticated ways to approach the problem since the war against terrorism is not being won. We need to be trained on modern counterterrorism and the strategies we can apply in combating terrorism with and without the use of force.

One participant acknowledged that the military had depended on external forces to help combat terrorism and that the military and the government were prepared to commit

millions of dollars to the project. Findings that showed how external forces can increase the chances of defeating terrorism in various countries. The participant (P1) stated:

Though it is good for external forces to join us to make us more formidable, it is also good for us to be very well trained. The external forces are obviously coming in with the knowledge that we do not have. Why can't we also go and get that knowledge so that in situations like this where external forces backed down from assisting Nigeria? We can at least operate effectively.

In further understanding the framework of terrorism, it is important to note that some forms of present-day terrorism are fuelled by greed or the desire to acquire or sustain a particular standard of living. There is no doubt that individuals and groups from Western countries stimulate disputes the same way members of the modern Niger Delta terrorist groups create feuds when they need financial gratification from the government. This was one of the strategies used in the Niger Delta region by an individual, to ensure that the sale of weapons which is his major business, is sustained by the disputes created within the region. The increasing number of disputes created around the world that lead to terrorism, especially in Africa and the Middle East, is generated by Western countries. Sales of merchandise used for war is the major reason there must be war, to sustain the business of manufacturing weapons. One participant acknowledged that disputes during the Niger Delta militancy days were mostly generated by businessmen though the motives seemed arguably right.

The participant (P6) stated:

I remember the days when the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta was active. The group had solid strategies to hold the government to ransom because they were educated and were also established businessmen with very many years of

experience. They put their business and intellectual experiences into the operation of the group and succeeded because it was operated like a business that needed to generate revenue. They always thought of ways to keep the dispute alive so as to keep their business afloat.

No new facts emerged during follow-up sessions aimed at authenticating either interview transcripts or themes development after data analysis. Participants expressed the view that a proper understanding of the framework of terrorism will facilitate the adoption of more effective coercive strategies to produce expected results in combating terrorism in Nigeria.

Emergent Theme Four: Counterterrorism strategies effectiveness in Nigeria?

Research Question Four: To what extent have counterterrorism strategies been effective in Nigeria?

One disturbing fact is that some strategies which originally should have been adopted by counter terrorists being used successfully by the terrorist group. Rather than incorporating civilians into the fight against terrorism and gain relevant intelligence details that may assist the military, civilians are treated like suspects and are kept at a distance, by the military. Most likely, this is as a result of past experiences that have occurred when terrorists who appear to be innocent civilians infiltrate the ranks of the military, concealing and detonating explosives. This has resulted in devastating effects which when looked at critically; one cannot fault the military for taking precaution. Boko Haram, however, frequently apply this tactic which has helped them gain valuable intelligence used to increase their victory in ambushing the military and civilians. They are recorded to have used civilians as agents of intelligence gathering at locations where they plan to attack and even have agents within the military, where they get precise

information on troop's movement and strategies. Worst of all is the military's involvement in providing arms and ammunition for the sect. In 2014, 15 Nigerian military officers were found guilty of this unthinkable crime. Though they were severely punished for this, it will not deter others from committing the same crime, as there must have been some form of benefits derived from this betrayal of their colleagues. With the low morale as well as the likelihood that some military personnel may share the ideologies of the sect, it is not out of place to assume that the military still have such characters within their ranks.

Another counterterrorist strategy that has worked against the Nigerian military involves human rights abuse where communal punishment is meted on an entire community that is suspected to harbour terrorists. The community is razed down in flames, and members of the community are physically abused by the military. This leaves civilians with no option but to flee from communities that are being approached by soldiers, in order to be saved from the wrought of the military

Emergent Subtheme Four: Counterterrorism Mitigation Barriers

The subtheme counterterrorism *mitigation barriers* emerged from participants' descriptions of their role performance during counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. Mitigation barriers reported include the inability to control the influx of foreign terrorists to support the local ones, lack of developmental plans for the upgrade of operatives to match up with the skills of terrorists trained in the Middle East by collaborating with international terrorist groups, lack of proper strategies to reduce or stop the mass recruitment of young Nigerians into terrorist's sects, adequate funding of military operations targeted at curbing terrorism, and external influences of major actors who benefit from the presence of disputes in Nigeria. A shared perception held by the

participants suggested that these barriers negatively impact the role of operatives in combating terrorism in Nigeria.

When asked about their inputs to the general organizational efforts aimed at mitigating terrorism, and incited to give more details on successes and challenges during mitigation, a participant (P5) responded with the following experience: Our borders are porous and we claim we want to stop terrorism. This is not possible because terrorist bodies have an international network. When the local ones need support, they invite foreign terrorists to come in and give them support. Once our immigration officers cannot stop the inflow of these terrorists, we have double trouble. We will be fighting more terrorists than we imagine. I believe this is why Boko Haram was able to overrun three military bases in cities where they operate. Some of the terrorists that were killed in those operations were foreigners.

Another participant acknowledged that the knowledge that operatives have does not match that of the terrorist they are engaging. He gave detailed accounts of how selected inducted terrorists are sent outside Nigeria for specialist training. Some courses undertaken include terrorism strategies and defeating the counterterrorism combat and guerrilla warfare, sourcing funds for operations, and industrial training for the manufacture of weapons and ammunition, locally.

The participant (P7) stated:

Boko Haram is more technically, strategically, and logistically equipped than the entire military. While I was with them, we were well trained in foreign countries. There are a lot of former Nigerian military men amongst us who reveal details of the training they receive. Based on this, we are trained to outsmart them with better strategies and combat training. To cap it, we are trained on how to make ammunitions and weapons

right there on the field while the military runs out of ammunitions most times. We also source all the money we need to operate while we hear stories of soldiers who have no food and water in the field, and they claim they are chasing after well-fed terrorists. Two participants described the recruitment of youths as a major tool for developing the strength of terrorist groups. Manpower is a strong tool in terrorism operations, especially with the enlistment of terrorists who apply the same deadly tactics as those from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

One participant (P1) stated: The numerical strength of terrorists far exceeds that of the operatives put together.

Terrorism has been made to appear viable in the eyes of Nigerian youths, and it is now seen as employment for youths that are not engaged and have no means of livelihood. The individual benefit is the primary focus while the ideology comes in as the secondary focus. This means that any side with a more promising bargain is likely to win the youths to its side. This calls for serious thoughts on the Nigerian government to start working on ways to win back the youths. I believe everyone prefers to earn a good living under safe conditions rather than as terrorists with no assurances for living till the next day.

A few participants affirmed that operatives would have done better if they were properly funded with enough resources to take care of their logistic and technical support, as well as their professional development.

One participant (P2) stated:

Training and equipment are what we have been talking about since the problem of terrorism started. A professional soldier's morale is boosted when he sees new and sophisticated weapons to fight the enemy with. He is also happy when he is given more

professional training, for better performance. The icing on the cake is when, in addition to all these, his welfare is seen as important, and he is properly compensated for all the risks and efforts he has put in.

While describing barriers, one participant pointed out that terrorism in Nigeria exceeds the struggle for the actualization of ideologies and social rights. He insists that there are other actors involved, who enjoy the benefits of disputes in Nigeria and described some individuals, groups, politicians and government employees who fuel disputes because of their personal gains from the disputes. This aligns with position that resources for terrorist activities are generated through criminal activities or abuse of legitimate undertakings. This means that for the benefits derived from these illegitimate transactions, some individuals get profits and must keep the dispute aflame to ensure their investments keep yielding results. The participant (P6) stated:

This problem is a business venture for some people that is why it cannot stop. The more terrorism exists, the more money some people will make. Recently the president of Nigeria gave 100 billion Nigerian Naira to a new form of a terrorist group (Fulani Herdsmen) as funds for the consideration to quit terrorist acts. Expect that another group that wants theirs will evolve in a short while.

Meanwhile, this is also a good opportunity for corrupt public officers to make money from the disbursement of these funds.

Emergent Subtheme Four: Stakeholder Cooperation

Subtheme 4 *stakeholder cooperation* emerged as participants recounted their role in engaging terrorists during operations, giving accounts of the importance of cooperating with other military and civilian stakeholders toward a common goal. When asked the question about how military cooperation with community stakeholders affected

counterterrorism operations, participants stated that to achieve good results, there must be cooperation with the community, as the community local security teams have useful information and strategies to defeat terrorists in their locations. Responses presented captured mental conversations in the minds of participants about their actions as individuals, and their behaviour as actors involved in curbing terrorism.

Participant views on their role behaviours partnerships between communities and counterterrorism operatives provide important cultural and verbal insights, vital information and cooperation, and informed observations that can become part of a productive strategy for terror crime prevention and solution. One participant (P7) stated: I tried to make the military understand that without the community support and participation in counterterrorism in my locality, the success rate will be poor.

Another participant (P6) mentioned:

We know the in and out of our community and also know those who are not part of us. We know those of us too, who are connected with terrorists so it is easy to deal with such situations if the operatives give us their full support and cooperation.

Another participant (P4) stated:

It will be difficult to cooperate with soldiers. Many people are scared of the military. Some of them are not rational in their behaviour so they can kill innocent people before realizing that they are not terrorists. For this reason, a lot of community members who could have been of good use in the fight against terrorism run from soldiers when they approach them.

One participant expressed his worries on the lack of inter-service cooperation amongst the military and security agencies and the negative impact it has yielded regarding the fight against terrorism. The participant (P3) stated:

Proper orientation should be given to operatives of all the military and security agencies involved in this mission. We all should understand that we are one in this battle. We all need to understand that there is a common goal and that it is to end terrorism. In this way, we all can identify ways we can contribute to the fight against terrorism, as a collective body. For example, the Immigration Service should work with the Police, Military, Community, and other stakeholders to ensure that terrorists are kept from passing through our borders to help local terrorists gain strength.

Another participant (P5) affirmed that:

Actually, there is an ongoing battle of supremacy between agencies assigned to combat terrorism. If this continues, the terrorists will keep gaining the upper hand.

The Police claim it is not their responsibility to fight terrorists, the Army on the other hand cannot tolerate the Police in joint operations as the Police are known to have professional conduct issues. There has to be a way to bring all these agencies to work together, to achieve the focus of defeating terrorists.

An interesting response was shared by one participant in response to a question on his suggestions on how policymakers can contribute to the counterterrorism drive. Participant (P1) stated:

There should be laws to form an agency for counterterrorism which will extract agents from various sub-agencies and put them together under one umbrella with a great administrative structure. It will be difficult to have the problems that we see now, in this case. I think it would be a better way of putting agents to work together without having issues.

The participant (P1) noted that conversations of this sort are impactful and will help redirect the focus of operatives toward the goal of ending terrorism in Nigeria.

Finally, in the last response to the probing question on if the government is encouraging the kidnapping of victims by terrorists due to the governments compromise in paying huge ransoms to terrorists, the participant (P1) stated:

Compare where we were in 2004 and where we are now 2022. Things have become terrible now because the government has been paying ransoms since then. Things did not get better. Rather, people saw kidnapping as lucrative and thousands of cases of kidnapping for ransom have occurred since 2007. This happens because ransoms are being paid. The most enticing one is from the government as the latest payment of ransom to terrorists by the Nigerian government is the highest so far.

100 billion Naira was given out to terrorists by the government without a joint consensus by all security forces involved in counterterrorism, to confirm that this was the best approach. Some of us believe that if that money was used to upgrade the military and initiate other counterterrorism strategies, it would have been a better venture.

During member checking, participants confirmed the accuracy of transcripts and repeated succinct versions of the initial responses, during the follow-up sessions. In summary, participants believed that deep collaborative efforts will positively impact the effectiveness of their roles as counterterrorist agents.

Emergent Subtheme Four: Setting Clear Expectations

The subtheme *setting clear expectations* validates the view that setting clear expectations and monitoring results is an important recipe for success in organizations or in operations. Participants understood the value of communicating instructions that will align with set goals while executing meaningful and effective operational strategies to defeat terrorists. Directing situational leadership style that provides clearly defined

followership tasks. This subtheme emerged following participants repeated references to proper and authorized channels of communication, as obtainable within the military and security agencies. Participants mentioned that setting clear expectations and proper supervision in the operational field is another component for success, only if those setting these expectations have a clear understanding of the situation, as well as the required knowledge and experience to supervise.

One participant (P2) stated:

I have seen situations where those giving instructions to troops do not know what they want. Young officers who have no experience are brought to operation areas and are expected to lead soldiers who have gained experience over the years. Such instructions will not be carried out because the soldier knows the officer has no experience. His wrong instructions may lead troops into an ambush so there is a problem.

For people to be in a position to give clear instructions with expectations, they must have enough knowledge and experience. Participants agreed therefore that those given the mandate to set expectations should be properly trained in advanced counterterrorism techniques, and allowed to gain some experience that will empower them with enough knowledge for the responsibility. A participant (P1) stated emphatically:

Most times we are given instructions on the expectations of the military, we get the same instructions every day and every time. No new sets of expectations. It is as if we are working with a template. This clearly shows that commanders expect that troops should go into the field and bring back results based on the situation they find themselves. Their instructions are always “ensure you defeat the enemy. In my view, a complete overhaul should be done in terms of training and development of those who lead operations.

Capacity-building interventions help reduce counter-productivity. This applies also in combat situations. One participant described how he used his own time and money to build himself through online short courses on capacity-building strategies. He (P1) stated: 120

I now understand certain ways to achieve results based on instructions that I give to subordinates. Not everything we do on the field was taught while we were in training. Most of the courses we attend as well, do not give us what we need to achieve results in peculiar cases like terrorism. Not too many operatives like me will want to spend their own money and time to develop themselves, so the military has to work out ways to develop us.

Another participant (P2) said:

Setting expectations seem unreal to me because you only expect results when you know you have worked hard towards a certain goal. We are not well trained, we do not have good weapons, we are not treated well, and yet our superiors want results. Some are actually good at giving instructions that do not bring results. We have had commanders that escaped and left their men in distress, resulting from poor instructions.

Participants' responses showed that giving instructions and setting expectations to achieve success is vital but this can only be achieved with proper knowledge and understanding of the situation and sufficient experience to set goals that are enhanced by nurturing productive behaviour by operatives.

Emergent Subtheme Four: Understanding Roles and Obligations

The emergence of this subtheme *understanding roles and obligations* developed from responses shared by participants about their role experience as occupants of leadership positions responsible for driving performance during operations, and managing

operative's behaviour. For those in supervisory roles, their effectiveness in managing troops was linked with the understanding of their responsibility to ensure compliance of team members with acceptable instructions, using operational guidelines. As one of the participants said: "We are responsible for ensuring that troops get all they require for effective performance, they are in top shape physically and they are in good spirit."

Participants presented a shared commitment on the need for driving performance and a clear understanding of their responsibilities over troops and operational assignments. They appreciate that an unclear understanding of their roles and obligations toward their troops as well as operations could potentially adversely impact the behaviour and performance of troops they are responsible for. One participant (P1) explained this during our interview:

My role with troops is well understood as I have very clear and direct instructions.

Our role basically, is to go on operations to engage terrorists in combat and to neutralize as many as possible, with little or no casualty on our side. It is very important to me that my team is successful, we hit our targets and all my men return with me. The problem is not about understanding my roles or my obligation to my men. The issue is do we get all we need to meet up with the obligations and then, our expectations? Though we know what to do, we do not have the empowerment to be controlling our troops. This is a huge operational flaw.

Those in supervisory positions have contractual and legal obligations to safeguard the interests of their subordinates, and control personnel under supervision. An operational team leader participant found it natural to understand and perform his responsibilities in relation to controlling troops' activities and behaviour. The participant (P1) described this vividly during our interview: My role, under normal situations, is to take full charge

and control over my soldiers while ensuring that they are also protected. In this case, I cannot be sure of either of these obligations. Though I clearly understand my roles, it is difficult to comply with them at this time when soldiers are not taken care of. They are always grumbling, threatening their superiors and being generally rude. You cannot blame them as they have families and rights as humans though they are soldiers. Part of my responsibility is to ensure that the soldiers go into battle with effective weapons and in guarded conditions. We have cases of obsolete vehicles and weapons being supplied to us for operations against terrorists who are better equipped with better weapons and mobility. If other conditions regarding their morale were right, what I should do in this case, knowing my roles and obligations is to reject this equipment and protect my soldiers from operational hazards. However, this will amount to disobeying my superiors, and there are consequences for this.

An interview with another participant described his actions. He (P3) said:

See and act is what I call my action. Though I understand my roles and obligations to my men, all I do is to act on whatever I see. I obey the orders that come from above but use my discretion to avert disaster for my men. That is the best I can do for them at this point where we are handicapped by lack of proper kitting.

Leaders of operations understood that their role in the mitigation of terrorism required equitable enforcement tasks within their teams. As one participant (P2) described it:

Though there are all the issues of troops not being properly taken care of, the fact remains that there cannot be more than one captain on a boat. The military is known for discipline, and superior officers are mandated to enforce tasks with stern instructions. Without this, there will be problems when troops go for operations and superior's instructions are flaunted. The entire team can be thrown into jeopardy, leading to

massive casualties. This may actually be the reason for high casualty rates in operational areas but since nobody comes back to tell the story in most cases, it is unknown if this issue should be given serious consideration.

Though participants agreed that having a clear understanding of their responsibilities in counterterrorism operations facilitates effective enforcement and performance, some expressed an aversion toward the approach of superior officers in assigning and supervising tasks during operations. As one participant (P5) stated:

We are all fighting towards the same goal on the field. Why are some people chosen for risky jobs and others are kept back at the headquarters? Nepotism has set it so it will be difficult for superiors to give instructions that will be followed when things are not done the right way. It is only when the right things are done that a leader commands the respect he deserves. Without that, we will keep having problems.

There were participants who indicated an understanding of supervisory responsibilities for helping team leaders manage their tasks, and efficiently enhance their performance in counterterrorism operations. One participant stated: We are different from the military and I believe our kind of training differs from theirs. While theirs is to forcefully achieve tasks in most cases, ours is to professionally apply strategies to ensure that work is done in the best achievable way. I am of the opinion that operational management should be introduced, where trained operatives in an incident command system help team leaders manage their assignments.

Others noted that as they are held accountable for team members under their command, the position requires that they have a clear understanding of their responsibilities. As one participant (P3) described it:

Having a clear understanding of roles means ideal training, not just in military operations. Operational heads have to be trained in leadership and managerial skills to boost their productivity. The military keeps it within the military. I think the Nigerian military and security forces should learn to go outside their comfort zones, to get knowledge that will help them increase their rate of productivity.

Emergent Subtheme Five: Using Available Resources

This subtheme *using available resources* emerged from responses participants offered, indicating that the use of resources that are physically available can aid operatives to be more effective in their role performance. Participants expressed feelings of dissatisfaction with the regular complaints of lack of equipment in terms of weapons, vehicles, and ammunition. Some participants indicated that there are weapons and ammunition manufacturing companies in Nigeria, as such, the government should acquire these supplies from them rather than cause long delays through the importation of weapons and ammunition from other countries. In agreement with UNDG (2017), the theory of change provides interventions that are expected to lead to a specific development change. Using the available resources that relate to gaps available in effectively fighting terrorism, the government of Nigeria can take advantage of these resources to fill such breaches.

Participant (P3) described how their jobs can be made much easier by utilizing the resources already available.

We have the Defence Industries Corporation that produces weapons and ammunition, yet we cry of lack of these items during operations. We have vehicle manufacturing companies, natural water, and food in abundance yet these supplies are part of those always being mentioned as lacking. When we ask them they talk about importing supplies as

if we do not have them in Nigeria. The government should start from somewhere. Allow us to use what we have first, and then we can improve on them.

In response to a follow-up question to clarify meaning, a participant (P1) elaborated his point in the following way:

The government does not need to create separate budgets for weapons for the military when they provide the same budgets to the Defense Industries Corporation (DIC). They already pay for these weapons through the allocation of budgets. They should ask the DIC to supply these items to operatives.

Another participant (P2) described how Nigerian vehicle manufacturing plants could help reduce the problems of mobility during operations.

Mobility in operational areas is a huge problem. We have situations where troops were killed because vehicles carrying troops got bad and troops were ambushed.

Rather than spending a lot of money importing bulletproof vehicles, the military can acquire vehicles that are locally made. There are companies that also do bulletproof cars. We should not have problems with the mobility of troops. A different opinion came from a participant who felt differently about buying products from Nigerian companies. A participant said: I do not agree that we should compromise standards for issues as serious as this. If we have to spend money, we should buy good products no matter how expensive they are.

Similarly, another participant (P5) stated:

I do not mind if we buy products from countries outside Nigeria if only these items are really bought. The problem here is that government claims they spend a lot of money whereas we on the field do not receive any item they claim to have bought. I think it is better we spend the money on locally manufactured products. We all know the

companies these contracts will be assigned to so, they must deliver or risk being classified as terrorists themselves.

One more participant described using natural resources in exchange for required tools to fight terrorism. The participant (P6) stated:

If this country truly wanted to acquire these items to fight terrorism, it would have been done long ago. Most oil producing countries do not use cash to buy things like weapons. Goods are exchanged with natural resources that the country has. The cash involved in purchases made from Nigeria are never used to buy these weapons. The story always ends with something happening to the transaction, the money not getting back, and attempts to recover the money through court cases that last forever.

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Budgetary Allocation to the Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force (2015-2022)




Chart: Dataphyte • Source: Budget Office of the Federation • Created with Datawrapper

Emergent Subtheme Six: Working with Unclear Mitigation Policies

The subtheme *working with unclear mitigation policies* emerged during participant's responses about the effectiveness of the implementation and enforcement of acceptable military and counterterrorist policies in an unfriendly environment. Security agencies continue to struggle with issues relating to balancing operatives rights and needs, for performance and protection against liabilities that create uncertainties in mitigation policies. Participants expressed feelings of frustration with having ambiguous terrorism mitigation policies within their various security agencies. As one participant (P3) stated:

It appears that we are all confused as to what the policies on counterterrorism are.

Various security agencies have different policies that at times, clash with each other. This causes contention between these agencies and of course, when four or more security agencies are put together to achieve one aim with different policies, there will be confusion in that camp.

Other participants reported that within their organizations, terrorism mitigation policies were unclear or unknown. One participant (P2) acknowledged having a policy in place but noted a lack of understanding and seriousness when he stated:

These policies put in by the government are there but nobody emphasizes them. We do not know what exactly to do with terrorists except to kill them the way they also slaughter soldiers. When we do, some human rights groups make noise all over the media. We have never been told not to kill terrorists. We are aware that there are policies on handling terrorists, as well as on operations regarding terrorism but all we are asked to do is go out and kill the terrorists.

One participant described how an organization's policies favoured a carefully selected group of ex-terrorists and the families and friends of public officers working in that organization.

The participant (P6) stated:

It amazes me how people joke with policies set in place by the government. As serious and tedious as it is to come up with policies, public officers mess around with them.

The policy on the Niger Delta Amnesty Program of 2007 was aimed at rehabilitating former militants who played roles in terrorism activities, from the Niger Delta region.

This policy seemed good but became unclear as only a selected few were made to benefit temporarily from it by participating in vocational training programs that were of no use to them. The militants are back now because they were not rehabilitated rather,

their leaders were compensated financially. This whole thing is unclear to everyone who thought it was a good strategy to curb terrorism in the Niger Delta, through youth empowerment.

Another participant noted that the policy on the rotation of soldiers to combat areas is also unclear.

A participant (P2) stated: Some of us are kept in mission fields for many years while others are in peaceful cities enjoying themselves. We all signed for the same military job. While some are in battle areas for two years and moved, others are there for over five years till they get killed. We need to understand the rotation policy so that if we are to fight for two years and leave, our minds would be made up for that period of time.

When we see others leave us in battle areas, we get discouraged. There are thousands of discouraged soldiers on the battlefield.

Emergent Subtheme Seven: Staying Current with Counterterrorism Advancements

The subtheme: staying current with counterterrorism advancements emerged as participants described how technological advancement had improved the strategies and combat skills of terrorists, and how the advancement in current counterterrorism studies and experience would enhance better results in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.

Some participants felt it was important to keep abreast with advancements to facilitate a better understanding of terrorists' behaviour. By this, operatives may understand and predict the next move of terrorists, just like forensic profilers do with other criminals, helping to prevent or reduce the effects of terrorism.

Participants felt that by keeping current with technology, updates and upgrades, operatives would be more proactive with their mitigation strategies.

One participant (P1) stated:

Terrorists are ten steps ahead of us in technology and knowledge in terrorism and counterterrorism. It is clear that they understand our next move, through their knowledge of the thoughts of counterterrorist, and their ability to cajole members of our team to give them useful information on our operations.

Terrorists spend good money to get advanced training abroad while we remain here deceiving ourselves that we are counterterrorist's.

Another participant (P1) stated:

Training on counterterrorism operations and strategies should go beyond chasing terrorists in the forest. We rate our level of success by the number of terrorists we kill in operations. We kill five terrorists and you see it all over social media with so much fanfare. We should think of better ways to end terrorism by moving with a better trend of counterterrorism strategies. Of course, I know that it is important to engage terrorists in combat but that is only one strategy out of many.

I am only speculating now because I do not know the others as I have not received any special training in counterterrorism except for combat engagements.

Other participants acknowledged how technological advancements can aid in the improvement of individual daily experiences.

One participant (P3) stated:

Technological advancement does not necessarily mean we must be sent abroad.

The technology can be brought into Nigeria to meet us. I have heard of simulators that can train counterterrorist's and make their experiences appear real. I am sure that a lot of soldiers do not even know the meaning of simulators. Another problem is that when

huge budgets are made for this equipment and they are eventually bought, their use may not be guaranteed. I am aware that the Nigerian Air Force has aircraft simulators that have been installed for many years but have not been touched. The bottom line, however, is to ensure that we are updated to meet up with the current trend in counterterrorism activities.

Discrepant Cases

All participants gladly responded to interview questions, providing useful details on their roles and activities regarding counterterrorism operations and strategies applied.

All participants were cooperative, and none of them refused to respond to any of the interview questions. During my interview transcripts reviews, two discrepant cases where participant responses were considerably different from the responses of other participants were identified. The first was where a participant felt that he was enlisted to serve the nation in whatever situation he finds himself. He explained that the military-owned him, and as such, he cannot find any fault with his organization. Rather he affirmed that he is ready to go for any mission wherever he is assigned to, and that he does not care if his return is not guaranteed.

In the second instance, the participant stated that he does not need any more knowledge than that which his superiors already have. He was of the opinion that since he has more exposed superiors, they should do the reasoning for him and simply send him on missions, with instructions. All participants presented detailed examples of experiences encountered during counterterrorism operations. Responses from the other six participants to the interview question on experiences with the operations, and the impact of the strategies on their performance described their experiences as either dumbfounding, disappointing, or a nightmare.

In contrast, the participant offered no specific experience even after probing further, during the interview. His positions and postings since his enlistment offered him no opportunity to gain any experience in counterterrorism strategies and operations. This explained his inability to share experiences of precise instances relating to counter-insurgency operations.

The Essence of Participants' Experiences

The essence of the participant's experience is to depict the meanings participants attributed based on actual accounts of their roles with counterterrorist strategies. This description provides a combination of the textural and structural participant descriptions regarding their experiences. Participants comprised of counterterrorist operatives, victims of terrorism, policymakers and former terrorists shared stories related to their role perceptions, role behaviours, and role performance within the perspective of evaluating counterterrorism strategies.

They shared their beliefs, feelings, and thoughts about their role in or with counterterrorism strategies, and suggested that the most important control activity required the development of counterterrorism strategies through training. Counterterrorist operatives require good knowledge and understanding of their role in counterterrorist operations, to help set clear expectations, recognize unproductive and jeopardizing activities, and ensure intervention is achieved with necessary support. Most participants exhibited a low level of confidence in their organization and the government. Sharing their experiences, therefore, will highlight most of the flaws that may have been concealed from authorities as a result of fear of being reprimanded by higher authorities. This may be addressed; resulting in positive impacts that would be significantly enhanced by increased levels of operative's performance.

Each participant understood that counterterrorism operations require supervision and leadership by professionals, trained in the act of modern terrorism and counterterrorism studies. Additionally, participants viewed the mitigation of terrorism issues from a performance perspective, and combining observation with verbal persuasion. Having a personal commitment to driving performance and an understanding of the responsibility for controlling the act of terrorism is essential for all operatives assigned to this task.

Finally, participants viewed an understanding developing effective counterterrorism strategies, along with manpower development and the provision of adequate and necessary supplies, as useful enhancers for performance and effectiveness.

Summary

In Chapter 4, a description of the research setting, participant demographics, participant recruitment, data collection, data analysis process, and evidence of measures used to establish trustworthiness were presented. Information about the results of the data analysis used to uncover the meaning participants ascribed to their role in counterterrorism operations was also provided. In this chapter also, details on the thematic development process used to derive the essences of participant experiences were offered, and discrepant cases identified during data analysis were discussed. In Chapter 5, a description of how the results of the study contribute to the body of knowledge on the development of effective counterterrorism strategies will be offered. The chapter includes information on the study's limitations and its influence on trustworthiness. Chapter 5 ends with recommendations for future research and implications of the study from a social change perspective.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Findings

Participants unanimously stated that their roles required more productive actions aimed at ensuring effective performance by operatives through the provision of essential items that will enhance their performance. The data backs a form of motivation that includes an external monitoring force with persons acting to fulfill the demands of an external source. For participants who are counterterrorist agents, the ability to provide adequate working conditions to boost the morale of operatives serves as the external stimulus for their performance.

Each participant understood the facts about ensuring operatives are motivated and its importance in counterterrorism operations. Leaders have an obligation to protect the interests of their employers and employees that they supervise. In the counterterrorist operational setting, it also follows that commanders must protect the interest of their operatives while guarding the military and the government as their principal employers. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, commanders are careful to do this, so as not to lose their positions. In the past, cases occur where commanders have been tried and sanctioned when they appear to tilt toward the welfare of the operatives, and seemingly question authorities about issues concerning the poor morale of soldiers.

This is required to provide the logistic and technical support as well as all other tools needed to boost the operative's morale, for effective performance. Measuring the performance levels of operatives in combat areas indicates that this role activity is essential for the effective building of morale levels and ensuring that counterterrorism strength is not compromised.

Additionally, drawing from the extrinsic motivation theoretical perspective, operational commanders' interests in mitigating operative's irrational behaviour during counterterrorism operations stems from an obligatory function within the organizations, to create a conducive and morale-filled work environment. Though the zeal of these commanders is a vital tool in such operations, unfortunately, it would have no effect as long as the tools to complement the zeal are unavailable.

From these perspectives, the consequences of ignoring the importance of an operative's welfare could be averted by offering the government of Nigeria a useful method of identifying and dealing with individual cases of negligence by supervising authorities, as regards the provision of welfare for security forces involved in counterterrorism operations. Participants showed elements of discouragement, distrust for, and neglect by authorities, as well as a tint of disorganization resulting from the loss of total command of troops as a result of the poor standard of their welfare.

While we continue to apply the combat strategy, the terrorists understand our strategies and do all they can to work around them. This implies that they are operating a step above us.

Findings on monitoring employee activity would have been ideal in checking operatives to ensure that they operate in the best professional fashion. However, participants discussed how operatives frustrate the efforts of commanders and their superiors.

5.2 Conclusion

The counterterrorism operations of the Nigerian forces also brought to the fore the need for collective efforts among the internal security forces and within the regional forces. The counterterrorism operations previously lacked collective and diplomatic

efforts as agencies were individualistic and uncooperative. The inability to keep the terrorist group at bay was because the security agencies were interested in securing the individual's glory as well as the President's attention at the expense of working together to win the war. The lack of a framework to ensure a collective effort became significant within the Nigerian security apparatus and her immediate neighbours as the realities on the ground made it essential for security agencies to be organically related. This became vital as the police force that has the primary responsibility for a particular role in the counterterrorism operation appeared to have failed in the performance of that role; thus it became inevitable for other agencies to provide the required support to succeed. The counterterrorism effort of the Nigerian government was largely ill-defined, ad hoc, and reactionary. Participants stated that the failure of many of the government responses, especially those concerning the use of the military approach, created unexpected negative consequences. More worrisome was the considerable sum of money the government had spent on Boko Haram terrorism that appeared not to have produced the desired result. Arising from this, the Nigerian people began to call for an appropriate and workable counterterrorism strategy that would be all-inclusive and comprehensive as well as take into consideration both military and other non-military approaches. The majority of the interviewees believed that this led to the passage of the Terrorism Prevention Acts. Owing to the continued attacks of the Boko Haram terrorist group and calls from Nigerians and the international community, the Nigerian federal government took a cursory look at the posture of its various counterterrorism strategies in theory and practice. Thus, a directive from the Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari to the National Security Adviser to come up with an all encompassing strategy to address Boko Haram terrorism. This theme of the call for a comprehensive national strategy that

would incorporate military and civilian capabilities and be designed around the functions of security, diplomatic, economic, political, and elements of national power was high in the mind of the people. There was the need for a counterterrorism strategy that would be all-inclusive, and not dictated by the prevailing situation, but supportive and complimentary of the security, economic, social, political, and diplomatic efforts. The Nigerian counterterrorism policy framework tagged National Counter-Terrorism Strategy

5.3 Recommendation(s)

The accounts from the interviews brought concern about the strategies that should be taken to tackle terrorist attacks.

1. Research is required to provide other researchers with knowledge about the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies toward Boko Haram terrorism.
2. The Nigerian counterterrorism policy must outline the measures for fighting the threat of Boko Haram in the country future research which could be carried out to determine if the Nigerian counterterrorism policy meets the aim for which it was established.
3. The Authority should employ quantitative methodologies to arrive at a different perspective about the policy effectiveness.
4. The characteristics of an active counterterrorism policy must be done with adequate planning, review mechanisms, distinct threat profile, resource allocation, and application as well as proper training.
5. A rigorous and regular evaluation of the present Nigerian counterterrorism policy effectiveness could help the country to determine its level of progress towards these goals. The findings of this study should be made available to the government

of Nigeria as it will help in resource application, terrorism combat readiness, and contingency planning.

6. There must be an understanding of the relationships between institutions that are involved in the counterterrorism effort is crucial as it could develop a healthy relationship and more consistent practices. A harmonious relationship brings about more productivity and more pleasantness at work. The healthy relationships are critical to successful counterterrorism effort in Nigeria and attention should be paid to it.
7. Researchers could explore whether there are healthy relationships among the Nigerian security agencies that are involved in counterterrorism effort and any future findings could assist in improving the working relationships among these agencies.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

This study contributed to knowledge in the following ways:

- a. It has revealed that the prevalence of terrorism in Nigeria is responsible for continued proliferation of illegal arms in the state, illegal mining and consequently for the perpetuation of criminality. Thus, conflict creates platforms for crime to fester.
- b. The study expanded the scope of knowledge beyond terrorism to its associated criminality in Nigeria, particularly the Borno state, which little information previously existed.
- c. Findings of the study verified the validity of the theories. The theoretical position of Relative Deprivation and Human Needs theories is understood within the context of the findings.

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Appendix I

Counter Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria: Case Study of the Boko Haram

Interview (CTSNBHI)

Dear Respondent,

I am a Student of Lead City University, Ibadan, Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, presently undertaking a research survey on the “**Counter Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria: Case Study of the Boko Haram**”. The information you provide below is strictly for the purpose of this research work and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you.

Researcher

Interview Questions to the Public

1. To what extent can we say counterterrorism strategies have been effective and efficient in Nigeria?
2. What in your view are the policy frameworks that have worked or failed in Nigeria's counterterrorism since 2009?
3. What regional or national counterterrorism measures or strategies ought to have been considered by the Nigerian government?
4. Can we see the possibility of an end to terrorism in Nigeria?
5. How best can terrorism be tackled in Nigeria?
6. What are the restraining factors in the use of kinetic (military) and non-kinetic (non-military) options in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria?
7. What are the implications of ineffective counterterrorism strategies for Nigeria's corporate existence?
8. What Political or legal or Diplomatic measures can enhance counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria?

Appendix II

Interview Questions for the IDP Welfare Workers

1. Name of the IDP Camp:
2. What is the name of the Organisation/MDA you represent?
3. How long have you been working in IDP Camp?
4. What is the population of IDPs in your camp?
5. What would you say is responsible for displacement of people? or What is/are the cause/s of internal displacement of people?
6. What is the connection between the establishment of IDP camps and Boko-Haram activities?
7. Having interacted with IDPs, what advice would you give the government that may help to curb the activities of Boko-Haram?
8. What has been your experience working with IDPs?
9. Any other comment/s

Appendix III

Interview Questions for the Internally Displaced Persons

1. Name not required
2. Name of IDP Camp
3. Gender:
4. Age:
5. Occupation:
6. Village/ Town
7. State:
8. How did you get to the camp?
9. For how long have you been in the camp?
10. Do you have relation/s in the camp? If yes how many are they and what is your relationship with them?
11. What do you miss or lose being in the camp?
12. How much loss would you say you have recorded?
13. What do you know of Boko- Haram members?
14. What would you advise the government to do to checkmate them?
15. Any other comments?

Appendix IV

Counter Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria: Case Study of the Boko Haram Questionnaire (CTSNBHQ)

Dear Respondent,

I am a Student of Lead City University, Ibadan, Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, presently undertaking a research survey on the “**Counter Terrorism Strategies in Nigeria: Case Study of the Boko Haram**”. The information you provide below is strictly for the purpose of this research work and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you.

Researcher

Questionnaire for Terrorists/Ex-Militants

1. Do you have any regrets for participating in insurgency?
2. What other ways do you think you can pass your message rather than through violence?
3. If you had a chance to undo what you have done how will you go about it?
4. How do you think victims of your actions feel?
5. Do you have suggestions that could stop the act of terrorism?
6. What ways did the military carry out counterterrorism operations that resulted in more attacks from insurgents?
7. What better ways should they have approached counterterrorism?
8. Do you think the government has a role to play in ending terrorism in Nigeria?
9. Is there a chance of ending terrorism if the government agrees with some of your terms and vice versa?
10. How do you think government can prevent youths from getting engaged in terrorism?
11. Do you have any ideas to offer to the government and counterterrorism agencies?
12. What was your motive in getting involved in terrorism?

Appendix V

Questionnaire for Victims

1. How has the situation you passed through affected you?
2. Are there things you think the government did not do to prevent the situation?
3. How do you think you can recover from the experience?
4. What ways do you think counterterrorist agencies should have carried out their operations?
5. Do you have any suggestions for policymakers in Nigeria regarding terrorism?
6. Do you expect any compensation, and how will that help you to recover?

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Appendix VI

Questionnaire for Counterterrorist agencies

1. How do you think you have handled the situation so far?
2. Do you have all it takes to fight insurgency?
3. What strategies other than physical combat do you apply in tackling insurgency?
4. How are the strategies working out?
5. Are there other ways you think these operations can be handled rather than by physical combat?
6. What difficulties do you face during operations?
7. Do you have enough training to handle these operations?
8. What areas do you think you require improvement?
9. How can the government help to get you better equipped for this task?
10. What exactly is your mission toward eradicating terrorism in Nigeria?

Further Probes

1. Can you tell me more about the failed operations you have carried out and why you think they failed?
2. Do you think the government is encouraging kidnapping victims by terrorists due to the governments' compromise in paying huge ransom to terrorists?
3. Is there anything else you would want me to know?

Appendix VII

NIGERIAN CORRECTIONAL SERVICE NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Bill Clinton Drive, Airport Road, (P.M.B. 16, Garki - Abuja)



Phone:.....

Your Ref:.....

NCoS.005/S.74/I/1

Our Ref:.....

Date: **11th October, 2021**


Department of Politics and International Relations
Faculty of Social and Management Sciences
Lead City University Ibadan,
PO BOX 30678 Ibadan, Oyo State.

Attention: Prof Tunde Oseni (HOD, Politics and International Relations)

RE: HON. BASHIR OMOLAJO BOLARINWA REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH STUDY ON COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN NIGERIA: CASE STUDY OF THE BOKO HARAM, APPROVAL OF:

Reference to your letter dated 16th August, 2021 on the above subject matter.

2. I am directed to write and convey the Controller General of Corrections approval to go ahead and conduct the research.
3. Furthermore, you are expected to obey the rules and regulations governing the Correctional Centres as breach of security guidelines will not be entertained.
4. Also you should submit a copy of your research report to the Education Unit at Correctional Service Headquarters Abuja for record purpose.
4. Be informed accordingly please.


AE ORISABINONE

(Controller of Corrections Education)
For: Controller General of Corrections

Copy: TO I/C Maximum SCC Lagos, Medium SCC Lagos and MSCC Kuje, Abuja

Biodata

A. Personal Data

Full Name: Bashir Omolaja, BOLARINWA
Home Address: 10, Shonga Street, Behind Shoprite, Ilorin, GRA, Kwara State.
Email: bashbolafirst@yahoo.com
Phone No: 08020685555
Place of Birth: Lagos
Date of Birth: 24th April, 1960
Nationally: Nigerian
Name of next of kin: Alhaja Aisha Adewunmi Bolarinwa
Home address: 10, Shonga Street, Behind Shoprite, Ilorin, GRA, Kwara State.

B. Educational Background

Oyelagbawo Grammar School, Ilala, Kwara State (WASCE) 1980
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Kwara State. (Bachelor of Science in Zoology) 1987
University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos. (PGD in Mass Communication) 1990
Lead City University, Ibadan, Oyo State. (M.Sc. in International Relations) 2019
Lead City University, Ibadan, Oyo State. (Ph.D. in International Relations) In-View

C. Working Experience

REEDWAN PETROLEUM NIGERIA LTD

Post Held: Chief Executive Officer

Services: Diesel and allied petroleum products Marketer

AIBEE OIL & GAS LIMITED

Post Held: Chief Executive Officer

Services: Oil & Gas Marketer

AIBOB Fisheries

Post Held: Chief Executive Officer

Services: Fishing business venture

AVRIL TWENTYFORTH COMMUNICATIONS

Post Held: Chief Executive Officer

Services: Media and Publishing

OLOMOH FARMS AND INTEGRATED SERVICES

Post Held: Chief Executive Officer

Services: Agriculture, Mining ND Allied business

D. PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP

- **Fellow**, Chartered Institute of Local Government and Public Administration of Nigeria (CILGPAN).
- **Fellow**, Centre for Corporate Governance and International Politics (CECGIP-Nigeria).
- **Member**, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA).

E. POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE

- **Chairman**, National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) 2021 till date
- **Foundation Member**, All Progressives Congress (APC)
- **Former State Chairman**, Kwara State All Progressives Congress (APC)
- **Member**, Bayelsa State Governorship Screening Committee 2015
- **Member**, Federal House Of Representatives 2007-2011

Post Held: Elected Representative for Mainland Federal Constituency.

Responsibilities: Legislative duty which includes law-making for the good governance of the country, oversight, adequate and effective representation of the constituency.

- Vice Chairman, Committee on Population
- Member, Committee on Communication
- Member, Committee on Information
 - Member, Committee on Aviation
 - Member, Committee on Nigerian Air Force

MAINLAND LGA, LAGOS STATE

Post Held: Two – Term LGA Chairman (Elected) 1999-2002 & 2004 - 2007

Responsibilities: Executive duties, which included policy making and implementation.

- Grassroots mobilisation and public enlightenment on state government's policies.
- Implementation and management of public health, road networks, waste management, and public primary education policies.
- Participation in the national and state government policies, particularly the security policy.

MAINLAND LGA, LAGOS STATE

Post Held: Re-Elected Councillor for the Ward 1992 - 1993

Responsibilities: Legislative duties, including serving as the Liaison Officer between the council and the ward community.

- Elected the Council Legislative Leader, with attendant additional duty of managing the relationship between the LGA Executive and Legislative arms.

MAINLAND LGA, LAGOS STATE

Post Held: Councillor for Ward (Elected) 1991-1992

Responsibilities: Legislative duties, including serving as the Liaison Officer between the council and my ward community.

- Served as the Chairman of Market Committee that overseeing the revenue generation and management of the markets within the jurisdiction of the LGA.

F. LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONS

- **PATRON**, Centre for Good Citizenship and Leadership (formerly Buhari Friends Organisation Network), Kwara State Chapter.

G. PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP

- **Fellow**, Chartered Institute of Local Government and Public Administration of Nigeria (CILGPAN).
- **Fellow**, Centre for Corporate Governance and International Politics (CECGIP-Nigeria).
- **Member**, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA).

Signature

Date

University Compliance Certificate

This is to certify this thesis by BOLARINWA Bashir Omolaja, LCU/PG/000309 in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Lead City University, Ibadan, is in FULL compliance with the approved University format and style.

Signature

Date

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