Performance Appraisal of NigerianFederal Government Public Relations Responsesand Strategiesin Inter-ethnic Crisis Management (1987 - 2002)

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Being a PhD Thesis Submitted to the Department of Mass Communication & Media Technology, Faculty of Communication & Information Science, Lead City University Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria

In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy Degree (PhD) in Public Relations and Advertising

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2023

Certification

This is to certify that this thesis, submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Public Relations and Advertising, was carried out by **Oyewole Oladele FAKOYA** with Matriculation Number: LCU/PG/002157 in the Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology, Faculty of Communication and Information Science, Lead City University Ibadan, Nigeria.

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to God Almighty, without Whom no man can achieve anything.

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Acknowledgment

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Although the above-named institutions an persons assisted me in the course of doing this research, I alone stand responsible for any error, if any, found in this work.

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Abstract

Since independence, Nigeria has experiencedhuge and devastating inter-ethnic crisisboth during civil and military rules with such already degenerating into situations that now threatens the country's political stability and sovereignty foundation. This study appraised the performances of public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crisis management in some communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. Explorative research design was adopted. Crisis management model and peacebuilding theories explained the variables and held that planning for deliberate proactive intervention of third-party in people's conflicting affairs within multi-ethnic society is a condition for realisation of peacebuilding. The population of the study comprises residents in communities where identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred. Multi-stage sampling procedure was utilised, while checklist and key personality interview were deployed to collect data. Data collected was analysed using descriptive statistics and historical analysis. Findings revealed that responses and strategies studies Federal Government of Nigeria's adopted as mitigation of damage on federal government's reputation, promotion of justice, victims welfarepackages, peacebuilding, propaganda, media intervention, public enlightenment, tribunals and panels of inquiries, corporate social responsibility, sympathy visits, peace meetings and community relations towards inter-ethnic crisis were effective given the fact that their grand means on a scale of 4 scored 2.60 and 2.58 againstthe decision rule of 2.50.The study concluded that the Federal Government of Nigeria's public relations responses and strategies policies should be improved upon to effectively deal with prevention of inter-ethnic crisis.Hence it is recommended that inter-ethnic conflict arbitration forum should be institutionalised and established in every local government of the federation.

Keywords: Ethnic nationality, Inter-ethnic crises, Crisis management, Inter-ethnic relationship, Performance appraisal

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

The definition of inter-ethnic crisis has undergone a great deal of explanation. However, the general understanding offered is that inter-ethnic crisis typically takes the form of misunderstanding and clashes in the ways of living of members of different social groups of people who constitute the population of a given community, country, or singular geographical political entity. Typically, those who identify as belonging to a specific ethnicity or ethnic group are those who have ancestry, history, culture, and language in common[1]. Since practically all societies with multiple ethnic groups are composed of different ethnic groups, then, the term "ethnic" or "ethnicity" is a social phenomenon[1]. Ethnicity is a general term used to classify people into ethnic groups or nationalities.

When classifying groupings of people based on their expression and identity with culture, the terms "ethnicity" and "ethnic nationality or group" are used interchangeably. In a political system where language and culture are the most salient characteristics, interactions between people of different ethnic groups show how ethnicity manifests itself attributively[1].

Crisis can be described as any situation that will inevitably lead to or may result in an unstable and unsafe situation that affects a specific person, a certain group of people, or the entire community. Inter-ethnic crises are described as critically unpleasant occurrences, situations, circumstances, problems, or whatever that occurs as a result of misunderstanding and clashes in the lifestyles of members of various social groups who make up the population of a specific community, country, or a single geographical political entity[2].

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Based on this background, inter-ethnic issues are those undesirable events brought on by competing interests of people of various ethnic nationalities coexisting in a particular community or country, with such having propensity to engender animosity, hostility, and discord among them. The livelihood, well-being, survival, and peaceful coexistence of people of various ethnic nationalities living side by side in a particular community or state are all threatened by inter-ethnic crises.

Every individual or group of individuals has a unique personality that is composed of several features. However, the fact that ethnicity is inherent in virtually all multicultural societies would suggest that ethnic identity is created as a result of interactions among members of many ethnic groups that are governed under the same political system. A shared awareness of being in connection to other relevant ethnic groups can be developed via this sort of engagement. Constrictions between the in-group and out-group then start to form, which over time become closely guarded. This perspective view ethnicity as a method for the politicization of ethnic identities [2].

Personality factors as condensed by academic works and intellectual paradigms at first glance appeared to support the notion that a person's requirements, value system, interests, and resources indeed shapes and forms his or her personality. The implication of this argument is that any person or group of people may act in a variety of ways in accordance to this burdensome cause. Technically, people's actions can occasionally be justified or based on factors that vary by civilization.

With the foregoing, one may submit that inter-ethnic dimensional issues, which were previously described as negative occurrences caused by competing social interests and/or poor

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governmental decisions within a given society or country with such having a tendency to endanger the people's livelihood, wellbeing, and survival, are in fact rooted in personality factors. And it is only when these recurring coloration/dimensional problems are allowed to smolder past the brewing stages in any given society or nation that they degenerate into crises, such as inter-communal violence, wars, secessionist movements, insecurity, loss of life and property of citizens, damage to the reputation of the government, disobedience to the rule of law, high rate of poverty, lack of economic empowerment, and a profound lack of unity among citizens [3].

Consequently, when these crises are recorded, the government being the arm of the society saddled with the responsibilities of exercising sovereign power, human governance and management, as well as control and allocation of resources for peoples' survival and development becomes faced with the challenge of timely crises management which involves mitigation or minimization of the damages by way of response through the use or applications of some professional designed principles and strategies. Crisis management occurs not only after a crisis has occurred; it is actually a comprehensive process that is put into practice before a crisis even happens.

Since its origin as a political entity, the phenomenon known as "inter-ethnic crises" has unsettled and prevented Nigeria from being able to achieve political stability, flawless democratic practice and economic prosperity. These conditions have persisted because, in the first place, the various personality traits of the more than 250 distinct ethnic groups that make up the country have not been carefully taken into account and permitted to influence the government's decisions that results in national sociopolitical choices. Secondly, the people have not yet addressed the issue of the incorrect and incompetent person or persons becoming the country's political leaders. In all

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facets of public administration and the management of social affairs, leadership is a crucial component.

One of the main causes of state incompetence in Nigeria has been ascribed to leadership failure. These factors have been highlighted as one of the key causes of the Nigerian government's inefficiency. Even democracy in the country has not yielded the anticipated results because of the makeup of the political elites, who have little understanding of what constitutes successful administration [4].

Additionally, numerous studies, including those by the former United States government, have found out that the past Nigeria leaders have not been able to harness and convert the country's wealth into sustainable development for the people and the country as a whole. The nation exported an average of 2 million barrels per day, yet it was not only unable to completely account for its profits but also failed to utilize its four refineries to its maximum 10.4% capacity [5].

As was previously stated, every human being or group of people has a unique personality that is made up of several features, such as their needs, value system, interests, and resources that indeed shapes and defines them. Every individual or group of individuals exhibits a variety of behaviours, including the attitudes and behaviours of political leaders, which might be attributed to this burdensome cause. In every community, people's actions are justified or based on their various personality configuration systems. There is therefore no possibility that conflicts between the personality traits of people from more than 250 different ethnic nations while interacting with one another inside the nation will go unrecorded [6].

Some of the crises faced by Israel in the Biblical era were caused by inter-ethnic wars, bad economy, and poverty, to name just few. However, Israel was able to rise above those various

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inter-ethnic crises that plagued the country's national life through some public relations responses and strategies, such as strategic unity, memorial communication, publishing and dissemination of single regulatory charter,promotion of justice and equity,strategic participatory communication, and publishing and dissemination of leadership code of conduct.

The pre-independence history of Nigeria reveals that the once autonomous ethnic groups that later became politically organized into city states (in the Northern protectorate), empires, and kingdomsengaged in wars of attrition prior to the country's amalgamation, which were ostensibly motivated by a desire for annexation and economic acquirement (in the southern protectorate). Secondly, rather than ensuring a peaceful relationship between various ethnic groups in the country, Lord Lugard's 1914 amalgamation of the former Northern and Southern protectorates caused increased and intensified ethnic and religious divides and antagonism among the populace that has been constituted by over 250 ethnic groups[6].

Thirdly, the direct and indirect rule systems of British colonial politics, which have perpetuated regional and cultural disparities amongst people of various ethnic nations in the country to this day, have done nothing other than causing loud discord and dissension[6]. However, it appears that these differences have continued to be a catalyst for racism, intolerance, political unrest, and instability among Nigerians. The British colonial political/administrative policies of direct and indirect rule system, therefore, while it helped the British colonialists maximize political and economic gains, the resultant inter-group relations in the country was the polarization of the country and people and intensification of suspicion, hatred, and occasionally outright hostility[6].

Retrospectively, inter-ethnic crisis prompted by clashes in personality factors of members of different ethnic nationalities that made up Nigeria which seems to have been upsetting and preventing the country from becoming successful are enormous. In this regard, some occurrences

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and developments in the country's national life since independence in 1960 till year 2020 would be highlighted subsequently under the following narrations: post-independence and new democratic life.

Political disputes among politicians between 1960 and 1966, military invasions, the separatist movement that resulted in the creation of the Republic of Biafra in 1967, and a three-year civil war were the main popular crises that marked Nigeria's post-independence history. Additionally, during the country's four distinct governmental civil regimes, known as the first, second, third, and fourth republics, there were several inter-ethnic disputes.

There have been many inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria since the start of the present fourth republic in 1999, with some of them already ballooning out of control and endangering the nation politically.

Violence over the succession of an emir erupted in Kaduna State in May 1999, left more than 100 people died. The Sagamu people in Ogun state claimed that Hausa women violated their cultural tradition which prohibited women from viewing what they do during their Oro festival by coming out of their houses while the festival was being held in July 1999. Arguments followed, and eventually escalated into a fully-fledged crisis. Before a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on Sagamu town, many Yoruba and Hausa people were killed. Even as the scandal in Sagamu was brought under control, retaliatory attacks persisted in Kano, a Hausa city, resulting in deaths and the destruction of property worth billions of Naira [7]. In retribution for a local gang killing 12 policemen in November 1999, the army demolished the town of Odi in Bayelsa State and executed a large number of residents. From February to May 2000, violence in Kaduna over the imposition of Sharia legal system in the State resulted in the deaths of over a thousand people. In retaliatory assaults in southeast Nigeria, hundreds of Hausa people were killed [7].

Also, a misunderstanding between Hausa and the Yoruba residents in Idi-Araba / Oko-Oba, Lagos over a Hausa man's usage of a convenience led to inter-ethnic dispute that had a significant influence on the people of Nigeria in October 2002. Numerous Yoruba people died as a result of the chaos. Consequently, as a result of this occurrence, the O'dua People's Congress, a Yoruba militia, was established, and thereby made the crisis worse as it eventually extended to Kano [8]. During racial tension between the Tivs and the Junkuns in Plateau State in September 2001, approximately 2,000 people were murdered in the inter-ethnic riots in Jos[8]. Communal unrest in October 2001 occurred and stretched to the states of Benue, Taraba, and Nasarawa, resulting in hundreds of fatalities and displacement of tens of thousands of people[8].

The battles between herders and farmers represent yet another significant inter-ethnic problem cum inter-communal violence that has not yet been addressed in Nigeria[9]. Historically, farmers and herders have records of repeated clashes over crop damage and livestock theft; however, the clashes usually escalate and lead to strained inter-communal relationships.

The Middle Belt area of Nigeria, notably Benue, has experienced protracted violent battles between farmers who are primarily Christians and cattle herders who are primarily Muslims[9]. Conflicts over rights to land and water resources, as well as growing desertification, which have altered cow grazing patterns, are at the heart of many current conflicts. Although these conflicts are not necessarily new, they have been increasingly frequent and severe since 2015. More than 2,000 people died in such skirmishes in 2018 alone, which is more than those that were murdered in two previous years combined[9]. Such conflicts have intensified in the northwest amid a climate of growing insecurity characterized by armed banditry, abduction for ransom, ethnic vigilantism, and inter-communal strife that have claimed almost 8,000 lives with about 200,000 people allegedly displaced between 2011 and early 2020[10].

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In reality, the attention and publicity given the fights between Fulani herders and farmers which have spread throughout the nation have indeed severely tarnished the ties between various groups in the country[9]. Allegedly, the Fulani herders violate the rights and privileges of their host communities in an effort to retain their nomadic economy and way of life, inciting distrust and animosity in the process. The Nimbo, Uzo-Uwani community, Igangan, Oke Ogun, and Agatu crises in the states of Enugu and Oyo, respectively, spring to mind and serve as more evidence of the tense ties between the country's many ethnic groups[11]. Despite the release of a ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan (NLTP) that calls for the creation of ranches for farmers, which attempts to stop farmer-herder violence and address resource access, total peace is still yet not in sight among farmers and herders across the country.

Islamist extremist organizations, including Boko Haram, ISWAP, and others, have allegedly lately tried to establish themselves in the northwest by forming alliances with regional criminal gangs, and militias with herding connection. Al-Qaida were said to have started to make some breakthroughs in the northwest region of the country[12].

In addition, there were south-south Niger-Delta militant criminal activities, and oil theft linked to neglect by the federal government, suffering from oil pollution that led to loss of means of livelihood, perceived exploitation and environmental degradation plagued the southern, oil-rich Niger Delta region for a decade despite the fact that the region generates the nation's revenue[13].

Early in the 1990s, Ogoni activists brought the severe environmental harm caused by oil exploitation in the Niger Delta to the attention of the world. In 1994, people, including activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, head of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), were charged with murder of a number of Ogoni leaders [14]. Despite their not guilty pleas, Saro-Wiwa

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and eight others were found guilty[14]. Sani Abacha's military dictatorship came under fire for the executions, and in reaction, the United States withdrew its ambassador[14]. Also in 2016, the Niger Delta Avengers (and other smaller organizations) equally took to damaging of oil production facilities which resulted in lowering of petroleum production from 2.2 million barrels per day to 1.1 million barrels per day[14]. Eventually, one of Nigeria's worst economic recessions on record began as a result of the just mentioned infrastructure damage[14].

The rise in activism for cessation that the country has been experiencing actually started before the civil war in 1967. However, in contrast to the earlier agitators headed in the Southeast of the country by the late Odumegu Ojukwu, these new ones operate in a rather polite manner with strength to cause numerous disruptions to the way the nation is governed. On one side is IPOB, which represents the Igbo ethnic group and is led by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu. On the other is the Oduduwa Republic, which represents the Yoruba ethnic group and is led by Professor Banji Akintoye and Chief Sunday Adeyemo also known as Sunday Igboho. At various venues, the leaders of these movements and agitations have asserted that the reasons behind their agitations are the marginalization and unjust treatment of people of their ethnicity by the Nigerian government, which is led by Muhammadu Buhari.

However, irrespective of how bad these experienced inter-ethnic crises may appear, even as it has been upsetting and preventing the country from becoming successful; the situations should not be beyond solution and redemption with the use of public relations responses and strategies.The demand or requirement of crises management principles which involves proactiveness, anticipation, preventive planned efforts, communication and reputation management makes public relations contributions or inputs unavoidably important to crises management, and inter-ethnic crises management[15].

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Therefore, the fact that fostering peace within a society or nation is public relations' main goal makes public relations practices a social phenomenon. Hence, as a social science, public relation is defined as deliberate, planned and sustained efforts to create mutual understanding between a government, an organization or individual and its Publics[16]. Public relations' (PR) is the term used to describe the range of actions taken by a government, an organization, or a person to advance and safeguard their reputation, and their policies in the eyes and thoughts of the general public[16]. Public relations activities usually involve developing strategic important messages and information and disseminating such to selected publics in order to accomplish the aforementioned goals. When a government, an organization or individual needs a broad set of communication activities in order to create and maintain favourable relations between itself and any publics, then public relations must be considered. Therefore, management of negative occurrences, news and events relating to government(s), organizations, groups or individuals' businesses and management of crises that are caused by conflicts in inter-human relationships and bad leadership are the functions of public relation.

Pertinently, to minimize harm and make sure the storm is weathered, its crucial to know how to react to and address these issues or crises as they arise [16]. When an inter-ethnic conflict arises, public relations first and foremost responds quickly to head it off, mitigates or minimizes harm, if any, and then helps the affected party recover, survive, rebuild their reputation, and promote their improved reputation. But again, crisis management procedures start before a crisis ever happens; they are a thorough procedure that is performed before a problem ever arises.

Therefore, the functions of public relations in crisis management start with anticipating and preventing crises through a variety of approaches, such as designating a response team and spokesperson, developing a strategy and briefing the team, crafting a communication message,

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identifying and addressing the affected parties. It also involves monitoring and reviewing the situation with its strategies or tools such as image laundering programmes, media relations (press conferences, releases, and propaganda), conflict resolution, peace-building programmes, corporate social responsibility (CSR), public awareness, sensitization and enlightenment, personal interviews, public lectures, town-hall meetings, social media, documentaries, training/ empowerment programmes, etcetera[16].

Public relations responses and strategies have been deployed in the past by experts and professionals of government towards the management of inter-ethnic crisis that occurred between members of different ethnic nationalities in the country. During the civil war for instance, media relations and propaganda were deployed by the Biafra Republic to the extent that it attracted world attention, and gained recognition as a country from France, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and some other countries of the world[16]. The Biafra radio dished out negative information that Nigeria was waging a war of genocide against the Ibo people. Advertisements were placed in major newspapers and magazines in Europe and America to the effect that the war was one-sided in favour of the Hausa/Fulanis of Northern Nigeria against the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria[16].

The Federal Government of Nigeria itself was not left behind as it also deployed media relations cum propaganda, conflict resolution, and peace-building programmes while the war lasted. The Federal Government as a result of negative information dished out by the Biafra radio embarked on serious and rigorous campaigns to refute the negative publicity coming out from Radio Biafra in order to repair its dented image and reputation especially at international circles. The government had to physically move public relations specialists within and outside the country to go abroad to counter the claims of the Biafran negative publicity about the issue of the civil war. International press conferences were held in London and New-York as well as Washington DC

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on the need for the international community to see Nigeria (Biafra) inclusive as one indivisible country[15]. The message was that the war in Nigeria was a mere family misunderstanding which would be resolved amicably[16].

The then General Yakubu Gowon administration during and after the civil war also created slogans in order to counter the Biafran campaign that the war was an ethnic cleansing of the Igbo in Nigeria. Such slogans include: "To keep Nigeria One is a task that must be done"! "GOWON = Go on with one Nigeria"! The name of GOWON which was analyzed and interpreted to mean[16]: G = Go, O = On, W = With, O = One, N = Nigeria; "No Victor No Vanquished"[16].

Inclusively, while the civil war lasted, several town-hall meetings and conferences were simultaneously sponsored within and outside Nigeria to explain to the world at large that the war was a mere quarrel between brothers and not a genocidal war as claimed by Radio Biafra[16]. In order to further pacify the Igbos, conflict resolution and corporate social responsibilities techniques and efforts were deployed by the Federal Government[16].

Some of the public relations peace-building programmes that Nigerian government had deployed in the past for inter-ethnic crises management in the country include the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) which was established by General Yakabu Gowon administration in 1973[17] and the establishment of the Federal Character Principle through its enshrinement in the Nigeria's Constitution in 1979[18].

The foregoing established the considerable utilization of many public relations responses and strategies by the Federal Government when faced with crises situations in the past. However, the occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in the country between 1987 and 2002 recorded the highest number of casualties.This generated maximum interests of both local and international

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media.The magnitude of the crisisraised questions about effectiveness of past public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crisis management in Nigeria.

Therefore, it is based on the foregoing that this study is considered to appraise the performance of public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethniccrisis- management in selected Nigerian communities in between 1987 and 2002.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria as a country is made up of members many ethnic nationalities which many scholars believe should be of great advantage to the development of the country. However, this position shared by these people has not been the case because instead of the citizens of the country to live together harmoniously; engagement in inter-ethnic crisis is the order of the day.

Currently in Nigeria, there is hardly a day without a reported inter-ethnic crisis of some kind resulting from conflicts in personality traits and interests of members of various ethnic nationalities that make up the country. These inter-ethnic crises frequently result from a variety of factors, including inter-ethnic dominance, rivalry or supremacy; border conflicts; land encroachments; tenancy disputes and cultural disparities.

Despite studies and research focusing on inter-ethnic crisis management, including instances of numerous public relations interventions provided by the Federal Government of Nigeria, inter-ethnic crises have continued to reoccur unabated among members of different ethnic nationalities within Nigeria's sociopolitical environments.

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Therefore, this study aimed to appraise the performance of public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crisis management in communities in the country particularly between 1987 and 2002 that recorded the highest number of casualties and loss of lives which generated the maximum interests of both local and international media publications.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to appraise the performance of public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crises management in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. The objectives are to

i. identify inter-ethnic crisis that occurred in communities in the Nigeria between 1987 and 2002.
ii. identify public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisis in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002.
iii. identify public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisis in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002.
iv. assess the performances of deployed public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002.
v. assess the performances of deployed public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002.

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1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions have been designed to help in the investigation of the study.

i. What inter-ethnic crisis occurred inselected Nigeriancommunities between 1987and 2002?

ii. What was the nature or characterof the public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisis inselected Nigerian communities between 1987 and 2002?

iii. By what public relations strategies did Federal Government of Nigeria respondto Nigerian inter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002?

iv. How effective were the Nigerian federal government public relations responses to inter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002?

v. To what degreedid the Nigerian federal government public relationsstrategies perform at addressinginter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002?

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1.5 The Significance of the Study

The findings of this study are expected to facilitate feedback on level of performances of public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crises management in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. The findings of this study would be useful to the Federal Government of Nigeria when in search for what to do in order to become more successful in its efforts on inter-ethnic crisis management in the country. Finally,

the findings would be useful to the Federal Government Nigeria towards reinforcing and realigning its goal setting and desired performance with that of Nigerians on inter-ethnic crisis management.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study focused on occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in the country between 1987 and 2002 because inter-ethnic crises that occurred within these periods reportedly claimed the highest number of casualties and loss of lives in the country. Also, the inter-ethnic crises that occurred during under-studied period attracted highest number of interests of both local and international media publications.

In terms of location for gathering of primary data (quantitative), the study was conducted at the communities where identified inter-ethnic crises occurred in the country between 1987 and 2002, which were: (1) Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State), (2) Zango-Kataf (Southern Kaduna State), (3) Sagamu (Ogun State), (4) Mile-12 (Lagos State), and (5) Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State).

1.7 Limitation of the Study

The limitation of this study were the difficulties encountered towards reaching the appropriate sample size during the process of listing every person that dwells in the communities where identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. Further, not all members of concerned communities were listed as respondents for the study which would have excluded some useful first-hand information that the research would have provided. Therefore, the researcher had to apply multi-stage sampling procedure to divide the population before the final sample elements were reached. Also, the study was limited to communities where the inter-ethnic crisis that occurred claimed highest number of casualties and

loss of lives that consequently generated high number of interests of both local and international media publications on the country between 1987 and 2002.

Additionally, other difficulties encountered by the researcher during the study include hostile and unreceptive attitudes of local government officials approached with official letters for help towards carrying out the study while on the field. They objected to official acknowledgment of the introduction letters presented to them, rather, they preferred designating a junior staff to describe the route to affected communities to the researcher for fear of publicity, misinterpretation and punishment by state government for being a source for releasing classified information on inter-ethnic crisis in the local government. Also, key personalitiessuch as traditional rulers and religious leaders that were the respondents interviewed in under-studied communities objected to taking photographs with the researcher for the same reasons given by the local government officials.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

Communities: This is a particular geographically-bound area or location within a larger society where members of different ethnic groups live or reside together.

Corporate Social Responsibility: This is an operational consciousness of an organization or government that aims to address humanitarian challenges in the society through providing compensations for victims of inter-ethnic crises, support to charities, activist, or philanthropic societal goals.

Ethnic Nationalityin this workrefers to social groupings of individuals who have a common and distinctive culture, language, religion, ancestry, history, etc. A member of an ethnic nationality is an individual that have cultural, language, religious, ancestral and historical links to a particular

country, state, community or family. Depending on where their family came from or immigrated from, many Nigerians historically preferred to be identified as Hausa, Igbo, or Fulani.

Federal Government refers to Nigeria's highest political authority through which sovereign power of the country is exercised by way of control and allocation of resources for citizens' survival and development. Politically, Nigeria practices federal system of government whereby there exists three tiers of government (Federal, State(s) and Local) with each possessing political powers to determine things in their various states, constituents or localities.

Inter-ethnic Crisis refers to those violent occurrences that are recorded as aresult of clashes in the interest of members of different ethnic nationalities that are living together in a particular community or country. Inter-ethnic conflicts endanger the ability of people of various ethnic nations to live in harmony and peace with one another within a particular community or state.

Inter-ethnic Crises Management: These are systemic responses, actions and strategies adopted and deployed or targeted at controlling the effect of violent occurrences that are recorded are a result of clashes in the interest of members of different ethnic nationalities that are living together in a particular community or country.

Inter-ethnic Relationship refers to elements that cause persons of various ethnic nations to associate, affiliate, rapport, connect, or bond. This clarifies how individuals from various ethnic nationalities interact or correlate with one another in a given social setting. Since they are all governed by the same political entity known as Nigeria, ethnic nationalities like the Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, and Fulani are related to one another. As a result, they have a common bond as fellow Nigerians.

Performance Appraisal: These are the procedures for analysing, examining, and evaluating previously completed tasks or services in the administration of an event or other task in order to

determine if the professionally performed tasks achieved their main goals and were properly completed.

Public Relations Response relates to the first reactionary direction or standpoint of a public relations specialist towards the management of a crisis under a given context and framework of an organization.

Public Relations Strategies relate to tactical activities often utilized by a public relations specialist to implement its responses in the management of its principal's challenging circumstance or situation.

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Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1Conceptual Review

This chapter deals with the researcher's tripartite review of literature on the subject in focus in this endeavour. The chapter examines conceptual review under the following sub-heads:

2.1.1 Concept of Inter-Ethnic Crises

2.1.2 Definition of Crisis Communication by Various Scholars

2.1.3 Roots and Types of Crises

2.1.4 Characteristics of Crisis

2.1.5 Crisis Identity Factor

2.1.6 Nature of Inter – Ethnic Crises

2.1.7 Elements of Inter-Ethnic Crises in Nigeria

2.1.8 Primary Causes of Inter – Ethnic Crises in Nigeria

2.1.9 Indicators of Inter – Ethnic Crises in Nigeria

2.1.10 Major Inter-Ethnic Crises in Nigeria between 1969 and 2020

2.1.11 Concept of Inter-Ethnic Crises Management

2.1.12 Stages of Crisis Management

2.1.13 Factors Affecting the Process of Crisis Management

2.1.14 Decision – Making in Crisis and Leadership in Crisis

2.1.15 Concept of Public Relations Response

2.1.16 Five Major Objectives of Public Relations Responses

2.1.17 Understanding Public Relations Crises

2.1.18 Approaches / Processes of Public Relations during Crises

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2.1.19 Concept of Public Relations Strategies

2.1.20 Historical Background of Nigeria

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2.1.21 Peculiarities of Five Selected Major Nigeria Ethnic Nationalities (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Tiv and Fulani)

2.1.22 Nigeria's Political System and Developments between 1960 and 2020

2.2 Theoretical Review

2.2.1 Crisis Management Model

2.2.2 Cross Cultural Communication Theory

2.3 Review of Empirical Studies

2.3.1. Major Public Relations Strategies of Nigeria's Federal Government during and after the Civil War

2.4 Summary of Gaps in Literature Reviewed

Endnotes

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2.1.1 Concept of Inter-ethnic Crisis

A crisis is any circumstance or occurrence that has the tendencies to result in or has the potential to result in an unsafe and unstable condition that will affect a person, a group, or society. Crises are unfavorable developments in human or environmental situations, particularly when they come suddenly and with little or no notice. A crisis, more broadly defined, is a trying situation or an emergency[1].

The word "crisis" was derived from the Greek word "krisis," which means "discrimination, choice, or crisis." When a shift in an illness's course suggests either recovery or death, or when the condition has reached a turning point, that is when the word "crisis" was first used in English. Additionally, it was applied to a significant shift in the progression of an illness. By the middle of the eighteenth century, it had acquired the figurative meaning of a crucially significant or deciding point in the development of anything, particularly a time of ambiguity or difficulty, without necessarily implying a decision-point[1]. The term "crisis" is used lexically by Arabs to denote harshness and dryness. However, the English language meaning of crisis refers to either a better or worse situation.

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2.1.2 Definitions of Crisis Communication by various scholars:

Crisis communication is the perception of an unanticipated occurrence that poses a danger to significant stakeholder expectations, has a negative influence on an organization's performance, and results in undesirable outcomes[2].

This term draws attention to the problem of a crisis' detrimental effects on the functioning of the afflicted government or organization, since any crisis stunts its growth and puts it in a condition of confusion, anxiety, and instability. Crises are mostly perceptual in nature. If stakeholders

think there is a crisis, the government or organization is in a crisis unless it can convince stakeholders it is not[2].

When handled improperly, a crisis poses a serious threat to operations and may have unfavorable effects. In crisis management, the trick is anticipating the harm that a crisis might cause to a government or organization, its constituents, and an industry.

During a crisis, three related threats may arise:

(1) loss of public safety,

(2) loss of finance, and

(3) loss of reputation.

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2.1.3 Roots and Types of Crisis

i. Natural Disaster and Emergencies: Disaster and crisis do not have the same meaning. Disasters can involve crisis management, but they are more complex;they call for greater cooperation. Inadequate disaster management can cause crises for the organizations in charge of handling it, and crises can be ingrained in disasters[3]. Disaster management places a strong emphasis on the collaborative process. Disasters need dealing with societies and society's network.

ii. Man-made: The area of crisis management primarily deals with situations that are produced by people.

2.1.4 Characteristics of Crisis

There are several criteria that define a crisis. In order to be classified as a crisis, an incident or set of events must be unique, unexpected, and out of the ordinary, as well as pose a real or perceived danger to an organization's top priorities. The four characteristics of the event are as follows:

i. It must have elements of surprise.

ii. It should foster ambiguity.

iii. Such event should be viewed as a danger to significant objectives.

iv. The last feature is need for change. When the existing system can no longer be sustained, there is a crisis that necessitates change. If change is not required, the circumstance is better characterized as a failure[3].

Understanding Crisis from the "Personal" Points of View: When someone is unable to handle a problem, they have a personal crisis. The crisis, which necessitates significant decisions or acts to address, is preceded by unusual occurrences that cause considerable tension and stress inside an individual.

Numerous circumstances, including but not limited to the following, can lead to crisis:

i. Severe weather conditions,

ii. Sudden changes in work or financial position,

iii. Additional Knowledge,

iv. Medical emergencies,

v. Long-term sickness, and

vi. Societal familiar unrest.

Crises are merely a shift in the everyday occurrences that affect a person and people in their immediate vicinity, such as job loss, severe financial struggle, drug addiction or abuse, and other

situations that are life-changing and need action outside of the "usual" daily routine. When a person is going through a crisis, they are in a mental state of disequilibrium where their ego is trying to balance both internal and external pressures. In this situation, the individual turns to coping techniques to deal with the stress[3].

Crisis Coping Strategies:

i. Emotional instability Control: This instability can result in suicidal inclinations, substance misuse, legal issues, and a general avoidance of services that can assist.

ii. Support System Network: One such tool used to help a person in need is their social support network, which might include family, friends, coworkers, or medical professionals. A support system must be made up of people the individual can trust. Although these support networks are essential for helping someone get over a crisis, they are also the root of two thirds of mental health problems. Marital problems, abandonment, parental conflict, and family difficulties are a few examples of the mental health crises stated above.

2.1.5 Crisis Identity Factor

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It is critical for anyone to be able to spot the signs of internal conflict in order to support someone going through a crisis. Along with the previously described coping methods, these indicators include:

From a sociopolitical standpoint, "identification" has both a personal and a communal connotation. Identity-related processes are "placed at the center of the person and yet at the core of his communal culture."[4]. Therefore, identification might be defined as a person's "feeling of belonging to a group" if (it) affects his political conduct.

A person's physiological "givens" and social duties both include elements of identity[5]. Features like an "emotive tie to a group," "love and belief for a group," "pledge to a cause," and "commitments and obligations to a group" are characteristics of identity that a person associates with[5]. Research on identification in general emphasizes the idea that identity entails both resemblance and opposition at once. "There may be several identities for an individual or a group. But such diversity creates tension and contradiction in both self-representation and social interaction. The reason for this is because identities and role-sets must be separate[4].

Only when they are co-opted by social actors do concepts of identity appear[5]. Identity definition frequently overlaps with expectations for social roles, but identities are more reliable sources of meaning than those roles. This is due to the fact that identities create meaning, whereas social positions define functions[5]. However, identity is not constant or shared by all people or groups. Its power and significance fluctuate and vary from group to group. Although identities are largely stable, identity consciousness is always evolving to reflect the shifting roles and expanding magnitudes of identities. This identity flexibility prevents the need to create a whole new identity for the specific position and situation. Thus, social influences have a significant impact on identity creation and construction[5].

2.1.6 Nature of Inter-ethnic Crisis

Inter-ethnic crises are undesirable events brought on by the competing interests of people from various ethnic backgrounds who coexist in a particular community or nation, but who have a propensity to produce animosity, hostility, and discord among them. The livelihood, well-being, survival, and peaceful coexistence of people of various ethnic nationalities living side by side in a particular community or state are all threatened by interethnic crises.

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Every human being or group of people has a unique personality that is made up of several qualities. However, the fact that ethnicity is inherent in virtually all multiethnic societies would imply that ethnic identity is created as a result of interactions among many ethnic groups operating under a same political system. Such interactions can foster a sense of unity among participants in connection to other pertinent ethnic groups. As a result, boundaries between the in-group and out-group begin to form, which over time become carefully defended. According to this theory, ethnicity therefore turns into a method through which ethnic identities are politicized[6].

Some of the most tenacious conflicts in the world today are rife in Africa, most of which are based on differences in ethnic identities. Conflicts over the exercise of state authority, the unequal distribution of resources, citizenship issues, state collapse, economic downturn, and interethnic crises have all been caused by ethnic nationalism. Nigeria has experienced frequent crises of state or regional illegitimacy, which frequently impede efforts at economic transformation, democratization, national cohesion, and stability[7].

Nigeria's multiethnic system is known for its intense divides. The topics deemed crucial for the state's validity and existence cause the most controversy. Opposing and competing assemblages frequently adopt a winner-take-all, exclusive strategy. These concerns include governmental authority, resource distribution, and citizenship. States with such divisions are hence predisposed to being fragile and unstable since, virtually by definition, they have little in common with regard to convergence and harmony, which are required to lessen the centrifugal forces that tear them apart[7].

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Thus, secession, civil unrest, civil war, minority unease, and violent clashes: all of which would ordinarily be viewed as exceptional factors or real events in states that are on the path of disintegration[7]. Nigeria has been said to be one of the most unstable countries in Africa as a result of a complex web of politically shrouded identities, as well as a long history of bloody conflicts and instability.

The idea of personality factors, as condensed by academic works and seemingly converging intellectual ideologies, proposes that an individual's personality is shaped by a variety of elements, including his wants, value system, interests, and resources[8]. You may say that every person or group of people exhibits a distinctive behavior as a result of this burdensome cause. Technically, occasionally, in every community, people's actions are justified or based on their various personality configuration systems.

Assumptions made from the aforementioned background "personality factors" lead to conclusion that personality factor is the true cause of inter-ethnic coloration issues, which were previously described as undesirable events brought on by competing interests of the people and poor governance decisions within a given society or country and having a tendency to threaten the people's livelihood, wellbeing, and survival[8].

2.1.7 Elements of Inter-ethnic Crisis in Nigeria

As was previously mentioned, Nigeria is a product of chance because the British colonial government was responsible for its creation. These kingdoms and city states were fighting one another before they united in attrition wars that were ostensibly waged for territorial conquest and economic hegemony. As evidenced by the various wars, such as the Egba-Egbado wars, the Yoruba civil wars, etcetera, the relationship between these ethno-linguistic groups that pretended

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to exist in the different domains was gruesome, antagonistic, and occasionally downright hostile. These charitable expeditions, though, came to an end after the merger[9].

By combining these numerous groups into one single geopolitical entity termed Nigeria, amalgamation brought forth a new type of intergroup connections. It should be remembered that this merger was coercive in character, motivated by politics and economics rather than by a genuine evaluation of the people's spirit or the merger's implications. The economic pervasiveness of the merger has not led to a peaceful consolidation of the country's numerous ethnic groups, but rather has increased racial and religious divisions and hostility among the populace. The three dominant ethnic groups are divided into three distinct groups as a result of regional geography and religion (Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa). These regional and cultural distinctions were furthered under British colonial rule. Since then, these inequalities have fueled intolerance, prejudice, political unrest, and instability.

With reference to the British colonial governmental system of direct and indirect rule, it is possible to comprehend the nature of intergroup relations in Nigeria in greater detail. In order to divide and dominate/exploit the populace, this political system of direct rule in Southern Nigeria and indirect rule in Northern Nigeria was instituted. This strategy split the nation by making the populace feels as though they were either us or them. The country's division and the "us versus them" mentality have continued to be a major source of mistrust, antagonism, and conflict among the nation's many ethnic groups.

Thus, despite the fact that the direct and indirect rule systems of British colonial political administration helped the colonizers maximize their political and economic gains, the country and its people became more divided as a result, and there was an increase in mistrust, hatred, and occasionally outright hostility between the various groups. Therefore, in order to improve

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relations between various ethno-linguistic groupings in the nation, policies that have the potential to further polarize the nation and its people must be reviewed[9].

In addition to the British colonialists' role in sowing suspicion, hatred, and hostility in the nation due to their political and administrative policies of direct and indirect rule, emerging nationalists such as Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe, Alhaji Tafewa Balewa, Alhaji Saduana, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo, among others, played a role in sowing these same feelings in the nation. Instead of bringing the populace together by creating a national party with a national outlook, these founding fathers of an independent Nigeria created ethnic-based political parties with ethnic-based followings in their drive for power. Mostly Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group (A.G.) and Alhaji Tafewa Balewa's Northern People's Congress (NPC), as well as Chief Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), exemplify this. Apart from Zik's party, which resembled a national party, other political groups like Awolowo's and Tafewa's never pretended to be motivated by ethnic sentimentality [10].

Zik, it may be said, advocated nationalism, whilst Awolowo and Saduana, respectively, preached Omo Oduduwa and Arewa. These political decisions unintentionally split the nation and its citizens along racial, religious, and political lines. Zik, it may be said, advocated nationalism, whilst Awolowo and Saduana, respectively, preached Omo Oduduwa and Arewa.This division eventually led to the 30-month civil war in Nigeria that was caused by the Igbos' (Biafra) attempted secession from the nation and its repercussions[10].

2.1.8 Primary Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis in Nigeria

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The causes of inter-ethnic crisis in Nigeria are discussed below under two different categorisations.

(A) **Personality Factor Induced Inter-Ethnic Crises**

i. **Tribalism:** True nationalism and national unity are hampered by loyalty to ethnic groupings. Since colonial times up to the present, politicians have used racial prejudice to win elections and split the nation. Most ethnic tensions that result in hostilities have their roots in political motivations from long ago. Taking employment into public office, ministries, departments, and directorates of the federal government as an example, tribal considerations predominate over competence. When concerns are voiced, conflict breaks out between ethnic groups. Tribalism undermines the country's ability to function as a single, cohesive unit.Rather, it supports division, which leads to ethnic strife and halts attempts to boost the economy. Tribalism is a phenomenon that separates society and encourages favoritism[11].

ii. **Contest for Power and Resource Control:** Inter-ethnic conflicts in the nation are brought on by ethnic groups' ruthless efforts to control national resources and the commonwealth of the nation. Since Isaac Adaka Boro founded a paramilitary organization in 1966 to fight for resource control, this subject has been divisive throughout the nation. Due to environmental degradation in the region and a lack of meaningful development in the Niger Delta, which generates over 90% of the federal money needed to operate the country's economy, resource control is a contentious subject that has persisted. By offering terrorists in the Niger Delta an unconditional amnesty and promising to teach them and rebuild the region in exchange for handing up their guns, the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua attempted to tackle the problem of resource control. Although militants no longer attack NNPC pipelines and vandalize export facilities, the movement for resource control continues till date[11].

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iii. **Religious Intolerance:** One of the main reasons for ethnic tensions in Nigeria is religious intolerance between Christians and Muslims. The Kano Riot on May 1, 1953, which sparked a wave of violent attacks against non-Muslims across the nation, was caused by religious intolerance. Christian ethnic groups in Southern Nigeria are afraid of the North's political influence because they believe it might be used to islamise the nation. This mistrust has publicly sparked religious disputes where one sect attacks the other and leads to retaliation killings[11]. In addition, the Islamist terrorist group, Boko Haram emerged as a result of theological conflicts, decrying western education and culture, and murdering and maiming both Christians and Muslims. Radical organisations like Maitatsine, Darul Islam, and Shiite movements have grown in the last fifty years and triggered riots that have killed people and destroyed property. However, Boko Haram surpasses them all, since it has elevated senseless deaths and damage to a terrible degree. Nigeria shouldnot have contemplated imposing Islamic Sharia law because it is a secular state.

iv. **Disputes over Ownership of Land:** Historically, ethnic conflicts between residents of the same states have occasionally erupted. Examples are the Brass and Nembe villages in Bayelsa, the Aguleri and Umuleri in Anambra State, and Ife and Modakeke in Osun State. Family members murder one another over who owns the property in these land disputes. When Cameroonian Gendarmes killed some Nigerian Soldiers guarding the Bakassi Peninsula in 1981, an international boundary dispute broke out. Nigeria's maturity, magnanimity, and acting as a big brother by not retaliating prevented this from turning into a full-scale war[11].

(B) **Bad Leadership**

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1 Amalgamation: Nigeria has continued to suffer from the mistake of combining the northern and southern protectorates, which were made up of several ethnic groups with diverse languages and traditions. History has shown that the creation of contemporary Nigeria resulted from the union of the southern and northern protectorates, two British colonial entities, in 1914. Despite being hostile neighbours, the colonialists did it for administrative reasons. While the majority of people in the south are Christians and adhere to traditional religions, the north practices Islamas a religion. Since colonial times, these theological divisions have been a source of political tension and mistrust between the two areas. Additionally, there are ethnic and religious minority in both regions that have grievances against three significant ethnic groupings they view as oppressors. Hence, Nigeria can be said to be divided because of the more than 200 ethnic groups that made up the country. Indeed, Nigeria has been deprived of true national loyalty and unity because of suspicion, animosity, a lack of trust, and prejudice in relationships between members of various ethnic groups in the nation[10].

2 Favouritism: Favouritism is the practice of treating someone more with unfair preference. It is the act of a person, especially an officially influential ones, preferring their family and friends, especially when elevating them to high positions. The fact that certain persons in positions of authority do not adhere to the law strictly when it affects their friends and family is a cause of strife for the country. Even when they lack the qualifications for government appointments, jobs, or contract execution, these officials favour family members and friends. This supports the claim that favouritism results in corrupt and ineffective leaders[10].

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3 Corruption and Inept Leadership: Ethnic strife in Nigeria is a result of corruption and incompetent leaders. Since Nigeria's independence, the majority of its population have been destitute and denied opportunity as a result of flagrant mishandling of national resources and misrule by unfit leaders, which has sparked protests from the populace. Nigeria's distribution of federal jobs and funding for infrastructure projects across the federating states is obviously unequal. Federal Character Commission was formed by the government to promote balance and equitably distribute appointments and projects, but this has not quenched objections because not all appointments are made using federal character, which has led to calls for resource control among other demands[10].

4 Marginalization of Some Ethnic Groups in the Country: One of the reasons for ethnic violence in Nigeria is the marginalisation of several of the ethnic groups that make up the country. Recently, individuals fighting for ethnic groupings have developed, such the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Many Nigerians view the state of Biafra as a concept that will never materialise, but one group is fighting for it. The marginalisation of the country's eastern region in the Nigerian project, which contributed to the civil war in 1967–1970, has not yet received full restitution or the attention of succeeding governments. Even after more than 50 years, the scars of the war have not fully healed, and reconciliation, rehabilitation, and population and economic restoration are still happening in the east. The southeast geopolitical zone's stability is currently in jeopardy because to IPOB's desire for a separate state of Biafra, which is a result of the same issue of marginalisation of the Igbo ethnic group. The current administration is working hard to address the unfair allocation of government jobs and projects to the country's eastern

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region. To thwart IPOB's separatist ambition, more has to be done to abolish racial discrimination and to institute constitutional reforms [12].

5 Constitutional Issues: One of the factors contributing to ethnic violence in Nigeria is the 1999 constitution, which is commonly regarded as a military product. Nigerians are calling for a real constitution written by the people and for the people to take its place. Governments have been urged by civil society and opinion leaders to hold a sovereign national conference to debate complex problems with the federal form of governance and draft a new constitution, but this has not happened. In order to explore issues that lead to ethnic strife and division, President Goodluck Jonathan's administration called the CONFAB, a constitutional conference, in 2014. The CONFAB produced comprehensive resolutions for revamping the Federal system of government. The National Assembly has begun modifying several sections of the 1999 constitution as the administration studies it at the moment. To address the following concerns, the House of Assembly should alter the constitution. To resolve requests for true federalism, resource control, citizen rights, and the removal of the state of origin from forms; to revisit the federal character and educationally disadvantaged states quota; to review the uneven creation of local governments and states in the six geopolitical zones; and to review the lopsided division of the country into states. In order to ensure economic justice and equality, the new constitution should transfer authority over resource allocation from the federal government to state and local governments. Along with removing the negative impact of religion in politics and addressing religious intolerance, the new constitution should define people' rights and privileges in terms of their residence rather than their place of origin [12].

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6 Introduction of Sharia Criminal Legal System: The adoption of the Sharia criminal justice system in some regions of Northern Nigeria is one of the other major factors contributing to ethnic violence in the country. Politicians often exploit religion to sow discord and get cheap votes, such as when Sharia law is introduced. For instance, Alhaji Sani Ahmad Yerima, a former governor of Zamfara State, recommended that the state adopt a sharia criminal law code in 1999. A Christian uproar resulted from this proposition, which prompted primarily Muslim states in the North to implement the Sharia criminal justice system between 2000 and 2002. This move sparked national controversy. While the criss lasted, Christians in the afflicted states revolted, which resulted in fatalities and property damage. Following these disputes, a settlement permitted governments with sizable Muslim populations to establish Islamic courts but restricted the application of Sharia to inheritance and family law[12].

7 Herdsmen Attack: Blatant assaults on one ethnic group over another or killings by a gang thought to be Fulani herders in many regions of the nation without government intervention gave these criminals the confidence to continue committing these horrible acts. Every month, reports of herder's raids on various communities, looting, claiming life and property, are common. These unjustified attacks and killings will continue until organizations that kill other residents and foment unrest get sufficient consequences for their crime, to act as deterrence to other groups. Although attacks by herdsmen and disagreements over who owns the property cannot be compared, we should condemn both[12].

8 Long Military Incursion in Government: Military culture was instilled in Nigerians throughout a long period of military administration. As if they were in a combat zone,

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this has an impact on how people regard one another in society. In simple conflicts between neighbors, civilians have adopted military conduct, and this has occasionally caused ethnic strife. Some police officers, military personnel, and elected officials set the incorrect examples for the public to follow when they display and use force. For instance, some politicians dangerously drive on our highways and use sirens as if to argue that power always has the last word. The high level of stress that many Nigerians experience causes them to have short tempers, which in turn cause minor misunderstandings to escalate into ethnic confrontations, deaths, and property damage[12].

9 Lack of vision: There is no national ideal to arouse patriotism among citizens because colonialists created the nation from a variety of ethnic values. The national song and promise are sung and recited by Nigerians without any deeper significance. The American dream exists in America, but there is no such thing as a national vision in Nigeria that people struggle for. The ethnic problem in Nigeria may persist until we establish the Nigerian ideals[12].

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2.1.9 Indicators of Inter-ethnic Crisis in a country

Some of the outlined indicators of inter-ethnic crisis in a country are:

i. Inter-communal violence,

ii. Civil war,

iii. Secessionist movements,

iv. Loss of public safety and lack of security,

v. Loss of lives and properties of citizens,

vi. Loss of Government's reputation,

vii. Lack of national sense of direction,

viii. Profound disunity among citizens from various ethnic groups,

ix. Lack of peace,

x. Lack of demonstrable trust in leaders,

xi. Lack of promotion and celebration of justice,

xii. Lack of happiness and contentment of citizens,

xiii. Lack of visible, reliable and accountability systems,

xiv. Inequality and preferential treatments of citizens from various ethnic groups by leaders,

xv. Displeasure and unsatisfaction of citizens in the leaders,

xvi. Lack of inspiration and motivation among citizenry,

xvii. Impracticable policies of leaders or government impacting negatively on the citizenry[13].

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2.1.10 Some Popular Crises in Nigeria between 1960 and 2020

a. Western Region Parliament Riot of 1962

The foundations of Nigeria's civil governance were widely regarded as unstable and divided. The then-Nigerian politicians began political activities in the nation with the formation of political parties that would reflect the makeup of the three main ethnic groups in the country—Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo—shortly after the country attained the right to civil rule and independence. This inter-ethnic group quest for dominance of central political power and control of national resources. The Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, which controlled Nigeria's Northern Region,

were predominantly represented by the Nigerian People's Congress (NPC). The interests of the Yoruba people in the West were represented by Action Group (AG), which many saw as a left-leaning party. Additionally, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) championed the concerns of the Eastern Igbo people in the Eastern Region of Nigeria[14].

The NPC won 134 seats in the 312 parliament seats that were contested for during 1959 elections that were conducted in advance of independence. As a result of winning 89 seats in the federal parliament, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) rose to the position of second-largest party in the newly independent nation. And in the 1959 elections, the Action Group (AG) won 73 seats[14].

As a result, the NCNC and NPC created a conservative coalition to form the first central government after independence. After Nigeria gained its independence, it was widely believed that Ahmadu Bello the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was unquestionably powerful and in charge of the North, would take office as prime minister of the new Federation Government. Bello, the party leader of the NPC, however, decided to stay in his position as premier of the North and chose the Hausa Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to be Nigeria's first prime minister[14].

Under the charismatic leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the predominantly Yoruba AG formed the opposition. But in 1962, Ladoke Akintola, who had been chosen as the Western premier, led a faction that emerged within the AG. The Igbo-dominated NCNC was a component of the ruling coalition, and the AG was not 14 years old, according to the Akintola side, which claimed that the Yoruba people were losing ground to Igbo people in terms of commerce in Nigeria.

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The Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa of the federal government concurred with the Akintola side and attempted to have the AG join the administration. Akintola was replaced as premier of the West by one of the party's followers when the party leadership, led by Awolowo, disapproved. However, at the meeting of the Western Region parliament to endorse this amendment, Akintola supporters in the parliament caused a disturbance in the chambers, and fighting amongst the members ensued. A member snatched the legislative mace and used it as a weapon to strike the Speaker and other members while chairs were hurled around. The riot had to be put down eventually, and the police had to use tear gas. Similar riots occurred after later efforts to reconstitute the Western parliament. West continued to experience unrest and hence, became known for anarchy and election rigging[14].

Awolowo and other members of his faction were detained and accused of treason by Prime Minister Balewa of the federal government, who also imposed martial law in the Western Region. A coalition administration in the Western Region was put in charge by Akintola. The AG was limited to playing an oppositional role in their own stronghold as a result[14].

b. The 1965 National Election Riot in Western Region

Beginning in 1963 and lasting until 1966 was the Nigerian First Republic. Former governor general Nnamdi Azikiwe was elected as the nation's first president after Nigeria declared itself the Federal Republic of Nigeria in October 1963. The differences in economic and educational progress between the south and the north from the beginning exacerbated Nigeria's ethnic and religious conflicts. A new pro-government Yoruba party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), assumed power when the Federal Government successfully moved the AG out of control of the Western Region. Soon after, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the head of the AG

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opposition, was jailed for being unfounded. A significant political realignment and a contentious outcome from the 1965 national election put the nation on the road to civil war [14].

The Igbo NCNC formed an alliance with the remaining members of the AG, while the strong northern NPC formed a conservative coalition with the nascent Yoruba NNDP. When it was found that the heartlands of the AG had allegedly chosen pro-government NNDP delegates[14], rioting broke out in the Yoruba West.

c. Military Incursions (1966 – 1996)

Between 1966, when it began, and 1996, when the Abacha palace coup ousted Chief Ernest Shonekan's Interim National Government, the country had to endure seven (7) different military incursions, governments, and coups[15].

Scholars have held that the first and subsequent military coups in the country were caused by the unfavorable political narrative that the Igbo extraction of the nation found themselves in following the 1965 national elections and the loud guiding principle of Inter-ethnic group quest for dominance of central political power and national resource control. First and foremost, on January 15, 1966, a group of army officers (the Young Majors), primarily from the south-eastern Igbo area, deposed the NPC-NNDP government and killed the prime minister as well as the premiers of the northern and western regions[15].

Another coup as a result of the brutal character of the coup on January 15, 1966, was hatched by a group of army officers from the south-eastern Igbos, which toppled the NPC-NNDP government and killed the prime minister and the premiers of the northern and western regions. In Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah, where he was greeted as a hero, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna took refuge. The Ironsi administration jailed and arrested several Young Majors. These prisoners

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held a heroic status among the Igbo people of the Eastern Region. But in the Northern Region, the Hausa and Fulani people pushed for the captives to be tried for murder. [15].

General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi's federal government failed to reduce ethnic tensions over these or other matters after assuming power. The Ironsi government also failed to draft a constitution that was acceptable to all regions of the nation. The decision to issue Decree No. 34, which aimed to unify the country, proved to be the most disastrous for the Ironsi government. Decree No. 34 attempted to abolish the whole federal system that has governed Nigeria since the country's independence in 1960.

Rioting nevertheless started in the North. As a result of the Ironsi government's efforts to abolish the federal system and rename the nation the Republic of Nigeria on May 24, 1966, tensions increased and a second coup by officers from the north took place in July of the same year. On July 29, 1966, in Ibadan, a well-planned coup led by then-interim Major Murtala Mohammed, Captain Martin Adamu, Captain TY Danjuma, and some other Northern Army officers resulted in the deaths of Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, the Military Governor of the then Western Region, and Major Gen. J. T. U. Aguyi-Ironsi, the Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces[14].

At a state event hosted by the then-Western Region under the command of Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, the military Governor, Major General J. T. U. Aguyi-Ironsi, the Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces, was the main guest. On July 28, the day of the incident, there was unrest in Ibadan. Fearing that they might be the target of the alleged "Plan 15" Igbo Plot, Northern public workers, chiefs, and traditional rulers who had traveled to the South for the Conference of Traditional rulers were ready to leave. There were false reports that the conference hall will be

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destroyed. General Ironsi's regimental parade sparked a minor press issue when it was noted that northern soldiers were marching[14].

But despite the brewing tensions, the Military Governor, Lt. Col. Francis Adekunle Fajuyi, gave a lavish celebration that evening. Both Ironsi and Fajuyi were finally pounced upon within the grounds of the Government House in Ibadan, caught, and grappled to stop any movement after a whole lot of intrigues, tensions, plans, dramas, and attempts used by Danjuma and other troops during the night of July 28, 1966.

In the meantime, Danjuma hitched a ride back to the barracks with two Landrover cars. Ironsi and Fajuyi shared a car's front seat while Lts. Bello and Nwankwo, Ironsi's ADCs, sat in the back. Lieutenants Walbe and Dada, two police officials, accompanied the party, with one of them sitting next to the lead vehicle's driver. Another vehicle carrying armed soldiers followed the command vehicl[14]. The 4th Battalion Unit RSM Useni Fagge, Sergeant Tijjani (from Maiduguri), Warrant Officer Bako, and other troops like Dabang, Wali, and Rabo are among the soldiers who are claimed to have been there. Several of those implicated went on to become well-known after the attempted Dimka coup in 1976.

On Iwo Road, they travelled to Mile 8, when the party dismounted and entered the forest after crossing a small brook. In addition to being beaten, Ironsi and Fajuyi were also questioned. General Ironsi behaved like a soldier when being interrogated, refused to be intimidated, and kept quiet while refusing to admit to any involvement in the January 15 coup. In fact, Ironsi's muteness in the face of a barrage of questioning, according to Elaigwu, "was credibly learned from an officer and a soldier on the site that it was Ironsi's muteness amidst a storm of inquiries that led to his being shot by an enraged Northern soldier." The "mad northern soldier" may have

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really been Sergeant Tijani, according to other hazy accounts. Also shot was Fajuyi. Although it was reported in the western region publication "Fajuyi the Great" published by the Ministry of Information in 1967 after his official burial that he had offered to die rather than "abandon his guest," those involved in his arrest and assassination insist that he was an even more important target than Ironsi. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was appointed Nigeria's new Head of State following the deaths of Ironsi and Fajuyi by TY Danjuma-led Northern military leaders[14].

Gen. Murtala Mohammed and some other officers carried out another bloodless takeover on July 29, 1975, accusing Gen. Yakubu Gowon of corruption and delaying the promised handover to civilian government. Thousands of state workers were removed by General Mohammed, who also set a deadline for the return of civilian authority on October 1st, 1979. In an unsuccessful coup, he was slain on February 13th, 1976, and his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, took over as president[14].

The Nigerian Second Republic, which eventually lasted between 1979 and 1983 with Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) elected president in 1979 general elections, was ushered in by the lifting of the ban on political activity and the publication of a new constitution by a constituent assembly that was elected in 1977[15].

The conservative coalition led by Shehu Shagari, the National Party of Nigeria, which was in power at the time, had intended to hold onto power through patronage and control of the Federal Election Commission. With a majority of members in the National Assembly and control of over 12 state administrations, Shagari and the NPN were easily re-elected to power in August 1983. However, there were reports of massive voter fraud, including missing ballots, closed polling

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places, and blatant results tampering, marring the elections. The legality of the victory was at issue in the bitter legal dispute over the outcomes[16].

The military overthrew the Second Republic on December 31, 1983. The country's new ruling body, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), elected Major General Muhammadu Buhari as its leader. General Ibrahim Babangida, the third-ranking member of the SMC, peacefully toppled the Buhari administration in August 1985. Babangida (IBB) used the abuse of authority, human rights abuses by significant SMC officials, and the administration's failure to address the country's worsening economic crisis as justifications for the coup[16].

General Babangida, who was in office as Nigeria's military president at the time, had pledged to establish the Third Republic (civilian administration) by 1990; this deadline was eventually postponed to January 1993. The constitution was finished by a constituent assembly in the first quarter of 1989, and political activity was once more authorized in the spring. The National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which were created by the government in October 1989, were the only two parties that were permitted to register[16].

Sixty-nine (69) suspected plotters were killed following secret trials before military tribunals in April 1990 after medium-level officers attempted but failed to topple the government. Local government elections in their initial round were held in December 1990. In spite of the low voter participation, there was no violence, and both parties showed strength in every area of the nation, with the SDP taking control of the majority of local government councils[17].

When state legislative elections were conducted in December 1991, Babangida issued an order allowing previously outlawed politicians to run in the August primary. As a result of fraud, both of these and following primaries slated for September were called off. Once a new election

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system was chosen, all previously announced candidates were no longer eligible to run for president. On June 12, 1993, a presidential election was ultimately held, and on August 27, 1993, the eighth anniversary of President Babangida's assumption of office, the new president was to be inaugurated[17].

An important interethnic conflict was sparked by the historic presidential elections of June 12, 1993, in the nation. Early results suggested that rich Yoruba businessman M. K. O. Abiola won a resounding win in what most observers believed to be Nigeria's most fair election. However, on June 23, Babangida declared the election void under the guise of multiple ongoing legal proceedings, causing chaos throughout Nigeria. Before Babangida decided to transfer control to an interim administration on August 27, 1993, there were disturbances that resulted in more than 100 deaths[17]. Afterwards, he tried to reverse his choice, but he was compelled to turn himself over to renowned nonpartisan businessman Ernest Shonekan because he lacked backing from the public and the military. Elections were slated for February 1994, and Shonekan was to reign until then. Shonekan had been in charge of Babangida's Transitional Council since 1993, but he was powerless to solve Nigeria's economic woes or calm the simmering political unrest that subsequently descended into ethnic conflicts[18].

Shonekan was compelled to retire on November 17, 1993, as the nation descended into anarchy under the leadership of Defense Minister Sani Abacha. Abacha abolished all democratic institutions and appointed military personnel to succeed elected governors. Despite vowing to reinstate civilian government, he waited until 1995 to provide a timeline for the changeover. After the June 12 election was declared invalid, the United States and other countriesimposed penalties on Nigeria, including travel restrictions for government officials as well as the

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suspension of arms sales and military aid. Nigeria failed to receive full accreditation for its counter-narcotics operations, and as a result, further penalties were put in place[19].

Despite the early enthusiasm of many Nigerians for Abacha, disillusionment spread quickly. The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), founded by opposition leaders, ran an advocacy campaign for the Senate and other democratic institutions that had been dissolved[19].

Inaugurating himself as president on June 11, 1994, Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola then went underground until his capture on June 23. Petroleum workers reacted by going on strike in order to get Abacha to free Abiola and give over authority to him. Other unions supported the protest, which halted all commercial activity in the area around Lagos and the southwest. Following the government's imposition of conditions on Abiola's release, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), which had previously called off a threatened strike in July, gave a nationwide strike another thought in August. The government sacked the NLC and petroleum union leadership on August 17, 1994, installed administrators to run the unions, and detained Frank Kokori and other labor leaders[20].

The government claimed that citizens and military personnel were involved in a coup attempt in the early months of 1995. Indicted individuals were collected up by security personnel, including former head of state Obasanjo and retired general Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, who served as his deputy. Many of the defendants were given death sentences after a secret tribunal found most of the accused guilty. In order to prosecute Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and others for their claimed participation in the murders of four Ogoni politicians, the government established the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal in 1994. Saro-Wiwa and eight other defendants

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received death sentences from the tribunal, and on November 10 of 1995, they were put to death[20].

Abacha made public the three-year timeline for the change to civilian rule on October 1st, 1995. Under 10% of eligible voters participated in the local elections held in December 1997, and the regime only approved five political parties. General Oladipo Diya, some military officers, and civilians were detained on December 20th, 1997 by the government on suspicion of plotting a coup. The defendants were brought before Gen. Victor Malu's military tribunal, where Diya and five other defendants—late Gen. AK Adisa, Gen. Tajudeen Olnrewaju, late Col. O.O. Akiyode, Major Seun Fadipe, and a civilian Engr. Bola Adebanjo—were found guilty and given the death penalty by firing squad.

Abacha allegedly violated various human rights, including the freedoms of expression, assembly, association, travel, and violence against women, while enforcing his rule through the federal security apparatus[20].

Despite this, Gen. Abacha passed away on June 8, 1998, from heart failure, and was succeeded by General Abdulsalami Abubakar (before he could carry out the formal execution of the death sentences imposed on the claimed above named coup plotters). Abacha's purported coup suspects had their sentences remitted by the military Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), which also freed nearly all known political prisoners who were civilians. The administration adhered to several articles of the 1979 and 1989 constitutions while waiting for the 1995 constitution to be ratified. The 1989 constitution was not put into effect, and neither Abacha nor Abubakar rescinded the edict suspending the 1979 constitution. Even after Abacha's death, the judicial system was nonetheless constrained by corruption and a lack of funding. Abubakar's administration

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announced a salary hike for the civil service as well as other changes in an effort to address these issues[20].

In order to organize elections for local government councils, state legislatures and governors, the national assembly, and the president, Abubakar established the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in August 1998. Elections were successfully held by the NEC on consecutively-scheduled dates. Three of the nine parties that were given temporary registration for the local elections also met the criteria to run in the subsequent elections. These were the All People's Party (APP), the People's Democratic Party (PDP), and the largely Yoruba Alliance for Democracy (AD). Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state, campaigned as a civilian candidate and won the election when Abubakar released him from jail. Before the new civilian president was inaugurated on May 29, 1999, the PRC issued a new constitution that was substantially based on the suspended 1979 constitution. The National Assembly, which consists of a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives, is to be a bicameral body under the terms of the constitution[20].

It was the 1999 constitution that made Nigeria became a federating political entity with 36 states, a federal capital area, and more than 250 ethnolinguistic groups, the most significant of which are the Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Ijaw, Ibibio, Tiv, Efik, and Fulani. These many ethnic and linguistic groupings are a reflection of the nation's multi-cultural diversity, which is shown in the nature of their current interrelationships[21].

The Fourth Republic of Nigeria, nevertheless, didn't begin until May 1999, when democracy finally took hold in Nigeria after 16 years of uninterrupted military dictatorship. Olusegun Obasanjo took over an economy that was lethargic and a democracy that was losing the majority of its democratic institutions. Former general Obasanjo was respected for his opposition to the

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Abacha regime, his role in restoring civilian authority to the federal government in 1979, and his assertion that he stood up for all Nigerians, regardless of their religious beliefs[21].

d. Civil War (1967 – 1970): On August 31, 1966, the Yakubu Gowon military administration reinstated the name Federal Republic of Nigeria following the assassinations of Ironsi and Fajuyi by TY Danjuma-led Northern military commanders and the installation of Gowon as Nigeria's new Head of State. Following the killing of thousands of Ibo in the north, thousands of people fled back to the south-east, where Igbo separatist aspirations became stronger. The military split the four regions into 12 states to give minority ethnic groups more authority. The Igbo, however, opposed moves to change the constitution and insisted on complete autonomy for the east[22].

However, when Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu, the military governor of the eastern region, emerged as the leader of growing Igbo secessionist sentiment, declared the independence of the eastern region as the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967, the situation once more took on an inter-ethnic dimension, worsened, and resulted in a civil war. Before the subsequent Nigerian Civil War was put an end by Gowon's infamous "No victor, no vanquished" statement in 1970, it is believed that 3.5 million people died in the country (mainly malnourished children) [22].

e. Kaduna Emir Succession Crises of 1999: Violence erupted in Kaduna State over the succession of an Emir resulting in more than 100 deaths [23]. Please see Plate 2.1.1 on Irate Youths during Kaduna Emir Succession Crises of 1999 in Appendix II.

f. Destruction of Odi, Balyesa Crises**:** In retribution for a local gang's murder of 12 policemen in November 1999, the army devastated the town of Odi in Bayelsa State and murdered a large number of residents [23,24].

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g. Kaduna Criminal Sharia Crises of May 2000: Over 1,000 people died in rioting in Kaduna from February to May 2000 over the imposition of criminal Sharia in the State. In retaliatory attacks in southeast Nigeria, hundreds of Hausa people died[24].

h. Benue, Taraba, and Nasarawa Crises of October 2001: Communal violence erupted in the states of Benue, Taraba, and Nasarawa in October 2001, resulting in hundreds of fatalities and tens of thousands of displaced people[24].

i. Fulani Herders and Hausa Farmers Crises (1999 till date): The fights between herders and farmers represent a significant problem that has not yet been settled in Nigeria in terms of coloration or dimension of intercommunal violence. Although disputes between farmers and herders over access to resources, crop damage, and livestock theft are not new, increasing demographic, ecological, and financial pressures have strained intercommunal ties. The Middle Belt area of Nigeria, more specifically Benue, has experienced protracted violent confrontations between the primarily Christian farmers and the primarily Muslim cattle herders. Conflicts over rights to and access to land and water resources, as well as the fast desertification that has altered cow grazing patterns, are at the heart of many current conflicts. These conflicts are not particularly new, but they have increased in frequency and violence since 2015. More than 2,000 individuals were murdered in such incidents in 2018 alone, surpassing the fatalities from the previous two years combined[25].

About six times as many people as the Boko Haram crisis have died in this battle thus far. In a country as severely divided as Nigeria, the debate is becoming political and inflaming tensions between ethnic groups and religions. Despite the lack of precise data and disagreement over death tolls, a professional investigation indicated that between 2011 and 2016 farmer-herder clashes in the Middle Belt killed 2,000 Nigerians yearly [25].

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In the northwest, such conflicts have intensified amid a climate of growing insecurity characterized by armed banditry, abducting for hostages, ethnic vigilantism, and inter - communal conflict that claimed the lives of about 8,000 people and forced 200,000 from their homes between 2011 and early 2020 [26]. Please see Plate 2.1.2 on Cross Section of Herders and Farmers Crises and Irrate Yoruba Youths led by Sunday Igboho in Igangan, Oyo State (2021) in Appendix II.

In reality, the most well-publicized incidents between Fulani herders and farmers have spread throughout the nation and significantly tarnished the already precarious inter-group ties in the nation. The Fulani herders violate the rights and privileges of their host communities in an effort to continue their nomadic economy and lifestyle, which incites distrust and animosity. The Nimbo, Uzo-Uwani communities, Igangan, Oke Ogun, and Agatu disturbances in Enugu and Oyo states usually spring to mind and witness to the tense ties between the many ethnic groups in the nation[25].

Islamist extremist organizations apparently tried to settle in the northwest more recently, forming connections with regional residents, criminal gangs, and militias with herding connections. The head of U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa said in August 2020 that "we're seeing al-Qaida starting to make some advances" in the northwest, but did not elaborate on the statement[25].

The Middle Belt's ability to graze animals has been drastically curtailed as a result of decades-long increases in farming activities. Herders are heavily armed for self-defense and herd protection as a result of organized cattle rustling and other types of crime being encouraged by rising livestock prices. All groups now employ more advanced weapons, which are either imported illegally or taken from national military stockpiles. Conflict settlement efforts are

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complicated by the fact that hostilities between farmers and herders in Nigeria sometimes coincide with ethnic and religious divisions, raising the possibility of an escalation[26].

In the Middle Belt, a substantial portion of the violence has been between primarily Christian farmers of various ethnicities and primarily Muslim Fulani herders. (The Fulani are a large, multifaceted people that inhabit most of Central and West Africa.)[27].

Herder-farmer disputes in Nigeria can occasionally be presented as being between religious groups or might result in retaliation that targets people based on their faith[28]. But in the northwest, the majority of the fighting has been between Muslim-majority Fulani herdsmen and ethnic Hausa farmers.

The National Livestock Transformation Plan (NLTP), which the Buhari government released in 2018, calls for the construction of ranches for immobile grazing as well as other investments in the agricultural sector over a ten-year period. The NLTP is being piloted in numerous states, but its adoption has really been slow[29]. Some detractors claim that it is unduly supportive of herder groups.

Meanwhile, government officials have primarily heightened tensions in the Southern region of the nation by forbidding open grazing, which herders perceive as a threat to their way of life[30].

j. Niger-Delta Militancy (1990 till date): The south-south Niger-Delta crisis, violent outbursts, criminal activity, and oil theft activities linked to resentments over neglect by the federal government despite the fact that the majority of the country's funding comes from the region, suffering from oil pollution that has been leading to the loss of livelihoods and sources of food for locals, and perceived exploitation and environmental degradation which have afflicted the country are all higher degree crises impeding the progress of the country[31,32,33].

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Despite having vast petroleum resources, the Niger Delta has high levels of unemployment and poverty. Oil spillage over many years have wreaked havoc on local lives and exacerbated severe ecological and health issues, which oil firms blame on theft and vandalism but which human rights organizations attribute to careless behavior on the part of oil operators[34].

The severe environmental harm caused by oil exploitation in the Niger Delta was brought to the public's notice by Ogoni campaigners at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1994, the head of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, and 14 other people were charged with murdering a number of Ogoni politicians. Despite their not guilty pleas, Saro-Wiwa and eight other people were found guilty and put to death. Sani Abacha's military dictatorship was criticized for the executions, and the United States reacted by withdrawing its ambassador.

Regrettably, in the past ten years, fighting among armed groups in the region and security forces has increased significantly. Kidnappings of shipping personnel are also on the rise as attackers use extensive river networks to conceal crew while negotiating ransoms, and oil infrastructure is being destroyed at an astounding rate[31].

The Niger Delta Avengers, one of the most well-known armed organizations in the area, together with other smaller groups, damaged oil production facilities in 2016, which caused output to drop from 2.2 million barrels per day to 1.4 million barrels per day - the lowest level in twenty years. One of Nigeria's worst recession periods on record began as a result of the infrastructure damage[31].

Large portions of the Niger Delta were to be rehabilitated, according to a 2011 U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) report, but these efforts have stopped due to claims of corruption

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and poor management against governmental organizations tasked with coordinating the clean-up. The bulk of the UNEP-marked zones, are still heavily polluted[32].

The government began offering militants amnesty and a monthly payment in 2009 in response to a spate of attacks on oil facilities that significantly impacted output. The program has reduced significant assaults on oil installations, but the underlying reasons of insecurity continue to be ignored, and ex-militants frequently threaten to recommence violence. A 30-year drop in output was reached in 2016 as a result of repeated attacks on the oil infrastructure, which also contributed to the start of a recession. Another major issue is the theft of oil for the purpose of selling it on the black market, which involves criminal organizations, authorities, and oil employees[33].

During its first term, the Buhari government made an attempt to resolve the region's complaints. Even still, the Niger Delta Avengers have recently broken their cease-fire, saying that the government has failed to deliver on its promises to promote peace and prosperity in the area. Given the damage the Avengers (and other such organizations) have already caused to the nation, there is ample reason for the government to work to better nurture peace and prosperity in the region[33].

k. Boko Haram Crises (1999 till date): Boko Haram is the source of this conflict, which has troubled Nigeria since 1999. The truth is that it is difficult to say that Boko Haram is a religious or ethnic struggle. More Muslims are the target in the first scenario than Christians. It mostly involves a Northern ethnic struggle in the latter. It may thus be more accurate to refer to Boko Haram as an interethnic crisis or an act of terrorism, despite the fact that it employs a religious rhetoric.

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A deadly effort has been launched by this organisation to establish a sui-generis Islamic dictatorship based on Sharia in the Muslim North of the nation. The stability of the nation is always under jeopardy due to the multiple wars and, specifically, the Boko Haram threat. Boko Haram has a degree of insurgency never seen before was injected into Nigeria's political and social life. Even before the nation had a chance to move past earlier ethno-religious tensions, the insurgency became violent in 2008[34,35,36].

Muhammad Yusuf established Boko Haram in the year 2002. According to its members, it is officially known as "Jama'at ahlis Sunnah lid Da'wat wal Jihad," which translates as "those devoted to the dissemination of the Prophet's teachings and jihad." The phrase "western education is sinful" is a loose translation of the name of the organization, "Boko Haram,"[37]. The understanding of this is that any Western civilization is prohibited. This is the justification given by those who support this organization for their preference for a Sharia-based governance over a liberal one. The core components of the Boko Haram ideology might be categorized as Wahhabism, Salafism, and Islamic fundamentalism. The gang, which was established in Maiduguri in 2002, did not turn violent until its head was caught and murdered by the Nigerian army in 2009. Since then, the organization has participated in stabbing, bombing, arson, gun fights, and other acts of violence to further their cause. In addition, Boko Haram seized a region in and around Borno state in the northeastern region of Nigeria in 2014. However, the group's geographical dominance has been undermined by the Nigerian military forces since 2015[34].

There are several approaches to analyze Boko Haram. In the beginning, it alludes to a lengthy history that is distinctive to Northern Nigeria and the ongoing extremist Islamic activities. The socioeconomic marginalization of the inhabitants in the country's north is the second factor that gave rise to the organization. Thirdly, Boko Haram is perceived as wanting retribution,

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particularly in response to the law enforcement officials' unethical behavior. The fourth assumption is predicated on the idea that northern elites use Boko Haram as a vehicle through which to air their complaints about the central government's lack of interest. Finally, it may be deduced that the group is evolving as an Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and perhaps Al-Shabaab affiliate[35].

The organization occasionally conducts irregular bombings in prominent Northern Nigerian cities including Kaduna, Saria, Jos, Kano, Maiduguri, and Damaturi, in addition to targeting national events, marketplaces, and churches. The combatants in such situations murder both Muslims and Christians without distinction. The leaders of the organisation have often said that they are still fighting for justice and the Islamization of Nigeria [35]. A number of terrorist organizations from throughout the world have made similar declarations of loyalty to the Islamic State (IS), including the group in question. Boko Haram might be viewed in this light as another another manifestation of the multinational terror operations with a religious bent that are currently sweeping the globe[35].

l. Secesion Agitations and Movements (1967 till date): The nation has been struggling with the effects of cessation movements similar to those that sparked the civil war in 1967. Although these agitators' methods of operation are more civil than those used by the late Odumegu Ojukwu in the country's southeast at the time, they still cause numerous disruptions to national governance. The Oduduwa Republic, which represents the Yoruba ethnic group in the Southwest, is led by Professor Banji Akintoye and Chief Sunday Adeyemo, also known as Sunday Igboho. IPOB, which represents the Igbo ethnic group, is led by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu in the Southeast. The leaders of these cessation movements and agitations have said in various places that the reasons behind their agitations are the marginalization and discriminatory

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treatment of people who belong to their ethnic group by the present Nigerian administration, which is led by Muhammadu Buhari.

2.1.11 Concept of Inter-Ethnic Crisis Management

- **Inter-ethnic Crisis Management:** refer to any actions taken to ensure prompt detection, mitigation, or minimizing of the harm (if any) caused by interethnic crisis by the use or implementations of some professionally developed ideas and tactics. However, these procedures entail organizing, directing, inspiring, and managing human resources, or employees. A thorough procedure is implemented before a crisis ever arises as part of crisis management methods, which don't just happen when a problem occurs.
- **Concept of Crisis Management:** Application of tactics intended to assist an organization in dealing with a sudden and severe bad incident is known as crisis management[1]. A crisis might originate from an unforeseen incident or an unanticipated outcome of an event that was previously thought to pose a risk. In either scenario, choices must be made swiftly to limit harm to the company during a crisis. Depending on the nature of the crisis, many types of harm are possible. The majority of the time, a crisis, however, can have an impact on the organisation's finances, reputation, or any combination of these. A catastrophe like a terrible fire might endanger the organization's finances. However, if the fire happens during business hours, it might potentially endanger health and safety since workers can be put in danger[1]. The word "crisis" alone has several connotations. These interpretations assist crisis managers and leaders in making decisions on what to do in a crisis scenario. The fact that we talk about

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"managing" a crisis yet each crisis scenario is actually rather unique by itself makes it an intriguing applied topic as well.

There are distinct circumstances of crisis in the crisis literature, despite the fact that it is difficult to agree on what defines a crisis. For instance, incidents often have six things in common: they're uncommon, important, have a major impact, are urgent, are uncertain, and have high stakes. When the organisation's or system's essential values are under jeopardy, there occurs a moment of discontinuity, which necessitates significant decision-making. The company and its stakeholders are affected, and an escalation of one or more problems, mistakes, or processes is anticipated during this time[1].

A crisis may begin with a straightforward item of news that spreads through media channels or social media and reaches a wide audience, creating a mood of agitation and uneasiness among the target of the crisis. A crisis can be curtailed within a specific framework to prevent unfavorable media attention, although this only applies to the communication aspect of a crisis. A strategic business plan is the first step in crisis management, and "...the integrity and legitimacy of the organization are key to the issue of crisis," according to the statement".

- **Origin of Field of Crisis Management:** The management of the 1982 Tylenol cyanide poisoning issue in the Chicago region by Johnson & Johnson is widely regarded as the beginning of the profession of crisis management. All Tylenol capsules in the nation were promptly recalled by the firm, and complimentary items in tamper-proof packaging were made available. The impact on shareholders was reduced as a consequence of the company's quick and efficient reaction, and the brand rebounded and prospered[1]. Today, crisis management is used by almost all large enterprises, nonprofit organisations, and

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public sector organisations. One of the most important steps in making sure a company can react to unplanned disasters is developing, rehearsing, and updating a crisis management strategy. However, depending on the organisation type, the scope of the crisis management operations may change. An insurance firm, on the other hand, would be much less likely to be exposed to such risks than, say, a manufacturing corporation, which would certainly require a crisis management strategy for handling a large-scale industrial mishap, like an explosion or chemical leak. Of course, not every dramatic event, like an industrial catastrophe, necessitates the use of a crisis management strategy. The company may need to implement its crisis management strategy in response to any circumstance that might endanger its finances or reputation. There is a contention that the fundamental ideas and practices of crisis management, particularly in the area of communication, are comparable to those of earlier civilisations, including the significance of direct communication between the people and the leadership. The correct identification of the crises' true roots, the prohibition of the spread of misleading information, the reassuring of the public that a solution exists, as well as smart management decisions and a competent execution strategy, are further commonalities[1]. Establishing a framework for comparison by connecting historical crises to the modern period. Since mankind has experienced numerous and diverse environmental, political, economic, and military crisis, history of crisis tends to demonstrate that the study of crisis management cannot be tied to a particular culture or time period. Furthermore, several of the concerns and complicated problems facing the present world have historical roots. Thus, many of today's global issues are the outcome of long-standing causes. From an academic perspective, studying crisis management should involve a thorough

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examination that takes into account history, culture, and anthropology to establish how the crisis developed and what effect it had[1]. The world now is experiencing several significant crises, including economic, economic, and ecological ones. However, the most damaging crises are those that result in never-ending wars, killing thousands of people year and uprooting millions of others. In fact, most of those destructive conflicts could be avoided if the parties involved embraced wisdom by prioritizing common goals over individual ones, choosing dialogue and patience over obstinacy and extremism, and especially when conflicts and crises do not serve to build nations and civilizations but rather to destroy everything. The theoretical frameworks that have been constructed by diverse researchers may not be sufficient to face the new problems that today's crises provide.

- **Crisis Management Goals:** In order to lessen the harm that a crisis creates, crisis management is used. This does not imply that crisis response and crisis management are equivalent, though. Instead, crisis management is an extensive procedure that is used in advance of a crisis. Before, during, and following a crisis, crisis management procedures are used [1].

2.1.12 Stages of Crisis Management

(1) **Warning and Risk Assessment**: It is important to recognize hazards and develop strategies to lessen their impact as it is to detect risks and set up monitoring systems that can send out early detection indications of any coming crisis. These slightly earlier mechanisms can come in a variety of forms and vary substantially depending on the recognized hazards [1].

Monitoring systems could be mechanical or electrical. As an illustration, a technology might be used to detect heat generation before a fire starts. Financial metrics might be incorporated into

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further early warning systems. A business may be able to predict a sharp drop in revenue by monitoring the stock prices of its customers, for example[1].

(2) **Key Steps at each Stage of a Crisis:** Pre-crisis preparation must include the broadest range of stakeholders as feasible. By doing this, every department of the business is represented in the process of identifying risks and planning for them. Participants in corporate crisis response teams usually come from the organization's legal, human resources (HR), finance, and operations teams. Designating someone to function as a crisis manager is another prevalent practice.

(3) **Crisis Response and Management:** Assembling the organization's response in accordance with the planned firm crisis management strategy is the responsibility of the crisis manager. The person responsible for alerting the public is often the crisis manager. The crisis management team should produce a press statement as soon as it is practical if a crisis has an effect on public health or safety. Media representatives will unavoidably get in touch with staff members for comments during a public crisis. Who is and is not allowed to speak to the media in advance must be made clear to the company's workers. Any employee who is given permission to speak to the media must do so in a manner that is in line with the crisis management's position[1].

(4) **Post-crisis and Resolution:** As soon as a crisis has passed and operations have resumed as normal, the crisis manager should stay in touch with the crisis management team to gauge how the recovery process is progressing, especially with those from the legal and finance departments. By providing them with the most recent information, the crisis manager will also need to keep key stakeholders informed about the situation[1]. The crisis management team must evaluate the organization's crisis management strategy after a crisis to determine how well it worked and to identify any components that need to be changed in light of the lessons learned[1].

- **Processes of Crisis Management**

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• One of the processes is dealing successfully with rumours and false information that attack both official and informal groups and promote a poisonous atmosphere is the first stage in dealing with any crisis. If this step is not taken quickly and effectively, the crisis may explode in the real world.

• The crisis is addressed before, during, and after the crisis with the help of issue management, a strategic technique. In order to prevent or lessen the damage that a crisis might do to a firm and its stakeholders, crisis management is considered. A cross process goes into managing a crisis. Crisis management seeks to protect the organization, sector, or stakeholders from harm in order to avoid or mitigate the negative impacts of a crisis.

Crisis management is a multidimensional process with a variety of phases as has already been stated. One crisis management approach breaks down this procedure into three stages [1].

i. The Pre-crisis Stage: There are three substages in this process: signal detection, crisis preparation, and prevention. If a crisis has already been discovered, it should be prevented at this stage, and crisis management should start. The goals are to lessen the risk of crises and to be strategically and tactically ready[1]. As of right now, it is anticipated that the company will have a crisis management plan that is routinely updated in this respect. In the process of forming the crisis management team, the organisation selects a spokesperson or spokespersons and develops model crisis communications.

ii. Crisis Stage: The second phase, which is the real crisis stage, is divided into two substages: crisis recognition and crisis containment. At this time, it's essential to focus on the organisation's crisis management plan, stakeholder outreach, and crisis scenario response. This stage covers the organization's response to the actual incident. The crisis management plan is put into practice,

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and the literature offers three pieces of advice: act quickly, precisely, and consistently. Since public relations develop the messages to be conveyed to all stakeholder groups, ensuring that the public's safety is the most important factor, their help is now thoroughly examined. Damage to the organisation is rectified as it is being attended to.

iii. **The Post Crisis Stage:** The post-crisis stage takes place following the resolution of the crisis, as its term suggests. The company now evaluates their response to the circumstance.

- **Overall Importance of Crisis Management:** Making businesses better prepared to deal with unanticipated calamities is the main purpose of crisis management. The group nevertheless keeps an eye on what the media and stakeholder organizations are doing, even though the issue might not be as serious as it once was. It is essential to understand how their stakeholder groups see the situation. A demand for information emerges during a crisis, and communication meets that need. Neither the crisis communication plan nor the crisis management strategy should be ignored before, during, or after a crisis.

  Crisis communication targets the internal and external audiences that have been impacted by the crisis events. It provides information, which should be consistent throughout the crisis situation, thanks to the choice of a single lead speaker. Stakeholder response management and crisis awareness management are two distinct categories of crisis communication. The process of "crisis awareness management" involves acquiring data, analyzing it, sharing what is learned, and taking action. Stakeholder response management is the process of attempting to communicate with and influence various stakeholder groups inside an organisation.

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This can be achieved either bodily or verbally. It is critical to know how the stakeholder groups view the crisis scenario, the organisation experiencing it, and its response to it in order to have an influence on those groups.

2.1.13 Factors Affecting the Process of Crisis Management

- Because we are talking about the process of altering fact and persuading the public of the viewpoint of the organisation that protects its goals and objectives, crisis management process necessitates a wide range of skills and knowledge, as stated earlier. In addition, the search for potential solutions during a crisis necessitates the use of essential social, legal, and communication skills. Some of the elements influencing crisis management are listed below:

First, a crucial component for the person in charge of crisis management is psychological considerations. As the crisis management process necessitates endurance, knowledge, and smart thoughts in the preparation for the management of the crisis and offering appropriate answers, self-control, confidence, and coolness are some of the mental qualities that are extremely necessary. In this context, Jin says that managing crises necessitates some fundamental understanding of psychology, primarily because handling some crises greatly necessitates regulating emotions and sentiments, self-control, patience, tranquility, and refraining from anxiousness and carelessness. These actions and dispositions are crucial for handling a crisis effectively, professionally, succinctly, precisely, and without temper tantrums that could impair reasoned and successful decision-making[1].

Second, thorough familiarity with the area in which the organization operates may include understanding of the social, governmental, and cultural aspects of the community. This is

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because handling a crisis is a complicated process that calls for fast judgment calls, incident management preparation, and emergency management implementation[1].

Thirdly, persons in the position of handling crises have to be well-versed in the nature of regional laws and rules pertaining to slander, contempt, misinformation, and trademarks. Additionally, legislative and political factors are closely related to ethical and values of a society since those in charge of managing the crisis should be able to manage its repercussions. By committing to openness and transparency and demonstrating true empathy for the victims, they will also be able to improve the performance of the organization, its reputation, and its image[1]. In the Gulf of Mexico oil leak catastrophe on April 20, 2010, British Petroleum (BP), for instance, used the aforementioned principles. By fully disclosing the problem and its effects as well as its consequences, and by extending a complete apology, the company chose to be open and truthful with the American people as well as the authorities. The company also provided compensations worth more than $20 billion, despite the fact that the incident's losses to the business had already reached $70 billion[1].

In order to engage with the public, which is in dire need of a real account of the situation, a mass communication plan must be established. Therefore, any delay, misunderstanding, or silence would expose the organisation to rumors and misleading information, aggravating and further complicating the problem. Because this is the correct and necessary course to take in order to repair the damage caused by the crisis, communication strategy must be based on openness with the general public and opinion leaders. The main difficulty is in the process of recovering the public's faith during or after the crisis, and it is Unrelenting verbal transparency and complete transparency in handling the problem are essential to winning it[5].

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Fifthly, the public must be involved in managing the issue. Several different scenarios can result in this. Nongovernmental groups, public figures, and members of the neighborhood community are a few of them. It finally results in the absorption of public rage and the regaining of the public's confidence to include them in the crisis communication plan in order to arrive at the suitable answers. In example, one strategy for recovering the public's confidence during or after the crisis is to acknowledge and respect the rights and sentiments of individuals who were impacted by it in order to help them heal and participate in decision-making[5].

2.1.14 Decision-making in Crisis and Leadership in Crisis

- Crisis management with the use of communication demands grasping and understanding of local cultural environment and its features, as well as the values and ethics of the community to which they belong. This leads to a topic of judgment and moral leadership[2].
- Making decisions in a crisis is highly crucial. Making sensible and solid judgments is an essential part of the crisis management process since they help to successfully end the crisis and lessen its impacts. This may help to understand why making decisions frequently demands a great deal of experience and information. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a great leader is his capacity to act wisely under pressure; thus, the timing of those judgments is essential to their effectiveness. When a crisis does not call for immediate intervention or a choice to be made, leaders should not jump to conclusions or act hastily in response to them. Being able to resist giving in to pressure

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and committing errors in the process but yet taking the required time to carefully consider the issue and confer with others who are aware of it exemplifies leadership[5].

Particularly in light of 9/11 and the terrorist threat, crisis leadership has grown in importance. Now more than ever, we need leaders with empathy, good communication skills, and a grasp of crisis situations. The needs from leaders who have to deal with crisis circumstances include these traits in addition to empathy, competence, and the capacity to provide guidance.

• Crisis leadership effectiveness is proven to be higher when mission leadership behaviors are used. The efficacy of leadership practices that are focused on the people and the company is also not poor. The authors draw the conclusion that, despite the fact that their study emphasizes mission leadership, concentrating solely on this leadership will not boost the effectiveness of crisis management[5].

In times of crisis, leaders provide the groundwork for group consultation, which gives everyone the chance to weigh in on decisions and look for answers.

Issues and Crisis Management in Public Relations

How do issue and crisis management connect to each other? Crisis may be caused by an issue, or conversely. Stakeholder organisations in addition to the government are the issue creators. Stakeholder groups may voice concerns about an organisation, and if they believe the business is not meeting their expectations, this may result in a crisis situation that might harm the brand productivity as well[1].

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Issues management, risk communication, and reputation management are three domains that are tied to or connected with crisis communication. A crisis situation and the requirement for crisis management can be caused by failure in any of these areas. The requirement for risk communication, problems management, and reputation management may also result from inefficient crisis communication[1].

2.1.15 Concept of Public Relations Responses

Aims and Objectives of Public Relations Responses during Crisis

i. Anticipate and Prevent Crisis: These are the actions of recognising a crisis, looking for signs of a crisis within a society or workplace, and responding quickly to such with the intention of avoiding it from developing into a full-blown crisis.

ii. Mitigate Damage on Reputation: These are the steps taken to make sure a crisis does not have the opportunity to destroy a government, an institution, or a person's integrity in the event that one arises. By ensuring that the victim's suffering is minimised, it implies acting swiftly to head off a crisis as it arises before it degenerates or becomes unmanageable.

iii. Recover, Survive & Rebuild Reputation: After weathering a catastrophe, an organisation or person must reestablish their prior integrity and reputation in order to recover and survive. After that, it re-launched its public relations initiatives and campaigns in an effort to restore its favourable public image.

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iv. Promote & Protect Rebuilt Reputation: These are the steps taken to promote the restored integrity and reputation of an organisation, government or individual and to protect them from any potential crises or harm in the future.

Public relations responses relate to the manner in which the profession or professional charged with managing the reputation and public relations of a nation, a person, or an organisation responds to, or reacts to, any incident, circumstance, event, or inquiry that has an impact on its principal[36]. The response, may take the form of communications (verbal, written, or symbiotic, inter-personal, group, or mass public), may include anticipating and preventing crises; managing crises through the appointment of a response team and spokesperson; a plan and preparation of the team; designing a communications strategy; recognizing and dealing with the affected parties; assessing the situation; and evaluating and continuing to learn from the circumstances[36].

However,Public relations (PR) has been described in a number of ways. PR is described by the British Institute of Public Relations (IBPR) as the intentional, well-thought-out, and ongoing efforts to develop and sustain a sense of mutual understanding between a business and its publics[36]. While the Mexican declaration described PR as the art and social science of trend analysis, foreseeing their effects, advising organisational leaders, and putting into action pre-planned programs of activities that would benefit both the organisation and the public interest[36].

Deliberate, planned, and ongoing attempts to foster understanding between a company and its publics are what constitute public relations (PR) as a social science. Public relations (PR) is any of a number of actions taken by a business to enhance and safeguard the public's perception of the business, its policies, and its goods. Thus, it seeks to control how the general public feels about a government or institution. A wide number of actions are included in public relations[36].

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It is used to disseminate and transmit all the information required to cultivate a positive reputation in the eyes of the general public. Positive programs are adopted for this aim by an effective and strong public relations department, and it is constantly emphasised to avoid bad publicity that results from dubious tactics[36].

A wide range of communication strategies are employed in public relations to build and maintain positive relationships between an organization and its target audiences; including customers, workers, stockholders, public authorities, and the larger society as a whole[36].

Since its inception, public relations have evolved from publicity to being characterized as "helping an organization and its audience in order the organization and its publics can acclimate to one another." In this managerial role, compromise rather than imposing one point of view on others is the main goal. Perhaps only because of this, the PR's reach has grown to such great heights. Furthermore, there is uncertainty regarding what PR is and is not due to the usage of a number of terminologies as expressions or replacements, such as public affairs corporate affairs and corporate communication.

Public relations is a crucial component of the marketing plan. The majority of multinational corporations work hard to manage and preserve their ties with their clients in the age of globalization. The public relations departments of the majority of multinational corporations go above and beyond to keep tabs on consumer attitudes and views[36].

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2.1.16 Five Major Objectives of Public Relations Responses

The goal of the public relations department's reactions is to create a favourable perception of the company, its policies, and its goods. It accomplishes the organisation's following goals of:

i. It makes it easier for businesses to run smoothly and for organisations to achieve their goals.

ii. It improves brand recognition and fosters confidence in the legitimacy of governmental, individual, or organisational goods and services.

iii. It supports the introduction of new initiatives and sustains consumer interest and trust in those already in place.

iv. It supports advertising in promoting both current and new items. As a result, it makes it easier for company and its partners to sell goods.

v. It reduces the expense of promotion since it just has to keep people to create and share content with the media or oversee events[37].

Five important features of Public Relations Responses

1. **Overload of Attempt:** Businesses vying for a limited quantity of media coverage are under pressure to outperform rivals in their public relations efforts. There may be no assurance that a PR campaign will affect the goals it is intended to achieve[37].
2. **Could be Focused:** If the appropriate media vehicle is chosen, public relations operations can be targeted to a limited, niche audience[37].
3. **Cost Effective:** Compared to other forms of advertising, it is significantly less expensive in terms of cost per person reached. In stark contrast to the enormous expense of purchasing space or time in the major media, much PR work may be carried out at essentially no cost, aside from minor production expenditures.

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4. **Fairly Unmanageable:** A company's direct control over public relations activities is relatively limited. A press release's complete publication is possible if it is successful, but neither the location nor the timing of its publication can be controlled. An incorrect reading of a press release might lead to unfavorable news coverage. In contrast, advertising allows for a great deal of control over the content, placement, and timing of an advertisement[37].

5. **Reputation:** When compared to other forms of marketing like advertising, PR activities have a higher level of legitimacy. Because the audience could interpret such a communication as coming from a reliable source that isn't trying to sell anything. Readers or viewers may be less skeptical of material when it is presented as news than when it is presented as an advertising, which they could assume is biased[37].

<

The Public Relations Department

A big firm typically has four key functional areas: finance, operations, marketing, and personnel or human resource management. The public relations department was traditionally seen as a tiny add-on to this structure. All of this work was delegated to the PR department in such businesses since it did not clearly fall under the purview of any functional department. Today, however, "Relations" are becoming more and more genuine[37].

All other operational departments and the PR department communicate oftenas shown in the following example:

(1) **Capital:** Resource mobilisation is aided by public relations

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(2) **Industrial Relations:** Buy for output

(3) **Customer Relations:** To better understand customer demands

(4) **Worker Relations:** To boost employee morale and foster teamwork.

(5) **Plan Formulations and Administrative Policies:** This department serves as a link between the different organisational constituencies and the different functional departments.

(6) Government and political Rapprochement: The Organisation must adhere to laws and regulations set out by the government. To maintain the smooth operation of the business, it must establish suitable relationships with various political parties and government authorities.

(7) **Crisis Communication:** In times of crisis, such as an accident, financial fraud, insolvency, etc., the function of public relations becomes critical importance. Public relations must ensure the public that corrective action is being done to control the situation by providing them with honest and accurate information. An organisation's public relations department oversees and evaluates public perceptions and promotes goodwill and mutual understanding with the general public. It enhances channels of communication and introduces fresh strategies for establishing a two-way exchange of knowledge and comprehension.

(8) **Visitor Relations:** Activities for welcoming guests, planning the visit's itinerary and other associated details, giving university tours, creating brochures, tour guides, cassettes, films, maps, and other guest-related communications materials, and creating gifts for the guests.

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(9) Mass Publication: Creating and disseminating documents for the general public, including dealers, agents, advisory bodies, and employees; assisting other departments in promoting and disseminating event notifications and other advertising materials relating to events[37].

How do Public Relations Responses help in Crisis Management?

Numerous crises have occurred in the past, and there are five measures that need be taken to handle one effectively[37].

i. To start, the firm in crisis should be prompt, speaking to the public soonest.

ii. Extend your regrets for any tragic event.

iii. The company in question should maintain its integrity because the general public is more apt to overlook an honest error than a purposeful falsehood.

iv. It is important to be informative because the media as well as the public will create their own rumours if no information is given to them by the corporation in crisis. Rumours can cause significantly more damage to the corporation than the truth.

v. People will be more understanding if it is evident that the company cares about the crisis victims, so it is important to show concern and care.

vi. Maintain two-way communication, to finish. This is crucial since listening may teach the company a lot about the current state of public opinion. These five stages must be followed in order to effectively manage any crisis through PR.

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2.1.17 Understanding Public Relations Crisis

Every government or corporation must deal with the idea of public relations at some time, from internet reviews to general public or consumer satisfaction. Every activity that a government or other organisation does in that involves dealing with the public is what first drew them into the public relations industry[37].

When a bad incident or review about your company acquires traction in the media, it is a public relations crisis. It's probable that bad PR will occur at some time, but how a government or institution handles the situation will decide how damaging the effect is[37].

The majority of firms in the public or nonprofit sectors will experience a PR crisis at some point. Nobody anticipates you to be flawless, but they do anticipate you to be genuine, and that comes through in the way you respond to certain situations[37].

Causes of Public Relations Crisis

i. Accidents/Natural Disasters

ii. Serious Management Maladministration

iii. Lawbreaking

iv. Poor leadership

v. Lawbreaking

vi. Workers/Industrial issues.

Realities about Public Relations Crisis

i. Public relations crisis pose a risk to the reputation of any government or institution.

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ii. Public relations crisis negatively affects the public's and consumers' perceptions of a company or government entity.

iii. You probably have no influence over how they turn out.

iv. Your government or organisation's company will need to roll with the punches and try to make a wrong into a right once the knowledge is out there.

v. Although the impact of a PR disaster may first appear intangible, it will unquestionably have a long-term impact on your company.

vi. The public and customers want to deal with enterprises run by organisations or the government they can trust. This trust is jeopardized if your government or organisation is involved in a PR crisis.

vii. Although the problem may appear little or straightforward at first, if the PR crisis isn't managed effectively, it might develop into a significant problem.

Basis of Public Relations Responses during Crises are:

• **Mitigate Damage on Reputation:** Thisrefers to the victim making sensible decisions during a crisis to prevent further losses. Mitigating damages is taking constructive, proactive measures to lessen the overall harm the victim experiences as a result of the observed incident, occurrence, or accident.

- **Recover from Reputation Crisis** describes a situation in which a person, a government, or an institution regains and restores its reputation in the eyes of the public[37].

- **Survive Reputation-Crisis:** describes a circumstance in which a person, a country, or an institution continues to exist despite having had a reputation crisis.

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- **Rebuild Reputation:** refers to activities that restore a positive public perception of a person, a government, or an organisation.
- **Promote Reputation:** This phrase refers to efforts made to improve the public perception of a person, a government, or an institution.

• **Protect Rebuilt Reputation:** This refers to the act of defending a person, group, or government's improved public perception against attack, scandal, and catastrophe[37].

• **Handling bad news and situations that have to do with the operations ofgovernment or organisation:** Mishaps do occur; issues arise. There is never a 100% guarantee that the operations of a government or organisation will not be negatively impacted by any unforeseen circumstances. Understanding how to react to and manage these issues or crises when they arise is crucial if you want to minimize harm and make sure your government or organization's operations survive the PR storm[37].

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2.1.18 Approaches and Processes of Public Relations Responses during Crisis

1. Establish a Response Taskforce and Spokesperson: Before a crisis even arises, a company should already have a response team and a spokesperson in place37. To make sure the right people are speaking on behalf of your government or organisation during a controversy, you should quickly name a response team and spokesperson. When several people start speaking on behalf of the government or organisation, it is challenging to react quickly and speak with a single voice, which is vital. The best teams are composed of both inside personnel who are familiar with the business and outside specialists who can see the issue from a journalistic stance[37].

2. Create a Plan and Inform the Team: The appropriate administration of your crisis communications operations depends on protocol. Each member of your response team has to be aware of their roles and know whether to report on the situation in a proactive or reactive manner for the media. Whatever the plan, the government or organization is required to communicate the etiquette to everyone who could be asked to speak on their behalf. This entails letting everyone know—staff, stakeholders, board members, etc.—about who will be speaking with the press and where they should address any questions. By doing this, the government or organization will avoid subsequently having to defend any remarks made by unofficial government or organization officials.

3. Compose your Messages: Following a thorough investigation of the occurrence by you and your team, you should decide on the tone and message of your response. Without blaming anybody outside your company or government, consider the most transparent course of action to take in this scenario and what you have done or plan to do about it. Being direct and truthful with your audience is the best course of action in a crisis. People will be more likely to forgive you as soon as you recognise your error and apologize. People will quit criticizing you on social media sooner if you deal with the issue quickly. Express your regret straight quickly, accept responsibility for what happened, and state categorically that it will not occur again. Make it more human by requesting the leader of the institution or company apologize for their error if the business has a sizable social media following[37].

However, there are times when it could be preferable to hold out on making a comment. It's crucial to be responsive while also being patient, and to refrain from speaking too much. When faced with a catastrophe, it is frequently preferable to remain silent. An apology won't stop the fallout from a story in legal situations where it would be construed as an admission of guilt. A

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press release can generate a ton of online information about the situation, which informs search engines that it is a hot topic and may make repairing a company's online image more cchallengin[37.]

4. Identify those Needed to Talk to: Determine who needs to be informed about the problem, such as workers, stakeholders, business partners, the general public or consumers, and the media, and address them. The audience will vary on the circumstances, but whoever your message is intended for, you should make sure it is delivered on time. Sending emails or a press release to well-known, reputable media sources that are likely to present the news favorably or fairly. However, media outlets are fast to report on breaking news, so you should be prepared with prepared remarks and press releases before reporters reach you[37].

5. Observe the Circumstance: After a PR disaster, it is extremely crucial to evaluate your brand's image. In order to respond to any ensuing inquiries or worries, you must keep a watch on both inbound and outgoing interactions. When interacting with members of the public, clients, and partners, it is imperative to proceed with the utmost caution and care. It's crucial to keep tabs on what individuals are saying online about your government or institution. Reputation Management, governments or organizations run the danger of losing 22% of their business with only one bad article on the first page of search results.Search for any bad user-generated material on Google Images, online review sites, social networking platforms, and even your own website. Understanding what various audiences and stakeholders are saying about an organization at any given moment is a crucial part of good crisis communications. It would be prudent to set up monitoring systems that immediately identify bad patterns before they intensify and move to the media37.

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6. Post-action Review: After the crisis has passed, it's crucial to perform a post-action review in order to reflect on the experience and learn from it. Examine the management's and your staff's handling of the circumstance. Talk about what may have been done differently and what adjustments are required to stop a similar issue from happening again. After a catastrophe, concentrate on regaining your credibility. Change the subject to good news about your company[37].

• **Avoiding these Mistakes in a PR Crisis:** The following strategies should be avoided while developing and implementing your media response plan.

i. **Reacting Adversely:** It's never a good idea to react negatively or to assign blame for the issue to the complaint, even if the opposing party has made an entirely incorrect statement about your government or company. All you have to do is exercise strategic thinking and set emotions aside[37].

ii. **Saying "no reply":** The worst thing you can do in a crisis is not have answers to inquiries that could come up. However, there are situations when the information at hand prevents you from providing a satisfactory response. Although saying "no comment" is preferable to making anything up merely to offer an explanation is understandable how this statement may be seen as an attempt to hide or evade a problem. If you don't have sufficient knowledge to respond intelligently, acknowledge as much and promise the person requesting that you will make a comment once you have more information[37].

iii. **Hasty Reaction:** Timing is essential when handling a PR issue. iii. Reacting too hastily or too slowly. Before you know all the information, you don't want to respond

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hastily. Reputational harm might be increased if you subsequently had to retract or dispute earlier remarks. You won't gain anything by responding slowly either[37].

iv. **Focusing on the Problem:** The issue will probably pass quickly because of the short news cycle. You shouldn't let a period of "poor" publicity fully deter you from managing your business because it's usually simply a bump in the road to success. People will be able to overlook your error and forgive you, but they won't forget how you handled yourself during the situation. No matter how dire (the situation appears), always remember to apply good judgment. It's crucial to approach the circumstance appropriately[37].

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2.1.19 Concept of Public Relations Strategies

Outlines of Public Relations Strategies

- Media Relations (Press Releases, Press Conferences and Propaganda).
- Peacebuilding Programme
- Conflict Resolution
- Corporate Social Responsibilities
- Town Hall Meetings
- Slogan System
- Fact Sheets
- Press Kits
- Video News Releases
- Employees Members Relations

- Community Relations
- Financial Relations
- Industrial Relations
- Development/Fund Raising
- Special Events
- Controlled Communications
- Face-to-Face Events
- News
- Speech
- Printed Materials
- Public Services
- Institution Identity, and
- Website.

Public Relations Strategies refer to the range of tasks often carried out by the profession or professional charged with managing the reputation and public relations of a nation, a person, or an organization in the course of fulfilling its obligations or/and duties. Programs for image-cleansing, media relations (press conferences, releases, and propaganda), conflict resolution, peace-building initiatives, corporate social responsibility (CSR), public awareness, sensitization, and enlightenment initiatives, in-person interviews, public lectures, and town-hall meetings, social media, documentaries, training/empowerment initiatives, etc. are just a few of the many activities that fall under this category.

Public Relations Strategies/Tools

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1. **Media Relations** Involves the following:

- Press releases are the fundamental building component of every PR campaign that focuses on story placement. The key details of the good or service are distilled here in an effort to grab the media's interest. The marketer must tailor press releases for the numerous media outlets he contacts in the same way that he would tailor the advertising message for each target [37].
- **Press Conferences:** To inform the media about a significant news occurrence, a press conference is conducted. Perhaps you've heard of these conferences being utilized by a politician or by the police in the course of a major criminal investigation. The method can be used in PR for a business or product. Editors and writers of features frequently receive invites to such occasions. As a result, they are picky about which news conferences they decide to attend. The topic needs to be particularly intriguing or current, or the conference or presentation may be appealing because it is held in an intriguing location. Please see Plates 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 on Honourable Minister of Information, Federal Ministry of Information, Lai Mohammed during apress conference and traditional media in Appendix II.
- **Propaganda:** The purposeful expression of thoughts or acts by people or organizations with the intention of influencing the beliefs or behaviors of other people or groups in order to forward specified goals and through cognitive maneuvers is known as propaganda. Propaganda is interactions that are mainly considered when it is important to sway an audience and advance an agenda[38,39]. It may not be objective, may present facts selectively to support a particular synthesis or perception, or may use loaded language to elicit an emotional rather than a logical reaction to the information being presented.

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Propaganda is frequently linked to content created by governments for use when faced with crisis or in warfare activities, political causes, insurgents [39,40,41]. Paintings, cartoons, posters, booklets, films, radio programmes, TV programmes, and websites are just a few of the materials and media that are used to spread propaganda messages. As new technology is developed, these methods also altered. More recently, the digital era has given rise to new methods of propagandizing; for instance, bots and algorithms are presently being used to produce computational propaganda and fake or biased news and propagate it on social media [42].

- **Functions of Propaganda**

a. **To Alter People's Perceptions:** The intention of any propagandist to alter people's perceptions of a problem or circumstance in order to influence their behavior and expectations in ways that the interest group finds desirable. In this way, propaganda functions as a counterpart to censorship, serving the same aim by shielding individuals from being exposed to alternative viewpoints rather than by inundating their minds with sanctioned material [40]. The ability of the propagandist to alter people's perceptions via deception and confusion rather than persuasion and understanding is what distinguishes propaganda from other types of advocacy. The organisation's leaders are aware that the material is biased or incorrect, but the rank-and-file members who assist in spreading the propaganda may not share this knowledge [40].

b. **To Incite Hostility toward Adversaries -** Propaganda is a potent tool in warfare; it is employed to dehumanise and incite hostility toward a fictitious adversary, whether internal or foreign, by instilling a false image in the minds of troops and civilians. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, including the use of derogatory or racist

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concepts (such as "Kei" and "darkie," which were utilised during the Second World War, and the Vietnam War; the avoidance of specific words or phrases, and the making of accusations of adversary's crimes. These most times are considered to demoralize the adversary and make members of the public believe that what was portrayed was truly true.

c. **Public Misinformation -** There are sneaky methods to use propaganda. For instance, the educational institution may promote or accept derogatory falsehoods about the past of particular communities or other nations. Since few individuals truly check anything they are taught in school, such false information will be recounted by media as well as families, supporting the perception that the false information is a "well-known truth" despite the fact that no one caught disseminating rumor can provide a reliable source[42].

2. **Peacebuilding Programme:** The goal of peacbuilding is to change the structural and cultural factors that lead to violent or destructive crises and to find peaceful solutions to injustice. It focuses on fostering positive interpersonal, social, and political ties across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic divides. Before, during, and after each instance of violence, the process comprises crisis management, resolution, or transformation; post-conflict reconciliation; and trauma recovery[43].

As a result, peace building is a multifaceted, bridge methodology or process that develops strategic value when it functions over the foreseeable future at all social levels to forge and maintain interactions between people locally and internationally and so fosters sustainable peace [43]. Sustainable peace - making efforts target the underlying or prospective causes of crises, promote a community standard for peaceful conflict resolution, and stabilize political and socioeconomic societal circumstances. Depending on the circumstance and the peace building agent, several ways are used. Successful

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peace building initiatives involve liberal democracy, provide procedures for the rule of law, address underlying institutional and sociological problems, and provide an atmosphere that is conducive to a lasting, peace [43].

In order to address the root causes of violence and guarantee that people from fear, humiliation and danger, a wide range of efforts by various stakeholders in civil society and the government at the community, national, and international levels are considered.

The primary goal of peace building is to restructure society and address the root cause of any crises in any society.

Also, the goal of peace building initiatives is to manage, reduce, resolve, and modify key components of the conflict through governmental mediation, social movement peace mechanisms, and conversation, bargaining, and arbitration. In order to stop the resurgence of physical and systemic aggression, peace building tackles all unidentified causes of the crises, be it political, social, or economic. Peace building focuses on promotion of a stable and peaceful coexistence of people of different cultural background in every given society [44].

- **Different Approaches to Peacebuilding**

  a. **Absence of Peace:** This is the absence of direct violence, sometimes known as "hot" violence, which refers to acts that cause immediate injury to a particular subject or group. In this view, the goal of negative peace building is to create a state of peace by addressing the root causes of destructive conflict. When referring to this move as "peace building," there is a deliberate effort by those responsible for creating and planning a peace building initiative to decrease direct violence [45].

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b. **Absence of Direct and Structural Hostility: This is also referred to positive peace:** Positive peace refers to the absence of both direct violence as well as structural violence[45].

c. **Relative Peace:** This is the absence of any aggression caused by either direct, structural cultural issue in a society[45].

3. **Conflict Resolution:** A social situation known as conflict resolution occurs when two or more parties engaged in armed conflict decide to live in peace despite their fundamental differences or to disband them altogether[46]. Conflicting parties refers to groups that are lawfully or loosely organized and involved in conflict within a society[46]. Fundamental difference is the term used to describe a significant conflict between at least two parties in which their demands cannot be supplied simultaneously by the same resources.

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Techniques for Resolving Conflicts

(a) **Change in One of the Parties' Priorities:** Although a party seldom alters its fundamental stances, it occasionally shows a change in the priorities it places at the top of the list. Such a situation can give rise to fresh options for resolving disputes. The resource under dispute is fragmented. This basically indicates that both sides who are at odds show some degree of competing priorities, which creates the possibility of some sort of "meeting the other side halfway" accord[47].

(b) **Exchanging Favors between the Opposing Sides:** This implies that one party receives satisfaction on all of its requests on one subject, while the other side receives satisfaction on all of its demands on a different one. The parties resolve to jointly exercise control over the disputed resource. It could be a long-term solution or a temporary agreement for a period of transition that, once it's through, has helped the dispute be transcended. The parties consent to handing over power to another party. In this process, the principal parties consent to, or accept the control of the challenged resource being transferred to a third party. The parties use legal or arbitral processes as means of resolving their disputes. This entails devising a method for settling the dispute in some of the five ways discussed earlier, but with the additional feature that it is accomplished by a process that is done through a process outside of the parties' absolute authority. It is possible to postpone some concerns. Arguments in favor of this include the possibility of political upheaval and shifting public opinion, as well as the possibility that some topics will benefit from postponement since they may lose relevance with time[47].

4. **Corporate Social Responsibilities:** Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a type of global personal business operational consciousness that aims to support charitable, activist, or

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philanthropic societal goals by participating in or encouraging volunteer work or other morally upstanding behaviors[48]. Previously, it was necessary to classify CSR as a company's internal policy or an organizational ethics tactic[49]. However, such a period has since gone as a result of the development of numerous domestic and international regulations as well as the use of power by various organizations to advance CSR beyond individual or even sector-wide initiatives. Although it has long been seen as a type of corporate self-regulation, during the past ten years or more, it has changed significantly from voluntary decisions made at the level of individual firms to mandated programs at regional, national, and worldwide levels[50].

When seen from an organisational perspective, CSR is typically viewed as a strategic project that enhances a brand's reputation [51]. Therefore, for social responsibility programs to be effective, they must be incorporated into and clearly correspond with a business model. In accordance with certain models, a company's CSR initiatives go beyond regulatory compliance and involve "activities that appear to serve some societal good, beyond the interests of the enterprise and what is required by law" [51].

Additionally, companies may participate in CSR for humanitarian or strategic reasons. CSR may increase company revenues from a strategic standpoint, especially if brands voluntarily thinks about both the good and bad results of their initiative[52]. These advantages arise in part from fostering goodwill and moral excellence in order to lower commercial and legal risk by accepting accountability for corporate deeds. CSR methods nudge businesses to have a good effect on the environment and other stakeholders, including as customers, staff, investors, communities, and others[52]. A moral point of view suggest that some companies will embrace CSR policies and procedures due to the moral convictions of senior management[53].

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The World Health Organization (WHO) designated the new coronavirus illness (COVID-19) outbreak to be a pandemic on March 11, 2020, which significantly expanded the notion and scope of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the recent past. The extent of the virus's influence on society and the subsequent impact on CSR have changed how corporations view society throughout the world[54].

CSR is intended to support an organization's goal and act as a roadmap for what the business stands for to its consumer. Corporate ethics is the area of applied morals that looks at humanitarian dilemmas that could occur in a professional context. The accepted worldwide standard for CSR is ISO 26000. Organizations in the public sector, like the United Nations, follow the triple bottom line (TBL). Although there is no explicit regulation governing CSR, it is largely acknowledged that it conforms to comparable principles[51].

Types of Corporate Social Responsibility

i. Organizational charitable donations: Donations made to charities by businesses in the form of money, commodities, and services, sometimes through corporate foundations.

ii. Volunteering in the community: This is usually done through company-sponsored events, often with money for labor done through a nonprofit firm or company.

iii. Utilizing socially responsible techniques: such as ethically made goods that attract a certain market.

iv. Funding empowerment advocacy for causes and activism.

v. Charitable contributions of products meant for sales to the less-privileged within a society.

5. Town Hall Meetings: Town hall meetings or forum, are a mechanism for local and national politicians to interact with their voters. They can do this to learn what issues are important to

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them or to debate impending legislation or regulations. Town halls can serve as gathering places for protest and more vigorous political discussion during times of heated political dispute[55].

Town hall meetings do not require to be held in a hall, despite their name. They frequently take place in a variety of settings, including churches, public buildings, libraries, and schools. Politicians usually hold town hall meetings at a number of sites dispersed around a voting district so that elected officials may hear from a larger percentage of people. However, town hall gatherings serve the objective of allowing local and regional leaders to hear the community's opinions on pressing concerns[55].

A town hall gathering hasn't always been described by any particular rules or principles. Any meeting that enables constituent interaction with a politician may be referred to as a town hall, as well as in events, group phone calls, and gatherings on social media sites like Facebook or Twitter. Practically speaking, town halls are forums where attendees may express their thoughts and ask questions of prominent personalities, political candidates, and elected authorities[56].

Town hall gatherings have a long history that dates back to Australia's nineteenth century and the colonial era in the United States[57]. In the 20th century, the development of television and other new media technologies sparked a revival of town hall meetings in the United States as well as international experimentation with other forms.

Town hall meetings in the United States are designed to emulate the New England town meetings that date back to the 17th century. However, unlike town meeting voters, attendees at town hall meetings do not really cast ballots or make choices that have legal force. Some political groups keep tabs on politicians' nationally-publicized town hall meetings[57].

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On March 16, 1977, President Carter attended a televised town hall meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts that was "modeled after" a genuine town meeting but did not involve binding votes. This was another milestone in the evolution of the contemporary town hall meeting[57,58]. Bill Clinton included town hall gatherings in his campaign for president.

Depending on how interested the general public is in the subjects being addressed, town hall attendance varies. Discussions on contentious or perplexing topics in the news have resulted in to further town hall meetings[59]. Political candidates have established and implemented rules regarding crowd behavior and the types of inquiries that may be made at town hall meetings since the 2000s[59].

Tea Party organsations opposed to the proposed health care reform bill legislation started showing up at town halls in 2009 to voice their opposition to the plan. Some delegates had their town hall meetings cancelled or reduced as a result of the big and loud audiences. Rep Brian Baird chose to make a telephone conference call with his constituents in place of his live town hall meetings after receiving death threats[60,61]. The number of online or telephonic town hall gatherings has increased. Beginning in 2011, Obama exercised some of his powers as President. Since at least 2013, federal agencies have sponsored town halls on Twitter also[62,63,64].

- **Organizing Town Hall Meeting:** A town hall gathering hasn't had any established rules or procedures. Meeting structures might differ. Typically, the meeting's host (such as a member of Congress or the government) introduces themselves. Occasionally, other people will also address the audience, such as regional authorities. The audience is usually given the opportunity to ask questions and make comments during the main portion of a town hall meeting. In general, attendees at town hall meetings share their

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thoughts, express their opinions, and ask questions of prominent citizens, elected officials, or political candidates. The town hall meeting is occasionally filmed or broadcast on television. Political candidates have started announcing and enforcing guidelines for crowd conduct and the types of questions that may be posed during town hall events in recent years. The audience can be divided into smaller discussion groups if there is a high number of participants and the goal of the specific town hall meeting is to allow as many individuals the opportunity to speak[61].

Venues of Town hall Meetings: Meetings may not necessarily have to be held in a town hall, despite the name. They frequently occur in a variety of locations, such as: libraries, community centers, schools, churches, etc. Normally it is held in a public location and without any financial charge for attendance by anyone[65].

6. Slogan System: A slogan is a catchy saying or phrase that is used repeatedly to represent a concept or objective in a clan, political, commercial, religious, or other setting with the intention of influencing the general public or a more specific target group. Slogan is a short, captivating phrase that is used in advertising, according to definition [66]. A slogan often possesses the qualities of being remembered, incredibly succinct, and audience-pleasing [67].

In its original context, the phrase was used as a tribal motto by Gaelic troops. In the United States and the United Kingdom, taglines and straplines are common terms used to describe marketing slogans. The words "baselines," "signature," "claims," and "pay-offs" are used throughout Europe. The term "sloganeering" is typically used in a derogatory manner to describe actions that reduce discourse to the level of slogans.

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Slogans are employed to communicate messages about the good, bad, or indifferent that they are standing for. It may be composed as songs or have a musical tone. Slogans are frequently employed to pique the interest of the target audience. When a slogan is used for marketing, it is frequently created to be memorable and catchy so that consumers will link it with the product [67].

Any successful slogan uses strong adjectives; when used with descriptive nouns, they aid in evoking the meaning of the message through the written word [68]. Whenever a slogan is utilized in advertising, the intention is to reach as many people as possible with the message and details it conveys. The message of a slogan may mention the caliber of the offered goods [68]. Words like "excellent," "lovely," "true," "superior," "amazing," "wonderful," "perfect," and "clean" are examples of those that may be utilized to influence customer preference toward a current product and its features. Slogans can affect how people act while deciding which goods to purchase [69, 70]. By highlighting the fact that the cause is supporting, for example, the slogan may be utilized to bring awareness of a contemporary issue. A slogan should have a strong message that is unambiguous. When paired with action, slogans can serve as a powerful platform for a cause to be seen by its target audience [70]. Slogans, whether they are used for social causes or advertising, convey a message to the public that affects the audience's perception of the subject.

7. Video News Releases: The equivalent of a press release in video format is a video news release (VNR). The usual VNR, which is made for television stations and lasts about 90 seconds, are utilized to illustrate several significant elements of a product or subject matter [37].

8. Employee Members Relation: An incredibly significant internal public is the organization's workforce. The development of staff communication initiatives, such as recurring newsletters, educational bulletin boards, and online posts, is frequently a major focus of corporate public

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relations professionals. These kinds of initiatives can be used to support brand communication efforts, especially in service organisations. For instance, you could remind staff members to provide prompt and courteous customer service in the company newsletter[37].

9. Community Relations: Companies must continue to play the part of good neighbors in the communities where they have manufacturing plants and administrative offices. Local enterprises frequently serve as significant supporters of community events and activities including art exhibitions, blood drives, and educational initiatives. Many businesses actively urge their workers to participate in community groups[37].

10. Financial Relations: Financial relations have become a crucial component of public relations work as a result of the large number of significant brand marketing firms that are publicly held businesses. When a company's earnings collapse, the stock price drops swiftly, and senior executives usually lose their jobs as a result. Establishing and sustaining connections with the investment community, which includes financial analysts, brokerages, and financial reporting-focused journalists, is the responsibility of financial relationships personnel. The financial relations specialist's responsibility is to increase news coverage for a company's financial triumphs and present any financial losses in the most favorable light. The company's annual statement and any other communications to investors are written by financial relations staff [37].

11. Industrial Relations: Industry-specific enterprises and trade organisations make up the main target audience for industrial relations professionals. The early troubles of the American tobacco industry serve as a reminder of the significance of industrial relationships.

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Whereas major corporations do not always agree on matters, they frequently come together to determine policies and laws on the basis that there should be power in numbers[37].

12. DevelopmentFund-Raising: For not-for-profit entities like volunteer work initiatives, academic facilities, and cultural organisations, this is a particularly crucial topic. For all or a portion of their running expenditures, these companies typically rely on donations from the general public, the government, and other institutions. The goal of development professionals is to discover potential donors, craft proposals for them to consider, and maintain connections with them[37].

13. Special Event(s): A day or event set aside to honor or remember significant historical events of a group of individuals or a corporation. Celebration of the day Nigeria attained independence is a prime example.

14. Controlled Communications: Publicity content for company utilization belongs to the category of controlled communications. Annual reports, instructional materials, pamphlets, audio-visual presentations, and any other content that might effectively be used to promote organizational goals are included. Due of the time needed to design and create it, many organizations view this inexpensive content as a luxury. Even more challenging to quantify than advertising or other mainstream media coverage are the advantages. But these avenues shouldn't be disregarded. The unconventional methods of reaching consumers might be successful simply because they take a different track.

15. Face-to-Face Events: These include more direct approaches to the target audience. Contact is facilitated by a variety of activities, including conferences, exhibits, lectures, shopping center events, demonstrations, open days, public visits, and many more. A crucial component is the

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setting for such interaction. The event must then be planned to provide the appropriate level of interest that is related to the communication message for it to be regarded worthwhile. Exhibitions usually are a great opportunity for businesses to meet their clients. They might be pricey, but they can also be a basic, affordable "shell" structure. No of the price, it's crucial to make sure an exhibition is as successful as possible. This entails encouraging visitors to your exhibition stand in a proactive manner rather than being reactive and waiting for vvisitor[37].

16. News: Public relations' primary tool is news. News regarding the company's products is disseminated through the public relations department. With the aid of the news, they hear or read in any publication, consumers are best equipped to form a judgment about the business.

17. Speech: Speaking out about the product and the business is another effective marketing strategy. Important newspapers publish the important opinions that top officials and company employees have regarding the company and its products. People are given copies of their speeches to read. All of these actions are required to provide a stronger image of the company[37].

18. Printed Materials: A key component of public relations' toolkit is printed content. Every reputable business often produces its own bulletins, yearly reports, and regularly produced publications, which are frequently provided to the general public. The operation of a firm, their revenue, their profits, and their long-term growth plans are all vital information that businesses make public. Customers often get these periodicals through mail or courier[37].

19. Public Welfarism: To improve their public relations, businesses turn to charitable endeavors. These initiatives for the common good also improve businesses' reputations. Health camps, scholarships etc. are a few examples of such initiatives.

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20. Institution Identity: Some businesses have their "Logos" printed so that they can be clearly identified in the public. When one sees a company's "Logo," they may recognize it right away. This serves as an essential instrument in public relations.

21. Website: Currently, this is seen as the most cutting-edge PR tool available. Businesses these days require the promotion of their items on their websites. After visiting the company's specific website, the general public may get all the essential information about the business[37].

Nigeria

- **Dynamism and Relationships between Public Relations Responses and Public Relations Strategies in Inter-ethnic Crisis Management**

i. Public relations responses and public relations strategies are two different concepts, but they are sesame twins.

ii. Both the public relations responses and public relations strategies come hand in hand, and depend on one another.

i. Both the public relations responses and public relations strategies operates jointly, they usually share the same mandate in every given situation and task(s).

ii. While public relations responses depends on public relations strategies to achieve its mission(s) and objective(s); public relations strategies depends on public relations responses for direction, order and control.

i. Conception or knowledge of suitable public relations responses to be considered in any given crisis situation comes first, followed by suitable public relations strategies to be considered for implementation of the overall objective(s) as determined by the public relations response(s).

ii. Public relations responses determine the public relations strategies that are deployed for any particular objective in inter-ethnic crises management.

2.1.20 Historical Background of Nigeria

Trading between people in the Middle East and Africa dates back to 1100 BC, when Nigeria's history began. The Nri, Benin and Oyo Empires were just a few of the ancient African civilizations that established themselves in the area that is now known as Nigeria. In contrast to Christianity, which arrived in Nigeria in the 15th century via Augustinian and Capuchin monks from Portugal, Islam entered Nigeria through the Borno Empire between 1068 and 1385 AD, when it reached the Hausa States. In this area, there was also Songhai Empire territory [71].

The period of trans-Atlantic slave trade that began in Nigeria in the late 15th century indeed had a significant impact on Nigeria's history. The British and Portuguese originally utilized the port city of Badagry as a slave trade hub. Local brokers supplied them with slaves, heightening tensions between the local ethnic groups and upsetting earlier trading routes via the Trans-Saharan area. In 1851, British troops conquered Lagos, and in 1865, Lagos was legally annexed. In 1901–1922, Britain took control of Nigeria. The British Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were combined in 1914, though, and that is when Nigeria became what it is today [72].

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Before an independence movement was successful in 1960, there was a period of colonialism. With the passage of a republican constitution, Nigeria initially established itself as a republic in 1963, although it chose to maintain its Commonwealth membership. but following a brutal coup d'état, gave under to military authority three years later. The three-year Nigerian Civil War began in 1967 after a separatist movement created the Republic of Biafra.

A new constitution was drafted for Nigeria in 1979, restoring its republican status. Although the military retook control and reigned for ten years, the republic was short-lived. 1993 saw the intended founding of a new republic, but General Sani Abacha put a stop to it. Three decades of sporadic military rule came to an end after Abacha's death in 1998 and the establishment of a fourth republic the following year [73].

Population: 219,034,000 as expected for 2020. Nigeria has the biggest population in Africa, the seventh-largest in the world, and is one of the most heavily populated nations in the continent. In Nigeria, one out of every 200 residents hails from a continent other than Africa. There are 800,000 individuals from India, 100,000 from the United States, 75,000 from Lebanon, 60,000 from China, and 16,000 from the United Kingdom residing in Nigeria. With 42.54% of the population being under the age of 14, youth make up the majority of the population. 88.2 dependents for every 100 non-dependents is an extremely high dependency ratio in the nation[74].

Climate of Nigeria: Depending on where you are in Nigeria, the seasons for rain and sun might change. While the southwest and further interior have dry weather, the southeast is often hot and humid. In the north and west, a savanna weather predominates with distinct wet and dry seasons, whereas the extreme north has a desert environment with limited precipitation[74].

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The rainy season often gets shorter as it moves northward. While it only occur from mid-May to September in the far north, the rainy season in the south lasts from March to November. The southern hemisphere's August is defined by a significant break in the rainy season, which causes a brief dry season known as the "August respite or break." In comparison to the southwest, which averages around 70 inches (1,800 mm) of precipitation annually, the south has significantly higher precipitation, particularly the southeast, which receives more than 120 inches (3,000 mm) annually. Away from the shore, rainfall gradually falls until it is barely 20 inches (500 mm) in the far north each year.

Plant and Animal life in Nigeria: In wide east-west strips parallel to the earth's surface, the major vegetation patterns are seen. Swamps made up of mangroves and freshwater may be found in the Niger delta and along the shore. The lush climatic rainforests replace the wetlands a short distance inland. While forests are destroyed for farming, the oil palm, which has economic value, typically grows spontaneously and is conserved. The natural forest vegetation has given way to wide palm shrub in the more heavily inhabited regions of the Southeast. Plantations for cacao and rubber have taken the place of large tracts of forest in the southwest[74].

Mangrove, garlic, and locust bean trees are scattered over the tropical savanna that lies to the north of the forestry belt. The grassland, which is characterized by dispersed stunted trees and short grasses, opens up and grows more expansive in the extreme north. A variety of perennial plants and the tuberous type of palm are widespread in the Lake Chad area, which has semi-desert-like conditions. The open grassland in the northwest also features lane forests, which are small areas of woodland along rivers. A steady Saharan expansion toward the south has been made possible in the extreme northern regions by the nearly complete extinction of plant life[74].

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Religions in Nigeria: Islam accounts for 45% of the population, Christianity for 45%, and various indigenous religions for 10% of the population. In the southeast are the Igbo, who are mostly Christian. The most prevalent Christian denomination in Igboland is Roman Catholicism, but Anglicanism, Pentecostalism, and other Evangelical groups are also significant[73].

Main Nigerian Languages: Although knowledge of two or more Nigerian languages is prevalent, people of diverse ethnic backgrounds choose to speak through English. The three most common languages spoken in Nigeria are Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba. Particularly in the Nigerian towns of Warri, Sapele, Ughelli, Benin, and Port Harcourt, Nigerian Pidgin is frequently used as an informal means of communication[75]. However, the official language in Nigeria is English.

Nigeria's Economy: The biggest in Africa is Nigeria's economy. While commerce, farming, and manufacturing together occupy a far bigger portion of the working population and provide the majority of GDP, they collectively only make up about half of state income and a significant portion of foreign exchange earnings.

One of the biggest cities in the world and the financial centre of Nigeria is Lagos. It has become a major technological capital in Africa. Nigeria has the potential to become a major player in the global economy because to its young, growing population and wealth of natural resource endowments[76].

Numerous evaluations indicate that Nigeria's economy is still performing poorly. Productivity has been hampered by a lack of infrastructure, policy instability, ongoing power outages, and years of underfunding of education [77]. Widespread corruption depletes public funds and deters private investment [78]. Long-standing government initiatives like energy subsidies, currency

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exchange controls, import quotas, and tax deductions have distorted the market, weakened state resources, and made corruption possible[79].

Nigeria has one of the lowest tax revenue to GDP ratios in the world, mostly as a result of poor quasi tax administration and substantial non-compliance[80]. Nigeria's economy is anticipated to see its greatest downturn in decades due to a fall in global oil prices and the effects of COVID-19, which are already causing sluggish growth after a brief recession in 2016.

The GDP of Nigeria was expected to decrease by 5.4% in 2020, while the country's statistics office reported that between April and June, the economy decreased by 6.1% annually.

The majority of the economic shocks caused by COVID-19 are projected to fall on 81 of Nigeria's poorest households.

General Overview of Nigerian Ethnic Nationalities/Groups

Concept of Ethnicity: Race and ethnicity can be mixed up easily. Both phrases can be used to refer to a person's origin as it relates to their lineage or country of birth, albeit not necessarily. However, ethnicity is typically employed to describe a people's unique traits rather than their outward look[81].

A social network known as an ethnicity is one that has a recognizable and shared history, customs, tradition, or language. Additionally, it describes a person's ethnic characteristics, allegiance, or relationship[81]. Similar to race, the definition and application of the word "ethnicity" have evolved throughout the ages.

Where does Ethnicity come from?

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Ethnicity has a shorter history than race, beginning approximately 1767–1775. Its foundation is ethnic, a considerably older word that dates back to the 1300s. Ethnic ultimately descends from the Greek word éthnos, which means "nation, people," via Latin.

While we're talking about social stratification, it's important to note that the word "ethnic" was first used in English to refer to a "heathen" or "pagan." The term "ethnic" was also likewise utilized informally to describe people who came from non-Christian or non-Jewish countries[81].

What defines a person's Ethnicity?: A person's ethnicity is determined by a variety of elements, many of which coexist. The following are some of the primary, universal cultural indicators of ethnicity:

• **Language:** Languages like Yoruba, Hausa, or Igbo, which indicate a common cultural heritage among persons who also speak the language, are frequently linked to ethnicity[81].

Nationality: This has to do with a person's links to a certain community or region, like where their ancestors were born or left for immigration. Regardless of whether they are able to speak Yoruba, a person might in this situation claim to be of Yoruba descent. Depending on where their family is from or where they moved from, many Nigerians historically identify as Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, or Fulani [81]. Please see Plate 2.1.5: Cross Section of Different Nigeria Ethnic Groups in Appendix II.

- **Religious expression**: When there are societal similarities and long-standing cultural traditions involved, such as in Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, ethnicity can also be linked to a religion[81].

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How many Ethnic Groups Constitute Nigeria? Nigeria is home to an estimated over 250 ethnic groups. By virtue of initial occupation and inheritance, each occupies a region that it regards as its own. Even after living and working in a dominant group's region for a number of decades, non-members of the group are still seen as foreigners[81]. Although many individuals have moved from one ethnic territory to another in quest of agriculture, most rural communities do not often grant such immigrants outright ownership to property[82]. (This is further illuminated by Figure 2.1: Nigerian Map with Ethnic Groups in Appendix I.

2.1.21 Peculiarities of Five Selected Major Nigerian Ethnic Nationalities (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Tiv and Fulani)

(1) **Yoruba:** A group of people known as the Yoruba (Yoruba: Ìran Yorùbá) live mostly in Nigeria, Togo and Benin in Western Africa. In Africa, there are over 30 million Yoruba people. One of the biggest ethnic groups in Africa, the Yorubas are mostly found in Nigeria, where they account for 13.9% of the population of the nation. The Niger-Congo language with the greatest number of native speakers is Yoruba, which is the language spoken by the majority of Yoruba people[83].

The Yoruba have boundary delineation with the Itsekiri, who are strongly linked to the Yoruba but prefer to retain their own ethnic heritage, in the south-east of the North West Niger delta, the Bariba in the north of Benin and Nigeria, the Nupe in the same region, and the Ebira in the northeast of central Nigeria. Midwestern Nigeria is home to the Edo, San, and Afemai ethnic groups. The related Igala people may be found in the northeast, on the left bank of the Niger River, next to the Ebira and Edo communities.

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The term "Yoruba" (or more accurately, "Yaraba") is the typical Hausa name for the Oyo folks and was first used to refer to the Oyo Empire. Thus, Hausa use and Sultan Muhammad Bello's ethnography, which was published in Ajami in the 19th century, popularized it. In current terminology, North-West Yoruba, the phrase was first used to refer to all the people that speak the dialects close to the Oyo language in the latter part of the 19th century. Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther, the first Anglican bishop in Nigeria, has a lot to do with the development of Yoruba language. Crowther, an Oyo Yoruba, created a standard for Yoruba orthography and wrote the first Yoruba dictionary[83,84,85,86].

- **Yorubas Religion and Believe System**: Yorubas who have a long history of being deeply religious, are now religiously diverse. One of the ethnic groups in Africa with the widest range of religions is the Yoruba. While many Yorubas practice different Christian denominations and some also practice Shia Islam, the majority of Yorubas practice the traditional Yoruba religion. Sunni Islam is practiced by certain Yorubas. Yoruba religious traditions like the Agemo, Osun-Osogbo and Eyo festivals are becoming more and more well-liked in modern Yorubaland. The majority of modern religious believers view them as cultural rather than religious occurrences. They take part in them to commemorate the history of their people and to promote tourism, which helps their local economies[86].

The Yoruba people's ancient religious and spiritual beliefs and activities make up their religion. The area that has come to be recognized as Yorubaland is in southwest Nigeria and the surrounding areas of Benin and Togo. In the Yoruba language, the Sun is referred to as Orun. Olorun is one of the main incarnations of the Omnipotent of the pantheon, the owner of the skies[86].

Olofin, who serves as a bridge between orunn (Heaven) and Ayé, and Olodumare, the supreme creator, are the two other main manifestations of the almighty God (Earth). Obatala is the deity of insight and invention, whereas Oshumare, also known as "sùmàrè" in Yoruba, manifests as a god who takes the shape of a rainbow[86] .

(2) **Hausa:** The total population of the Hausas in Nigeria is 70 million. Settlements that speak primarily Hausa are dispersed over West Africa and along the historic Hajj route north and east through the Sahara; a particularly significant number may be found in and around Agadez. Hausas typically reside in tiny villages and pre-colonial towns and cities where they cultivate crops, rear animals, notably cattle, and conduct local and foreign trade across Africa. They converse in the Chadic group's Afro-Asian language of Hausa. Historically, the Hausa gentry had a strong equestrian tradition. The horse to this day appears in the Eid day celebrations, known as Ranar Sallah, and is still a symbol of status of the classic aristocracy in Hausa societal structure. The cultural heart of the Hausa people is Daura. The town's traditions and culture predate those of all the other significant Hausa ttown[87].

- **Hausa Language:** There are more native speakers of the Hausa language in Africa than any other language. It is a part of the Afroasiatic family of languages. Nearly 50 million people speak it as a second language, while there are an estimated 67 million original speaker of the language. Niger Republic and Northern Nigeria are the primary Hausa-speaking regions. Along with Fulani, Tuareg, Kanuri, Gur, Shuwa Arab, and other Afro-Asiatic language communities, Hausa is extensively spoken in Cameroon, Sudan, Chad and the Ivory Coast.

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There is a sizable and expanding body of literary texts in Hausa, including publications on development concerns, magazines, newspapers, dramas, etc. Northern Nigeria and Niger are rife with Hausa radio and television transmissions, while foreign broadcasters including the VOA and BBC also often broadcast in Hausa.

Northern Nigerian schools employ Hausa as the medium of teaching at the primary level, and colleges there offer courses in the language. Additionally, several universities in the UK, US, and Germany offer Masters and PhD programs in Hausa. Additionally, currently, a number of social networking platforms all across the world employ Hausa[87]. One of the most widely spoken languages in the world, Hausa is spoken in several African nations.

- **Hausa Religion:** The predominant and long-established religion of the Hausa people is Maliki-style, orthodox Sunni Islam. As early as the 11th century, Islam was practised in Hausaland, giving rise to notable indigenous Sufi saints and scholars like Dan Masani and Dan Marna in Katsina. Long-distance traders to North Africa were primarily responsible for spreading Islam to the common people, while the ruling class either continued to exercise pagan religions or mixed Islam with them[87].

(3) **Igbo:** The Igbos are otherwise known as the "Ndigbos". Their estimated total population is 43 million[88].

The Igbo people are a meta-ethnicity native to the present-day south-central and southeastern Nigeria and also Equatorial Guinea. There has been much speculation about the origins of the Igbo people, as it is unknown how exactly the group came to form. Geographically, the Igbo homeland is divided into two unequal sections by the Niger River – an eastern (which is the

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larger of the two) and a western section. The Igbo people are one of the largest ethnic groups in Africa.

The Igbo language is a part of the Niger-Congo language family. It is divided into numerous regional dialects, and somewhat mutually intelligible with the larger "Igboid" cluster. The Igbo homeland straddles the lower Niger River, east and south of the Edoid and Idomoid groups, and west of the Ibibioid (Cross River) cluster[88].

- **Igbo Traditional Society:** A semi-democratic republican form of governance served as the foundation for traditional Igbo political structure. This structure, as opposed to a feudalist one with a monarch governing over subjects, ensured equality for its residents in close-knit communities. The Portuguese, that came and interacted with the Igbos in the 15th century, observed this political structure. A republican consultative assembly of the general populace dominated Igbo villages and area administrations, excluding a few important Igbo cities like Onitsha, which had monarchs by the name of Obi, and locations as Arochukwu and Nri Kingdom that had priest kings. Typically, a council of elders ran and managed communities in Igboland[88].
- **Igbo Culture:** The various practices, traditions, and customs of the Igbo people make up their culture. It includes both outdated customs and fresh ideas that have been incorporated into Igbo culture either naturally or as a result of external influences. Igbos artwork, language use, music, and dancing styles, as well as their apparel, linguistic etc reflects their customs and traditions. Their diverse subgroups further increase the richness of their culture[88,89].
- **Igbo Religion:** Majority of Igbo people are Christians, however they occasionally combine their faith with traditional Igbo religion and belief systems. The Igbo people

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were initially exposed to Christianity in 1857 as a result of European colonialism. The Igbo people were first wary of accepting Christianity because they thought their traditional religion's gods would do them harm. However, with the help of church agents, Christianity increasingly won adherents in Igbo territory. These leaders concentrated on influencing the youth to accept Christian principles while building schools. The Igbo people are recognized as the ethnic group in Africa with the highest rate of Christian conversion today[89].

(4) **Tiv:** The Tiv (or Tiiv) belong to the Tivoid ethnicity. They number around 14 million people across Nigeria and Cameroon and make up about 3.5% of the country's overall population. Millions of individuals in Nigeria speak Tiv, and a small number of people also speak it in Cameroon. Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa, and Plateau States are home to the majority of the language's Nigerian speakers. The Tiv language is a subgroup of the Benue-Congo family, which ultimately belongs to the Niger-Congo[90].

- **Tiv Society and Culture:** Black and white striped anger is the Tiv's national clothing. Several centuries ago, when the Tiv people first arrived at their current location, they learned that the zebra they had been using to hunt for meat and skin for ceremonial clothing was not indigenous to the region. When they learned how to use a loom, they made the decision to pay homage to their heritage by weaving a fabric with stripes that resembled zebra skin. This fabric would later become the standard clothing. When it first started, it was just a simple cloth that was wrapped around the torso. The traditional elders and rulers, from the Tor Tiv to other subordinate, wear elaborate robes made of it today[90].

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Tiv Indigenous Communication: Indigenous people communicate horizontally as well as vertically, from the kings to the subjects. People interact with society through both material and spiritual methods. To emphasize private ownership and deter human invaders, a farmer, for instance, may prominently hang a charm on his property[90]. The terror of witches and herbalists has a significant impact on social actions. Rainmakers use a variety of mental techniques to convey their ability to interrupt events. In Africa, the source of ideas contributed by customs, religion,observances, traditional divination, are how village sectors primarily interact. Kakakis, Agbamde, etc and other ancient methods of communication are still used by the Tiv people of Benue State. However, the structure of cultural communication is under danger due to the expansion of western media[90].

(5) **Fulani:** With a population of between 45 and 49.2 million, the Fulani people are also known as "Fula people"[91]. One of the largest and most extensively scattered ethnic groups in the Sahel and West Africa is the Fula, Fulani, or Fule people. They reside in a number of nations, primarily in West Africa and northern Central Africa, but they are also found in South Sudan, Darfur, Eritrea, and areas close to the Red Sea coast[92].

- **Fulani Settlement and Islam:** Early converts to Islam were the Fula people, who had Islam and North African roots. The acceptance of Islam gave the Fulani a sense of "cultural and religious dominance to adjoining inhabitants, and that adoption is now a dominant ethnic barrier marker" separating them from other African racial communities in the Semi - humid and Western Africa. With horses and military hardware from the north, settled and herders Fulani groups evolved into political and belligerent forces. The wars weren't just between the Fula and other ethnic groups; they were also internal

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conflicts between the pastoral and sedentary Fulani, where at times they cooperated and at other times the Muslim Fulani leaders attacked the nomadic Fulani as unbelievers[93].

- **Fulani Culture:** The Fulani are historically a herdsmen, primitive people that engage in trade. Through their vast, arid hinterlands, they herd sheep, goats, and cattle while remaining relatively apart from the nearby agricultural communities. They are the world's biggest ethnic group of nomads and live in a number of areas covering an area greater than a usual continental country. For a stranger to marry a Fulani lady is challenging due to the nomadic culture of the herders' ccla[93,94].
- **Fulani Herding:**Although they are sometimes traders, Fula are mostly recognized as pastoralists. The majority of Fula in rural areas spend a lot of time by themselves on foot and are commonly spotted roaming with their cattle around the West African countryside as they move their flocks in search of better pasture and access to water.
- **Fulani Houses:** The Fula are a nomadic people who typically live in dome-shaped structures called suudu, bukkaru or hudo, which means "grass residence". The distinctively trapezium domed dwellings are supported by tightly packed millet stalk pillars in the dry season and by tightly woven reed mats fastened to wooden poles in the wet days. As is typical of homes from nomadic tribes, these mobile homes are incredibly simple to assemble and disassemble. The homes are simply dismantled and placed onto donkeys, horses, or camels for transportation when it comes time to relocate [94].

2.1.22 Brief Discussion of Nigeria's Political System and Development

The political climate in Nigeria has long been marked by bitter conflicts between the nation's many ethnic groupings. This history of conflicts has given rise to an unusually complex and

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multifaceted political system in Nigeria. Politics in Nigeria is characterized by ethnic interspersion, giving them a common means to ownership and rights[95,96,97]. Since gaining independence in 1960, the country has struggled to stay alive by controlling society and improving the socioeconomic circumstances of its citizens. The Nigerian federation is still messy, disputed, and conflict-ridden. Military actions and toxic competitiveness have overrun the country's political scene. These events have had a significant impact on our understanding of the various facets and dynamics of Nigerian politics today. Additionally, they have impacted Nigeria's growth trajectory, democratic norms, and upholding peace and serenity.

The Fourth Republic's inauguration in 1999 marked a pivotal moment in Nigerian politics. It has been Nigeria's longest era of democratic rule so far, and over that time, the country's political system has evolved from an infant stage to a mature one[98,99,100]. A number of people claimed that Nigeria's democratic practices were undermined by the lengthy military dictatorships that heralded the Fourth Republic, preventing the nation from reaping the benefits of representative government even after 1999. This claim has some merit because, in addition to suppressing the country's political development, military rule also prevented the country's society from developing nnaturall[101,102,103]. The 1966 coup d'état and counter-coups that eventually sparked the civil war are just a few of the events that took place in Nigeria during military rule. Other events include the eradication of civil practices, the introduction of unsuitable policies, the annulment of the June 12 general elections in 1993, and many others[104,105].

Nevertheless, several academics noted that, despite the advantages of criticizing the military, it is also plausible to claim that the Fourth Republic, which is headed by civilians, has struggled to raise the quality of life for the majority of Nigerians. Nigeria is currently considered to be one of the world's most poor nations, plagued as it is by unemployment, inflation, and corruption. Inter-

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ethnic crises, armed robbery, banditry, terrorism and kidnapping are problems that are currently plaguing the country. Election tampering and blatant indifference are commonplace in politics. Furthermore, Nigerian politics have struggled to advance due to the presence of ineffective, unpatriotic, and corrupt leaders. It is reasonable to argue that the emergence of ethnic peculiarities and religious fundamentalism in the 1980s solidified Nigerian politics' course resulting to the current regime[96].

Originally observed on May 29 annually since General Olusegun Obasanjo became president in 1999, Nigeria's Democracy Day is now a national holiday. The current president of Nigeria, General Muhammadu Buhari, however, announced on June 12, 2018, that this date would change from May 29 to June 12 starting in 2019. This was done to remember the June 12, 1993, election and the circumstances surrounding it[105].

2.2. Theoretical Review

2.2.1 Crisis Management Model

In the latter half of the 1990s, Alfonso Gonzalez-Herrero and Cornelius Pratt created a crisis management model that included three stages of crisis management[106].

A crisis is an unforeseen process or event that can harm an organization in a negative way. Examples of such crises include unhappy stakeholders, astute competitors, environmental issues, disgruntled employees, industrial accidents, and financial difficulties[106].

Crisis management refers to a company's response to challenges and issues that develop within the organization. It establishes the organization's vulnerability, how the crises will affect it, and what should be done to lessen adverse effects. A crisis can result in a loss of revenue, but it can

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also have a negative impact on the morale of the workforce. People who experience a crisis begin to feel threatened and afraid, which causes them to lose interest in and confidence in the company.

Alfonso Gonzalez-Herrero and Cornelius Pratt identified and described three phases that in their Crisis Management Model in the late 1990s[106]

1. Crisis Diagnosis: This phase of crisis management is regarded as the time when a initial warning signs of a crisis emerge. It entails spotting crisis warning signs early on. It is the responsibility of managers and leaders to recognize the signs of an impending crisis and to prepare their team members to meet it head-on with courage and resolve. To keep up with what their employees are doing, superiors should periodically review their performance[106].

A manager's job description goes beyond simply yelling orders at his staff from behind closed doors. He needs to be aware of his surroundings. Regularly assessing an employee's performance enables managers to anticipate crises and alert staff to their potential negative effects. The warning signs of a crisis should not be disregarded; instead, essential steps should be taken to avert them. Self-initiative is key. Don't hold off till others[106].

Leaders and supervisors are alerted to impending threats and are responsible for motivating staff to overcome challenges. Therefore, it is crucial that managers keep a close eye on their staff in order to recognize warning indications of something like a crisis and act as early and efficiently as possible.

2. **Planning**: Once the issues have been identified, a crisis management team needs to be formed and given control of the situation. Because emotions may start to factor into complex situations, it is crucial to remain composed and in control. The crisis management team should respond

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right away if a problem is identified. Ask the staff not to freak out. Create appropriate plans of action to prevent a crisis. Come up with a plan that will function best during times of crisis by sitting down and talking with the relevant members. It is crucial to make judgments quickly. Awareness is required, but patience is most crucial. Ensure the accuracy of your data and facts. Don't rely solely on conjecture and presumptions[107].

Create the tactics that will be employed to stop a crisis from evolving into an emergency situation. To solve any difficulties that occurs with specificity and to be able to act quickly, you must consult the team. With numbers and facts, pay attention, be patient, and be explicit. Make no assumptions since having highly protected data is important for the survival of the business.

3. Implementation of Changes and Monitoring: The staff makes adjustments at this phase of the crisis response model to respond to the novel operating environment.

Monitoring manufacturing techniques or any process where a critical mistake might have occurred is crucial. A Root Cause Analysis should be used to identify the potential causes of the beginning of the crisis. Employees must successfully adapt to new circumstances and changes in order for the organization to operate effectively in the near future. It's critical to examine the factors that contributed to a workplace crisis. Errors shouldn't be made again, and the system has to be updated with new plans and procedures[107].

- **Relevance to the Study:** The Crisis Management Model by Alfonso Gonzalez-Herrero and Cornelius Pratt, which was previously discussed, is pertinent to this study because it identifies and explains the practical procedures and actions needed by any leader or crisis manager to overcome an undesirable situation, occurrence, or event, such as how Nigeria's Federal Government can handle interethnic crises among Nigerians. This notion

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supported the idea that performance evaluation is essential for spotting crises. And that managing crises entails identifying crises through indicators, preparing, and carrying out plans.

2.2.2 Peacebuilding Theory

Peacebuilding theory was propounded by Lederach in 1997 after the use of the term peacebuilding by Galtung. This theory holds that intervention and interactions of a third-party with different actors performing different tasks at the same time or at different points in time must be employed if peace is to be built in any given community or society[108].

However, being proactive is a condition for the realization of peacebuilding. Hence, in this context, proactiveness involves a situation whereby third-party interveners carryout the implementation of intervention that would guarantee the prevention of occurrence of conflict or crisis of any sort among parties[108]. Most times, peacebuilding efforts are undertaken by governments to address and overcome deep rooted causes of conflict among citizenries that cut across many ethnic groups in other to prevent like occurrence of inter-ethnic crisis in the future[108].

In practice, peacebuilding theory advocates for multilateral processes of engagements that will provide elements of conflict resolution and social justice simultaneously towards de-escalation of crisis-situations and restoration of normalcy for sustainable peace in every community. This theory practically provides an operational system or structure for reduction of agitations and social tensions, recovery from disputes, armed conflicts and violence; including provision of the

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path for implementation of a win-win reconciliation outcome, restoration and justice in a community or society[108].

- **Relevance to the Study:** Peacebuilding theory explained the characteristics of inter-ethnic crises. It equally suggested that inter-ethnic crises management in Nigeria requires the establishment of third party forum or institution which will serve as intervener in every occurrence of conflict and disputes in various communities in the country.

2.3 Review of Empirical Studies

2.3.1 Public Relations Responses and Strategies in Inter-ethnic Crisis Management

Inter-ethnic criss management is a field that has been indirectly attracted the interest of many sages in the past given the fact that many countries of the world were at one time and the other faced with the challenges of managing inter-ethnic crisis. But in Nigeria it is an area that only recently started attracting many scholarly interest and attention despite the enormous unabated occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in the country. The public relations responses and strategies' principles applied by past country governments and crisis management experts have been relied upon by many these days in proffering solution to challenges posed by inter-ethnic crisis in their domains.

1. **Media Relations:**

(a) **Press Releases and Conferences:** The Federal Government resulted to use of press releases and conferences during the civil war in order to repair its image which was dented by the Biafrans. The Federal Government embarked on serious and rigorous campaigns to refute the negative publicity coming out from Radio Biafra in order to repair its dented image and reputation especially at international circles. The government

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had to physically move public relations specialists within and outside the country to go abroad to counter the claims of the Biafran negative publicity about the issue of the civil war. International press conferences were held in London and New-York as well as Washington DC on the need for the international community to see Nigeria (Biafra) inclusive as one indivisible country. The message was that the war in Nigeria was a mere family misunderstanding which would be resolved amicably[36].

(b) Propaganda: During the civil war, media relations cum propaganda were deployed by the Biafra Republic to the extent that it attracted world attention, and gained recognition as a country from France, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and some other countries of the world. The Biafra radio was always dishing out negative information that Nigeria was waging a war of genocide against the Ibo people. Advertisements were placed in major newspapers and magazines in Europe and America to the effect that the war was one-sided in favour of the Hausa/Fulanis of Northern Nigeria against the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria[36].

The Federal Government itself was not left behind as it also deployed media relations cum propaganda, conflict resolution, and peace-building programmes during while the war lasted. The Federal Government as a result of negative information dished out by the Biafra radio embarked on serious and rigorous campaigns to refute the negative publicity coming out from Radio Biafra in order to repair its dented image and reputation especially at international circles. The government had to physically move public relations specialists within and outside the country to go abroad to counter the claims of the Biafran negative publicity about the issue of the civil war. International press conferences were held in London and New-York as well as Washington DC on the need for the international community to see Nigeria (Biafra) inclusive as

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one indivisible country. The message was that the war in Nigeria was a mere family misunderstanding which would be resolved amicably[36].

Federal Governments Media Relations and Propaganda activities have however continued after the civil war with the use of her established Television station NTA, Radio station FRCN and Newspaper Press[36].

(c) **Slogan System**: One other important public relations strategy used by the General Yakubu Gowon administration during the war was to create a slogan with the saying "To keep Nigeria One is a task that must be done"! The slogan became a permanent signatory tune to introduce all major news bulletins on Radio Nigeria and at the end of the news. The slogan on Radio Nigeria was used to counter the Biafran Radio campaign that the war was an ethnic cleansing of the Igbo extraction from Nigeria, hence, the radio introduced such catch phrases as "the Progrom", "Igbo ethnic annihilation" and "Genocide". But with the airwaves being taken over by such campaigns from both sides, the choice is for the listeners to take which one suits them. Some people would call all these propaganda, but professionally, it is the child of public relations. Car stickers with the messages were printed and used freely on the Nigerian side and distributed all over the country. It was used as door labels and pasted on the walls of government establishments[36].

Another slogan that gathered such popularity again at the period was coined from the name of the then Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon. The name of GOWON which was analyzed and interpreted to mean:

G = Go

O = On

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W = With

O = One

N = Nigeria

GOWON = Go on with one Nigeria.

These slogans and many more lasted throughout the war period at the home level. Immediately after the 30 months civil war (July 1967 – January 1970), the Federal Government also came up with another other slogans such as "No Victor No Vanquished". This slogan was to convince the rest of the world that the Igbos were welcomed back to be part of Nigeria as fellow citizens. The message that this slogan portended was that the Igbos must not, and should not be seen as being defeated in the war. The Nigerian soldiers were warned not to behave as conquerors because it is One Nigeria. Thus, the rest of Nigeria should not see the Igbos as secondary citizens[36].

(d) Corporate Social Responsibilities: This strategy was considered by the Federal Government to soften the effects of the civil war on the Ibos as the Federal Government embarked on what it called a "Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation" programme to repair roads, buildings and other public utilities in the war affected areas in order to bring back the Ibo ethnic nationalities into the mainstream of the Nigerian polity as it was in the beginning[36].

(e) **Town Hall Meetings:** During the Civil War, Town-Hall Meetings and Conferences were simultaneously sponsored and used within and outside Nigeria by the Federal Government in order to explain to the world at large that the war was a mere quarrel between brothers and not a genocidal war as claimed by Radio Biafra. Since then the Federal Government has been making use of this public relations strategy in reaching out to Nigerians for management of inter-ethnic relations, and provision of explanations on its policies and programmes[36].

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(f) Introduction of Some Peace Building Programmes such as:

- The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) - The introduction of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) by General Yakubu Gowon in 1973 was intended to ameliorate the ugly incidence of suspicion and hatred between the various ethnic groups (Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani) engendered by the civil war in the country has recorded but a little success[109,110].

• The Federal Character Principle: The Federal Character Principle was included in the Nigerian Constitution in 1979 to guarantee an equal and fair distribution of appointments to public service institutions among the nation's many ethnic nationalities. Therefore, the federal character principle, which is executed underneath the federal character commission, is established and launched to correct negative effects deriving from privileges and services provided to citizens of the nation by the federal government that appear neutral but have an adverse impact on a protected group[111]. The federal character concept is set up to safeguard all Nigerians' sense of belonging while also maintaining a strong, indivisible country founded on justice and fairness. As admirable as the aforementioned policy may be, and as empowered as the concept is in the country's constitution, its implementation has remained a contentious issue. According to some critics, the policy includes a meritocratic system that will foster quality service delivery for the growth of the country by creating conducive environment for those who are only eligible to be employed in the Nigerian civil service[111].

Mandate and modus operandi: The 1999 Constitution's Articles 14.3 and 14.4 have since replaced the Second Republic's Second Republic Constitution's original inclusion of the federal

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character concept. The federal and its departments must not have a "predominance of personnel from a few states as well as from some few ethnic or other regional groupings." State and municipal governments, as well as their councils and agencies, must similarly represent the variety within their spheres of responsibility. The Federal Character Commission (FCC) was established by order of Sani Abacha's military government in 1996. One of the 14 self-governing federal executive bodies recognized by the 1999 Constitution is the FCC (153.1, Third Schedule Part 1). The organization's first task is to devise an equitable formula for the allocation of political appointments as well as positions in the public service, subject to the president's approval[111].

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Similar studies on the subject matter have also been undertaken outside the shores of Nigeria. Israeli as a country in the biblical era faced a lot of inter-ethnic crises. However, conducted study revealed that the country's political and spiritual managers / leaders under Joshua and Samuel deployed the following public relations strategies for the management of inter-ethnic crises faced by the country then:

i. **Strategic Unity Memorial Communication**: After crossing River Jordan by the Israelites under the leadership of Joshua, all the twelve (12) ethnic groups or nationalities through their representatives jointly set up memorial stones where they camped as way of communicating their unity indicating[112].

ii. **Publication and Dissemination of Single Charter**: A Charter was published and disseminated in the whole of Israel among all twelve ethnic groups / nationalities to invoke patriotism and foster unity in the country[113].

iii. **Promotion of Justice and Equity:** Equity and Justices was promoted as every ethnic group or nationality possessed and exercised control on lands, territories, revenues and developmental projects of Israel as allocated to each and every of them[114].

iv. **Strategic Participatory Communication:** Strategic Participatory Communication took preeminence among all ethnic groups in Israel as their representatives / leaders' voices and opinion were exhibited and respected. There were agreements of purpose among the people[115,116].

v. **Prevention of Crisis through Establishment of Leadership Code of Conduct:** Leadership code of conduct was drafted and launched by Samuel for the current and all future leaders that would emerge in Israel. This was done to regulate and guide against leadership excesses and mal-administration in the whole land of Israel[117].

Another study that was carried out centered on public relations strategies for managing religious, ethnic and social conflicts for the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) and development in Nigeria. According to the study's summary of findings, Nigeria's ongoing religious, ethnic, and social crises have negatively impacted foreign direct investment inflow over the past five years. Religious, ethnic, and social crises in Nigeria have also increased capital flight and foreign direct investment outflow over the past five years in comparison to earlier years. Nigerians are losing work as a result of some foreign-owned enterprises closing down and moving to other African nations[118].

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The study came to the conclusion that social harmony is a requirement for socioeconomic advancement in any society (118). Under conditions of social unrest, Nigeria's lofty goal of joining the group of 20 most developed countries in the next ten years will be challenging to achieve[118].

The study also suggested that the following public relations and conflict resolution techniques be considered by the Federal Government of Nigeria to stop dysfunctional religious, ethnic, and social conflicts:

1. Identification of issues that are likely to develop into disputes and stop them in their tracks, the government must periodically do public relations research[118].

2. Always sifting through the sentiments and opinions of the public.

3. Organizing integrated stakeholder meetings periodically at the national, state, municipal, and community levels.

3. Employment of integrated Multi-Media Marketing Communications approach by the government in enlightening Nigerians on the dangers of violence and the need to shun such ignoble acts[118].

4. The incorporation of public relations and marketing communications practitioners into our national conflict-management committees for better results. They have the training to discern issues in the natural environment that could be pregnant with crisis and advise governments on how to proactively nip such in their buds[118].

5. Dealing with the problem of inequality in the nation's money, power, and status distribution.

6. Establishment of good, open, and service-oriented administrations at all levels of government in Nigeria towards gaining and maintaining public's trust, foster national unity, and advance economic development.

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7. Inclusion of religious organizations, traditional and socio-cultural institutions in the transformation agenda of the country toward halting the spread of racial, ethnic, and inter-communal violence and to bring about the much-needed peace.

8. Prohibition of corruption at all costs in all spheres of Nigerian society.

9. Utilization of public relations programmes towards the discouragement of electoral crimes, violence, political killings.

Additionally, a study that focuses on crisis management has shown the root causes of crises by demonstrating the continuity of crises from the past with those of the present. As a result, the study has established a framework for comparison between the two[119].

The study came to the conclusion that it is impossible for world individuals to survive in a crisis-free environment; as a result, it advised "crisis literacy" awareness, which is roughly comparable to media literacy. The fundamental ideas of media literacy may also be applicable to crisis literacy, and having skill in crisis literacy will result in the capacity to meaningfully transmit and decode crisis circumstances. The information landscape of today comes from a wide range of sources. Through these well-built, potent illusions, people's judgment may be tainted, and occasionally the reality from the cleverly constructed crisis communication media messages may be purposely excluded. The stakeholders' groups' perceptions of the facts may be muddled by the mediation of crisis management operations. In parallel, viewers work to influence public views of the issue, just as the media and organisations could[119].

Inclusively, a longitudinal study was carried out to identify the roles of public relations in crisis management focusing on the Etiti Ihitte-Uboma, Local Government Area of Imo State.

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This study's primary goal was to determine ways to handle crises and maybe lessen their frequency while redirecting their energy into more useful endeavors that would encourage social advancement[120].

The study concluded that public relations strategies play significant role in crisis management, hence its principle should be allowed to be utilised for crisis management. Also, that tolerance among members of different ethnic groups in the country should be promoted; hence such function should be allowed to be carried out by public rrelation[120].

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2.4 Summary of Gaps in Literature Reviewed

The reviewed literature was not directed at appraising past Federal government public relations responses and strategies used for inter-ethnic crisis management among Nigerians. The reviewed literature did not provide or facilitate feedbacks from Nigerians on how well the Federal Government's public relations responses and strategies between 1987 and 1002 has done in inter-ethnic crisis management in the country and what more they need to do which in a way will minimize perceptions of uncertainty in the country.

Hence, the unanswered questions and gaps which this study tends to provide answers to that are not in the reviewed works are facilitation of feedbacks from Nigerians in selected communities on how well the Federal Government's public relations responses and strategies between 1987 and 2002 has done in inter-ethnic crisis management in the country and what more they need to do which in a way will minimize perceptions of uncertainty in the country; how the Federal Government can reinforce and realign its goal setting and desired performance with that of Nigerians; and discovery of required modern public relations responses and strategies that can

serve as mechanism needed by the Federal Government to detect fresh inter-ethnic crises whenever it begins to loom or build-up among Nigerians.

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Chapter Three

Methodology

This chapter explains the meansadopted to undertake the study. This includes research design, population, sample and sampling technique. It also provides information on research instruments, data collection and ethical considerations or procedures.

3.1 Research Design

The research design adopted for this study was mixed method (qualitative and quantitative), including historical and content analyses. Firstly, the researcher began with collection of qualitative data; secondly builds a feature to be tested from the collected data; and thirdly, tests the built feature which was tailored to meet the needs of the individuals being studied in a quantitative phase.

3.2 Population of the Study

The population of the study consists of members of different ethnic groups living in communities where identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred in the country namely: Zango-Kataf, Kafanchan,

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Sagamu, Mile 12 and Idi-Araba. Preliminary information gathered from National Population Commission (NPC) from its 2006 Census shows that the total population of people living in Kafanchan is 83,092;Zangon –Kataf is 318,991; Sagamu is 253,421; Mile – 12 is 682,772; and Idi-Araba is 633,009.

This is further shown in Figure 3.1: Map of Nigeria with the Six Geo-political Zones in Appendix 1.

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3.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques

Multi-stage sampling procedure was utilised for the quantitative stage of this study where primary data was collected.

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The first phase of the study (Qualitative: collection of secondary data): In the qualitative phase of the study, purposive sampling was used to select relevant 20 publications for conceptual content analysis towards answering research questions (RQs) 1, 2, and 3. The relevant published relevant documents that were conceptually analyzed comprised: government reports of Commissions of Inquiries, books, report articles, journals and newspapers that were checked, studied and analyzed, which were able to help in identifying occurrences of five (5) inter-ethnic crisis in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002 in the following communities: Kafanchan, Zango-Kataf, Sagamu, Mile 12 and Idi-Araba, including the public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria that were deployed to manage those inter-ethnic crisis.

The first and second phase of the study (Quantitative: collection of primary data): In the quantitative phase of the study, multi-stage sampling procedure was adopted to draw appropriate sample size from the total population of the study which covers all residents living in communities where identified inter-ethnic crises occurred namely: Kafanchan, Zango-Kataf, Sagamu, Mile 12 and Idi-Araba.

Firstly, the population in each of the five (5) communities where identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred was stratified into contending ethnic groups:

- Kafanchan: the population was stratified into Hausas and Atyaps
- Zango-Kataf: the population was also stratified into Hausas and Atyaps
- Sagamu: the population was stratified into Yorubas and Hausas
- Mile-12: the population was stratified into Yorubas and Hausas
- Idi-Araba: the population was also stratified into Yorubas and Hausas

Secondly, purposive sampling was used to select 20 respondentsconsisting of traditional leaders, market leaders and religious leaders from each of the 2 (two) contending ethnic groups at each of the 5 (five) communities where the identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred namely: Kafanchan, Zango-Kataf, Sagamu, Mile 12 and Idi-Araba.

Table 3.1: Multi-stage Sampling Procedure for Study's Sample Size

S/No	Communities	Stage 1 Stratification	Stage 2 Purposive	Total Number of Respondents (200)
1	Kafanchan	Contending Ethnic Groups: Hausas & Atyaps	Selected 20 among each of the Hausas & Atyaps' Traditional, Market & Religious Leaders	40
2	Zango-Kataf	Contending Ethnic Groups: Hausas &	Selected 20 among each of the Hausas & Atyaps'	40

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		Atyaps	Traditional, Market & Religious Leaders	
3	Sagamu	Contending Ethnic Groups: Yorubas & Hausas	Selected 20 among each of the Yorubas & Hausas' Traditional, Market & Religious Leaders	40
4	Mile-12	Contending Ethnic Groups: Yorubas & Hausas	Selected 20 among each of the Yorubas & Hausas' Traditional, Market & Religious Leaders	40
5	Idi-Araba	Contending Ethnic Groups: Yorubas & Hausas	Selected 20 among each of the Yorubas & Hausas' Traditional, Market & Religious Leaders	40

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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3.4 Description of the Research Instrument(s)

The instruments that were used for data collection include:

a. Inter-ethnic Crises Occurrence Identifier Content Analysis Checklist (IECOICAC)

b. FGN Public Relations Responses Identifier Content Analysis Checklist (PRRICAC.

c. FGN Public Relations Strategies Identifier Content Analysis Checklist (PRSICAC)

d. FGN Public Relations Responses Level of Performance Questionnaire (PRRLPQ)

e. FGN Public Relations Strategies Level of Performance Questionnaire (PRSLPQ).

3.4.1 Inter-ethnic Criss Occurrence Identifier Content Analysis Checklist (IECOICAC)

This instrument was used to collect secondary data (qualitative) on identification of inter-ethnic crisis that occurred in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002. The items featured on the checklist were:

1. Title, Source and Year of Publication
2. Occurrence of Inter-ethnic Crisis, Date and Year

3. Contending Ethnic Groups
4. Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis.

3.4.2 FGN Public Relations Responses Identifier Content Analysis Checklist (PRRICAC)

This instrument was used to collect secondary data (qualitative) on identification of public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crisis management in communities between 1987 and 2002. The items featured on the checklist were:

1. Title, Source and Year of Publication
2. Occurrence of Inter-ethnic Crises, Date, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups
3. Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises
4. Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) Deployed Public Relations (PR) Responses.

3.4.3 FGN Public Relations Strategies Identifier Content Analysis Checklist (PRSICAC)

This instrument was used to collect secondary data (qualitative) on identification of public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crises management in communities between 1987 and 2002. The featured items on the checklist were:

1. Title, Source and Year of Publication
2. Occurrence of Inter-ethnic Crisis, Date, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups
3. Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises
4. Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) Deployed Public Relations (PR) Strategies.

3.4.4 FGN Public Relations Responses Level of Performance Questionnaire (PRRLPQ)

This instrument contained two sub-sections as follows:

i. **Section A:** This section focused on gathering demographic information such as (1) gender(2) age bracket(3) level of acquired education (4) ethnic nationality (5) position in community from respondents, key personality consisting of traditional leaders, market leaders and religious leaders, 20 members each from 2 (two) contending ethnic groups at each of the 5 (five) communities where the identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred namely: Kafanchan, Zango-Kataf, Sagamu, Mile 12 and Idi-Araba.

ii. **Section B:** This section focused on collection of primary data (quantitative) on level of performance of public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crises management in communities between 1987 and 2002. Specifically, the questionnaire through a 4-point scale rating assessed the effectiveness of deployed public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria in communities where identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred between 1987 and 2002.

The 4-point rating scale questionnaires asked whether the following FGN Public Relations Responses: (1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims Welfarism Packages (4) Peacebuilding were:

1. Very Effective (4.0)
2. Effective (3.0)
3. Less Effective (2.0)
4. Not Effective (1.0).

3.4.5 FGN Public Relations Strategies Level of Performance Questionnaire (PRSLPQ)

This instrument contained two sub-sections as follows:

i. **Section A:** This section focused on gathering demographic information such as (1) gender (2) age bracket (3) level of acquired education (4) ethnic nationality (5) position in community from respondents (key personalities consisting of Traditional leaders, Market leaders and Religious leaders) from respondents: 20 members each from the 2 (two) contending ethnic groups at each of the 5 (five) communities where the identified inter-ethnic crises occurred namely: Kafanchan, Zango-Kataf, Sagamu, Mile 12 and Idi-Araba.

ii. **Section B:** This section focused on collection of primary data (quantitative) on level of performance of public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in inter-ethnic crises management in communities between 1987 and 2002. Specifically, the constructs on the questionnaire through a 4-point scale ratingassessed the effectiveness of deployed public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in communities where identified inter-ethnic crisis occurred between 1987 and 2002.

The 4-point ratings questionnaire asked whether the following FGN Public Relations Strategies: (1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunals / Panels of Enquiries (5) Corporate Social Responsibility (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations were:

1. Very Effective (4.0)
2. Effective (3.0)
3. Less Effective (2.0)
4. Not Effective (1.0).

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All the checklists were subject-completed, while the questionnaireand scheduled-interview were researcher-developed.

3.5 Validity of the Research Instrument

The validity of the instruments used for this study in content and context was achieved by consulting and discussing each section of it with the thesis supervisor and other lecturers in the Department during which necessary corrections were made and effected accordingly.

3.6 Reliability of Research Instrument

A reliability test on the following research instruments, checklist and questionnaire were conducted. That of checklist was carried out at Nigerian Tribune Library, Ibadan, Oyo State; while the one done on questionnaire was carried out at Mile 12 Market, Lagos State. To test the reliability of the checklist instrument, a total of 5 publications were analysed at The Nigerian Tribune Library, Ibadan, Oyo state towards identifying occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002; while questionnaire were administered to 12 key personalities (2 traditional rulers, 5 Market leaders and 5 religious leaders) at Mile 12 Market, Lagos state towards finding out the level of performance of public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisis management.

To assess the internal consistency of the constructs, the study made use of Cronbach Alpha to determine the level of internal consistency of the research instrument. The following are the reliability result of each of the instruments: Identification of inter-ethnic crises - 0.861, Identification of public relations responses of FGN - 0.850, Identification of public relations strategies of FGN - 0.842, Level of performance of public relations responses of FGN - 0.761,

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Level of performance of public relations strategies of FGN - 0.910. It is adjudged that when a reliability result is above 0.70, such construct is good to be utilised for investigation.

Table 3.2 Reliability Value of the Research Instrument

Section	Construct	Cronbach Alpha
Ai	Identification of inter-ethnic crisis	0.861
Aii	Identification of public relations responses of FGN	0.850
Aii	Identification of public relations strategies of FGN	0.842
Bi	Level of performance of public relations responses of FGN	0.831
Bii	Level of performance of public relations strategies of FGN	0.910
Overall		**0.977**

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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3.7 Method of Data Collection

This study consisted of both primary and secondary data. For the secondary data (qualitative), published documents, such as government reports of Commissions of Inquiries, books, report articles, journals and newspapers were checked, studied and analysed for identifying five (5) inter-ethnic crisis that occurred in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002, including the public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in the country between 1987 and 2002.

While for the primary data (quantitative), questionnaire was administered to forty (40) key personalities andprincipal actors (consisting traditional, religious and market leaders) in each of the communities where inter-ethnic crises occurred in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002 in order to answer the Research Questions 4 and 5: the level of performances of public relations responses and strategies that were deployed by the Federal Government of Nigeria to manage the identified inter-ethnic crisis in their communities between 1987 and 2002.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

The method of data analysis used for this study is descriptive statistics. The responses to each of the research questions that were given by the respondents were scored using tables. The results generated were presented with frequency counts that were scored with simple percentages. Also, responses that were gathered were used as supplementary data in discussing the findings presented.

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Chapter Four

Results and Discussion of Findings

Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of the data gathered through self-checklists, rating scales and interview-schedules. Findings are discussed in relation to the research questions. Firstly, five items each in the first, second and third self-checklists (all addressed to the researcher) provides data on occurrences of inter-ethnic crises in Nigeria in selected communities in the country between 1987 and 2002, as well as provides data on the public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to manage inter-ethnic crises in selected communities in the country between 1987 and 2002 respectively.

Secondly, five items under section A of the first and second questionnaire (all addressed to key personalities) provided demographic data of respondents. While items under section B of the same first and second rating scales (all addressed to key personalities) provided data on respondents' ratings on level of performances of deployed public relations responses and strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to manage inter-ethnic crises in selected communities in the country between 1987 and 2002.

This chapter is presented under the following sub-headings:

4.1 Demographic Data Analysis

4.2 Presentation of Data

4.2.1 Analysis of Research Questions

4.3 Discussion of Findings

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4.1 Demographic Data Analysis

Table 4.1: Demographic Information of Respondents of Key Personalities at Identified Places of Inter-ethnic Crisis (N=200)

Demographic Study Statement		Sample						
S/No	**Characte-ristics**	**Informa-tion**	**Kafan-chan**	**Kataf**	**Zango-**	**Sagamu**	**Mile-12 Araba**	**Idi-ency**	**Frequ-ency**	**Percen tage %**
1.	Gender	Male	38	36	34	30	32	170	85
		Female	2	4	6	10	83015		
2	Age	50-64	8	10	24	20	14	76	38
		65 & Above	32	30	16	20	26	124	62
3.	Level of Acquired Education	Formal	14	20	22	30	24	110	55
		Informal	26	20	18	10	16	90	45
4.	Ethnic Nationality	Yoruba	-	-	20	20	20	60	30
		Hausa	20	20	20	20	20	100	50
		Atyap	20	20	-	-	-	40	20
5.	Position-in Community	Traditional Leaders	2	2	2	2	2	10	5
		Market Leaders	30	30	30	30	30	150	75
		Religious Leaders	8	8	8	8	8	40	20

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4.1 contains gender distribution of respondents. It shows that 170 (85%) of the total respondents were male, while 30 (15%) were female.

The above age distribution table shows that 76 (38%) of the total respondents were of the age group 45 – 64, while 124 (62%) of the total respondents were of the age group 65 and above.

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The minimum age of respondents was pegged at 50years because it is believed that only people of this age and above can give adequate account of what occurred in 1987 (36 years ago).

In table 4.1, level of acquired education distribution table, 110 (55%) out of the total number of 200 respondents acquired formal education; while 90 (45%) acquired informal education. Both formally and informally educated people were selected as respondents because these groups of people were both witnesses of the occurrences of inter-ethnic crises in their various communities.

In table 4.1, the ethnic nationality distribution shows that out of the total number of 200 respondents, 60 (30%) belonged to Yoruba ethnic nationality because members of the ethnic group were the main contending group against the Hausas in three different communities of occurrences of inter-ethnic crises, hence, 20 respondents were selected to represent the population of the ethnic at each of the communities. Also, 40 respondents (20%) belonged to Kafanchan/Atyap ethnic nationality because members of the ethnic group were also the contending group against the Hausas in two different communities of occurrences of inter-ethnic crises. Hence, 20 respondents were selected to represent the population of the ethnic group at each of the communities. 100 (50%) of the total respondents belonged to Hausa ethnic nationality because members of the ethnic group were the main contending group against both the Yorubas and the Atyap at all the five different communities of occurrences of inter-ethnic crises, hence, 20 respondents were selected to represent the population of the ethnic at each of the communities.

In table 4.1, the positions occupied by respondents, distribution shows that out of the total number of 200, only 10 (5%) of respondents were traditional leaders, while 150 (75%) were Market leaders, and 40 (20%) of the respondents were religious leaders. These set of people were selected because they were key personalities within the communities.

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4.2 Presentation of Data

Secondary Data Consulted: The responses to each of the research questions that were given by respondents are presented as follows:

4.2.1 Analysis of Research Questions

Research Question One: What inter-ethnic crisis occurred inselected Nigeriancommunities between 1987and 2002?

Table 4.2a(i): Identification of Inter-ethnic Crises at Kafanchan in 1987

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Crise, Place and Year	Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis
1.	*"Kafanchan 1987* ***White Paper*** *on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State".* March 1987	Kafanchan Crises of: March 5, 1987 / March 15, 1987 (Southern Kaduna State)	Christian and Muslim Students / Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas *See Appendix III: Page 248-266*	Religious Disagreement / Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives
2.	**Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria"*, by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 267-280*	Kafanchan Crisis of: March 5, 1987 / March 15, 1987 (Southern Kaduna State)	Christian and Muslim Students / Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas	Religious Disagreement / Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives
3.	**Academic Journal:** "The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna…"; By Favour Uroko, UNN *See Appendix III: Page 280-288*	Kafanchan Crisis of: March 5, 1987 / March 15, 1987 (Southern Kaduna State)	Christian and Muslim Students / Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas	Religious Disagreement / Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives

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4.	**Report Article:** *"Miss World Riots: Continued Impunity for killings in Kaduna II, Background 4".* (Human Right Watch, July 2003).	Kafanchan Crisis of: March 5, 1987 March 15, 1987 (Southern Kaduna State)	Christian and Muslim Students Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas *See Appendix III: Page 289*	Religious Disagreement Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4.2a(i) reveals that in order to identify the occurrence of inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (March 5 and 15, 1987) at Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **White Paper:** *"Kafanchan 1987* ***White Paper*** *on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State";* March 1987 (Feb. 27 2017; Updated: March 18, 2021); *See Appendix III: Page 248-266.* (2) **Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999); *See Appendix III: Page 267-280*. (3) **Academic Journal:** "The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna…"; By Favour Uroko, UNN; *See Appendix III: Page 280-288*; and (4) **Report Article:** *"Miss World Riots: Continued Impunity for killings in Kaduna II, Background 4"*(Human Right Watch, July 2003), *See Appendix III: Page 289*.

Table 4.2a(i) further shows that for the March 5, 1987 occurrence, the crisis was caused by religious disagreement between Christian and Muslim Students of Kaduna State College of Education. While it reveals that regarding the March 15, 1987 occurrence, the crisis was caused by resentment of Hausa rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan (Atyap) natives.

Evidences in Appendix III: page 246 – 289 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.2a(ii): Identification of Inter-ethnic Crises at Zango-Kataf in 1992

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Occurred Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place and Year	Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis
1.	**Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria"*, by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 290-302*	Zango-Kataf Crises of: February 6, 1992 May 12, 1992 (Southern Kaduna State)	Hausas and Atyaps	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands
2.	**Newspaper:** *"Tango-Kataf Civil Disturbances"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. February 19, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 303*	Zango-Kataf Crises of: February 6, 1992 May 12, 1992 (Southern Kaduna State)	Hausas and Atyaps	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands
3.	**Newspaper:** *"General Arrested over Kaduna Riots"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. May 20, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 304*	Zango-Kataf Crises of: February 6, 1992 May 12, 1992 (Southern Kaduna State)	Hausas and Atyaps	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands
4.	**Newspaper:** *"Corpses liters Kaduna Hospitals"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Thur. May 21, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 305-306*	Zango-Kataf Crises of: February 6, 1992 May 12, 1992 (Southern Kaduna State)	Hausas and Atyaps	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.2a(ii) reveals that in order to identify the occurrence of inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (February 6 and May 12, 1992) at Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 290-302*; (2) **Newspaper:** *"Tango-Kataf Civil Disturbances"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. February 19, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 303*. (3) **Newspaper:** *"General Arrested over Kaduna Riots"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. May 20, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 304*; and (4) **Newspaper:** *"Corpses litters Kaduna Hospitals"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Thur. May 21, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 305-362*.

Table 4.2a(ii) further shows that the February 6, 1992 occurrence was between members of the Hausas and Atyaps ethnic groupsoverannouncement of the then Local Government plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market from the then current location to another place. While it revelas that regarding the May 16, 1992 occurrence, the crisis was caused by disputes over ownership of farmlands between members of the Hausas and Atyaps ethnic groups.

Evidences in Appendix III: page 290 – 306 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.2a(iii): Identification of Inter-ethnic Crisis at Sagamu in 1999

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place and Year	Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis
1.	**Newspaper:** *"Sagamu: Death toll now 120";*(Nigerian Tribune, Tue. July 20, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 307-308*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival
2.	**Report Article:** *"Killings and Abuses by the OPC";* (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003). *See Appendix III: Page 309-314*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival
3.	**Report Article:** *"Nigeria: Riots in Kano";* (Immigration and Refugees Board of Canada, Feb. 20, 2001). *See Appendix III: Page 315*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival
4.	**Online News Report:** *"Uneasy Calm in Kano following Riots";* (The New Humanitarian, July 22, 2001). *See Appendix III: Page 316*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.2a(iii) reveals that in order to identify the occurrence of inter-ethnic crises that occurredon July 15, 1999 at Sagamu, Ogun State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Newspaper:** *"Sagamu: Death toll now 120";* (Nigerian Tribune, Tue. July 20, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 307-308*; (2) **Report Article:** *"Killings and Abuses by the OPC";* (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003), *See Appendix III: Page 309-314*; (3) **Report Article:***"Nigeria: Riots in Kano";*(Immigration and Refugees Board of Canada, Feb. 20, 2001), *See Appendix III: Page 315*; and (4) **Online News Report:***"Uneasy Calm in Kano following Riots";* (The New Humanitarian, July 22, 2001), *See Appendix III: Page 316*.

Table 4.2a(iii) further shows that the July 15, 1999 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over arguments on customs observed during annual Oro Festival in Sagamu: a community in Yorubaland.

Evidences in Appendix III: page 307 – 316 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.2a(iv): Identification of Inter-ethnic Crises at Mile - 12 in 1999

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place and Year	Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis
1.	**Report Article:** "Killings and Abuses by the OPC"; (Human Right Watch, Published: March 2, 2003). *See Appendix III: Page 317-321*	Mile - 12 Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 (Lagos State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee
2.	**Online News Report:** *"Nigeria: The Blood Bath at Mile – 12"*; (All Africa, November 6, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 322*	Mile - 12 Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 (Lagos State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee
3.	**Research Paper:** *"An assessment of Hausa/Yoruba Conflicts and Peace-building Initiatives in Mile 12 Market, Lagos between 1999-2014"*, by Lawal Rafiu Adeniran, University of Ibadan; Published: March 2016. *See Appendix III: Page 323-328*	Mile - 12 Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 (Lagos State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee
4.	**Report Article:** *"The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence"*; (Human Right Watch, Published: Feb. 28, 2003 Vol. 15 N(A). *See Appendix III: Page 329-336*	Mile - 12 Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 (Lagos State)	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.2a(iv) reveals that in order to identify the occurrence of inter-ethnic crises that occurred on November 25 and 26, 1999 at Mile – 12, Lagos State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Report Article:** "Killings and Abuses by the OPC"; (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003), *See Appendix III: Page 317-321*; (2) **Online News Report:** *"Nigeria: The Blood Bath at Mile – 12"*; (All Africa, November 6, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 322*; (3) **Research Paper:** *"An assessment of Hausa/Yoruba Conflicts and Peace-building Initiatives in Mile 12 Market, Lagos between 1999-2014",* by Lawal Rafiu Adeniran (University of Ibadan, March 2016), *See Appendix III: Page 323-328*; and (4) **Report Article:** *"The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence";* (Human Right Watch, Feb. 28, 2003 Vol. 15 N(A), *See Appendix III: Page 329-336*. Table 4.2a(iv) further shows that the November 25 and 26, 1999 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over dispute on control of key leadership positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee. Evidences in Appendix III: page 317 – 336 buttresses these facts.

Table 4.2a(v): Identification of Inter-ethnic Crises at Idi-Araba in 2002

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Criss, Place and Year	Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis
1.	**International Telivision News:** *"Lagos Violence death toll mounts"*; (CNN, Feb. 5, 2002).	Idi-Araba Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 (Surulere, Lagos State). *See Appendix III: Page 337-340*	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Urination by a Hausa man at an open place
2.	**Online News Report:** *"Lagos Mayhem Continues"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Mon. Feb. 4, 2002).	Idi-Araba Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 (Surulere, Lagos State). *See Appendix III: Page 341-342*	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Urination by a Hausa man at an open place
3.	**Online Newspaper:** *"Nigeria: Death rise in Lagos Clashes, thousands flees";* OCHA Services, Tue. Feb. 5, 2002).	Idi-Araba Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 (Surulere, Lagos State). *See Appendix III: Page 343-344*	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Urination by a Hausa man at an open place
4.	**Int'l Newspaper:** *"3rd Day of Ethnic Violence in Streets of Lagos";* (The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2002).	Idi-Araba Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 (Surulere, Lagos State). *See Appendix III:*	Yorubas and Hausas	Dispute over Urination by a Hausa man at an open place

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Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.2a(v) reveals that in order to identify the occurrence of inter-ethnic crises that occurred on February 2 - 15, 2002 at Idi-Araba, Surulere, Lagos State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **International Television News:** *"Lagos Violence death toll mounts"*; (CNN, Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 337-340*; (2) **Online News Report:** *"Lagos Mayhem Continues"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Mon. Feb. 4, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 341-342*; (3) **Online Newspaper:** *"Nigeria: Death rise in Lagos Clashes, thousands flees";* OCHA Services, Tue. Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 343-344;* and (4) **International Newspaper:** *"3rd Day of Ethnic Violence in Streets of Lagos";* (The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 345-346*.

Table 4.2a(v) further shows that the February 2 – 15, 2002 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over dispute on urination by an Hausa man at an open place.Evidences in Appendix III: page 337 – 346 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.2b: Identified inter-ethnic crises in communities in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002 in contents analysed (N = 20)

Types of Published Contents	Kafanchan Kaduna State (1987)	Zango-Kataf Kaduna State (1992)	Sagamu Ogun State (1999)	Mile-12 Lagos State (1999)	Idi-Araba Lagos State (2002)	Total	Percentage %
White Paper	1	-	-	-	-	1	5
Book	1	1	-	-	-	2	10
Newspaper	-	3	1	2	-	6	30
Online News Report	-	-	1	1	1	3	15
Report Article	1	-	2	-	2	5	25
Television News Report	-	-	-	1	-	1	5
Research Paper	-	-	-	-	1	1	5
Academic Journal	1	-	-	-	-	1	5
Total Number Of Contents Analyzed	4	4	4	4	4	20	100

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.2b reveals that five occurrences of inter-ethnic crises in the following communities in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002 namely: (1) Kanfanchan inter-ethnic Crisis of 1987; (2) Zango-Kataf inter-ethnic Crisis of 1992; (3) Sagamu inter-ethnic Crisis of 1999; (4) Mile 12 inter-ethnic Crisis of 1999; and (5) Idi-Araba inter-ethnic Crisis of 2002 were identified from twenty analyzed published contents. For the identification of all the five occurrences of inter-ethnic crises, percentages of the total number of published contents that were analyzed were: White paper 1 (5%), Book 2 (10%), Newspaper 7 (30%), Online News Report 3 (15%), Report Article 5 (25%), Television News Report 1 (5%), Research paper 1 (5%) and Academic Journal 1 (5%).

Research Question Two: What was the nature or characterof the public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisis inselected Nigerian communities between 1987 and 2002?

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Table 4.3a(i): Identification of Public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises at Kafanchan in 1987

S/No	Title, Sourceand Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Criss, Place, Year &Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Criss	FGN-Deployed PR Responses
1.	*"Kafanchan 1987* ***White Paper*** *on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State".* March 1987	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives *See Appendix III: Page 248 - 266*	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
2.	**Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999).	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan Natives *See Appendix III: Page 267-280*	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
3.	**Academic Journal:** "The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna…"; By Favour Uroko, UNN	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives *See Appendix III: Page 280-288*	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
4.	**Report Article:** *"Miss World Riots: Continued Impunity for killings in Kaduna II,*	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice

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Background 4". (Human Right Watch, July 2003).	Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	Kafanchan natives *See Appendix III: Page 289*	(3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4.3a(i) reveals that in order to identify the public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (March 5 and 15, 1987) at Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **White Paper:** *"Kafanchan 1987* ***White Paper*** *on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State";* March 1987, *See Appendix III: Page 248-266*; (2) **Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 267-280*; (3) **Academic Journal:** "The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna…"; By Favour Uroko, UNN, *See Appendix III: Page 280-288*; and (4) **Report Article:** *"Miss World Riots: Continued Impunity for killings in Kaduna II, Background 4"*(Human Right Watch, July 2003), *See Appendix III: Page 289*.

Table 4.3a(i) further shows that for the March 5, 1987 occurrence, the crisis was caused by religious disagreement between Christian and Muslim Students of Kaduna State College of Education; and that regarding the March 15, 1987 occurrence, the crisis was caused by resentment of Hausa rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan (Atyap) natives. However, the identified public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (March 5 and 15, 1987) at Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation; (2) Promotion of Justice; (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages; (4) Peace-Building. Evidences in Appendix III: page 248 – 289 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.3a(ii): Identification of Public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisesat Zango-Kataf in 1992

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis	FGN-Deployed PR Responses
1.	**Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria"*, by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 290-302*	Zango-Kataf(Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: February 6, 1992	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
		May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	
2.	**Newspaper:** *"Tango-Kataf Civil Disturbances"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. February 19, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 303*	Zango-Kataf(Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: February 6, 1992	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
		May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	
3.	**Newspaper:** *"General Arrested over Kaduna Riots"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. May 20, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 304*	Zango-Kataf(Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: February 6, 1992	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
		May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	
4.	**Newspaper:** *"Corpses liters Kaduna Hospitals"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Thur. May 21, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 305-306*	Zango-Kataf(Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: February 6, 1992	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
		May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.3a(ii) reveals that in order to identify the public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (February 6 and May 12, 1992) at Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 290-302*; (2) **Newspaper:** *"Tango-Kataf Civil Disturbances"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. February 19, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 303*; (3) **Newspaper:** *"General Arrested over Kaduna Riots"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. May 20, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 304*; and (4) **Newspaper:** *"Corpses litters Kaduna Hospitals"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Thur. May 21, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 305-306*.

Table 4.3a(ii) further shows that the February 6, 1992 occurrence was between members of the Hausas and Atyaps ethnic groups over announcement of the then Local Government plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market from the then current location to another place. While it revelas that regarding the May 16, 1992 occurrence, the crisis was caused by disputes over ownership of farmlands between members of the Hausas and Atyaps ethnic groups. However, the identified public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (February 6 and May 12, 1992) at Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation; (2) Promotion of Justice; (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages; (4) Peace-Building. Evidences in Appendix III: page 290 – 306 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.3a(iii): Identification of Public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Inter-ethnic Crises at Sagamu in 1999

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Crises, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis	FGN-Deployed PR Responses
1.	**Newspaper:** *"Sagamu: Death toll now 120";* (Nigerian Tribune, Tue. July 20, 1999). *See Appendix III: page 307-308*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
2.	**Report Article:** *"Killings and Abuses by the OPC";* (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003). *See Appendix III: page 309-314*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
3.	**Report Article:** *"Nigeria: Riots in Kano";* (Immigration and Refugees Board of Canada, Feb. 20, 2001). *See Appendix III: page 315*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
4.	**Online News Report:** *"Uneasy Calm in Kano following Riots";* (The New Humanitarian, July 22, 2001). *See Appendix III: page 316*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building

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And Hausas

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4.3a(iii) reveals that in order to identify the public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on July 15, 1999 at Sagamu, Ogun State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Newspaper:** *"Sagamu: Death toll now 120";*(Nigerian Tribune, Tue. July 20, 1999), *See Appendix III: page 307-308*; (2) **Report Article:** *"Killings and Abuses by the OPC";*(Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003), *See Appendix III: page 309-314*; (3) **Report Article:** *"Nigeria: Riots in Kano";*(Immigration and Refugees Board of Canada, Feb. 20, 2001), *See Appendix III: page 315*; and (4) **Online News Report:** *"Uneasy Calm in Kano following Riots";*(The New Humanitarian, July 22, 2001), *See Appendix III: page 316*.

Table 4.3a(iii) further shows that the July 15, 1999 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over arguments on customs observed during annual Oro Festival in Sagamu: a community in Yorubaland. However, the identified public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to this occurred inter-ethnic crisis from the contents analyzed were: (1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation; (2) Promotion of Justice; (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages; (4) Peace-Building. Evidences in Appendix III: page 307 – 316 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.3a(iv): Identification of Public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisesat Mile - 12 in 1999

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Criss, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis	FGN-Deployed PR Responses
1.	**Report Article:** "Killings and Abuses by the OPC"; (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003). *See Appendix III: Page 317-321*	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
2.	**Online News Report:** *"Nigeria: The Blood Bath at Mile – 12"*; (All Africa, November 6, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 322*	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
3.	**Research Paper:** *"An assessment of Hausa/Yoruba Conflicts and Peace-building Initiatives in Mile 12 Market, Lagos between 1999-2014"*, by Lawal Rafiu Adeniran (University of Ibadan, Published: March 2016). *See Appendix III: Page 323-328*	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
4.	**Report Article:** *"The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence"*; (Human Right Watch, Feb. 28, 2003 Vol. 15 N(A). *See Appendix III: Page 329-336*	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.3a(iv) reveals that in order to identify the public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on November 25 and 26, 1999 at Mile – 12, Lagos State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Report Article:** "Killings and Abuses by the OPC"; (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003), *See Appendix III: Page 317-321*; (2) **Online News Report:** *"Nigeria: The Blood Bath at Mile – 12"*; (All Africa, November 6, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 322*; (3) **Research Paper:** *"An assessment of Hausa/Yoruba Conflicts and Peace-building Initiatives in Mile 12 Market, Lagos between 1999-2014",* by Lawal Rafiu Adeniran (University of Ibadan, Published: March 2016), *See Appendix III:Page 323-328*; and (4) **Report Article:** *"The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence"*; (Human Right Watch, Feb. 28, 2003 Vol. 15 N(A), *See Appendix III:Page 329-336.*

Table 4.2a(iv) further shows that the November 25 and 26, 1999 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over dispute on control of key leadership positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee. However, the identified public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on November 25 and 26, 1999 at Mile – 12, Lagos State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation; (2) Promotion of Justice; (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages; (4) Peace-Building. Evidences in Appendix III: page 317 – 336 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.3a(v): Identification of Public Relations Responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Inter-ethnic crisis at Idi-Araba in 2002

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publication	Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis	FGN-Deployed PR Responses
1.	**International Television News:** *"Lagos Violence death toll mounts"*; (CNN, Feb. 5, 2002). *See Appendix III: Page 337-340*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by a Hausa man at an open place	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
2.	**Online News Report:** *"Lagos Mayhem Continues"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Mon. Feb. 4, 2002). *See Appendix III: Page 341-342*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by a Hausa man at an open place	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
3.	**Online Newspaper:** *"Nigeria: Death rise in Lagos Clashes, thousands flees";* OCHA Services, Tue. Feb. 5, 2002). *See Appendix III: Page 343-344*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by a Hausa man at an open place	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
4.	**Int'l Newspaper:** *"3rd Day of Ethnic Violence in Streets of Lagos";* (The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2002). *See Appendix III: Page 345-346*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by aHausa man at an open place	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.3a(v) reveals that in order to identify the public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on February 2 - 15, 2002 at Idi-Araba, Surulere, Lagos State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **International Television News:** *"Lagos Violence death toll mounts"*; (CNN, Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 337-340*; (2) **Online News Report:** *"Lagos Mayhem Continues"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Mon. Feb. 4, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 341-342*; (3) **Online Newspaper:** *"Nigeria: Death rise in Lagos Clashes, thousands flees";* OCHA Services, Tue. Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 343-344*; and (4) **International Newspaper:** *"3rd Day of Ethnic Violence in Streets of Lagos";* (The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 345-346*.

Table 4.3a(v) further shows that the February 2 – 15, 2002 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over dispute on urination by a Hausa man at an open place. However, the identified public relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on February 2 - 15, 2002 at Idi-Araba, Surulere, Lagos State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation; (2) Promotion of Justice; (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages; (4) Peace-Building. Evidences in Appendix III: page 337 – 346 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.3b: Frequencies of public relations responses (PRR) of Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to occurrences of inter-ethnic crises between 1987 and 2002 in content analyzed (N = 20); 4PRR = (1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-building

Types of Published Contents	Kafanchan Kaduna State (1987)	Zango-Kataf Kaduna State (1992)	Sagamu Ogun State (1999)	Mile-12 Lagos State (1999)	Idi-Araba Lagos State (2002)	Total	Percentage %
White Paper	4PRR	-	-	-	-	1	5
Book	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	525	
Newspaper	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	525	
Online News Report	-	-	4PRR	4PRR	-	2	10
Report Article	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	4PRR	525	
Television News Report	-	-	-	-	4PRR	1	5
Research Paper	-	-	-	4PRR	-	1	5
Total Number Of Contents Analyzed	4	4	4	4	4	20	100

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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In above table 4.3b, four public relations responses (PRR) of Federal Government of Nigeria (Mitigate damage on FGN Reputation, Promotion of justice, Victims' welfarism and Peace-building) to occurrences of inter-ethnic crises in communities in the Nigeria between 1987 and 2002 were identified from twenty analyzed published contents. For the identification of all the four public relations responses (4PRR) of Federal Government of Nigeria to each of the identified five inter-ethnic crises, percentages of the total number of published contents that were analyzed were: White paper 1 (5%), Book 5 (25%), Newspaper 5 (25%), Online News Report 2 (10%), Report Article 5 (25%), Television News Report 1 (5%), and Research paper 1 (5%).

Research Question Three: By what public relations strategies did Federal Government of Nigeria respond to Nigerian inter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002?

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Table 4.4a(i): Identification of Public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises at Kafanchan in 1987

S/No	Titles, Sources and Year of Publications	Occurred Inter-ethnic Crises, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises	FGN Deployed PR Strategies
1.	*"Kafanchan 1987* ***White Paper*** *on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State".* March 1987 *See Appendix III: Page 248-266*	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
2.	**Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 267-280*	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan Natives	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenement / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
3.	**Academic Journal:** "The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna…": By Favour Uroko, UNN *See Appendix III: Page 280-288*	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenement / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
4.	**Report Article:** *"Miss World Riots: Continued Impunity for killings in Kaduna II, Background 4".* (Human Right Watch, July 2003). *See Appendix III:*	Kafanchan (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: (1) March 5, 1987 (Between Christian and Muslim Students) (2) March 15, 1987 (Between Indigenous Kafanchans and Hausas)	(1) Religious Disagreement (2) Resentment of Hausa Rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan natives	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenement / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations

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Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4.4a(i) reveals that in order to identify the public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (March 5 and 15, 1987) at Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **White Paper:** *"Kafanchan 1987* ***White Paper*** *on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State";* March 1987, *See Appendix III: Page 248-266*; (2) **Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 267-280*; (3) **Academic Journal:** "The Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna…"; By Favour Uroko, UNN, *See Appendix : Page 280-288*; and (4) **Report Article:** *"Miss World Riots: Continued Impunity for killings in Kaduna II, Background 4"*(Human Right Watch, July 2003), *See Appendix III:Page 289*.

Table 4.4a(i) further shows that for the March 5, 1987 occurrence, the crisis was caused by religious disagreement between Christian and Muslim Students of Kaduna State College of Education; and that regarding the March 15, 1987 occurrence, the crisis was caused by resentment of Hausa rulership by indigenous minority Kafanchan (Atyap) natives. However, the identified public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (March 5 and 15, 1987) at Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention; (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization; (4) Tribunal / POI; (5) CSR; (6) Sympathy Visit; (7) Peace Meetings; (8) Community Relations. Evidences in Appendix III: page 248 – 289 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.4a(ii): Identification of Public Relations Strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Inter-ethnic crisis at Zango-Kataf in 1992

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publications	Inter-ethnic Crise, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis	FGN-Deployed PR Strategies
1.	**Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria"*, by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 290-302*	Zango-Kataf (Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: February 6, 1992 / May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market / Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
2.	**Newspaper:** *"Tango-Kataf Civil Disturbances"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. February 19, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 303*	Zango-Kataf(Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: February 6, 1992 / May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market / Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
3.	**Newspaper:** *"General Arrested over Kaduna Riots"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. May 20, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 304*	Zango-Kataf(Southern Kaduna State) Crises of: February 6, 1992 / May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market / Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
4.	**Newspaper:** *"Corpses liters Kaduna Hospitals"*; (Nigerian	Zango-Kataf(Southern Kaduna State)	Announcement of L.G plan to relocate Zango	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment

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Tribune, Thur. May 21, 1992). *See Appendix III: Page 305-306*	Crises of: February 6, 1992 May 12, 1992 Both Between the Hausas and Atyaps	Weekly Market Disputes over Ownership of Farmlands	/ Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4.4a(ii) reveals that in order to identify the public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (February 6 and May 12, 1992) at Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Book**: *"Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria",* by: Rotimi T. Suberu. (FIRAN Spectrum Ibadan, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 290-302*; (2) **Newspaper:** *"Tango-Kataf Civil Disturbances"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. February 19, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 303*; (3) **Newspaper:** *"General Arrested over Kaduna Riots"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Wed. May 20, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 304*; and (4) **Newspaper:** *"Corpses litters Kaduna Hospitals"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Thur. May 21, 1992), *See Appendix III: Page 305-306*.

Table 4.4a(ii) further shows that the February 6, 1992 occurrence was between members of the Hausas and Atyaps ethnic groups over announcement of the then Local Government plan to relocate Zango Weekly Market from the then current location to another place. While it reveals that regarding the May 16, 1992 occurrence, the crisis was caused by disputes over ownership of farmlands between members of the Hausas and Atyaps ethnic groups. However, the identified public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred twice in a month (February 6 and May 12, 1992) at Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Propaganda; (2) Media Intervention; (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization; (4) Tribunal / POI; (5) CSR; (6)

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Sympathy Visit; (7) Peace Meetings; (8) Community Relations. Evidences in Appendix III: page 290 – 306 buttresses these facts.

Table 4.4a(iii): Identification of Public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises at Sagamu in 1999

S/No	Titles, Sources and Year of Publications	Occurred Inter-ethnic Crises, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises	FGN Deployed PR Strategies
1.	**Newspaper:** *"Sagamu: Death toll now 120";* (Nigerian Tribune, Tue. July 20, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 307-308*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
2.	**Report Article:** *"Killings and Abuses by the OPC";* (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003). *See Appendix III: Page 309-314*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building
3.	**Report Article:** *"Nigeria: Riots in Kano";* (Immigration and Refugees Board of Canada, Feb. 20, 2001). *See Appendix III: Page 315*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building

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4.	**Online News Report:** *"Uneasy Calm in Kano following Riots";* (The New Humanitarian, July 22, 2001). *See Appendix III: Page 316*	Sagamu / Oro Cultists Crisis of: July 15, 1999 (Ogun State) Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Arguments over Customs observed during Annual Oro Festival	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.4a(iii) reveals that in order to identify the public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on July 15, 1999 at Sagamu, Ogun State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Newspaper:** *"Sagamu: Death toll now 120";*(Nigerian Tribune, Tue. July 20, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 307-308*; (2) **Report Article:***"Killings and Abuses by the OPC";*(Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003), *See Appendix III: Page 309-314*; (3) **Report Article:***"Nigeria: Riots in Kano";*(Immigration and Refugees Board of Canada, Feb. 20, 2001), *See Appendix III: Page 315*; and (4) **Online News Report:***"Uneasy Calm in Kano following Riots";*(The New Humanitarian, July 22, 2001), *See Appendix III: Page 316*.

Table 4.4a(iii) further shows that the July 15, 1999 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over arguments on customs observed during annual Oro Festival in Sagamu: a community in Yorubaland. However, the identified public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on July 15, 1999 at Sagamu, Ogun State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Propaganda; (2) Media Intervention; (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization; (4) Tribunal / POI; (5) CSR; (6) Sympathy Visit; (7) Peace Meetings; (8) Community Relations. Evidences in Appendix III: page 307 – 316 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.4a(iv): Identification of Public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises at Mile - 12 in 1999

S/No	Titles, Sources and Year of Publications	Occurred Inter-ethnic Crises, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises	FGN Deployed PR Strategies
1.	**Report Article:** "Killings and Abuses by the OPC"; (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003). *See Appendix III: Page 317-332*	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenement / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
2.	**Online News Report:** *"Nigeria: The Blood Bath at Mile – 12"*; (All Africa, November 6, 1999). *See Appendix III: Page 322*	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenement / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
3.	**Research Paper:** *"An assessment of Hausa/Yoruba Conflicts and Peace-building Initiatives in Mile 12 Market, Lagos between 1999-2014"*, by Lawal Rafiu Adeniran (University of Ibadan, Published: March 2016). *See Appendix III: Page 323-328*	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenement / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
4.	**Report Article:** *"The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence"*; (Human	Mile – 12 (Lagos State) Crisis of: November 25 and 26, 1999 Between the	Dispute over Control of Key Leadership Positions within the Mile	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenement / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI

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Right Watch, Feb. 28, 2003 Vol. 15 N(A). *See Appendix III: Page 329-336*	Yorubas And Hausas	– 12 Market Traders' Committee	(5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4.4a(iv) reveals that in order to identify the public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on November 25 and 26, 1999 at Mile – 12, Lagos State, four publications were reviewed and analyzed namely: (1) **Report Article:** "Killings and Abuses by the OPC"; (Human Right Watch, March 2, 2003), *See Appendix III: Page 317-321*; (2) **Online News Report:** *"Nigeria: The Blood Bath at Mile – 12"*; (All Africa, November 6, 1999), *See Appendix III: Page 322*; (3) **Research Paper:** *"An assessment of Hausa/Yoruba Conflicts and Peace-building Initiatives in Mile 12 Market, Lagos between 1999-2014",* by Lawal Rafiu Adeniran (University of Ibadan, March 2016), *See Appendix III: Page 323-328*; and (4) **Report Article:** *"The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence"*; (Human Right Watch, Feb. 28, 2003 Vol. 15 N(A), *See Appendix III: Page 329-336*.

Table 4.4a(iv) further shows that the November 25 and 26, 1999 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over dispute on control of key leadership positions within the Mile – 12 Market Traders' Committee. However, the identified public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on November 25 and 26, 1999 at Mile – 12, Lagos State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Propaganda; (2) Media Intervention; (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization; (4) Tribunal / POI; (5) CSR; (6) Sympathy Visit; (7) Peace Meetings; (8) Community Relations. Evidences in Appendix III: page 317 – 336 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.4a(v): Identification of Public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises at Idi-Araba in 2002

S/No	Titles, Sources and Year of Publications	Occurred Inter-ethnic Crises, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises	FGN Deployed PR Strategies
1.	**International Television News:** *"Lagos Violence death toll mounts"*; (CNN, Feb. 5, 2002). *See Appendix III: Page 337-340*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by an Hausa man at an open place	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
2.	**Online News Report:** *"Lagos Mayhem Continues"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Mon. Feb. 4, 2002). *See Appendix III: Page 341-342*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by an Hausa man at an open place	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
3.	**Online Newspaper:** *"Nigeria: Death rise in Lagos Clashes, thousands flees";* OCHA Services, Tue. Feb. 5, 2002). *See Appendix III: Page 343-344*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by an Hausa man at an open place	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations
4.	**Int'l Newspaper:** *"3rd Day of Ethnic Violence in Streets of Lagos";* (The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2002). *See Appendix III:*	Idi-Araba (Surulere, Lagos State) Crisis of: Feb. 2 – 15, 2002 Between the Yorubas And Hausas	Dispute over Urination by an Hausa man at an open place	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings

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Source: Field Survey, 2022

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Table 4.4a(v) reveals that in order to identify the public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on February 2 - 15, 2002 at Idi-Araba, Surulere, Lagos State, four publications were reviewed and analysed namely: (1) **International Television News:** *"Lagos Violence Death Toll Mounts"*; (CNN, Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 373-340*; (2) **Online News Report:** *Lagos Mayhem Continues"*; (Nigerian Tribune, Mon. Feb. 4, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 341-342*; (3) **Online Newspaper:** *"Nigeria: Death rise in Lagos Clashes, thousands flees";* OCHA Services, Tue. Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 343-344*; and (4) **International Newspaper:** *"3rd Day of Ethnic Violence in Streets of Lagos";* (The New York Times, Feb. 5, 2002), *See Appendix III: Page 345-346.*

Table 4.4a(v) further shows that the February 2 – 15, 2002 occurrence was between members of the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups over dispute on urination by a Hausa man at an open place. However, the identified public relations strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises that occurred on February 2 - 15, 2002 at Idi-Araba, Surulere, Lagos State from the contents analyzed were: (1) Propaganda; (2) Media Intervention; (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization; (4) Tribunal / POI; (5) CSR; (6) Sympathy Visit; (7) Peace Meetings; (8) Community Relations. Evidences in Appendix III: page 337 – 346 buttresses these facts.

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Table 4.4b: Frequencies of Public relations strategies (PRS) of Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to occurrences of inter-ethnic crises in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002 in content analyzed (N = 20); 8PRS = (1) Propaganda (2) Media intervention (3) Public enlightenment (4) Judicial tribunal / Panel of Inquiries (5) Corporate Social Responsibility (6) Sympathy visit to scene of incident (7) Peace meetings (8) Community Relations

Types of Published Contents	Kafanchan Kaduna State (1987)	Zango-Kataf Kaduna State (1992)	Sagamu Ogun State (1999)	Mile-12 Lagos State (1999)	Idi-Araba Lagos State (2002)	Total	Percentage %
White Paper	8PRS	-	-	-	-	1	5
Book	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	525	
Newspaper	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	525	
Online News Report	-	-	8PRS	8PRS	-	2	10
Report Article	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	8PRS	525	
Television News Report	-	-	-	-	8PRS	1	5
Research Paper	-	-	-	8PRS	-	1	5
Total Number Of Contents Analyzed	4	4	4	4	4 20	100	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

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In table 4.4b, eight public relations Strategies (PRS) of Federal Government of Nigeria (Propaganda, Media intervention, Public enlightenment, Judicial tribunal/Panel of Inquiries, Corporate Social Responsibility, Sympathy visit to scene of incident, Peace Meetings, and Community Relations) were identified from twenty analyzed published contents. For the identification of all the eight public relations strategies (8PRS) of Federal Government of Nigeria to each of the identified five inter-ethnic crises, percentages of the total number of published contents that were analyzed were: White paper 1 (5%), Book 5 (25%), Newspaper 5 (25%), Online News Report 2 (10%), Report Article 5 (25%), Television News Report 1 (5%), and Research paper 1 (5%).

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Research Question Four: How effective were the Nigerian federal government public relations responses to inter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002?

Summary of how study was conductedbetween Monday 12th and Friday 23rd Sept., 2022are presented as follows:

Getting to the field, the first point of call were the offices of Chairmen of the Local Governments that are politically overseeing the communities where identified inter-ethnic crises occurred:

1. Jema'a L.G, Southern Region, Kaduna State with Headquarters in Kafanchan (for Kafanchan Inter-ethnic Crises of 1987).
2. Zangon Kataf L.G, Southern Region, Kaduna State with Headquarters in Zonkwa Town (for Zango-Kataf Crises of 1992).
3. Sagamu L.G, Ogun State with Headquarters in Sagamu (for Sagamu/Oro Festival Crises of 1999).
4. Kosofe L.G, Lagos State with Headquarters in Ogudu (for Mile-12 Crises of 1999).
5. Mushin L. G, Lagos State with Headquarters in Mushin (for Idi-Araba Crisis of 2002).

- From the L.G Chairmen's Offices, a junior member of Staff of the L.G was detailed to link the researcher to potential respondents at the affected communities (key personalities: Traditional, Market and Religious Leaders).
- At each of the Local Government/affected community, 40 Respondents (Key personalities) were administered questionnaires to, given the following distribution: Traditional Leaders (2), Market Leaders (30) and Religious Leaders (8).

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- Total numbers of respondents that questionnaires were administered to in this study were 200. They were key personalities (10 Traditional Rulers, 150 Market leaders and 40 Religious Leaders) living in the identified five affected communities.

- Whereas, respondents were asked to rate how effective were the following public relations responses deployed by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in various communities: (i) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (ii) Promotion of Justice (iii) Victims Welfarism Packages (iv) Peace Building. Appendix III: in page 248-346 buttresses the deployment of the above listed public relations responses by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in various communities.

Table 4.5: Table showing how effective were the Public Relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria toKafanchan, Kaduna State inter-ethnic crisis of March 5 and 15, 1987

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation	13 (32.5)	10 (25.0)	7 (17.5)	10 (25.0)	2.65
2. Promotion of Justice	19 (47.5)	9 (22.5)	11 (27.5)	1 (2.5)	3.15
3. Victims Welfarism Packages	13 (32.5)	12 (30.0)	5 (12.5)	10 (25.0)	2.70
4. Peace Building	14 (35.0)	5 (12.5)	16 (40.0)	5 (12.5)	2.70
Weighted Mean	2.80				

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

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Table 4.5 reveals the level of performances of Federal Government of Nigeria public relations responses to the Kafanchan inter-ethnic crisis in 1987. "Mitigate Damage on Reputation" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 32.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Response 1:(Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation) was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 17.5% believed it was less effective; while 25% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 2: "Promotion of Justice" towards managing the occurred inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 47.5% of the total respondents opined that it was very effective; 22.5% of them held that it was effective; 27.5% believed it was less effective; while 2.5% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 3: "Victims Welfarism Packages" towards managing the occurred inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 32.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed PRR3 was very effective; 30% of them held that it was effective; 12.5% believed it was less effective; while 25% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table revealed that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 4: "Peace Building" towards managing the occurred inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, only 35% of the total respondents opined that the deployed PRR4 was very effective; 12.5% of them held that it was effective; 40% believed it was less effective; while 12.5% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 248-289 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations responses listed in Table 4.5 ((i) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (ii) Promotion of Justice (iii) Victims Welfarism Packages (iv) Peace Building) by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Kafanchan, 1987.

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Table 4.6: Table showing how effective were the public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to occurrence of Zango-Kataf, Kaduna State inter-ethnic crises of Feb. 6 & May 12 – 15, 1992

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation	13 (32.5)	0 (0.0)	16 (40.0)	11 (27.5)	2.38
2. Promotion of Justice	24 (60.0)	8 (20.0)	5 (12.5)	3 (7.5)	3.33
3. Victims Welfarism Packages	12 (30.0)	9 (22.5)	10 (25.0)	9 (22.5)	2.60
4. Peace Building	11 (27.5)	8 (20.0)	8 (20.0)	13 (32.5)	2.43
Weighted Mean	2.69				

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

Table 4.6 shows the level of performances of Public Relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to the Zango-Kataf inter-ethnic crisis in 1992. At Zango-Kataf, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 1: "Mitigate Damage on Reputation" towards managing the occurred inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 32.5% of the total respondents opined that

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thePublic Relations Response 1 was very effective; 0% of them held that it was effective; 40% believed it was less effective; while 27.5% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 2: "Promotion of Justice" towards managing the occurred inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 60% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Response 2 was very effective; while 20% of them held that it was effective; another 12.5% believed it was less effective; while 7.5% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the Public Relations Response 3: "Victims Welfarism Packages" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 30% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Response 3 was very effective; 22.5% of them held that it was effective; 25% believed it was less effective; while 22.5% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table demonstrates thatPublic Relations Response 4: "Peace Building" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, only 27.5% of the total respondents said that thePublic Relations Response 4 was very effective; 20% of them held that it was effective; and another 20% believed that it was less effective; while 32.5% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 290-306 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations responses listed in Table 4.6 ((i) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (ii) Promotion of Justice (iii) Victims Welfarism Packages (iv) Peace Building) by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Zango-Kataf.

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Table 4.7: Table showing how effective were the Public Relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to occurrence of Sagamu, Ogun State inter-ethnic crisis of July 15, 1999

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation	7 (17.5)	28 (70.0)	5 (12.5)	0 (0.0)	3.05
2. Promotion of Justice	10 (25.0)	10 (25.0)	8 (20.0)	12 (30.0)	2.45
3. Victims Welfarism Packages	29 (72.5)	0 (0.0)	10 (25.0)	1 (2.5)	3.43
4. Peace Building	9 (22.5)	6 (15.0)	17 (42.5)	8 (20.0)	2.40
Weighted Mean	2.83				

Source: Field Survey, 2022
Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

Table 4.7 shows the level of performances of the Public Relations responses of the Federal Government to Sagamu inter-ethnic crises in 1999. At Sagamu, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 1: "Mitigate Damage on Reputation" towards managing the occurred inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 17.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Response 1 was very effective; 70% of them held that it was effective; 12.5% believed it was less effective; while 0% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 2: "Promotion of Justice" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 25% of the total respondents opined that the

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deployed Public Relations Response 2 was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 20% believed it was less effective; while 30% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 3: "Victims Welfarism Packages" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 72.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Response 3 was very effective; 0% of them held that it was effective; 25% believed it was less effective; while 2.5% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table revealed that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 4: "Peace Building" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, only 22.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Response 4 was very effective; 15% of them held that it was effective; 42.5% believed it was less effective; while 20% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 307-316 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations responses listed in Table 4.7 ((i) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (ii) Promotion of Justice (iii) Victims Welfarism Packages (iv) Peace Building) by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Sagamu, 1999.

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Table 4.8: Effectiveness of the Public Relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Mile-12, Kosofe, Lagos State inter-ethnic crisis of November 25 and 26, 1999

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation	0 (0.0)	11 (27.5)	11 (27.5)	18 (45.0)	1.83
2. Promotion of Justice	5 (12.5)	15 (37.5)	7 (17.5)	13 (32.5)	2.30
3. Victims Welfarism Packages	14 (35.0)	11 (27.5)	4 (10.0)	11 (27.5)	2.70
4. Peace Building	5 (12.5)	12 (30.0)	19 (47.5)	4 (10.0)	2.45
Weighted Mean	2.32				

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

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Table 4.8 shows the level of performances of Public Relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Mile-12 inter-ethnic crises in 1999. At Mile-12, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 1: "Mitigate Damage on Reputation" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 0% of the total respondents said that the deployed Public Relations Response 1 was very effective; 27.5% of them held that it was effective; 27.5% believed it was less effective; while 45% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 2: "Promotion of Justice" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 12.5% of the total respondents opined that the

deployed Public Relations Response 2 was very effective; 37.5% of them held that it was effective; 17.5% believed it was less effective; while 32.5% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 3: "Victims Welfarism" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 35% of the total respondents held that the deployed Public Relations Response 3 was very effective; 27.5% of them held that it was effective; 10% believed it was less effective; while 27.5% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table reveals that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 4: "Peace Building" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, only 12.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Response 4 was very effective; 30% of them held that it was effective; 47.5% believed it was less effective; while 10% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 317-336 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations responses listed in Table 4.8 ((i) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (ii) Promotion of Justice (iii) Victims Welfarism Packages (iv) Peace Building) by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Mile-12, 1999.

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Table 4.9: Effectiveness of the Public Relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Idi-Araba, Surulere, Lagos State inter-ethnic crisis of February 2 – 15, 2002

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation	10 (25.0)	11 (27.5)	0 (0.0)	19 (47.5)	2.30
2. Promotion of Justice	0 (0.0)	4 (10.0)	25 (62.5)	11 (27.5)	1.83
3. Victims Welfarism Packages	16 (40.5)	3 (7.5)	11 (27.5)	10 (25.0)	2.63
4. Peace Building	10 (25.0)	8 (20.0)	14 (35.0)	8 (20.0)	2.50
Weighted Mean	2.32				

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

Table 4.9 shows the level of performances of the Public Relations responses of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Idi-Araba inter-ethnic crisis in 2002. At Idi-Araba, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 1: "Mitigate Damage on Reputation" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 25% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Response 1 was very effective; 27.5% of them held that it was effective; 0% believed it was less effective; while 47.5% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 2: "Promotion of Justice" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 0% of the total respondents held that the deployed

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Public Relations Response 2 was very effective; 10% of them held that it was effective; 62.5% believed it was less effective; while 27.5% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 3: "Victims Welfarism" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 40.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Response 3 was very effective; 7.5% of them held that it was effective; 27.5% believed it was less effective; while 25% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table shows that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Response 4: "Peace Building" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, only 25.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Response 4 was very effective; 20% of them held that it was effective; 35% believed it was less effective; while 20% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 337-346 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations responses listed in Table 4.9 ((i) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (ii) Promotion of Justice (iii) Victims Welfarism Packages (iv) Peace Building) by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Idi-Araba, 2002.

Research Question Five: To what degreedid the Nigerian federal government public relationsstrategies perform at addressinginter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002?

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Summary of How Study was conductedbetween Monday 12th and Friday 23rd September, 2022 are presented as follows:

Getting to the field, the first port of call were the offices of Chairmen of the Local Governments that are politically overseeing the communities where identified inter-ethnic crises occurred:

1. Jema'a L.G, Southern Region, Kaduna State with Headquarters in Kafanchan (for Kafanchan Inter-ethnic Crises of 1987).
2. Zangon Kataf L.G, Southern Region, Kaduna State with Headquarters in Zonkwa Town (for Zango-Kataf Crises of 1992).
3. Sagamu L.G, Ogun State with Headquarters in Sagamu (for Sagamu/Oro Festival Crises of 1999).
4. Kosofe L.G, Lagos State with Headquarters in Ogudu (for Mile-12 Crises of 1999).
5. Mushin L. G, Lagos State with Headquarters in Mushin (for Idi-Araba Crises of 2002).

- From the L.G Chairmen's Offices, a junior member of Staff of the L.G was detailed to link the researcher to potential respondents at the affected communities (key personalities: Traditional, Market and Religious Leaders).

- At each of the Local Government / affected community, 40 Respondents (Key personalities) were administered questionnaires to, given the following distribution: Traditional Leaders (2), Market Leaders (30) and Religious Leaders (8).

- Total numbers of respondents that questionnaires were administered to in this study were 200. They were key personalities (10 Traditional Rulers, 150 Market leaders and 40 Religious Leaders) living in the identified five affected communities.

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Whereas, respondents were asked to rate how effective were the following public relations strategies deployed by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to manage inter-ethnic crises in various communities: (i) Propaganda (ii) Media Intervention (iii) Pubic Enlightenment (iv) Judicial Tribunals and Panel of Enquiries (v) Sympathy Visit (vi) Corporate Social Responsibility (vii) Peace Meetings (viii) Community Relations.

Appendix 1: in page 248-346 buttresses the deployment of the above listed public relations strategies by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in various communities.

Table 4.10: Effectiveness of Public Relations Strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria to Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna State Inter-ethnic Crisis of March 6 &15, 1987

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Propaganda	7 (17.5)	10 (25.0)	14 (35.0)	9 (22.5)	2.38
2. Media Intervention	10 (25.0)	10 (25.0)	4 (10.0)	16 (40.0)	2.35
3. Public Enlightenment	25 (62.5)	11 (27.5)	10 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	3.53
4. Tribunals & POIs	12 (30.0)	7 (17.5)	14 (35.5)	7 (17.5)	2.60
5. Corporate Social Responsibility	7 (17.5)	8 (20.0)	13 (32.5)	12 (30.0)	2.25
6. Sympathy Visit	0 (0.0)	19 (47.5)	5 (12.5)	16 (40.0)	2.08
7. Peace Meetings	6 (15.0)	8 (20.0)	22 (55.0)	4 (10.0)	2.40
8. Community Relations	2 (5.0)	5 (12.5)	24 (60.0)	9 (22.5)	

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Weighted Mean	2.45

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

Table 4.10 shows the level of performances of Federal Government of Nigeria deployed public relations strategy to Kafanchan inter-ethnic crises in 1987. At Kafanchan, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategies 1: "Propaganda" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 17.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 35% believed it was less effective; while 22.5% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 25% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 10% believed it was less effective; while 40% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 62.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" was very effective; 27.5% of them held that it was effective; 25% believed it was less effective; while 0% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table shows that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, only 30% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" was

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very effective; 17.5% of them held that it was effective; 35.5% believed it was less effective; while 17.5% of them said it was not effective.

Inclusively, at Kafanchan, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 17.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" was very effective; 20% of them held that it was effective; 32.5% believed it was less effective; while 30% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 0% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" was very effective; 47.5% of them held that it was effective; 12.5% believed it was less effective; while 40% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, 15% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" was very effective; 20% of them held that it was effective; 55% believed it was less effective; while 10% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table shows that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" towards managing the occurred inter-ethnic crisis in 1987, only 5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" was very effective; 12.5% of them held that it was effective; 60% believed it was less effective; while 22.5% of them said it was not effective.

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Appendix III: in page 248-289 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations strategies listed in Table 4.10: (i) Propaganda (ii) Media Intervention (iii) Pubic Enlightenment (iv) Judicial Tribunals and Panel of Enquiries (v) Sympathy Visit (vi) Corporate Social Responsibility (vii) Peace Meetings (viii) Community Relations by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Kafanchan, 1987.

Table 4.11: Effectiveness of Public Relations Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna State inter-ethnic crisis of February 6 & May 12 – 15, 1992

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Propaganda	7 (17.5)	10 (25.0)	16 (40.0)	7 (17.5)	2.43
2. Media Intervention	15 (37.5)	10 (25.0)	12 (30.0)	3 (7.5)	2.93
3. Public Enlightenment	2 (5.0)	15 (37.5)	17 (42.5)	6 (15.0)	3.33
4. Tribunals & POIs	4 (10.0)	10 (25.0)	14 (35.5)	12 (30.0)	2.15
5. Corporate Social Responsibility	13 (32.5)	7 (17.5)	9 (22.5)	11 (27.5)	2.55
6. Sympathy Visit	17 (42.5)	7 (17.5)	16 (40.0)	0 (0.0)	3.03
7. Peace Meeting	11 (27.5)	5 (12.5)	10 (25.0)	14 (35.0)	2.33
8. Community Relations	0 (0.0)	21 (52.5)	19 (47.5)	0 (0.0)	2.53
Weighted Mean	2.54				

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Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

Table 4.11 revealed the level of performances of Federal Government of Nigeria deployed public relations strategies to Zango-Kataf inter-ethnic crisis in 1992. At Zango-Kataf, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 17.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 40% believed it was less effective; while 17.5% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 37.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 30% believed it was less effective; while 7.5% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" was very effective; 37.5% of them held that it was effective; 42.5% believed it was less effective; while 15% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table showed that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, only 10% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" was

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very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 35% believed it was less effective; while 30% of them said it was not effective.

Inclusively, at Zango-Kataf, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 32.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" was very effective; 17.5% of them held that it was effective; 22.5% believed it was less effective; while 27.5% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 42.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" was very effective; 17.5% of them held that it was effective; 40% believed it was less effective; while 0% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, 27.5% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" was very effective; 12.5% of them held that it was effective; 25% believed it was less effective; while 35% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table showed that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1992, only 0% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" was very effective; 52.5% of them held that it was effective; 47.5% believed it was less effective; while 0% of them said it was not effective.

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Appendix III: in page 290-306 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations strategies listed in Table 4.11: (i) Propaganda (ii) Media Intervention (iii) Pubic Enlightenment (iv) Judicial Tribunals and Panel of Enquiries (v) Sympathy Visit (vi) Corporate Social Responsibility (vii) Peace Meetings (viii) Community Relations by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Zango-Kataf, 1992.

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Table 4.12: Effectiveness of Public Relations Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to Sagamu, Ogun State inter-ethnic crisis of July 15, 1999

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Propaganda	10 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	19 (47.5)	11 (27.5)	2.23
2. Media Intervention	8 (20.0)	19 (47.5)	1 (2.5)	12 (30.0)	2.58
3. Public Enlightenment	8 (20.0)	10 (25.0)	11 (27.5)	11 (27.5)	3.38
4. Tribunals & POIs	15 (37.5)	8 (20.0)	13 (32.5)	4 (10.0)	2.85
5. Corporate Social Responsibility	18 (45.0)	3 (7.5)	7 (17.5)	12 (30.0)	2.68
6. Sympathy Visit	7 (17.5)	2 (5.0)	17 (42.5)	14 (35.0)	2.05
7. Peace Meeting	25 (62.5)	5 (12.5)	7 (17.5)	3 (7.5)	3.30
8. Community Relations	20 (50.0)	8 (20.0)	6 (15.0)	6 (15.0)	3.05

Weighted Mean	2.64

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

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Table 4.12 shows the level of performances of Federal Government of Nigeria deployed public relations strategies to Sagamu inter-ethnic crisis in 1999. At Sagamu, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 25% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" was very effective; 0% of them held that it was effective; 47.5% believed it was less effective; while 27.5% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 20% of the total respondents opined that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" was very effective; 47.5% of them held that it was effective; 2.5% believed it was less effective; while 30% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 20% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 27.5% believed it was less effective; while 27.5% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table shows that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, only 37.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" was very effective; 20% of them held that it was effective; 32.5% believed it was less effective; while 10% of them said it was not effective.

Inclusively, at Sagamu, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 45% of the total respondents said that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social

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Responsibility" was very effective; 7.5% of them held that it was effective; 17.5% believed it was less effective; while 30% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 17.5% of the total respondents said that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" was very effective; 5% of them held that it was effective; 42.5% believed it was less effective; while 35% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 62.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" was very effective; 12.5% of them held that it was effective; 17.5% said it was less effective; while 7.5% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table showed that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, only 50% of the total respondents said that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" was very effective; 20% of them held that it was effective; 15% believed it was less effective; while 15% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 307-316 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations strategies listed in Table 4.12: (i) Propaganda (ii) Media Intervention (iii) Pubic Enlightenment (iv) Judicial Tribunals and Panel of Enquiries (v) Sympathy Visit (vi) Corporate Social Responsibility (vii) Peace Meetings (viii) Community Relations by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Sagamu, 1999.

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Table 4.13: Effectiveness of Public Relations Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to Mile-12, Kosofe, Lagos State inter-ethnic crisis of November 25 and 26, 1999

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Propaganda	11 (27.5)	9 (22.5)	6 (15.0)	14 (35.0)	2.43
2. Media Intervention	7 (17.5)	7 (17.5)	18 (45.0)	8 (20.0)	2.33
3. Public Enlightenment	19 (47.5)	9 (22.5)	7 (17.5)	5 (12.5)	3.05
4. Tribunals & POIs	11 (27.5)	17 (42.5)	11 (27.5)	1 (2.5)	2.95
5 Corporate Social Responsibility	14 (35.0)	6 (15.0)	13 (32.5)	7 (17.5)	2.68
6. Sympathy Visit	14 (35.0)	0 (0.0)	22 (55.0)	4 (10.0)	2.60
7. Peace Meeting	11 (27.5)	17 (42.5)	5 (12.5)	7 (17.5)	2.80
8. Community Relations	14 (35.0)	7 (17.5)	13 (32.5)	6 (15.0)	2.73
Weighted Mean	2.70				

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

Table 4.13 demonstrates the level of performances of Federal Government of Nigeria deployed public relations strategies to Mile-12 inter-ethnic crisis in 1999. At Mile-12, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" towards managing the inter-ethnic

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crisis in 1999, 27.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" was very effective; 22.5% of them held that it was effective; 15% believed it was less effective; while 35% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 17.5% of the total respondents said that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" was very effective; 17.5% of them held that it was effective; 45% believed it was less effective; while 20% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 47.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" was very effective; 22.5% of them held that it was effective; 17.5% believed it was less effective; while 12.5% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table demonstrates that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, only 27.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" was very effective; 42.5% of them held that it was effective; 27.5% believed it was less effective; while 2.5% of them said it was not effective.

Inclusively, at Mile-12, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 35% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social

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Responsibility" was very effective; 15% of them held that it was effective; 32.5% believed it was less effective; while 17.5% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 35% of the total respondents held that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" was very effective; 0% of them held that it was effective; 55% believed it was less effective; while 10% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, 27.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" was very effective; 42.5% of them held that it was effective; 12.5% said it was less effective; while 17.5% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table showed that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 1999, only 35% of the total respondents said that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" was very effective; 17.5% of them held that it was effective; 32.5% believed it was less effective; while 15% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 317-336 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations strategies listed in Table 4.13: (i) Propaganda (ii) Media Intervention (iii) Pubic Enlightenment (iv) Judicial Tribunals and Panel of Enquiries (v) Sympathy Visit (vi) Corporate Social Responsibility (vii) Peace Meetings (viii) Community Relations by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Mile-12, 1999.

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Table 4.14: Effectiveness of Public Relations Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to Idi-Araba, Surulere, Lagos State inter-ethnic crisis of February 2 – 15, 2002

	VE (%)	E (%)	LE (%)	NE (%)	Mean
1. Propaganda	13 (32.5)	5 (12.0)	12 (30.0)	10 (25.0)	2.53
2. Media Intervention	14 (35.0)	0 (0.0)	24 (60.0)	2 (5.0)	2.65
3. Public Enlightenment	21 (52.5)	0 (0.0)	13 (32.5)	6 (15.0)	3.90
4. Tribunals & POIs	9 (22.5)	5 (12.5)	16 (40.0)	10 (25.0)	2.33
5. Corporate Social Responsibility	9 (22.5)	9 (22.5)	14 (35.0)	8 (20.0)	2.48
6. Sympathy Visit	9 (22.5)	8 (20.0)	16 (40.0)	7 (17.5)	2.48
7. Peace Meetings	8 (20.0)	13 (32.5)	13 (32.5)	6 (15.0)	2.58
8. Community Relations	12 (30.0)	10 (25.0)	12 (30.0)	6 (15.0)	2.70
Weighted Mean	2.58				

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Key: VE = Very Effective, E = Effective, LE = Less Effective, NE = Not Effective, M = Mean

Table 4.14 demonstrates the level of performances of Federal Government of Nigeria deployed public relations strategies to Idi-Araba inter-ethnic crisis in 2002. At Idi-Araba, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" towards managing the inter-

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ethnic crisis in 2002, 32.5% of the total respondents said that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 1: "Propaganda" was very effective; 12.5% of them held that it was effective; 30% believed it was less effective; while 25% of them said it was not effective.

Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 35% of the total respondents held that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 2: "Media Intervention" was very effective; 0% of them held that it was effective; 60% believed it was less effective; while 5% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 52.5% of the total respondents held that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 3: "Public Enlightenment" was very effective; 0% of them said that it was effective; 32.5% believed it was less effective; while 15% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table shows that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, only 22.5% of the total respondents held that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 4: "Tribunals and POIs" was very effective; 12.5% of them believed that it was effective; 40% believed it was less effective; while 25% of them said it was not effective.

Inclusively, at Idi-Araba, on the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 22.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 5: "Corporate Social Responsibility" was very effective; 22.5% of them held that it was effective; 35% believed it was less effective; while 20% of them said it was not effective.

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Concerning the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 22.5% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 6: "Sympathy Visit" was very effective; 20% of them held that it was effective; 40% held it was less effective; while 17.5% of them said it was not effective.

However, regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, 20% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 7: "Peace Meetings" was very effective; 32.5% of them held that it was effective; 32.5% believed it was less effective; while 15% of them said it was not effective.

Whereas, the table shows that regarding the deployed FGN Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" towards managing the inter-ethnic crisis in 2002, only 30% of the total respondents believed that the deployed Public Relations Strategy 8: "Community Relations" was very effective; 25% of them held that it was effective; 30% believed it was less effective; while 15% of them said it was not effective.

Appendix III: in page 337-346 buttresses the deployment of the following public relations strategies listed in Table 4.14: (i) Propaganda (ii) Media Intervention (iii) Pubic Enlightenment (iv) Judicial Tribunals and Panel of Enquiries (v) Sympathy Visit (vi) Corporate Social Responsibility (vii) Peace Meetings (viii) Community Relations by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to mitigate inter-ethnic crises in Idi-Araba, 2002.

Checklist was used to gather data towards answering research questions 1, 2 and 3 which were to identify occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in selected communities in the country between

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1987 and 2002, and the public relations responses and strategies deployed by FGN to managing them differently and respectively. While questionnaires were used to gather data towards answering research questions 4 and 5. There was only one section in the checklist which was used to gather data for research questions 1, 2 and 3. Each of the checklists however, has four items. The items on the checklist for research question 1 were: (1) Title, source and year of Published Analysed Content, (2) Inter-ethnic Crisis, date and year (3) Contending Ethnic Groups, (4) Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises. Furthermore, the items on the checklist for research question 2 were: (1) Title, source and year of Published Analysed Content, (2) Occurred Inter-ethnic Crises, date, year and contending ethnic groups, (3) Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis(4) FGN Deployed PR Responses. While the items on the checklist for research question 3 were: (1) Title, source and year of Published Analyzed Content, (2) Occurred Inter-ethnic Crisis, date, year and contending ethnic groups, (3) Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis(4) FGN Deployed PR Strategies.

The questionnaires used were divided into two sections (A and B) to gather data on questions 4 and 5 differently and respectively. The section A has five items that were used to gather information on demographic characteristics of the respondents' gender, age, level of acquired education, ethnic nationality, and position in community. While the section B has three items that were used to gather data on level of performance of FGN's deployed public relations responses and strategies to occurred inter-ethnic crisis differently and respectively.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

The first question that this study answers is identification of the occurrences of inter-ethnic crisis in Nigeria between 1987 and 2002. Hence, through content analysis that was guided by

checklist, the study in relation to its findings identified five inter-ethnic crises. The first one that was identified occurred in March 1987 at Kafanchan in Kaduna State, with the Hausas and Atyap (indigenous people of Kafanchan) as the contending ethnic nationalities on the one hand, and the Christian and Muslim students on the other. What caused the eruption of this inter-ethnic crisis in Kafanchan initially was theological disagreement between Christian and Muslim students of Kaduna College of Education that is located in Kafanchan; and later, the resentment of Hausa rulership in Kafanchan Town by Atyaps: the indigenous minority Kafanchan natives. During this crisis, many people were killed (both Hausas and Atyaps/Kafanchans), houses and other properties burnt to ashes. Evidences in Appendix III: page 248-289 buttresses these facts.

The second inter-ethnic crisis that was identified occurred in February and May 1992 at Zango Town, in Zango-Kataf Local Government of Kaduna State with the Hausas and Atyaps as the contending ethnic nationalities. What caused the eruption of this inter-ethnic crisis at Zango Town in February 1992 was the announcement of the then Chairman of Zango-Kataf Local Government (who was a Kataf by ethnicity) to relocate the local Government main weekly market from Zango: a town largely populated by the Hausas to a neutral location that would allow non-dominance of the market by any ethnic nationality in the local government. Also, disputes over ownership of farmlands between the Hausas and Atyaps in the same Zango Town which occurred in May 1992 (same year) extended and further prolonged the inter-ethnic crisis in the Zango Town. While the inter-ethnic crisis lasts, thousands of people (Hausas and Atyaps) were killed, with many houses and other properties burnt to ashes. Evidencein Appendix III: page 290-306 buttresses these facts.

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The third inter-ethnic crisis that was identified occurred in July 1999 at Sagamu, Ogun State, with the Yorubas and Hausas as the contending ethnic nationalities. Degenerated arguments over observance of indigenous Yorubas' customs in Sagamu during an annual Oro Festival which was flouted by an Hausa woman caused the eruption of the inter-ethnic crisis in sagamu, during which many people were killed (both Yorubas and Hausas), many houses and other properties burnt to ashes. Evidences in Appendix III: page 307-316 buttresses these facts.

The fourth inter-ethnic crisis that was identified occurred in November 1999 at Mile 12 Market in the Ketu/Mile 12 Area of Lagos State, with the Yorubas and Hausas as the contending ethnic nationalities. Disputes over the control of key leadership positions within the Mile 12 market among the market traders association committee which comprises of both the Yorubas and the Hausas caused the eruption of the inter-ethnic crisis in Mile 12. While the crisis lasts, scores of people were killed, with many houses and properties burnt to ashes. Evidences in Appendix III: page 317-336 buttresses these facts.

The fifth inter-ethnic crisis that was identified in the study occurred in February 2002 at Idi-Araba / Mushin area of Lagos State, with the Yorubas and Hausas as contending ethnic nationalities. Degenerated minor dispute between suspected Yoruba Area Boys/OduaPeople's Congress members (OPC) and members of Hausa Community living in the area caused the eruption of the inter-ethnic crisis. During the crisis, hundreds of people were killed (both the Yorubas and Hausas), with many houses and other properties destroyed. Also, evidences in Appendix III: page 337-346 buttresses these facts.

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The second question that this study provides answer is theidentification of public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises management in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. Hence, through content analysis that was guided by checklist, the study in relation to its findings discovered that it was in the style of the Federal government of Nigeria to usually react to the occurrences of inter-ethnic crises in the country between 1987 and 2002 by deploying four public relations responses that can be defined as: (i) Mitigation of damages on reputation (ii) Promotion of justice (iii) Victims' welfarism packages and (iv) Peace-building. Evidences in Appendix III: page 248-346 buttresses these facts.

The third question that this study answers is the identification of public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises management in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. Equally, evidences in Appendix III: page 248-346 buttresses these facts.

Hence, through content analysis that was guided by checklist, the study in relation to its findings discovered that in the principle and practice of public relations, it is the response adopted in any given situation confronting experts that determines which public relations strategy to be used in particular towards carrying-out such response. Given this professional principle, therefore, in order to carry-out the first identified public relations response towards managing identified inter-ethnic crisis, the Federal Government of Nigeria considered the use of some public relations strategies. The public relations strategies identified that were used by the Federal Government of Nigeria to carry-out the public relations response of "Mitigation of damages on reputation" were: propaganda and sympathy visit to the scene of incidents by designated Federal Government of Nigeria's representative or delegation.

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Additionally, it was observed during the study that the identified public relations response and strategies were particularly adopted in order to stop further damage on Federal Government of Nigeria's reputation which it is seen to usually incurred automatically in occasion of occurrence of any inter-ethnic crisis anywhere in the country, as people usually blame the occurrences of inter-ethnic crises on the Federal Government of Nigeria's perceived lack of adequate inter-ethnic relationship managerial know-how. This understanding align itself with a scholarly position which states that propaganda is frequently linked to content created by governments for use when faced with crisis or in warfare activities, political causes, insurgents and to alter people's perceptions of a problem or circumstance in order to influence their behavior and expectations in ways that the interest group finds desirable[1,2,3]. The statement further hold that propaganda is the interactions that are mainly considered when it is important to sway an audience and advance an agenda[1,2,3,4]. It may not be objective as it tends to present facts selectively to support a particular synthesis or perception, or may use loaded language to elicit emotions rather than a logical reaction to the information being presented.

To carry-out the second identified public relations response of "Promotion of Justice" during the unidentified inter-ethnic crisis by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the public relations strategies that were used were: Media intervention activities through press releases on television, radio and newspapers towards engaging the people living in the affected communities in public enlightenment, and setting up of Judicial tribunals and Panel of Inquiries with the aim of investigating, arresting, and bringing perpetrators of the inter-ethnic crises to book.

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Also, to carry-out the third identified public relations response of "Victims' Welfarism" towards the management of the identified inter- ethnic crises by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the identified public relations strategies that was deployed was engaging in "Corporate Social Responsibility" by offering free medical services, setting up refugee camps to house displaced persons, offering relief materials and compensations of some sorts to the victims.This is in agreement with interpretations provided by some scholars that corporate social responsibility (CSR) aims to support charitable, activist, or philanthropic societal goals by participating in or encouraging volunteer work or other morally upstanding behaviors [5].

While in order to carry-out the fourth identified public relations response of "Peace Building" during the identified inter-ethnic crises by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the identified strategies that was deployed were engaging the people living in the affected communities in peace meetings and community relations: synergizing with host-state government, local government and community leaderships towards restoration of peace and unity to the affected communities.It has been severally explained in few literatures that the goal of peace building is to change the structural and cultural factors that lead to violent or destructive crises and to find peaceful solutions to injustice. Peacebuilding focuses on fostering positive interpersonal, social, and political ties across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic divides. Before, during, and after each instance of violence, the process comprises crisis management, resolution, or transformation; post-conflict reconciliation; and trauma recovery[6].

As a result, the findings of this study aligned with the saying that peace building is a multifaceted, bridge methodology or process that develops strategic value when it functions

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over the foreseeable future at all social levels to forge and maintain interactions between people in order to foster sustainable peace[6]. Sustainable peace-making efforts target the underlying or prospective causes of crises, promote a community standard for peaceful conflict resolution, and stabilize political and socioeconomic societal circumstances. The findings further showed its agreement with the posited statements that the goal of peace building initiatives is to manage, reduce, resolve, and modify key components of the conflict through governmental mediation, social movement peace mechanisms, and conversation, bargaining, and arbitration. In order to stop the resurgence of physical and systemic aggression, peace building tackles all indentified causes of the crises, be ye political, social, economic, etc. Peace building focuses on promotion of a stable and peaceful coexistence of people of different cultural background in every given society[7].

Futhermore, the fourth question that this study provides answer to is provision of feedback on level of performances of public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises management in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. Hence, responses or data gathered from ratings of 200 representatives of residents in identified five places of inter-ethnic crises occurrences (40 respondents from each of the communities that consisted traditional, market and religious leaders) on deployed public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria showed that the Grand Mean for the total performances of all the four public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to occurrences of inter-ethnic crises between 1987 to 2002 (i) Mitigation of damages on reputation (ii) Promotion of justice (iii) Victims' welfarism and (iv) Peace-building) is 2.60. Consequently, the Grand Mean score of 2.60 on a scale of 4 indicated that the public relations responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises between 1987 and

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2002 were effective. This is owing to the fact that 2.60 (the Grand Mean) is just a little bit above the decision rule of 2.50.

Lastly, the fifth question that this study provides answer to is provision of feedback on level of performances of public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises management in communities in the country between 1987 and 2002. Hence, responses or data gathered from ratings of 200 representatives of residents in identified five places of inter-ethnic crises occurrences (40 respondents from each of the communities that consisted traditional, market and religious leaders) on deployed public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria showed that the Grand Mean for the total performances of all the eight public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to occurrences of inter-ethnic crises between 1987 to 2002 ((i) Propaganda (ii) Media intervention (iii) Public Enlightenment (iv) Tribunals and panel of enquiries (v) Corporate social responsibility (vi) Sympathy visits (vii) Peace Meeting (viii) Community Relations is 2.58. Consequently, the Grand Mean score of 2.58 on a scale of 4 indicated that the public relations strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crises between 1987 and 2002 were effective. This is owing to the fact that 2.58 (the Grand Mean) is a little bit above the decision rule of 2.50.

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Endnotes

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Chapter Five

Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Findings

Peradventure the Federal Government of Nigeria's thoughts are that her deployed public relations responses and strategies for inter-ethnic crises management in the country between 1987 and 2002 performed effectively, the feedback which this study facilitates on the subject matter however, did not suggest otherwise.

This study has established as it is evident from available facts and answers generated that all the deployed public relations responses (Mitigation of damages on reputation, Promotion of justice, Victims' welfarism packages and Peace-building and strategies Propaganda, Media intervention, Public enlightenment, Tribunals and panel of enquiries, Corporate social

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responsibility, Sympathy visits, peace meetings, and community relations)of the Federal Government of Nigeria to inter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002 were effective.

However, the implication of "effective" performances of all the four public relations responses and strategies is that the Federal Government of Nigeria's public relations reactions and strategies to occurrence of inter-ethnic crisis in the country can still be reviewed for higher performance.

5.2 Conclusion

Notwithstanding the implications of the findings of this study, the challenges faced by the Federal Government of Nigeria over continuous unabated reoccurrences of inter-ethnic crises in the country till date shows that what the current situation demands is an improvement on the Federal Government of Nigeria inter-ethnic crisis management's public relations response and strategy concepts and policies. The Federal Government of Nigeria' inter-ethnic crisis management public relations responses and strategy concepts and policies should be seen to dwell more on inter-ethnic crisis prevention.

5.3 Recommendations

In view of the results of this study, the following recommendations are made:

i. Prevention of inter-ethnic crisis should be incorporated by the Federal Government of Nigeria as the first public relations response to inter-ethnic crises management in the country.

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ii. Inter-ethnic peace committee should be set up in everycommunity (villages, towns and cities) in the country with the objectives of sensing and resolving of minor disputes as well as reporting serious disputes or conflicts to higher conflict arbitrary forum for further intervention.

iii. Peacebuilding committee should be set up in every market populated with members of different ethnic groups in the country with the objectives of sensing and resolving outbreak of minor disputes, as well as spontaneous reporting of serious disputes or conflicts to higher conflict arbitrary forum for further intervention.

iv. Inter-ethnic conflict arbitration forum should be institutionalizedin every local government of the federation for the purpose of receiving and adjudicating on petitions brought forward by constituted peace committees in communities and markets in order to ensuremis-understandings and disputes or conflicts between members of different ethnic nationalities anywhere in the country are quickly nipped in the bud, without allowing such to snow-ball into larger occurrences of any inter-ethnic crisis. In fact, these would guarantee less pressure on the Federal Government of Nigeria's financial spendings on inter-ethnic crises management.

v. Inter-religious organisations already set up by the Federal Government of Nigeria should be motivated towards being proactive in the prevention of religious conflicts in the country.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

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Firstly, the data sets gathered by this study have contributed to body of knowledge on inter-ethnic crises management for future study. Secondly, the theories used in this study (crisis management model and peacebuilding theory) indeed affirmed the relevance of the study conducted. Thirdly, the instruments used to collect data in the study can be adopted / adapted for future study by researchers. Fourthly, this study as a whole is a contribution to knowledge as it could be useful or adopted by scholars anywhere in the world, and more particularly the Federal Government of Nigeria when there is need for appraisal and a feedback on how the Federal Government of Nigeria deployed public relations responses and strategies for inter-ethnic crises management in the country between 1987 and 2002 have performed.

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5.5 Suggested Areas for Further Research

It is the hope of the researcher that further researches would be conducted on how inter-ethnic conflict arbitration forum serving as a strategy of public relations can be used to prevent the occurrence of inter-ethnic crises in order to prove that public relations is an important factor to prevention of crisis of any sort anywhere in the world.

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Zachary J., A. Minoo A. & L. Yun, *"Self-Reporting CSR Activities: When Your Company Harms, Do You Self-Disclose?"*. Corporate Reputation Review. 21 (4): 153–164. doi:10.1057/s41299-018-0051-x. S2CID 170000354. 2018.

Zamoum K. & Serra Gorpe T., *"Crisis Management: A Historical and Conceptual Approach for a Better Understanding of Today's Crises"*. Submitted: October 28th, 2017 Reviewed: March 5th, 2018. Intechopen. Available at: DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.76198.www.intechopen.com. June 27th, 2018.

Interviews

Field Interview, Oyewole Fakoya. Key Personalities (Traditional Leaders, Opinion Leaders, and Market Leaders) in Kanfanchan, Zango-Kataf, Sagamu, Mile-12 and Idi-Araba Communities in Nigeria. 12th September, 2022.

Do Not Copy, Lead City University, Nigeria

Appendix I

Figures



Figure 2.1: Nigeria's Map with Ethnic Groups. Source: ResearchGate.



Figure 3.1: Map of Nigeria with the Six Geo-political Zones. Source: ResearchGate.

Appendix II

Conceptual Illustrative Images (Plates 2.1.1 – 2.1.5)

Plate 2.1: Irate Youths during Kaduna Emir Succession Crises of 1999. Source: Wordpress

Plate 2.2: Cross-section of irate Yoruba Youths led by Sunday Igboho in Igangan, Oyo State 2021 during Herder-farmer Crisis.

Source: KOKO TV Nigeria

University, Nigeria

Plate 2.3: Honourable Minister of Information, Federal Ministry of Information, Lai Mohammed during Press Conference. Source Federal Ministry of Information, Nigeria

sity, Nigeria

Plate 2.4: Traditional Media. Source: Mate Plus

Plate 2.5: Cross-section of different Nigerian Ethnic Nationalities

Source: Nigerian Embassy, Iran

Appendix III

Evidence of Publications Reviewed and Analysed at the Qualitative Stage of the Study while on the Field

A. Kafanchan Inter-ethnic Crisis, 1987:

i. Kaduna State Government White Paper



KADUNA STATE OF NIGERIA

WHITE PAPER

ON THE

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CAUSES OF RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN KADUNA STATE

6TH – 12TH MARCH, 1987

Printed by the Government Printer, Kaduna

workers.

(i) **Mode of Dressing in Schools:**

The issue of mode of dressing used in schools by female students was raised by several submissions. It was argued that the existing mode of dressing did not conform with the Islamic injunctions.

ments:

The Committee is aware of the fact that in some schools, the mode of dressing been adjusted to reflect Islamic injunctions. In this regard, consideration should given to Christians in order to reflect some measure of fairness.

cision:

Government notes the Committee's finding and accepts the recommendation. e Ministry of Education is hereby directed to design model dresses acceptable to uslim and Christian Communities for their pupils in post-primary institutions in e state.

(j) **Utterances Relating to Religious Matters by Individuals:**

There were complaints that unguarded religious utterances made by highly aced individuals/groups had invariably contributed in building tension within the ciety.

omments:

The Committee observes that there is need for the Government to, from time time, appeal to religious leaders and highly placed individuals to exercise straint in their utterances.

ecision:

Government notes the Committee's findings and comments.

(k) **Militant Attitude of Religious Organisations in Institutions of Learning:**

From the memoranda submitted, it was evident that people had been worried bout the rising wave of religious militancy in schools.

omments:

The Committee notes this ugly state of affairs and strongly recommends that oth the School Authorities and Government should try as much as possible to rrest the situation.

ngeria

Decision:

Government notes the Committee's finding and comment. Government i aware of the rising wave of religious militancy in schools. However, that must be reflection of the wider society. Government is convinced that as soon as greate understanding and tolerance are enhanced between different religious groups, suc militancy will be on the decline.

(*f*) **Relationship between the Fellowship of Christian Association and Musli Students Society of College of Education, Kafanchan:**

From the memorandum submitted by the F.C.S., it would appear that w before the Mission '87, relationship between the two groups had not been cordi The F.C.S. alleged that the MSS had not only been in the habit of disturbing th through religious songs, sermons from cassettes during their fellowship meeting had on occasion decided to hold a religious meeting in the classrooms being used the F.C.S. at a time when the F.C.S. was to use it.

Decision:

Government notes the Committee's finding. The deteriorating situa between the religious organisations in that institution could not have been poss if there had been meaningful inter-action between them. The school authoritie that institution are hereby directed to make all necessary and adeq arrangements for the religious groups to hold their meetings in separate an between places to avoid any disturbances.

3.00 IMMEDIATE CAUSES:

3:01 Introduction:

In view of the fact that the circumstances leading to the identification immediate causes of the crisis would have to rely heavily on the series of even happened within the period in question, the Committee felt that its presen would have to conform with events that took place during the crisis.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation.

3.01.1 A—PRE-RALLY ACTIVITIES:

(*a*) **Mission '87:**

From the submissions made, it became evident that the Fellowship of C Students (FCS) did apply for permission on the 10th of February, 1987 "Mission '87" to which permission was granted on the 24th of February. then started preparation towards the realisation of its objectives. This le display of a banner at the College gate.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation.

(*b*) **The Banner:**

The displayed banner bore the inscription "Welcome to Jesus Campus". The wordings of the banner angered the members of the Muslim Students Society who felt that the inscription was unfair in view of the fact that not all the students in the College were Christians. The complaint of the MSS was duly registered with the College authorities, which in turn, prevailed on the FCS to remove the banner, which the FCS did. The situation was then calm.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation.

3:01.2 B. EVENTS OF FRIDAY, THE 6TH MARCH, 1987:

(*a*) As part of the activities of Mission '87, the F.C.S. held a rally on Friday 6th March, 1987. The rally which included many activities started at 6.30 p.m. At 8.00 p.m., Reverend Abubakar Bako who was the Guest Speaker, was invited to preach.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation.

(*b*) **Preaching:**

It was quite evident from the submissions made that Reverend Bako did preach on the date in question (6th March, 1987). As for the substance of his preaching, a memoranda submitted by Hajiya Aishatu Garba who was present at the material time, pointed out that there were mis-interpretations from the Holy Quran and falsification of the prophet-hood of Prophet Mohammed by the said Reverend.

From the submissions made, no memoranda countered these points raised by Hajiya, nor was the Reverend available to counter the points.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. Government observes that it was not the practice of the Committee to specifically invite or compel people to testify in respect of allegations made against them despite the powers given to them by the Instrument that set up the Committee and the provisions of the enabling Law (Commission of Inquiry Law, Laws of Kaduna State, 1963, Cap. 25).

(*c*) **Confrontation by both Religious Groups (Kafanchan 20):**

From the submissions made, it was alleged that the confrontation started at a time when the Christian Lecturers and the Students Affairs Officer, in trying to

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sity, Nigeria

protect Reverend Bako from attack, ended up by being beaten by angry Muslin students. At this point, confrontation between the two groups started and lasted fo some hours. In the process, the Student Affairs Officer was mistakenly beaten b the Christian Students. As a result of this confrontation, the Students Affair Officer and some students sustained injuries. Later, some were hospitalised whi others were treated and discharged.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation but does not accept the sequence o events as stated thereto. Confrontation started when the Muslim students begar making noise from afar in reaction to what they felt was a misinterpretation of th Quran by Rev. Bako at the convocation square which they heard through th loudspeaker. Physical assault with stones and sticks followed later, culminating in th beating up of the Students Affairs Officer, mistakenly, by the Christian students, ir his effort to pacify the two groups. Government agrees that as a result of thi confrontation, the Students' Affairs Officer and some students sustained injuries Later, some were hospitalized while others were treated and discharged.

(*d*) **The Destruction of the Mosque and the Burning of Quran in the College o Education, Kafanchan:**

The Student Affairs Officer of the College of Education Kafanchan, in his memorandum, mentioned that a Security man reported to him that the College of Education Mosque was destroyed by the over-reacting Christian students. The Committee visited the "Locus in quo" (College of Education) and saw both the damaged Mosque and the remains of sacred materials that were brought out an burnt.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation.

3:01.3 C. EVENTS OF SATURDAY THE 7TH OF MARCH, 1987:

On Saturday, 7th March, 1987 a group of Muslim students gathered at the Palace of the Emir of Jema'a but before they were addressed by the Emir they marched to the Campus of the College of Education Kafanchan. At the Campus, the students were addressed by the Emir and some Malams and advised them to return to the town which they did.

At the Emir's Palace both the Emir and the Malams addressed the students, after which they dispersed. Because of the tense situation, at about 2.00 p.m. the same day, the Acting Registrar summoned a meeting of the Academic Board which took place at the Local Government Secretariat. During the meeting, a signal was

received from Kaduna to the effect that the College should be closed indefinitely. Consequently, the members resolved to comply with the directive.

Decision:

Government notes the above observations. Government observes however that after leaving the Emir's Palace the 1st time, it was to the Teachers College Kafanchan that they went and not the College of Education Kafanchan) threatening to burn the Church there in retaliation for the burning of the mosque the previous night at the College of Education. Government has taken a full view of the students confrontation with each other and is convinced that as from Saturday 7th March 1987, following the closure of the College of Education, Kafanchan, the students had dispersed and that confrontation had come to an end.

3:01.4 D. EVENTS OF SUNDAY 8TH MARCH, 1987:

In assessing the events that took place on Sunday the 8th of March, 1987, this Committee thought it wise to rely heavily on the submissions made by the Security Forces and Government functionaries. This decision was arrived at because of the divergent views emerging from other memoranda.

Whereas both memoranda received from the Police and the Local Government Chairman agreed that the confrontation between the two groups started as a result of a rumour that a Church was going to be set ablaze thereby throwing the town into confusion, the memorandum from the State Security Service (S.S.S.) however, indicated that the confrontation between the two groups started as a result of an attack by the members of the Muslim Students Society on a congregation attending a Church service in Kafanchan. This confrontation led to the death of nine persons (mainly Muslims) and wanton destruction of property mostly belonging to the Muslim Community. Both the death and the destruction were said to have been caused by Christians.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. However, there does not appear to be any serious divergence emerging from people's memoranda submitted and the Report of the State Security Service (S.S.S.). On the contrary, as the Committee itself reports, there is a conflict of views in the memoranda received from the police and the local government chairman on the one hand, and the memoranda from the state security service (S.S.S.) on the other hand. However, inspite of admitted conflict, government notes that the Committee "thought it wise to rely heavily on the submissions made by the Security Forces and Government functionaries".

3:01.5 E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF KAFANCHAN CRISIS:

From the submissions made, it became evident that the following factors

Decision:

Government accepts the above observation.

4:00.1 ROLES PLAYED BY INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN CAUSING TENSION AND OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE:

In identifying the roles played by individuals and groups in causing tension and outbreak of violence, the Committee had to rely entirely on both the memoranda submitted and oral presentations made. Ideally, the Committee ought to have gone beyond the submissions and carried out investigation in order to establish the authenticity or otherwise of cases raised in the submissions. However, in view of the time at its disposal, such an exercise became impossible considering the number of people mentioned in the various submissions and the scattered nature of the places where the disturbances took place. Apart from the above factors, the Committee was also aware of the fact that the Federal Military Government had set up a Special Judicial Tribunal to try all cases of individual and group involvement in the crisis. As a result of this time limitation, the Committee had no choice but to indicate that the roles said to have been played by individuals and groups in causing tension and outbreak of violence as recorded in this Report were mere allegations. Below is an account of the roles played by individuals and groups in causing tension and outbreak of violence:—

Decision:

Government notes the above observations. However despite the critical shortage of time, the Investigation Committee should have established the authenticity or otherwise of the allegations made against any individual or group as required of the Committee under item *(c)* of its terms of reference. Government advised that all people mentioned should be interrogated by the Special Investigation Committee *(SIC)* set up by the Federal Government.

4:01 KAFANCHAN:

(i) **Mr. Dare Akau:**

From submissions made, it would appear that the only relevant reference made about Mr. Dare Akau, in relation to the crisis, was the statement purported to have been made by him at an Academic Board Meeting of the Kafanchan College of Education, which took place on the 9th of February, 1987. During the meeting, the issues of N1 million subvention and the possibility of the College of Education Kafanchan taking over of the Teachers' College, Kafanchan were discussed. The allegation went further to say that Mr. Akau was not only unhappy with the idea of the taking over of Kafanchan Teachers' College but was also said to have remarked that bows and arrows might have to be used to prevent the take-over. In one of the

submissions however, it was stated that Mr. Dare Akau did offer to assist Hajiya A'ishatu Garba and her collegues all students of the College of Education on the 6th of March, 1987.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation and observes that especially in such a situation the Investigation Committee should have given Mr. Dare Akau the opportunity to defend himself against such allegations or failing that, should have verified the allegations with the Provost of the College when he appeared before it to testify, or with any member(s) of staff of College of Education, Kafanchan alleged to have been present at the meeting. Similarly, even if the Committee had verified the statement as a declaration of intention, it should have gone ahead to ascertain the extent to whish the declared intention had been pursued, leading to the crisis.

(ii) **Captain Manya:**

In a memoranda which was supported by an oral submission, it was alleged that Captain Manya *(Rtd.)* conveyed some people in his car and drove near the house of one Mallam Ya'u Mohammed during which he *(Ya'u)* was intimidated by Captain Manya.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. However, the retired Military Officer mentioned *(Capt. Manya)* should have been given the opportunity to appear before the Committee and clarify issues. Government also observes that neither the Police to which Ya'u purportedly reported his case successively nor anyone of those mentioned in his oral testification or written memorandum was invited by the Committee for purposes of cross examination.

(iii) **Fellowship of Christian Students** *(College of Education, Kafanchan):*

Members of the Fellowship of Christian Students were responsible for organising Mission '87 during which a banner which bore the inscription "Welcome to Jesus Campus" was used. The banner angered the members of the Muslim Students Society *(MSS)* but was removed after the intervention of the College Authority. They did also participate in the fracas that took place in the College on Friday 6th March, 1987.

Decision:

Government notes the Committee's findings and accepts its observations. However, Government observes that there could have been other Christians who were not necessarily members of the F.C.S. who participated in the fracas that took place in the College on Friday 6th March, 1987, just as there could have been F.C.S.

embers who did not participate in that fracas.

The Kaduna State Government is aware of the existence of the Special vestigation Committee whose jurisdiction cuts across the entire stratum of society the course of its investigations.

(iv) **Muslim Students Society *(MSS)* College of Education, Kafanchan:**

During the crisis, several appeals by individuals both within and outside the llege were made to the members of the Muslim Students Society *(MSS)* not to e the law into their hands but they refused to heed to such pleadings. They did participate in the fracas on Friday 6th March, 1987.

ecision:

Government notes and accepts the above observation. However, Government bserves that there could have been other Muslims who were not necessarily embers of the MSS who participated in the fracas that took place in the College Friday 6th March, 1987, just as there could have been members of Muslims udents Society who did not participate in that fracas.

The Kaduna State Government is aware of the existence of the Special vestigation Committee whose jurisdiction cuts across the entire stratum of society the course of its investigations.

(v) **Reverend Abubakar Bako:**

From several submissions received, it was alleged that Reverend Abubakar ako, who was the Guest Speaker at the "Mission '87" which took place on the 6th March, 1987 did quote and misinterprete verses from the Holy Qur'an and also lsified the Prophethood of Prophet Mohammed.

ecision:

Government notes and accepts the above observation. From the evidence vailable to Government and in particular the memorandum sent to the vestigation Committee in his name and the arguments adduced thereto in support his quotations from the Qur'an clearly show evidence of deliberate misquotation some cases, deliberate misinterpretation in some other cases and deliberate isrepresentation in other cases.

As in many other cases, the Investigation Committee should have not only vited Rev. Abubakar Bako to defend himself against any allegations, but he hould have been compelled soonest to appear before it to testify should he have eclined to do so voluntarily. Government is aware that the Investigation ommittee was unable to compel him to do so because he could not be found by e Police. Government observes however that if the Police has acted promptly, ev. Abubakar Bako, being a key witness to the crisis on that day, would have been ound.

Government is aware of the existence of the Special Investigation Committ set up by the Federal Military Government as provided by Decree No. 2 of 1987.

(vi) **Hajiya A'ishatu Garba:**

From submissions made, it was alleged that Hajiya A'ishatu Garba, a student c the College of Education, Kafanchan, did not only incite fellow Muslim students t react to the alleged misinterpretation of the Qur'an and the falsification of th Prophethood of Mohammad, but went ahead to seize the microphone being used b the Speaker. In other submissions however, it was pointed out that Hajiya did no seize the microphone from the Speaker. And in her own submission, she denie both allegations.

Decision:

Government notes and accepts the above observation, except that from evidence available, Hajiya A'ishatu Garba did not seize microphone from the Speaker. Government observes that both in her memorandum and her ora testification, she had highlighted the principal immediate causes of the crisis as being the misinterpretation or misrepresentation of certain verses in the Qur'a quoted by the Speaker on that occasion. However, whereas two suras namely Sura 1 *(Baqara)* and Sura 10 *(Yunus)* have been referred to as chapter without any relevant verses indicated by her, in the case of Suratul Fatiha and Sura 3 *(Ali-Imran)*, the verses referred to i.e. verses 5, 6 and 7, and verse 13 respectively, have been clearly misquoted, misplaced and misinterpreted.

(vii) **El-Zak-Zaky:**

In one submission, it was stated that El-Zak-Zaky was one of the Guest Speakers during the "Danfodio Week" organised by the Muslim Student Society *(MSS)* on the College Campus, a week before the "Mission '87".

Decision:

Government notes the above observation.

(viii) **The roles of Media:**

A number of submissions complained that during the crisis news media, especially the electronic ones, tended to have exaggerated the news relating to the crisis.

Decision:

Government decision in respect of 3:01.5*(a)(iv)* above applies here as well.

(ix) **Muslim and Christian Groups:**

It was revealed from some of the memoranda that Christians, mainly from

Aduwan and Garaje, marched towards Kafanchan town destroying properties. And in the process lives were lost. The Muslims marched from Kafanchan town towards Garaje also destroying properties.

Decision:

Government notes the above observations. From evidence available, crisis erupted at Garaje on Sunday morning after the closure of College of Education, Kafanchan on the preceeding Saturday, 7th March, 1987. Although the student crisis erupted out of religious disputes, the crisis at Garaje was more ethnic than religions in selection of targets of attack, be such targets people or their property. Government is aware of the existence of the Special Investigation Committee set up by the Federal Government with objectives as provided by Decree No. 2 of 1987.

(*x*) **Ali Maidobi:**

It was alleged that Mallam Ali Maidobi who was a Security Guard with the Challenge Bookshop Kafanchan did join the mob that attacked the bookshop.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. The Kaduna State Government is aware of the existence of the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal set up by the Federal Military Government has defined objectives as provided by Decree No. 2 of 1987.

(*xi*) **Alhaji Alfa Waziri:**

In some of the memoranda received, it was alleged that Alhaji Alfa Waziri was one of the leaders that led some of the rioters during the crisis.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. Government is aware of the existence of the Tribunal mentioned in (*x*) above.

(*xii*) **Alhaji Shitu Mai Koto:**

Some submissions alleged that Alhaji Shitu Mai Koto did lead some of the rioters during the crisis. However, there was a submission which pointed out that he was one of the people that dissuaded some members of the Muslim Students Society from burning down a Church near the Kafanchan Teachers College.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. Government is aware of the existence of the Tribunal as in (*x*) above.

(*xiii*) **Ayuba Bako:**

There was an allegation that a student by name Ayuba Bako, led many people to the hostel of Kafanchan Teachers College and directed that all Christians should

leave because all Muslims would be killed.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. Government is aware of the existence of the Tribunal as in (*x*) above.

(*xiv*) **Addass:**

It was alleged that during the crisis on the 8th March, 1987 one Addass injured Reverend Sarki Madaki's son, with a knife.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation. Government is aware of the existence of the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal set up by the Federal Military Government has objectives as provided by Decree No. 2 of 1987.

(*xv*) **Tijjani, Alhaji Aminu and Alhassan:**

In one of the submissions, it was alleged that these three students did cause some disturbances during the rally of Mission '87. Whereas Tijjani and Aminu were said to have seized the microphone from Reverend Bako, Alhassan was alleged to have slapped the FCS President.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation but observes that from evidence available, there was no microphone seized from Rev. Bako nor was the FCS President slapped by any-one. Government is aware of the Tribunal as in (*xiv*) above.

(*xvi*) **The Following People:—**

(*i*) Alhaji Garba Manchok
(*ii*) Sarkin Pawa
(*iii*) Mal. Dantsoho
(*iv*) Dan Inna Sarkin Kasuwa
(*v*) Alhaji Tahir
(*vi*) Amadu Maikoto
(*vii*) Mal. Uba Gizo
(*viii*) Sule Sawaba

Were alleged to have led some of the rioters during the crisis.

Decision:

Government notes and accepts the above observation. Government is aware of the existence of the Tribunal stated in (*xiv*) above.

(*xvii*) **Audu Dogo and Adamu Sunday:**

The above were alleged to have attacked Malam Musa Audu, Higher Area Court Judge Moroa, removed the sum of ₦1,200 (one thousand, two hundred Naira)

from him, broke his hand and burnt his car.

Decision:

Government notes and accepts the above observation. Government is aware of the existence of the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal set up by the Federal Military Government has objectives as provided by Decree No. 2 of 1987.

4:01.2 General Observations on Kafanchan:

In general, Government observes that in dealing with the situation on the ground within the framework of the terms of reference of the Investigation Committee, the Committee has not dealt with certain aspects of that situation fairly adequately:

(*i*) **The Police.**—Despite a number of memos submitted to the Committee such as: Kafanchan 11, Kafanchan 32, Kafanchan 13, Kafanchan 123, Kafanchan 18, Kafanchan 76, Kafanchan 121, Kafanchan 20 and Kaduna 304 (on Kafanchan) as well as the report of the State Security Service submitted to the Committee, it is conclusively clear that the Police Command in Kafanchan did their best under the circumstances at the time of the crisis.

(*ii*) **Traditional Rulers.**—In a situation in which a whole community resorted to mob action, Government observes that the Investigation Committee should have invited the Ward Heads in Aduwan and Garaje to testify on behalf of the people over whom they serve as the traditional authority. In such a situation, they could have helped in informing the Committee what they knew and believed to be the cause of the crisis, what role they played in their capacities as traditional authorities closest to the people in controlling it as well as in identifying some of those they could have known to have participated in the crisis.

(*iii*) **People.**—(*a*).—Government observes that the Committee should have highlighted the role of some individuals for their alleged role whether positively or negatively during the crisis. For example, whereas one Mrs Ladi Leckwot in memo Kafanchan 121, and an old woman identified in memo Kafanchan 119 had allegedly played a very negative role in the crisis, Arch Deacon Sule Sarki of the Holy Trinity Church and a teacher in the College of Education Kafanchan in memo Kafanchan 117 have been reported as having played a very positive role in diffusing tension and preventing the outbreak of violence. In the latter case, the Investigation Committee should have invited them, being eye witnesses to help the Committee in identifying any persons or group of persons they might have seen playing any negative role during the crisis. Similarly, in the case of memo Kafanchan 132, in which it was alleged that one Mr J. B. Kantiyok and Mr Sambo Bobai of the College of Education, Kafanchan were known to have been making inciting statements in the classroom

about Hausa/Fulani domination in Southern Zaria and in the case of Mr J. B. Kantiyok to the extent of inciting minority ethnic group students against majority ethnic group students such as Hausa/Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba and urging them to unite to resist such domination, the Committee should have invited them to defend themselves against the allegations. Among the students the ones mentioned as witnesses i.e. Binta Ayuba and Chinyere Eze should also have been invited to testify.

4:01.3 KATSINA:

(*i*) **Katsina Polytechnic Students:**

It was stated that on hearing the news about the crisis in Kafanchan, students of the Katsina Polytechnic decided to stage a peaceful demonstration. Although not approved by the Police, some Police men were detailed to follow them so as to avert any ugly situation.

After their demonstration, some commandeered two vehicles and returned to the campus while those that remained behind were joined by the hooligans from the motor park. This latter group, was responsible for the burning and destructions that took place in the town.

Decision:

Government notes the above findings. Government notes that the Police was handicapped in terms of manpower and equipment. Under the prevailing circumstance the police has done its best in handling the riot.

Government observes that whereas the students in the Polytechnic were not engaged in any arson whether at the school premises or outside in Katsina town, and whereas they had demonstrated peacefully against the religious riots and disturbances in Kafanchan, the hooligans who took over from them at the motor park engaged in outright destruction of churches, hotels and beer parlours, exclusively belonging to non-indigenes in Katsina, most of them Christians. This kind of selective destruction makes it possible to believe that what happened in Katsina town was essentially religiously motivated in retaliation to the Kafanchan disturbances even if it was contrary to the teaching of Islam.

Government observes that contrary to the reports there was not a single evidence to support that the Katsina riots were spearheaded by a religious organisation known as the Muslim Students Society (MSS).

(*ii*) **Alhassan B. Musa:**

It was alleged that one Alhassan B. Musa delivered a sermon at Katsina Polytechnic Mosque urging Muslims to fight for their rights and protest against

m:

vernment notes and observes that such inscriptions should have by now ared. However, Government urges practitioners of all religions to adhere to the tenets of their religion.

It should be noted that in spite of the Committee's appeal for "Rev." ar Bako, a key figure in the crisis, to appear before it, this was not done. a memorandum purported to have been written by him was received on 4th 87, well after the deadline for the receipt and consideration of memoranda. r, in view of the fact that "Reverend" Bako was one of the central figures in s, the Committee has decided to include his unconsidered memorandum in he appendices.

n:

ernment notes the above observation. The decision of Government stands cision 4:00.1*(v)* above. Government will take up the matter of his signature dwriting experts.

COMMENDATION:

naking these recommendations, the Committee is aware of the fact that e in the Report some recommendations have been made. However, of the importance of some of the issues already treated coupled with their e to this particular term of reference, the Committee decided to re-state der this section.

Community Fora should be established in all the Local Government Areas with a view to promoting proper understanding and harmonious relationship among the various groups within the Community:

:

Government Decision No. 2:04.1*(i)*.

n order to take care of our teeming unemployed school leavers, the esent Vocational Centres should either be adequately expanded or a few ore established in the State.

Government Decision No. 2:01.10*(x)*.

Government should expedite the movement of the College of Education afanchan to its permanent site:

Decision:

See Government Decision No. 2:01.7*(vii)*.

4. Government should integrate the "Almajirai" pattern of education into the existing school system and also make a legislation controlling their movements;

Decision:

See Government Decision No. 2:01.8*(viii)*.

5. Government should properly control the proliferation of beer parlours and brothels by taking stringent measures with particular consideration to where residential places have been converted to either beer parlours or brothels;

Decision:

See Decision No. 2:01.9*(ix)*.

6. Government should endeavour to educate the populace on land matters;

Decision:

Government notes the above.

7. The three tiers of Government and Institutions of Learning should establish Fora for Religious Affairs whose meetings should be held regularly;

Decision:

See Decision No. 2:04.1*(i)*.

8. In the event of the Government accepting that Sharia should be introduced and applied in its totality to Muslims, provisions in the Law should be made allowing non-Muslims to opt out for a court of their choice. In case of conflicts Courts of Resolutions should be established;

Decision:

Governments accepts the above recommendation.

9. Since the word "Secularism" is not in our Constitution, its use should be discouraged.

Decision:

Government accepts the above recommendation.

10. Government should introduce and sustain Religious teachings in all our schools;

1:

vernment accepts the above recommendation.

Foreign Religious Literature, Video Cassettes, Tapes, etc. should be properly censored.

1:

vernment accepts the above recommendation.

Government should direct her relevant organs to allocate adequate time/space for religious programmes.

n:

: Decision No. 2:04.9*(ix)*.

Government should provide functional Mosques and Churches in all our schools.

n:

: Decision No. 2:04.5.

Government should use both Gregorian and Islamic Calendars.

n:

overnment accepts the recommendation.

e Decision No. 2:04.11*(xi)*.

. Excessive use of loudspeakers amounting to public nuisance should be stopped.

on:

overnment accepts the above recommendation.

. Government should ensure that the law regarding derogatory and abusive references to books on other religions should be enforced.

on:

overnment notes the above recommendation.

. Government should make a concerted effort in calling people to order when provocative religious utterances, capable of causing tension, are made by individuals or groups.

on:

overnment accepts the above recommendation.

18. Government should, as a matter of priority, equip the State Fire Service Units.

Decision:

Government accepts the above recommendation.

19. House to house preaching should be discouraged.

Decision:

Government rejects the above recommendation.

20. Government should direct all Heads of Institutions of Learning not only to be serious in dealing with crisis but to also be available during such crisis.

Decision:

Government notes the above recommendation.

21. In view of the fact that banning of religious activities from our Institutions of Learning would do more harm than good, the Government should, as soon as possible, consider lifting such a ban.

Decision:

Government notes the above recommendation.

22. Government should device ways and means of dealing with rumour mongering.

Decision:

Government notes the above observation.

23. Government, should pay full compensation for lives *(Diyya in respect of Muslims)* and property lost during the crisis:

Decision:

Government accepts the above recommendation with respect to all lives lost.

24. All recommendations accepted by Government should be implemented and made public as soon as practicable.

Decision:

Government accepts the recommendation.

25. Government should, as much as possible, not only discourage, but also stop people from writing religious inscriptions likely to arouse ill-feelings.

Decision:

Government accepts the above recommendation.

ENERAL VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT:

general, and taking a total view of the situation, Government observes that ıeral character of the riots and disturbances varied from place to place: s it was entirely religious at the Kafanchan College of Education, it was ınd political in Kafanchan town, religious in Katsina, largely more economic ligious in Funtua, religious and economic in Zaria, and entirely religious in ı.

ıe unfortunate incident in Kafanchan was what triggered off a chain of ns in all the areas where riots and disturbances did occur in other parts of the

ıvernment observes that social, political, legal and educational among other have had the effect of generating tension and sometimes outright ill-feelings the various ethnic groups co-existing in the Local Governments of ka, Kachia and in particular, Jema'a Local Government area of the State. long term causes of disturbances in the State clearly appear to have been ın often out-right wrong assumptions and wrong perceptions of Government n one way or another and indeed quite often the result of total ignorance of a lar situation. It becomes even clearer that various successive Governments State have not had an articulate programme for the dissemination of ation on Government policies when made as well as when such policies were ed from time to time in the interest of the general welfare of the citizens of te. Some of those long-term causes deserve special comments:

Social/Political:—

om the various memoranda submitted and oral testifications to the gation Committee, it is evident that in the area of social relations between usa/Fulani and the diverse ethnic groups in the 3 Local Government Areas referred to, there has been complete misunderstanding of the concept of in Islam and what well and truly took place in the 19th century after Shehu Danfodio and his later successors when some ethnic groups in the name of ıut purely for economic gains and material benefits went out of their way to others as their kith and kin to the obnoxious slavery and slave trade prevalent century. From evidence available to Government nothing in that social s could be described as truly Islam i.e. In modern times however, the concept d has come to be misapplied to mean the political hegemony of one ethnic ıver another or the denial of economic opportunities and social amenities to rticular ethnic group or another, even in such circumstances when there is no ce of such denial or as in some cases some ethnic groups appear to have a advantage over others.

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ii. Book



Chapter Four

Ethnic Minorities and Political Turbulence in Kaduna State

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Ethnic minority tensions and conflicts in southern Kaduna have probably engendered far more serious violence than any other forms of communal instability in recent Nigerian history. Because these conflicts and tensions have deep roots in northern Nigerian history, it is useful to examine this historical background before proceeding to discuss the complex facts and facets of ethnic minority political turbulence in Kaduna State today.

Historical Background

What is presently known as Kaduna State emcompasses the area of the old Zaria (Zazzau) emirate-cum-province. In his historical-cum-anthropological study of Government in Zazzau, 1800—1950, M.G. Smith identified two broad cultural segments in this emirate province. The first of these segments is what Smith referred to as the Muhammadan Hausa-Fulani group. The group constitutes about 60 per cent of the emirate population, occupies mainly the northern part of the province and dominates the structure of traditional governance as expressed in the emirate system (Smith, 1960:2).

The second ethnocultural bloc of the Zazzau kingdom comprises a "pagan population" of some thirty tribes. These are located in the southern and western half of the territory. However, throughout this pagan-dominated half of the territory are to be found the Hausa "in enclaves, walled towns or open villages which are the foci of economic, political and administrative life in their respective areas" (Smith, 1960:2). As shall be demonstrated in the course of this chapter, this pattern of settlement has contributed enormously to the crystallization of the contours of socioeconomic conflict between the Hausa population and the pagan communities.

More importantly, however, complex forms of clientage and vassalage have developed between the dominant Hausa-Fulani bloc and the pagan population of Zazzau. The pagan tribes were traditionally the legitimate target for slave-raiding, the exaction of tribute and other forms of domination by the Hausa-Fulani. The political and military vulnerability of the pagan groups to Hausa-Fulani hegemony arose from their relatively inferior technology, smaller settlements and decentralized modes of political organization, all of which rendered them relatively defenceless in the face of Hausa-Fulani expansionism and imperialism.

However, the pagan communities differ in their degree of penetration by, or subordination to, the Fulani emirate system. Indeed, some of these communities had successfully resisted conquest and incorporation by the Fulani power-group. Thus, the Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa populations of southern Zaria have enjoyed some degree of independence from the emirate system. Although involved in diverse forms of historical, political and administrative relationships with the Zaria emirate, these three groups have been able to retain their integrity and autonomy as independent chiefdoms since the colonial era. Consequently, the core emirate population accords the pagan populations of Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa a higher status than pagan groups that are incorporated and subordinated within the emirate society itself (Smith, 1960:242).

The incorporated pagan populations are closer geographically to the Hausa settlements and enclaves than the independent pagan groups. Consequently, these incorporated populations

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are more vulnerable to cultural, economic and political domination by the Hausa-Fulani power group. While the independent pagan populations are ruled by their own chiefs, the incorporated pagan communities are administered by emirate-appointed district heads. Such district heads have often been nominated from the Hausa-Fulani group, although pressures from the pagan communities have sometimes led to the appointment of elements from the indigenous tribesmen to this position.

This unequal historical political relationship between the Hausa-Fulani group and the pagan community has been compounded by religious differences. Islam is the religion of an overwhelming majority of the Hausa-Fulani. The religion also provides the doctrinal or ideological foundation for the emirate system On the other hand, different forms of animistic worship have traditionally predominated amongst the pagan populations. Moreover, looked down upon as infidels by the emirate population, and often arbitrarily and oppressively subjected to the Muslim judicial and legal system, these pagan populations have become particularly receptive to Christian conversion and education. Thus, historically, the leadership of these minority populations has been dominated by mission-educated elites, many of whom have also been employed in occupations related to the Church, mainly as pastors or vernacular teachers of religion (Yahaya, 1980:28). Today, these ethnic minority elites occupy a frontline position in the Christain Association of Nigeria (CAN), which has persistently and violently attacked the hegemony of Muslim Hausa-Fulani elites in the North and in the whole of Nigeria.

The political, cultural and religious cleavages between majority and minority communities in the Zaria emirate have been reinforced by economic imbalance between the two groups. Although blessed with heavier rainfall and denser woodland than northern Zaria, the southern districts of Zaria are generally relatively more underdeveloped than the northern section of the emirate. Moreover, even within the southern Zaria area itself, socioeconomic opportunities and infrastructure improvements have tended to be concentrated in areas or enclaves inhabited by Hausa settlers (Smith, 1960:2; Yahaya, 1980:74).

Official sources have often attributed the relative economic backwardness of southern Zaria to the sparse population of these areas, and their lack of viable internal sources of revenue (Yahaya, 1980:75). To the southern Zaria intelligentsia, however, the underdevelopment of their communities is the result of deliberate and persistent neglect by the emirate officials who, until the 1976 local government reforms, also dominated the system of local or native administration.

The aforementioned differences between majority and minority communities in Zaria over traditional political control, culture, religion and resource distribution have predictably often escalated into violent agitations and confrontations. C.S. Whitaker (1970), for instance, reports that at different times during the 1946-66 period, riots were staged by the ”Kataf and other related peoples in southern Zaria province” over certain oppressive features of the emirate system, particularly the headship of Fulani ruling families over predominantly non-Fulani districts.

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More specifically, A.D. Yahaya (1980:28) notes that in 1942, political protests developed among the Kaje ethnic group of the Zangon Katab district over perceived discrimination by the Native Authority administration against the southern Zaria population. Similar protests took place in 1948 among the Kataf of the same Zangon Katab district. As Yahaya (1980:28) explains:

These protests, which in certain cases were reinforced by violence, were the beginnings of what was to become a continuous demand for political recognition and participation (by Southern Zaria groups). Such protests often escalated during periods of major political developments or tensions, such as the demise of the Emir or of a Fulani district head in southern Zaria.

The protests were geared towards the realization of specific southern Zaria demands which included, increased autonomy and control over local matters; the indigenization of all district head appointments in southern Zaria; the establishment of independent chiefdoms for all the southern Zaria tribes; an end to the proliferation of village heads as a strategy of divide-and-rule by emirate officials; an end to deliberate acts of discrimination and maladministration by the Native Authority administration against the southern Zaria population; the establishment of a Customary Court of Appeal for non-Muslim groups to complement the existing Sharia Court of Appeal; and, more recently, the subdividion of Kaduna into one or two new states in order to mitigate or eliminate the minority status of the southern Zaria population.

Official responses to these demands and protests have varied from outright repudiation and denunciation of the claims of the southern Zaria communities to genuine efforts to mollify these communities. Thus, although Native Authority officials often dismissed agitations by the southern Zaria population as the work of a ”few vocal malcontents and missionaries” (Yahaya, 1980:73), the regional or state governments have sought to implement appropriate redressive policies. These policies have included: the prohibition of discriminatory acts by Native Authority officials against the southern Zaria population; the promotion of political decentralization through the establishment of village and district councils; the establishment of an Outer Court in order to facilitate the participation of southern Zaria groups in emirate affairs; the employment of southern Zaria indigenes as emirate and Native Authority functionaries; the establishment of new Native Authority departments and welfare projects in southern Zaria; and the transfer of the independent districts of Moroa, Kagoro and Kwoi from the Zaria Province to Jema’a Division (Yahaya, 1980:73-75).

Although the aforementioned policies were hardly effective in defusing ethnic minority conflict, they nevertheless ensured that this conflict did not unduly polarize Kaduna State or the country at large. Indeed, the local government reforms of 1976, and the inauguration of the egalitarian-oriented Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) Government in Kaduna State in 1979, would appear to have substantially ameliorated the fears and grievances of the southern Zaria population.

However, the re-introduction of military rule in 1984, and the frenzied religious mobilization in the North that followed the controversy over Nigeria’s purported enlistment in the

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Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, appeared to have opened up a new phase of ethnoreligious conflict in Kaduna State. This era of conflict has witnessed three major outbursts of ethnoreligious violence in southern Kaduna and Kaduna State in general, viz; the Kafanchan disturbances of March 1987; the first Zangon Katab disturbances of February 1992; and the second Zangon Katab disturbances of May 1992. Each of these flashes of ethnoreligious violence will now be discussed in turn.

The Kafanchan Crisis of March 1987

The Kafanchan disturbances of March 1987 started as theological disagreements between Christian and Muslim students of the Kafanchan Teachers College, Kafanchan, in the Jema'a Emirate of southern Zaria (Ibrahim, 1989). These disagreements rapidly degenerated into a fracas which spilled into Kafanchan town and ignited age-old tensions between the politically dominant Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers located in the town centre on the one hand, and the numerically larger and predominantly Christian and/or animist non-Hausa-Fulani natives inhabiting the town's suburbs, on the other. According to one source, "the indigenes of Kafanchan resented the Hausa rulership because it deprived them of their wealth and power, virtually making them strangers in their own land" (Sunday New Nigerian, 15 March 1987:1). Indeed, the intensity of this ethnic minority opposition to the emirate rulership was demonstrated by the angry rebuff and physical attacks visited by the indigenous Kafanchan elements on the Emir of Jema'a, Alhaji Isa Muhammadu, when he tried to intervene in the Kafanchan College of Education imbroglio (Sunday New Nigeria, 15 March 1987:1).

However, the fiercest phase of the Kafanchan crisis was played out in such areas as Kaduna city, Katsina and Funtua, where Muslim mobs attacked Christian and/or southern Nigerian migrant communities and their properties (mainly churches and hotels) in retaliation for the alleged killing of muslims and burning of mosques in Kafanchan town.

According to official estimates, the Kafanchan crisis claimed nineteen lives, and resulted in the destruction of 169 hotels, 152 churches, five mosques and 95 vehicles (New Nigerian, 17 April 1987:9).

Apart from the relatively heavy toll on lives and properties, three other features of the Kafanchan crisis may be noted. First, the sheer magnitude of the crisis induced the intervention not only of the state government but also of the federal authorities. The latter used the army to contain the riots, and subsequently established a judicial tribunal to try rioters apprehended by law enforcement and security agents.

Second, the Kafanchan crisis marked the assimilation of the ethnic minority ferment in southern Zaria into a federation-wide, inter-regional and inter-religious struggle involving northerners and southerners, and christians and muslims. In short, the tensions between majority and minority communities in Kaduna State had acquired a national character, with telling implications for the safety of southerners living in the North, and for the relationships between christians and muslims throughout the federation.

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Finally, the Kafanchan crisis presaged a new wave of ethnoreligious turbulence and violence in northern Nigeria as epitomized in subsequent riotings in Bauchi, Adamawa and Taraba States, as well as in the southern Zaria local government area of Zangon Katab. It is to the convulsions in Zangon Katab during February and May 1992 that we now turn our attention.

The Zangon Katab Riots of February 1992

An outbreak of ethnoreligious rioting that was far more serious than the Kafanchan crisis took place during February 1992 in Zango, a town in the Zangon Katab Local Government Area of Kaduna State. Complex historical, political, cultural and economic factors were at play in this outbreak of communal rioting. But the basic details may be briefly described as follows.

The Zangon Katab Local Government Council, under the chairmanship of a Kataf, Juri Babang Ay ok, had in January 1992 announced the impending relocation of the Zango weekly market from the Hausa-dominated town centre to a new site on the outskirts of Zango town. The ostensible and/or real reasons for this move included the congestion in the old market centre, with little or no space in the market to accommodate new traders; the poor hygienic conditions of the old market; the unsuitable location of the market in the midst of residential houses belonging to the Hausa; and the need to reduce Hausa commercial domination and expand opportunities for emergent Kataf traders in Zango (Citizen, 17 February 1992:23-24; Mahmood, 1993:36-39).

The Hausa community in Zango predictably resisted the relocation of the market. The community claimed that the newly proposed site was a part of the muslim annual Eid praying ground. It also argued that the relocation bid was a vindictive design to hurt its economic position. Consequently, the community sought and obtained a court injunction, with accompanying police protection, restraining the relocation (Mahmood, 1993:36).

The conflicting Kataf and Hausa positions and actions over the market relocation issue escalated into violent confrontations on 6 February 1992, the weekly (Thursday) market date on which the use of the new market site was expected to commence. These clashes, according to official estimates, left 95 persons (mostly Hausa) dead, 252 others injured and 133 houses and 26 farmlands destroyed.

In retrospect, it would seem that the market relocation issue had merely provided a convenient opportunity for the outpourings of Kataf resentment of Hausa-Fulani domination of cultural, political and economic life in Zangon Katab. Specifically, the Kataf resented their continued incorporation within the Zaria emirate, the alleged appropriation of land around Zango by the emir of Zaria and the Hausa farmers, the derogatory references to the Kataf as ”arna” or pagans by the Hausa population, as well as other forms of unequal sociocultural exchange between the two communities (Mahmood, 1993:36-37). These grievances and differences polarized Zango town at elite and mass levels, so that relationships between influential Kataf elites and the Hausa community leaders became sorely strained. The real

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extent of this polarization did not become apparent, however, until May 1992 when an even more devastating outbreak of communal rioting convulsed Zango and several other places in Kaduna State.

The Zangon Katab Riots of May 1992

The Kaduna State Government-appointed Justice Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry into the February 1992 clashes in Zango town had barely concluded its public sittings when a new wave of riotings broke out in the town during May 1992. The riotings eventually engulfed other key cities of Kaduna State such as Kaduna, Zaria and Ikara. The immediate and remote causes of this renewed outbreak of violence in Zangon Katab included:

A written threat by Kataf village heads and community leaders indicating their intention to repossess Kataf land allegedly appropriated, and handed over to the Hausa, by the Emir of Zaria in 1920.

The subsequent uprooting of crops on farmlands belonging to the Hausa by Kataf youths as a part of the aforementioned agenda of land restitution by the Kataf.

Retaliatory attacks on Kataf and/or Kataf farmlands by the Hausa.

A letter written by the extremist Izalaru Islamic Group to the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, seeking his assistance in waging a jihad to defend the rights of the Muslim Hausa population in Zangon Katab.

The failure of the police to arrest and prosecute those implicated in the February 1992 riots, and to search for, and confiscate, weapons used during these earlier disturbances.

The alleged manipulation of the proceedings of the Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry into the February 1992 disturbances. These proceedings were, indeed, eventually boycotted by the Kataf (Mahmood, 1993:36-39; Citizen, 25 May 1992:10-19).

Two main factors were responsible for the escalation of the Zangon Katab riotings into retaliatory campaigns by muslim mobs against christian and/or southern Kaduna and southern Nigerian groups in Kaduna city, Zaria, Ikara and other areas of Kaduna State. These are:

Reports and rumours of the annihilation and dispossession of Hausa muslims by 'infidels' in Zangon Katab. The emotions evoked among Kaduna muslims by the sight of dead or severely injured bodies of the Zangon Hausa as they were conveyed into Kaduna city from Zango (Mahmood, 1993:37).

In sum, 471 persons were officially confirmed killed in the May disturbances, with 250 and 188 of these deaths occurring in Kaduna city and Zangon Katab respectively. According to police sources, 518 persons were injured, and 229 houses and 218 vehicles were destroyed in the same riots (New Nigerian, 20 July 1992). These official figures may, however, represent an understatement of the scale of casualties and destruction during the May 1992 riots. Indeed, the presentations of the Zangon Hausa community to the relevant Government

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investigatory panel included names of some 1,528 members of the community who reportedly died in the disturbances (The News, 7 June 1993:20).

Government Responses to Ethnoreligious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna

Official responses to recent violent outbursts of ethnoreligious discontent in southern Kaduna have been mainly regulatory in nature. In the wake of the Kafanchan crisis of March 1987, for instance, the Kaduna State Government set up a six-member committee, under Mrs. Hansine Donli, to identify the immediate and remote causes of the crisis, assess the extent of damage engendered by the riotings, identify the key culprits and make appropriate recommendations to the Government (New Nigerian, 14 March 1987:1) However, except for a press conference addressed by Donli at the end of the public sittings of the committee in April 1987, little is known both of the report of the committee and the Government's White Paper on it.

The Federal Government, for its part, established a five-member tribunal, under Justice A.G. Karibi-Whyte, to try, in "summary fashion", all those arrested for participating in the riotings (New Nigerian, 17 March 1987:3). Although all suspects were allowed legal representation of their choice, appeals against the sentences of the tribunal were disallowed. Rather, such sentences were made subject to ratification by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The proceedings and judgments of the tribunal eventually became the object of heated opposition from several Islamic groups, which felt that the tribunal had overlooked the atrocities committed against muslims in Kafanchan during March 1987, while imposing harsh sentences on muslim youths implicated in the subsequent "reactive" disturbances in Kaduna, Funtua, and Katsina.

Government responses to the February and May 1992 disturbances in Zangon Katab have followed the pattern of the official reactions to the initial Kafanchan crisis. The Kaduna State Government, for instance, appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the Zangon Katab disturbances. Headed by Justice Rahila H. Cudjoe, the commission had the following terms of reference:

Inquire into, investigate and identify the immediate and remote causes of the Zangon Katab disturbances.

Assess the extent of damage caused by the disturbances.

Ascertain and identify the roles played by individuals and groups in causing tension and outbreak of violence.

Determine the extent of loss of lives and property.

Examine any other matters incidental to the aforementioned terms of reference;

Recommend appropriate penalties for culprits as well as measures to forestal future disturbances (Citizen, 15 June 1992:14).

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The Cudjoe Commission submitted its report to the Kaduna State Governor, Alhaji Dabo Mohammed Lere, in June 1992. Its findings, like those of the earlier Donli Commission, have, however, not been officially released. Nevertheless, the Kaduna-based Citizen magazine has published important revelations about the activities of the commission. According to the magazine, the recommendations of the commission included the following proposals or measures:

The President of the Federal Republic should take appropriate disciplinary actions against the chairman of the Zangon Katab Local Government, Juri Babang Ayok. Ayok was indeed removed as chairman on 21 May, and charged for murder before a federal tribunal which, however, acquitted him.

Appropriate disciplinary action should be taken against other persons implicated in the riots, including members of the police force, and the Kataf and Hausa communities. In particular, the activities of Kataf ex-servicemen within and outside Zangon Katab should be investigated with a view to ascertaining their roles in encouraging, funding and equipping Kataf rioters.

The police should conduct a comprehensive security search in Zangon Katab in order to curtail and control the possession and use of firearms and other dangerous weapons in the area.

The controversial market should be moved to a neutral site and provided with basic infrastructures or facilities, while a new weekly market day, other than Thursday, should be adopted.

A committee should be set up to verify claims for compensation by individuals and groups displaced during the disturbances.

The Zangon Hausa community, in particular, should be resettled and rehabilitated (The Federal Government eventually released the sum of ₦25 million for the reconstruction of houses destroyed in Zango town). Further, a police barracks as well as a detachment of the National Guard should be stationed in the rehabilitated Zango town.

A more suitable location should be provided as an Eid praying ground for the Hausa community of Zango town.

Derogatory references to the Kataf as ”Arna” or ”Kafirai” (unbeliever or pagan) should be discouraged.

The Kaduna State House of Assembly should look into the issue of the establishment of a Customary Court of Appeal in the State (Citizen, 15 June 1992:13).

Finally, on the crucial issue of demands for chiefdoms by the Kataf and other southern Kaduna groups, the Cudjoe Commission called on the Kaduna State Government to accede to these demands in ”deserving” cases, provided that ”it is adjudged that such a grant would guarantee peace and stability in the state” (The News, 7 June 1993:20). It, however, condemned vehemently:

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.... the approach adopted by the Katafs and their resort to violence in order to press home their demands for a chiefdom. As a deterrent to others, the Katafs shall be the last to be considered for the grant of a chiefdom among the southern Kaduna groups (The News, June 1993:20)

Notwithstanding the commission's proposals for the compensation and rehabilitation of riot victims and the establishment of chiefdoms, however, its recommendations suggest a general preference for a regulatory, rather than a redistributive or a reorganizational, approach to ethnic minority problems in southern Kaduna. This is also the approach that the Federal Government has tended to pursue.

Thus, in the wake of the May disturbances, two presidentially appointed seven-member tribunals were set up by the Federal Government to try the suspected rioters in accordance with the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree No. 2 of 1987 (now Civil Disturbances Act Cap 53 of the Laws of the Federation 1990). The two tribunals were headed by Justices Benedict Okadigbo and Emmanuel Adegbite respectively.

Both tribunals were subsequently to sentence 14 persons to death, and many other individuals to various terms of imprisonment, for their alleged roles in the May disturbances. Among those sentenced to death were some leading Kataf tribesmen, including retired General Zamani Lekwot, a former military Governor of Rivers State.

Yet, the proceedings and judgments of the tribunals provoked cutting strictures, fervent demonstrations and frenzied litigations from various human rights' bodies, members of the Bar, the Press and southern Kaduna groups, and other interested observers. Some of the reasons for this opposition include:

A statement, allegedly made by President Ibrahim Babangida, after visiting Zango town, that the tribunals he appointed would presume suspects "guilty until proved innocent" (African Guardian, 25 January 1993:19)

The hasty promulgation of Decree 55 of December 1992 which purportedly ousted the competence of regular courts of superior record to make orders against actions of the tribunals which violate constitutional provisions on fundamental human rights.

The improper or illegal constitution of the Okadigbo and Adegbite Tribunals, each of which had seven members, in violation of the provisions of the Civil Disturbances Decree which prescribe a tribunal of five members.

The ethnoreligious imbalance in the composition of the Okadigbo Tribunal. The tribunal had four muslim members, including three Hausa-Fulani. It was, therefore, perceived by the Kataf as susceptible to being influenced by the extreme emotional bitterness among muslim and /or Hausa-Fulani elements over the fate of the Hausa in Zango. It should be noted, however, that a similar religious imbalance was evident in the composition of the Adegbite Tribunal, which had five christian and two muslim members.

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The extremely hostile attitude of Justice Okadigbo to the Kataf defence counsel and witnesses.

The discontinuation of legal representation for the Kataf tribesmen following the decision of their lawyers, led by Chief G.O.K. Ajayi, to withdraw from the Okadigbo Tribunal in protest against the anomalies enumerated above.

Predictably, the death verdicts of the tribunals provoked a legal and political impasse. The National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) — the successor to the AFRC — was not able to ratify the tribunals' decisions because of the political sensitivity of the issue. Moreover, these decisions became the subject of various legal actions in the Supreme Court which restrained the Government from carrying out the death sentences on Lekwot and others. Eventually, the Government was constrained to commute the death sentences to short prison terms.

In view of the controversial and counterproductive character of its regulatory policies on the southern Kaduna crisis, it is useful to consider Government's attitude to alternative policy options for containing the crisis. The most important and compelling of these options remains the policy of reorganization, involving the establishment of new chiefdoms, states or even local government areas in the southern Kaduna region.

Indeed, as from October 1992, the issue of chiefdoms for the Kataf and other southern Kaduna communities featured very prominently in the deliberations of the defunct Kaduna State House of Assembly. Members of the House from southern Kaduna, in particular, worked vigorously to put the issue on the agenda of public policy in the state. Thus, defying the intrigues and opposition of conservative elements and the emirate establishment, the House of Assembly on 19 October 1992 established a seven-man committee, under Alhaji Isa Aliyu Shika, to investigate the issue (Newswatch, 7 December 1992:28). The committee received a total of 71 memoranda by individuals, organizations and communities from all sections of the state. Thirty-seven of these memoranda involved demands for chiefdoms from such southern Kaduna communities as the Bajju (Kaje), Kataf (Atyap), Kadara, Chawai, Kurama, Gbagyi, Kono and Kagarko of Zaria Emirate, as well as the Ninzam, Ayu, Numana, Caninkon and Kagoma of Jema'a Emirate (Newswath, 7 December 1992:28; New Nigerian, 29 December 1992:16).. Twenty-nine of the memoranda were of a general nature, while the remaining five involved demands for more districts.

In the report it submitted during December 1992, however, the Shika Committee simply concluded that the constitutional competence to create new chiefdoms or districts lies with the executive rather than the legislature. Sadly, the Committee could not decide on whether to advise the House to forward the memoranda on new chiefdoms and districts to the State Governor for appropriate action, or to institute a constitutional amendment that would enable the House legislate on the establishment of new units of traditional authority. More importantly, the Committee could not advise on the merits or demerits of the various memoranda presented to it. Such an advice could have served as an important input into any future executive action on the issue of new chiefdoms. In essence, perhaps owing to the

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opposition of the conservative political establishment and traditional ruling class in Kaduna to the idea of new chiefdoms, the Shika Committee was content to reduce its own work to a mere rigmarole.

The executive, for its part, adopted the position that the creation of new chiefdoms was politically and financially inexpedient. In the words of the National Republican Convention (NRC) Governor, Dabo Lere:

The main problem is the number of tribes that are involved.... Everybody wants a chiefdom, and we have so many tribes. This is physically impossible. And in these days of lean finances, if you make a chief, the chief is entitled to a lot of regalia, you have to build a palace for him, you have to buy him not only one car but cars that will befit him... and so on. And these things cost money. Instead of spending that money creating hospitals or... roads, you spend the money creating so many chiefs (African Concord, 8 February 1993:19).

Given the attempt by Governor Lere to portray the demand for new chiefdoms as economically diversionary, it is instructive to note that the southern Kaduna groups see such chiefdoms as a means of accelerating development in their areas. Indeed, the southern Kaduna communities often attribute their relative backwardness to the insentivity of the emirate authorities to the developmental needs of these communities. This insensitivity is said to be underscored by the unwillingness of the emirate to make any serious efforts to attract development to the southern Kaduna region. In essence, Governor Lere's apparent postulation of a dichotomy between political autonomy and economic development would appear unconvincing to the southern Kaduna people.

Pressures and proposals for a reorganizational solution to the southern Kaduna problem have not been limited to demands for the establishment of new chiefdoms. The Government has also had to contend with pressures and proposals for the creation of new states and/or local governments in the southern Kaduna region.

The subdivision of Kaduna State into Kaduna and Katsina States by the Babangida Administration in September 1987 was widely approved by the southern Kaduna groups since this reorganization gave them a relatively more enhanced position within the new and smaller Kaduna State. However, the euphoria in southern Kaduna over the excision of Katsina from Kaduna soon evaporated as the southern Kaduna elites became increasingly disenchanted with what they described as "a grand design to scheme us out of the affairs of Kaduna State" (National Concord, 13 June 1988:16-18). In particular, the southern Kaduna elites inveighed against their inadequate representation in the critical decision-making sectors of the Kaduna State Civil Service, and the systematic manipulation of political appointments and civil service postings and promotions to favour indigenes of mainstream Zaria. In the words of the southern Kaduna elements:

The totality of evidence, both direct and indirect,... points to the fact that some senior public officers in the state civil service who hold key positions in the state government, particularly from Zaria Local Government Area, have formed the habit of manipulating Government

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machinery in order to achieve a total enslavement of the people from the other local government areas of the state (National Concord, 13 June 1988:16).

Following the May 1992 disturbances, allegations of the victimization of southern Kaduna civil servants in general, and the Kataf ethnic class in the bureaucracy in particular, became even more strident (Kukah, 1992:1).

It was in this context of deepening inter-ethnic distrust and bitterness that proposals began to emerge for the further subdivision of Kaduna State into Zazzau and Jema'a or Gurara (Southern Zaria) States, along the lines of the Hausa/Fulani — non-Hausa minorities' divide (Jibrin, 1993:5). As trenchantly articulated by a group of southern Kaduna indigenes in Plateau State in May 1993, such a subdivision could help to mitigate, if not eliminate, the following "social facts" of the southern Kaduna situation (The Guardian, 30 May 1993:A17):

The wide gap in socioeconomic development and political representation between the northern and southern parts of Kaduna State.

The systematic attempts to reduce the peoples of southern Kaduna to "second class citizens, slaves, drawers of water and hewers of wood."

The political and cultural subjugation of the southern Kaduna people under the emirate system, and the failure to create chiefdoms for these peoples.

The perpetration of various forms of religious discrimination and persecution against southern Kaduna groups.

The concentration of a disproportionate number of educational institutions in northern Kaduna at the expense of the southern parts of the state.

However, although the case for a southern Zaria state had also featured prominently in the report of the 1986-87 Political Bureau, and the Federal Government has become increasingly lavish in its state reorganization policies, the prospects for the subdivision of Kaduna appear to be poor for at least three reasons.

In the first place, considerable differences exist among the affected communities over the demarcation and configuration of the proposed Zazzau and Jema'a (Gurara) States. For instance, competing claims have been made to the important city of Kaduna by both the Hausa-Fulani and the non-Hausa-Fulani blocs. Such divisiveness, it would be recalled, has been the Achilles' heel of demands for new states in other parts of the country, including the Rivers State. Secondly, the state creation strategy cannot resolve, and may in fact compound, the position of the Hausa settler communities of southern Zaria who may become isolated, alienated and marginalized in the proposed Jema'a or Gurara State. A final and related problem is that with the departure of the Hausa-Fulani power group, the establishment of Jema'a State may simply open up a new phase of competition and conflict among the diverse communities of southern Zaria. Nevertheless, the relatively complex and dispersed ethnic structure of the Jema'a State will probably produce less polarizing and destabilizing

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outcomes than the centralized ethnic structure in the present Kaduna State (cf. Horowitz, 1985:39).

Finally, Government has faced intensive pressures from minority communities in the southern Kaduna region for the creation of additional local government areas in the region (The Guardian, 3 August 1992 and 30 May 1993). These pressures were never satisfied by the extensive reorganizations of the local government structure undertaken by the Babangida Administration during May 1987 and August — September 1991. Both of these reorganizational exercises increased the number of localities in the country from 301 to 589. Consequently, like other groups in Nigeria, the southern Kaduna communities have continued to agitate for additional local government areas as a means of bringing "government and development" closer to their region, and of giving more effective expression to the cultural complexity of this part of Kaduna State. Despite the Federal Military Government's continuing commitment to the creation of additional local government areas in the country, however, the deluge of competing demands for new localities from several parts of the federation, the increasing official sensitivity to the counterproductive effects of too many local government areas, and the entrenchment of the local government territorial structure in the Federal constitution, all make the prospects for the creation of additional areas in southern Kaduna somewhat uncertain.

iii. Academic Journal

THE ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN KADUNA OF NIGERIA: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

Religious conflicts exist between groups which differ ideologically with each striving for political and religious relevance. This paper aims at ascertaining the causes of conflicts in southern Kaduna local government area. The situation in southern Kaduna has claimed thousands of lives, destroyed properties worth millions of naira, and led to an increase in the number of displaced persons. The interpretative, as well as the descriptive phenomenological methods of research, was used in this study. It was discovered that land, religious supremacy, hate speeches are some of the major causes of the southern Kaduna crisis. As part of recommendations, perpetrators of religious conflict in the region should be fished out and dealt with publicly and appropriately.

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Keywords: Conflict, Religion, National, Development, Crisis.

Introductions

Just as religion as a concept is difficult to define, so it is that the dangers it poses to the society are usually difficult to estimate. Nigeria as a nation is made up of different religious, ethnic and tribal groups, hence, there is bound to be differences in tenets, doctrines and ways of approaching the supreme-being amongst the different religious adherents in Nigeria. When religious faithful fail to accommodate other religions' adherents it results in religious conflict. Religious conflicts according to Gofwen, Rotgak form a specific form of conflict between groups which differ ideologically along religious lines within a pluralistic setting with each striving for political relevance (200). Religious conflicts occur when there is a struggle for supremacy among religious groups. This supremacy might be political, economic, social or cultural in nature. This paper assesses the religious conflicts in southern Kaduna Religious crises in southern Kaduna came to limelight with the Zango Kataf crisis of mid May 1992. According to Edward John in the International Research Group for Transregional & Emerging Area Studies a dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed on Kaduna State on May 19, following two days of what reports described as religious clashes which claimed as many as 100 lives, caused by the fact that rioters rampaged through the streets, looting and burning at will, the general hospital overflowed with the wounded. This conflict divided Kaduna state along religious lines. There became distrust in the state amongst various religious adherents. There arose what became known as Muslim and Christian neighbourhoods in Kaduna. These conflicts have continued to reoccur and hundreds of lives have been lost and are still being lost to the southern Kaduna religious crises.

This paper aims at ascertaining the causes of conflicts in southern Kaduna local government area. It assesses how detrimental this crisis has been to the development of southern Kaduna. The interpretative, as well as the descriptive phenomenological method of research, were used in this study. This methodology was used because of the fact that it "...produces an account of lived experience in its own terms rather than one prescribed by pre-existing theoretical preconceptions and it recognizes that this is an interpretative endeavour as humans are sense-making organisms"(Smith and Osborn 41).

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Conceptual Clarification

Religious conflict results when a group of people with a belief or dogma finds it difficult to accommodate the belief and dogma of another group of people. This often results in physical and vocal assaults or cold war. Religious conflicts are a more complex phenomenon that engages a combination of contested domains, including power, personality, space or place, and group identity (Wendy). This portends that when two religious groups struggle for supremacy in power or to show their affinity in terms of their religious beliefs, religious conflicts occur. Religious conflict is a "struggle between and among individuals or groups over values and claims to scarce resources, status symbols, and power bases. The objective of the individuals or groups during conflict is to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals so that they can enjoy the scarce resources, the status symbols, and power bases" (Okai 22)

In Nigeria, especially in northern Nigeria, religious conflicts was firmly rooted as a response to the colonial pattern of government employed and actualized by the Lord Lugard and his men.

Gofwen Rotgak notes: "To convince the Northern emirs and the sultan of the commitment of the colonial government towards maintaining the socio-political status quo, it became a matter of

colonial policy not to interfere with the functioning of the existing institutions, rather, they were strengthened on the condition that they were accountable and made subservient to the colonial government"(59). Nwaomah S., opines that:

In these circumstances, and depending on the degree of threat that the colonial government thought each religion posed to the colonial system in a locality, the colonial authorities evolved administrative patterns that served their purpose of strengthening the colonial system. However, it seems, by its policies, that the colonial system developed a system of non-interference on Islamic affairs and seemed to have inadvertently limited the spread of Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Certain policies seemed to point in this direction.

Hence, religious conflicts, bigotry, tension have its roots in the process of struggle for political or ideological supremacy amongst the two major religions in southern Kaduna. National development according to Bhawna Bawa is "a process of reconstruction and development in various dimensions of a nation and development of individuals. It includes fullgrowth and expansion of industries, agriculture, education social, religious and cultural institutions". Rico Alolor says it is "ability of a country or countries to improve the social welfare of the people e.g by providing social amenities like quality education, potable water, transportation, infrastructure, medical care, etc. For Tolu Lawal and Abe Oluwatoyin (238)

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national development is the "the overall development or a collective socio-economic, political as well as religious advancement of a country or nation." Religious conflicts have a lot contribution to the development of any community. When there is peace, infrastructural and intellectual development continues to be the order of the day. But, when there is war, rancour, and strive, it halts developmental plans. Furthermore, national development encompasses the transformation of community into socially, economically, politically, educationally, orderly, and materially desirable conditions (OyeAdeniyi 52).

The Southern Kaduna Crises

Kauru, Kachia, Zango-Kataf, Kaura, Kagarko, Jaba, Jema'a, Sanga, are the local government areas that constitute southern Kaduna. It was known as southern Zaria before Nigeria got her independence from the Britain in 1960. Most crises in southern Kaduna starts with land disputes before it degenerates into a full-blown religious war.1987 burning down of College of Education

Kafanchan signalled the hatred between the Christians and Muslims in Kaduna. Zwahu Bonnat puts that Muslim Students Society attacked students of the College of Education hence the escalation of the crisis along religious lines. Ajunwa Patrick reports that the crisis at the college of education "spread to other parts of the state leading to the burning of places of worship, with many lives and properties worth millions of naira lost. Consequently, in 1992, the Zango Kataf

Crisis catalysed the hike in killings in southern Kaduna. The Zangon Katab has the Atyap as the dominant ethnic group. The Zango Kataf crisis was bloody on February 6th and May 15th and 16th 1992.

Furthermore, in 1999, there was an ethno-religious assault and aggression against Southern Kaduna Christians. Edwards Johns reveals that residents of Jama'a emirate took the opportunity of the appointment of a new Emir of Jama'a to protest not only this appointment but the entire emirate system but unknown to them the protest turned into rioting between the Hausa minority and the non-Hausa majority resulting in the deaths of perhaps 30 persons and the injury of several others. Also, Zwahu Bonnat explains that Southern Kaduna people were killed, beaten,

matcheted, and Human Right Watch describes it as the single worst outbreak of violence in Nigeria since the 1967-70 civil war. Consequently, according to the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Kaduna State Religious Disturbances of February 2000, The 2000 violence in Kaduna took place in two main waves—sometimes referred to as "Sharia 1" and "Sharia 2" — a first wave from February 21 to 25, with further killings in March,

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followed by a second wave from May 22 to 23. In reaction to the prospect of the introduction of Sharia into Kaduna Sate (sic), the Kaduna branch of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) organized a public protest on February 21. Then the situation degenerated: Muslim youths clashed with the Christian protestors, and fighting between Christians and Muslims spiraled (sic) out of control, with massive violence and destruction on both sides. An accurate, total death toll has never been ascertained, and as is typical in these situations, government and police officials were keen to play down the figures. A judicial commission of inquiry set up by the Kaduna state government reported that at least 1,295 people had been killed, while an unspecified additional number were buried unidentified, and others were declared missing.

Also, in 2002, in Birnin Gwari, a woman was killed, and they alleged that the killer was wearing a fez cap; one Kataf man who had been away at Zaria when the incident occurred, returned to

Birnin Gwar and was killed, several other "Katafs" i.e Southern Kaduna people were killed, their houses and property burnt (Zwahu Bonnat). This 2002 crisis according to international observers like the human right watch erupted because the factors that led to the 2000 crisis were not addressed.

In 2011, September 2, Zwahu Bonnat explains that, a Sallah procession was allowed to take place under heavy police and military guard, and the celebrants-in-procession carried and waved different weapons, including machetes, knives, swords, cutlasses and other dangerous instruments of war and they drove their motorcycles wildly, knocked down and killed two Arna women. The youths put up strategies to defend their community but late in the evening of that day, the army JTF launched attacks on houses at Adauwan breaking down doors, dragging out youths, hammered them with gun butts, beat and brutalized them.

Very important to state, is the 2016 southern Kaduna massacre which some nongovernmental organizations have titled genocide against southern Kaduna indigenes. Uche Atuma narrates that

The Catholic Archdiocese of Kafanchan has said the unrest in Southern Kaduna State has claimed 808 lives. Fifty three villages have so far been attacked and 57 people injured, the church said. However, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, the umbrella organization of herdsmen notes that the group said it has lost no fewer than 6,000 cows to the crisis in

Southern Kaduna. The group faulted claims by independent bodies that the indigenes of southern

Kaduna were the sole victims of the conflict going on there.

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Causes of the Crises

The causes of the crises in southern Kaduna cannot be underestimated. One of the causes is the fight for supremacy over land. Luka Binniyat discovers from Musa Kaptain Solomon, president of Southern Kaduna Peoples Union, that the quest for Southern Kaduna land, through the creation of grazing reserves is the cause of the Southern Kaduna crisis. It could be deciphered that southern Kaduna has agriculture as the main stay of her economy, hence, the vegetative nature of her ecosystem. The herdsmen having no green vegetation to use to feed their cattle resort to taking their cattle into the farm lands of the indigenes or southern Kaduna.

Consequently, fully armed as the herdsmen were any resistance from the indigenes would be met with a return of fire from the nozzle of a gun and the edge of a cutlass. Furthermore, Luka

Binniyat explains that the first is expropriating lands belonging to indigenes of southern Kaduna and giving it to the Fulani. The second is that if they resist, they would be killed and chased out.

The third is that southern Kaduna shall be kept under perpetual intimidation until they run away

from their lands on their own.

Foreigners from mostly Niger, Mali and Chad have constituted themselves as tools to be used in the destruction of lands and properties in southern Kaduna. This is evident in the speech by the governor of Kaduna state, Mallam Rufai that the attackers were from Niger, Cameroon, Chad,

Mali and Senegal and that the attack in southern Kaduna was a reprisal attack to what southern

Kaduna indigenes did to them after the 2011 elections. Sola Ojo reveals that the governor further noted how he went and pleaded for a stoppage to the incessant riots in southern Kaduna the herdsmen asked for monetary compensation and he as the governor paid them. For this statement, the governor has been able to prove that the perpetrators of these crises in southern Kaduna are mercenaries from neighbouring countries.

Hate Speeches, claims and counter claims are other contributory factors to the survival of religious conflicts in southern Kaduna. The exchange of war provoking statements from both the leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Islam leaders have fuelled the

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reoccurrence of the war and cold war in southern Kaduna. For the Islam leaders, Luka Binniyat

puts that, they said that the issue of grazing reserves is not related to this problem, because the grazing reserves have been there back to colonial days hence the right of the Fulani's to own the land, that's why the herdsmen should not be held accountable for what they do. Also, the

Minister of Interior, Abdulrahman Dambazau, said: "…there are people who are always looking for ways to further create division along religious or ethnic fault lines for their selfish interest, with the aim of creating instability in our internal security…True religious leaders do not fan the embers of hate, but ensure that communities live in peace and harmony". Dambazau was referring to leaders of the CAN and the Roman Catholic church. The Kaduna state Christian Association of Nigeria replied him, "Shut up if you have nothing to say… it would be an unfortunate thing for a Minister like Dambazau to say that the Christian leadership in the country was fanning the embers of hatred."This exchange of vocal war words has served to fuel the disputes between indigenes and non-indigenes in southern Kaduna which have degenerated into a religious conflict.

The hypocrisy of Security agencies has not helped matters, in the worsening situations in southern Kaduna. According to the report of the International Centre for investigative Justice, the killings in Southern Kaduna continue relentlessly, as the state and security agencies appear helpless in tackling the crisis and ICIJ reveals that Southern Kaduna has been attacked about 41 times between 2009 and May 1, 2016, with hundreds of deaths and thousands of property

destroyed. The security agencies of Nigeria is made up of the Nigerian army, Nigerian police, and State Security Service, amongst others. Lamenting further, Luka Binniyat notes that the community members in some of the affected southern local government areas said that, "there is a large presence of police in Goska now. But as far as we are concerned, it means nothing to us. They have burnt the whole town and destroyed our possession. This morning...11 persons killed, about 15 injured." Its Implication to National development National development could be seen as the disposal with which a state is able to cater to the lives of her citizenry. National development could be political, religious, economic or social in structure. Southern Kaduna has for long being retarded from achieving her great potentials and thus contributing her quota to the national growth and development. The survival and sponsorship of these killings of both of Christians and Muslims have not yielded any gains to both sides. Consequently, the effects that this wanton destruction of lives and properties had

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brought to people of southern Kaduna are innumerable. Many hectares of Farmlands, as well as its products, have been destroyed. Food produced such as yam and tomatoes were devastated as a result of the crises. The means of livelihood of the indigenes of southern Kaduna has been destroyed. These problems have not gone down well with the people of southern Kaduna.

Hungry and starvation have been the place of survivors in southern Kaduna. .Other implications

of the ethno-religious crises in southern Kaduna are: First, the term Internally Displaced Persons otherwise known as IDPs refers to persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes, as a result of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (United Nations). In Jema'a local government area alone, there are over 2234, 0000 IDPs currently. There are growing reports of food shortages in IDPs camps because these food items were stolen. Consequently, children are being smuggled and trafficked outside of the camp.

Second, the crises have led to unemployment. According to the International Labour Organization unemployment means when a person is "without work", that means he/ she was not in paid employment or self-employment during a particular reference period; "currently available for work", that means he/she was ready for a paid employment or self-employment during the reference period; "seeking work", that means he/she had taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment." This is the situation in southern Kaduna currently. During the crises, so many shops and business centres were burnt to ashes. Many farm lands were destroyed. The losses that the survivor's recount cannot be overemphasized neither will it be underestimated. According to Luka Binniyat, a total of 19 shops were destroyed and market places which have served as a source of living were destroyed. The destruction of farmlands have forced the youths and other farmers to be jobless, hence, there is bound to be shortage of food.

Third, there has been a disruption of Education Programme. Formal and informal education has been disrupted since the beginning of the crises. Centers of academic learning especially primary and secondary schools were destroyed. For instance Luka Binniyat reports that five students of the College of Education, Gidan Waya, Jema'a Local Government Area, Kaduna State, were, Sunday evening, reportedly shot dead close to Gidan Waya, when a commercial car taking them to school from Kafanchan was waylaid by herdsmen.

The effects that this wanton destruction of lives and properties has caused to the people of

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Southern Kaduna cannot be overemphasized. Many deaths have been recorded which has led to the downsizing of the population. Most elderly persons, as well as children, were killed. Hence, the ideas which the young ones would have gotten from the older once have been wiped cut short, hence, there is bound to be knowledge drain, especially with the deaths of teachers and tutors.

Recommendations

First, the issue of land grazing should be appropriately addressed by the government. Both groups, the Christians and the Muslims in southern Kaduna should come to a consensus on which land, if any, should be given as a grazing reserve. Dialogue should be the watchword in achieving a level playing field for Muslims and Christians in southern Kaduna.

Second, the leaders of CAN and the Islamic community should as a matter of urgent attention control the use of hate speeches. For words which could overheat the polity should be avoided for the sake of peace. Religious leaders should avoid the use of the media to showcase their anger; instead, they should resort to action, such as assisting the affected communities in self-defence and provision of essential services. This is in a bid to avoid an escalation of the conflict.

This is evident in the escalation of the conflict caused by the burning down, by Muslim youths, of the college of education Kafachan. What religious leaders should do is to condemn the destruction of lives and properties just like the Sultan of Sokoto and president-general of the

Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar III, rather than resorting to war mongering.

Third, the nation's security agencies like the Nigerian army and the police should desist from being partisan in a religious conflict. A situation where the nations security agencies, aid a religious group with arms and ammunition to kill members of other groups does not portend well for the Nigerian nascent democratic challenges.

Fourth, Kaduna state is made up of Christian and Muslim religions' votaries. The person in the seat of power, in the person of the governor, should learn to play politics devoid of religious sentiments. Issues related to the loss of lives and properties should be dealt with as fast as possible without hesitation. Perpetrators of religious conflict in the region should be fished out and dealt with publicly and appropriately. Fifth, religious freedom as enshrined in the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria should be followed and adhered to.

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The various ethnic groups in southern Kaduna and its environs should be made to accept and accommodate votaries or faithful of other religions.

Government neglect and victimization, marginalization and nepotism foster religious fanaticism.

Sixth, educating the youth could go a long way in reorienting and changing the ideology of those that have been negatively indoctrinated. Education makes people civilized, well mannered, aware, well-skilled and responsible. With education, the ideology of the people will be restructured and it enlightens the mind against negative indoctrinations.

Conclusion

The southern Kaduna religious crisis is brought about by the inability of groups with different ideology to accommodate themselves. This is the situation in southern Kaduna. Many lives and properties have been destroyed as a result of the religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims in southern Kaduna. The December 2016 Massacre of defenceless women, children and the elderly men in southern Kaduna demands condemnation from spirited individuals and the government. Dialogue should be used as a way of settling disputes rather than resorting to violence. The government should make sure that all those involved in any act of religious conflicts should be made to bear the full weight of the law.

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iv. Report Article

Report Article

"The Miss World Riots: Continued Impunity for Killings in Kaduna"

By: Human Rights Watch: July 22, 2003

II. BACKGROUND

The city of Kaduna, the capital of Kaduna State, is one of the largest in northern Nigeria and is viewed by some as the symbolic capital of the north. While the north of Nigeria is

predominantly Muslim, Kaduna has a significant population of Christians, from around thirty ethnic groups based mostly in the south of the state, sometimes referred to as the South Kaduna minority tribes. According to some estimates, close to half the population of Kaduna may be made up of Christians. The majority of the population in the northern part of Kaduna State are Muslims from the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups. Kaduna differs from other northern states in that although some areas are dominated by particular ethnic groups, these different groups have also lived side by side in the same areas for many years, especially in Kaduna town. Kaduna has a different mix of populations from other northern states: as its capital is one of the more developed cities in the north, it has become host to people from many ethnic groups from different parts of the country, including Christians from other states.

Over several decades, Kaduna, like other states of Nigeria, has experienced outbreaks of violence and fighting between different groups. Most often, this has pitted Muslims against Christians, although the fundamental causes can be traced to political and economic rivalries, rather than religious differences. In recent years, however, religion has come to the fore as one of the aspects with which people have identified most readily and which has enabled leaders to stir up violence whenever it suited their purposes. Since 2000, in particular, the religious dimension to the tensions in Kaduna emerged more explicitly, as conflicts began to center around the extension of Sharia to criminal law, one of the most divisive issues in Nigeria in recent times.

Three of the most serious outbreaks of violence in Kaduna State occurred in 1987, 1992 and 2000. In 1987, a dispute erupted between students from different ethnic and religious groups in Kafanchan, and the violence spread to several other towns and areas. In February and May 1992, in what became known as the Zangon-Kataf crisis, there were clashes in Zangon-Kataf between the Hausa and the Kataf (a predominantly Christian ethnic group), initially sparked off by a dispute over the relocation of a market. Killings of Hausa by Kataf were followed by reprisal killings of Christians by Muslims, including in several other parts of Kaduna State.

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B. Zango-Kataf Inter-ethnic Crisis, 1992

i. Book



Chapter Four

Ethnic Minorities and Political Turbulence in Kaduna State

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Ethnic minority tensions and conflicts in southern Kaduna have probably engendered far more serious violence than any other forms of communal instability in recent Nigerian history. Because these conflicts and tensions have deep roots in northern Nigerian history, it

is useful to examine this historical background before proceeding to discuss the complex facts and facets of ethnic minority political turbulence in Kaduna State today.

Historical Background

What is presently known as Kaduna State emcompasses the area of the old Zaria (Zazzau) emirate-cum-province. In his historical-cum-anthropological study of Government in Zazzau, 1800—1950, M.G. Smith identified two broad cultural segments in this emirate province. The first of these segments is what Smith referred to as the Muhammadan Hausa-Fulani group. The group constitutes about 60 per cent of the emirate population, occupies mainly the northern part of the province and dominates the structure of traditional governance as expressed in the emirate system (Smith, 1960:2).

The second ethnocultural bloc of the Zazzau kingdom comprises a ”pagan population” of some thirty tribes. These are located in the southern and western half of the territory. However, throughout this pagan-dominated half of the territory are to be found the Hausa ”in enclaves, walled towns or open villages which are the foci of economic, political and administrative life in their respective areas” (Smith, 1960:2). As shall be demonstrated in the course of this chapter, this pattern of settlement has contributed enormously to the crystallization of the contours of socioeconomic conflict between the Hausa population and the pagan communities.

More importantly, however, complex forms of clientage and vassalage have developed between the dominant Hausa-Fulani bloc and the pagan population of Zazzau. The pagan tribes were traditionally the legitimate target for slave-raiding, the exaction of tribute and other forms of domination by the Hausa-Fulani. The political and military vulnerability of the pagan groups to Hausa-Fulani hegemony arose from their relatively inferior technology, smaller settlements and decentralized modes of political organization, all of which rendered them relatively defenceless in the face of Hausa-Fulani expansionism and imperialism.

However, the pagan communities differ in their degree of penetration by, or subordination to, the Fulani emirate system. Indeed, some of these communities had successfully resisted conquest and incorporation by the Fulani power-group. Thus, the Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa populations of southern Zaria have enjoyed some degree of independence from the emirate system. Although involved in diverse forms of historical, political and administrative relationships with the Zaria emirate, these three groups have been able to retain their integrity and autonomy as independent chiefdoms since the colonial era. Consequently, the core emirate population accords the pagan populations of Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa a higher status than pagan groups that are incorporated and subordinated within the emirate society itself (Smith, 1960:242).

The incorporated pagan populations are closer geographically to the Hausa settlements and enclaves than the independent pagan groups. Consequently, these incorporated populations are more vulnerable to cultural, economic and political domination by the Hausa-Fulani power group. While the independent pagan populations are ruled by their own chiefs, the incorporated pagan communities are administered by emirate-appointed district heads. Such

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district heads have often been nominated from the Hausa-Fulani group, although pressures from the pagan communities have sometimes led to the appointment of elements from the indigenous tribesmen to this position.

This unequal historical political relationship between the Hausa-Fulani group and the pagan community has been compounded by religious differences. Islam is the religion of an overwhelming majority of the Hausa-Fulani. The religion also provides the doctrinal or ideological foundation for the emirate system On the other hand, different forms of animistic worship have traditionally predominated amongst the pagan populations. Moreover, looked down upon as infidels by the emirate population, and often arbitrarily and oppressively subjected to the Muslim judicial and legal system, these pagan populations have become particularly receptive to Christian conversion and education. Thus, historically, the leadership of these minority populations has been dominated by mission-educated elites, many of whom have also been employed in occupations related to the Church, mainly as pastors or vernacular teachers of religion (Yahaya, 1980:28). Today, these ethnic minority elites occupy a frontline position in the Christain Association of Nigeria (CAN), which has persistently and violently attacked the hegemony of Muslim Hausa-Fulani elites in the North and in the whole of Nigeria.

The political, cultural and religious cleavages between majority and minority communities in the Zaria emirate have been reinforced by economic imbalance between the two groups. Although blessed with heavier rainfall and denser woodland than northern Zaria, the southern districts of Zaria are generally relatively more underdeveloped than the northern section of the emirate. Moreover, even within the southern Zaria area itself, socioeconomic opportunities and infrastructure improvements have tended to be concentrated in areas or enclaves inhabited by Hausa settlers (Smith, 1960:2; Yahaya, 1980:74).

Official sources have often attributed the relative economic backwardness of southern Zaria to the sparse population of these areas, and their lack of viable internal sources of revenue (Yahaya, 1980:75). To the southern Zaria intelligentsia, however, the underdevelopment of their communities is the result of deliberate and persistent neglect by the emirate officials who, until the 1976 local government reforms, also dominated the system of local or native administration.

The aforementioned differences between majority and minority communities in Zaria over traditional political control, culture, religion and resource distribution have predictably often escalated into violent agitations and confrontations. C.S. Whitaker (1970), for instance, reports that at different times during the 1946-66 period, riots were staged by the ”Kataf and other related peoples in southern Zaria province” over certain oppressive features of the emirate system, particularly the headship of Fulani ruling families over predominantly non-Fulani districts.

More specifically, A.D. Yahaya (1980:28) notes that in 1942, political protests developed among the Kaje ethnic group of the Zangon Katab district over perceived discrimination by the Native Authority administration against the southern Zaria population. Similar protests

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took place in 1948 among the Kataf of the same Zangon Katab district. As Yahaya (1980:28) explains:

These protests, which in certain cases were reinforced by violence, were the beginnings of what was to become a continuous demand for political recognition and participation (by Southern Zaria groups). Such protests often escalated during periods of major political developments or tensions, such as the demise of the Emir or of a Fulani district head in southern Zaria.

The protests were geared towards the realization of specific southern Zaria demands which included, increased autonomy and control over local matters; the indigenization of all district head appointments in southern Zaria; the establishment of independent chiefdoms for all the southern Zaria tribes; an end to the proliferation of village heads as a strategy of divide-and-rule by emirate officials; an end to deliberate acts of discrimination and maladministration by the Native Authority administration against the southern Zaria population; the establishment of a Customary Court of Appeal for non-Muslim groups to complement the existing Sharia Court of Appeal; and, more recently, the subdividion of Kaduna into one or two new states in order to mitigate or eliminate the minority status of the southern Zaria population.

Official responses to these demands and protests have varied from outright repudiation and denunciation of the claims of the southern Zaria communities to genuine efforts to mollify these communities. Thus, although Native Authority officials often dismissed agitations by the southern Zaria population as the work of a "few vocal malcontents and missionaries" (Yahaya, 1980:73), the regional or state governments have sought to implement appropriate redressive policies. These policies have included: the prohibition of discriminatory acts by Native Authority officials against the southern Zaria population; the promotion of political decentralization through the establishment of village and district councils; the establishment of an Outer Court in order to facilitate the participation of southern Zaria groups in emirate affairs; the employment of southern Zaria indigenes as emirate and Native Authority functionaries; the establishment of new Native Authority departments and welfare projects in southern Zaria; and the transfer of the independent districts of Moroa, Kagoro and Kwoi from the Zaria Province to Jema'a Division (Yahaya, 1980:73-75).

Although the aforementioned policies were hardly effective in defusing ethnic minority conflict, they nevertheless ensured that this conflict did not unduly polarize Kaduna State or the country at large. Indeed, the local government reforms of 1976, and the inauguration of the egalitarian-oriented Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) Government in Kaduna State in 1979, would appear to have substantially ameliorated the fears and grievances of the southern Zaria population.

However, the re-introduction of military rule in 1984, and the frenzied religious mobilization in the North that followed the controversy over Nigeria's purported enlistment in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, appeared to have opened up a new phase of ethnoreligious conflict in Kaduna State. This era of conflict has witnessed three major outbursts of ethnoreligious violence in southern Kaduna and Kaduna State in general, viz; the

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Kafanchan disturbances of March 1987; the first Zangon Katab disturbances of February 1992; and the second Zangon Katab disturbances of May 1992. Each of these flashes of ethnoreligious violence will now be discussed in turn.

The Zangon Katab Riots of February 1992

An outbreak of ethnoreligious rioting that was far more serious than the Kafanchan crisis took place during February 1992 in Zango, a town in the Zangon Katab Local Government Area of Kaduna State. Complex historical, political, cultural and economic factors were at play in this outbreak of communal rioting. But the basic details may be briefly described as follows.

The Zangon Katab Local Government Council, under the chairmanship of a Kataf, Juri Babang Ay ok, had in January 1992 announced the impending relocation of the Zango weekly market from the Hausa-dominated town centre to a new site on the outskirts of Zango town. The ostensible and/or real reasons for this move included the congestion in the old market centre, with little or no space in the market to accommodate new traders; the poor hygienic conditions of the old market; the unsuitable location of the market in the midst of residential houses belonging to the Hausa; and the need to reduce Hausa commercial domination and expand opportunities for emergent Kataf traders in Zango (Citizen, 17 February 1992:23-24; Mahmood, 1993:36-39).

The Hausa community in Zango predictably resisted the relocation of the market. The community claimed that the newly proposed site was a part of the muslim annual Eid praying ground. It also argued that the relocation bid was a vindictive design to hurt its economic position. Consequently, the community sought and obtained a court injunction, with accompanying police protection, restraining the relocation (Mahmood, 1993:36).

The conflicting Kataf and Hausa positions and actions over the market relocation issue escalated into violent confrontations on 6 February 1992, the weekly (Thursday) market date on which the use of the new market site was expected to commence. These clashes, according to official estimates, left 95 persons (mostly Hausa) dead, 252 others injured and 133 houses and 26 farmlands destroyed.

In retrospect, it would seem that the market relocation issue had merely provided a convenient opportunity for the outpourings of Kataf resentment of Hausa-Fulani domination of cultural, political and economic life in Zangon Katab. Specifically, the Kataf resented their continued incorporation within the Zaria emirate, the alleged appropriation of land around Zango by the emir of Zaria and the Hausa farmers, the derogatory references to the Kataf as ”arna” or pagans by the Hausa population, as well as other forms of unequal sociocultural exchange between the two communities (Mahmood, 1993:36-37). These grievances and differences polarized Zango town at elite and mass levels, so that relationships between influential Kataf elites and the Hausa community leaders became sorely strained. The real extent of this polarization did not become apparent, however, until May 1992 when an even

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more devastating outbreak of communal rioting convulsed Zango and several other places in Kaduna State.

The Zangon Katab Riots of May 1992

The Kaduna State Government-appointed Justice Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry into the February 1992 clashes in Zango town had barely concluded its public sittings when a new wave of riotings broke out in the town during May 1992. The riotings eventually engulfed other key cities of Kaduna State such as Kaduna, Zaria and Ikara. The immediate and remote causes of this renewed outbreak of violence in Zangon Katab included:

A written threat by Kataf village heads and community leaders indicating their intention to repossess Kataf land allegedly appropriated, and handed over to the Hausa, by the Emir of Zaria in 1920.

The subsequent uprooting of crops on farmlands belonging to the Hausa by Kataf youths as a part of the aforementioned agenda of land restitution by the Kataf.

Retaliatory attacks on Kataf and/or Kataf farmlands by the Hausa.

A letter written by the extremist Izalaru Islamic Group to the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, seeking his assistance in waging a jihad to defend the rights of the Muslim Hausa population in Zangon Katab.

The failure of the police to arrest and prosecute those implicated in the February 1992 riots, and to search for, and confiscate, weapons used during these earlier disturbances.

The alleged manipulation of the proceedings of the Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry into the February 1992 disturbances. These proceedings were, indeed, eventually boycotted by the Kataf (Mahmood, 1993:36-39; Citizen, 25 May 1992:10-19).

Two main factors were responsible for the escalation of the Zangon Katab riotings into retaliatory campaigns by muslim mobs against christian and/or southern Kaduna and southern Nigerian groups in Kaduna city, Zaria, Ikara and other areas of Kaduna State. These are:

Reports and rumours of the annihilation and dispossession of Hausa muslims by 'infidels' in Zangon Katab. The emotions evoked among Kaduna muslims by the sight of dead or severely injured bodies of the Zangon Hausa as they were conveyed into Kaduna city from Zango (Mahmood, 1993:37).

In sum, 471 persons were officially confirmed killed in the May disturbances, with 250 and 188 of these deaths occurring in Kaduna city and Zangon Katab respectively. According to police sources, 518 persons were injured, and 229 houses and 218 vehicles were destroyed in the same riots (New Nigerian, 20 July 1992). These official figures may, however, represent an understatement of the scale of casualties and destruction during the May 1992 riots. Indeed, the presentations of the Zangon Hausa community to the relevant Government

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investigatory panel included names of some 1,528 members of the community who reportedly died in the disturbances (The News, 7 June 1993:20).

Government Responses to Ethnoreligious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna

Official responses to recent violent outbursts of ethnoreligious discontent in southern Kaduna have been mainly regulatory in nature. In the wake of the Kafanchan crisis of March 1987, for instance, the Kaduna State Government set up a six-member committee, under Mrs. Hansine Donli, to identify the immediate and remote causes of the crisis, assess the extent of damage engendered by the riotings, identify the key culprits and make appropriate recommendations to the Government (New Nigerian, 14 March 1987:1) However, except for a press conference addressed by Donli at the end of the public sittings of the committee in April 1987, little is known both of the report of the committee and the Government's White Paper on it.

The Federal Government, for its part, established a five-member tribunal, under Justice A.G. Karibi-Whyte, to try, in "summary fashion", all those arrested for participating in the riotings (New Nigerian, 17 March 1987:3). Although all suspects were allowed legal representation of their choice, appeals against the sentences of the tribunal were disallowed. Rather, such sentences were made subject to ratification by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The proceedings and judgments of the tribunal eventually became the object of heated opposition from several Islamic groups, which felt that the tribunal had overlooked the atrocities committed against muslims in Kafanchan during March 1987, while imposing harsh sentences on muslim youths implicated in the subsequent "reactive" disturbances in Kaduna, Funtua, and Katsina.

Government responses to the February and May 1992 disturbances in Zangon Katab have followed the pattern of the official reactions to the initial Kafanchan crisis. The Kaduna State Government, for instance, appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the Zangon Katab disturbances. Headed by Justice Rahila H. Cudjoe, the commission had the following terms of reference:

Inquire into, investigate and identify the immediate and remote causes of the Zangon Katab disturbances.

Assess the extent of damage caused by the disturbances.

Ascertain and identify the roles played by individuals and groups in causing tension and outbreak of violence.

Determine the extent of loss of lives and property.

Examine any other matters incidental to the aforementioned terms of reference;

Recommend appropriate penalties for culprits as well as measures to forestal future disturbances (Citizen, 15 June 1992:14).

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The Cudjoe Commission submitted its report to the Kaduna State Governor, Alhaji Dabo Mohammed Lere, in June 1992. Its findings, like those of the earlier Donli Commission, have, however, not been officially released. Nevertheless, the Kaduna-based Citizen magazine has published important revelations about the activities of the commission. According to the magazine, the recommendations of the commission included the following proposals or measures:

The President of the Federal Republic should take appropriate disciplinary actions against the chairman of the Zangon Katab Local Government, Juri Babang Ayok. Ayok was indeed removed as chairman on 21 May, and charged for murder before a federal tribunal which, however, acquitted him.

Appropriate disciplinary action should be taken against other persons implicated in the riots, including members of the police force, and the Kataf and Hausa communities. In particular, the activities of Kataf ex-servicemen within and outside Zangon Katab should be investigated with a view to ascertaining their roles in encouraging, funding and equipping Kataf rioters.

The police should conduct a comprehensive security search in Zangon Katab in order to curtail and control the possession and use of firearms and other dangerous weapons in the area.

The controversial market should be moved to a neutral site and provided with basic infrastructures or facilities, while a new weekly market day, other than Thursday, should be adopted.

A committee should be set up to verify claims for compensation by individuals and groups displaced during the disturbances.

The Zangon Hausa community, in particular, should be resettled and rehabilitated (The Federal Government eventually released the sum of ₦25 million for the reconstruction of houses destroyed in Zango town). Further, a police barracks as well as a detachment of the National Guard should be stationed in the rehabilitated Zango town.

A more suitable location should be provided as an Eid praying ground for the Hausa community of Zango town.

Derogatory references to the Kataf as ”Arna” or ”Kafirai” (unbeliever or pagan) should be discouraged.

The Kaduna State House of Assembly should look into the issue of the establishment of a Customary Court of Appeal in the State (Citizen, 15 June 1992:13).

Finally, on the crucial issue of demands for chiefdoms by the Kataf and other southern Kaduna groups, the Cudjoe Commission called on the Kaduna State Government to accede to these demands in ”deserving” cases, provided that ”it is adjudged that such a grant would guarantee peace and stability in the state” (The News, 7 June 1993:20). It, however, condemned vehemently:

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.... the approach adopted by the Katafs and their resort to violence in order to press home their demands for a chiefdom. As a deterrent to others, the Katafs shall be the last to be considered for the grant of a chiefdom among the southern Kaduna groups (The News, June 1993:20)

Notwithstanding the commission's proposals for the compensation and rehabilitation of riot victims and the establishment of chiefdoms, however, its recommendations suggest a general preference for a regulatory, rather than a redistributive or a reorganizational, approach to ethnic minority problems in southern Kaduna. This is also the approach that the Federal Government has tended to pursue.

Thus, in the wake of the May disturbances, two presidentially appointed seven-member tribunals were set up by the Federal Government to try the suspected rioters in accordance with the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree No. 2 of 1987 (now Civil Disturbances Act Cap 53 of the Laws of the Federation 1990). The two tribunals were headed by Justices Benedict Okadigbo and Emmanuel Adegbite respectively.

Both tribunals were subsequently to sentence 14 persons to death, and many other individuals to various terms of imprisonment, for their alleged roles in the May disturbances. Among those sentenced to death were some leading Kataf tribesmen, including retired General Zamani Lekwot, a former military Governor of Rivers State.

Yet, the proceedings and judgments of the tribunals provoked cutting strictures, fervent demonstrations and frenzied litigations from various human rights' bodies, members of the Bar, the Press and southern Kaduna groups, and other interested observers. Some of the reasons for this opposition include:

A statement, allegedly made by President Ibrahim Babangida, after visiting Zango town, that the tribunals he appointed would presume suspects "guilty until proved innocent" (African Guardian, 25 January 1993:19)

The hasty promulgation of Decree 55 of December 1992 which purportedly ousted the competence of regular courts of superior record to make orders against actions of the tribunals which violate constitutional provisions on fundamental human rights.

The improper or illegal constitution of the Okadigbo and Adegbite Tribunals, each of which had seven members, in violation of the provisions of the Civil Disturbances Decree which prescribe a tribunal of five members.

The ethnoreligious imbalance in the composition of the Okadigbo Tribunal. The tribunal had four muslim members, including three Hausa-Fulani. It was, therefore, perceived by the Kataf as susceptible to being influenced by the extreme emotional bitterness among muslim and /or Hausa-Fulani elements over the fate of the Hausa in Zango. It should be noted, however, that a similar religious imbalance was evident in the composition of the Adegbite Tribunal, which had five christian and two muslim members.

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The extremely hostile attitude of Justice Okadigbo to the Kataf defence counsel and witnesses.

The discontinuation of legal representation for the Kataf tribesmen following the decision of their lawyers, led by Chief G.O.K. Ajayi, to withdraw from the Okadigbo Tribunal in protest against the anomalies enumerated above.

Predictably, the death verdicts of the tribunals provoked a legal and political impasse. The National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) — the successor to the AFRC — was not able to ratify the tribunals' decisions because of the political sensitivity of the issue. Moreover, these decisions became the subject of various legal actions in the Supreme Court which restrained the Government from carrying out the death sentences on Lekwot and others. Eventually, the Government was constrained to commute the death sentences to short prison terms.

In view of the controversial and counterproductive character of its regulatory policies on the southern Kaduna crisis, it is useful to consider Government's attitude to alternative policy options for containing the crisis. The most important and compelling of these options remains the policy of reorganization, involving the establishment of new chiefdoms, states or even local government areas in the southern Kaduna region.

Indeed, as from October 1992, the issue of chiefdoms for the Kataf and other southern Kaduna communities featured very prominently in the deliberations of the defunct Kaduna State House of Assembly. Members of the House from southern Kaduna, in particular, worked vigorously to put the issue on the agenda of public policy in the state. Thus, defying the intrigues and opposition of conservative elements and the emirate establishment, the House of Assembly on 19 October 1992 established a seven-man committee, under Alhaji Isa Aliyu Shika, to investigate the issue (Newswatch, 7 December 1992:28). The committee received a total of 71 memoranda by individuals, organizations and communities from all sections of the state. Thirty-seven of these memoranda involved demands for chiefdoms from such southern Kaduna communities as the Bajju (Kaje), Kataf (Atyap), Kadara, Chawai, Kurama, Gbagyi, Kono and Kagarko of Zaria Emirate, as well as the Ninzam, Ayu, Numana, Caninkon and Kagoma of Jema'a Emirate (Newswath, 7 December 1992:28; New Nigerian, 29 December 1992:16).. Twenty-nine of the memoranda were of a general nature, while the remaining five involved demands for more districts.

In the report it submitted during December 1992, however, the Shika Committee simply concluded that the constitutional competence to create new chiefdoms or districts lies with the executive rather than the legislature. Sadly, the Committee could not decide on whether to advise the House to forward the memoranda on new chiefdoms and districts to the State Governor for appropriate action, or to institute a constitutional amendment that would enable the House legislate on the establishment of new units of traditional authority. More importantly, the Committee could not advise on the merits or demerits of the various memoranda presented to it. Such an advice could have served as an important input into any future executive action on the issue of new chiefdoms. In essence, perhaps owing to the

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opposition of the conservative political establishment and traditional ruling class in Kaduna to the idea of new chiefdoms, the Shika Committee was content to reduce its own work to a mere rigmarole.

The executive, for its part, adopted the position that the creation of new chiefdoms was politically and financially inexpedient. In the words of the National Republican Convention (NRC) Governor, Dabo Lere:

The main problem is the number of tribes that are involved.... Everybody wants a chiefdom, and we have so many tribes. This is physically impossible. And in these days of lean finances, if you make a chief, the chief is entitled to a lot of regalia, you have to build a palace for him, you have to buy him not only one car but cars that will befit him... and so on. And these things cost money. Instead of spending that money creating hospitals or... roads, you spend the money creating so many chiefs (African Concord, 8 February 1993:19).

Given the attempt by Governor Lere to portray the demand for new chiefdoms as economically diversionary, it is instructive to note that the southern Kaduna groups see such chiefdoms as a means of accelerating development in their areas. Indeed, the southern Kaduna communities often attribute their relative backwardness to the insentivity of the emirate authorities to the developmental needs of these communities. This insensitivity is said to be underscored by the unwillingness of the emirate to make any serious efforts to attract development to the southern Kaduna region. In essence, Governor Lere's apparent postulation of a dichotomy between political autonomy and economic development would appear unconvincing to the southern Kaduna people.

Pressures and proposals for a reorganizational solution to the southern Kaduna problem have not been limited to demands for the establishment of new chiefdoms. The Government has also had to contend with pressures and proposals for the creation of new states and/or local governments in the southern Kaduna region.

The subdivision of Kaduna State into Kaduna and Katsina States by the Babangida Administration in September 1987 was widely approved by the southern Kaduna groups since this reorganization gave them a relatively more enhanced position within the new and smaller Kaduna State. However, the euphoria in southern Kaduna over the excision of Katsina from Kaduna soon evaporated as the southern Kaduna elites became increasingly disenchanted with what they described as "a grand design to scheme us out of the affairs of Kaduna State" (National Concord, 13 June 1988:16-18). In particular, the southern Kaduna elites inveighed against their inadequate representation in the critical decision-making sectors of the Kaduna State Civil Service, and the systematic manipulation of political appointments and civil service postings and promotions to favour indigenes of mainstream Zaria. In the words of the southern Kaduna elements:

The totality of evidence, both direct and indirect,... points to the fact that some senior public officers in the state civil service who hold key positions in the state government, particularly from Zaria Local Government Area, have formed the habit of manipulating Government

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machinery in order to achieve a total enslavement of the people from the other local government areas of the state (National Concord, 13 June 1988:16).

Following the May 1992 disturbances, allegations of the victimization of southern Kaduna civil servants in general, and the Kataf ethnic class in the bureaucracy in particular, became even more strident (Kukah, 1992:1).

It was in this context of deepening inter-ethnic distrust and bitterness that proposals began to emerge for the further subdivision of Kaduna State into Zazzau and Jema'a or Gurara (Southern Zaria) States, along the lines of the Hausa/Fulani — non-Hausa minorities' divide (Jibrin, 1993:5). As trenchantly articulated by a group of southern Kaduna indigenes in Plateau State in May 1993, such a subdivision could help to mitigate, if not eliminate, the following "social facts" of the southern Kaduna situation (The Guardian, 30 May 1993:A17):

The wide gap in socioeconomic development and political representation between the northern and southern parts of Kaduna State.

The systematic attempts to reduce the peoples of southern Kaduna to "second class citizens, slaves, drawers of water and hewers of wood."

The political and cultural subjugation of the southern Kaduna people under the emirate system, and the failure to create chiefdoms for these peoples.

The perpetration of various forms of religious discrimination and persecution against southern Kaduna groups.

The concentration of a disproportionate number of educational institutions in northern Kaduna at the expense of the southern parts of the state.

However, although the case for a southern Zaria state had also featured prominently in the report of the 1986-87 Political Bureau, and the Federal Government has become increasingly lavish in its state reorganization policies, the prospects for the subdivision of Kaduna appear to be poor for at least three reasons.

In the first place, considerable differences exist among the affected communities over the demarcation and configuration of the proposed Zazzau and Jema'a (Gurara) States. For instance, competing claims have been made to the important city of Kaduna by both the Hausa-Fulani and the non-Hausa-Fulani blocs. Such divisiveness, it would be recalled, has been the Achilles' heel of demands for new states in other parts of the country, including the Rivers State. Secondly, the state creation strategy cannot resolve, and may in fact compound, the position of the Hausa settler communities of southern Zaria who may become isolated, alienated and marginalized in the proposed Jema'a or Gurara State. A final and related problem is that with the departure of the Hausa-Fulani power group, the establishment of Jema'a State may simply open up a new phase of competition and conflict among the diverse communities of southern Zaria. Nevertheless, the relatively complex and dispersed ethnic structure of the Jema'a State will probably produce less polarizing and destabilizing

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outcomes than the centralized ethnic structure in the present Kaduna State (cf. Horowitz, 1985:39).

Finally, Government has faced intensive pressures from minority communities in the southern Kaduna region for the creation of additional local government areas in the region (The Guardian, 3 August 1992 and 30 May 1993). These pressures were never satisfied by the extensive reorganizations of the local government structure undertaken by the Babangida Administration during May 1987 and August — September 1991. Both of these reorganizational exercises increased the number of localities in the country from 301 to 589. Consequently, like other groups in Nigeria, the southern Kaduna communities have continued to agitate for additional local government areas as a means of bringing "government and development" closer to their region, and of giving more effective expression to the cultural complexity of this part of Kaduna State. Despite the Federal Military Government's continuing commitment to the creation of additional local government areas in the country, however, the deluge of competing demands for new localities from several parts of the federation, the increasing official sensitivity to the counterproductive effects of too many local government areas, and the entrenchment of the local government territorial structure in the Federal constitution, all make the prospects for the creation of additional areas in southern Kaduna somewhat uncertain.

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Nigerian Tribune, Wednesday 19 February

News

TANGO-KATAFF CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Tribunal calls for memoranda

Dare Oyewole
Kaduna

THE judicial commission of inquiry into the Tango-Kataff civil disturbances has called for memorandum from members of the public who have useful and relevant information or facts about the crisis.

The panel which is headed by Justice Rahila Cudjoe is empowered to investigate and establish the immediate and remote causes of the disturbances, make suggestions and recommendations as to the appropriate measures the government should take to deal with those involved in such acts and also how to prevent future re-occurrence.

In a statement issued in Kaduna on Monday, the secretary to the commission, Mr E.U. Sukola directed interested persons to submit their memoranda to state attorney general's chambers at the Ministry of Justice, Kaduna or to the office of the secretary to the state government or to the secretary Tango-Kataff Local Government.

It will be recalled that violent crisis broke out in the area following disagreements over the local government council's decision to relocate the Tango market.

Thirty people were officially said to have been killed during the riot and 50 others sustained serious injuries while unspecified number of houses were set ablaze.

Meanwhile, the state governor, Alhaji Mohammed Dabo Lere has directed that emergency relief materials be made available for distribution to those rendered homeless.

The governor who gave the directive when he paid a condolence visit to the affected communities at the weekend appealed to all and sundry in the state to learn how to live in peace with one another.

THE Akwa Ibom state Government is not happy with local government councils in the state that owe their staff salary arrears.

The state deputy governor, Mr Etim Okpkyo, revealed this on Monday in Uyo in reaction to reports of non-payment of workers' salaries by some local governments in the state.

Mr. Okpkyo who was exchanging views with executive members of the National Association of Nurses and Midwives on a visit to his office, said government would never

A-Ibom unhappy over non-payment salary arrears

identify with such a situation.

He said that the state government was considering the possibility of getting the local governments to set aside workers' salaries before channelling funds into other projects which he said would help regularise payment of salaries to workers.

The state chairperson of the association, Mrs. Koko Etuk, had earlier appealed to the state government to take over the payment of nurses' working in the local government.

According to her, many local government councils had not paid their member salaries for months now.

She also appealed to the state government to impress upon local governments to remit to the association than shame of deductions from member's salaries and other entitlements.

Assemblyman decries A-Ibom budget

THE 1992 Akwa Ibom State budget has been described as unrealistic.

This was the view of a member of the state House of Assembly at the end of a five-day debate of the budget proposal presented to the house.

The member Mr. Sunday Akpan, representing Etinan the constituency said that "from a hard look at the budget proposal, there was no way the state could generate the estimated ₦1.2 billion for its capital expenditure of ₦677.041 million and recurrent expenditure of ₦623.431 million.

Mr. Akpan argued that the economy of the state was very poor owing to its civil service orientation and weak industrial base.

He also pointed out that external loans projected in the budget would be hard to acquire because creditor nations would be reluctant to grant such loans in the light of previous non-payments.

Consequently, Mr. Akpan urged the state legislature and executive to trim down the budget to a manageable package.

To finance expenditure in the 1992 budget, the state government has estimated that ₦851 million would be realised from the federation account while ₦62.528 million will be internally generated and the balance sourced from external loans.

Meanwhile, the bill has been passed to the Appropriation and Finance Committee for study and recommendation.

Motion against minister set for March 18

James Dadzie,
Lagos

A MOTION seeking to restrain the Minister of Mines, Power and Steel, Air Vice Marshal Nura Immam from Interfering, Interrupting operations and stopping of all mining operations at the Owukpa mines was on Monday adjourned to 18 March, 1992 by the Lagos High Court.

The motion was brought by Bulnig Mining Company Limited, a co-defendant in a N500 million suit filed by another mining company, Bienventures against Bulnig, the Nigerian Coal Corporation, the Mines Minister and four others for a breach of contract.

In a 13-paragraph affidavit in support of the motion, Mr. John Akinsanya, a company executive of Bulnig deposed that it is a term of agreement that his company be granted a lease to commence mining operations at the Owukpa mines by the Nigerian Coal Corporation.

Mr. Akinsanya said that by letters dated 22 November, 1991 and 22 January 1992, the Minister of Mines, through his stoppage of operations at the Owukpa mines.

Aspirant calls for funding of parties

A PRESIDENTIAL aspirant on the platform of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Chief Layi Balogun, has implored the Federal Government not to stop funding the two political parties so that the money bags will not hijack them.

Chief Balogun made the call on Monday at the monthly political forum organised by the Oyo State council of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) at the Press Centre, Iyaganku, Ibadan.

Chief Balogun who described politics as an attempt to control other people, either by coercion or by democracy, said he had no personal grudge with anybody in the party.

BALARABE

Continued from Page 1

in this country have to resolve and deliver the country."

The former governor explained that since the military ban the politicians each time they come into power, it was imperative that the military leaves the civilians alone when the civilians are back in power.

"No member of the Armed Forces should be allowed to hold any of these posts. I am not calling for a decree though", he said.

The former governor said that though everybody has a right to contest any post, civilians should exercise their rights not to vote in retired military officers.

Commenting on the claim in some political circles that only retired military officers could stop coups, Alhaji Balarabe said it was the civilians who would tell them (retired military officers) that Nigeria could be ruled without the military.

"The military should perform their functions just like workers, engineers, teachers and just like any other segment of the society. They are an integral part of Nigeria, but now we are talking of political leadership.

"Yar 'Adua is saying that Nigeria cannot make it without military leadership now. We are telling him that Nigeria will make it without military leadership and we should show him by not voting him in if he attempts to contest", he stressed.

OIL

Continued from Page 1

Arabia, had expressed reservations about the OPEC decision, arguing that the proposed cut in production would not in any way affect the prices of oil in international markets which stood at about $18.45 a barrel last weekend.

Oil market watchers were also of the opinion that the failure of the market to respond positively through price increase to OPEC decision might signify a gradual erosion of the organisation's power to influencing oil prices at the international market.

It would be recalled that Nigeria was allocated 1.751 million barrels per day production level last Saturday by OPEC.

However, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Professor Jibril Aminu, indicated that Nigeria would press for an upward review of the allocation.

Observers also believed that unless this is done, the Federal Government budgetary package for this year might be a goose chase.

VILLAGE

Continued from Page 1

ary school property he was accused of stealing.

The deceased was said to have revealed where he had kept the stolen items ... ing which the village chief went with some of his councillors to confirm it. But on their return, however, they discovered the man had been beaten to death by some youth.

The village chief and his councillors, who were detained by the police at Ikotedibon police station for six days, were later released on bail last Sunday.

When the *Nigerian Tribune* called at the state police command for confirmation the police PRO was not present but police sources indicated that the matter had not been officially reported to the police headquarters.

NAVY

Continued from Page 1

Admiral Dan Preston Omatsola.

Also, Rear-Admiral J. O. Ayinla is now the Chief of Personnel at Naval Headquarters, while Commander J. O. Pearse becomes the new Commander of the Navy Information Management Corps (NIMAC).

NRC

Continued from Page 1

opment, "the committee stands adjourned".

The committee had invited Alhaji Mantu, Mr. Fani-Kayode and Mr. Francis Doukpolagha to appear before it yesterday to defend themselves against various charges of indiscipline and anti-party activities.

Meanwhile, Mr. Fani-Kayode has indicated his intention to go to court latest this week to sue the national chairman of the party, Chief Tom Ikimi, for an alleged libel.

According to Mr. Agoro, Mr. Fani Kayode had instructed him to start a court proceeding against Chief Ikimi, because of the libel contained in a release issued on him by the press secretary to the chairman, Mr. Ida Iguaabor, sometime last month.

BRIEFS

MWAN elects officers

THE Oyo State branch of the Medical Women's Association of Nigeria (MWAN) has elected new officers for the year 1992-1993. They are Dr. Remi Iyun, president; Kike Osinusi, vice-president; Dr. Ibilola Adeika, secretary; Dr. Shade Omokuodion, assistant secretary. Others are Dr. Yinka Ashaye, treasurer; Dr. Ronke Makinde-Idahosa, financial secretary; Dr. Balogun and Dr. Akinwale, ex-officio members. Among others, the association intends this year to establish a well equipped screening centre and help 12 primary health workers serve Lagun and its environs.

Minister visits immigration office

THE Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Tunji Olagunju, ... be in Ibadan at the Immigration Office, Oyo ... headquarters, in continuation of his familiarisation ... establishments under his ministry.

Pilgrims

THE Niger State Pilgrims Board on Monday in Minna advised this year's intending pilgrims to pay their hajj fares on or before 20th April 1992 or miss performing it. According to a statement signed by the board's director, Alhaji Mohammed Kagara, ... male intending pilgrim was expected to pay a minimum of N17,582.50k and a maximum of N23,757.50k, while females were to pay a minimum of N17,992.50k and maximum of N24,067.50k.

Oke passes away

THE death has been announced of the mother of ... chief education officer ... Motorised Brigade, Ikeja, Col. Walter Oke. Late ... Mrs. Mary Eyunsefere ... died at the Eko Hospital ... during a brief illness. She survived by Lt.-Col. ... Oke and the wife of Brig. John Shagaya, military secretary, Army Headquarters, Mr. Paulin Shagaya ... Mrs. Oke will be buried in Orogun village in ... Wanogho's compound ... Delta State on Saturday ... February 1992.

Nwachukwu for Kenya

THE Foreign Affairs Minister, Retired Maj-Gen. ... Nwachukwu, on Monday ... Abuja for Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire ... Somalia to deliver ... messages from the chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), President Ibrahim Babangida, to ... counterparts in those countries. Maj-Gen. ...

iii. Tribune Newspaper

Zango/Kataf, Kaduna Crisis (1992)

NIGERIAN Tribune

Founded 16 November 1949 • • NO. 18,063 WEDNESDAY 20 MAY 1992 N2.00

General arrested over Kaduna riots

•300 dead so far
•two pastors included
•offices remain shut
•JNI offices, churches burnt

MAJOR General (rtd) Zamani Lekwot has been arrested in connection with the on-going riots in Kaduna.

The General, said to be guilty of complicity, was said to have been picked up during investigations to unearth the cause(s) of the riots.

Offices remained closed in Kaduna yesterday as pockets of clashes continued.

Unconfirmed reports put the number of the dead at about 300 including two pastors.

The headquarters of the Jama'atul Nasiril Islam (JNI) was also burnt down. Most of the non-indigenes have taken refuge in police and army barracks.

Though there was heavy military presence on the streets, reports stated that curfew could not continue for two days if security is not beefed up.

It would be recalled that the Kaduna riots were a spill over from Zango Kataf Local Government in Kaduna State where many people were killed at the weekend.

The relatives of the dead were said to have reacted violently on seeing the corpses.

The fight, initially, was between the Hausas in Zango Kataf and the indigenes over the relocation of the town's main market.

The government is reported still at a loss on why non-indigenes are always the target of attacks in the event of riots in the North.

Disagreements between the Hausa-Fulani and indigenes of the town first surfaced in February this year leaving at least 38 people dead.

Following this, the Kaduna State government set up a panel of enquiry to look into the matter.

The government was yet to arrive at a decision over the panel's report when the latest hate explosion in Zango Kataf leaving several people dead.

The riot spreads to Kaduna metropolis when the bodies of those who died in Zango Kataf were brought to the Kaduna General Hospital.

WAITING FOR VOTERS CARDS

•SOME eligible voters who could not register yesterday at Mokola, Ibadan, set early as 12 a.m. because there were no registration cards. PIX... BY OLADEBIKAN BAYO.

UI re-opens May 29

THE University of Ibadan is to re-open on 29 May 1992.

The decision to re-open the institution was taken at a Senate meeting held last Monday.

100 level students are to report to the campus on Friday, May 29 and commence a week-long examination from June 1 to 5, while post graduate students are also to arrive the campus on the same day.

Two hundred to 500 level students are to report on Saturday, 6 June 1992 and start their examinations from July 27 to August 7, this year.

The Senate has also suspended, until further notice, the students union executive with immediate effect.

Each student is to pay the sum of N25.00 for damage

See UI, Page 2

FG bans political groups

Ola Awonyi, Abuja

THE Federal Government has proscribed all associations such as the Middle-Belt Forum, CAHA, Association of Northern Elders, Egbe Omoluabi Funsho, Committee for Unity and Understanding.

Other such groups said by the government are the Association of Minority Oil States, Commonwealth of Oil Producing Areas and any other such association of persons made of a select group of states excluding other states in the federation.

Announcing the proscription order in Abuja yesterday, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation, Mr Clement Akpamgbo (SAN), said that the government had decided to follow "all such associations which are based on the basis of being political, religious, ethnic, tribal, cultural or social interests of a group of persons or individuals contrary to the peace, order and good government of the federation."

He said that the government had been gravely concerned about the springing up of several associations and groups organised mainly along tribal, ethnic, religious or other parochial lines.

These organisations, the government noted, had at various points in the transition programme, had a largely disruptive influence on the free choice of individuals which was the ultimate objective of the programme.

The government noted

See BAN, Page 2

Voters registration yet to start in some areas

THE registration of voters exercise which started all over the country on Monday has not taken off in Ikeja Eze Odo Local Government Area of Ondo State.

Prince Adebanjo Edema, chairman of the Ondo State Housing Corporation, who is an indigene of the area, told a news conference in Akure yesterday that materials meant for the local government were still in the warehouse of the local government in Igbokoda.

He said that given the difficult terrain of the local government, it was most unlikely that the materials would be distributed round the local

See VOTERS, Page 2

Nigeria under arms siege

Abiodun Akinsu's Abeokuta

THE Ogun State Police Commissioner, Mr Olusegun Akinlade, yesterday alerted the nation of the presence of sophisticated weapons now being recovered by the police from militants, especially those suspected to be members of the underworld.

Briefing newsmen in Abeokuta yesterday over the recent upsurge of armed robbery in the state, Mr Akinlade disclosed that the weapons included sophisticated submachine guns like those used in the Liberian civil war and bore the insignia of the United States of America.

Mr Akinlade, who wondered how the weapons got into the hands of hoodlums, said the police had now been put on red alert and roadblocks were being set up to arrest the situation.

The police boss, who also disclosed a new wave of

See ARMS, Page 2

INSIDE
•Africa: The legacy of a brutal history —P5
•What are Gana, Jakande up to? —P6
•Walker's Candour —P9
•Megaforce signs on diplomatic relations with Israel —P13
•Shooting stars players protest —BP

iv. **Tribune Newspaper**

NIGERIAN Tribune

Founded 16 November 1949 ++ NO. 10,064 THURSDAY 21 MAY 1992 N2.00

AS PEACE RETURNS TO KADUNA

Jitters of riot grip Kano

Sunday Alu
Kano

BUSINESS activities in Sabon Gari area of Kano metropolis grounded to a halt for over two hours yesterday as non-indigenes locked up their shops and took to their heels following the rumours of another riot in the state capital.

There was confusion in the city over rumours that the disturbance in Kaduna had spread to Kano.

The rumour raised tension which caused confusion in the state capital and forced businessmen and women, who had earlier opened their shops and stores for the day's business as early as 8 a.m. to close down and head for some areas in Sabon Gari believed to be safe.

Some non-indigenes who were determined to resist the rumoured attack on them stood by the streets ready to repel any attack while the Sabon Gari Market was also deserted.

Parents who had children in secondary and primary schools within Sabon Gari and other areas of Kano metropolis also rushed to the schools to pick their children while the schools already deserted were immediately closed down.

Life, however, returned to normal after two hours of restlessness of the non-indigenes who later discovered that there was no need for panicking.

Business activities in the area picked up again in full as shops and the market earlier deserted were later reopened.

The Kano State police command had earlier drafted policemen with tear gas and armed, mobile policemen to strategic areas in the state capital, especially Sabon Gari, where they were seen patrolling the streets in

See KANO, Page 2

Protest again in Lagos

By
Sam Ugo

LAGOS again experienced a bout of demonstration yesterday as about five hundred people took to the streets ostensibly protesting the high prices of commodities in the country.

The demonstration, which was confined to the business areas in Lagos Island, particularly Oluwole, Marina and Apongbon, was generally peaceful.

All the same, traders as well as many offices hastily locked up to forestall hoodlums from looting their wares and business properties.

Some roadside traders on Breadfruit Street and Apongbon and parts of Oke Aarin lost some of their wares to the kaiz street boys who soon took over the demonstration.

As though anticipating

See LAGOS, Page 2

Corpses litter Kaduna hospitals

-Governor Kabiru Gaya

-Governor Muhammed Da'u Lere

HEAPS of decaying corpses now litter various government hospitals in Kaduna.

Unconfirmed sources put the death toll of the sectarian violent upheavals which engulfed Kaduna metropolis within the last four days at close to 1,000.

Our correspondent in Kaduna reported that among the casualities were three clergymen, a popular artiste with the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), Kaduna, a top Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) official in Zaria and six policemen, including

See KADUNA, Page 2

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Voters compelled to produce old cards

By Wole Elunnuga/
Kola Olonilde &
Sunday Oyediji

AS the voters registration exercise entered its third day yesterday, people were compelled to produce their previous registration cards before they could be registered in some centres.

Those who were unable to tender the required cards were turned back unregistered.

At a centre in Ward 8, Mokola area of Ibadan, some of the registration officers interviewed said the measure was "to help prevent people from bringing the abandoned cards to the polling stations during elections".

Some of the people who claimed that they were not opportuned to register during the last exercise were not registered.

Shortage of registration cards hindered the exercise in most centres visited.

Officers in some registration centres were seen sitting idly waiting for the arrival of more cards having exhausted

See VOTERS, Page 2

Ban 'll drive political groups underground

News analysis
By Segun Olatunji

THE Federal Government on Tuesday outlawed political groups such as the Middle Belt Forum, CARIA, Association of Northern Elders, Egbe Isokoso Yoruba, Committee for Unity and Understanding, etc.

The decision was on the premise that "all such associations which were formed for furthering political, religious, ethnic, tribal, cultural or social interests of a group of persons or individuals, contrary to the peace, order and good governance of the federation" are against the

See BAN, Page 2

News

LAGOS

Continued from Page 1

such a protest, authorities of the General Post Office, Marina, not only mounted serious security at their premises, ever before the demonstration began, but the iron shutter-doors of its entrances were drawn with the result that a lot of people who wanted to transact businesses at the post office had to leave when they could not gain entrance.

Although the head postmaster could not be reached for comment, a reliable source at the office informed the **Nigerian Tribune** that such a security measure was taken because of the riotous mood in Lagos and also because of the large number of people milling around the office to buy JAMB forms.

As at the time of filing in this report, the demonstration was generally peaceful while efforts to put the Lagos State Police Public Relations Officer, Mr. Wole Odubela, or his commissioner did not bear fruit.

KANO

Continued from Page 1

armoured vehicles while the state radio on an hourly interval, broadcast advice to the people to go about their normal business and assured them of protection.

The state commissioner of police, Alhaji Abdulkadir Shehu, in an interview warned the public to be aware of rumour peddlers among them and advised that such rumour mongers trying to cause the break down of law and order should be reported to the nearest police station.

KADUNA

Continued from Page 1

two inspectors.

The affected policemen were said to have been killed at Tundun Wada area of Kaduna while trying to quell the riot.

Many people were reportedly burnt alive either on the streets or inside their houses or vehicles by the rioters.

The crisis, which subsided on Monday afternoon, was again heightened on Tuesday night at Nasarawa, Sabon Tasha, Ungwar Television, and Ungwar Sanusi areas of Kaduna metropolis in spite of the dusk to dawn curfew and the monitoring of the areas by military personnel.

Sporadic shootings were heard in these areas till about 3.30 a.m. mid night on Tuesday.

As at yesterday afternoon, uneasy calm still reigns in Kaduna metropolis as commercial activities remained paralysed.

Some of those who took refuge in military barracks are yet to come out of hiding in spite of assurances by the state governor, Alhaji Mohammed Dabo Lere, that the situation was under control.

Meanwhile, National Republican Convention (NRC) frontline presidential aspirant, Alhaji Lema Jibrilu, has commended both the Federal and Kaduna State governments for the prompt way they handled the "unfortunate sectarian crisis" that took place in parts of Kaduna State.

In a press release issued on his behalf by his director of public affairs, Alhaji Zakari Yakubu, Alhaji Lema appealed to all Nigerians to learn to live together in peace and harmony.

"It is necessary that we cultivate a mutual acceptance and respect for one another's religious and cultural norms for that is the way God Almighty wishes from all of us", he said.

Alhaji Lema also commended the Federal Government for the timely proscription of the unsavoury tribal, religious and regional ideological associations that were formed.

VOTERS

Continued from Page 1

the ones in their possession.

It was gathered that between 50 and 100 cards were given out to each centre every morning with a view to providing more when they have been exhausted.

When the **Nigerian Tribune** contacted the National Electoral Commission (NEC) office at Ibadan, the assistant public affairs officer, Mr Femi Akinbiyi, confirmed the incident.

Mr Akinbiyi said NEC deliberately restricted the number of cards given out to forestall any foul play in the exercise.

He maintained that NEC was a bit handicapped by vehicles, which he said if available, could facilitate their rate of monitoring the exercise.

Mr Akinbiyi said what they planned for was to be moved round the centres with the help of supervisors to provide cards wherever they are not enough.

Some affected voters who spoke with the **Nigerian Tribune** attributed the shortage to the 1991 census figure which NEC is using.

The Kwara State governor, Alhaji Shaaba Lafiagi, ordered all political appointees in the state to go back to their respective local governments to mobilise their people for the registration exercise.

The governor gave the order yesterday after inspecting registration centres in Ilorin and Moro local government areas of the state.

The governor, who was unimpressed by the low turn out of eligible voters at the various registration centres, said that all commissioners, special advisers, directors-general and all chairmen of boards and parastatals should proceed to their respective local government areas to mobilise their people.

He said that the political appointees should remain in their local government and mobilise their people for registration until Monday, 25 May, 1992 when the exercise would end.

Alhaji Lafiagi also appealed to traditional rulers in the state to mobilise their people for the exercise.

Most of the centres visited by the governor in Ilorin recorded as low as four voters while up to 50 voters were recorded in a few centres where the turn out was fair on the third day of the exercise.

Meanwhile, only 45 percent of the 1991 population census figures of Nigerians are to be registered by NEC during the ongoing registration of voters exercise. This indication was given yesterday by the Resident Electoral Commissioner of Ogun State, Mallam Ismaila Musa Makun, while speaking after an inspection tour of some registration centres in Obafemi/Owode, Sagamu, Ikenne, Odogbolu, Ijebu-Ode and Ijebu North local government areas of the state.

Shortage of registration materials has been reported in various parts of the state.

Though no reason was given for the shortage, Mallam Makun, who along with the state deputy governor, Chief Rafiu Ogunleye, went round to see things for themselves, promised to look into the complaints of shortage of materials.

He, however, said that the voters card were sensitive materials and that electoral officers were duly controlling the distribution of the cards in line with the new population figures of each area.

In his own remarks, the deputy governor expressed the hope that the state NEC would remedy the problem of shortage of voters card.

BAN

Continued from Page 1

spirit of democracy. The government further hinged its action on the need to provide a climate of free choice, conducive to "our grassroots democracy."

Interestingly, all the banned associations, in spite of possible protestations to the contrary, are political groups in one form or the other. We can thus safely infer that they are the target of the proscription order.

The action definitely proceeded from government's belief that such groups were capable of tearing the country apart, given their exclusive nature as opposed to democracy which is accommodationist. This fear is legitimate.

Yet, the ban stands to achieve exactly the polar opposite of what is intended because it bespeaks a flawed understanding of 'grassroots' democracy.

Democracy is all about group interests. Indeed, this form of governance is based on the logic that society harbours disparate interests and aspirations which should not be forcefully brought into harmony as socialism and communism attempted to do, but that all differences should be resolved within the context of negotiation, understanding and compromise without any group or interest being left out.

Proceeding from this premise, political or ethnic groups are natural fallouts of any political set up. If it is thus legitimate for all groups and individuals to seek to advance and articulate their interests within the ambit of democracy, then, there is nothing out of place if they perceive formal associations as the most realistic vehicles for doing this.

Unless, of course, we are being told that there are no diverse interests in Nigeria, in which case the concept of democracy and transition will be irrelevant and the military can continue to govern in a regimented manner.

If the associations had been allowed to evolve, at a stage, they would have been forced to coalesce their positions because no single unit can exclusively produce the president. This would have given the Third Republic a foundation based on the spirit of give and take, a quality in short supply in previous experiments. Stifling this healthy trend through a flat approximates to sacrificing democracy on a dubious promise.

It is both self-defeatist and self-deluding that a country as educationally, religiously and culturally diverse as Nigeria could be free of contending ideas and aspirations as each group aspires to political power. An absence of this conflict will, in itself, render democracy irrelevant.

It is too late in the day to begin to pay lip service to 'free' choice when the transition itself is predicated on the absence of it.

The two parties were not Nigeria's choice, neither was the amendment to Decree 50 which took away the power of the legislature to approve the list of commissioners.

We can equally not pretend that in the last gubernatorial elections and the elections into the houses of assembly that Nigerians were allowed to make 'free' choice. It is an open market secret that the process was controlled and moderated, in the main, by money cabals and five-star thugs.

The emergence of the associations, headed by patriotic, informed and urbane Nigerians, thus served as a new lease of life, raising hopes that future elections would be better managed.

Apart from its potentials to expose the transition to a crisis of credibility because the groups were mainly born a section of the country, the action may be suggestive of the inability of the military to reconcile itself with the realities of democracy, a free market of contending ideas, aspirations and interests which can be distilled by the multifarious groups and mutually beneficial positions taken.

Proscribing these powerful groups would drive them underground where they would flower because the government would be incapable of monitoring and regulating their activities in the desired direction.

Happily, Nigerians hardly need any association to make their will known in a free and fair election.

Waziri supports ban on political groups

A PRESIDENTIAL aspirant of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Senator Mahmud Waziri, has endorsed the Federal Government's proscription of regional groupings.

He said that the action had vindicated his earlier stand that there should not be regional groupings during the transition programme.

Speaking in Lagos yesterday, Senator Waziri said regional groupings only tend to inflame the fire of tribalism, adding that anyone who wants to be president should take the country as his sole constituency.

Senator Waziri, who was one of the presidential aspirants endorsed by the Middle Belt Forum, disclosed that he had long maintained at previous meetings of the forum that the Middle Belt alone could not produce the president.

He said that the country was too large and diverse for any regional grouping to dictate who should be president of this country.

BRIEFS

Installation

AN Onde based businessman and philanthropist, Chief S. K. Adeyeye is to be installed the Adaja of Onde by the new Olumawe of Onde on Saturday in what is the first public outing of the new oba. With this title, Chief Adeyeye becomes a High Chief and a king-maker in Onde land.

Oludare is dead

THE death has occurred in Ibadan, Oyo State of Mr Nathaniel Olawale Olusde (Alias E ku Pelington), who died during a brief illness at Jericho Nursing Home, Ibadan. There will be service of songs and christian wake-keeping at his residence — Adubi Guest House, SW9/675E, Bora Road, BCJ, Moor Plantation, Ibadan, Oyo State today and tomorrow. Also a funeral service will be held at First Baptist Church, Idikan, Ibadan where the motorcade will leave for Ilora for the lying-in-state and for short service at First Baptist Church, Ilora. He will be buried on his land at Alamo Layout of Jagun Akindele's Compound. He is survived by wives, children and grand children. Entertainment of all guests will be at his residence Ilora, Moor Plantation, Ibadan same day.

Missing purse

MR Anthony Ulagba of the Customs and Excise Department, P.M.B. 5220, Agodi, Ibadan, Oyo State, has lost his purse containing his identity card, driving license, and international passport last May 8 at Ijokodo area of Ibadan. If found, please return to the above address.

King's College buffet

THIS year's buffet organised in honour of new parents by the Parents' — Teachers' Association of King's College, Lagos, comes up on Sunday in the College Hall, at 3.00 p.m.

Adedeji passes on

PRINCESS Comfort Opeyemi Alina Adedeji the Iya-Ijo of St. Paul's Anglican Church, Odo-Ona Ibadan is dead. She died on April 29 this year at the age of 107, funeral arrangements are as follows.

Special wake-keeping today at St Paul's Anglican Church, Odo-Ona Ibadan at 6.00 p.m.

Wake keeping service tomorrow at the deceased's residence at SW9/127A Odo-Ona Ibadan at 6.00 p.m.

Funeral service on Saturday at St Paul's Anglican Church Odo-Ona Ibadan at 11.00 a.m.

Thanksgiving service on Sunday at the same church Odo-Ona at 11.00 a.m. prompt.

C. Sagamu Inter-ethnic Crisis, 1999

i. Tribune Newspaper

Sagamu / Oro Cult Crisis 1999

NIGERIAN TRIBUNE — THE NEWSPAPER FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM

50th ANNIVERSARY 1949-1999

Founded, 16 November, 1949 ★★ NO. 12,116 TUESDAY, 20 JULY, 1999 N40.00

Sagamu: Death toll now 120

Lasisi Olagunju and Wole Efunnuga in Sagamu

DEATH toll in Sagamu's violent clashes has risen to 120, eyewitnesses told the *Nigerian Tribune* in the town yesterday.

Men of the Lagos State Rapid Response Squad and other anti-riot policemen mobilised from the state and neighbouring ones, at noon yesterday succeeded in restoring some degree of normalcy.

At the central setting of the violent clashes, all buildings were burnt beyond repairs with some still emitting smoke. Several charred remains of vehicles also littered the area.

Sources said that in some of the buildings, scores of people including children were trapped and burnt to death.

Already, 35 of such corpses which were retrievable would be given mass burial any moment from now.

Apart from these, eyewitnesses said bloody violence continued till about 9 a.m. yesterday with several streets of the town littered with corpses.

But many of the corpses, according to eyewitnesses, were removed from those streets shortly before the state governor, Chief Olusegun Osoba, arrived the town for the second time in two days to appeal to the warring sides to give peace a chance.

Several people were seen moving out of the trouble spots with their belongings, apparently for fear of a repeat attack.

Several stern looking anti-riot policemen were seen in these areas enforcing the peace and screening every passer-by.

The state governor was particularly disturbed with the ugly incident and has, consequently, ordered immediate transfer of the Area Commander, Alhaji A. Shehu, following indictment by residents. He has ordered

(Continued on Page 6)

Syphilis causes madness!

What you should know about BACK PAIN

Ndiokho tasks NAFDAC, SON

Buhari may face independent prosecutors

Govs, dep govs may lose seats

...Buhari sues *The News* for ₦500m

Bitrus Yohanna, Ibadan and Yemi Giwa, Abuja

TWO governors, two deputy governors, an official in the National Assembly and at least a committee chairman in the Assembly are among public officers already in panic over the presidential permission for the State Security Service (SSS) to investigate any allegation of impropriety against any elected official just as the embattled Speaker of the House of Representatives, Alhaji Salisu

(Continued on Page 2)

House may force Buhari to step down

THE embattled Speaker of the House, Alhaji Salisu Buhari, may step down as the House debates a motion on the forgery allegations, the House Rules Committee chairman, Musa Elayo, has hinted.

Addressing the press yesterday, the committee chairman noted that while he might not pre-empt what would happen

(Continued on Page 2)

Vehicles burnt in the Sagamu clash. PIC BY KUBURAT ALULADE GANIYU. More pictures on Page 6 & 7

Another legislator exposed

Lawale Rasheed, Abuja

security operatives screen legislators, fresh forgery scandal has rocked the leadership of the just as the party's caucuses plot to remove their leaders.

ranking officer of the House is also in the soup over and age falsifications.

party chief (names withheld) is involved in the fire-fighting efforts to save the Speaker and it was gathered that stumbled on his record in the course of screening the

officer is alleged to be under-aged and was never a student of Ibadan and Ahmadu Bello universities where he claimed graduated.

(Continued on Page 2)

AD govs stall NBN's take-off —*CBN*

Seye Akinola, Lagos

THE Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has alerted the nation over clandestine moves by some people to subvert its plans to bring the embattled National Bank of Nigeria (NBN) to full operation as soon as possible.

The *Nigerian Tribune* exclusively gathered that the apex bank which had given the Udu'a Investment Company Limited the approval-in-principle for the re-vitalization of the National Bank of Nigeria since June 8, 1999, is now worried that no serious step has been taken by the new governors of the owner states of the NBN to effect the immediate reopening of the institution for normal banking operations.

A top CBN official told the

(Continued on Page 2)

Page 6 • NEWS • Nigerian Tribune, Tuesday 20 July, 1999

Sagamu: Death toll now 120

(Continued from Page 1)

the crisis.

The Area Commander in charge of Abeokuta, Mr. Mike Foyibo, has taken over as the Area Commander for Sagamu as residents said bluntly that a non-Yoruba and a non-Hausa officer make a better replacement.

Throughout the better part of yesterday, there was tension in all the nooks and crannies of Sagamu including the palace of the *Akarigbo of Remoland*, Oba Michael Sonariwo, which was heavily besieged by armed residents.

Oba Sonariwo told the state governor, Chief Olusegun Osoba, that things were still not normal in the area. He complained that the banks still refused to transact business despite assurance from him.

Responding, Chief Osoba said intolerance was the cause of the crises, adding that "if there was certain degree of tolerance by the two parties, the crises would have been averted."

The leader of the Yoruba youth in Sagamu, Chief Sanni Owodunni, said Oro-festival had been in existence for over 200 years, noting that complaints started to surface about 18 years ago when some residents declared *Sabo* a no-go area for the traditionalists.

"In Sabo, there are Yorubas and Hausas. Infact, the Yorubas have a leader there. Therefore, for a foreigner to say we can't celebrate our festival in Sabo is a great insult," he stressed.

In his response, the Seriki Hausa, Alhaji Garuba Abdulahi, said it was a pity the whole thing happened that way, adding: "We told our people to respect the people's culture. We are all one and we have to live in peace and harmony.

He told the governor that arrangements had been concluded to bury 35 retrievable corpses en-masse but were helpless as Sagamu indigenes "have caged us and will not allow us to leave this confinement."

Alhaji Abdulahi also stated that some hospitals rejected some of their wounded colleagues. Chief Osoba however promised to wade into the matter as soon as possible.

Trouble erupted in Sagamu at the early hours of Sunday when two prostitutes allegedly defied traditional warning, thus losing their lives. Their death triggered off violence that brought about loss of lives and property.

The state Police Commissioner, Mr. Jonah Ekanna, told newsmen at the town's central police station, that the situation had become "static" and disclosed that he had met with the *Akarigbo of Remo*, Oba Sonariwo and the *Sarki* of the Hausas in the town on the need to prevail on the people to give peace a chance. The police boss would, however, not give any official figure of the casualties of those arrested so far, saying it would be "premature" to do so as investigations were still on.

He also hinted that more policemen would be drafted to the town to further enforce the fragile peace reigning there yesterday. The Commissioner of Police was, however, with senior police officers throughout the afternoon, apparently mapping out strategies to stamp out the crisis.

There was, however, a drama shortly after the governor left the Oba palace when irate youths of the town stormed the place looking for a businessman indigene of the town said to be siding the other side.

The businessman had to take refuge in the oba's palace to escape being lynched and was still there till about 2 p.m. when the *Nigerian Tribune* left the palace. The Akarigbo, however, came out to appeal to the youths to give peace a chance. Ogun State Governor, Olusegun Osoba, has said that he would not deploy any troops to the volatile town of Sagamu even as he admitted that it would take some time before confidence could be restored between the warring communities in the area.

He, however, promised to calm frayed nerves as soon as possible and expressed his disappointment over the current situation, adding that the factions had been living together for almost a century.

"Under no circumstance will I allow the military to come in under a civilian setting. What we are going to do is to re-equip the police force and let them start to learn the process of reacting to this kind of situation. We will never allow the military to come in, under no circumstance will they come in," he said on the *British Broadcasting Corporation* (BBC) yesterday.

•A mob waiting to lynch a businessman in front of the palace in Sagamu. PIX BY KUBURAT ALOLADE GANIYU.

•Above, burnt body of a victim of the clash, while left, is another burnt body.

CLASSIFIED ADVERT
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Miss Ibironke Ajibike Eleyinmi now MRS IBIRONKE AJIBIKE BALOGUN. Ministry of Education, Akure, note.

Olunike Adebiyi now MRS CHRISTIANAH OLUNIKE AFOLAYAN. Odigbo LG note.

Miss Adebori Grace now MRS ADEBAYO GRACE ADERONKE. Ministry of Education Ondo note.

Miss Olukemi Olufunke Fagbemigun now MRS OLUKEMI OLUFUNKE TIFASE. Ministry of Education note.

Formerly Mr. Gabriel Peter Gbadura Adeyinka Ogundipe now MR. PETER ADEYINKA OGUNDIPE. Public note.

Miss Janet Ayowumi Atanda now MRS JANET AYOWUMI TANIMOWO. Former documents remain valid. Osun SPEB note.

Formerly Miss Bosede Funmilayo Adeleke now MRS BOSEDE FUNMILAYO AKINLABI. Public note.

OSOGBO KLOB 879
PUBLIC NOTICE

NOTICE is hereby given that the above-named Klub has applied to the Corporate Affairs Commission, Abuja for registration under the Companies and Allied Matters Decree No. 1 of 1990 - Part C.

The Trustees are:
(1) MR. WALE BABATUNDE
(2) ENGR. OLU OYEYEMI
(3) ALHAJI BODE FADARE
(4) PROF. TUNDE ADELEKE.

Any objection to the registration of the Klub should be forwarded to the Registrar-General, Corporate Affairs Commission, P.M.B. 198, Area 11, Garki, Abuja FCT within 28 days of this publication.

Signed: Kunle Adeigbe & Co.
Legal Practitioners
No. 31 Awolowo Avenue, Bodija, Agodi P.O. Box 6558, Ibadan.

PUBLIC NOTICE
CHRIST CHURCH IN THE WORLD MISSION INTERNATIONAL

Notice is hereby given to the general public that the above named Church has applied for registration under the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree No. 1 of 1990.

The Trustees are:
1. Pastor Joshua Bayo Ajayi
2. Pastoress Cecilia Akingbehin
3. Bro. Olagide Hamolele

Any objection of that registration should be forwarded to the Registrar General, Corporate Affairs Commission, Area 11, Garki, Abuja within 28 days of the publication.

Signed: Pastor Joshua Bayo Ajayi
General Overseer

PUBLIC NOTICE
SEEK AND SAVE PRAYER MINISTRY

The general public is hereby notified that the above Ministry with her Headquarters at Ibadan has applied for registration under the Companies and Allied Matters Decree No. 1 of 1990, Part C.

The Trustees are:
(1) Rev. (Mrs) Christianah Ajoke Amoke Akanmikun-President
(2) Elder Gbenga Alade Olawoye - Secretary General
(3) Bishop Sylvester Agboola Adeleke - Member
(4) Pastor Apostle Olayinka - Member
(5) Pastor Olawunmi Akinwokoye - Member

Any objection should be forwarded to the Registrar General, corporate Affairs Commission, Area 11, P.M.B. 198, Garki, Abuja within 28 days of this publication.

Signed: Rev. Owners,
Yemisi Ajayi-Ajoke,
P.O. Box 6378, Agodi, Ibadan Tel. 03 [illegible], 7101.34, 7113.04

PROGRESSIVE PRACTITIONERS OF NATURAL MEDICINE OF NIGERIA
PUBLIC NOTICE

NOTICE is hereby given that the above-named organisation has applied to the Corporate Affairs Commission, Abuja for registration under the Companies and Allied Matters Decree No. 1 of 1990, Part C. The Trustees are:

(1) Mr. Adekunle Olusegun
(2) Mr. Ogungbe Aceke
(3) Mr. Bolanle Adaramo
(4) Mr. Ajonle Akanke
(5) Mr. Ranuse Ajayi
(6) Mr. Olaiya Ajala
(7) Mr. Mohutar Aceke
(8) Mr. Oluwafemi Adeola
(9) Mr. Kabiru Kadiri
(10) Mrs. Bodun Ayeni

Any objection to the registration of the organisation should be forwarded to the REGISTRAR-GENERAL, CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION, P.M.B. 198, AREA 11, GARKI, ABUJA FCT within 28 days of this publication.

Kunle Adeigbe & Co.
Legal Practitioners
No. 31 Awolowo Avenue, Bodija, Agodi P.O. Box 6558, Ibadan.

ii. Report Article

Report Article

III. KILLINGS AND ABUSES BY THE OPC

By: Human Right Watch: March 2, 2003

The OPC has been responsible for numerous acts of violence and its members have killed or injured hundreds of people. While many of their most serious attacks were directed against Hausa, or people suspected to be northerners, their victims have also included Igbo, Ijaw and people from other ethnic groups. There have even been cases where they have attacked Yoruba, both civilians and policemen. Most of their victims have been men.

Numerous eye-witness testimonies gathered by Human Rights Watch confirmed that contrary to their leaders' denials, the OPC have used a variety of weapons, including fire-arms, machetes, cutlasses, knives and daggers, which they are often seen carrying openly. There have also been several cases where they have poured acid on their victims. Frequently they set fire to the corpses of those they had killed, sometimes after mutilating them. It has been difficult to confirm the sources of the weapons used by the OPC. Small arms proliferate in Nigeria and it is easy to purchase guns and other weapons. In addition, the OPC have sometimes seized weapons belonging to the police or to suspected criminals that they have apprehended during their vigilante activities.

In the cases documented below, the victims and witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch confirmed that the perpetrators were specifically OPC members, as opposed to other Yoruba. They had been able to identify them in a variety of ways. In some cases, the OPC explicitly identified or announced themselves as OPC. In other cases, witnesses identified them by the clothes they wore: although there is no full OPC uniform, their members typically wear a red or white cloth tied around their head, and wear charms and fetishes. Some wear T-shirts or head-bands with the words "OPC" printed on them. In some cases, they arrived in large convoys of vehicles bearing OPC banners or flags. In a few cases, the victims or witnesses recognized local individuals known to be OPC members.

Most of the incidents in which OPC members have been responsible for killings fall into one of two categories: large-scale ethnic clashes, creating many casualties, or isolated incidents in which individual OPC members have attacked or killed other individuals, for example in the course of vigilante activities or attempts at extortion or theft. In addition, there have been situations where the OPC has intervened or been used in political disputes, such as that in Owo, Ondo State, where it has ended up attacking supporters of rival political factions.

Ethnic Clashes

There has been a pattern of killings by the OPC in the context of disputes or clashes with other ethnic groups since at least 1999. Often these clashes were sparked off by a minor argument between two individuals from different ethnic groups, which typically then escalated when the Yoruba party brought in the OPC to fight their cause, while the other

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ethnic group retaliated by calling youths from their own community to the rescue. The incident would then rapidly degenerate into a violent ethnic conflict within hours, or sometimes within minutes. The widespread availability of small arms and traditional weapons and the readiness of youths from all sides to use them meant that community leaders were often unable to stop the violence or restore calm, despite efforts to do so. By the time the violence reached its peak in the second half of 2000, hundreds of people had been killed, many by the OPC, others by other groups. Some of the most serious incidents are described below. A journalist commented: "Around 2000 was the worst period of OPC violence [...] The police were incapable of controlling it. The OPC could shut down a whole street [...] Every other week there were clashes."

These clashes had repercussions far beyond the southwestern states or the locations where they occurred. One of the immediate effects was that many Hausa-who were one of the most directly-affected groups-fled the southwest and moved back to the north; some have not returned since. A seventy-five-year-old Hausa man, whose thirty-five-year-old son was killed by the OPC in Ajegunle in October 2000 (see below), told Human Rights Watch: "My son Sahabi was killed. He was on his way home with his family. The OPC stopped them. They pushed his wife and children into the house then slaughtered him. His wife saw it happen. They cut his body into pieces with a cutlass. He had two children. The wife was traumatized. She couldn't speak for two months. She left for the north and has stayed there."

In several instances, attacks by the OPC on Hausa or northerners in the southwest were followed by reprisal attacks on Yoruba in the north. For example, following the killings in Sagamu in July 1999, violence erupted in the northern city of Kano, widely seen as an act of retaliation by the Hausa. Similarly, riots broke out in Minna, capital of Niger State, following the violence in Ajegunle in October 2000. The same has been true in reverse: clashes in the north between Yoruba and Hausa have had repercussions in the south and appeared to strengthen the resolve of the OPC to "fight the Yoruba cause." This was notably the case with the explosion of violence between Christians and Muslims in the northern city of Kaduna, in which an estimated 2,000 people were killed in February and May 2000, and which was followed by violence in the southwest.

Sagamu

In mid July 1999, there was a major clash between Hausa and Yoruba in Sagamu, Ogun State. Scores of people were killed. The violence began following an argument over customs observed during the Oro festival, an annual Yoruba event which had not been disrupted by any disputes either before or since 1999. Yoruba and Hausa had agreed to respect a traditional night-time curfew usually observed during the festival. However, according to local residents, a fight erupted between the Yoruba and the Hausa after a Hausa woman was killed by a group of Yoruba because she had broken the curfew. The fighting escalated and the OPC intervened to support the Yoruba. Both sides were armed. At least sixty-eight Hausa were killed, including three boys between the ages of ten and fifteen; some were killed with guns, but the majority were killed with cutlasses. A number of Yoruba were also killed, including one of the Oro leaders. Some people were burnt inside their houses.

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According to another local resident, two or three days later, the OPC came back to Sagamu in five vehicles, but there was a curfew and they were stopped by the police near the central police station. Local residents reported that there was a shoot-out and that the police killed some OPC members. Some policemen were also attacked by the OPC, including Sergeant Danda Shahibu; the OPC poured petrol over him with the intention of burning him, but he survived.

The OPC, while agreeing that both Hausa and Yoruba were killed in Sagamu, offered a different version of events. They alleged that the fighting was pre-meditated by the Hausa, and that the police in Sagamu had sided with the Hausa and provided them with ammunition. A report on the violence in Sagamu, circulated by the Gani Adams faction of the OPC, states that the OPC "is seen to have been the saviours of the town, as their members, also known as the Oodua Warriors, did battle to save the town."

A Hausa man in Sagamu told Human Rights Watch that after the violence, "the local government gave us forms to fill in for compensation, but nothing happened. Even the Seriki's [Hausa leader] house was burnt. The president, who came here on the Monday, promised there would be compensation, but there wasn't. There was an investigation but nobody was arrested. The governor of Ogun promised to rebuild the Seriki's house, but didn't."

According to an inside source within the OPC, the violence in Sagamu marked a turning point for the Gani Adams faction of the OPC. Fasehun and those close to him apparently had not wanted to intervene, and it was Gani Adams who decided to mobilize large numbers of OPC members as reinforcements to the Yoruba in Sagamu. This decision was popular with many rank-and-file members and resulted in a surge in membership of the Gani Adams faction.

Ketu / Mile 12 Market

On November 25 and 26, 1999, scores of people were killed when the OPC clashed with traders in Ketu / Mile 12 market in Lagos. The exact number of victims has not been confirmed, but is estimated to be more than one hundred. A senior police official who was at the scene said he saw an estimated two hundred bodies, but that others had already been buried in mass graves.

The fighting is thought to have been caused by jealousy on the part of Yoruba about the perceived dominance of the market by Hausa traders. There had also been disputes between particular individuals for control of key leadership positions within the market traders' committee. According to some of the traders, some Yoruba had been threatening to challenge this dominance and "claim back" the market from the Hausa. Consequently, many of the victims of the OPC attack were Hausa, or people of northern origin suspected to be Hausa; however, a number of Igbo and members of other ethnic groups were also attacked by the OPC. Some Hausa also attacked and killed Yoruba. Both groups were well-armed. Most of

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the violence took place in the market and on the roads surrounding it. However, witnesses reported that there were also house to house searches, in which the OPC targeted Hausas and Igbos. Market traders who witnessed the violence confirmed that large numbers of OPC members were involved (some estimated as many as 1,000) and that many of those carrying out the attacks were wearing vests with "OPC" written on them. They carried a range of weapons, including guns, machetes and daggers; some were wearing charms. Some traders believed that OPC members had been drafted in from other areas.

A woman who had been trading in the market for five years said she had never witnessed anything like it: "People were shouting: `OPC! OPC!' We started hearing gunshots. I had to find my way out of the market. [...] The expressway [the main road which runs along the market] was blocked by the OPC. This expressway was turned into a killing zone. For days a lot of dead bodies littered this road. [...] Many traders lost their lives and even some customers that were unfortunate to come to the market at that time."

A representative of the Perishable Foodstuffs Market Association told Human Rights Watch that sixty-eight Hausa traders had been killed in the food market alone; thirty of them were women. The Hausa traders sent a list of the victims they had counted to the Lagos State Governor; dated December 3, 1999, it lists sixty-eight people confirmed dead, including four blind men killed at a mosque; eleven unnamed people burnt at Ketu bus-stop; twenty-four people missing (who were never found), including nine schoolchildren; and details of buildings and property that were burnt or looted.

A Hausa trader described how the OPC were specifically targeting Hausa and Igbo in and around the market. Some northerners who were not even Hausa were among those they attacked:

On 25 November, a young man, Mohammed, was knifed in the belly. He was rushed to hospital and was lucky to survive. They [the OPC] beat a lot of our members who started chasing them out. We went to the main road. The road was blocked. They were stopping all vehicles. They would offload any Hausa or Igbo, kill them and set them on fire. I saw them stopping vehicles. They were a very big group, maybe thousands. Some had OPC uniforms. Other Yoruba also joined in. They were asking people who were passing: `What is your state [of origin]? What is your tribe?' They stopped a northerner who sells provisions. He is not a Hausa; he is from the Zabruma tribe, from Kebbi State. His name is Bako; he is about thirty or thirty-five years old. They asked him which state he was from. He said Kebbi. They said: `Kill him. He's a Hausa man. He's from their states.' They cut him in several places. He managed to run away as the OPC heard the police siren and fled. I saw him face to face. He looked like he could have been attacked with knives or bottles; they used bottles a lot. He swore he would never return to Lagos.

An Igbo trader in the yam market narrowly survived being burnt to death:

That day, at about 9 a.m., we came to the market as usual [...] People said they were seeing movements they didn't understand, in the yam depot. We asked them not to panic. Some leaders went to report the movements to the police at Ketu. [...]

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We heard noises, like whistles. Then we heard the main road was blocked. People were running, burning. They were looting yams and vehicles. There was no killing in the depot but there was killing and burning in lots of houses along the road. The next day, we saw corpses [...]

At about 4.30 p.m., I was trying to leave to go home. I was trapped by a group who identified me as Igbo. They said the Igbos were supporting the Hausas, therefore I should be killed. I was thoroughly beaten. They put a tyre around my neck and brought petrol. About ten or twelve people attacked me. They had bottles and sticks and beat me. Some were young and some were middle-aged. [...] It was a miracle they didn't set me on fire. I don't know what happened. Someone pulled me from the ground by the arm and said: "Run! Run!" An okada [motorcycle taxi] appeared from nowhere and told me to sit and we drove off. I was hospitalized for one or two days.

The attack of November 25-26 took place in the context of increasing tension in different parts of Lagos and followed a series of other attacks and incidents of intimidation involving the OPC. A trader at Ketu/Mile 12 market mentioned that some days before the attack on the market, about forty or fifty people wearing OPC uniforms had come to the market and threatened some of the traders: "They attacked Hausa and Igbo boys here. They kicked several of them with their boots. People started running away, shouting `OPC is in the market!' The OPC were telling Hausas and Igbos: `We're giving you fourteen days to leave this place.' They said the place should be controlled by Yoruba. It was a warning, but they didn't kill anybody that day. [...] There were also attacks in other places around. It started from the Tin Can Port. We first heard they had attacked Igbos and others there, including labour leaders. Then it happened at Sagamu, then here. This was all one or two weeks before."

Witnesses of the violence at Ketu/Mile 12 market on November 25-26 described how the security forces had failed to stop the attacks, and only intervened after many people had been killed. A trader told Human Rights Watch: "Eventually the police and army were deployed, after the crisis had lasted for several hours. The police were here while the OPC was busy killing people outside. The military were brought in later." Another said: "The police came after two days and dragged them away. They were not present during the crisis." He also deplored the lack of action on the part of the government: "We have a list of the victims [killed in the food market]. We recorded everything. We sent the list to the federal government but nothing happened. There was no investigation." Another said: "The fight lasted for two days before the police took control of the situation. The market was closed for several weeks and when we resumed business, all our goods had been either destroyed or rotten. I lost all my goods to the crisis. I saw a lot of dead bodies. I know a lot of traders that were killed. [...] I think the government is encouraging these OPC people because the way they carry out their mission suggests that they are not afraid of the law."

Some OPC representatives denied any involvement at all in the violence at Ketu/Mile 12, describing it as "an intra-market issue which did not involve us and in which we have not involved ourselves in any way."39 Others denied that the OPC had initiated the fighting but

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admitted that it had been present; however, they claimed that many people had been killed before the OPC arrived on the scene. As usual they denied having any weapons other than traditional charms, and claimed that the police had supplied the Hausa with guns. They stressed that the Hausa had also been responsible for violence and mentioned an incident in which a group of Hausa men had allegedly killed several Yoruba schoolchildren at the Baptist primary school. Human Rights Watch tried to cross-check this information but was not able to confirm that these killings had actually occurred. A senior school official at the Baptist school confirmed to Human Rights Watch that a group of Hausa had tried to break into the school, but denied that any children had been killed. She indicated that the media reports which had also mentioned the incident at that time had been based on false information.

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iii. Report Article

Report Article

Nigeria: Riots in Kano in 1999

By: Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

20 February 2001

A Report on Nigeria summarizes the July 1999 riots in Nigeria as follows:

Violent clashes between the Hausa and Yoruba tribes occurred in Shagamu, a Yoruba dominated town, on 17 July 1999. It is reported that at least sixty people have been killed. This violence followed the death of a Hausa woman, who was killed when she was found watching a Yoruba religious ceremony, which was forbidden to outsiders. The Nigerian authorities deployed police reinforcements in the towns.

This violence spread when Hausas fled to Kano, and the local population attacked Yorubas resident there, a dawn to dusk curfew was also imposed and troops sent to the city. The violence was reported to have subsided by the end of July, and there have been conflicting reports on the number of casualties (IND Apr. 2000, Ch. VII).

Africa Confidential reported on tensions between the Hausa and Yoruba ethnic groups in 2000 stating:

The current Yoruba-Hausa fighting began in mid-July 1999 in the town of Shagamu, 36 miles north of Lagos, a traditional centre of the kola nut trade where Hausas have lived for generations. A Hausa woman was caught allegedly watching traditional Yoruba religious rites known as Oro, and murdered. About 60 others were slaughtered and dozens of homes, shops, mosques and market stalls were burned to the ground, both in Yoruba neighbourhoods and in the mainly Hausa quarter known as Sabo.

Ethnic militias proscribed: Hausa victims of the Shagamu clashes fled to the northern city of Kano where, in retaliation, up to 70 Yoruba residents were killed on 22 July, dozens were wounded, and hundreds were driven from their homes. Adams' [leader of an "ultra-militant" faction of the Oodua Peoples' Congress, OPC] followers ransacked Fasehun's Best Hope Hospital, and Lagos was rocked by ethnic riots. The police blamed Adams' supporters, who had whipped up mainly local disputes (27 Oct. 2000, 3-5).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

iv. Online News Report

Do Not Copy, Lead City University, Nigeria

Uneasy calm in Kano following riots

The New Humanitarian

22 July 1999

An uneasy calm returned to the northern Muslim Nigerian city of Kano on Friday after rioting the previous day. This rioting was linked to earlier disturbances in the south-western town of Shagamu which left dozens dead, news organisations reported. One senior official in

the state governor's office told Reuters that the governor "will douse the tension when he makes a broadcast". Witnesses told Reuters that shops and houses belonging to southern Nigerians were looted on Thursday by youths in Kano's Kruna district, after Hausa victims returned from Shagamu, some 50 km north-east of Lagos. There were no confirmed reports of deaths in Kano, but dozens of people were injured, it said. Clashes took place on Sunday in the south-western town of Shagamu between Nigeria's two largest ethnic groups, the Yoruba and the Hausa, during a traditional Yoruba festival known as the Oro. The conflict erupted because Yoruba people said that the Hausa community had refused to obey the traditional rule which requires non-participants in the festival to stay off the streets.

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D. Mile-12 Inter-ethnic Crisis, 1999

i. Report Article

Report Article

III. KILLINGS AND ABUSES BY THE OPC

By: Human Right Watch: March 2, 2003

The OPC has been responsible for numerous acts of violence and its members have killed or injured hundreds of people. While many of their most serious attacks were directed against Hausa, or people suspected to be northerners, their victims have also included Igbo, Ijaw and people from other ethnic groups. There have even been cases where they have attacked Yoruba, both civilians and policemen. Most of their victims have been men.

Numerous eye-witness testimonies gathered by Human Rights Watch confirmed that contrary to their leaders' denials, the OPC have used a variety of weapons, including fire-arms, machetes, cutlasses, knives and daggers, which they are often seen carrying openly. There have also been several cases where they have poured acid on their victims. Frequently they set fire to the corpses of those they had killed, sometimes after mutilating them. It has been difficult to confirm the sources of the weapons used by the OPC. Small arms proliferate in Nigeria and it is easy to purchase guns and other weapons. In addition, the OPC have sometimes seized weapons belonging to the police or to suspected criminals that they have apprehended during their vigilante activities.

In the cases documented below, the victims and witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch confirmed that the perpetrators were specifically OPC members, as opposed to other Yoruba. They had been able to identify them in a variety of ways. In some cases, the OPC explicitly identified or announced themselves as OPC. In other cases, witnesses identified them by the clothes they wore: although there is no full OPC uniform, their members typically wear a red or white cloth tied around their head, and wear charms and fetishes. Some wear T-shirts or head-bands with the words "OPC" printed on them. In some cases, they arrived in large convoys of vehicles bearing OPC banners or flags. In a few cases, the victims or witnesses recognized local individuals known to be OPC members.

Most of the incidents in which OPC members have been responsible for killings fall into one of two categories: large-scale ethnic clashes, creating many casualties, or isolated incidents in which individual OPC members have attacked or killed other individuals, for example in the course of vigilante activities or attempts at extortion or theft. In addition, there have been situations where the OPC has intervened or been used in political disputes, such as that in Owo, Ondo State, where it has ended up attacking supporters of rival political factions.

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Ethnic Clashes

There has been a pattern of killings by the OPC in the context of disputes or clashes with other ethnic groups since at least 1999. Often these clashes were sparked off by a minor argument between two individuals from different ethnic groups, which typically then escalated when the Yoruba party brought in the OPC to fight their cause, while the other ethnic group retaliated by calling youths from their own community to the rescue. The incident would then rapidly degenerate into a violent ethnic conflict within hours, or sometimes within minutes. The widespread availability of small arms and traditional weapons and the readiness of youths from all sides to use them meant that community leaders were often unable to stop the violence or restore calm, despite efforts to do so. By the time the violence reached its peak in the second half of 2000, hundreds of people had been killed, many by the OPC, others by other groups. Some of the most serious incidents are described below. A journalist commented: "Around 2000 was the worst period of OPC violence [...] The police were incapable of controlling it. The OPC could shut down a whole street [...] Every other week there were clashes."

These clashes had repercussions far beyond the southwestern states or the locations where they occurred. One of the immediate effects was that many Hausa-who were one of the most directly-affected groups-fled the southwest and moved back to the north; some have not returned since. A seventy-five-year-old Hausa man, whose thirty-five-year-old son was killed by the OPC in Ajegunle in October 2000 (see below), told Human Rights Watch: "My son Sahabi was killed. He was on his way home with his family. The OPC stopped them. They pushed his wife and children into the house then slaughtered him. His wife saw it happen.

They cut his body into pieces with a cutlass. He had two children. The wife was traumatized. She couldn't speak for two months. She left for the north and has stayed there."

In several instances, attacks by the OPC on Hausa or northerners in the southwest were followed by reprisal attacks on Yoruba in the north. For example, following the killings in Sagamu in July 1999, violence erupted in the northern city of Kano, widely seen as an act of retaliation by the Hausa. Similarly, riots broke out in Minna, capital of Niger State, following the violence in Ajegunle in October 2000. The same has been true in reverse: clashes in the north between Yoruba and Hausa have had repercussions in the south and appeared to strengthen the resolve of the OPC to "fight the Yoruba cause." This was notably the case with the explosion of violence between Christians and Muslims in the northern city of Kaduna, in which an estimated 2,000 people were killed in February and May 2000, and which was followed by violence in the southwest.

Ketu / Mile 12 Market

On November 25 and 26, 1999, scores of people were killed when the OPC clashed with traders in Ketu / Mile 12 market in Lagos. The exact number of victims has not been confirmed, but is estimated to be more than one hundred. A senior police official who was at the scene said he saw an estimated two hundred bodies, but that others had already been buried in mass graves.

The fighting is thought to have been caused by jealousy on the part of Yoruba about the perceived dominance of the market by Hausa traders. There had also been disputes between particular individuals for control of key leadership positions within the market traders' committee. According to some of the traders, some Yoruba had been threatening to challenge this dominance and "claim back" the market from the Hausa. Consequently, many of the victims of the OPC attack were Hausa, or people of northern origin suspected to be Hausa; however, a number of Igbo and members of other ethnic groups were also attacked by the OPC. Some Hausa also attacked and killed Yoruba. Both groups were well-armed. Most of the violence took place in the market and on the roads surrounding it. However, witnesses reported that there were also house to house searches, in which the OPC targeted Hausas and Igbos. Market traders who witnessed the violence confirmed that large numbers of OPC members were involved (some estimated as many as 1,000) and that many of those carrying out the attacks were wearing vests with "OPC" written on them. They carried a range of weapons, including guns, machetes and daggers; some were wearing charms. Some traders believed that OPC members had been drafted in from other areas.

A woman who had been trading in the market for five years said she had never witnessed anything like it: "People were shouting: `OPC! OPC!' We started hearing gunshots. I had to find my way out of the market. [...] The expressway [the main road which runs along the market] was blocked by the OPC. This expressway was turned into a killing zone. For days a lot of dead bodies littered this road. [...] Many traders lost their lives and even some customers that were unfortunate to come to the market at that time."

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A representative of the Perishable Foodstuffs Market Association told Human Rights Watch that sixty-eight Hausa traders had been killed in the food market alone; thirty of them were women. The Hausa traders sent a list of the victims they had counted to the Lagos State Governor; dated December 3, 1999, it lists sixty-eight people confirmed dead, including four blind men killed at a mosque; eleven unnamed people burnt at Ketu bus-stop; twenty-four people missing (who were never found), including nine schoolchildren; and details of buildings and property that were burnt or looted.

A Hausa trader described how the OPC were specifically targeting Hausa and Igbo in and around the market. Some northerners who were not even Hausa were among those they attacked:

On 25 November, a young man, Mohammed, was knifed in the belly. He was rushed to hospital and was lucky to survive. They [the OPC] beat a lot of our members who started chasing them out. We went to the main road. The road was blocked. They were stopping all vehicles. They would offload any Hausa or Igbo, kill them and set them on fire. I saw them stopping vehicles. They were a very big group, maybe thousands. Some had OPC uniforms. Other Yoruba also joined in. They were asking people who were passing: `What is your state [of origin]? What is your tribe?' They stopped a northerner who sells provisions. He is not a Hausa; he is from the Zabruma tribe, from Kebbi State. His name is Bako; he is about thirty or thirty-five years old. They asked him which state he was from. He said Kebbi. They said: `Kill him. He's a Hausa man. He's from their states.' They cut him in several places. He managed to run away as the OPC heard the police siren and fled. I saw him face to face. He looked like he could have been attacked with knives or bottles; they used bottles a lot. He swore he would never return to Lagos.

An Igbo trader in the yam market narrowly survived being burnt to death:

That day, at about 9 a.m., we came to the market as usual [...] People said they were seeing movements they didn't understand, in the yam depot. We asked them not to panic. Some leaders went to report the movements to the police at Ketu. [...]

We heard noises, like whistles. Then we heard the main road was blocked. People were running, burning. They were looting yams and vehicles. There was no killing in the depot but there was killing and burning in lots of houses along the road. The next day, we saw corpses [...]

At about 4.30 p.m., I was trying to leave to go home. I was trapped by a group who identified me as Igbo. They said the Igbos were supporting the Hausas, therefore I should be killed. I was thoroughly beaten. They put a tyre around my neck and brought petrol. About ten or twelve people attacked me. They had bottles and sticks and beat me. Some were young and some were middle-aged. [...] It was a miracle they didn't set me on fire. I don't know what happened. Someone pulled me from the ground by the arm and said: "Run! Run!" An okada [motorcycle taxi] appeared from nowhere and told me to sit and we drove off. I was hospitalized for one or two days.

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The attack of November 25-26 took place in the context of increasing tension in different parts of Lagos and followed a series of other attacks and incidents of intimidation involving the OPC. A trader at Ketu/Mile 12 market mentioned that some days before the attack on the market, about forty or fifty people wearing OPC uniforms had come to the market and threatened some of the traders: "They attacked Hausa and Igbo boys here. They kicked several of them with their boots. People started running away, shouting `OPC is in the market!' The OPC were telling Hausas and Igbos: `We're giving you fourteen days to leave this place.' They said the place should be controlled by Yoruba. It was a warning, but they didn't kill anybody that day. [...] There were also attacks in other places around. It started from the Tin Can Port. We first heard they had attacked Igbos and others there, including labour leaders. Then it happened at Sagamu, then here. This was all one or two weeks before."

Witnesses of the violence at Ketu/Mile 12 market on November 25-26 described how the security forces had failed to stop the attacks, and only intervened after many people had been killed. A trader told Human Rights Watch: "Eventually the police and army were deployed, after the crisis had lasted for several hours. The police were here while the OPC was busy killing people outside. The military were brought in later." Another said: "The police came after two days and dragged them away. They were not present during the crisis." He also deplored the lack of action on the part of the government: "We have a list of the victims [killed in the food market]. We recorded everything. We sent the list to the federal government but nothing happened. There was no investigation." Another said: "The fight lasted for two days before the police took control of the situation. The market was closed for several weeks and when we resumed business, all our goods had been either destroyed or rotten. I lost all my goods to the crisis. I saw a lot of dead bodies. I know a lot of traders that were killed. [...] I think the government is encouraging these OPC people because the way they carry out their mission suggests that they are not afraid of the law."

Some OPC representatives denied any involvement at all in the violence at Ketu/Mile 12, describing it as "an intra-market issue which did not involve us and in which we have not involved ourselves in any way."39 Others denied that the OPC had initiated the fighting but admitted that it had been present; however, they claimed that many people had been killed before the OPC arrived on the scene. As usual they denied having any weapons other than traditional charms, and claimed that the police had supplied the Hausa with guns. They stressed that the Hausa had also been responsible for violence and mentioned an incident in which a group of Hausa men had allegedly killed several Yoruba schoolchildren at the Baptist primary school. Human Rights Watch tried to cross-check this information but was not able to confirm that these killings had actually occurred. A senior school official at the Baptist school confirmed to Human Rights Watch that a group of Hausa had tried to break into the school, but denied that any children had been killed. She indicated that the media reports which had also mentioned the incident at that time had been based on false information.

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ii. Online News Report

Online Newspaper

Nigeria: The Blood Bath at Mile 12

By All Africa

6 DECEMBER 1999

The News (Lagos)

Lagos — There was harvest of deaths following a clash between Hausa and Yoruba traders at a popular market in Lagos.

Thursday, 25 November would remain indelible in the minds of inhabitants of Mile 12, on the outskirts of Lagos. That day, traders who had coexisted peacefully for several years went berserk. Instead of money changing hands, the traders exchanged bullets from the barrels of guns. After about 14 hours of heavy fighting, several bodies lay lifeless while properties worth several millions of naira were vandalised.

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iii. Research Paper

AN ASSESSMENT OF HAUSA/YORUBA CONFLICTS AND PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN MILE 12 MARKET, LAGOS, 1999-2014

By: Lawal Rafiu Adeniran (University of Ibadan)

March 2016

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ABSTRACT

Markets serve as the hub or convergence points for buying and selling. It is a place that brings buyers and sellers of different ethnic and cultural affiliations into contact in order to carry out transactions. This unique characteristic makes markets a vulnerable place for ethnic collision. The transition to democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 marked the resurgence of conflicts along ethnic lines. This period, 1999/2000 witnessed violent conflicts in many places such as Mile 12 market, Idi-Araba, Ajegunle, Lagos State, Bodija market, Oyo State, Sagamu, Ogun State, Ilorin, Kwara State, Jos, Plateau State and so forth. These conflicts have left both ethnicity and development scholars with the task of investigating the causes and how institutions can help in the management of such conflicts. Following the cessation of hostilities between Hausa and Yoruba in Mile 12 market (a market known for the sale of foodstuffs and agricultural produce) in 1999, a lot of peacebuilding initiatives were implemented. This study, therefore, investigated the causes of conflicts, the various peacebuilding initiatives adopted and the challenges to peacebuilding in Mile 12 market.

The study adopted the descriptive research design. It employed the qualitative approach in the gathering of data. The sources of data included both primary and secondary sources. This study relied heavily on data collected through interviews with key informants. Purposive sampling was used in the selection of interviewees based on the nature of the study. Data were obtained from 15 respondents including market leaders, religious leaders, security agents, government officials and selected traders. The secondary sources included national newspapers, journals and books. Data were content analysed. Major causes of conflicts in Mile 12 market included contest over resources, incompatible value system, poor communication and impatience. The post conflict peacebuilding initiatives adopted in the

market within the period 1999-2014 included: reorganisation of the market- which divided the market into three sections, trainings and education, religious understanding and accommodation, provision of security and market task force, setting up of a consociational leadership, introduction of election and an election monitoring committee. These initiatives have been largely responsible for the downward trend of violent conflicts and the stable peace enjoyed in the market. Despite these successes, the following challenges to peacebuilding were identified: sanitation and irregular cleaning of the market, housing problem and hooliganism, charging of fees before reports of conflicts and disagreements were entertained by market authorities, imposition of market leaders by the government, insecurity, over population and lack of social amenities such as public toilets, pipe borne water, electricity, health centre and good roads. For the sustenance of stable peace in Mile 12 market, internal and external institutions should move towards coping with both cultural and ethnic diversities; as well as resolve the social and economic shortcomings identified, which can strain ethnic relations. Conflict resolution and complaint processes must not be commercialised, Lagos State Government, market leaders and traders must show preference for democratic culture, adequate resources should be allocated for provision of social amenities within the market.

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1.1 Introduction

As many of us packed our belongings to return east, some of the people we had lived with for years, some for decades, jeered and said. 'Let them (Igbos) go; food will be cheaper in Lagos'. That kind of experience is very powerful. It is something I could not possibly forget. I realised suddenly that I had not been living in my home. I had been living in a strange place (Achebe, 2012:68). The above expression captures the frustration of a prominent Nigerian writer, late Chinua Achebe during the Nigerian Civil War which took place within the period 1967 and 1970. The Civil War, which was assumed to be a battle by the Nigerian state (allegedly made up of Hausa and Yoruba) against the people of Igbo extraction, was reported to have been responsible for the death of more than one million people (Achebe, 2012).

In recent years a new dimension of conflict has established itself permanently in International politics. What is of major concern to this study is ethnic conflicts which has become a major threat to peace and development in a number of countries today, Rwanda, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Kenya, and Nigeria inclusive.

According to Carola Lentz (1995), 'ethnicity is a dazzling, ambiguous category at once a descriptive and an evaluative normative. It has long since ceased to be the exclusive domain of social scientist, having entered the practical vocabulary of politicians and social movements'. Ethnicity or ethnic groups now gradually replace concepts such as tribe and race which have remained politicised. In 1970, Aidan Southall joined other scholars in calling for the replacement of the word 'tribe' which gained currency among Africanist with 'ethnic groups'. His argument was that the word tribe was a primitive connotation to affront the sensibilities of Africans (Lentz 1995:304). Nnoli, in his scholarship journey (1978:5) defines ethnicity as 'a social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups.' To him, ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by communal character of their boundaries such as language, common worldview, religion and common cultural traits. Ethnic groups, therefore represent a group of people with similar cultural symbols including language, value systems and normative behaviour, and whose members are domiciled in a particular geographical area (Otite, 1990). Citing Asiyanbola (2007), 'the word 'ethnic' is derived from the Greek word ethnos which means a group of people who share a common and distinctive culture. Thus, ethnicity according to Imobighe should be seen as the feeling of belonging to a distinctive cultural or linguistic group, or a manifestation of ethnic consciousness in relation to other groups' (Asiyanbola 2007:3)

In 1914, the British colonial masters wielded together over 250 diverse ethnic groups differing in social, cultural, religious background and orientation into a single country called Nigeria. Since then, there has been continuous friction, sometimes resulting in violent conflicts (Adebayo 1986:65). The escalation of ethnic conflicts has been one of the most important causes of social crisis and political instability in Nigeria, and ethnicity has been perceived in general as a major obstacle to the overall politico-economic development of the country (Otite 1990: 145). In an interview credited to a foremost Yoruba leader, Dr. Frederick Fasehun, during the 2002 Hausa/Yoruba conflict in Lagos, his words were:

We identify with those defending themselves and ask the attackers to be careful…our guest if they cannot comply with our norms should know where to go (Vanguard News, February 7th, 2002). Similarly, during the protracted Ife/Modakeke conflict, one of the chiefs at a peace meeting that was summoned to settle the impasse in 1886 sums up his frustration:

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We need not say that our guest the Modakekes have become too mighty for us. They have rewarded us evil for good. They have thrice dispersed us and destroy our town. We can no longer live together with them (Albert, 1999). In 1996, D.D. Dodo, a Tiv leader, described Tiv/Jukun relation in the following sentences; 'the enmity between a Tivman and Jukun can never end. Even if we meet in Heaven we will fight' (Onwuzuruigbo, 2009:2). This statement testifies to the negative application of ethnicity and its implications not only for the political stability, national development and integration but also for the survival of humanity.

Nigeria is a society where ethnic cleavages remain a critical problem and where ethnic violence has erupted periodically (Asiyanbola 2007:4). In recent years, Nigeria had experienced the outbreak of violent ethnic conflicts. Among the prominent ones are: 'Yoruba/Hausa clash in Sagamu, Ogun State; Eleme Okrika in Rivers State; clashes in Kano, Kano State; Zango/Kataf in Kaduna State; Tiv/Jukun in Wukari, Taraba State; Aguleri/Umuleri in Anambra State; Hausa/Yoruba clashes in Idi-Araba, Lagos State, and Ife/Modakeke in Osun State' (Ubi, 2001; Imobighe, 2003)(Asiyanbola 2007:4). All these are a few of the several violent outbreaks all in the name of ethnicity.

Contact between the Hausa and Yoruba people pre-dates the colonial period. There had been significant migrations of Yoruba people into Hausa territory and vice versa, as far as the coastal regions of Lagos. However, the Hausa people had settled in Lagos since the eighteenth century or even much earlier (Tijani, 2003). The colonial situation further accelerated the interaction. According to Albert (1999:5) the Yoruba were the first to arrive in the city of Kano as early as 1903. Some of them had arrived with the British as servants, clerks and artisans. The reasons were because the British recruited their first batch of aides from among the Yoruba a consequent upon the occupation of Lagos and Ibadan in 1861 and 1893 respectively. The revolution in the transportation sector which led to the construction of the railway system that connects Kano to the Yorubaland contributed massively to these interactions. Ever since, Hausa and Yoruba have enjoyed relative cordial relationship.As a result, major towns in Lagos State have played host to Hausa migrants in search for economic opportunities. Notable among them are Agege, Idi- Araba, Ikorodu, Mile 12, where today a tangible size of the population are of Hausa descent.

Between November 25 and 26, 1999, scores of people were killed when the Yoruba, led by OPC (an ethnic militia) clashed with traders in Mile 12 market in Lagos. The exact number of

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victims has not been confirmed, but it is estimated to be more than one hundred (100).A senior police official who was at the scene said he saw an estimated two hundred (200) bodies, but that others had already been buried in mass graves (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The fighting is thought to have been caused by jealousy on the part of Yoruba about the perceived dominance of the market by Hausa traders. There had also been disputes between particular individuals for control of key leadership positions within the market traders' committee.

According to some of the reports from traders, some Yoruba threatened to challenge this dominance and claim back the market from the Hausa. Although they argued that the Hausas were the first to relocate to the market and implored their Yoruba counterpart to join, but they did not move until the prospect of the market became evident. When the Yoruba eventually moved, they were not comfortable with Hausa occupying all key positions (Lartey, 2005). Consequently, many of the victims of the OPC attack were Hausa, or people of Northern origin suspected to be Hausa. However, a number of Igbo and members of other ethnic groups were also attacked by the OPC. Some Hausa also attacked and killed Yoruba. Both groups were well-armed. Most of the violence took place in the market and on the roads surrounding it.

However, witnesses reported that there were also house to house searches, in which the OPC targeted Hausas and Igbos. Market traders who witnessed the violence confirmed that a large number of OPC members were involved (some estimated as many as 1,000) and that many of those carrying out the attacks were wearing vests with "OPC" inscribed on them. They carried a range of weapons, including guns, machetes and daggers; some were wearing charms. Some traders believed that OPC members had been drafted in from other areas (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The violence had a lasting impact on Mile 12 market, an area where Hausa/Yoruba previously enjoyed good relationship, there were mixed marriages, and past disagreements were peacefully resolved.

These clashes had repercussions far beyond the Southwestern states or the locations where they occurred. One of the immediate effects was that many Hausa, who were one of the most directly affected groups, fled the Southwest and moved back to the North; some have not returned since then. A seventy-five-year-old Hausa man, whose thirty-five year old son was killed by the OPC at Ajegunle in October 2000, told Human Rights Watch: “My son

Sahabi was killed. He was on his way home with his family. The OPC stopped them. They pushed his wife and children into the house then slaughtered him. His wife saw it happen. They cut his body into pieces with a cutlass. He had two children. The wife was traumatised. She couldn't speak for two months. She left for the north and has stayed there".

In several instances, attacks by the OPC on the Hausas or northerners in the southwest were
followed by reprisal attacks on the Yoruba people living in the north. For example, following the
killings in Sagamu, Ogun State in July 1999, violence erupted in the northern city of Kano and
Kaduna, which was widely seen as an act of retaliation by the Hausa.

Similarly, riots broke out in Minna, capital of Niger State, following the violence in Ajegunle, Lagos in October 2000. This triggered repercussion in the South west and appeared to strengthen the resolve of the OPC to "fight the Yoruba cause". This was notably the case with the explosion of violence between Christians and Muslims in the Northern city of Kaduna, in which an estimated 2,000 people were killed in February and May 2000, and which was followed by violence in the southwest (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Over 300 people were killed in Aba, Owerri, Umuahia, and Port Harcourt primarily in retaliation of the Kaduna massacre (Segun, 2013:275).

Eventually, the massacre in Mile 12 ended when the police and army intervened militarily, with unconfirmed number of casualties on both sides. Ever since, as post conflict peacebuilding went underway the town now enjoys stable peace with just a microcosm of attacks. Various efforts and initiatives have been made by all concerned stakeholders towards building peace. These initiatives aim to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

iv. Report Article

The O'odua People's Congress (OPC): Fighting Violence with Violence

By Human Right Watch

February 28, 2003 Vol. 15, No. 4 (A)

Do Not Copy, Lead City University, Nigeria

I. Summary

Nigeria has witnessed an increase in the activities of ethnic and regional militia, vigilantes, and other armed groups in the last few years. One of the better-known of these groups is the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), an organization active in the southwest of Nigeria which campaigns to protect the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group and seeks autonomy for the Yoruba people. The OPC is a complex organization, which has taken on several different roles as it has adapted to the changing political and security environment in Nigeria. One of several Yoruba self-determination groups, it was established in 1994 with the aim of overcoming what it alleged was the political marginalization of the Yoruba. It has since evolved in several different directions. Its activities have ranged from political agitation for Yoruba autonomy and promotion of Yoruba culture to violent confrontation with members of other ethnic groups, and, more recently, vigilantism and crime-fighting. In its two main spheres of activity-ethnic militancy and vigilantism-the OPC has been responsible for numerous human rights abuses and acts of violence, and its members have killed or injured hundreds of unarmed civilians. However, OPC members have been victims as well as perpetrators of human rights abuses. Hundreds of real or suspected OPC members have been killed by the police; many others have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and detained without trial for extended periods.

The most widespread killings by the OPC took place in the context of clashes between Yoruba and other ethnic groups, which reached a peak during 2000; however, violence and human rights abuses continued in 2001 and 2002. There have also been numerous individual cases in which OPC members have killed or injured people, in the course of their vigilante work and in attempts to extort money. The OPC's activities have led them into direct confrontation with the police: there have been repeated, violent clashes between the two,

with casualties on both sides. OPC members have attacked police stations on many occasions, and have killed and injured several policemen.

Part self-determination organization, part vigilante group, the OPC has defied easy classification. The usual description of the OPC as an ethnic militia, while accurate, is also misleading, in that not all the acts of violence committed by its members have been ethnically motivated. Many of the conflicts in which the OPC has got involved have been among Yoruba, and consequently victims of OPC violence have included Yoruba. The contrast between, on the one hand, the clearly articulated ideological discourse and sophisticated propaganda of some OPC leaders, and on the other hand, the mindless thuggery which characterizes many of its operations, has also posed a challenge in defining appropriate reactions to the organization. In a sense, the OPC combines aspects of two distinct types of organizations which have emerged in Nigeria: those which advocate for the specific interests of their particular ethnic, regional or religious group in a broadly political context, and those which have taken on the task of fighting crime, without an explicit political agenda of their own. In addition, OPC members frequently carry out acts of intimidation and violence which appear to be motivated more by a desire to rob their victims of money or possessions, than by any ideological objective.

Despite public statements by the federal government condemning ethnic and vigilante violence, little effective action has been taken to keep these groups in check or to enforce accountability; on the contrary, some of these groups have benefited from the financial and political support of influential political figures, including state government officials. Several government officials maintain close links with the OPC leadership, and OPC members have provided security arrangements at official and public functions, in the presence of government officials. Where action has been taken by the federal government to crack down on the violence, it has often resulted in further human rights violations by the police, including extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests. The weakness of the Nigerian police force, its apparent inability to maintain law and order, and the lack of public confidence in its effectiveness have aggravated the problem and have given many armed groups the freedom to operate according to their own rules, and to carry out serious human rights abuses with impunity.

In 1999, the federal government announced a ban on the OPC and gave the police orders to deal with the organization ruthlessly. Instructions to the police to "shoot on sight," combined with the OPC's defiance of the ban, provoked a heavy-handed and brutal response from the police. The police regularly raided and broke up OPC meetings; scores of OPC members were killed by the police and hundreds arrested. Few of the arrests have resulted in successful prosecution. In many cases, suspects were detained for a short period then released on bail; in others, they have remained in detention for prolonged periods awaiting trial. The actions of the Nigerian government and the police against the OPC have been in violation of Nigeria's national and international human rights obligations.

Despite this crackdown, the OPC has continued to function, sometimes underground, but more often boldly and openly challenging the federal government's and the police's attempts

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to crush it. In some of the states where it operates in the southwest, it enjoys close relations with state government authorities and even the explicit support of governors-a support which, to some extent, may have provided it with a level of protection.

Human Rights Watch does not take a position on the legitimacy of the political demands of the OPC or other self-determination groups, but believes that the federal government's strategy in responding to these groups has been inappropriate and counter-productive. Not only has it resulted directly in human rights violations against members of these groups, but it appears to have strengthened the determination of some of them, notably the OPC, to fight against the existing political system, often using violence with the justification that this is the only way to be heard. The weakness and corruption within the judicial system have meant that the vast majority of members of these groups responsible for violence have not been brought to justice, while many of those detained may well have been innocent. Justice has been selective, discriminatory and often arbitrary.

By early 2003, incidents of large-scale killings by the OPC have decreased, but clashes between different ethnic groups, including the Yoruba, are still taking place, and ethnic tensions have not abated. The OPC remains active and visible. Its leaders have not accepted responsibility for the serious human rights abuses committed by their members, despite the fact that the organization has a clear structure, chain of command and disciplinary procedures. The OPC continues to enjoy significant support among sectors of the population in southwestern Nigeria and among state government officials. There could be a resurgence of violence at any time, and the OPC remains poised to intervene in the event of ethnic or political crises, which remain a common feature of the Nigerian landscape.

The coming months will be especially critical. As political tensions rise leading up elections in Nigeria in April 2003, and many ethnic and social groups are voicing increasing dissatisfaction with their political and economic situation, ethnic militia such as the OPC represent a powerful force which could be unleashed with disastrous consequences. By the end of 2002, the number of cases of political violence in different parts of the country, including the southwest, has increased significantly-an alarming signal of what may lie in store for local government, state, legislative and presidential elections. Candidates for the elections at all these levels, and their supporters, have made widespread use of thugs and other armed groups to intimidate and even eliminate their opponents. The OPC, with its large following and readiness to use violence, is one of many groups which can easily be mobilized in this context.

In late 2002, OPC leaders publicly warned against the use of political violence in the pre-election period. Media reports quoted OPC leader Frederick Fasehun as stating that the "OPC would wage war against thuggery come year 2003 election, warning politicians that are contemplating using thugs to desist from it or have their names dragged in the mud." However, there is no guarantee that OPC rank-and-file members will feel bound by these words, especially when they see other groups and individuals carrying out abuses with impunity. Even the public positions of the OPC leaders themselves have been ambiguous. In December 2002, leaders of the OPC, including Frederick Fasehun, and of other self-

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determination groups vowed that there would be no election in Nigeria unless the government pledged to hold a "sovereign national conference." It was not clear what means they would envisage using to disrupt or prevent the elections.

There are also deeper, underlying problems which threaten to undermine the conduct of the 2003 elections and any attempts at installing a real democracy in Nigeria. The federal government has failed to address the grievances of the many groups which complain of marginalization and discrimination, opting to either ignore them, or to try to silence them. The long-awaited reform of the Nigerian constitution, which many civil society groups have been campaigning for several years, has not yet been completed. Many Nigerians, of various political and ethnic backgrounds, feel that their voices remain unheard. The OPC has provided a vehicle for those of Yoruba ethnicity to express some of these frustrations.

In addition to creating a political environment in which open and genuine debate can take place, the federal government should take effective measures to bring to justice members of militia and other armed groups who have been responsible for acts of violence. Rather than contenting itself with blanket bans and sweeping laws to outlaw such groups, it should ensure that individual members of the OPC who carried out these crimes, as well as those who planned and organized them, are charged and tried promptly, according to due process. It should also investigate the role of state government authorities in passively or actively condoning these abuses. The federal government should also ensure that members of the police force responsible for extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary arrests of OPC members are brought to justice. In the pre-election period, in particular, the government should pay special attention to the risks of an escalation of political violence and the dangerous role which such groups could play if they are led to believe they can continue terrorizing the population with impunity, and if they see members of the security forces who have killed their own people evade justice too.

The information in this report is based in large part on research conducted by Human Rights Watch in Nigeria between May and September 2002; additional information has been gathered from other sources inside and outside Nigeria. Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed a wide range of people in Nigeria, including victims and eye-witnesses of OPC violence from different ethnic groups, current and former members of the OPC (including their leaders and rank-and-file members), sympathizers and critics of the OPC, police and government officials, non-governmental organizations, and other sources. This report is not aiming to provide an exhaustive account of all the incidents of OPC violence or of all human rights violations of OPC members by the police. By concentrating on a limited number of incidents which have occurred over the last two to three years, it aims to illustrate the patterns of violence and presents an overview of the different faces of the OPC, highlighting the human rights impact of both the OPC's actions and those of the government and police. The report concentrates on events which took place since the present government of Nigeria came to power in May 1999. However, there were also many serious incidents of violence both by and against members of the OPC in previous years, which are not documented in this report.

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Human Rights Watch is aware that the OPC is not the only ethnic militia responsible for acts of violence, and that many of the groups with which they have been in conflict have themselves taken up arms, and killed and injured Yoruba civilians. Human Rights Watch also condemns the role of these groups in fuelling and perpetrating acts of ethnic violence. However, this report does not attempt to document those cases in detail, as its specific focus is the conduct and responsibility of the OPC and the response of the government and the security forces.

Ethnic Clashes

There has been a pattern of killings by the OPC in the context of disputes or clashes with other ethnic groups since at least 1999. Often these clashes were sparked off by a minor argument between two individuals from different ethnic groups, which typically then escalated when the Yoruba party brought in the OPC to fight their cause, while the other ethnic group retaliated by calling youths from their own community to the rescue. The incident would then rapidly degenerate into a violent ethnic conflict within hours, or sometimes within minutes. The widespread availability of small arms and traditional weapons and the readiness of youths from all sides to use them meant that community leaders were often unable to stop the violence or restore calm, despite efforts to do so.

By the time the violence reached its peak in the second half of 2000, hundreds of people had been killed, many by the OPC, others by other groups. Some of the most serious incidents are described below. A journalist commented: "Around 2000 was the worst period of OPC violence […] The police were incapable of controlling it. The OPC could shut down a whole street […] Every other week there were clashes."

These clashes had repercussions far beyond the southwestern states or the locations where they occurred. One of the immediate effects was that many Hausa-who were one of the most directly-affected groups-fled the southwest and moved back to the north; some have not returned since. A seventy-five-year-old Hausa man, whose thirty-five-year-old son was killed by the OPC in Ajegunle in October 2000 (see below), told Human Rights Watch: "My son Sahabi was killed. He was on his way home with his family. The OPC stopped them. They pushed his wife and children into the house then slaughtered him. His wife saw it happen. They cut his body into pieces with a cutlass. He had two children. The wife was traumatized. She couldn't speak for two months. She left for the north and has stayed there."

In several instances, attacks by the OPC on Hausa or northerners in the southwest were followed by reprisal attacks on Yoruba in the north. For example, following the killings in Sagamu in July 1999, violence erupted in the northern city of Kano, widely seen as an act of retaliation by the Hausa. Similarly, riots broke out in Minna, capital of Niger State, following the violence in Ajegunle in October 2000. The same has been true in reverse: clashes in the north between Yoruba and Hausa have had repercussions in the south and appeared to strengthen the resolve of the OPC to "fight the Yoruba cause." This was notably the case with the explosion of violence between Christians and Muslims in the northern city

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of Kaduna, in which an estimated 2,000 people were killed in February and May 2000, and which was followed by violence in the southwest.

Ketu / Mile 12 Market

On November 25 and 26, 1999, scores of people were killed when the OPC clashed with traders in Ketu / Mile 12 market in Lagos. The exact number of victims has not been confirmed, but is estimated to be more than one hundred. A senior police official who was at the scene said he saw an estimated two hundred bodies, but that others had already been buried in mass graves.

The fighting is thought to have been caused by jealousy on the part of Yoruba about the perceived dominance of the market by Hausa traders. There had also been disputes between particular individuals for control of key leadership positions within the market traders' committee. According to some of the traders, some Yoruba had been threatening to challenge this dominance and "claim back" the market from the Hausa. Consequently, many of the victims of the OPC attack were Hausa, or people of northern origin suspected to be Hausa; however, a number of Igbo and members of other ethnic groups were also attacked by the OPC. Some Hausa also attacked and killed Yoruba. Both groups were well-armed. Most of the violence took place in the market and on the roads surrounding it. However, witnesses reported that there were also house to house searches, in which the OPC targeted Hausas and Igbos. Market traders who witnessed the violence confirmed that large numbers of OPC members were involved (some estimated as many as 1,000) and that many of those carrying out the attacks were wearing vests with "OPC" written on them. They carried a range of weapons, including guns, machetes and daggers; some were wearing charms. Some traders believed that OPC members had been drafted in from other areas.

A woman who had been trading in the market for five years said she had never witnessed anything like it: "People were shouting: 'OPC! OPC!' We started hearing gunshots. I had to find my way out of the market. […] The expressway [the main road which runs along the market] was blocked by the OPC. This expressway was turned into a killing zone. For days a lot of dead bodies littered this road. […] Many traders lost their lives and even some customers that were unfortunate to come to the market at that time."

A representative of the Perishable Foodstuffs Market Association told Human Rights Watch that sixty-eight Hausa traders had been killed in the food market alone; thirty of them were women. The Hausa traders sent a list of the victims they had counted to the Lagos State Governor; dated December 3, 1999, it lists sixty-eight people confirmed dead, including four blind men killed at a mosque; eleven unnamed people burnt at Ketu bus-stop; twenty-four people missing (who were never found), including nine schoolchildren; and details of buildings and property that were burnt or looted.

A Hausa trader described how the OPC were specifically targeting Hausa and Igbo in and around the market. Some northerners who were not even Hausa were among those they attacked:

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On 25 November, a young man, Mohammed, was knifed in the belly. He was rushed to hospital and was lucky to survive. They [the OPC] beat a lot of our members who started chasing them out. We went to the main road. The road was blocked. They were stopping all vehicles. They would offload any Hausa or Igbo, kill them and set them on fire. I saw them stopping vehicles. They were a very big group, maybe thousands. Some had OPC uniforms. Other Yoruba also joined in. They were asking people who were passing: 'What is your state [of origin]? What is your tribe?' They stopped a northerner who sells provisions. He is not a Hausa; he is from the Zabruma tribe, from Kebbi State. His name is Bako; he is about thirty or thirty-five years old. They asked him which state he was from. He said Kebbi. They said: 'Kill him. He's a Hausa man. He's from their states.' They cut him in several places. He managed to run away as the OPC heard the police siren and fled. I saw him face to face. He looked like he could have been attacked with knives or bottles; they used bottles a lot. He swore he would never return to Lagos.

That day, at about 9 a.m., we came to the market as usual […] People said they were seeing movements they didn't understand, in the yam depot. We asked them not to panic. Some leaders went to report the movements to the police at Ketu. […] We heard noises, like whistles. Then we heard the main road was blocked. People were running, burning. They were looting yams and vehicles. There was no killing in the depot but there was killing and burning in lots of houses along the road. The next day, we saw corpses […]

At about 4.30 p.m., I was trying to leave to go home. I was trapped by a group who identified me as Igbo. They said the Igbos were supporting the Hausas, therefore I should be killed. I was thoroughly beaten. They put a tyre around my neck and brought petrol. About ten or twelve people attacked me. They had bottles and sticks and beat me. Some were young and some were middle-aged. […] It was a miracle they didn't set me on fire. I don't know what happened. Someone pulled me from the ground by the arm and said: "Run! Run!" An okada [motorcycle taxi] appeared from nowhere and told me to sit and we drove off. I was hospitalized for one or two days.

The attack of November 25-26 took place in the context of increasing tension in different parts of Lagos and followed a series of other attacks and incidents of intimidation involving the OPC. A trader at Ketu/Mile 12 market mentioned that some days before the attack on the market, about forty or fifty people wearing OPC uniforms had come to the market and threatened some of the traders: "They attacked Hausa and Igbo boys here. They kicked several of them with their boots. People started running away, shouting 'OPC is in the market!' The OPC were telling Hausas and Igbos: 'We're giving you fourteen days to leave this place.' They said the place should be controlled by Yoruba. It was a warning, but they didn't kill anybody that day. […] There were also attacks in other places around. It started from the Tin Can Port. We first heard they had attacked Igbos and others there, including labour leaders. Then it happened at Sagamu, then here. This was all one or two weeks before."

Witnesses of the violence at Ketu/Mile 12 market on November 25-26 described how the security forces had failed to stop the attacks, and only intervened after many people had been

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killed. A trader told Human Rights Watch: "Eventually the police and army were deployed, after the crisis had lasted for several hours. The police were here while the OPC was busy killing people outside. The military were brought in later." Another said: "The police came after two days and dragged them away. They were not present during the crisis." He also deplored the lack of action on the part of the government: "We have a list of the victims [killed in the food market]. We recorded everything. We sent the list to the federal government but nothing happened. There was no investigation." Another said: "The fight lasted for two days before the police took control of the situation. The market was closed for several weeks and when we resumed business, all our goods had been either destroyed or rotten. I lost all my goods to the crisis. I saw a lot of dead bodies. I know a lot of traders that were killed. […] I think the government is encouraging these OPC people because the way they carry out their mission suggests that they are not afraid of the law."

Some OPC representatives denied any involvement at all in the violence at Ketu/Mile 12, describing it as "an intra-market issue which did not involve us and in which we have not involved ourselves in any way." Others denied that the OPC had initiated the fighting but admitted that it had been present; however, they claimed that many people had been killed before the OPC arrived on the scene. As usual they denied having any weapons other than traditional charms, and claimed that the police had supplied the Hausa with guns. They stressed that the Hausa had also been responsible for violence and mentioned an incident in which a group of Hausa men had allegedly killed several Yoruba schoolchildren at the Baptist primary school. Human Rights Watch tried to cross-check this information but was not able to confirm that these killings had actually occurred. A senior school official at the Baptist school confirmed to Human Rights Watch that a group of Hausa had tried to break into the school, but denied that any children had been killed. She indicated that the media reports which had also mentioned the incident at that time had been based on false information.

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E. Idi-Araba Inter-ethnic Crisis, 2002

i. International Television News Report

Lagos violence death toll mounts

February 5, 2002 Posted

LAGOS, Nigeria (CNN) -- At least 100 people have been killed and more than 400 injured in four days of ethnic fighting in Lagos, the Nigerian Red Cross said.

CNN's Jeff Koinange reported a large military convoy had arrived in Lagos and were fanning out across the battle-scarred city.

Earlier in the day, he said, the police presence was described as largely non-existent as marauding gangs roamed the streets of the working-class suburb in the midst of ethnic clashes.

About 100 heavily armed members of Nigeria's army arrived in Lagos on Tuesday afternoon, as a senior military officer tried to persuade residents to return home.

Soldiers ordered residents of the northern suburbs of Mushin and Idi Araba -- where fighting between Yoruba and Hausa tribal militants began on Saturday -- to walk through the battle-torn streets with their hands above their head as a precaution.

searched them for weapons.

Residents were still fleeing the area, saying they were afraid the security forces would soon leave despite widespread fears of a resurgence of fighting after nightfall.

Others, however, were nervously venturing back to collect whatever belongings were left in their looted, burned homes.

One woman, who gave her name to the Associated Press only as Bimbola, found nothing of value in her small house, where the roof was caved in and furniture torched beyond recognition. But she was thankful no one in her family was harmed during the fighting.

"If there's life, there's hope," she said.

Hundreds of people -- mostly Hausa women, children and elderly men -- had sought refuge at the Abalti army barracks, near Idi Araba, and the Ikeja police college, farther away.

The ethnic Yoruba governor of Lagos state appeared on national television alongside Hausa governors of several northern states to appeal to fighters in their respective languages to lay down their weapons.

"We are one nation, one people, under one God," Governor Bola Tinubu said.

There are long-standing hostilities between the mainly Muslim Hausas from the north of the country and the Yorubas, most of whom are Christians from the southwest. Koinange reported that many Lagos residents welcomed the military presence, despite strained relations after the January 27 army munitions plant explosion that left at least 1,000 dead.

He said the army was perceived as able to restore order rather than the police who last week abandoned their posts in a dispute over pay and working conditions.

Koinange said that in the mainly Hausa Muslim north there are Christian enclaves and there were fears of retaliatory attacks there for what had happened in Lagos.

Five trucks of soldiers were stationed at key positions in the highly volatile mostly Muslim city of Kano, where hundreds died last year in ethnic rioting.

Police said they had also reinforced Jigawa state, which borders Kano.

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"We've been going to the villages telling people they should not see the clashes in Lagos as an attack on Hausas by any particular tribe, but the activities of hoodlums," said the police chief in Jigawa State, Shehu Adedayo Adeoye.

The sight of soldiers on the streets has become routine in Nigeria after ethnic disturbances which have killed thousands since President Oluesgun Obasanjo took office in 1999.

The violence started on Saturday after Hausas claimed a young Yoruba man desecrated a mosque.

Hausas apparently turned on him and beat him to death. Yorubas saw this and retaliated.

ii. The Nigerian Tribune Newspaper

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Idi-Araba / Mushin Lagos Crisis 2002.

COMPLIMENTARY
NOT FOR SALE

Nigerian TRIBUNE

THE NEWSPAPER FOR THE MILLENNIUM

Founded, 16 November, 1949 ** No. 12,781 Monday 4 February, 2002 N50.00

LAGOS EXPLOSIONS

It could be sabotage —Obasanjo

CHRIS AGBAMBU and OKEY MUOGBO, Abuja

PRESIDENT Olusegun Obasanjo on Sunday night said he would not rush to any judgement on the Lagos bomb explosions but did not rule out sabotage.

The President, who was answering questions on his live television programme, "*Meeting Chat*", also said the report of the board of inquiry into the disaster would be made public.

"It (the explosions) could be accident, it could be sabotage, but I will not rush to pronounce judgement yet", he said.

The President announced that the report of the board of inquiry would also contain how to forestal future occurrence, "which we will prevent."

He regretted that the incident was tragic and very sad and that it touched the heart of everyone at home and abroad.

On why he headed to

(Continued on Page 2)

MTN rolls out GSM in Ibadan today

By YINKA AKINREMI

ANOTHER Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) operator, MTN, rolls out its services in Ibadan today.

In an advertorial, the company said that the services being introduced include the post-paid package called *business time* and the pre-paid package, *pay-as-you-go*.

(Continued on Page 2)

I would have put my life on line if... —Tinubu

MICHAEL OLUGBODE, Lagos

LAGOS State governor, Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, at the weekend said he would have put his life on the line if last Sunday's bomb explosions was a coup d'etat.

Governor Tinubu expressed his readiness to pay the ultimate price while fielding questions from newsmen after visiting the Police College and Ikeja Military Cantonment in Ikeja.

The governor, who said his first thought after the third bomb blast was that the incident was a coup d'etat, stated that he had informed his top aides that he was ready to resist any attempt at giving up his mandate.

Tinubu also stated that if he had died in the course of resisting the mutiny, that would have meant God chose to put an end to his mission on earth.

"If the bomb explosions

(Continued on Page 2)

Burnt houses at Idi-Araba, Lagos, following skirmishes between some people on Saturday and Sunday leading to the death of at least 15 people. PIC BY NIYI OYETUNJI KING

Eagles shot down Black Stars

GARBA Lawal salvaged Nigeria's hope of lifting the 23rd Nations Cup on Sunday in Bamako with a late minute goal to give the Super Eagles a 1-0 win over Ghana's Black Stars and the qualification ticket to the semi-final.

The match was characterized by a barrage of misses mostly by the star-studded Eagles who showed superiority in their

(Continued on Page 2)

Lagos mayhem continues

- *Another 5 feared killed*
- *Area boys, not OPC, caused crisis —Tinubu*

JOHNSON FAGBAMILA and MICHAEL OLUGBODE, Lagos

THE hostility between the Yoruba and Hausa communities in Idi Araba area of Surulere, Lagos continued on Sunday with five people killed while more houses were burnt.

(Continued on Page 2)

'It could be sabotage'

(Continued from page 1)

Katsina, the second day of the disaster, the President noted that at the scene on that Monday morning, nobody reported to him any case of casualties, hence he decided to go ahead with his journey to Katsina.

On the suggestion that a public inquiry was necessary to ascertain the actual figure of casualties and the extent of damage, the President totally agreed, that he would not object to such.

He said that some people were claiming that 1000 people died, and "I believe that such public inquiry would ascertain the actual figure of casualties."

The President, however, added that the military had a system on how to carry out its own investigation which was normally held in secret "which we have now decided to make public, unlike in the past where such was not done in the military."

President Obasanjo also restated that the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was still opposed to easy conditions of registration for new parties, insisting that they should contest only local government elections next year.

In his *Media Chat*, President Obasanjo said the opposition of the PDP to easy entry for new parties was to prevent the emergence of unserious political parties in Nigeria.

Though he said the party could still change its position, the President maintained the view that new parties must test their popularity at the local government elections first before contesting other elections.

On whether he will sign the newly passed Electoral Bill 2002, the President said he would need to see the Bill first, know what it contains before deciding whether to sign it.

Speaking on the problem of military pension for which he requested permission from the National Assembly to take money ahead of 2002 budget approval, Obasanjo said he was asking for money outside the 2002 budget.

He said the House of Representatives understood him and gave him the go ahead unlike the Senate which frowned at the request.

(Continued from page 1)

An eyewitness informed the *Nigerian Tribune* that the fight resumed at about 5.00 a.m. when the warring groups renewed their hostilities due to the killing and burning to death of some people along Morgan Street, Idi Araba.

This action, the source said, led to a reprisal capture and burning alive of three people from the other group early Sunday morning at a road intersection around Isaga close.

'I would have put my life on line if...'

(Continued from page 1)

were a coup, I would have fought headlong and if I had died in the course, I would have known that was the end of my mission on earth."

The governor said the information made available to him painted a picture of a coup d'etat and also at a point, he was informed there were fightings going on at Bonny Camp as well as the Cantonment at Ikeja before he had to summon enough courage to send his military personnel out on a fact finding mission.

Tinubu stated that it took divine inspiration for him to go on air to make a broadcast so as to calm down residents.

Residents of Mafoluku area of Lagos State, the area which recorded the largest death toll, said that when the bombs started exploding on Sunday evening, they thought Lagos was under siege.

In the words of one of the residents, "we thought Lagos was under siege and would be grounded."

He added that "we had to take to our heels as the bang kept on, we thought the explosion was getting nearer.

"When we took to our heels, we thought on returning, Lagos would have been totally demolished," he lamented.

Also on Sunday, the state government held an interdenominational church service for the repose of the souls of victims of the explosions at the Chapel of Christ the Light Church, Alausa.

At the service was Senator Tinubu, members of the state executive council and top government functionaries.

Lagos mayhem continu[es]

When the *Nigerian Tribune* visited the area Sunday afternoon, there was an uneasy calm due to the lull in the fighting occasioned by the presence of men of the Rapid Response Squad of the Lagos State Police Command and soldiers of the Police/Military joint patrol, as well as mobile policemen.

Religious activities were equally disturbed in the area, especially on Isaga Close, Morgan, Babalola and NEPA area of Idi Araba as most worshippers stayed away from churches for fear of being attacked.

Trouble started early Saturday morning when a man reportedly went to collect some money owed him by a friend who happened to belong to another tribe.

The refusal of the debtor to pay reportedly led to an assault on the creditor.

Thereafter, he reportedly took a cutlass and chopped off the hand of the credit[or] ... quickly ran to his kin[smen to] report the attack.

As a result, othe[rs ...] the creditor reportedl[y ...] in their hundreds to a[ttack the] assassilant, setting [...] buildings.

Lagos State Comm[issioner] of Police, Mr. Mike [...] confirmed two people [...] the Sunday attack.

Lagos State gover[nor ...] Ahmed Tinubu, while [...] said: "I have already [...] the combined team of [...] and police patrol of [...] Hausas and Yorubas in [...] have been living pea[cefully] together for years.

"I have made enqu[iries ...] the crisis and have [...] that it is not the OPC[...]

Meanwhile, Lag[os] governor, Senator Bo[la] Tinubu, on Sunday [...] mayhem did not in[volve the] OPC.

The governor, [...] with newsmen in h[...] explained that the [...] was caused by area [boys ...] not members of the [...]

"Security repo[rts ...] disposal has absolve[d ...] of complicities in th[e ...]

It was also gathe[red ...] *Nigerian Tribune* [...] governor shelved h[...] go to Mushin to [...] residents of the area [...] learnt that the situ[ation] not abated.

The governor [...] the Chairman of Mu[shin Local] Government Are[a ...] Ganiyu Solomon, [...] situation in the Idi-A[raba ...] of the local governm[ent ...] the intention of g[...] to calm frayed nerve[s].

However, Chief [...] advised the governo[r against] taking such an actio[n as] the situation w[as] explosive.

Eagles shot down Black Stars

(Continued from page 1)

quality of play.

A danger signal came in the 34th minute when Goalkeeper Ike Shorunmu was injured by on-rushing defender, team mate, Isaac Okoronkwo, which paved the way for the introduction of reserve goalkeeper, Murphy Akanji.

The water-tight defence of the Eagles, however, ensured a good outing for Akanji who was on holiday for the better part of the game.

The Eagles lost no fewer than five gilt-edge chances leaving Ghanaian keeper, Sammy Adjei, as man of the match.

Adjei put his wealth of experience at the Inter Club Championship level to bear, standing between Nigeria and a basketful of goals against Ghana.

He denied Garba Lawal a chance to score in the 73rd minute using his leg to deflect the grounder which came off a pull out by Austin Okocha.

As the Nigerian team was still relishing over the unpardonable miss, Kanu Nwanko lost another golden chance when he aimlessly latched on to Julius Aghahowa's pull-out inside the penalty box.

Aghahowa, who exhibited excellent performance after switching to the left flank in the latter part of the second half, had equally lost what would have been the certain raiser when his close range drive missed the target by an inch.

The pressure was kept on the youthful Ghanaian team which made most of their goal moves as a result of occasional breakthroughs.

Keeper Adjei was eventually displaced by Lawal's grounder in the 79th minute during a goal mouth scramble. Aghahowa had taken two Black Star defenders on, as a result of a loose ball, which he pushed to well placed Garba, whose shot zoomed past the reach of goalkeeper Adjei for the only goal of the match.

The Nigerian team after the curtain raiser held on to the game with slow but excellent goal build-ups but their finishing was not good enough.

Ghana brought in Emmanuel Duah and Mathew Amoah but their approach to the game could not yield enough dividends.

Wilson Oruma tasted action in the championship just for a few minutes as he came in to replace Okocha while Yakubu Aiyegbeni took over from Finidi George.

It was a sweet revenge for the Eagles who lost to the Black Stars in the semi-final of Senegal '92.

The Eagles semi-finals opponents would be known today after the last quarter final match between Senegal and Congo Dr.

The semi-final match comes up in Bamako on Thursday.

Zamfara budgets N16b

MUHAMMAD SABIU, Gusau

ZAMFARA State government would spend the sum of N16.4 billion naira in the 2002 fiscal year.

Presenting the budget before the state House of Assembly, the state governor, Alhaji Ahmed Sani, said out of the projected budget, the sum of N12 billion would be spend on recurrent expenditure while the remaining would be expended on capital projects.

Governor Sani contended that in view of the shortfall in the statutory allocation, the state government had decided to complete all on-going projects this year.

•Commandant, Ikeja Military Cantonment, Brigadier General George Emdin, receiving cash donation from Mr. Charles Nwodo (left), Vice-President, [illegible] Trust Bank during the bank's visit to the displaced Lagos explosions victims. PIC BY NIYI OYETUNJI KING.

MTN ro[lls] out GS[M] in Ibad[an] today

(Continued from p[age 1])

The company [...] stated all the places [...] services were [...] operation, re-affir[ming its] commitment to "[...] country faster than [any] GSM operator", [...] it is "a commitment [...] intend to deliver on".

The *MTN* advise[d ...] intending customers [...] contact any of its [...] the city to get [...] through any of its pa[rtners].

The *MTN* had [...] its services in Lagos, Port Harcourt, [...] Enugu, Onitsha, [...] Asaba.

ECONET wireless [...] extended its services [...] and January.

iii. Online Newspaper

Nigeria: Deaths rise in Lagos clashes, thousands flee

Originally published

5 Feb 2002

LAGOS, 5 February (IRIN) - Ethnic fighting in Lagos has killed dozens of people and forced thousands to seek refuge in military barracks and other safe places, witnesses said. The clashes pitted local Yorubas against Hausa-speakers from northern Nigeria. The clashes, which broke out on Saturday at Idi Araba in the city's Mushin slum district following a minor dispute, continued until Monday despite the deployment of troops and policemen to quell the violence. "The police had told us to remain indoors, that there was a curfew on Sunday night but surprisingly that same night we were attacked," Salisu Abdulrahman, a Hausa resident of Idi Araba, told IRIN on Tuesday. "This morning I had to take my wife and children to the Abalti Barracks for safety."

Gangs of rival youths, armed with shotguns, swords, bottles, bows and arrows fought street battles on Monday morning in several northern suburbs of the city, still recovering from the devastating effects of explosions at an ammunitions dump that killed more than 1,000 a week before. Idi Araba and other areas including Fadeyi, Obanikoro and Yaba market, were littered with corpses. Several houses were burnt.

Joint police and military patrols restored a semblance of control by late Monday afternoon after shootouts with gangs of fighters. "I have counted no less than 50 dead bodies since we began our patrols this morning," one police sergeant told IRIN. "It's really a bloody business."

Police sources said the situation worsened with the involvement of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) militia, which purports to defend Yoruba interests. The OPC has been blamed in the past for similar ethnic clashes in Nigeria's southwest region. Police said hoodlums also looted shops and robbed people.

Red Cross officials said more than 150 people were given first aid treatment, while 57 others considered seriously wounded were taken to hospital.

Residents of the affected areas fled in their thousands with the few belongings they could carry to police stations, military barracks or the homes of relatives in more peaceful areas of the city. Many northerners left Lagos on Monday for their home regions, raising fears that there might be reprisal attacks when they relate their experiences to relatives back home.

Nigeria has been engulfed in shifting rounds of ethnic violence since the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 ended more than 15 years of military rule. Many analysts believe the end of military rule lifted the lid on bottled-up grievances among the country's more than 250 ethnic groups, a situation aggravated by the deep poverty engendered by years of misrule.

[ENDS]

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iv. International Newspaper

New York Times

Give this article

3rd Day of Ethnic Violence in Streets of Lagos

By The Associated Press
Feb. 5, 2002

Gangs of youths armed with machetes, swords, and bows and arrows took to the streets of Lagos today in a third day of ethnic bloodletting in which at least 55 people have been killed, the authorities said.

Grabbing what possessions they could, thousands fled the gangs as plumes of black smoke rose from the city's slums. The violence between the Yoruba and Hausa fighters was the latest blow to a city still shaken by explosions at an army munitions depot that killed at least 1,000 people last week.

"We carried my grandmother from my house while they were shooting at us," said Muhammad Gorlunu, a 30-year-old Hausa resident who fled. "My neighbor's house was burning when we left, and maybe mine is burning now too."

Soldiers were deployed today to help contain the violence, which began Saturday in the impoverished northern Lagos neighborhoods of Idi Araba and Mushin.

The Nigerian Red Cross president, Emmanuel Ijewere, said his organization had counted 55 bodies by late Sunday and was helping care for more than 150 people with gunshot, machete and other serious wounds at area hospitals. But witnesses spoke of dozens more killed overnight in clashes that spread to the Fadeyi and Onipanu neighborhoods.

There are longstanding hostilities between the mainly Muslim Hausa and the Yoruba, most of whom are Christian and animist. The Hausa dominate Nigeria's north, the Yoruba, the southwest.

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The Hausa-Yoruba divide is one in a list of ethnic, religious and political rifts that haunt Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation. Thousands have been killed in periodic outbursts of violence since President Olusegun Obasanjo -- a Yoruba who was a general, in an army dominated by Hausa -- won 1999 elections ending 15 years of military rule.

This morning in Idi Araba, a Hausa mob was witnessed hacking to death a suspected Yoruba militant with cutlasses and machetes. Another body lay on the street outside the area's main hospital, while a third lay on a highway in Fadeyi.

Reporters counted 17 more burned, mutilated bodies on Sunday.

Gunshots reverberated through nearly abandoned streets, as streams of residents fled. Hundreds of people -- mostly Hausa women, children and elderly men -sought refuge at the Abalti army barracks, near Idi Araba. Officials there said the refugees would soon be transferred to a camp set up at the Ikeja Police College to house the thousands displaced last week by the munition explosions.

Hundreds were already at the police college camp, where they lined up to receive meals of beans and rice served by Red Cross workers, or dozed on bags of clothing and other belongings.

"I've lost my house and everything that I saved in 10 years of work," said Bello Adamu, 65, a market vendor, who planned to return to his village in northern Nigeria as soon as he could raise the bus fare.

The fighting died down on Sunday after hundreds of police officers moved in and imposed an overnight curfew. But it broke out again after midnight when the police appeared to have retreated. The handful of officers who remained on the scene were vastly outnumbered by fighters who openly toted machetes, swords, slingshots, bows and arrows.

Yet in other parts of this city of 12 million people today, life continued as normal, interrupted only by an occasional bus or truckload of refugees escorted by soldiers.

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Appendix IV

Research Instruments

Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology
Faculty of Communication and Information Science
Lead City University Ibadan, Nigeria
PhD in Public Relations and Advertising

Performance Appraisal of NigerianFederal Government Public Relations Responsesand Strategiesin Inter-ethnic Crisis Management (1987 - 2002)

Dear Respondent,

Please this instrument is designed to obtain information on Public Relations Responses and Strategies Performance Appraisal of Federal Government of Nigeria in Inter-Ethnic Crises Management in Communities between 1987 and 2002. Be rest assured that your responses shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Thank you in anticipation of your cooperation.

Checklist (Researcher)

(Research Question 1)

Identification of Inter-ethnic crisis in Selected NigerianCommunities between 1987 and 2002:

S/No	Title, Source and Year of Publications	Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place and Year of Occurrence	Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
9.				
10.				

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11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

(Research Question 2)

Identification of Public Relations Responses of Federal Government of Nigeria to Inter-ethnic Crisis between 1987 and 2002:

S/No	Titles, Sources and Year of Publications	Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crisis	FGN-Deployed PR Responses
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				

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12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

(Research Question 3)

Identification of Public Relations Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria to Inter-ethnic Crisis between 1987 and 2002:

S/No	Titles, Sources and Year of Publications	Occurred Inter-ethnic Crises, Place, Year and Contending Ethnic Groups	Causes of Inter-ethnic Crises	FGN Deployed PR Strategies
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
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Do Not Copy, Lead City University, Nigeria

Lead City University Ibadan, Nigeria
PhD in Public Relations and Advertising

Performance Appraisal of NigerianFederal Government Public Relations Responsesand Strategiesin Inter-ethnic Crisis Management
(1987 - 2002)

Dear Respondent,

Please this instrument is designed to obtain information on Public Relations Responses and Strategies Performance Appraisal of Federal Government of Nigeria in Inter-ethnic Crisis Management in Selected Communities between 1987 and 2002. Be rest assured that your responses shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Thank you in anticipation of your cooperation.

Questionnaire (Respondents: Key Personality)

Section A: Demographic Information

Gender/Sex: Male ☐ **Female** ☐

Age Bracket/Group: 45-64 years ☐ **65 years and above** ☐

Level of Acquired Education: Formal ☐ **Informal** ☐

Ethnic Nationality: Hausa ☐ **Yoruba** ☐ **Fulani** ☐ **Atyap** ☐

Position in Community: Traditional Leader ☐ **Market Leader** ☐ **Religions Leader** ☐

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(Research Question 4)

Level of Performances of Public Relations Responses Deployed by Federal Government of Nigeria to Inter-Ethnic Crisis in Selected Communities between 1987 and 2002:

Please rate how effective are the following deployed Public Relations Responses of Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to occurrences of inter-ethnic crises between 1987 and 2002:

S/No	Inter-ethnic Crisis, Place and Year	Identified FGN-Deployed Public Relations Responses to Occurred Inter-ethnic Crisis	Level of Performance of Identified FGN's Public Relations Responses to Inter-ethnic Crisis			
			Very Effective	Effective	Less Effective	Not Effective
1.	Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna, 1987	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building				
2.	Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna, 1992	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building				

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3.	Sagamu, Ogun State, 1999	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building				
4.	Mile-12, Lagos State, 1999	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building				
5.	Idi-Araba, Lagos State, 2002	(1) Mitigate Damage on FGN Reputation (2) Promotion of Justice (3) Victims' Welfarism Packages (4) Peace-Building				

Very Effective – 4.0 **Effective – 3.0** **Less Effective – 2.0** **Not Effective – 1.0**

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(Research Question 5)

Level of Performances of Public Relations Strategies Federal Government of Nigeria Deployed to Inter-ethnic Crisis in Selected Communities between 1987 and 2002:

Please rate how effective the following Public Relations Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN)deployed to Address inter-ethnic crisis between 1987 and 2002:

S/No	Inter-	Identified FGN's Deployed	Level of Performance of FGN's Identified

	ethnic Crisis, Place and Year	Public Relations Responses to Inter-ethnic Crisis	Public Relations Responses to Inter-ethnic Crisis			
			Very Effective	Effective	Less Effective	Not Effective
1.	Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna, 1987	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations				
2.	Zango-Kataf, Southern Kaduna, 1992	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations				
3.	Sagamu, Ogun State, 1999	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI				

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		(5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations				
4.	Mile-12, Lagos State, 1999	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations				
5.	Idi-Araba, Lagos State, 2002	(1) Propaganda (2) Media Intervention (3) Public Enlightenment / Sensitization (4) Tribunal / POI (5) CSR (6) Sympathy Visit (7) Peace Meetings (8) Community Relations				

Very Effective – 4.0 **Effective – 3.0** **Less Effective – 2.0** **Not Effective – 1.0**

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Appendix V

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support from the Department to Jema'a Local Government Chairman Overseeing Identified Communities where Inter-ethnic Crisis occurred in Kaduna State, Nigeria in 1987



Lead City University (LCU)

Motto: Knowledge For Self-Reliance

Lagos-Ibadan Express Way. Toll-Gate Area P. O. Box 30678, Secretariat, Ibadan Oyo State Nigeria.

Faculty of Communication and Information Science

Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology

Dr. Yemi Oginni
Head, Department of Mass Communication

www.lcu.edu.ng

8th September, 2022.

The Chairman,
Jema'a Local Government,
Kafanchan,
Kaduna State.
Dear Sir

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support to Carryout a Study in the Local Government

The above named Department at Lead City University Ibadan, Oyo State hereby respectfully introduce the person of: Oyewole Oladele Fakoya (a PhD Student of the Department with Matric Number LCU/PG/002157) to your local government sir.

The bearer is expected to carryout a study on "Performance Appraisal of Public Relations Responses and Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in Inter-ethnic crises in communities between 1987 and 2002"

It is our humble request that you please support him towards accomplishing the above objective.

Thank you sir,

Yours faithfully,

Oginni Yemi Kunle, *PhD, LL.B*
Head of Department
Tel: +2348035738894
Email: oginni.yemi@lcu.edu.ng

Appendix VI

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support from the Department to Zango-Kataf Local Government Chairman Overseeing Identified Communities where Inter-ethnic Crises Occurred in Kaduna State, Nigeria in 1992

Do Not Copy, Lead City University



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Faculty of Communication and Information Science

Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology

Dr. Yemi Ogini

Head, Department of Mass Communication

www.lcu.edu.ng

8th September, 2022.

The Chairman,
Zangon Kataf Local Government,
Zonkwa Town,
Kaduna State.
Dear Sir

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support to Carryout a Study in the Local Government

The above named Department at Lead City University Ibadan, Oyo State hereby respectfully introduce the person of: Oyewole Oladele Fakoya (a PhD Student of the Department with Matric Number LCU/PG/002157) to your local government sir.

The bearer is expected to carryout a study on "Performance Appraisal of Public Relations Responses and Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in Inter-ethnic crises in communities between 1987 and 2002"

It is our humble request that you please support him towards accomplishing the above objective.

Thank you sir,

Yours faithfully,

Oginni Yemi Kunle, *PhD, LL.B*

Head of Department

Tel: +2348035738894

Email: oginni.yemi@lcu.edu.ng

Appendix VII

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support from the Department to Sagamu Local Government Chairman overseeing Identified Communities where Inter-ethnic Crisis Occurred in Ogun State, Nigeria in 1999



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Faculty of Communication and Information Science

Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology

Dr. Yemi Oginni
Head, Department of Mass Communication

www.lcu.edu.ng

8th September, 2022.

The Chairman,
Sagamu Local Government,
Sagamu,
Ogun State.
Dear Sir

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support to Carryout a Study in the Local Government

The above named Department at Lead City University Ibadan, Oyo State hereby respectfully introduce the person of: Oyewole Oladele Fakoya (a PhD Student of the Department with Matric Number LCU/PG/002157) to your local government sir.

The bearer is expected to carryout a study on "Performance Appraisal of Public Relations Responses and Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in Inter-ethnic crises in communities between 1987 and 2002"

It is our humble request that you please support him towards accomplishing the above objective.

Thank you sir,

Yours faithfully,

Oginni Yemi Kunle, *PhD, LL.B*
Head of Department
Tel: +2348035738894
Email: oginni.yemi@lcu.edu.ng

Appendix VIII

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support from the Department to Kosofe Local Government Chairman overseeing Identified Communities where Inter-ethnic Crisis Occurred in Lagos State, Nigeria in 1999



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Faculty of Communication and Information Science

Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology

Dr. Yemi Oginni
Head, Department of Mass Communication

www.lcu.edu.ng

8th September, 2022.

The Chairman,
Kosofe Local Government,
Ogudu,
Lagos State.
Dear Sir

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support to Carryout a Study in the Local Government

The above named Department at Lead City University Ibadan, Oyo State hereby respectfully introduce the person of: Oyewole Oladele Fakoya (a PhD Student of the Department with Matric Number LCU/PG/002157) to your local government sir.

The bearer is expected to carryout a study on "Performance Appraisal of Public Relations Responses and Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in Inter-ethnic crises in communities between 1987 and 2002"

It is our humble request that you please support him towards accomplishing the above objective.

Thank you sir,

Yours faithfully,

Oginni Yemi Kunle, *PhD, LL.B*
Head of Department
Tel: +2348035738894
Email: oginni.yemi@lcu.edu.ng

Appendix IX

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support from the Department to Mushin Local Government Chairman overseeing Identified Communities where Inter-ethnic Crisis occurred in Lagos State, Nigeria in 1999



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Faculty of Communication and Information Science

Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology

Dr. Yemi Oginni

Head, Department of Mass Communication

www.lcu.edu.ng

8th September, 2022.

The Chairman,
Mushin Local Government,
Mushin,
Lagos State.
Dear Sir

Letter of Introduction and Request for Support to Carryout a Study in the Local Government

The above named Department at Lead City University Ibadan, Oyo State hereby respectfully introduce the person of: Oyewole Oladele Fakoya (a PhD Student of the Department with Matric Number LCU/PG/002157) to your local government sir.

The bearer is expected to carryout a study on "Performance Appraisal of Public Relations Responses and Strategies of Federal Government of Nigeria in Inter-ethnic crises in communities between 1987 and 2002"

It is our humble request that you please support him towards accomplishing the above objective.

Thank you sir,

Yours faithfully,

Oginni Yemi Kunle, *PhD, LL.B*

Head of Department

Tel: +2348035738894

Email: oginni.yemi@lcu.edu.ng

Appendix X

Some Photographs of the Researcher taken with Permission while on the Field to Collect Data




The researcher at The NigerianTribune Newspaper Library, Ibadan, Oyo state Nigeria on Thursday August 25, 2022 collecting secondary data

The Researcher at Kafanchan, Jema'a Local Government, Kaduna state on Monday 12th September, 2022 collecting primary data

The researcher at Zangon-Kataf Town, Zangon-Kataf Local Government, Kaduna state on Wednesday 14th September, 2022 collecting primary data in the course of the Study

Do Nc



The researcher at Sagamu City, Sagamu Local Government, Ogun state on Monday 19th September, 2022 collecting primary data in the course of the Study

The researcher at Mile 12 Market, Kosofe Local Government, Lagos state on Wednesday 21st September, 2022 collecting primary data in the course of the Study

The researcher at Idi-Araba, Mushin Local Government, Lagos State on Friday 23rd September, 2022 collecting primary data inthe in the course of the Study

Bio Data

A. Personal Data

1. Name: Oyewole OladeleFAKOYA

Address: 1, Oyewole Fakoya Close, Kolobo, Idi-Ishin, G.P.O. Box 39120, Dugbe, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria

Email: nigerianoyewole@yahoo.co.uk

Phone Number: 08135977410, 09086459298

2. Date of Birth: 12th November, 1975

3. Nationality: Nigerian

4. Name and Address of Next of Kin: Irewole Angel Michael-Fakoya; 1, Oyewole Fakoya Close, Idi-Ishin, Jericho, G.P.O. Box 39120, Dugbe, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria

B. Education Background

- Name of Institution: Lagos State University, Ojoo, Lagos State, Nigeria

  Degree Pursued/Awarded: Master's Degree in Communication Studies (CGPA: 4.0)

  Date of Completion: September 28, 2018

- Name of Institution: Nigerian Institute of Public Relations

  Degree Pursued/Awarded: HND/Professional Diploma in Public Relations

  Date of Completion: December 2008

- Name of Institution: Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Edo State, Nigeria

  Degree Pursued/Awarded: Diploma in Law

  Date of Completion: July 2002

- Name of Institution: National Broadcast Academy (FRCN Training School), Lagos, Nigeria

Degree Pursued/Awarded: Certificate in Broadcasting

Date of Completion: June – July 2015

C. Work Experience with Date

- Name of Organisation: The Polytechnic Ijebu

  Job Title/Position: Rector

  Duration: 2021 till date

- Name of Organisation: Federal Ministry of Health

  Job Title/Position: Consultant on Health Exhibition & Promotion

  Duration: 2017 till date

- Name of Organisation: World Network Newspaper

  Job Title/Position: Publisher & Editor in Chief

  Duration: 2020 till date

- Name of Organisation: National Broadcasting Commission (NBC)

  Job Title/Position: Consultant for Public Enlightenment on Digital Switch-Over (DSO) in Ekiti State

  Duration: November – December 2014

- Name of Organisation: Oyo State Ministry of Trade, Investment and Industry

  Job Title/Position: Organizing Consultant, Oyo State Trade Fair 2012

  Duration: October – December 2012

- Name of Organisation: LinkGate Corporate Resources Limited

  Job Title/Position: Chief Executive Officer

  Duration: 2009 till date

D. Awards and Fellowships

- Governor - Postgraduate Class (2020 – 2021), Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology, Faculty of Communication and Information Science, Lead City University, Ibadan, Nigeria
- Governor - Master in Communication Studies 2016/2017 Set,
  School of Communication, Lagos State University, Ojoo, Lagos, Nigeria
- National Vice-President - Old Students Association, Anglican Comprehensive High School, Ikoto-Ijebu, Ogun State, Nigeria (2016-2018)
- National Secretary - Old Students Association, Anglican Comprehensive High School, Ikoto, Ijebu, Ogun State, Nigeria (2018 till date)

E. Membership of Academic Professional Bodies

- Member, Nigerian Institute of Public Relations (NIPR) 2008 till date.
- Member, International Association for Media Communication and Research (IAMCR) May, 2018 till date

F. Publication

- May, 2020 - Officer of the Director
- May, 2018 - Roles of Communication in Medical Treatments
- Year 2014 - Marital Issues Magazine
- Year 2011 - Gas News Magazine
- Year 2001 - Inside Ijebu Kingdom
- Year 2000 - The Youths and their Future
- Year 2000 - Patriotism: The Mystery of Peace

- May 1999 - My Marriage Partner

G. References

- Barrister Ademola Fakoya

  Senior Partner, FFC Eagle Attorney,

  Iyaganku, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria.

  Mobile Telephone: 08028338235

- Prof. Sunday Alawode

  Dean, School of Communication,

  Lagos State University,

  Ojoo, Lagos State.

  Mobile Telephone: 08074173965

_____ _____

Signature Date

The University Compliance Certification

This is to certify that this thesis by Oyewole Oladele FAKOYA with Matric Number: LCU/PG/002157 in the Department of Mass Communication and Media Technology, Faculty of Communication and Information Science, Lead City University, Ibadan is in full compliance with the approved University format and style.

_____ _____

Signature Date

Turn-it-in Test Result

ya_Performance_Appraisal_of_PRR_S_Of_FGN_in_IECM_in_SC...
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