

Boko Haram, Herdmen and Niger Delta Militancy: Exploring the Dynamics of Nigeria's Security Challenges

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Abstract

The reality in Nigeria today is the danger posed by centrifugal social forces that has resulted in high rate of insecurity. The failure of past governments in their efforts to address holistically, the security challenges confronting the country has given rise to the growth of insecurity and their attendant challenges. The mayhem unleashed by the Boko Haram Islamic sect on citizens of the country, particularly in the Northeast geo-political zone had led to loss of lives, properties and the displacement of over 200,000 people in that part of Nigeria. Kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, destruction of oil facilities by Niger Delta militants alongside the attacks carried out by perceived Fulani Herdsmen on some communities in the North, Middle Belt and South of the country are also major security challenges facing the country. As a result of the dynamics of these centrifugal social forces, Nigeria has been listed among the terrorist countries of the world. Government responses to these challenges have been a mixture of carrot-and-stick approach that has not put an end to the menace. Rather, the rate of insurgency and in fact, general insecurity in the country is becoming alarming with each passing day. This paper contributes to the growing literature on this issue but, in addition, argues that there should be re-conceptualization of government failed approach in favour of a holistic and ideology driven approach. Relying strongly on secondary source for its validated and authenticated study data, the paper adopted the relative deprivation theory and argues that feeling of mass deprivation has resulted in aggressive and violent behavior by a large proportion of Nigerian youths. The resultant organized violent behaviour has found outlets in terrorism, banditry, militancy among others. Concluding that insecurity has been the bane of stability, growth and development in Nigeria, the paper recommended among others, that

government should improve human, economic and security governance through well taught out policies and implementable programmes.

Keywords: *Security, Terrorism, Insecurity, Boko Haram, Militants and Bandits*

Introduction

Toward the dusk of the last millennium, unfolding events on the global stage indicate that the 21st century would be characterized by twin issues of security and terrorism. The September 11th 2001, Al-Queda terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre [WTC] in New York-USA, the global economic meltdown and the collapse of the Asian Tigers constitute the preamble to the problems of global insecurity as a result of armed conflicts, militancy banditry and terrorism the nations of the world are now passing through.

Violent agitation by social and ethnic groupings is not new in Nigeria. Scholars such as Onigu (2016), Subruan (2009) and Richard (2011) have all examined the bases of insecurity as a result of terror attacks in Nigeria. The level of insecurity as a result of terrorism, militancy and farmers/herders clashes, in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria has created unprecedented security challenges. These challenges according to Ewetan and Urhie (2014) ranges from kidnapping, through suicide attacks to bombing, ritual killings, politically motivated killings, ethnic clashes, armed banditry and in recent times herdsman attacks on farmers and communities. According to Imhonopi and Urim (2012), both the Federal and the State Governments in Nigeria have used force-for-force as well as carrot and stick approach to deal with the challenges but insecurity seems to be on the rise despite these concerted efforts. This development Egwu (2011) has observed may not be unconnected with the rise in the level of hatred among ethnic groups, religious intolerance by sectarian religious groups, political rivalry and a growing youth population that are increasingly disconnected with governance in the country. A report

by the Open Society (2012), noted that the primordial tendencies of various ethnic groups towards violence, the perennial eruption of various ethnic militias such as the Niger Delta militias and the inclinations of religious fundamentalists like Boko Haram group to violence have all collectively aggravated the scale and widen the scope of insecurity in Nigeria. The resultant destruction of infrastructure as fall-outs of those violent attacks has taken the country many years' backward as well as retarded industrial growth and socio-economic development across the country.

This paper, within the context of Boko Haram, Insurgency, Herdsmen Attacks, and Niger Delta Militancy explores the dynamics of the security challenges confronting Nigeria. The first level of analysis examines insecurity in Nigeria from the analytical tripod of intolerant religious bigotry and terrorism under the guise of religious fundamentalism championed by the Boko Haram insurgents. The second analytical tripod examines insecurity induced by climate shift which has resulted in increasing spates of Herdsmen/farmers clashes across Nigeria due to diminishing natural resources. The third analytical tripod examines insecurity rising from resource control agitators under the guise of environmental activism, spear headed by various Militia in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The activities of the various actors represented in the above groups have not only aggravated the level and scale of insecurity in Nigeria but also widened its scope, to the point that insecurity now threatens the very fabric of national integration as well as created an ecology of fear, disquiet and anxiety across the country.

Conceptual Framework

The framework for conceptual analysis in this paper is anchored on the concepts of security, terrorism and insecurity.

The Concept of Security

Mc Grew (2008) asserts that the security of any nation is anchored on two fundamental planks namely, (i) the maintenance as well as the protection of the citizenry, and the nation's economic interest against external aggressions (ii) promotions of an international order that safeguards national core values, interest and social order. It is in this regard that Omede (2012) sees security as a dynamic condition involving the ability of a nation to counter threats to its core values and interest. Garuba (2016) on the other hand sees security as the capacity of the State to secure its territory against external attacks through a network of security agencies as well as protecting the democratic structures and the people by the military and police/paramilitary agencies from internal upheavals arising from unemployment, hunger and other socio-economic injustices. Nwagboso (2012), notes that historically, security has been about protecting people and that without this pre-occupation, security makes no sense at all. Arguing along this line, Gaskin (2016) posits that the primary duty of any government is to keep its citizen safe by guaranteeing their security. He argues further that the *raison d'être* for the legitimacy and existence of any government is its ability to provide adequate security and protect the society from anarchy. Dike (2010) and Omede (2012) stretched this argument and narrowed it to Nigeria by emphasizing that security in Nigeria should be holistic and incorporate the citizens as primary beneficiaries of every security apparatus and deliverables the government can put on the table. Drawing from the forgoing, security in this paper is conceptualized as the effort by governments at all levels to strengthen its protective capacity to contain internal and external aggression, control crime and criminality, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, preserve and ensure the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad, as well as the protect the country's sovereignty.

The Concept of Terrorism

Even though the Oxford Advanced learner's Dictionary (2010), defines terrorism as the use of violent action to achieve political aims or to force government to act, terrorism as a concept is not easily defined. In spite of the volumes of scholarly work, there is no generally accepted definition of the concept. According to Martin (2006), nearly all the definitions explained terrorism emotively or polemically to "arouse emotions rather than exercise intelligence".

Terrorism is a dimension of insecurity. The US Commission on War on Terror (2012) conceptualized the act of terrorism as a premeditated use of violence by sub-national groups to secure political or self-interest objectives through intimidation of people, attacks on states, territories by bombing, hijacking and suicide attacks among others. For Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamuose (2013), terrorism is seen as a premeditated or politically motivated act of violence carried out against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. The US Commission on War on Terror (2012) identified two types of terrorism viz: the domestic and the transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism involves activities of local terrorist within the territory of a host country and their targets are fellow citizens, their property, institutions and policies. Activities of Boko Haram terrorist in Nigeria, Tamil Tigers in Srilanka are examples of domestic terrorism. Activities of transnational terrorism on the other hand cut across national boundaries and their victims' and targets are institutions and supporters of such institutions (Sander and Ender, 2018). The Al-Queda sponsored US attack of 9/11/2001 is a classic example of activities of transnational terrorism.

Similarly, terrorism is not easily classified. Writers and scholars have come up with different classification based on their subjective perspectives. Pumphrey (2012) classified terrorism within the context of Revolutionary terrorism; Friendly Fire terrorism, False Flag terrorism, and State Sponsored terrorism among others. According to Galtung (1996) the form of terrorism determines the choice of the

target and victims but diplomats, civilian, key state officials including heads of government, airlines and key economic infrastructure top the list of targets and victims. Laqueur (2017) predicted that the terrorist of the post-cold war would be less ideological, more likely to harbor ethnic grievance and harder to distinguish from other criminals. This prediction seems to be unfolding in Nigeria today.

Causes of terrorism have been identified by Martin (2006) to include psychological motivation, culture and religion. He argues that psychological motivation is intertwined with poverty and economic disadvantage that fueled terrorism. In this vein, Pumphrey (2012), notes that statistics show that 15 percent of the world's population consumes 85 percent of global resources and that third world countries are at the receiving end of this inequality. According to Galtung (1996) culture and religion are the two causative factors of terrorism. He argued that the tenets of certain cultures and religion encourage violence, as religious fundamentalists believe that the end justifies the means in achieving religious survival. For Eme and Jide (2012) colonialism and nationalism with associated struggle for self-determination are factors that trigger terrorism across the globe. They pointed out that there exist a co-relational relationship between groups perceived to be engaged in terrorist activities and their struggle for self-determination. Drawing from the foregoing analysis, this paper submits that poverty, economic deprivations, social and political injustice are the potential trigger for terrorism.

The Reality of Terrorism in Nigeria

Francis (2006) notes that, prior to the Fourth Republic, terrorism was a perception rather than reality in Nigeria. It was almost impossible to conceive of Nigeria as host to terrorist activities a few years back let alone the high level of terrorism being witnessed today. He argued that knowledge of terrorism was restricted to newspaper stories and headlines announcing terrorist attacks in countries like Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Israel, Afghanistan, Sudan and Iran among others. The feeling

of being secure pervaded Nigeria. Nigeria then did not experience any terrorist attack like those that rocked Kenya and Tanzania in which the Al Queda bombed the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 killing 258 people and injuring more than 5,000. The narrative has changed since 2010, when the country witnessed relentless terrorist activities especially in the northern part of the country. Specifically, some of the terrorist activities in Nigeria since 2010 include the October 1st bombing of the Police Force Headquarters in Abuja in 2011, Christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic church Madalla in Suleja, on December 25th 2011, Easter day bombing in Kaduna 2012, bombing of United Nations building Abuja 2011, August 26th, Kano bombing and bombings in Maiduguri 2012. FBI (2021) report indicates that most attacks take place in northern and northeast Nigeria. There has been an increase in insurgent attacks in Borno State. However, there have been a significant number of attacks elsewhere. Public places where crowd gather have been targeted, including places of worship, markets, shopping malls, hotels, bars, restaurants, football viewing centres, displacement camps, transport terminals, government buildings, security and education institutions (schools, further education colleges and universities are all regular targets), and international organization. Attacks have taken place around religious and public holidays in public and crowded places including places of worship and during election periods.

In its March (2021) Report, the FBI documented some of the most recent terrorist attacks perpetuated mostly by the Boko Haram, but also the ISWAP and JASDJ to include:

- October 2016 – Boko Haram coordinated attacks on IDP camps, market, places of worship and security force installations in Borno and Adamawa states.
- February 16, 2018 – Detonation of devices by 3 Boko Haram suicide bombers at a fish market in Konduga, Borno state. 19 people were killed and about 70 others injured.

- March 1, 2018 – Boko Haram terrorists, armed with light weapons, anti-aircraft weapons and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) conducted a well attack against a military base in Rann, Borno state. 9 members of the Nigerian security forces and 3 UN consultants were killed. Several others were injured and some abducted.
- October 31, 2018 – Boko Haram conducted a raid on Dalori IDP camp and surrounding communities near Maiduguri where at least 8 people were killed and several women abducted.
- November 18, 2018 – ISWAP conducted an attack against a military base in Metele and a significant number of soldiers were killed.
- February 16, 2019 – JASDJ conducted a complex attack on a mosque in southern Maiduguri killing up to 20 people.
- February 23, 2019 – ISWAP conducted an indirect fire attack against Maiduguri, focused on the West of the City in the area around the airport and military cantonment.
- June 17, 2019 – Three Boko Haram suicide bombers detonated their devices outside a hall in Konduga, Borno state where football fans were watching a match on television. At least 30 people were killed and 40 injured.
- February 9, 2020 – Boko Haram insurgents are reported to have killed at least 30 people and abducted women and children while sleeping in their vehicles during an overnight stop in Auno town, on a major highway near Maiduguri.
- June 9, 2020 – Boko Haram insurgents are reported to have killed about 81 civilians in Felo village, Gubio LGA.
- June 13, 2020 – Insurgents attack Munguno town, killing at least 38 civilians and targeting the humanitarian hub located in the town.
- July 2, 2020 – Shots were fired at an UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flight in Damasak, Borno state.

Attacks have increased in frequency and casualty since 2014 and includes the capture and control of local government areas around Bama and Malam Faturi, establishment of their base in the Sambisa Forest, attack on a hotel in Mubi, Adamawa state in 2014, abduction of female students of Chibok, Dapchi, and Damaturu Government Secondary Schools between 2014 and 2018 among other strikes. All these forceful termination of lives, destruction of property, abduction of young girls and turning them into sex slaves, abduction and killing of aid workers and expatriates among others clearly indicates that terrorism has firmed its tap root in Nigeria.

The Concept of Insecurity

Insecurity is the antithesis of security. Terrorism and insecurity are the twin menace that has continued to threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria. Achumba *et al.*, (2013) argue that insecurity exist where there is inability or lack of capacity to take defensive action against forces that portend harm or danger to an individual or group, thereby rendering them vulnerable. For Beland (2015), insecurity exist when there is a state of fear or anxiety from a lack of protection. Beland contends that physical insecurity is more visible and pervasive than economic and social insecurity. According to Egwu (2009), the pattern of insecurity in Nigeria has been regionalized. For instance, Militia groups operate in the south, religious insurgency run havoc in the north, kidnapping has free reign in the east and south, ritual killings in the east and west, political and non-political assassinations across the nation. Recently, the regional pattern of insecurity in the country has given rise to regional security formation and vigilante groups across the country in a bid to address the high rate of insecurity. Drawing from the foregoing analysis, in this paper, insecurity is defined as a chronic threat to human life, territories, state, religious beliefs, property and institutions.

Identified Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria

Analyst and scholars have examined different sources of insecurity. Beland (2015), Egwu (2009), Achumba *et al.*, (2013) had earlier identified emotional response to external threat, as well as threat from within and threat to beliefs especially religion as sources of insecurity. Achumba *et al.*, (2013) more recently and within the context of Nigeria's experience identified two major sources of insecurity in Nigeria, namely insecurity resulting from remote factors and those resulting from proximate factors. One of the remote causes of insecurity identified by Achumba *et al.*, (2013) is the cumulative effect of bad governance as a result of corruption which over the years have weakened the institutional framework in the country and rendered them ineffective. In addition, Igbuzor (2011) noted that due to weakened institutions, democratic accountability is lacking. This he argues is manifested in the inability of government to provide basic public goods to Nigerians. As a result of government failure, frustration and discontents on the part of the citizenry find expression in violence at the slightest provocation. Increase in crime, criminality and resultant insecurity in Nigeria according to Hazen and Horner (2007) is a response by the people to the perception that Nigeria has the resources but entrenched corruption has created a state of poverty in the midst of plenty.

Another identified remote cause of insecurity in Nigeria is the perception of marginalization by the minority ethnic groups. Egwu (2000) contends that the lifestyles exhibited by the political class is out of tandem with the grinding poverty to which less connected citizens are subjected. In addition, he argues that there are disparities in the location of economic infrastructure, employment opportunities and other safety nets skewed in favour of the dominant ethnic groups and this state of inequality, unfairness and injustice has bred discontents. Some ethnic groups in response have been forced to take their destiny into their hands, as it is being played out in the Niger Delta region. Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) and Salawu (2010) also

identify the prevalence of the ethnic and religious crisis as a remote source of insecurity in Nigeria. For Hazen and Horner (2007), these crises continued to brew and throw up violence due to the existence of imbalance in the social relations between one ethnic or religious group and another. Adagba *et al.*, (2012) in their contribution noted that the root cause of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria is located within the context of distribution of scarce resources, power, expansion of religious territories and political offices. The development of suspicion and fear between who gets what, when and how has created a tendency towards violent confrontations to even scores resulting in large-scale killings among ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria.

Another remote but critical source of insecurity in Nigeria identified by Adagba *et al.*, (2012) is the social disconnect between the majority of citizens of the country, their leaders and the government in power. The authors argues that whether the government in power is military or democratically elected civilian, there exist a gulf between them and the people. The gulf has widened with every successive administration as their failures to address the socio-economic needs of the citizens have bred a culture of mistrust and resentment. Consequently, centrifugal forces have no difficulty co-opting them to vent their anger on the perceived enemies of the people. This demonstration of anger was put in full display when hoodlums hijacked the “End Sars” protest, destroying the much needed and vital national and private infrastructure and assets.

Nwagboso (2012), observed that one of the fallouts from the civil war in Nigeria is the gradual and eventual breakdown of moral and socio-cultural value system. He argues that this breakdown of socio-cultural and communal value system resulted in exploitation of the weak by the strong. The emerging zero- sum and corrupt value system in Nigeria is anchored on the principle that might-is-right or the end-justify-the means. All these tendencies have contributed to the prevailing insecurity in the country. On the other hand, Achumba *et al.*, (2013) noted that proximate causes include the existence of porous

borders that enhance unimpeded inflow of heavy weaponry and hired killers from the North Africa war zone to infiltrate Nigeria and used as mercenaries. Rural urban drifts due to absence of economic opportunities and environmental degradations that pollute land and water that are the main sources of livelihood of rural people due to oil spillage and the lack of CSR by the oil companies are factors that cumulatively provoke social, unrest within their host communities, while the terrorism that result creates insecurity across Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework that underpins this paper is the Relative deprivation theory. Developed in the 1940s, the concept of relative deprivation itself has a longer history in the social sciences. Tocqueville and Marx in the 19th century used the idea of relative deprivation in their respective analysis of the French revolution and the problem associated with the rise of capitalism and personal property. However, sociologist Samuel Stouffer (1900-1960) is credited with developing relative deprivation theory after WW II. Subsequently, scholars like Gurr (1970), Wilson (1973) and Morrison (1978) also made their own variable contributions.

Relative deprivation refers to the idea that feeling of deprivation and discontents are related to a desired point of reference (reference groups). Feeling of relative deprivation arises when desires becomes legitimate expectations and those desires are blocked by society. Generally considered to be the central variable in the explanation of social movements, relative deprivation theory is used to explain the quest for social change that inspires social movements. The theory enables us to understand why men rebel and just as frustration produce aggressive behaviour on the part of the individual, so too does relative deprivation predicts collective violence by groups especially those members of the society who feel more frustrated and disgruntled by social and economic conditions. According to Krahn and Harrison (1992) relative deprivation theory is used to explain the root causes of social movements and revolutions in the field of sociology.

Proponents of the Theory

Some of the major proponents of relative deprivation theory are Aristotle, Karl Marx, Bertrand de' Tocqueville, Samuel Stouffer, Simme Flynn, Quinn McMemar, Renois Likert, Linda Brown and Townsend Patric.

Basic Thrusts of the Theory

Among the basic thrusts of the theory that: (i) relative deprivation predicts collective action by groups especially those members of the society who feels more frustrated and disgruntled by social and economic conditions.

- (ii) Relative deprivation is a conscious feeling of negative discrepancy between legitimate expectation and present actualities (Wilson 1973).
- (iii) Relative deprivation also leads to political violence. According to Okanya (1999), political violence is the exercise of physical force by individuals or groups so as to inflict injury or cause damage to person or property with the intention of influencing the political process.
- (iv) The higher the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seem to be attainable, the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression.
- (v) Individuals and groups who lack some goods, services and comforts are more likely to organize themselves collectively to improve and defend their conditions (Morrison 1978).
- (vi) Men who feels that they have many ways to attain their goals are less likely to become angry when one way is blocked than those who have few alternatives.

Major Strengths and Weakness

Relative deprivation theory provides researchers and policy makers adequate paradigm in the effort to resolve a large volume of social problems. For instance, the theory enhances our understanding of why

men rebel. This is because just as frustration produces aggressive behaviour on the part of the individual so too does relative deprivation predict collective violence by groups especially those members of society who feels more frustrated and disgruntled by social and economic conditions. The theory also helps us to have a better understanding of why there are frequent problems associated with ethnic groups, regions or provinces that are fighting to address their relatively deprived situations especially in federations where resources and revenue are not well distributed. Unfortunately, relative deprivation theory has come under strong attack for contradicting its central idea which suggest that individuals or groups feel deprived when their current circumstances are negative compared to the situation of others. Critics have observed that whereas absolute deprivation clearly leads to feeling of discontent and ultimately efforts to effect social change, feelings of relative deprivation may or may not definitely lead to the creation of social movements and collective identity (Morrison 1971).

Application of Theory to the Study

Proponents of relative deprivation theory sees it as the main cause of conflict, insecurity and violence in the society. Gurr (1970) for instance defines relative deprivation as perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their capabilities. According to this theory, the wider the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seems to be attainable, the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression. The theory further propose that individuals and groups who lack some goods, services and comfort are more likely to organize themselves collectively to improve their conditions (Morrison 1978).

Relative deprivation theory unravels, albeit paradoxically, the widening material gulf between the state and the masses in Nigeria. This antagonistic divide is attributed, primary, to exploitation and structural violence that manifests in the form of unjust policies,

inequitable distribution of resources, unequal access to power, poverty etc in the country. The class analysis framework of Marx and Engels (1977) when employed to support the relative deprivation theory, can best explain the endemic struggle at play between the exploiters (the national elites) on the one hand and the exploited (mass of the citizens of Nigeria) on the other hand.

Nigeria manifests in abundance the shortcomings of capitalism. Despite that she generates billions of dollars annually from the sale of crude oil and other resources, such earnings have been largely mismanaged owing to the elites inadequate capacity for economic, resource and sovereign governance. This has, in turn, exposed the masses of the country to exploitation at various degrees. Major fallout of Nigeria's degenerating structural condition are rising insecurity and underdevelopment as symptomized by dwindling economic and social conditions as well as the general state of anomie and tension at the political realm.

Thus, amid the weakening structural conditions, conscious feeling of negative discrepancy between legitimate expectation and present activities as well as a growing army of people who lack some goods, services and comfort, groups have increasingly begun to organize themselves collectively to improve and defend their conditions in Nigeria. Utume(2005) has rightly observed a strong correlation between suffering, deprivation or frustration on the one hand and crime on the other and has argued that criminals carry out their acts in reaction to socioeconomic deprivation imposed on them or their people by the elite. Thus, the escalating security challenge as epitomized by the tripartite conditions of terrorism, banditry and militancy clearly reflects the structural state of affairs of the Nigerian state today.

The Dynamics of Nigeria's Security Challenges

As highlighted earlier, this paper seeks to explore the dynamics of Nigeria's security challenges from the following perspectives:

1. Insecurity as a result of Religious Intolerance and the rise of Boko Haram insurgency

Agi (2018) notes that the issue of religion evokes heated debates and creates division and insecurity than any other in Nigeria. This he observed and explains why many religious sects and socio-political groups exploit the fault line to unleash terror and create insecurity in Nigeria. Prior to 1966, Coleman (2016) notes that incidents of religious extremism and violence in Nigeria were uncoordinated and haphazard in their occurrence and no direction from outside strategists. Those that occurred at all were short-lived, collapsing at the appearance of the military or police forces. He noted further that the narrative changed between 1966-1979 with the emergence of provocative Islamic religious teachings with external influence from Libya and Yemen resulting in organized killings. These were in turn followed by violent responses from government. The situation degenerated between 1986-1996 when sectarian rivalry became prominent and religious intolerance of other groups became the order of the day. Within this period, Agi (2018), notes that violence and insecurity resulting from religious intolerance became regionalized. Northern Nigeria became the epic-center for religious violence and gangsterism. A prominent feature of the insecurity during this period was the bloody nature of the religious and ethnic violence. Starting with the Maitatsine religious uprising in Kano, Maiduguri and Kaduna in 1992. Yola in 1994, the Palm Sunday riot and Kafanchan riot in 1995, culminating in the Jama'atul Tajid quit notice to non-indigenes in Kano in 1995 and Muslim vs. Christian clash in Kaduna in 1996. All these scenarios prepared the ground for the rise of Boko Haram at the beginning of the 21st century.

Boko Haram is perceived by many as a radical militant Islamic sect that seeks to impose strict Sharia laws and its radical interpretation of Islamic injunctions in the northern states of Nigeria as well as other parts of the country (Olugbode, 2010). "Boko" is an Hausa word for western or non-Islamic education, while "Haram" is an Arabic word that literally means 'forbidden'. The sect has its origin in Islamic

fundamentalism and was formed by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno state in 2002. According to Ikenga and Efebeh (2013), Boko Haram moved to Kanamma in Yobe state in 2004 and set up its base called Afghanistan. The official recognized name of Boko Haram is “Jama’atul Alhul Sunna Liddo’ Wati Wal Jihad” meaning “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad” (Ikenga and Efebeh, 2013). The group also promotes an Islamic doctrine that prohibits Muslims to participate in any form of political or social activities. The killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the sect by security agencies transformed Boko Haram into a violent terrorist insurgent group that has ravaged the north-east geo-political zone of Nigeria leading to wanton destruction and death of thousands and displacement of the entire population of the region. At the peak of the insurgency, Boko Haram was in control of over eleven (11) local government’s areas in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States and paralyzed economic and social activities of the Northeast geopolitical zone. Tekhon (2015) notes that the most audacious attacks on churches, military barracks and police headquarters were launched in 2011. More sophisticated attacks were carried out on religious buildings, Foreign missions and the UN Headquarters in Abuja seen as symbols of western culture. Table 1 below shows the summary of violent attacks and activities carried out by Boko Haram from 2009-2014.

Table 1: Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria

Year of Attacks	States Targeted	Victims		
		Deaths	Injured	Displaced
2009	Yobe, Borno, Bauchi and Kano	Over 800 persons	Over 1000 persons	Unquantified number of persons
2010	Borno, Abuja, and Plateau	Over 330 persons	Unknown	700 prison inmates freed
2011	Borno, Kaduna, Yobe, Niger, Bauchi, Abuja, Kastina and Plateau Bombed UN building in Abuja	Over 425 persons	Over 300 persons	Unquantified number of persons in (11) LGAs
2012	Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Plateau, Yobe, Abuja, Sokoto and Katsina	Over 1047 persons	Over 2045 persons in 9 states	Entire villages in Northeast region
2013	Borno, Adamawa, Kano, Plateau, Gombe, Yobe and Bauchi	Over 732 persons	Several hundreds in Gombe, Bauchi and Yola	Several hundreds across the Northeast region
2014	Borno, Adamawa and Yobe	Over 200 persons	Several hundreds	Kidnapped 270 girls from a girls secondary school in Chibok
	Total	3534	3345	Over 200,000 displaced in the Northeast states

Source: Human Rights Watch (2017).

According to Nwagboso (2012), Boko Haram now constitute a serious security challenge in Nigeria with its linkage to Al-Qaeda and even recently the ISIS. The activities of the sect according to Tunde (2017), had received motivation and financial boost from its association with external transnational terrorist groups and the acceptance of its creed

by its adherents. The sophisticated guerrilla tactics deployed by the Boko Haram insurgents during its attacks, Onigu (2016) notes has emboldened the group and made it possible for them to carry out their activities unhindered in the north east geo-political region of Nigeria. It is in the light of this that this paper posits that the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents threatens the fabric of the Nigeria state and also, exposes the incapability of the country and its political class to respond positively to the insecurity created by the sect which has made the country unattractive for Foreign Direct Investment(FDI).

2. Insecurity in Nigeria Induced by Farmers-Herders Conflicts over land Resource Shortage as a Result of Climate Change

Until the return of democracy in 1999, Fulani pastoral herdsman have lived peacefully with their host communities wherever they settled across Nigeria. In some communities like Agatu in Benue State where the host population is largely Muslims, they have even intermarried. Many scholars have written on the causes of insecurity created by herdsman attacks on farmers and host communities where they had, hitherto, lived in peaceful co-existence. Some writers, social commentators and even socio-political analysts have alluded to a conspiracy theory or Islamisation agenda, while others see the herdsman attacks as an extension of Boko Haram insurgency. This paper is a departure from those narratives and objectively situates the root cause of the herdsman attacks on the disputes over limited land resources as a result of changing global climate condition. According to the New York based Human Rights Watch (2017) report, 40 percent of all inter and intra state conflicts in Nigeria since 1990 were natural resources related conflicts. The report estimated that communal violence involving contested land disputes had resulted in the death of over 10,000 Nigerians in less than a decade. The perennial farmer-herder's conflict in Nigeria follows a similar pattern across the Sahel where as a result of over thirty years of drought induced by climate change has resulted in feed and water shortages due to desertification (HRW 2017). This situation, the report notes pushed nomadic

pastoralists, mostly ethnic Fulani's to move southward outside their normal grazing routes. At the same time, climate change weather-related factors have also pushed farmers in the South to cultivate more land each year on hitherto known grazing routes, leaving herdsmen with fewer places to water and graze their cattle. The resulting contest according to Aaron (2017) is responsible for the persistent and deadly clashes between Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers who had coexisted for years in peace. Experts had warned that there were grounds to believe that climate change impacts could lead to herdsmen-farmer conflicts and poor government response to the resulting violence could lead to insecurity in the country (Homer-Dixon, 2017). Poor government responses at the early stages of herders attacks created gaps that were capitalized on by criminals, mostly from Nigeria's neighbours to the north to infiltrate the conflict. Having been unchecked for long, and having become more lethal as a result of massive infiltration by criminals, the modus operandi of herdsmen attacks transformed dangerously. Thus, beginning from 2017 but certainly at its peak today, criminality at different dimensions-banditry, armed robbery, cattle rustling, kidnapping, abduction, even terrorism all crystalized under the identity "Fulani Herdsmen" to continue to wretch havoc all over the country but particularly in the Northwest and North central geopolitical zones. With deadly instrument of violence at their disposal today, the criminals "Fulani Herdsmen" have on daily basis since 2019 invaded schools and abducted school children, attacked and over run police and military settlements and check points, attacked and kidnapped travellers over run villages and set them on fire, rusted cattle, abducted traditional rulers, politicians and expatriates. Table 2 presents a summary of the dimension and spread of attacks perpetuated by Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria since 2012 as reported by the Human Rights Watch (2017).

Table 2: Fulani Herdsmen Attacks in Nigeria (2012-2013)

Dates of Attacks	States Targeted	Location of Attacks	Victims		
			Death	Injured	Displacement
June 2012	Plateau	Chakaruma village	2 persons	20 persons	Whole village displaced
July 2012	Plateau	Maseh, Tse and Shong villages	192 persons	450 persons	3 villages razed down
August 2012	Benue	Ojankele and Ijegwu communities	12 persons	300 persons	1000 persons
September 2012	Edo	Ubiaja village	1 person	50 persons	-----
October 2012	Plateau and Benue	Dallyam, Ranghol, Lotton villages in Plateau , Yogbo village in Benue	34 persons	150 persons	Several persons
Novermber 2012	Plateau	Barkin-Ladi	13 persons	Several persons	-----
December 2012	Plateau and FCT Abuja	Bachit village in Plateau, Gwarko village in Abuja	6 persons	Several persons	-----
January 2013	Plateau and Nassarawa	Du village in Jos, Agbu, Ekye and Agwasu villages in Nassarawa	570 persons	150 persons	Whole communities razed down
January 2013	Plateau and Benue	Wadatan, Gerba village in Jos, Amla village in Benue	450 persons	120 persons	20 houses razed down
Febuary 2013	Nassarawa	Iga and Rutu communities	10 persons	15 persons	100 persons
March 2013	Plateau, Benue and Kaduna	Kadarko, Uvir communities, Anguwah and Mafan in Kaduna	32 persons	60 persons	500 persons
April 2013	Benue, Delta and Plateau	Yogbo village in Benue, Ogume community in Delta, Riyom LGA in Plateau	28 persons	120 persons	1000 persons Farmlands destroyed
May 2013	Benue and Plateau	Okpachanyi, Akongh villages in Benue, Zangang villages in Plateau	75 persons	60 persons	450 persons
	Total	34 villages across Nigeria	1425 persons	1495 persons	2550 persons
		Total	5470 victims across Nigeria		

Source: Human Rights Watch (2017)

3. Insecurity in Nigeria Due to Resource Control Agitations

Nwagboso (2012) traced the origin of the Niger Delta crisis to early 1990's when tension heightened between international oil companies operating in the region and some group of leaders representing the Niger Delta ethnic groupings. The ethnic groups complained about exploitation by the oil companies drilling oil in their Ogoni region and not paying commensurate compensation. This situation according to

Osungade (2016) persisted until the emergence of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Ken Saro-Wiwa an Ogoni environmental right activist became the arrow head of the agitation which started on the platform of environmental activism. He was later joined by nine other Ogoni leaders after the Kaiama Declaration. Unrest in the region continued and became a threat to oil companies whose royalties were the major source of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings. The persistent violence in the region led to the extra-judicial killing of the Ogoni leaders including Ken Saro-Wiwa by the General Abacha military regime. This act was met with international condemnation followed by sanctions placed on Nigeria. The root cause of the Niger Delta agitation and conflict as noted earlier was primarily environmental degradation due to pollution of the Ogoni land and water space as a result of oil spillage which consequently led to poverty, unemployment and absence of basic amenities (Nwagboso, 2012). The poor response from the government in addressing the conflict and its root cause resulted in the emergence of a variety of ethnic militias and the militarization of the entire region. These militant groups include:

- (i) The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)
- (ii) Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC)
- (iii) Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
- (iv) The Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari
- (v) The Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Ateke Tom.

These militant groups carried out deadly attacks on oil and gas facilities, as well as other criminal activities such as hostage taking, kidnapping, bombing, raping piracy of diverse forms, extortion, oil bunkering, pipeline vandalization and assassination. Thus, the foundation was laid for the wave of insecurity in the region and subsequent spread across Nigeria with the October 1st bombing of Eagle square in Abuja in 2010. Some of the major attacks carried out by Niger Delta militants in Nigeria are presented in table 3.

Table 3: Major Niger Delta Attacks (2003-2010)

Dates of Attack	Militant Group	Target attacked	Victims	
			Deaths	Injured
16 th , March. 2003	MOSOP militants	Shell petroleum Development oil Facilities in Warri Nigerian Naval Facilities on Escravos river	7	20
July 2006	MEND militants	Naval officers escorting Chevron oil tanker on Chomoni creeks in Warri	4	3
14 th , April. 2007	NDV	Mini-Okoro Elelenwo Police station	Unrecorded number of policemen killed	Several policemen and civilians
1 st , January. 2008	NDVF	Two police stations Five star hostel in port Harcourt	Not recorded	Not recorded
1 st , October. 2010	MEND	Eagles square Abuja	Not recorded	Not recorded

Source: Human Rights Watch (2017) Report.

As the violence became widespread forcing oil companies to suspend operations, government responded by establishing some institutions to address the environmental and poverty issues. The Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta (MND) were established as remedies. These gestures of the government failed to calm the tension in the region as the conflicts and insecurity in the Niger Delta persisted. The Federal Government under President Musa Yar' Adua used a mixture of the carrot-and-stick response by proposing an amnesty program and unconditional pardon to the militants in the region. The militants were given a period of time to surrender their arms in return for training and rehabilitation (Nwogu, 2014). The Amnesty Program reduced the rate of militant attacks on oil facilities in the Niger Delta, but the spillover effect into neighbouring South-east geo-political zone gave birth to other dynamics of security challenges in Nigeria.

4. Insecurity in Nigeria as Result of Armed Banditry, Kidnapping and Assassination

According to Adagba *et al.*, (2012) the incessant kidnapping with its associated activities such as pre-meditated assassination and armed robbery that is the hallmark of the militant modus-operandi in the Niger Delta, spilled over into the South-East zone especially in Abia, Imo and Ebonyi states. These states according to Achumba *et al.*, (2013) witnessed the highest acts of abductions where prominent indigenes became easy targets. Nwogu (2014) notes that this phenomenon became widespread and took on a whole new economic attraction after 2007 general elections in which youths that were armed by politicians as political thugs diverted their guns, skills and energies into kidnapping and paid assassinations as a means of economic survival. As the level of kidnapping, armed robbery and assassination of prominent Nigerian citizens spread across the country, insecurity of lives and property also spread unabated. The kidnappers were so emboldened in their brigandage that they attempted to kidnap a sitting executive governor of Abia state in 2008 (Nwogu, 2014). Thus, between 2007 and 2010 many prominent citizens especially in Abia, Imo and Ebonyi states were kidnapped for ransom. The prevailing insecurity in the South-East geo-political zone forced the relocation of many businesses and the consequent negative impact on economy of the region like Boko Haram did to the economy of the North-East region. To address the level of prevailing insecurity in the south-east region, the Federal Government deployed soldiers at the invitation of the South-east governors. The soldiers launched intensive attacks on the kidnapper's hide-outs especially those in the notorious armed robbery and kidnapper's dens in Ukwa West Local Government Area of Abia State (Francis, 2006). These military actions according to Francis minimized the reported cases of the menace.

At the root of Nigeria's security challenges is the issue of economic deprivation and unemployment especially among the youthful population. According to Langer and Ukiwo (2011), 60 percent of Nigeria's population and three-quarters of its unemployed are youths

under thirty years. Lander and Ukiwo argue that both internal and external evidences tend to suggest that alienated young people who lack resources and economic opportunity are more likely to be easily recruited by centrifugal forces as the foot soldiers to fight their cause against the Nigerian state. In Borno and other North-east states, Boko Haram was able to attract these categories of jobless young men who initially enrolled in the school established by the sect leaders. According to Tekhon (2012), the school became a primary recruiting ground, producing a ready mass of armed gangs. The school also produced two groups using the Boko Haram front to unleash terror. The first group consisting of the poor and jobless youths had deep social and economic grievances against Nigeria. The second group had clear radical religious vision which is directed against the foundation of the political-religious and economic interest of the Nigerian state (Tekhon, 2012). According to Aaron (2011), leaders of the Niger Delta militias also attracted disaffected youths from Warri, Port Harcourt, Yenegoa and their sub-urban areas as recruits. Aderujo (2012) notes that the presence of high number of unemployed youths on the streets across Nigeria deepens the recruitment pool for political violence and insecurity in Nigeria as politicians' bankroll, mobilize and manipulate them for their political survival. Thus, idle young men and women provided the muscle and stoked the fire of conflict and insecurity in the country.

Aaron (2011), has rightly observed that in the South, many farmers now cultivate on hitherto known grazing routes long agreed upon with Fulani Herders. This encroachment into the grazing routes have led to violence as the farmers regard the dung offered by the Fulani herdsman for grazing and watering rights less valuable. Case studies across Nigeria shows that as social fabrics decay and old understanding became irrelevant and jettisoned, groups tend to rely more on divisive identity politics to sort the haves from the have not's (Aaron, 2011).

Another emerging trend in the dynamics of Nigeria's security challenges is the emergence of the notion of "indigeneity" which

connotes “original inhabitant of a place”. According to information from Human Rights Watch (2017), the issue of indigeneity has been used across Nigeria to limit access to natural resources and public goods and has contributed significantly to the insecurity and violence being played out in Jos, Plateau state. The Jos crisis that has transformed into a sectarian violence started in 1999 the root cause being anchored on the prism of the indigeneity to deny Hausa settlers the right to land and political offices. The Human Rights Watch Report (2017) notes that:

“Jos lies on the border between Nigeria’s Muslim majority North and Christian South. Access to land resources is often determined by whether one is a native or indigene..... Jos is historically a Christian city.....”

The crisis has snow balled and pitched the Hausa Muslims against the “indigenous” Christian population in which over 10,000 Christians were killed between 2007 and 2010 (Nwogu, 2014). In the 2010 crisis, it was reported that 500 Christians lost their lives and property worth millions of naira were destroyed. Whatever the argument over the remote causes of the frequent sectarian crises in Jos, the emerging trend now is that the crisis is transforming into one of the most disturbing internal security threats to Nigeria’s corporate existence. Manipulation of categories like indigeneity according to the Human Rights Watch (2017) is not only a symptom but also a cause of the breakdown in moral narrative around land, identity and history.

According to Africa Report No. 168 put together by the International Crisis Group (2010) negative relationship between Nigerians and government fuels an atmosphere of insecurity in the country. The report shows that Nigerians view the credibility and relevance of their leaders, governments and public institutions with reservations and low perceptions. This according to the Africa Report No. 168 (2010) promotes and enhances expression of violence at the slightest provocation. Both in the Niger Delta and the North-east

regions, official government infrastructure were targets during violent confrontations, imposing huge cost on the whole country. The militants and Boko Haram insurgents on the other hand explained and justified their actions by citing government failure as well as voiced their disgust with government.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Insecurity in Nigeria has been a major challenge to successive administrations especially with the return of democratic governance in the country. Activities of the terrorists groups like Boko Haram, the Niger Delta militants, kidnappers, armed bandits and Fulani herdsmen have led to loss of many lives and property and also the displacement of over 200,000 persons in the North-east region and other parts of Nigeria. Some of these activities that create insecurity in the country include bombing, suicide bomb attacks, burning of churches and police stations among others. Government at various levels have responded within the ambit of their constitutional powers like in Benue State where the open grazing law enacted prohibits open grazing and wandering of cattle into farmlands. At the Federal level, a mixture of carrot-and-stick approach was applied giving birth to federal institutions and agencies established to address the environmental and poverty issues in the Niger Delta. On the security challenges posed by Boko Haram government responded by establishing the North-east Development initiatives to rebuild the infrastructure in the North-east region and its economy as well as resettle the displaced population in the IDPs back to their ancestral communities. In spite of all the efforts aimed at addressing the dynamics of the Nigeria's security challenges, the level of insecurity in Nigeria in the light of prevailing trend remains alarming. Due to the fall-out of the end-sars protest that cut across Nigeria, policemen have abandoned their duty posts either on the highway or within towns, thereby enhancing attacks by hoodlums and social miscreants on the citizens. In the light of all these therefore, the paper recommends as follows:

1. Government should declare a state of emergency on security and articulate poverty reduction policies that will strengthen efforts aimed at addressing the various security challenges confronting Nigeria.
2. Nigerian security agencies should be equipped with modern state of the art security devices as well as heavy weaponry and power packed Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) sophisticated enough to fight modern day terrorism.
3. Ranches and grazing grounds with clearly demarcated boundaries should be legally established in all states of Nigeria for herdsmen to graze and water their stock in order to significantly reduce the incessant farmer- herder clashes.
4. Government at every level should create more jobs and also create enabling conditions for the private sector participation in the economy so that large number of youth population that would ordinarily have taken to crime will be properly engaged in employment.
5. Finally, the Federal Government of Nigeria should seek help from military strong and technologically advanced countries aimed at supporting her to defeat terrorism and banditry.

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