

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background of Study

Political stability and socioeconomic development are not only closely related, but also play a significant role in the long-term viability and efficient operation of states. On the one hand, the unpredictability brought on by a volatile political climate may slow down investment and the rate of economic growth. On the other side, bad economic performance could result in political instability and a collapse of the government, endangering the state's ability to continue.

Political parties in a nation like Nigeria, where a multi-party system is used, are expected to remain committed to working for the social and economic development of their nations. They should be working hard to win the support and trust of the general public. It is expected that their political actions will improve the nation's and the people's conditions. Nigeria, however, is an exception to this. In an effort to highlight the flaws and shortcomings of the ruling party, the political parties are continually at odds with one another and upsetting the stability of the nation. This is done in an effort to undermine public confidence in the ruling party and persuade people to cast a vote against them. This method of handling politics and the government has contributed to an increase in political instability in the nation in recent years, and its effects may be observed in the slow growth of the country¹. Regardless of their political system or level of development, many countries around the world have been concerned about political instability recently. Politics may have a terrible effect on an economy we have seen in the past. On the other hand, certain circumstances can make a nation into a fragile state as a result of domestic strife. Fragile and conflict-ridden nations frequently struggle to carry out governance duties and lose the ability to build positive relationships within their societies². Politically unstable nations experience

instability because they are more susceptible to both internal and external shocks. It is possible that the negative effects of political instability will be less severe than they would otherwise be given the prevalence of the informal sector in economies like Nigeria. Numerous issues bordering on national security are very critical for the material progress of any polity³.

According to some experts, any society's ability to maintain law and order, which are based on national security, is essential to its existence. Tales of misery are left in the aftermath of insecurity, which the nation and its people have had to deal with over time. Unusual and recent is the Fulani crisis. The Peul, or Fula, ethnic group, which has existed in some form for thousands of years, includes the Fulani in Nigeria⁴. Today, there are more than 20 million Fulani throughout Africa, and the greatest settlement of the tribe is in Nigeria, where it is one of the main ethnic groupings there⁵. The Fula people are almost solely Muslim, having converted to Islam from their traditional belief system in the 1500s, and most Fulani maintain a semi-nomadic lifestyle, earning them the appellation of "Fulani herdsmen."

The persistent disputes between the Fulani and their host populations are the result of the influence of foreign Fulani groups looking for pasture. It is nearly impossible to discern between Fulani from other countries in the Sahel region going into Nigeria and Fulani from Nigeria due to cultural and religious affinity⁶. Researchers claimed that variations in rainfall, grazing animals, pasture, and water control the nomadic pastoralists' travel in a predictable manner. Due to the fierce competition that exists between pastoralist and farming groups, the itinerant character of pastoralists is a potential source of violence.

Others claimed that the most of the extremely violent battles brought on by Fulani Herdsmen took place in the central belt of Nigeria, specifically in the states of Plateau, Benue, and Taraba⁷.

In Benue State, local government areas like Agatu, Guma, Gwer West, Makurdi, Kwande, Katsina-Ala, and Loggo have had highly destructive wars that have taken a great number of lives and property. In the first half of 2014, more than 5000 people had died as a result of community clashes facilitated by Fulani herders in Benue State. However, the recent attacks by Fulani herders on their host community in Ekiti, Osun, Oyo, and Ogun in the South East and South Western parts of Nigeria. The use of modern weapons and communication tools has given the attacks by Fulani herders a more sophisticated aspect. As a result, the sedentary farming populations have turned to local vigilante groups for self-defense^{8,9}. With the loss of lives and property, this has made the conflict even worse. Research from the past claims that conflicts brought on by cattle grazing in Nigeria between 1991 and 2005 were actually responsible for 35% of all documented crises¹⁰. In order to sort through the various significant but conflicting narratives that have been used to explain the reason behind the recent escalation of the conflict, a critical assessment of the underlying factors responsible for the escalation of conflicts between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers is therefore necessary.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Politicians, political scientists, and economists are always debating the connection between political stability and economic growth in any nation. Political stability and economic growth, according to some academics, are closely related. On the one hand, the unpredictability brought on by a volatile political climate may slow down investment and the rate of economic growth. On the other hand, bad economic performance could result in political upheaval and a collapse of the administration. Political stability, it was suggested, was anticipated to encourage economic growth in the short term¹¹. Political stability ensures an increase in both domestic and foreign investment because it protects citizens' fundamental rights, improves employment conditions,

fosters national unity and culture, and provides access to basic infrastructure and services like electricity, water supply, and healthcare. Political stability, regardless of the degree of democracy, has a substantial impact on growth in emerging countries. Democracy promotes political stability and boosts economic growth relative to non-democratic governance in a given country. A turning point in contemporary Nigeria's history occurred in 1999, when what was hailed as an "enduring democracy" was established. The country had previously alternated between civil and military control, with the latter having lengthier stretches of time. Although Nigeria has experienced uninterrupted democratic rule since 1999, which assumes political stability, the apparent expansion of the economy looks illusory.

Given that democratic governance should typically, among other things, usher in societal development, inclusion and participation of citizens in governance; accountability and transparency on the part of government officials; and a stable political environment which attracts investment (local and foreign) that leads to increase growth of the economy, it is this reality that guided this study.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to investigate the role of political instability and socio-economic development. To aid the completion of the study; the specific objectives are to.

- i. understand the extent of political instability in Nigeria.
- ii. examine the extent of socioeconomic development in Nigeria.
- iii. study the relationship between political instability and socioeconomic development in Nigeria.
- iv. find out the effect of political instability and socioeconomic development in Nigeria

1.4 Research Questions

1. To what extent is Nigeria politically unstable?
2. What is the extent of socioeconomic development in Nigeria?
3. Is there any relationship between political instability and socioeconomic development in Nigeria?
4. What effect does political instability have on the socio-economic development in Nigeria?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study was informed by the political unrest and slow development that are actual features of Nigeria. Given that democratic governance should typically lead to societal development, citizen inclusion and participation in governance, official accountability and transparency, and a stable political environment that attracts investment (both domestic and foreign), which leads to increased economic growth. The relationship between political unrest and socioeconomic advancement will be uncovered through this study and related academic research. By offering workable solutions to the issue of political instability, this will benefit academia.

1.6 Scope of the Study

To aid the measurement of the impact of political instability and socio-economic development in Nigeria. This study focuses more on the fourth republic democratic experience since 1999. The researcher intend to achieve the objectives of the study by narrowing it evaluation on fourth republic. The reason for the selection of this timely gap is to be able to provide a robust and vibrant assessment of the two understudied variables. The temporal scope would be between 1999 and 2021. It is believed that two decade is long enough to discover specific changes in

which political instability had poised on Nigeria's socio-economic system. The time and space selected for this study will advance knowledge frontiers on the two variables under investigation.

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

Development: Development is a process that creates growth, progress, positive change or the addition of physical, economic, environmental, social and demographic components. The purpose of development is a rise in the level and quality of life of the population, and the creation or expansion of local regional income and employment opportunities, without damaging the resources of the environment. Development is visible and useful, not necessarily immediately, and includes an aspect of quality change and the creation of conditions for a continuation of that change. The international agenda began to focus on development beginning in the second half of the twentieth century. An understanding developed that economic growth did not necessarily lead to a rise in the level and quality of life for populations all over the world; there was a need to place an emphasis on specific policies that would channel resources and enable social and economic mobility for various layers of the population.

Through the years, professionals and various researchers developed a number of definitions and emphases for the term "development." It is a tool enabling people to reach the highest level of their ability, through granting freedom of action, i.e., freedom of economic, social and family actions, etc. In contrast, while some scholars focused on mechanisms that prevent or oppress development in various countries, and cause them to linger in abject poverty for dozens of years. These are the various poverty traps, including civil wars, natural resources and poverty itself. The identification of these traps enables relating to political – economic – social conditions in a country in an attempt to advance development. One of the emphases in a for instance is the

promotion of sustainable development, which believes in growth and development in order to raise the standard of living for citizens of the world today, through relating to the needs of environmental resources and the coming generations of the citizens of the world.

Political Instability: The unstable structure of a government and its inclination to collapse in a short time due to unstable political structures. Is a crisis situation within the country that can be caused by a variety of reasons: government incompetence, economic problems, high crime rates, and so on. Political instability can also be caused by conflict or, conversely, to become the basis of the conflict itself.

Socio Economy: Social economics is a social science and a branch of economics that focuses on the relationship between social behavior and economics. Social economics is also referred to as socioeconomics. Social economics is primarily concerned with the interplay between social processes and economic activity within a society.

Endnotes

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Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 Political Instability

Analysis clarifies, makes apparent, improves insight, and draws attention to the meaning that is inherent in words, whereas an unexplained concept is mostly a misnomer that prevents comprehension and knowledge¹. As a result, studying political instability is crucial. Political instability is a term used to describe a nation's inconsistent conduct in its public affairs. Political instability is a characteristic of an unstable state of things in a nation's administration. Political instability in this sense refers to a shaky, unsteady, wobbly, and hazardous state of affairs in a state's administration.

This suggests even more that political instability is a situation that cannot be retained or fixed firmly; a deterioration of political structure that is evident in unstable conditions and societal upheavals. This has led some academics to define political instability as the occurrence of political unrest or violence in society, such as protests, agitations, strikes by workers, dissidence, etc. Political instability is thus defined as any ambiguous or shifting state that an institution or government is experiencing, as well as the resulting public uproar². In this context, political instability is seen as an unhealthy condition in a civil society that is characterized by power struggles, inadequate policy implementation, and public displays of discontent.

Political instability is correlated with the violent transfer of power and modifications to the legal system³. Three categories are used to describe it: armed or violent instability, which includes

civil war and guerrilla warfare as well as violent political action, elite or executive instability, which includes coups d'état, mass instability, which corresponds to social movements like strikes. In a similar way, political instability was taken into account along with unconstitutional modifications as a tendency to shift governments⁴. A researcher links political unrest, notably the number of military coups, to political instability.

Political instability is defined by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to include governmental stability, internal and external conflicts, military involvement in politics, tensions between religious and ethnic groups, socioeconomic conditions, investment profiles, corruption, law and order, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.

Government stability, internal and external conflicts, and the involvement of the military in politics were all considered indicators of political instability. It was argued that a variety of political upheavals, such as the frequency of military coups, have a major and detrimental impact on growth. Political instability has been shown to have detrimental consequences on economic growth, according to theoretical analyses of the topic. However, there are still differences of opinion regarding the channels through which political instability affects growth.

According to this viewpoint, political stability affects economic growth via investment, savings, and disruption of the labour market, levels of productivity/output of private agents, and the monetary and fiscal policies of the government. Through the investment channel (lower physical and human capital accumulation), sociopolitical unrest (reduced productivity due to the interruption of normal economic activity), and ineffective economic policy, political instability has an impact on growth (political underperformance). Explain, however, that political unrest

results in a disruption of economic activity and a rise in transaction costs, which may hinder a nation from reaching its full potential, which is necessary for achieving economic progress.

On the other hand, other academics believe that the shift to a more democratic political system may be followed by political instability that manifests itself in riots, strikes, and sudden changes in the administration that have a detrimental impact on investment and economic growth.

According to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, political instability is a state in which things in a society are liable to alter or collapse quickly. In plain terms, political instability includes, among other things, racial or religious insurgencies, riots in urban areas, coups d'état, and civil wars, as well as conflicts among elites over the allocation of resources for power. All of these types of political unrest can result in widespread acts of violence.

A nation is experiencing political unrest under this situation. Political instability results from the current administration's and society's failure to appropriately address the complaints of the general populace or a specific segment of the populace. Depending on the situation, the source of complaints may be internal, external, or political⁵.

Political instability is not always caused by discontent alone, but when tensions rise in a community, there must be people and systems in place to voice the grievances and mobilize the harmed to demand redress from the government. The nation invariably descends into anarchy and political instability when violent wars recur⁶. Thus, this always leads to the re-occurrence of political instability as witnessed from two years after the independence when there was leadership crises with the Action Group (AG) that eventually led to the declaration of state of emergency in the Western Region, up till January 15, 1966, when the military eventually took over government for the first time in the first republic from the civilian political leadership.

As was seen from the preceding, disputes inevitably result in political instability, which can be brought on by any one of the three elements of conflicts—political, sociocultural/religious, and economic and industrial⁷. As a result, conflicts that might cause political instability will develop where there is unequal access to the control of natural resources and political authority, as is the case in Nigeria. Conflicts are common and inescapable in all human societies.

The idea of political instability is used in studies on the positive analysis of political parties to theoretically and empirically explain why the current political and economic conditions varies significantly between nations and even within countries during the past ten years.

A more advanced thesis was based on ethnic, linguistic, religious, ideological, and economic conflicts that have not been adequately resolved through institutional channels. The first category includes political unrest phenomena (political violence), such as: deaths and killings committed for political reasons, revolts, and revolutions. The second category consists of unanticipated and unanticipated events, such as the legal or unjust termination of a government or electorate (government instability), which is brought on by interactions between the opposing interests represented in these institutions and shifts in voter preferences. These research' measurements and definitions of political instability capture it⁸.

These many definitions have concentrated on two elements of political instability: the scale of government instability, which supports probabilistic aspects, and the dimension of political turbulence, which favours the descriptive component of political instability. Following these research, a number of definitions for the two aspects of political instability have been put forth⁹.

Political instability is described as a regular forced shift of the executive government under the category of political unrest. They solely take into account the overall number of coups when

defining political instability. According to, political instability is defined as shifts in political power accompanied by violence and modifications to the legal system¹⁰.

Political instability is characterized by the emergence of political violence (riots, uprisings, and coups) that is influenced by economic policies and is connected to wealth redistribution despite government withdrawals, which results in problematic economic inequality and has a high human cost when repression is severe¹¹. Political instability is a phenomena that is brought on by state-sponsored coups and other related factors with the sole intention of stalling change and negatively affecting economic performance¹². The author seeks to establish a link between growth, political unrest, and structural improvements. Political instability is described as prospective programmes without a development strategy, the two most significant of which are violence and a lack of property rights. The most significant political instability factors are violence, a lack of property rights, and other types of disorder that hurt economic agents. Political instability is defined as possible policies without a development programme¹³.

Political instability was outlined as the frequency of constitutional or institutional changes that have an impact on the executive branch of government¹⁴. Political instability creates uncertainty, which paralyzes production, investment decisions, and encourages capital flight on the one hand, and one might think that people are even less motivated to the productive sphere in favour of revolutionary activities as leaders are perceived as weak on the other¹⁵. These and other arguments are used to demonstrate how political instability would harm economic growth.

This provides yet another argument in favour of the definition of political instability as the likelihood of an impending shift in power¹⁶. It was proposed that political instability can be broadly defined as the degree of propensity for a change of government in a country, which

includes various types of insurrections, revolutions, and military coups. This definition of political instability incorporates the degree of propensity or probability. It should be noted that some examples of political instability indicators include the number of political assassinations, the number of fatalities in clashes between large crowds of people, the number of successful coups, anti-government demonstrations and clashes generally, and more recently, terrorist activities that gradually undermine governmental stability¹⁷.

Coercive actions like assassinations, terrorism, armed attacks, civil wars, civil strife, conflicts, domestic violence, and strikes; irregular government change like illegal elections, revolutions, and coups; and political protests like mass arrests, anti-foreign demonstrations, and fractionalization are the three main signs of political instability. Researchers incredibly take coercive practises and then the government's strategy to change. A researcher contends that assassinations, coups, and revolutions are all indicators of political instability and that they are harmful to property rights²¹. As a result, these factors will have a detrimental impact on investment and growth. He also holds that the link between political stability and economic growth is causal. It's interesting that there are two articles on growth and political instability¹⁸.

There were two ways of interpreting political instability. First, it was interpreted as the propensity of a government collapse and was viewed as executive instability, whether constitutional or not. These researchers hypothesized that ambiguity surrounding economic choices was primarily caused by a high tendency for political change. Indicators of political instability were centred on social unrest and political violence in the second approach¹⁹. In fact, it was discovered through investing that there is an inverse relationship between growth and political instability. Successful coups were utilized as an index of political instability (PI) in a study conducted by a scholar. He separated successful coups from unsuccessful ones as well as

officially publicized coup plots. Another study suggested a nonlinear five-category type regime measure²⁰.

They suggested two additional forms of political instability in addition to civil conflict (including ethnic and revolutionary wars): unfavorable regime shifts and genocides and politicizations²¹.

Six indices were used to categories political instability, including the Violence Index (1 and 2), Within Regime Instability Index (1 and 2), and Regime Instability Index (1 and 2). Each index was then given a set of indicators to consider. Overall, however, the literature suggests that not much study has been done on political demonstrations. However, a different researcher did employ qualitative techniques to look at how political upheaval, such as strikes, protests, turbulence, and violence, can effect economic growth²². It is evident that the majority of growth studies examining political unrest rely on the two primary data sources of previous authors to construct government stability indicators²³.

The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators has been used to determine the frequency of regular executive transfers and the frequency of irregular executive transfers (successful coups) in relation to political instability. On coups and political transitions, the Cross-National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS, Banks) has concentrated. There are additional sources that measure political stability or instability, notwithstanding the current prominent datasets for regime instability, and they have seldom ever been used by other scholars²⁴. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PSAV) provided by Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and Polity IV, which offers significant datasets of political instability events like "State Fragility Index and Matrix, 1995-2012," "Coups d'état, 1946-2012," and "Political Instability Task Force, 1955-2012," are among them. Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946–2012 is one of the

additional datasets (MEPV). In conclusion, political stability throughout time is crucial for economic growth since any disruption of a stable environment endangers market stability and slows economic progress. Studies on the relationship between political stability and development appear to have largely concentrated on regime or governmental change. However, it would be sage to reinstate political instability in the political economy both in terms of both the magnitude and the persistence of the impact on economic growth²⁵.

2.1.2 Nature of Political Instability in Nigeria

Conflicts are more likely to occur in Nigeria because of its many ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. Since its independence, Nigeria has seen numerous crises and acts of violence that have weakened the nation's foundation and corporate existence. Despite having a wealth of both natural and human resources, Nigeria's population are trapped in a cycle of poverty and poor governance.

Since the country's independence and up until the present, there have been numerous episodes of political instability, and such difficulties have been a significant contributor to violence there. In the distant decade following Nigeria's civil war, which lasted from 1967 to 1970, and in the years that followed, there had been a series of sporadic violence and the counter attacks by the people from different regions due to suspicion and mistrust against one another in the country's geopolitical landscape. Even at the end of the country's civil war, there had been series of conflicts and violence amounting to political instability in the country. For instance, there were the series of military coup d'état, electoral crises, religious/ethnic crises, ethnic militant uprisings, kidnapping, corruption and the on-going Boko Haram insurgency, to mention a few.

However, the nation's political landscape is showing terrible trends due to the ongoing political upheavals. Therefore, political instability and violence would result from widespread dissatisfaction in society. For instance, political violence could appear as a result of the high percentage of unemployment among the populace, and money politics could also have a negative impact on the political system. Violence during elections is increasingly being linked to the use of guns, arms, and ammunition, which invariably results in political instability. Politicians use touts to frighten their rivals and rival parties at every level of the political process²⁶.

2.1.3 Historicizing Political Instability in Nigeria

Nigeria's political unrest started in 1914 as numerous ethnic groups were forced to merge into a single nation. This claim is supported by the fact that colonialism was a period, not an episode, as some have suggested. In 1983, he made his perception known in his inaugural lecture. These indigenous ethnic groups' fusion is the source of enduring mistrust, suspicion, apprehension, and hostility. This was made worse by the actions of virtuous Nigerian politicians, who spent their time fighting for control over the colonizers rather than resolving the divergent political interpretations and understandings of the many indigenous ethnic groups²⁷.

This is supported by the 1979 Constitution drafting committee report, which notes that these honorable politicians were more concerned with power and material gains than with how to govern and rule a community in a way that benefits everyone²⁸. In order to mitigate the effects of societal transitions and competing ethnic political theories, the nationalists overlooked the essential sociopolitical institutions and structures. Furthermore, nationalists oppose forging a strong national identity that would encourage harmony and respect among Nigeria's ethnic groupings.

Instead, these honourable leaders were devoted to divisive measures and behaviours that promoted long-term political instability. Political party creation and management as well as ethnically based government are examples of such practices. Thus, the Eastern region and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe established and controlled the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC), which was Igbo-dominated. The Northern area and Sir Ahmadu Bello established and maintained the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which was dominated by Hausa-Fulani. The Western area and Chief Obafemi Awolowo created and managed the Action Group (AG), which was predominately Yoruba²⁹.

In Nigeria, both of these factors contributed to the development of political parties and instability⁵. The alliance of NCNC and NPC in the general elections on December 12, 1959, cemented Nigeria's political unrest because "no party was able to gain a simple majority of the 312 seats in the federal legislature to enable it to form a government"³⁰. This is due to the fact that it mocks the AG party, which was left in the opposition, and exhibits political and structural imbalance, ethnic hegemony and dominance, as well as dictatorship in the polity. However, the opposing AG party's retaliatory activities further increased political instability and plagued the first republic. The Western crises of 1962, the Nigerian census debate of 1962 and 1963, and other recent events make these measures clear.

In addition to this, the military's involvement in Nigerian politics increased the nation's political unrest. Based on their coups and countercoups, draconian pronouncements, edicts, and decrees that were put into effect. For instance, all political, ethnic, and cultural groups that had been used as a forum for the collection of public ideas were banned by Decree No. 33 of the Military Ruling Council (MRC) promulgated under General Aguiyi Ironsi³¹. The unitary structure was further established and regional governments were similarly eliminated by Decree No. 34 of May

24, 1966. All of them contributed to volatility in Nigerian politics by severing the last stable trajectory.

With these came the Nigerian-Biafra civil war with different managements from different political and cultural backgrounds, Nigerian political system is unstable from time to time. For these managements often execute different interpretations, understandings and applications of political doctrines imbibed from diverse cultural backgrounds. In this way, these managements often create antagonistic tempos that foul political stability. This stability is truncated further by political gestures from these individuals within the management as each try to actualize his political and cultural demands or expectations³².

Additionally, the stability of the nation is harmed by the colonial governance model that Nigerians received. Nigeria's post-independence government was a continuation of colonial rule due to its background. Therefore, the primary adjustment was the substitution of local politicians for foreign ones. And these replacements were even controlled and foisted on the populace, setting the stage for a later tradition of doing the same with political candidates³³. On the basis of this, Nigeria's post-independence history has been marked by political maneuvering, pressure, and imposition of political candidates on the populace.

2.1.4 Causes of Political Instability in Nigeria

In most situations, the causes of Nigeria's political instability are internal. One such cause is the political class's failure to strictly uphold the fundamental principles of democracy and constitutionalism³⁴. Other academics said that such circumstances had led to abuses of power, blatant corruption, rigging of elections, intolerance of political opposition, and the undermining of institutions³⁵. This goes against the fundamental principles of governance, which assume

social engagement on both the part of the ruled and the ruler within a political community. Political unrest caused the focus of leadership to become localized, with personal survival taking precedence above the advancement of the country.

There are numerous examples of this happening right now in the Dasuki Gate investigation into Col. Sambo Dasuki, the former NSA to former president Goodluck Jonathan, in which funds that should have been used to buy weapons to fight insurgencies were instead distributed among the political stooges of the previous administration. The political class's abject disregard for the fundamental principles of democracy and constitutionalism is one of the main causes of political instability³⁶. A number of academics have correctly remarked that this circumstance "has given birth to abuse of power, flagrant corruption, contempt for due process and the rule of law, intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the electoral process, and the erosion of institutions.

The principle of governance requires "the process of social engagement between the rulers and the ruled in a political community," which is in conflict with what is being done here³⁷. When the government is operating in accordance with the accepted legal and ethical standards of the political society, good governance may be achieved. When this occurs, system affect will be strong, and the population will all strive to participate in state-sponsored activities knowing full well that doing so will benefit the interests of the vast majority of the populace. Since people's rights would be safeguarded within the bounds of the law, deprivation of benefits and selective justice would not be encouraged.

Political leaders would hold dear the watchwords: transparency and accountability in governance. Successive governments in Nigeria have indicated their awareness of this as a way of ensuring stability and legitimacy. The Jaji Declaration of the Murtala/Obasanjo administration, Ethical

Re-orientation Campaign of Shagari's Second Republic, War Against Indiscipline (WAI) of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime, Babangida's Committee on Corruption and other Economic Crimes, the numerous probe panels of the Abacha years and the current War Against Corruption are a façade of genuine measures to promote good governance through the eradication of corrupt practices³⁸.

Two anti-corruption organizations were set up between 2000 and 2003 to support the campaign of Obasanjo's administration. The overall system is still seriously flawed, though. Contracts with the federal government are sometimes overpriced in order to give officeholders gratuities, while contractors regularly offer poor or nonexistent services. The extent of corruption on a state and municipal level has increased significantly. The only time the leaders followed the rules was when they were being used against the opposition. Rarely were these policies introduced for nationalistic reasons; instead, riches and power were most often sought after out of self-interest. Furthermore, the disease of poor governance persisted, separating the political elite from the majority of the populace³⁹.

However, due to the growing gulf between this political elite and the general populace, which has eroded accountability, public fury is stoked by poverty and discontent with the slow pace of change⁴⁰. A never-ending loop of political and legitimacy issues has resulted from the hypocritical attitudes toward corrupt actions. Citizens voiced their displeasure with careless governance and inevitably lost faith in the system. In the Niger Delta, where oil development had further reduced the region's population's standard of living, this issue garnered further attention. The majority of Nigeria's riches was generated in this region, yet the local economies are still quite underdeveloped. The Niger Delta Basin has produced 30 billion barrels of crude oil and almost 30 trillion cubic feet of gas since 1965, when oil was discovered at Oloibiri. Deep-sea exploration got going⁴⁰.

People's lot was one of environmental degradation and a lack of basic necessities like clean water and good roads. Despite the creation of government organisations such as the Niger Delta Basin Development Board (NDBDB) in 1965, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, and the current Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), there has not been much progress made in the region's physical infrastructure to support the amount of wealth the area contributed to the federal government's coffers. In the end, "issues of legitimacy, transparency, and mismanagement tainted by political jobbery have debilitated these agencies that were meant to deliver development in the region." This is made worse by a flawed institutional structure and insufficient technical and administrative ability to deliver programmes effectively⁴⁰.

Since January 15, 1966, the military has frequently intervened in domestic politics due to the political class's incapacity to maintain the nation's good administration. They became involved in politics instead of leaving it to the armed forces to protect the nation's territorial integrity, failing to do their job of keeping the peace and maintaining serenity. The unhealthy, fierce competition for political power that exists among the military hierarchy and the political class on the one hand, and between civilians and soldiers on the other, are signs that the country's political structure is unstable⁴¹.

Any state's military participation in politics causes instability in its political system, which in turn hurts its economy and is essentially a result of its leadership issues⁴². The problem of money-politics is another element contributing to Nigeria's political unrest. In a civilised society, according to former American President Bill Clinton, money is not a factor in choosing candidates for electoral office. However, in Nigeria, political instability is frequently caused by politicians' hunger for cash since they view politics as a lucrative business. He added that the

issue with Nigerians is that they enter politics in search of financial gain. As a result, the money that could have been used to advance the nation would be siphoned by the selfish politicians, as it is being witnessed in the ongoing probe of Col. Dasuki and others in the previous administration of Goodluck Jonathan. It was posited that this could be responsible for the reasons why the country has been unable to realize its potentiality as an African power, despite high natural resource endowment, considerable human capital and large domestic market⁴³.

Another reason why conflict continues, keeps occurring, and ultimately contributes to political instability in the nation is that the individuals who incite, organise, sponsor, and even arm the rioters are permitted to escape justice. They never face charges or legal proceedings, and if found guilty, they receive lengthy prison sentences. Elites and influential persons in society are among those that support violent wars. These people are perceived as being untouchables, and their supporters agree. Since they were never held accountable for their heinous crimes, many of these sponsors return to prepare new rounds of such conflicts and violence. Additionally, the police and other security agencies lack the necessary training to manage crises⁴⁴.

The unskilled and underequipped police have often found it difficult to control the rioters when violence breaks out. Surprisingly, the rioters frequently carry sophisticated weaponry and are well-equipped. Furthermore, conflicts continue to occur in Nigeria because the government never adopted the suggestions made by the judicial and other panels of inquiry into civil disobedience and violence. This frequently causes political unrest in the nation. Additionally, because Nigeria is a multi-ethnic nation, political unrest and violence will arise when the various ethnic groups think that their hopes or objectives cannot be met concurrently due to opposing viewpoints. Therefore, it is only inevitable that there would be unrest, disagreement, controversy,

and unrest when there is disparity in access to the control of natural resources and political authority⁴⁵.

2.1.5 Leadership Aspect of Political Instability

Despite having a wealth of natural riches, scholars have referred to Nigeria as a "unfinished state" and "a truculent African tragedy" because of the country's autocratic government and abject poverty. The country was further caught at the "political crossroads by attempts to create a democratic government⁴⁶. Nigeria has earned the title of "the giant of Africa" due to its vast oil wealth, economic, social, and political sturdiness. It was noted that 20 years of brutal and corrupt military rule brought the giant to its knees, leaving a legacy of executive dominance and political corruption in the hands of Nigeria's so-called "godfathers"—powerful political bosses sitting atop vast patronage networks who primarily view the government through the lens of their own⁴⁷.

Because of this unpredictability, the leadership's priorities changed to become local, with personal survival taking precedence over the advancement of the country. The personality cult of the burgeoning political gladiators, who used the levers of state authority to advance their own agendas, thwarted efforts to promote "democratic consolidation." As was correctly noted, Nigeria's political elites "fight for power and control over the huge rewards of office"⁴⁸. While 70% of Nigerians fell into abject poverty, the concentrated political and economic structures "made the military and civilian individuals who controlled important state posts immensely wealthy"⁴⁹. These presidents share a flagrant disdain for the law, a weak legislature, and a non-independent judiciary.

This situation, as indicated, was the product of the pattern of state affairs in the developing world. According to him, the high premium on political power, and the attendant intense struggle for it,

marginalized national development for the promotion of the personal interests of the political leaders⁵⁰.

The Nigerian government continues to be disengaged from acting in its citizens' best interests. The powerful people who developed enormous patronage networks during the military era and who now utilise political position to grow these networks and their personal wealth control politics at the federal, state, and municipal levels of the Nigerian federation. Additionally, a lot of these so-called "godfathers" have started building up their own militias to protect their positions, which has sparked a local arms race in some areas. The bonanza continues at public coffers for these power holders despite the fact that several governors are being investigated at home and others are being indicted for money laundering abroad, and basic infrastructure in many parts of the country is still as deteriorated as it was during military rule⁵¹.

The majority of African presidents are politically uneasy because they are under attack from numerous hostile forces. They scarcely have time to address the issue of development because they are so preoccupied with trying to survive⁵². It is interesting to observe that the Nigerian polity's leadership issue was a symptom of the dysfunctional pattern that existed during the years of the military interregnum⁵³.

The Nigerian leadership style lacks the required emphasis to foster political stability and national progress. Instead, the appropriation and privatization of the Nigerian state are the leaders' main concerns in Nigeria⁵⁴. For instance, the widespread corruption and accompanying political violence that followed electoral manipulations in an effort to gain power led to the fall of the Second Republic.

Similarly, the military coups and counter coups were also plagued by bad leadership, although their successors did not fare better. Consequently, development performance was slowed down, and political instability continued to pervade the polity, as focus was shifted to combat the looming forces of insecurity and internal regime instability.

2.1.5 Governance Aspect of Political Instability

The political class's abject disregard for the fundamental principles of democracy and constitutionalism is one of the main causes of political instability. This circumstance, as correctly highlighted, "has led to abuse of power, flagrant corruption, disdain for due process and the rule of law, intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the election process, and the erosion of institutions⁵⁵." The principle of governance requires "the process of social engagement between the rulers and the ruled in a political community," which is in conflict with this. When the government is operating in accordance with the accepted legal and ethical standards of the political society, good governance may be achieved.

When this occurs, system affect will be strong, and the population will all strive to participate in state-sponsored activities knowing full well that doing so will benefit the interests of the vast majority of the populace. Since people's rights would be safeguarded within the bounds of the law, deprivation of benefits and selective justice would not be encouraged. The watchwords of transparency and accountability in governance would be held dear by political leaders. Nigeria's successive governments have expressed knowledge of this as a means of preserving stability and legitimacy⁵⁶.

The Jaji Declaration of the Murtala/Obasanjo administration, Ethical Reorientation Campaign of Shagari's Second Republic, War Against Indiscipline (WAI) of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime,

Babangida's Committee on Corruption and other Economic Crimes, the numerous probe panels of the Abacha years and the current War Against Corruption are a façade of genuine measures to promote good governance through the eradication of corrupt practices. Between 2000 and 2003, two anti-corruption agencies were established to complement Obasanjo's administration's crusade. However, "the overall system remains deeply compromised. Federal government contracts are routinely inflated to provide kickbacks for officeholders, and contractors frequently provide substandard or nonexistent services. State and local – level of corruption has been far more brazen⁵⁷".

The rules were not observed by the leaders except in its application to frustrate the opposition. The deeper motives of introducing these measures were rarely nationalistic; they were primarily motivated by self-interest for the acquisition of wealth and power. And the scourge of bad governance persisted thereby isolating the political elite from the generality of the citizenry.

A never-ending loop of political and legitimacy issues has resulted from the hypocritical attitudes toward corrupt actions. Citizens voiced their displeasure with careless governance and inevitably lost faith in the system. In the Niger Delta, where oil development had further reduced the region's population's standard of living, this issue garnered further attention. The majority of Nigeria's riches was generated in this region, yet the local economies are still quite underdeveloped. The Niger Delta Basin has produced 30 billion barrels of crude oil and almost 30 trillion cubic feet of gas since 1965, when oil was discovered at Oloibiri.

Deep-water exploration commenced in the early 1990s and currently its reserves account for 39 percent of world deep-water reserves⁵⁸." Environmental degradation and lack of basic needs like good roads, potable water was the lot of the people. Notwithstanding the establishment of

government agencies like the 1965 Niger Delta Basin Development Board (NDBDB), Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), in 1992, and the current Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), there has been little to show, in terms of physical infrastructural development in the area to justify the quantum of wealth the region produced to the coffers of the federal government.

Eventually, “problems of legitimacy, transparency and mismanagement tainted by political jobbery have crippled these agencies that were established to deliver development in the region. This is aggravated by faulty institutional framework and poor technical and managerial capacity for effective programme delivery⁵⁹.”

Nigeria earned 25 billion US dollars from oil in 1980. The early profits from the oil boom were spent on initiatives that had no beneficial effects on the economy, even if there was a decrease by the late 1980s. Nigeria owed the United States \$30 billion as of 1989. When accounting for the repayment arrears that were due at the end of the year, it increased to 36 billion US dollars by 1994. In actuality, the oil boom served only as a tool for non-development. While providing income, it also served as a "source of dependence". As mentioned, the Nigerian government exported \$20 billion worth of oil every year, yet its citizens still struggle to make ends meet with an average salary of only \$1.

Since the first republic, the Niger Delta region has been getting poorer. The struggle of Adaka Boro arose in response to the predicament⁵⁹. The severe poverty reached its zenith during the Abacha years, after the founding of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and worsened after Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were "judicially murdered." To better their living and environmental conditions, the people wanted a fair share of

the oil revenue. An observer noticed that despite having access to oil, poverty in the Niger Delta is persistently rising. The actions of the government and oil companies have enraged the youth and radicalized them.

No roads, water, light, schools, hospitals. People are tired of talking because nothing is coming out from many years of talking. So, the youths feel the only thing to do now to get the attention of government and oil firms is to become militant... I think the problem was created by government, which, for many years, failed to address the unacceptable poverty and total neglect of the oil-producing communities⁶⁰.

Repressive force was used in response to the demands of the oil-producing towns. Through the game of political intrigues and divide-and-conquer strategies, a select few people—mostly the political elites—were given a taste of the spoils. The more coercive measures were deployed, the more unstable the political system became and the more people shied away from taking part in politics. Poor governance and poverty led to the start of the current cycle of crises and unrest that has gripped the Niger Delta area and had a ripple effect on national politics. For instance, it was shown that since independence, Nigerian officials have stolen more than \$500 billion USD⁶⁶. Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, confirmed the nation's debt to the London Club.

"Par Bonds and Promissory Notes make up the majority of the London Club's debt portfolio at the moment. These instruments have US\$1,441,793,302 and US\$544,528,914 in residual principal outstanding, respectively. The Par Bonds also include accompanying oil warrants that mandate payments be made when oil prices increase above per barrel regularly for six months in addition to these liabilities. The Par Bonds were created as a result of Nigeria's accumulation of

late payments on term loans made to foreign commercial banks in the 1990s, as well as some late payments on letters of credit, bills of collection, open accounts, etc. The projected maturity date for these Bonds is November 15, 202060. Another researcher claims that 75% of the population makes less than US\$1 per day, whereas US\$ 300 billion oil wealth has disappeared from the country, Nigeria presents a classical example of how people in a resources rich country could wallow in abject poverty'⁶¹.

2.1.6 Implications of Political Instability in Nigeria

Political instability has widespread effects and is extremely expensive. There is much to be desired in Nigeria given the prevalence of violent wars that have consistently resulted in political instability for more than 50 years. Some of the ramifications for Nigeria include the ones listed below. First, the Nigerian state's natural and human resources are not being utilised to their full potential. As a result, Nigeria has become fixated on indicators of economic hardship like poverty and hunger. Second, political unrest always results in fatalities. Many people have died as a result of violent upheavals in Nigeria. For instance, about two million people died as a result of the Nigerian Civil War, which lasted from 1967 to 1970.

The current Boko Haram insurgency and other lesser crises in the nation have both claimed lives. As the homicides have an impact on the nation's productive workforce, the deaths have economic repercussions. Many bright and spirited Nigerians have been slaughtered by the Boko Haram rebels, while hundreds of oil workers and expats have lost their lives in the brutal Niger Delta wars. Additionally, generating money for the government is severely impacted, particularly during industrial unrest. Constant industrial strikes are a key feature of the nation, particularly

the nationwide strikes in 1993 by civil officials and in 2012 over the rise in the price of petroleum. The country would have lost a lot of money as a result of these attacks.

Additionally, political unrest may inhibit the expansion of foreign investment in the nation. The influx and expansion of foreign investment have also been slowed down in Nigeria by ongoing, violent crises. Nigeria's fragile economy won't entice any foreign investor to make a purchase. While insecurity and political unrest may deter international investors from investing in Nigeria's business climate, relative peace, security, and stability will draw visitors from abroad. Once more, the country's religious, sectarian, and political problems are to blame for the influx of migrants and internally displaced persons. Residents of the war-affected areas were forced to escape, either as refugees to nearby states or communities or to neighboring nations⁶².

Apart from the economic implications to the nations, the refugees and internally displaced person constitute unexpected strangers in either new place of residence with the consequent increased pressure on social amenities on the areas.

2.1.7 Political Regimes, Institutions and Social Conflict

The conceptual framework adopted in this chapter sees governance conditions as the result of the interaction of three sets of variables:

- a. the nature and stability of the political regime and the constitution;
- b. the quality of state institutions;
- c. the pattern of social conflict and cooperation related to inequality and ethnic diversity;
- d. other factors affecting governance.

The political regime and constitutional rules constitute the highest echelon in the hierarchy of institutions⁶³. The judiciary, the regulatory bodies, the ministries, the budgetary process are part of the second level in the hierarchy of institutions. This chapter identifies complex agent-principal problems, rent seeking, corruption, and violence as important factors that weaken state institutions and create serious governance problems. The third set of variables goes beyond formal institutions and focuses on patterns of social behavior such as cooperation and conflict, largely related to inequality of income and wealth and to ethnic diversity. This framework highlights the impact of each of these three sets of variables (and the effects of their interaction) on the governance and economic performance of the Andean countries.

a. Political Regimes and Constitutions

A social contract, such as the constitution, is the emphasis of the public choice school, or contractarian approach, which is supported by Nobel Prize winner James Buchanan⁶⁴. This social contract serves as the overarching political framework under which society develops. The process of creating a constitution, which establishes the fundamental rules of society's game, was distinguished from the particular policymaking process that takes place in accordance with those rules. According to game theory, the constitution is the first step in creating the game's rules; the next step is actually playing the game. A normative analysis would start with stage one (writing the constitution and creating the basic institutions). The positive analysis would then concentrate on engaging in the game. Under ideal conditions, constitutions are assumed to have been written under the 'veil of ignorance' regarding initial resources and interests and such that the writers of the constitution did not end up in a better or worse position in society as a result. This assumption has been criticized as unrealistic because the framers of constitutions do often consider their own interests in the process of writing the constitution⁶⁵.

An important tradition in political theory focuses on the design of the main political institutions of the state. This institutional design includes electoral rules, division of powers, and checks and balances among different branches of the state. The constitution is the main legal charter that establishes the basic rights and responsibilities of individuals and the workings of the political system. The major types of democracies are the parliamentary and presidential systems with semi-presidential regimes (for example France) that mix elements of both systems. In presidential systems (for example like in the United States), presidents are elected either by a direct vote or by an electoral college, have fixed terms in office, and often have legislative initiative. In fact, presidents are often endowed with considerable powers to present legislation to congress and to administer the executive branch of government and cannot be removed from office before the expiration of their official term, except in cases of impeachment or resignation. Presidential regimes do not require legislative majorities. In contrast, in parliamentary regimes, heads of government or prime ministers are the leaders of the majority party in parliament. They can be removed through a vote of no-confidence in cases of political crisis and the head of government (that is the prime minister) needs a parliamentary majority to sustain their government.

Basic criteria with which to compare presidential and parliamentary systems include how each system contributes to the continuity and stability of democracy and how the system forestalls 'regime breakdowns' in the event of a major political crisis. Authors such as Juan Linz and Arturo

Another scholar argued that the 'dual legitimacy' between the president and parliament, the alleged tendency towards a 'winner-take-all' system in presidential regimes, the role of outsiders in bidding for the presidency, and the rigidity of terms make presidential regimes more prone to

generate political crises than parliamentary regimes. From an economic viewpoint the choice of political regime and, even more importantly, its stability overtime are important factors that affect the degree of political stability in a country, a variable that influences both investment and the rate of economic growth.

b. Institutions of the State: Strengths, Weaknesses and Factors that Affect Quality

Once the basic political framework of a country has been defined by its constitution, there is a vast array of political and economic institutions (for example ministries, central banks, customs, public investment agencies, the judiciary) whose quality of performance is critical for ensuring appropriate governance and, ultimately, good economic outcomes. Positive political economy (PPE) applies economic principles of individualism, incentives, rationality and constraints to the analysis of institutions and of their impact on economic performance. In this view, institutions are formed to reduce transaction costs both in the economic and political realms. A political economy approach that has gained considerable attention in recent years is the theory of transaction costs politics (TCP)⁶⁶. This approach evaluates how different political governance structures (constitutions, government agencies, laws) cope with 'transaction costs'. In an analogy with transaction cost economics (TCE), transaction cost politics uses the contract as a unit of analysis. While in economics a contract is a verifiable process (for example renting a house or lending to a firm), in politics contracts are more complex. The definition of a 'political contract' is often ambiguous: a president or senator may be elected on a platform that is vague, making it difficult to monitor the fulfillment of the initial promises. Besides, there are incentives to change policies along the way, dismissing initial commitments (for example the phenomenon known as 'time inconsistency'). These agency problems are further complicated by the existence of several principals (the general public, voters, specific interest groups); these multiple principals lead

agents (the government, parliament, public agencies) to face several mandates that are often inconsistent. The enforcement of 'political contracts' is difficult because the institutional mechanisms of enforcement (elections, the Supreme Court, referendums) cannot be activated at every small deviation from initial commitments. In recognition of all these difficulties, modern political economy theories have devised new concepts such as reputation, commitments, rules, and delegation (using independent central banks, for example, to conduct non-inflationary monetary policy). This literature sees these institutional mechanisms as a way to cope with incentives for noncompliance by agents that face incentives to be inconsistent, conflicting mandates, and a system with limited accountability. These complex principal-agent problems make clear the need for appropriate institutions that can deal with governance problems.

Rent-seeking, corruption, and violence as factors that weaken institutions under ideal conditions, institutions and organizations must have clear goals, be properly funded, have a sound financial and human resource base, and be free of undue political interference. At a 'general equilibrium level' they must be part of an institutional architecture that is based on adequate governance principles that ensure a proper working of institutions for among other things fostering economic prosperity. In the previous subsection we identified several reasons related to the agent-principal problems that are particularly serious in the case of political transactions as regards why institutions fail to function properly. Here we identify three phenomena that tend to weaken the institutions of the state. These three factors are:

- i. rent-seeking behavior;
- ii. corruption;
- iii. violence.

- i. **Rent Seeking:** The rent seeking approach in political economy sees society as formed by individuals organized in special interest groups (or acting alone) that are motivated by their particular interests rather than by the general interest of society⁶⁷. Common examples include: farmers seeking price support schemes, industrialists wanting import protection, bankers pressing for protective regulation and less competition from new intermediaries. From this perspective, the state is seen as institutional machinery that, among other things, dispenses economic favors and transfers income among groups in exchange for political support. Rent seeking behavior leads some groups to attempt the capture of key state institutions such as customs, tax administration authorities, public contracts agencies, where they can extract rents.
- ii. **Corruption:** These rents can be obtained by lobbying (rent seeking) or simply by illegally appropriating public assets for personal benefit. In this latter case we are referring to corruption. In some cases, groups may attempt to capture the whole state apparatus and corruption becomes the norm for the predatory groups (for example the kleptocracy) that have captured the state. Corruption and the stealing of state assets (like the 'spontaneous privatization' in post-Soviet Russia) tend to flourish in weak states where mechanisms that make government officials accountable to the public, parliament, and the courts work very poorly and curtail the rule of law. Corruption and rent seeking clearly undermine the strength of state institutions. Moreover, intense rent seeking can lead to corruption.

Violence In a world of voluntary exchange and compliance with the rule of law, there is no role for violence. Less so for internal armed conflict entailing different armed groups from the official army. An important feature of several contemporary societies and

relevant for some of the African countries, however, is pervasive violence and internal conflict that severely weaken the state and can lead to its collapse. In these cases, the state loses its monopoly on the use of force and the rule of law becomes severely limited or simply non-existent. In the case of armed conflicts, it is interesting to analyze the different motivations of rebel groups. They may be a mix of political motives (rebellion as justice seeking) and quasi-criminal motives (rebellion as crime). The view of rebellion as driven by greed considerations emphasizes the quasi-criminal features of rebel organizations and the motivations that those organization have in common with criminal organizations.¹⁵ The scale of rebellion and armed conflict is much larger than that of crime, even including organized crime⁶⁸.

The view of rebellion as 'justice seeking' emphasizes 'grievance factors such as income inequality, ethnic and religious divisions, and political motivations as the most important driving factors of the groups engaged in internal conflict. Rebel groups with a mix of both political and quasi-criminal motives consistently behave in a way oriented to weakening and even destroying the state, so as to pursue their goals more easily, and with impunity. It is interesting to note that in many cases, rebel organizations do not want victory against the government (that is the seizure of power). They are often interested in preserving a very weak state and profiting from that situation. In these conditions, an armed conflict becomes an 'equilibrium' or at least a stable situation that can last for a long time⁶⁹. Interestingly, this model can be used to explain the long duration of certain internal conflicts such as the one in Nigeria.

c. Social Cooperation and Conflict, Inequality and Ethnic Fragmentation

Beyond formal institutions, social cooperation and social conflict also play an important role in generating actual governance and economic outcomes. Individuals, groups and social classes each have different economic interests and motivations. Society, in turn, is an arena in which conflict and cooperation coexist with a political system that mediates the various demands and claims from different social groups. Social conflict can vary in nature: one type is distributive conflict, in which groups (or economic classes) fight over their shares of the national income⁷⁰. In a situation of distributive conflict, inflation can be seen as the result of the conflict over real income in which each group manages a price (wages, markups, and so on), which combines with an accommodative monetary policy to generate inflation. Other points of distributive conflict are taxes, transfers, and spending, with low-income groups pressing for higher taxation to finance social spending and income transfers. In contrast, the upper middle class and the wealthy tend to favor lower taxation of income, financial assets and productive wealth. In practice, conflict and cooperation alternate; the approval of tax and spending laws, for example, has different distributive implications and requires some degree of cooperation and consensus in parliament.

The endogenous growth theory investigates the role of inequality in economic growth and finds that more unequal societies such as countries with more income and wealth inequality among their members tend to generate more social polarization and political conflict than more egalitarian societies. Thus economic growth, controlling for development levels, would be higher in more egalitarian societies than in unequal and polarized ones, as in the latter the pressures for higher taxation tend to be higher and the quality of labor-capital relations tends to be lower than in the more egalitarian societies. Recent literature on the origins of institutions relates them to social and distributive conflict, and argues that inefficient policies and institutions are functional to the interests of politicians and social groups holding power to the detriment of society at

large⁷¹. In this view institutions can be socially inefficient. The only and overriding motivation to create institutions is not to reduce transaction costs: they are often set up and maintained to help keep power for certain groups and individuals.

Another dimension of social differentiation that is especially relevant for Nigeria is ethnic diversity. The question arises whether multiethnic societies have more difficulties in reaching consensus than ethnically homogeneous societies. Empirical studies of the impact of ethno linguistic fractionalization on economic performance (growth) suggest different answers to this question. On the one hand, some scholars attach a central role to ethno linguistic fractionalization in explaining the poor growth performance of multiethnic Africa⁷². In contrast, finding revealed that ethnically differentiated societies do not necessarily have either worse economic performance or greater risk of civil conflict than more ethnically homogeneous societies. To this school of thought, the political regime and the degree of ethnic dominance are more important than simple ethnic diversity in explaining growth performance in Africa.

d. Other Factors Affecting Governance

The previous set of variables affecting governance does not exhaust the factors that explain the type and quality of governance. A variable emphasized by Max Weber, for example, is the quality of leadership. A forceful leader (for example a president) can be important in steering a country in a certain direction and help it to avoid political conflict, ensuring stability. However, that leader can also be authoritarian, therefore their behavior could be inconsistent with democracy. Moreover the economic ideas of the leader may be inconsistent with economic policies that bring prosperity. This discussion underscores the fact that the type of leader, their personality, ideas, political abilities, and so on, can have an important influence in creating good

or bad governance in a country. Other governance variables that can be important are ideology, the type of legal system (Anglo-Saxon, Napoleonic, and so on), and the degree of professionalism (or politicization) of the armed forces and others⁴².

2.1.8 Suggested Measures for Political Stability

To ensure political stability in the country, Nigerians should not see politics as a business but as a call to serve and to help distribute fairly the resources that are given by God. Political leaders should not see politics as a call to acquire and divert government money to one's account, while the generality of the citizens will be languishing in abject poverty and unemployment. The political leaders, at all levels of government, have to be model to the citizens by avoiding inciting statements that could disunite the country and plunge the country into crisis, rather they should focus their attention on those issues that will promote peaceful co-existence and unity among the citizens⁴².

The past leaders have either intentionally or not, being carrying out actions that would constantly promote tension in the system and thereby consistently over-heat the polity. Also, the institutions of government in the country must work out an enduring strategy for crises management and resolutions. There should be a committee in the National Assembly and a unit in the presidency that will be in charge of crises management and resolution. Also, the focus of the government in Nigeria should be in ensuring good governance, since good governance will promote social justice, equality and even distribution of resources to the citizens. This will promote peace and stability in the country, and with peaceful atmosphere prevailing in the country, there will not be any need for any citizen to be deceived or enticed into thuggery or any situation that would lead to political instability⁵³.

The prevalence of good governance in the country, when the political leaders would discharge their functions effectively and efficiently, would discourage the military personnel from thinking of planning any military coup d'état that can lead to political instability which could disrupt democratic government in the country. Nigeria with diverse ethnic, religious and political groups should learn to embrace a culture of dialogue in managing the endemic disputes that pervade the country by focusing their attention on those issues that unite them and promote peaceful co-existence among the citizenry.

This can be done by organizing a sovereign national conference that would have representatives from all ethnic groups to resolve those knotty issues that always promote conflicts among Nigerians, such as resource control, revenue allocation formula, religious crisis, power sharing among others. It is when this is done that the various ethnic groups in the country can see themselves as one. Also, as some political elites in the country are in the habit of sponsoring the jobless and restive youth across the country to embark on ethnic and religious violence in order to promote their hidden personal interest, the government should provide jobs for these youths across the country, since most of the youths always engage in violence due to their idleness and joblessness. These groups of restive youth need to be engaged by the government, to kill boredom and inactivity. Engaging the jobless youth positively by the government will re-direct their energy to productive activities that can enhance the economic development of the country.

2.1.9 Socio-economic Development

In order to understand this concept, let us begin by defining development. Generally, development is defined as a state in which things are improving. But it is defined in different ways in various contexts, social, political, biological, science and technology, language and

literature. In the socio-economic context, development means the improvement of people's lifestyles through improved education, incomes, skills development and employment. It is the process of economic and social transformation based on cultural and environmental factors. Socio-economic development, therefore, is the process of social and economic development in a society. It is measured with indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. For better understanding of socioeconomic development, we may understand the meaning of social and economic development separately⁴⁶.

This is the process of social and economic development in a society. Socio-economic development is measured with indicators such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. Changes in less tangible factors are also considered, such as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety and freedom from fear of physical harm and the extent of participation in civil society. Causes of socio-economic development are basically changes in technology and in laws which is one of responsibilities of the state in the process of governance.

Scholars opined that development as an idea embodies all attempts to improve the conditions of human existence in all ramifications⁴⁷. It implies improvement in material wellbeing of all citizens, not the most powerful and rich alone, in a sustainable way such that today's consumption does not imperil the future.

Another scholar views socio-economic development as a process of societal advancement, where improvements in the wellbeing of people are generated through strong partnership between all sectors, corporate bodies and other groups in the society³⁸.

Socio-economic development is the combination of social and economic development. In this case, socio-economic development includes the advancement or improvement in the standard of living and the increase in economic life and conditions of the people.

2.1.10 Political Instability and Insecurity

Different ways of thinking about security, which is the opposite of insecurity, exist. In order to better grasp the concept of insecurity, this study aims to analyse the idea of security. The social compact between the people and the state, in which people voluntarily gave up their rights to an institution (government) that ensures everyone's survival, was founded on the need for security. The system put in place to avoid, prevent, mitigate, or resolve violent conflicts and threats that come from other states, non-state actors, or structural socio-political and economic conditions is represented by security in this way⁴⁹. Security-related topics have dominated the conversation about development for many years.

Since the end of the Cold War, numerous attempts have been made to redefine security from a state-centric perspective to a more expansive view that prioritises individuals. Human security, which incorporates aspects of national security, human rights, and national development, remains a major barometer for explaining the concept. This argument is center on attempts to broaden and extend the idea of security from the level of states to that of societies and individuals, as well as from military to non-military concerns¹⁸. Two main strands may be distinguished between the various conceptualizations of human security found in the theoretical literature.

One is a neo-realist theoretical strand that conceptualizes security as primary responsibilities of the state. The second strand, a postmodernist or plural view, conceptualizes security as the responsibilities of non-state actors and displaces the state as a major provider of security. Proponents of this approach argue that the concept of security goes beyond a military

determination of threats. They are of the view that government should be more concern with the economic security of individual than the security of the state because the root causes of insecurity are economic in nature.

Some scholars in conceptualizing security placed emphasis on the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion, political and socio-economic objectives of a country⁷². Thus there is a general consensus in the contemporary literature that security is vital for national cohesion, peace and sustainable development. It is therefore apparent that national security is a desideratum, sine qua non for economic growth and development of any country⁷³. In the intelligence community there is a consensus that security is not the absence of threats or security issues, but the existence of a robust mechanism to respond proactively to the challenges posed by these threats with expediency, expertise, and in real time.

The concept of insecurity connotes different meanings such as: absence of safety; danger; hazard; uncertainty; lack of protection, and lack of safety. Insecurity is a state of fear or anxiety due to absence or lack of protection. The concept was defined from two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury. Secondly insecurity is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune. These definitions of insecurity underscore a major point that those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers when they occur. In the context of this paper insecurity is defined as a breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno regional, civil, social, economic, and political that contributes to recurring conflicts, and leads to wanton destruction of lives and property.

The conceptualization of development has undergone metamorphosis since the Second World War ended in 1945. The meaning and the conceptualization of development was greatly influenced by the ideological contradiction between the Socialist East and the Capitalist West. The issue of ideology of development posed a problem to conceptualizing development. Growth theorists argued that development is an outcome of economic growth while other scholars posited that economic development and growth result from structural changes, savings and investments in an economy.

The failure of economic growth in most developing and developed countries of Latin America and Africa, in the late 1970s, to deliver corresponding social goods and solve problems of unemployment, poverty, disease, hunger, illiteracy and ever increasing crimes and wars, necessitated the new thinking, and redefinition of development from economic growth centered perspective to human centered approach⁷⁴. Development as a broader concept that recognizes psychological and material factors that measure human well-being. Development therefore is a multifaceted phenomenon and man centered. It is the process of empowering people to maximize their potentials, and develop the knowledge capacity to exploit nature to meet daily human needs⁸³. The transformation of the society and the emergence of new social and economic organizations are critical indicators of development⁷⁵.

Socio-economic development is a product of development and can be defined as the process of social and economic transformation in a society. Socio-economic development embraces changes taking place in the social sphere mostly of an economic nature. Thus, socio-economic development is made up of processes caused by exogenous and endogenous factors which determine the course and direction of the development. Socio-economic development is measured with indicators, such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment.

Changes in less-tangible factors are also considered, such as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety and freedom from fear of physical harm, and the extent of participation in civil society. Causes of socio-economic impacts are, for example, new technologies, changes in laws, changes in the physical environment and ecological changes.

Scholars have identified strong links between security and development since the cold war ended. They argued that development cannot be achieved in any nation where there are conflicts, crisis and war. There is a consensus in the literature that security and development are two different and inseparable concepts that affect each other, and this has naturally triggered debates on security-development nexus⁷⁶.

2.1.11 Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria

The fear of insecurity in Nigeria is on the increase and this has been compounded by the rising waves of terrorism since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Violent crime has a root and history in Nigeria, and could be traced back to the period from 1960 to 1970. At independence in 1960 a federal structure was imposed on Nigeria by the British. A scholar conceptualizes federalism as a constitutional division of power between two levels of government which are independent and coordinating in their respective spheres of influence.

Unfortunately, the federal structure bequeathed to Nigeria at independence did not conform to where as tenets of federalism as a system of government where two levels of government exist each sovereign in its sphere of jurisdiction⁷⁶. The incursion of the military into governance, and the consequent imposition of military command structure in a federation set the tone for the distortion of Nigeria's federalism. Thus the practice of federalism in Nigeria no doubt has been

distorted by overwhelming dominance of the federal government that distributes national resources to lower level government at its own whims and caprices⁷⁷.

Since independence, the demand for true federalism, fiscal and political restructuring by different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria has not abated. These agitations have contributed to violent rebellious reactions by aggrieved ethnic groups in the country, endangering the security, unity, and corporate existence of Nigeria as one country. Federalism that undermines the independence and autonomy of its federating units will only bring about conflict, threat to national cohesion and peace, and ultimate disintegration⁷⁸.

Insecurity challenges can be traced to the early years of military rule when large quantities of arms were imported into the country for the use of the military during and after the Nigerian civil war, some of which got into the hand of the civilians. Soon after the civil war these arms were used by civilians and ex-military men for mischievous purposes such as armed robbery. There was also the army of unemployed youths some of whom lost their job during the civil war. The level of insecurity assumed dangerous dimensions in the prolonged years of military rule beginning from 1970 during which people procure arms and light weapons for personal defence. Some of these arms and light weapons got into the hands of unemployed youths who used them for deviant purpose. While some researchers attribute youth violence to peer group influence and other psychological factors associated with growing up, others emphasized the impact of political and economic factors such as ethnic agitation, political agitation, unemployment, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as triggers of violent reaction among the youth.

Many scholars have identified several causes of conflict and insecurity in Nigeria that are inimical to socio-economic and national development. These causes have been classified into

external and internal causes. In Nigeria the internal causes of insecurity pose major challenge to socio-economic development than the external causes of insecurity. This study therefore focuses on the internal causes of insecurity in Nigeria. These causes include:

Ethno-religious Conflicts: These conflicts are caused by suspicion and distrust among various ethnic groups and among the major religions in the country. Ethno religious conflict is a situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious and another of such group in a multiethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation. The frequent and persistent ethnic conflicts and religious clashes between the two dominant religions (Islam and Christianity) is a major security challenge that confronts Nigeria. Since independence, Nigeria appears to have been bedeviled with ethno-religious conflicts. There are ethno-religious conflicts in all parts of Nigeria and these have emerged as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity often structured around ethno-religious identities⁷⁹. Ethno-religious violence is also traceable to the inability of Nigerian leaders to tackle development challenges, and distribute state resources equitably. Other causes are accusation, and allegation of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry. In all parts of Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming rates. It has occurred in places like Shagamu (Ogun State), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba, Ebonyi and Enugu State respectively. These ethno-religious identities have become disintegrative and destructive social elements threatening the peace, stability and security in Nigeria⁸⁰.

Political Violence: Nigeria has a long history of politically based violence since the collapse of the first republic on January 14, 1966, and the incursion of the military into governance that

same date. The electoral politics in Nigeria right from 1960s till date have been characterized with violent conflicts, political thuggery, assassinations, and arson. Politicians in Nigerian do not accommodate dialogue, negotiation and consensus⁴⁵. Political contests are characterized by desperation, and violent struggle for political power among politicians. Recurring political violence in Nigeria could be attributed to over-zealousness and desperation of political gladiators to win elections or remain in office at all cost. These misadventures have often been catastrophic leading to decimation of innocent lives, disruption of economic activities, and the destruction of properties among others.

Systemic and Political Corruption: This is a twin evil and hydra-headed monster that has held the Nigerian state captive. This has contributed to government failure and breakdown of institutional infrastructures. The state of insecurity in Nigeria is greatly a function of government failure, traceable to systemic and political corruption. It has added another dimension of violent conflicts which has eroded national values. Corruption is bad not because money and benefits change hands, and not because of the motives of participants, but because it privatizes valuable aspects of public life, bypassing processes of representation, debate, and choice. It has been described as cancer militating against Nigeria's development, because corruption deeply threatens the fabric of the Nigeria society⁸¹. Corruption hampers economic growth, disproportionately burdens the poor and undermines the effectiveness of investment and aid⁸².

Economic-Based Violence: It is also referred to as "political economy of violence". A scholar noted that, in recent writings in the mass media, much emphasis is laid on the role of resources in generating conflict which is a major cause of economic-based violence across the globe and across political divide. Cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and opponents also leading to violent agitations among the contending

actors and between the state and proponents. The Niger-Delta crisis in Nigeria presents a classic case of this violent struggle that has been on since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. These violent agitations have claimed many lives of Nigerians and foreigners, military and paramilitary personnel, and properties worth billions of naira. It has also resulted in economic misfortune in Nigeria through loss of oil revenue as a result of shortfall in crude oil exports by the oil companies occasioned by disruption of oil exploration activities by the Niger-Delta militants. Although by no means limited to oil in the Niger Delta, the most prevalent campaign about the link between resources and conflict in Nigeria focuses on oil and the Delta region. No doubt oil has given rise to vertical and horizontal conflicts between National, State and society or between dominant and subordinate geopolitical zones, classes and groups across Nigeria, given the pivotal role that oil plays in the political economy, and power relations in Nigeria. It is however true those other types of resource driven conflicts have received less attention in the debate. Assets such as grazing and farming and water resource, have tended to give rise to horizontal conflicts that involve communities across the geo-political zones.

Pervasive Material Inequalities and Unfairness: A major factor that contributes to insecurity in Nigeria is the growing awareness of inequalities, and disparities in life chances which lead to violent reactions by a large number of people. There is a general perception of marginalization by a section of the people in areas of government development policies, political patronage, and these are triggers of disaffection, resentment, and revolt⁸³. The incessant strikes by labour, professional groups and demonstrations by civil society groups are mainly due to pervasive material inequalities and unfairness. Their agitations are aimed at drawing public sympathy for their struggle for just and fair treatment by the government.

Unemployment/Poverty: Unemployment/poverty among Nigerians, especially the youths is a major cause of insecurity and violent crimes in Nigeria. In particular youth's unemployment have contributed to the rising cases of violent conflict in Nigeria. Also, one of the major causes of insecurity in the country is the failure of successive administration to address challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic nationalities.

Organized Violent Groups: Organized violent groups such as ethnic militia, vigilantes, secret cults in tertiary institutions and political thugs contribute significantly to security challenges in Nigeria in different dimension and forms. Their emergence have been linked to a number of factors which include the culture of militarism that has its antecedents in military rule, the failure of the state and its institutions, economic disempowerment, the structure of the state and Nigeria's federalism, non-separation of state and religion, politics of exclusion, culture of patriarchy, ignorance and poor political consciousness⁸³.

Weak Security System: This is a major contributory factor to the level of insecurity in Nigeria, and this can be attributed to a number of factors which include inadequate funding of the police and other security agencies, lack of modern equipment both in weaponry and training, poor welfare of security personnel, and inadequate personnel⁸⁴. The police-population ratio in Nigeria is 1:450 which falls below the standard set by the United Nations. The implication of this is that Nigeria is grossly under policed and this partly explains the inability of the Nigerian Police Force to effectively combat crimes and criminality in the country.

Porous Borders: It's the porous frontiers of the country, where individual movements are largely untracked have contributed to the level of insecurity in Nigeria. As a result of the porous borders there is an unchecked inflow of Small Arms and Light Weapons into the country which

has aided militancy and criminality in Nigeria⁸⁵. Available data show that Nigeria host over 70 percent of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa⁸⁶. Also, the porosity of the Nigerian borders has aided the uncontrollable influx of migrants, mainly young men, from neighboring countries such as Republic of Niger, Chad and Republic of Benin responsible for some of the criminal acts⁸⁷.

Terrorism: The most fundamental source of insecurity in Nigeria today is terrorism which is traceable to religious fanaticism and intolerance particularly in Islam dominated states of Nigeria⁸⁸. Terrorism is a global phenomenon and it is ravaging the whole world. It has been defined as “the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts.

Terrorism in Nigeria is not a recent phenomenon, it started with the notorious Islamic sect in the Northern part of Nigeria called Mataisine during Alhaji Shehu Shagari civilian regime of the second republic which was aborted by a military coup in December 1983 led by General Muhammadu Buhari. Terrorism rears its ugly head again during the Obasanjo civilian regime of the fourth republic which witnessed religious riots in Plateau state in Northern Nigeria. In recent times terrorism has assumed a political undertone and is spearheaded by a faceless Islamic insurgents based in the Northern region of Nigeria called Boko Haram, that has claimed thousands of lives in the North since 2009.

Terrorism in Nigeria has been linked to religious, socio-political, economic and cultural factors. Even though terrorism originated from Islamic fanaticism, it is now driven by factors such as

inequalities within the country and lack among Nigerians, in terms of livelihood (economic) resources, education or access to education and good values. The current challenge of terrorism to physical security is threatening the Nigeria society on all fronts. Some foreign observers have linked terrorism in Nigeria to a number of factors which include, political conflicts, unbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities, religious/ethnic distrust, poor governance linked to leadership failure, and high level corruption⁸⁹.

2.1.12 Fulani Herdsmen Crisis

While Nigeria and the world focus attention on the actions of the movement known as Boko Haram, another internal security challenge is brewing in Nigeria's Middle Belt region and Benue State in particular. This security challenge is epitomized in the Fulani herdsmen clashes with the rural farming communities in Nigeria's north-central region. Unlike the more high profile and internationally recognized Boko Haram insurgency, the Fulani herdsmen violence in the Middle Belt is under-reported in both the domestic and international media, and the government's response to it has been a sort of denial that this conflict exists, with senior government officials preferring to focus on Boko Haram⁹⁰.

Owing to the seasonal southward migration of Fulani herdsmen, they usually enter into contention with indigenous people of the Middle Belt region for farmland. This contention bordered on the destruction of their crops by the cattle of the Fulani herdsmen, and the theft or rustling of livestock by the farming communities. Inevitably, while the natives complained and attacked the herders, the herders recourse to organized violence. This marked a transition away from the original lifestyle of the herders. This transition is tagged the change of occupational tactics: staff to a gun⁹¹. The author further explained that: The Fulani in the course of carrying

out their pastoral nomadic activities has been seen to have changed tactics from mere land grazing to barrel-induced-land grazing⁹².

In short, the spate of killing and kidnappings as perpetuated by the Fulani nomads calls for great concern before this fetus is given birth to and culminates into another sect, or plunges the country into a primitive, primordial and pedestrian state of nastiness, solitary and brute. The attacks by the farming communities and reprisal attacks by the herders led to several fatalities on both sides. It was argued that the communal conflicts orchestrated by Fulani herdsmen in Benue State claimed the lives of more than 5000 victims in the first half of 2014⁹³. The herdsmen sacked more than 100 communities; throwing thousands of refugees into internally displaced person camps located in Makurdi.

Also, scholars opined that a total of 853 people lost their lives just in the period between January 2014 and March 2014 alone⁹⁴. Of the 853 deaths: Fulani herdsmen claimed to have lost 214 people (in addition to 3200 cows), an estimated 633 Tiv people were killed (excluding women and children who died later in camps), and six government soldiers were also killed³³. The killings were indiscriminate, with everyone as targets, regardless of age, gender or class. This is because their combat readiness and sophistication gives them the courage not only to attack host communities but to confront and attack constituted authorities that are heavily protected with state of the art military convoys. A case in point was the event where the convoy of the Governor of Benue State, Gov. Gabriel Suswan, was ensnared and attacked by herdsmen on his way from Tse-Akanyi village in Guma Local Government Area where he went to commiserate with the victims of conflict with Fulani Herdsmen ^{30, 32}. The fundamental question now is: how do these herders get their weapons?

From the information derived from the interviews organized with victims, security officials and senior government functionaries, scholars noted that the herdsmen were involved in transporting small arms into Benue State using cows and donkeys. Sometimes these weapons were hidden in sacks of grain, beans and rice transported on the back of donkeys as they move from place to place. They further added that according to some military sources, some of the herdsmen use Hilux Jeeps and motorcycles to carry out their attacks. The weapons in use include AK-47 assault rifles, homemade rifles, handguns and Molotov cocktails. Furthermore, it is believed that there are some religious connotations to the violence.

Evidence suggests that Christians are being targeted for violence on the account of their faith. According to the fieldwork by the Africa Conflict and Security Analysis Network (ACSAN) and the data collected from Benue State Emergency Management Agency (BSEMA) and Young Professional Association in Makurdi, the estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Benue State between 2014 and 2016 were 4194 and 2597 respectively. The same groups reported that the estimated number of Christian homes and churches reported damaged or destroyed in Benue State between 2014 and 2016 were 195,576 and 30 respectively.

The Fulani herdsmen crisis, deemed only less deadly than Boko Haram, the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Shabaab, globally, affects the socio-economic development of the Nigerian State. Research showed that the major social effect of the menace of Fulani herdsmen are loss of human life, sexual harassment of human life, small arms proliferation, sour national social relationship, and high cases of rape, among others. Likewise, another scholar discovered that the major implications of the Fulani herdsmen menace were the reduction in output and income of farmers/nomads, loss of produce in storage, displacement of farmers, scarcity of agricultural products, loss of house and properties and infrastructural damages⁹⁶.

Likewise, in a 2015 study, the Fulani herdsmen violence accounted for the federal government's loss of \$13.7 billion in revenue annually because of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states. The study further found that on average, these states lost 47% of their internally-generated revenues. Researchers have argued that violent conflicts lead to refugee crises in the affected regions⁹⁷. The violence led to poor security of human and property. With little protection offered by state security services against the incessant violence, many farmers have begun abandoning their plots to seek safety elsewhere, leading to food shortages, depopulation of fertile land, and further damage to an already fragile economy.

So, it was argued that those remaining in the villages are afraid to travel to farms in remote locations due to fear of violence from herdsmen⁹⁸. The implication of this situation is ominous on food production. There are already reports that prices of foodstuff have increased in some of the affected states while refugee problems have escalated. The reasons for this violence are myriad. They range from encroachment on farmland, cattle rustling, scarcity of freshwater, age-long disagreements, to climate change. Be that as it may, this has created a volatile situation where the herders who were known to only walk around with bows and arrows and daggers now carry sophisticated weaponry like AK-47 and assault rifles; using these to raid villages and agrarian communities leaving a high death toll and massive displacement of denizens of attacked and neighboring communities in the wake of their attacks.

Owing to the foregoing, the Global Terrorism Index described the herdsmen as the world's fourth deadliest militant group¹⁰⁰. The major source of tensions between pastoralists and farmers is economic, with land-related issues accounting for the majority of the conflicts¹⁰¹. This can then be situated within the broader context of the political economy of land struggle, traceable to

burgeoning demography in which there is fierce competition for fixed space to meet the demands of the growing population of man and animal (especially sheep, goats and cattle) alike.

A group of researcher mentioned that the causes of the herders-farmers clashes involve several factors which they explain to include the mal-administered government's pastoralist policy. This involved the usurpation of designated grazing reserves across the 19 Northern states by politicians who saw the reserves as lucrative, thereby, creating a shortage of land, water and other resources. Others problems include environmental degradation arising from desertification and the shrinking of Lake Chad Basin which forces many pastoralists' communities to move further into areas outside the regular pastoral routes. Also, existing cattle rustling militias and other criminal elements prompt the proliferation of small and light weapons leading to bloody herders-farmers attacks and stimulating allegations that the herders have links to Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab¹⁰³.

Furthermore, Ahmadu and Ayuba classified the causes of violence into two: remote; and immediate causes. The remote cause of violence between herders and farmers can be seen in the general deteriorating fortunes of pasture in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa since the early 1990s. according to Ahmadu and Ayuba, this cause arises from the effects of desertification, land degradation, unstable rainfall and other climatic factors, 'pushed' the Fulani pastoralist to abandon their respective traditional ecological range in the neighboring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon republics, and moved inwards into Northern part of Nigeria ⁴⁷. This led to increasing demand for land, water and pasture. Besides, major agricultural expansion programs (Fadama Program and River Basins irrigation projects) also contributed to shrinking lands for both pastoralism and sedentarism which led to competition over limited land and pastures.

On the other hand, the immediate causes include the deliberate attitudes of farmers and herders alike towards themselves. For instance, the herders contaminate water by dragging their cattle into water ponds while farmers poison the water ponds with harmful insecticides intentionally meant for killing herds to prevent pastoralists from contaminating their only source of water. Another point is cattle rustling and violent attacks on the herders by criminal elements who view them as invaders of the host communities. This has resulted in the herders carrying sophisticated arms and ammunition to protect themselves and their cattle.

Given all of these, it was opined that group solidarity – in the form of collective action to defend and attack – is the major precipitator of violent acts between herders and farmers. More so, while seeing the rainy season as the intense period of clashes between the herders and farmers owing to the availability of arable land, Imo identifies other factors that cause violence to include: climate changes, the migration further south, the growth of agro-pastoralism, the expansion of farming on pastures, the invasion of farmlands by cattle, assault on non-Fulani women by herders, blockage of stock routes and water points, freshwater scarcity, burning of rangelands, cattle theft, inadequate animal health care and disease control, overgrazing on fallow lands, defecation on streams and roads by cattle, extensive sedentarisation, ineffective coping strategies, ethnic stereotyping, and the breakdown of conflict intervention mechanisms as the root causes of such violence in rural areas¹⁰⁵.

2.1.13 Boko Haram

Since the return to democratic governance in 1999, Nigeria has faced myriad security challenges including terrorism, insurgency, militancy and crime, among others. Domestic terrorism became entrenched in Nigeria with the emergence of the Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad

(People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad"), popularly known as Boko Haram, with sworn allegiance to the Islamic State. Though the sect has been in existence for some years (since 2002), its activities became a serious security challenge in 2009 when violence erupted between the police and the sect members in Borno state. Since then, the group has embarked on a deadly campaigns of terror including suicide bombing, invasion of police and military outputs, raids of villages and communities, and arson among others¹⁰⁶.

North-Eastern states of Nigeria (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe) with a population of 18,971,965 inhabitants and other major northern cities such as Jos, Kaduna, Kano and Madalla and Suleja (in Niger State), became the epicentre of Nigeria's terrorism-related violence. The insurgency has resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of people, displaced millions of people from their homes and destroyed livelihoods and properties worth millions of Naira. Determining the actual impact of insecurity on the economy and livelihoods in the north is extremely difficult given the absence of accurate data in this regard. However, the crisis has not only displaced people but also stalled and sometimes completely shut down commerce in the affected states (including Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Kano etc.).

Investors have equally moved out of the region relocating to other parts of the country leading to a serious loss of revenue. Hitherto vibrant commercial centres have been seriously destabilized. Kano for instance serves as a commercial hub neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger Republic, and of northern Cameroon, but with current spate of violence rocking the town business concerns are being scared away and the foundation of economic and social well-being of that region is being threatened. Several studies have ascribed various causes to the emergence of the sect, its metamorphosis from a recluse religious sect to a full blown terrorist organization.

These include: extremist religious ideology; ethnic discrimination; poor economic conditions, reflected in poverty, unemployment; bad governance, particularly corruption and mismanagement; limited political participation and revolt against the ruling elite.

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2.1.14 Causes of the Crisis

Border Porosity: Regardless of the economic and social aspects, a standard character of the Nigerian boundaries is porous¹⁰⁷. Nigeria has porous borders with Cameroon (1,690 kilometers) in the east, Niger (1,497 kilometers) in the north, Benin (773 kilometers) in the west, and Chad (87 kilometers) in the northeast. The three critical immediate neighbors of Nigeria have a predominantly itinerant Fulani Islamic population that share common borders with Nigeria's eight states in the northern region, namely Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Taraba and Gombe. The cross - border activities are defined in certain push and pull variable. The push factors consisting of the domestic conditions in Chad, Niger and Cameroon include the severe socio-economic dislocation that stalls sustainable development, perennial drought, famine, political instability, social and ethnic conflicts and near collapse of state control of resources and institutions, as well as the survival pressures on immediate and extended family members¹¹⁰. The pull factors to Nigeria are critically socio-economic prospects, food security, religious and cultural affinity with Nigerians and political freedom. The Fulani herdsmen, moving with guns, causing violence, fighting with farmers are not Nigerians. These are foreigners coming into Nigeria to cause a breach of the peace of the nation. They are, therefore, terrorists and should be treated as such by the Nigerian security agencies. The porous borders are to blame for the infiltration of the extremists. Nigeria has international land borders of about 4,470 kilometres (2,513 miles) with Chad, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger, and a coastline of 774 kilometres (480 miles), which are largely unmanned.

Cattle Rusting: In Nigeria, the pervasiveness of cattle rustling especially in the northern part of Nigeria has been extensive with thousands of the incidence reported by the cattle rearers every year. The paucity of data make it difficult to ascertain the exact statistics on the trend of cattle

rustling, nevertheless, isolated figures that exist with cattle breeders association put the death toll of herders at 322 and the loss of 60,000 cattle's stolen by rustlers in 2013 alone across Plateau, Nasarawa, Niger, Kaduna, Taraba, Benue and Zamfara states. It was observed a scholar that, in Plateau State among Berom and Fulani tribes, cattle rustling led to loss of lives and properties among them. It was later recorded that, on several occasions, Fulani traced their cattle to Berom communities, throughout 2014, more than 1 thousand cows were stolen; this did not include those that were killed. After a fighting that ensued between these two tribes, the Fulani could be able to retrieve like 150 cows, but more than 887 were still missing till date. The report ostensibly narrated what really led to fighting between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Plateau State, Nigeria and the case is more of suspicion other ethnic group as perpetrator of an act.

Environmental Factors: The environmental factors range from desertification, bush burning, climate change and increase in population. Mohammed observed that like lake chad that used to provide water and other resources to more than 30 million people in four countries including Nigeria in the early 1960s has shrunk by 90% from 25000 square kilometers to 2500 square kilometers, thus forcing those affected to move southward in search of resources for their flocks. Therefore, this migration resulted from loss of grazing land to expanding settlements, and the migration to southward is causing unholy violent competition over land within communities in Nigeria. This and other reasons like desertification have altered the resources landscape, heightened competition for dwindling resources and raise the possibility of clashes between the hosting communities and herders.

Political Limitation: The fact that farmer/Fulani clashes are politically motivated with ethnic conflation in Nigeria cannot be undermined. The comments of Nigerian political class especially

Emir of Kano, Sultan of Sokoto and the silence of Mr. President, Muhammad Buhari juxtaposed this fact. Burton argued that, even Nigerian President Muhammad Buhari has been accused of giving the Fulani preferential treatment due to his own Fulani heritage, and legislation proposed by his party has been met with suspicion and outrage. This legislation, a series of attempts to provide grazing land for the Fulani herdsmen, has been rejected at least once already, though the government continues its attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. As of June 8, 2016, the Nigerian military was not being used to counteract the efforts of Fulani militants, and members of the government have expressed the improbable belief that local police forces have the resources to get the situation under control. Therefore, the fact that the president did not visit the scene of the attack of Fulani herdsmen in Benue until after a year despite the Benue State Governor, Samuel Ortom submitted a report of early warning that, there would be deadly strike of the Fulani herdsmen in the state, this transmits that the group still enjoys continuing support from the presidency. Similarly, Nobel Laureate, Prof. Wole Soyinka has said the President was in a trance to have remained silent over heinous crimes committed by Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria. Soyinka came to this conclusion based on “unforced errors” and the President body language which had aggravated the killings by the herdsmen in Nigeria.

Climate Change: One of the major factors that affecting pastoral farming in Nigeria is climate change, this result from long dry season in a year. Describing the annual herding cycle and how climate change has affected herders in Nigeria, Iro stated that the herding season begins with southward movement of the herds along rivers and stream valleys from October to December – marking the end of rainy season and beginning of dry season ⁵⁶. January to February is the harmattan season that is characterized by longer grazing hours, herd splitting, and more frequent visits to stable water sources. The months of March and April are usually the toughest for the

herdsman and his cattle, as it is the hottest period in the grazing calendar. Indeed, he now herds his cattle only in the evenings and nights. Iro believed that, climate change coupled with the hot weather in the north caused the Fulani herdsman to look for greener pasture southward.

2.1.15 Socio-economic Consequences of the Crisis

The deadly conflicts between herdsman and crop farmers have become one of the major insecurity problems in Nigeria – only second to Boko Haram imperil¹¹¹. The violent conflict between the two groups have been manifesting in form of bloody clashes (attacks and counter attacks). These bloody attacks and counter attacks have created social or relational implications and economic adverse effects such as:

Loss of Human Lives: Most of these clashes between the herdsman and farmers have resulted to humanitarian catastrophe precipitating human loss. For instance, in the work of Oli, Ibekwe, and Nwankwo, the Tiv people in Guma, Gwer-West, Makurdi and other towns at the border with Taraba state have recorded about 458 deaths and over 350 communities have been sacked and are now living in IDP camps.

Displacement of Persons: Reports of internally displacement of persons abounds. Displacement occurs when herdsman and farmers clash. Host farmers especially women who stayed behind stop going to distant farms for fear of attack by nomads in the bush. Such displaced farmers have become liabilities to other farmers whom they have to beg for food for themselves and their families. This therefore has created a vicious cycle of poverty in such communities. It was observed that herdsman-farmers conflict has not only resulted to internal displacement of herdsman and farmers in Yakurr, Cross River State, especially women; but also led to reduction in income/savings and crops output ⁵⁸. The Benue State Emergency Management Agency,

SEMA has registered about 80,000 Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs, across four camps located in Guma and Logo local government areas of the state. There are indications that as at March 1, 2018 no fewer than 80,450 children are currently trapped in eight Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs camps established by the Benue state government to cater for victims of herdsmen incursions in the state. According to official figures obtained from the State Emergency Management Agency, SEMA, in March 2018, of the said figure 47,353 are male while 39,909 are female children.

Destruction of Houses: Clashes between herdsmen and farmers are also not leaving houses untouched in most affected communities across Nigeria. For instance, the killing of Nimbo indigenes in Uzo-Uwani LGA of Enugu State where 40 deaths were recorded, also saw to the destruction of ten residential houses, a church, in addition to vehicles, motorcycles and domestic animals. In Dekina LGA of Kogi State, several houses were burnt down on March 14th 2018 when an Ogane-Enugu and Ikende community was invaded by herdsmen

Destruction of Farmlands and Crops: It is factual to say that most clashes between herdsmen and farmers were triggered as a result of frustrations from farmers whose farmlands and crops were destroyed by herders. More than 40 million worth of crops are usually lost annually due to invasion of cattle in the South-South region of Nigeria, especially Delta and Edo States ⁶⁰. This has created an impediment to the survival of the host communities as many crop-farmers have abandoned their farm lands to avoid suffering in vain or being killed. Aliyu argued that the conflict has continued to lead to destruction or loss of properties and crops in Katsina State leaving an already endangered populace even poorer. The food security welfare of urban dwellers especially residents of Calabar that depend on these farmers for food supply has been negatively affected since the incessant clashes in Yakurr, which is predominantly a farming

community and prices of available food supply skyrocketed. In Oyo State, as Adelokun, Adurogbangba and Akinbile put it, farmers were worst hit by the conflicts as it affects their farming and has led to reduction in farm output, loss of properties and scarcity of food.

Distrust: the conflict has created distrust between the two groups – farmers now see herdsmen as intruders and vice versa. According to Burton majority of the members of the expansive Fulani ethnic group are solely pastoralists without connection to militant violence¹⁵. Even these peaceful ones, however, are largely viewed with suspicion and anger by the sedentary communities on whose land they take their cattle, largely as a result of the actions of the violent group. And because many of these herdsmen do not understand the languages of their host communities, will always get provoked or frustrated at any movement or action of anybody within the community pointing at them, all because of the existence of distrust. This has altered the mutual relationship that has existed between the Fulani and most of their host communities. Furthermore, most members of the affected communities now see government and security agencies in bad light, as they feel that government is not doing enough to protect them, and therefore take laws into their hands in form of self-defense.

Unemployment: In terms of employment, agricultural sector has been leading in economic activities, as it accounts for one-third of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It remains the leading employment sector of the vast majority of the Nigerian population as it employs two-third of the labor force⁶³. In the view of Olatunji, in Nigeria today, farming still remains the sources of employment of majority of the adult population, its productivity is the most important single factor influencing the standard of living of both the rural and urban centers⁶⁴. About 90% of the rural population is involved in activities related to the crop sub-sector which provides the bulk of agricultural income. However, the current herdsmen-farmers imbroglio has continued to

deny many farmers access to their farmlands – many community members deserting their farmlands and already cultivated crops in fear of being attacked by the herdsmen. Many have abandoned their farming activities which are their means of livelihood and relocated to other places, while some have been displaced and conformed in some IDPs camps. The above submission proved that the conflict has resulted to massive unemployment.

Threat to National Security: A scholar posited that “the failure of government to address the situation of herdsmen attacks decisively has several implications for Nigeria. The fact that herdsmen now carry sophisticated ammunition with which they kill and maim perceived opponents at will constitutes grave danger to national security. This is because security personnel including the police have not been able to withstand weapon-wielding herdsmen’s boldness and firepower”⁶⁵. The herdsmen have sacked whole communities, abducted elder statesmen, burnt churches, killed church priests and other worshipers, and killed Police officers, raped, looted and perpetrated heinous crimes while the government has done less to arrest the situation, which is a serious threat to national security.

Threat to Food Security: herdsmen-farmers conflict is an impediment to food security. The displacement of farmers from the affected communities, has drastically reduced agricultural production. This has been amply demonstrated by relative shortage of farm produce in the rural and urban markets of central Nigeria. This is evidenced in the tremendous price hike of food commodities across the county.

2.1.16 The Political Economy of Instability in Nigeria

The fragility of the economic and political achievements of the African states in recent years has revived an interest in using a political economy approach to explain the shifts in economic policy and in democratic strength.

Some states initially appears to have had a successful experience of stabilization and structural adjustment (1985-89), and of political and institutional reform (1993-97). The implementation of reforms has, however, revealed the significant difficulties of the process and suggests the necessity of amending any analysis of the ‘ success’ of these reforms with an analysis of the ‘viability’ of the conditions that facilitate or impede the implementation of any public policy of magnitude. In the last two years, social violence, road blocks, strikes, and the rise of anti-system movements suggests that the ‘democratic transition’ as much as the ‘structural adjustment’ of the last 80 years is still incomplete. Instead of extending the first and second generations of reform, there exists the perception in Bolivia that the country has only gone back to where it started from
112.

This section propose to examine (i) formulate an interpretive framework of the political economy to understand the success and the crisis behind the process of economic and political reform in the last two decades: (ii) analyze the determinants of governance, understood here as the political conditions that make the development o f a representative democracy possible and the reform of public policy viable, and (iii) analyze the determinants of economic development, with a particular emphasis on determinants of economic stability, sustained growth, and the struggle against poverty. From a practical point of view, we ask why the reforms’ ‘success’ did not become a ‘success’ in terms of growth rates, reduced poverty, and decreased inequality.

From an analytical point of view, the study approaches the paradoxical trajectory of the reforms: why didn't economic and political success coincide instead of diverging and thereby weakening the chances of further political and institutional reform?

The analysis of economic policy reform could be approached from two critical 'moments' : the first being the foundation of the initial rules of the game (the political moment) and the second being the clarification of economic policies in those rules (the policy moment). The more stable the rules of the game are, the lower the transaction costs are of making public policy. The more unstable the rules of the game are, the higher the transaction costs are and, therefore, the larger is the disparity between economic and political cycles. When the rules of the game are not stable, discontent with a public policy reflects not only a disapproval of the policy itself, but also a disapproval of the rules, institutions, and actors that produced the policy.

The rejection of one policy can produce a crisis of legitimacy and force the government to go through a costly process of political reaffirmation to strengthen legitimacy. In the Bolivian experience, the problems of political credibility continue to return in an iterative way, persistently eroding the political and bureaucratic system. Rather than reduce transaction costs of reforms, many political pacts that are constructed simply indefinitely postpone solving the problem.

An Interpretive Framework

How to approach the different time frames of the political and economic moments in Bolivian experience? This study examines an interpretive framework that complements the model of 'policy transaction costs' to discover the effects of these distinct time frames and create a new understanding of Nigeria's case. In the literature of 'policy transaction costs' initiated by

Nigerian government and expanded upon by through economic policy is understood to be the result of a political process of negotiation. This process is also marked by multiple failures of information in the political market - negotiations occur with asymmetries of information in a market that, in the absence of credible external sanctions, depends upon self-enforcement of rules. The increase in the transaction costs of the negotiation process frequently determines the viability of an economic policy. One way of decreasing transaction costs is creating arbitrating institutions with high credibility (superintendent offices, offices that control public spending, public prosecutor offices, courts of justice), that enforce obedience to the law in an impartial way. Another way is to decrease transaction costs is to align interest groups to maintain checks and balances during the construction of arbitrating institutions. The focus of 'policy transaction cost' requires an entrance into the 'black box' of the political process of negotiations to identify the sources of stability or instability in the construction of credibility¹¹³. In Bolivia, the three factors that characterize the social and historical conditions of negotiation policy also help explain some of the most important restrictions on the political process.

First, in Nigerian political negotiations there is a serious clash between formal and informal institutions. The formal rules emphasized the hybrid aspect of the formal system of the political coalitions that generate a political space in the legislature to make reforms viable with the president's support. The stability of the democratic system observed during the last four presidential elections has made a set of political and economic reforms viable in recent years.

The informal rules suggest that parallel to the 'coalition politics' are 'street politics' that burst into the careful order created by the political rules, and push multiple negotiations and concessions to pressuring groups, social movements, and regional organizations in the country.

The nature of reducing transaction costs frequently favors partial negotiations that make reform viable but push vital issues of institutional credibility towards a distant future.

Second, it is clear that formal channels of negotiation currently work through highly fragmented political parties and a political clientele that provides a fragile base for political governance. In recent years, the weakening of the traditional parties of the Nigerian democracy which has made the system of political pacts and agreements more unstable than they were when a credible political infrastructure existed. Local and partial leaderships have multiplied the possible scenarios in political negotiation both inside and outside of the formal system of political mediation.

By adapting the analytical framework with the approach that 'transaction costs' explain two aspects of the crisis in the African region: (i) a crisis of governance, defined in terms of decreasing support and satisfaction with democracy, worsening of the quality of political and bureaucratic institutions, the presence of high levels of corruption, and the presence of growing social violence; (ii) an economic crisis, defined by the indicators of growth, inflation, employment creation, and poverty reduction¹¹⁴. For both issues, I have created hypotheses about the causes of the crises and the more structural factors of the crisis in the African region. Among the determinants of governance that we analyze are the effect of the weak presence of the state, the effect of political fragmentation and volatility, ethnic fragmentation, and the increasing levels of inequality. Among the determinants of the economic crisis that I have examined and analyzed are the effects of the context of macroeconomic policies, the macroeconomic environment, the productivity rate of the economy, the effects of geography, and the effects of distribution. Finally, we incorporate governance variables to explain the path of the political and economic crises from a political economy approach.

2.1.17 The Link between Political Instability and Socio-economic Development

The nexus between political instability and economic growth has been one of the most important topics in empirical research in economics in the last decade. The major goal of this research was to establish the structure of causal interrelations. Sociologists and economists have tried to test whether a stable political system is a vital precondition for economic growth or whether economic growth creates the foundations of political stability. According to the earliest contributions experts, technological progress is necessary for economic growth, although it must be accompanied by liberal democratic institutions, which provide citizens with political freedom, and which allow them to participate in the political process. This is coupled with economic freedom, which in turn enables their participation in the economy.

In general, previous papers on political stability-growth links may be classified into four groups. The first strand in the economic literature argues that political instability has a negative impact on economic growth, but that there is no causality in the opposite direction⁷. Another group of contributions supplies evidence that economic growth causes political stability, but not vice versa⁶⁸. Another tendency in the literature argues that causality in the relationship between political instability and economic growth runs both ways¹¹⁵.

Finally, the last group of papers contains evidence supporting a lack of causality between the variables. In general, previous investigations also vary with respect to the samples or countries that different contributors investigate. In some of the previous studies on the relationship between the political instability and economic growth both direct and indirect effects of instability on GDP have been found and discussed¹¹⁶.

The major conclusion was that because of the negative impact of political instability, there are indirect consequences for most important growth factors such as savings or investment. Another strand of research, also related to indirect effects, was focused on the well-known 'brain drain' effect, which is the process of declining human capital caused mainly by political disorder. An issue which is especially related to the nexus between political instability and growth is whether democratic institutions are harmful or conducive to growth. In some previous papers, democracy was made responsible for not providing enough political stability and for slowing down economic growth¹¹⁷.

In many democracies the government is based on coalition partners, who are often ideologically opposite to each other. Therefore, any instability in the relationships between coalition partners can easily lead to a withdrawal of support for the government. Newly-elected governments in democratic countries often tend to make frequent changes in the country's policy in both domestic and international areas. Even if a particular political party hangs onto full executive power, noisy demonstrations on the streets and harsh criticism by the mass media can lead to violent and unexpected political change. Sudden and frequent policy changes with regard to business are likely to deter investment, which in turn may hamper economic growth. Therefore, some contributors think that if democracy leads to this kind of instability, it is unsuitable for developing countries where economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priorities.

It is very likely that these two goals have been deemed, at least to some extent, main priorities in the case of CEE countries as well, especially in the early 1990s. The different points of view about the impact of political freedom (accompanied by political instability in the early stages of democratization) on the growth rate are widely reflected in the economic literature. A scholar found that the net effect of more political freedom on economic growth is rather uncertain. He

found that democracy speeds up economic growth when the initial level of democracy is relatively low. However, the relationship becomes negative once a moderate amount of political freedom has been attained.

It was stressed that an increase in political rights in the worst dictatorships supports the growth rate and investment as result of limitations on governmental power. However, an attaining a moderate amount of democracy and a further increase in political freedom hampers economic growth and investment because a serious problem with redistribution arises. There is controversy on the impact of democracy on growth in many other papers. In the opinion of some researchers, democracy will support economic growth more than authoritarian regimes. A democratic political system creates conditions conducive to growth because it allows the most active and talented citizens to participate fully in business. Other studies have also found a significant positive association between democracy and economic growth, especially in the direction from democracy to growth¹¹⁸.

In a study, it is emphasized, however, that political freedom and democracy in developing countries could undermine the effectiveness of government policy with discipline, law and order. Therefore, under a democratic system a government may be less efficient in performing its basic obligations and responsibilities, and in supplying basic services. In an article concerned with economic convergence and government policies, it was found that in order to catch up with rich countries, poor countries should implement appropriate economic policies, especially to support open foreign trade and to protect private property rights¹¹⁹. In the late 1990s, an evidence was found that countries without internal social conflicts and with strong conflict-managing institutions grow much faster than countries with a divided society and weak institutions of conflict management.

2.1.18 Insecurity Situation and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria

After fifty-three years of nationhood Nigeria still ranks among the poorest countries in the world, also ranks low in all socio economic indicators such as life expectancy, death rate, access to water, poverty rate, mortality rate, and crime rate, and still carries the tag of a developing economy. Nigeria is a classic illustration of an oxymoron, a poor country in the midst of abundant human and natural resources. This scenario has contributed to security challenges that have bedeviled the country since independence till now with grave consequences for socio-economic development. There is no nation that can achieve socio-economic development in an environment of socio and physical insecurity. The increasing challenge of insecurity in Nigeria has also been linked to failure of leadership to deliver good governance, and secure the welfare of persons on the principles of freedom, equality, and justice. The ruling elites in Nigeria in both the military and democratic dispensation are dependent, parasitic, and very corrupt in nature, and mal-administration.

The various constitutions that Nigeria has operated including the 1999 constitutions make provisions for the rights of citizens to include; right to life, right to social security, right to work, right to livelihood, just and favorable remuneration, right to a standard of living adequate for the health, and well-being of individual and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and right to education. No doubt, Nigeria is blessed with abundant human, and natural resources to guarantee the attainment of these rights.

Regrettably previous and present governments have failed to guarantee these rights and thus the onus is on individuals to seek for means to provide the basic necessities of life for him and his family. The inability of government to provide a secure and safe environment for lives,

properties and the conduct of business and economic activities has led to resentment and disaffection among ethnic groups. This has resulted in ethnic violence, communal clashes, and religious violence in different parts of the country that has destroyed lives and properties, disrupted businesses and economic activities, and retarded economic growth and development of Nigeria. There is no investor whether local or foreign that will be motivated to invest in an unsafe and insecure environment. In a globalized world investors are not only looking for high returns on their investments but also safe haven for their investments. Thus the alarming level of insecurity in Nigeria has made the economy unattractive to foreign investors, and this has impacted negatively on economic growth and development.

Socio economic development is the primary goal of every well-meaning government, and it is essentially dependent on the level of economic activities in a country; the level of economic activities is in turn enhanced by peaceful co-existence by people. In the absence of security, socio-economic development cannot be sustained as it destroys economic, human and social capital. The Boko Haram insurgence in Northern Nigeria has almost crippled economic activities in that region. Also activities of other militia groups in other parts of the country pose serious threat to the economic health of these regions. The security crises in different parts of Nigeria is destroying existing infrastructure and preventing a peaceful environment for the development of further infrastructure, and a safe environment for economic activities by individuals to give them economic empowerment that will enable households not only to cater for their present generations, create wealth, but also to provide for future generations.

The report by World Bank on “Conflict, Security and Development” reveals that about 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by political and criminal violence, which has exacerbated human misery, and disrupted development. The bane of Nigeria’s development is insecurity.

Insecurity situation is costing Nigeria its leadership role in Africa in terms of development. Consequently, more proactive initiatives regarding tackling menace of insecurity are needed in Nigeria since security is central to development, and the national transformation agenda of the current administration may not be achieved if there is no solution to the menace of insecurity ravaging the country.

2.1.19 The Consequences of Socio-Economic Problems in Nigeria

Nigeria's contributions towards decolonization and eradication of apartheid from the continent of Africa and the maintenance of regional stability in Africa have been phenomenal. The country successfully chaired the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee from 1970 until that committee was dissolved in 1994. During this period Nigeria played a pivotal role in the decolonization of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa¹¹⁹.

Nigeria was in the forefront of international efforts towards bringing peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone under the auspices of the Economic Monitoring Group of West Africa (ECOMOG) which is a regional body in West Africa. The ECOMOG operation has cost Nigeria over \$13 billion since the beginning of the operation in 1990. Also, the country is presently the highest troop contributor in Sudan and has played an important role in the maintenance of peace and stability in the subregion.

The Nigerian Government's worthy track record of services and its potentialities to contribute meaningfully to global governance, and the purposes of the United Nations in the 21st Century cannot be over emphasized. Nigeria has numerous resources, especially oil and gas. In addition, Nigeria's influence in Africa is very strategic; however, with the increasing socio-economic problems in the country the government may have to reduce her participation in order to

concentrate more on diversifying her economy. It is hoped that Nigeria can overcome the socio-economic problems facing it; otherwise in a worst case scenario, the West African region and Africa, may witness the absence of a stabilizing nation. Nigeria must not allow itself to lose her potential and the leadership role she plays in Africa. Today's realities are different from yesterdays. This is the time to deploy all of Nigeria's energies, resources and clout to address the socioeconomic problems that prevent the country from achieving her national objective¹²⁰.

2.1.20 Attaining Socio-economic Development

In reality, the fragile political situation in Nigeria constitutes a complex mixture of causes and effects, a syndrome that has proven largely impervious to quick template driven solutions. There are no fixed solutions for addressing the issue of socioeconomic problems in a country as every country has its own peculiarities, and settings keep changing in a complex, volatile and ambiguous environment. Some researchers have however identified a three dimensional relationship between the political environment, the economic situation and the social problems in Nigeria. Turbulence in any of these three sectors usually has a direct impact on the others. For instance, political instability usually leads to economic problems, which then triggers social strife. Thus, the remedies for the prevailing socio-economic problems in Nigeria can be found in the political, economic and social dimensions. A comprehensive view of the Soviet and Chinese political experience reveals how internal transformations of old political processes have enhanced good governance. For instance, the Soviet perestroika under President Gorbachev and the Chinese economic reforms starting in the late 1970s were driven by endogenous force, a realization by the leadership that the old, counterproductive policy model had run their economies into the ground and that a change of course had to be undertaken.

Drawing from experiences of India, another former colony of Great Britain and the world's biggest democracy with a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural setting, Professor Jagdish N. Bhagwati, an Indian and a renowned scholar of Columbia University, stated that "democracy in India has been a source of immense gratification, not just to elites, but also to the common man. It is easy to slip into the fallacy that the masses yearn for economic gains, not for political rights. I have long argued that economic betterment, in a country of an immense backlog of poverty, inevitably takes time. On the other hand, democracy gives the poor and the underprivileged instant affirmation of what Americans call their personhood, a sense of equality with the castes and classes above you in a strongly hierarchical society. The elections are preceded by the elite politicians courting your vote and not ordering you around; and the election day is when you have the sense that you can turn the bums out"¹²¹.

This implies that in a democracy, both the elites and the poor masses are considered to be equal and can exercise their franchise to choose who governs them. A critical appraisal of the political environment in the country reveals that Nigerians do not have a problem with democracy, or the presidential system of government, but are tired of corrupt leadership and poor democratic values. The 2011 election was the third election since 1999, and was adjudged the best in the country's history. It recorded high voter turnout compared to the ugly experiences of the past.

For the first time in the country's history, a Southerner from the minority group, in the person of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, was elected as president of Nigeria. The smooth conduct of the electoral process, which was relatively better than the others, portrays a positive development in the democratic process in the country. It is also believed that good political leadership would create a sense of unity and nationalism in Nigeria. Good political leadership is highly desired for the stability required to attract the foreign investment that would stimulate the Nigerian economy.

The government must sustain this positive development and resist returning to its oligarchic political culture where the winner takes all. The ruling party must work towards having an all inclusive government, with active participation from all regions, to address the socio-economic problems in the country and ensuring good governance. To earn political legitimacy there must be good leadership, transparency and integrity at all levels. The administration must also eschew all forms of corruption as it can quickly ruin the reputation of the government and may create avenues for strife. To maintain a stable and secure environment, the administration must provide an equitable justice system and most of all provide essential services to the populace. The words of General Colin Powell succinctly captures the essence of this point that —endeavors succeed or fail because of the people involved and only by attracting the best people will you accomplish great deeds."

The demands of the various political groups must be addressed within a holistic framework. The framework must be inclusive to incorporate all the key political interests, social values and economic interests of the various regional groups. The FGN must review the appropriation bill to address these problems. The FGN should have a balanced appropriation policy that must be well nested in the national strategy for economic development and nation building. The diversification of the Nigerian economy should be of the utmost importance to avoid over-dependence on oil, which is a finite commodity. Investments should be directed to revamping and expanding the moribund industrial base, especially in the Northern parts of the country, to address unemployment. The pay-off of this strategy will not only address the problem of unemployed youth bulge but will substantially increase productivity, reduce importation and reduce poverty in the country.

Public trust can fade much more quickly than it is accumulated. It can wane for a variety of reasons, whether from oversight or mistakes that have strategic consequences, or from failing to build and maintain a culture of competence, accountability, and integrity, as required of strategic leadership. Strong political will is desired from leaders to give Nigeria good leadership and for the FGN to earn legitimacy. The fight against corruption is one that may have a political backlash, since a large majority of the elite groups are involved, but the consequences of not fighting the menace may be more heinous in the long run. Nigeria is a country blessed with abundant human and natural resources that can stimulate the country's economy, but is yet to attain her full potential. A vibrant and productive population is one of the demographic factors that set nations on the path of growth. Countries with a large and growing wage earning (youth) population and small ageing (retired) population, like the U.S. and Brazil, may enjoy significant advantages in international economic competition¹²².

A growing population in a stable environment with balanced wealth distribution ensures potential sustainability for economic growth. In developing countries like Nigeria, where the combination of demographics and economy permits population growth; it is difficult for the government to meet rising expectations due to a weak industrial base. To address unemployment and kick start the economy, the government could explore giving subsidies and incentives to investors as a means of attracting investments and creating jobs.

The FGN also has to invest more in education. A well informed and educated mind is the best security against contagion of folly and vice. The importance of education to society cannot be over-emphasized as it is important for the formation of character, creativity and intellect. Conversely, a growing uneducated and un- or underemployed population will lead to rising social unrest rather than to economic growth. To address the issue of education in Nigeria,

especially in the North, the FGN must build more schools and make education available to the poor masses that are widely dispersed. The performance of the FGN in the education sector and the global economy will be important in either dampening down or inflaming ethnically or religious based violent movements in Nigeria.

In order to harness the enormous natural resources with which the country is endowed, such as iron ore, coal, tin, limestone, cotton among others, the FGN has to reverse the trend of large imports of most finished products into the country and focus on how to boost local production. A productive industrial sector would create employment for the youths, which will reduce poverty and the multiple social problems in the country. In addition, if the industries are sited in rural areas; it can also reduce the movement of people from rural to urban areas in search of jobs and the ethno religious tensions associated with it.

The migration of the Northerners to the South is likely to continue because of the challenges posed by global warming and dwindling water resources. Lake Chad, the Niger River and the Benue River are fast drying up, so more northerners in future will migrate southwards; especially cattle herdsman in search of water for pasturing. This may further escalate the tense socio-economic problems as witnessed in Jos, North Central region. To reverse this trend, the FGN must be creative by investing in modern irrigation and animal husbandry methods, and also seeking alternative sources of water to address the water problem which is essential for life.

In order to stimulate the economy, the FGN must also provide basic infrastructure, such as good roads, water, rail transportation and steady power supply, which would facilitate the movement of goods, services and people. In addition, building of these infrastructures also creates jobs. Good infrastructure induces economic activity and opens new markets which are necessary

inputs to enhance economic productivity. The development of modern infrastructure and functional public service systems are the keys to Nigeria's economic development. What distinguishes economies today are ideas and energy. A country can prosper if it is a source of ideas or energy for the world. Luckily, Nigeria has numerous energy sources but lacks the required research and development (R&D) base needed to balance a dangerously tilted equilibrium. Over the years, the budget allocation to the Ministry of Science and Technology, which is the organization responsible for R&D, has been inadequate and cannot stimulate any activity in that sector. In 2011, the FGN allocated a meager N27, 587,283,407.00 billion (\$172,420,521.00 million) to this sector for her capital and recurrent expenditure, which is insufficient for R&D. The FGN would need to increase the budget in R&D and education to about 15 to 18 percent of the annual budget for the next ten years. This will stimulate the sectors responsible for creating the educational foundation for scientific innovation. Nigeria must also begin to explore alternative sources of electricity such as solar, wind, geothermal, and ocean energy to move to the next level of development. This may address the economic and social problems in Nigeria¹²³.

For the FGN to meet the economic projection of Vision 2020 framework of becoming one of the world's 20 leading economies by the end of this decade, the government may need to restructure the country's monetary and fiscal policies. Monetary policies are usually concerned with the conditions for the use of money supply and/ or interest rates to influence the level of economic activity. It is anchored on the use of all or some policies on open market operations, liquidity ratios, rediscount policy, minimum reserve requirements and sector credit guidelines. Fiscal policies involve the use of taxes and changes in government expenditure to influence the level of economic activity¹²⁴.

The current monetary and fiscal policies of the country were designed to stimulate economic growth but have not been too successful due to macro-economic variables such as capacity under- utilization and lack of investment security. The FGN spends about \$8 Billion yearly to subsidize fuel, which sells for about \$0.40 per liter. The government has proposed to remove subsidies and deregulate the sector to cut wastage. It is envisaged that the money spent on fuel subsidizes can be channeled to infrastructure development aimed at creating jobs. The removal of subsidies will directly imply an increase in cost of fuel which could cause inflation in a fragile economy with a high unemployed population. This increase is likely to cause the closure of a few middle class productive companies that may not be able to afford the new price of fuel. To avoid adverse effects on the middle class and the populace, the FGN may consider a phased removal of subsidizes to reduce the effect on the populace. The FGN will have to adopt a balanced approach in her attempt to stimulate the economy. An unproductive economy can be stimulated by creating incentives for investment and a phased deregulation of the oil sector. Also, the FGN may consider using the subsidy funds to revamp the moribund industrial sector which will create the much desired jobs.

The aftermath of a social conflict, such as war or anarchy, can lead to economic decline; also, waning economic fortunes can lead to closure of companies and high unemployment rates which can lead to social strife. Hence, most countries with fragile political structures and a weak economy will usually have multi-dimensional socioeconomic problems. To avert this ugly trend, the government can embark on construction of infrastructure such as roads and bridges linking agro-centers, dams for irrigation and railway, among others, which stimulates the economy. Construction spurs a plethora of other activities across the economic and social sector. These

activities, if well-coordinated with the state governments and foreign donor agencies, can substantially provide huge benefits at the local, regional and national levels¹²⁵.

Infrastructure spurs the opportunity for education and technical training of the population as well. A working population provides government stability, and enables it to generate income to sustain and expand the services it renders to the populace. A stable environment will attract private and international investments which creates jobs and employment that can address the remote causes of socio-economic problems. The FGN needs to make some policy reforms to address the status of settlers and indigenes. The strictures embedded in the policy of indigeneity act as a constraint on both labor mobility and social interactions between communities outside their home states or local government¹²⁶. Settlers and indigenes alike should have equal rights and privileges in the states as long as they pay taxes and contribute meaningfully to the development of the state and abide by state laws. To implement this policy, a national constitutional conference could be organized by the executive, legislative and judiciary arms of government to ensure that all the stake holders including traditional rulers and civil societies are involved in the process. This will address the problems of ethnic exclusiveness and the tensions it creates.

To address the problem of religious bigotry and radicalism, religious leaders must rise to the occasion and dissociate themselves from radical groups who use religion to seek cheap political ends. A program for de-radicalization, similar to the Saudi Arabia model, should be adopted by the FGN. This may address the issue in the mid to long term. Also, public office holders in all tiers of government should imbibe good institutional stewardship of financial resources, acquisition, and enterprise management to earn public trust. Politicians, and Nigerians as a whole, must jettison primordial tribal and religious sentiments, and embrace good virtues that are built

on integrity, trust, collaboration and the inclusiveness of all. This will create the desired atmosphere to reduce religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Capacity building is the process of creating an environment that fosters institutional development, community participation, human resource development, and strengthening managerial systems. It includes efforts to improve governance capacity, political moderation, and good governance-ethos as well as structure. To enhance capacity building and education in Nigeria, the government must improve the infrastructure in the universities to enhance the educational standard and also design a means of creating employment for graduates. In addition, the government has to make education accessible to those in rural areas and the hinterland where schools do not exist. These groups of people are academically disadvantaged. This makes them open to manipulation by unscrupulous politicians and anti-government organizations resulting in violent conflicts which may not be justifiable, as recently demonstrated by the activities of the Boko Haram group.

Institutional reforms are another aspect the FGN must try to embark on. Most public institutions worldwide are structured in a bureaucratic pattern to minimize flaws in policy promulgation and also be able to withstand internal or external turbulence. A strong institutional framework is the teeth and strength of any government as they are responsible for implementing government policies. In countries where law enforcement institutions are strong, like in the U.S., Britain and France, they act as a check on the corrupt tendencies of elected officials and also maintain standards and regulations in the different administrations. Recently the Governor of Illinois, Mr. Rod Blagojevich, was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment for corrupt practices; he is the fourth governor from that state indicted on corruption charges¹²⁷. The anti-graft institutions in Nigeria are still relative new and weak, thus are vulnerable to manipulation by elected officials.

There exists a capacity gap in these institutions. They are also not adequately equipped to perform their roles. To correct this anomaly, anti-graft institutions, such as the Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), should be reformed to meet the expectations of the populace and their operations should be free of government interference. The FGN must also make reforms in the judiciary system to meet public expectations. The FGN must sanction all corrupt judicial officers and empower law enforcement agents sufficiently to discharge their duties. The reforms must explore ways to quickly conclude law cases in court. The populace must feel secure and trust the judiciary to discharge its duties sincerely. In addition, the immunity from prosecution enjoyed by elected political officials should be expunged, as this will curtail their abuse of power. Lack of stiff sanctions for those that break the law encourage corruption which weakens the legitimacy of government and ultimately breeds socio-economic problems.

2.1.21 Political Stability

According to Encyclopedia Britannica, Political stability is the durability and integrity of a current government regime. This is determined based on the amount of violence and terrorism expressed in the nation and by citizens associated with the state. A stable society is one that is satisfied with the ruling party and system of operations and is not interested in revolutionary or despotic ideas. A stable political scene is one where the ruling government is favored by the population and does not experience strong indicators of social unrest. While there are problems within any nation, and times of war or hardship are common, a stable political system is one that can withstand these occurrences without major societal upheaval and ongoing endurance of these circumstances.

The concept of political stability is a very controversial concept. It was argued that; a first broad definition refers to the absence of domestic civil conflict and widespread violence. In this sense, a country can be considered rid of instability when no systematic attacks on persons or property take place within its boundaries. Secondly, classic interpretation equates stability with government longevity. Thirdly, political stability draws on the lack of structural change, that is, the absence of internally or externally induced change in the basic configuration of a polity. In the same way, it was defined political stability to cover four dimensions; stable government, stable political system, internal law and external stability. It was also argued that, these four dimensions are sufficient for the explanation of political stability.

The International Consulting Firm Eurasia Group defined political stability as the capacity of a country's political system to withstand internal or external shocks. In this sense, a broad operational definition of political stability should take concepts and indicators into account such as human development (as measured by the UN Human Development Index); inequality (Gini index); political legitimacy (i.e. the more or less widespread support for the government, be it democratic or non-democratic); constraints on regime responsiveness (i.e. the economic constraints that governments encounter in meeting the requests of their citizens as expressed, for instance, by the total stock of a country's public debt); and regional/international integration (meaning, for instance, membership in international and regional organizations or the ratio of total foreign trade over GDP).

Economic growth as more output, while economic development implies both more output and changes in the technical and institutional arrangement by which it is produced and distributed. Friedman in his fashion defines growth as an expansion of the system in one or more dimension without a change in its structure, and development as an innovative process leading to the

structural transformation of a social system¹²⁸. Economic growth is defined as a persistent rise in the national income over a range of time of not less than five years. In economic growth theory, growth is usually calculated in real terms, that is, inflation-adjusted terms, in order to obviate the distorting effect of inflation hence, the use of real gross domestic product in most growth literature¹²⁹.

Economic growth is simply the percentage or proportionate increase in real income during a given period, usually a year. It is the rate at which gross domestic product (GDP) is during- positive growth or decreasing-negative. Economic growth occurs when there is a positive increase in economic variables, real or nominal, normally persisting over successive period¹³⁰. Economic growth has two tentacles, namely, extensive and intensive economic growth. Extensive economic growth is present when output of a nation, as measured by real GNP is expanding regardless of whether output per capita increases; while intensive economic growth is a situation in which there exist an increase in output per person or expansion in the availability of goods and services per capita. Thus, a nation may experience extensive economic growth even though the output per-capital is not rising¹³¹.

Economic growth is the increase in the market value of the goods and services produced by an economy over time¹³². It is conventionally measured as the percent rate of increase in real gross domestic product, or real GDP. Of more importance is the growth of the ratio of GDP to population (GDP per capita), which is also called per capita income. An increase in per capita income is referred to as intensive growth. GDP growth caused only by increases in population or territory is called extensive growth. Growth is usually calculated in real terms – i.e., inflation-adjusted terms – to eliminate the distorting effect of inflation on the price of goods produced. In

economics, "economic growth" or "economic growth theory" typically refers to growth of potential output, i.e., production at "full employment".

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Mancur Olson's Theory of Stability and Growth

Mancur Olson's theory of stability and growth explicitly claimed that, a complex relationship exists with economic growth¹³³. War, revolution, and other destabilizing events obviously disrupt economic activities in the short term and set the stage for more rapid growth in the medium term. Over the long term, however the theory asserts that political stability can be economically dysfunctional and cause growth to decelerate. Political stability has these economic effects because of the self-seeking activity of interest groups or "distributional coalitions."

Drawing from his earlier work on the individualistic basis of group behavior, Olson asserts that "stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective action over time. His major conclusion is that these "distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing economic conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth." Olson is careful to avoid suggesting, however, that chronic political instability is beneficial for economic growth, despite the fact that it might keep interest groups perpetually off balance. It is worth quoting his reasoning at some length¹³⁴.

Olson's theory implies that political stability and instability are dichotomous: instability must reach a threshold to disrupt distributional coalitions. Lesser degrees of instability may not trigger this effect at all. The discontinuous character of stability suggests a fourfold typology of political systems. Each type is expected to have a characteristic growth pattern. (1) The Chronically

Unstable states should exhibit persistently slow growth. (2) The Consistently Stable ones should grow relatively quickly but show a declining trend over time. (3) The Stabilizing political systems that are settling into a new pattern of political order should undergo a spurt in growth rate. (4) Finally, there are regimes that are becoming less stable.

Olson does not make an explicit prediction about these destabilizing systems, but the inference is that their growth rates would drop sharply. Many studies have established the relationship between political stability and economic growth in various ways however most of these studies link political instability rather than stability with economic growth.

For instance, using cross sectional analysis Barro found that economic growth is affected negatively by political instability as property rights are hardly implemented in unstable political situation. It was argued that unstable political situation discourages private investments which in turn affects economy negatively. Past research used three different variables to proxy for the political instability and found it causing a decrease in economic growth. There exists a negative relationship between political instability and productivity growth for a panel of 93 countries for the period of 1960-1990, though the relation was relatively weak¹³³.

Taking a panel data of four countries, the relationship between political instability and economic growth was examined. The study found out a negative relationship between the variables under study, Drazen identified two reasons for which political instability affects economic performance. Firstly, it creates uncertainty about future return from the investment of firms and private agents, which inhibits the society as a whole to accumulate physical capital. Again, there is a direct effect of political instability on productivity as it distorts the functions of the market¹³⁴.

Lower economic growth due to lower human capital accumulation owing to endemic political instability is the finding of a study of Latin American countries. Some researchers investigated the effects of various political instability factors on economic growth for selected Asian countries during 1990-2005. The study found close relationship between political stability and economic growth and the results showed that the role of political stability is more important than economic freedom.

Some scholars used GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample of 169 countries, and 5-year periods from 1960 to 2004 to investigate the link between political instability and economic growth, and found that lower growth is associated with higher degree of political instability¹³³. Country specific studies include the studies used ARDL framework to investigate the link between political instability and economic growth for Venezuela for the period of 1983-2000. It was founded that political instability affects growth negatively but not through the channel of investment¹³⁴.

Another study was to test the influence of political instability on UK economic growth for 1961-1997 using GARCH-M model. Their study revealed a negative effect on growth and positive effect on growth. Also, Campos and Karanasos used power ARCH framework with yearly data for Argentina for the period 1896-2000 and came up with the conclusion that both the informal political stability (assassinations and strikes) and the formal political stability (constitutional and legislative changes) have direct negative effect on economic performance¹³⁴. The effect of formal instability was stronger in the long run while the effect of informal instability was stronger in the short run in their study.

Some authors examined the relationship empirically for Greece and found strong negative association. Some authors reported that, political stability regardless of the level of democracy has the greatest effects on the country's economic growth. Few studies however found a negative relationship between political stability and economic growth¹³⁵.

It was found that for LDCs, political stability negatively affected economic growth. However, it was only to a little extent. Research investigated the direct effect of political stability on the economic performance of Bangladesh for the period of 1984-2009. Their study found out that, political stability has negative effect on economic performance in long term while the short run effect is positive¹³⁶.

2.3 Review of Empirical Studies

A study investigated the relationship between political stability, inflation, unemployment, GDP per capita, and vice versa. Previously this question has been studied in the relationship between political stability and each of these economic variables individually. With this study we can analyse if the poor economic performance in some countries is caused by unstable political institutions, that is why we find it important. Here we are analysing and comparing all of the economic variables at the same time and analysing which ones show the strongest relationships, or if the relationships are significant or not significant. In previous studies, the measurements that were used for political stability were: government changes, cabinet changes, index of economic freedom, or polity state. However, in this study, the political stability measurement used is the Political stability index and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, which measures the likelihood that the government will be destabilised. Additionally, differently, from previous

studies, Granger causality is used to understand causality between political stability and economic development variables¹³⁷.

A study analyzed the effect of political instability on economic growth in Ethiopia since 2004 using ARDL regression approach to identify the existence of this correlation and the channels through which this impact happened. The study found that political instability has a significant effect on economic growth and this impact is more significant through the direct channels more than the indirect effects through its effect on economic environment or investment and financial flows. The result suggested the existence of a direct impact of political stability on Ethiopian economic growth and to analyze this effect in more detail, the study estimate both long term and short-term impacts of political stability using ARDL bounds test approach of co-integration and error correction model. The results suggest that political stability have a significant impact on economic growth both in short and long term¹³⁸.

A study was set to investigate the impact of political instability and macroeconomic growth on the CO2 emission in Thailand. In addition to that the impact of CO2 emission and political instability on the real GDP is also observed. Thailand is the Asean country with highest value of political instability. Political instability also reduces reliability in forecasting that could result in minimal short-term policy making. Remarkable regional differences can be measured through political instability index by cabinet changes. The political instability index determines how many times a premier change in a year, in addition to this new staff is also replaced with 50% of the members of the cabinet. The ARDL is used on the data collected over the period of 27 years 1987 to 2014. The findings of the study have provided support to the proposed results. Numerous studies have been conducted and various theories have been illustrated, approved or rejected, consequently. The present study focuses upon the governments' political instability, and which

type of government is considerably more fragile or more stable. The study will be helpful for policymakers, legislators and researchers and understanding relationship between political instability, CO2 emission, Trade, energy consumption, and economic growth in an merging economy like Thailand¹³⁹.

A study examined the relationship between political instability and economic growth in both short and long-run, employing the Panel Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (PARDL) model. The nexus existing between the growth rate of countries and political instability has been subjected to increasing interest among academic scholars and policymakers in different contexts all around the globe. The current study examined the relationship between political instability and economic growth in both short and long-run, employing the Panel Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (PARDL) model. Through the efforts taken via the study to redefine the political instability and growth nexus in South Asia, it could be stated that despite the insignificant impact of political instability on economic growth in the short run, countries gain the capability in elevating the growth level by maintaining stable political regimes in the long run. The results suggested that there is an overall negative and also a significant linkage between political instability and the long-run growth rate. The holistic analysis highlighted that regulatory quality and civil liberties needed to be well ensured to attain economic growth in the long run as they showed a significant positive relationship with the growth of the South Asian region. The short-run analysis of the variables depicted that there is no strong linkage between the growth and instabilities in the political arena, as the majority of the proxies of political instability exhibited an insignificant relationship with economic growth except regulatory quality. The study suggested that since political instability and economic growth are deeply interconnected in the long run, it is important to restructure the political structure of majority of the countries in South

Asia where political instabilities and uncertainties are high. Also, the quality of the regulatory activities is vital to monitor continuously as it has strong impact towards the growth rates of the countries both in the long and short run¹⁴⁰.

Political instability and economic growth in Nigeria was assessed. Using annual data spanning from 1984 to 2020, the study analysed the effect of political instability on economic growth in Nigeria. To explore both the short and long-run relationship, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) technique is used. The cointegration test shows that political instability and economic growth are cointegrated. In the short run, the finding indicated that political instability negatively impacted economic growth. Likewise, in the long-run, political instability harms economic growth. Government expenditure contributed to economic growth in the short-run and long-run. Gross capital formation and financial development have detrimental effect on economic growth. Based on the findings from this study, there is a need for the government to address the frequent political instability to achieve the expected long-term growth in the economy. The study therefore recommended that the government must reduce the level of unemployment in Nigeria and also there is a need for the government to establish special organs or agencies that will maintain equal rights for all ethnic groups and religious groups, and hold a constructive dialogue. Those agencies will serve as regulators, which can promote peace and be able to devise a solution for the resolution of differences based on the needs of different ethnic groups and religious groups. The agencies must also be saddled with the responsibility of ensuring that various ethnic and religious groups are treated equally and benefit in the sharing of national wealth¹⁴¹.

A study aimed to examine the impact of political instability, food prices, and the crime rate on tourism development in Pakistan over the semi-annual data from 1995 to 2019. To achieve the

goal of this study, an asymmetric ARDL technique was used. The Asymmetric Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) aided in gaining access to both positive and negative shocks in political stability, crime rate, and food inflation. The findings showed that due to positive variations in the political conditions, tourism will increase by 0.12%, and if political instability prevails in the country, tourism will decrease by 23%. On the other hand, the magnitude of political stability is less than the negative variation of political instability on tourism. The study concludes that there is a considerable asymmetric association between political instability, crime rate, food prices, and tourism development in Pakistan. Based on these findings, it is advised that the government adopt proactive measures to establish and reinforce the political stability mechanism and terrorism control, as well as to improve the living standards of the general population. Moreover, establish a structure for adaptation efforts, focusing on the coordination of tourism expansion platforms for sustainable tourism in Pakistan to attract more foreigners for the sake of a surge in tourism proceeds¹⁴².

A study was set to investigate potential political barriers to fostering an egalitarian redistribution of income within an economy. It empirically establishes that countries characterized by the prevalence of political instability are less likely to adopt progressive income redistribution. Employing data for up to 143 countries between 1996 and 2015, I consistently find evidence that political instability has a negative impact on effective fiscal redistribution, captured by the difference between market and net income inequality. Further analyses indicate that the economic and statistical significance of the redistributive impact of political instability is stronger in non-democratic and highly diverse societies, and low-income economies. Hence, the detrimental effect of political uncertainty on effective fiscal redistribution appears to hold only in non-democratic, fragmented and low-income countries. The findings imply that reducing

political instability contributes to establishing an egalitarian redistribution of income, potentially leading to less income inequality¹⁴³.

A study examined the impacts of inbound tourism on economic growth by using panel system generalized methods of moment techniques for over 100 countries during the period 1995–2016. Using political instability as a moderator variable, the evidence shows that inbound tourism alone can lead to economic growth along with an increase in the standard control variables such as capital formation, education, and R&D expenditure. Nevertheless, a significant adverse effect on economic growth is revealed in the presence of medium to high political instability. The marginal impact of inbound tourism on economic growth with a high level of political instability is more detrimental in low-income countries than in their counterparts. Developing countries, which are heavily reliant on tourism, suffer more severe damages to economic growth when there is increasing political instability. Therefore, the analysis concludes that political stability is one of the key players in sustainable tourism development and economic growth¹⁴⁴.

A study analysed the impact of income inequality on Socio-Political Instability (hereinafter SPI) in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2018 with a sample of 47 countries. The study first presented the theoretical and empirical debate on income inequality and SPI. This literature review allows to measure SPI using the principal component analysis method and hierarchical clustering and partitioning to analyse the similarities and differences between countries from a multidimensional perspective. The study then estimated the SPI concerning income inequality and democracy. The findings are that assassinations are not linked to a regime's duration, and the duration of a regime reduces if coups d'état (successful or not) are rampant. Between democracy and income inequality, the former has 34 times more impact on SPI. GDP growth increases SPI

and education reduces SPI. Key Words: income inequality, democracy, socio-political instability, political regime, Sub-Saharan African countries¹⁴⁵.

A study investigated the nature of the relationship between political instability and economic growth in a selection of countries witnessing political instability including Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, Brazil, Turkey and Indonesia, during the era (1994-2019). Research methods include country case study analysis of macroeconomic indicators and an empirical analysis, to determine whether political instability plays a significant and important role in the different dimensions of economic growth measured by the Human Development Index, Gross Domestic Product GDP, and gross fixed capital formation. Findings prove a significant negative relationship between political instability and economic growth statistically and economically. Recommendations highlight the importance of transmission channels that enforce the significant negative relationship between political instability and economic development¹⁴⁶.

A study reviewed the use of the concept of political instability in economic research, the importance of which has been growing in recent years due to its potentially profound economic consequences. The article explores this concept by working through the definitions, dimensions, and methods of quantification. It also summarizes the results of the theoretical and empirical research on the economic implications of political instability. In contrast with the previous literature reviews, this article is not limited to the relationship between of political instability and one specific macroeconomic phenomenon but intends to summarize the findings of the research regarding its impact on a variety of economic phenomena investigated in the literature. The review covers the most influential publications in this area characterized by formulation of original research hypotheses, use of novel datasets, and development of innovative research methods. The study reviewed shows that political instability has a detrimental effect on

economic growth, investment, inflation, fiscal deficits, public debt, and the functioning of financial markets¹⁴⁷.

A study analyzed the effects of political instability on economic growth in Republic of the Congo. The Autoregressive Lagged Model (ARDL) was used in the study period from 1986 to 2017. The result obtained using an autoregressive lag model (ARDL) and annual data covering the period from 1986 to 2017, taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database for macroeconomic variables and from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for variables used in the construction of the political instability indicator show that political instability has a significant negative impact on economic growth in the Republic of the Congo, thus hindering economic growth. To this end, implications for strengthening policies to promote political stability were formulated. The study recommended a future study to be conducted in such a way as to disaggregate instability by focusing on mass instability (instability that corresponds to social movements such as strikes, demonstrations or riots)¹⁴⁸.

A study examined the key goals relationship between political instability and economic development, and how does political instability affect GDP and growth in the country? To this end, we have selected four variables for calculating their effect on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), such as political uncertainty, inflation rate, unemployment and public debt. The study used time - series data of 10 years (from 2010 to 2019) to draw the findings and analyze them through SPSS software. The study applied the techniques of Multiple Regression, ANOVA, Pearson and Correlation for data analysis. The result shows that debt and index growth rates are closely, correlated, while unemployment and inflation are negatively correlated. It must therefore accept the first and third hypothesis while denying, the second hypothesis, which indicates that GDP has a positive association with unemployment¹⁴⁹.

A study assessed the effect of political instability on economic growth in Iran between two revolutions (1907-1979). From the constitutional revolution (1907) to the Islamic revolution (1979), Iranian governments had been fluctuated sharply (longevity of government from 3 days to more than 12 years). This situation was the result of permanent competition between the king, parliament, government, interest groups, and also international political conditions. For this purpose of the, it defined 7 political instability indices and examine the best definition for political instability that was suitable for the Iranian condition in mentioned duration. Using the Solow growth model and OLS approach, the study find that when the longevity of government was smaller than four years, or the longevity of two of three sequential governments were smaller than one year, then Iran experienced political instability and it shrinks the economic growth. Finally, it find that when the government was politically stable, and institutional constraints on government by other branches were strong, the Iranian economy experienced positive and reliable economic growth. These conditions had been experienced in three periods of time: 1927-1939, 1955-1960, and 1964-1977. It means that the duration of 1907-1979 can be divided into two major parts: duration of political stability with remarkable economic growth (for three mentioned periods), and duration of political instability with high economic fluctuations or recession¹⁵⁰.

A study aimed to examine whether instability of the political environment (measured by the political stability index and duration of the chief executive in the office) significantly influences economic growth in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Political instability is often considered to have a negative influence on economic growth. Hence, the methodology used is a fixed effects model for panel data analysis where the dependent variable is the real growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The data covers the period from 2006 to 2016 for 13

CEE countries. Additionally, the study considered other macroeconomic variables, such as investment, inflation, human capital, trade openness, etc. The findings from the study indicate that the political stability index has a positive effect on economic growth, as expected and predicted in the literature. However, the indicator of the years the chief executive has been in the office has shown a negative effect. This effect appears to be weakly significant only for the second variable. These findings allowed us to conclude that the political stability index positively influences economic growth, while the years the chief executive stays in the office has a negative effect. Frequent changes in the cabinet can actually have a positive impact in transition countries characterised by corruption, meaning that the long stay of a chief executive in the office can lead to power abuse¹⁵¹.

A study assessed an economic impact of political instability with an evidence from Pakistan. The economy of Pakistan has been badly damaged by the political instability in the country. Despite its enormous economic resources, Pakistan's economy remained under dark shadows during most of its historical discourse. The economic indicators describe a significant relationship between politics and the economy of Pakistan. The following study, by reviewing previous studies, concludes that there is a negative relationship between political instability and economic growth in Pakistan from 2000 to 2019. Political instability flourished corruption and reduced the economic growth of the country. Moreover, a weak political system and government institutions could not resist the political tension in the country. The study finally concludes that political instability reduces economic growth in the country and economic growth reinforces political stability in the country and recommended that governmental bodies should establish the objectives of the economy and formulate smart policies accordingly¹⁵².

Corruption, political instability and economic growth using panel data. Corruption has been an issue of major political and economic significance in Africa. The expectation that democracy offers a potential route to dealing with the developmental bottleneck of the region, has led to a resurgence of interest in analyzing the nexus between corruption, political instability and economic growth. This study examined these crucial links for seven West African countries considered as the hot-spot of the region from 2002- 2018 using panel cointegration, panel dynamic OLS and causality. The results from the panel cointegration shows evidence of long run relationship between corruption, political instability and economic growth. The result of the panel dynamic OLS shows a negative and significant relationship between index of political instability and index of corruption. Also, the result from the Granger-causality shows evidence of unidirectional causality running from corruption and political instability to economic growth. Based on the result that emanated from this study, the study suggest a critical need for politically fragmented states with high level of political instability to address the underlying problem that paved the way for conflict through concerted effort. This can be achieved through the design and implementation of policies that will address structural imbalances in the socio-economic and political space of the countries experiencing conflict. Also, corruption can be curbed or minimize by enhancing the quality of governance through intense institutional reform for better economic outcomes¹⁵³.

The impact of political stability on economic performance in Africa was examined with evidence from 40 African countries. The economy, like all other human activities, would not be properly exercised in a place where there is a societal unsteadiness. Indeed, governments place the maintenance of political stability at the center of their interests. So, what is the impact of maintaining this stability upon the economic performance? To provide an answer to this question,

studied this dynamic on the most unstable continent on the planet, Africa. This study attempts to model the relationship between these two components under a macro-dynamic model, Autoregressive Delayed Model (ARDL), on a panel of forty African countries over a period of 20 years that goes from 1997 to 2017. The study's empirical results reveal that political stability has an impact on GDP per capita through investment. Moreover, the nature of this impact may depend on the location of an African country in the sample. Indeed, this model allows us to distinguish three categories of countries where the impact of stability on economic performance is either positive, negative or neutral. In the short run, political stability has a positive impact on GDP per capita across the Southern African region, while its impact is neutral for North African countries¹⁵⁴.

A study examined export, political stability, and growth in developing-8 countries. The relationship between growth in export and economic growth is still a current issue in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Besides, there are also non-economic factors that determine economic growth in a country, namely political stability. This study aims to examine the impact of export and political stability on economic growth in D8 member countries. The study on the development of the D8 country's economy is still minimal, so this study expected to be able to contribute to drafting policies for D8 member countries. By using panel regression, this study finds that there is no impact between export on economic growth. However, political stability had an impact on economic growth in developing-8 countries. This result implies that the government should increase political stability to accelerate growth. This result has several practical implications. First, trade between D-8 member countries must increase so that the benefits of joining D-8 members can felt in improving economic performance. Second, exports in D-8 member countries must be in the form of exports of goods that have high added value,

and not only exports in the form of raw materials. Third, each country must produce goods that have a competitive advantage. Fourth, political stability in a country must always be maintained so as not to have an impact on the decline in the country's economic performance¹⁵⁵.

A study examined the nexus between democracy and economic growth while taking into account the role of political stability, using dynamic panel data model estimated by means of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) over the period 1998 to 2011 for 17 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The empirical results showed that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between democracy and economic growth. Moreover, it was found that the effect of democracy on economic growth depends on the political stability. The results also indicated that there is important complementarity between political stability and democracy. In fact, political stability is a key determinant variable of economic growth. Eventually, democracy and political stability, taken together, have a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth. This finding suggests that, if accompanied by a stable political system, democracy can contribute to the economic growth of countries. Thus, the MENA governments should use policies to promote political stability in the region¹¹¹.

Political instability and organizational competitiveness sustainability in Nigeria. Nigeria happens to be one of the African countries that have been subjected to economic misery as a result of political instability. Political instability is becoming prevalent in our society today with its attendant consequences of lowering both the competitiveness of industries and the pace of economic development generally. The study focuses on achieving political stability which entails reduction in religious tensions, ethnic tensions, control of corruption, reduction in violent threats to government and changes in government terrorism, instability in government policies and regulations reduction, which helps in promoting economic growth. Business organizations have

been fingered as playing an important role in a country's economic growth and job creation; hence its sustainability is vital for a nation's wellbeing. The study explores external and internal factors that influence organizational competitiveness¹⁵⁶.

Corruption, social justice and political instability in Nigeria was assessed. Since the advent of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, hitherto long nurtured but suppressed feelings of neglect, marginalization, discrimination and domination by aggrieved communities, nationalities/sections of the society against the Nigerian state have burst in the open; and the political landscape has been inundated with separatist agitation movements, calls for resource control/true federalism and the restructuring of the polity. This has surreptitiously given vent to emergence of ethnic militia, escalation of youth restiveness, acts of kidnapping and hostage taking which have posed a threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria. This study is a modest contribution to the ongoing national discourse on governance and political instability in Nigeria. The study which is analytical adopts the rentier-state theory as its framework of analysis; it relies on secondary data sources and situates corruption at the epicenter of political instability in the country. The study argues that the clamour for restructuring of the Nigerian polity, separatist agitations and the crisis of governance in the country are a direct response to social injustice and the obstacles imposed on the nation's development through acts of corruption. The study recommends among other things that corruption should attract severe penalty¹⁵⁷.

A study focused on the effect of political instability on international investment and trade in Pakistan. The sample comprised of annual data for a period of 41 years (from 1976 to 2016). To test the long and short run relationships among the variables, ARDL model is applied and particularly Error Correction Model is used for short run analysis. To check the serial correlation in the ECM models, LM serial correlation test is applied. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) is also

utilized to test the stability of the ARDL models. The unit root of all the variables is also tested and it is found that all the variables are stationary either at level or at first difference. Findings conclude that political instability badly hampers both the international investment and trade in the long-run. Moreover, in short-run, the political instability significantly hinders the foreign portfolio investment and exports. No significant impact of political instability is found on foreign direct investment and imports in the long run¹⁵⁸.

A study was carried out to analyze the relationship between political instability and economic growth of Pakistan. Estimation has done by using time series data over the period of 1883-2016. The study analyze that unstable political economic conditions enforce negatively the economic growth, inflation and trade. In Pakistan political instability is on its peak from many decades. For the study of these fluctuations ARDL approach is used to check the relationship between selected variables. The concluded results based on empirical analysis that instable and poor political system with less efficient working skills of the administration will decrease the terms of trade of the economy, inflation will rise and unemployment will also be increased. The study concluded that government should take especial measures to stabilize the political conditions in Pakistan. For this purpose government should mobilize the legal measures in efficient way and also adopt policies for the welfare of the economy of Pakistan¹⁵⁹.

A study aimed to examine the consequences of interaction between political instability and foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth of 31 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to analyse one of the channels through which political instability affects economic growth. To achieve this objective, the study relies on a dynamic panel procedure and the Three Stage Least Squares Method to estimate a model of simultaneous equations over the period 1984-2015. The empirical results indicate that political instability affects economic growth directly and

indirectly through its impact on foreign direct investment. The study also highlights the simultaneous character of the relationship between political instability and the level of economic development in Sub-Saharan African countries. The results of the study then corroborate the idea that political instability hinders growth and thus calls for measures to improve the quality of political climate, which is one of the conditions necessary for a country's economy to benefit from foreign direct investment¹⁶⁰.

A study empirically probed the nexus between political instability and economic growth in Guyana using time-series data covering the period 1961 – 2018 and GARCH (1,1) models. The results show that changes in the Head of State (HOS) exert a positive and significant impact on real GDP growth rates, while strikes have the opposite effect on economic growth. Other proxies of political instability, such as political assassinations, riots, insurrection, and terrorism, are not significantly related to growth in real GDP because of the dispersed nature of economic activities and their negligible effect on production and productivity. When the proxies of political instability are added to the conditional variance equation, the results indicate that only changes in Head of State (HOS) moderate volatility in growth rates. This is probably due to transitory goodwill enjoyed by the incoming Head of State that serves to dampen ethnic tensions, reducing instability. The latter result indicates the importance of democratic turnover¹⁶¹.

A study investigated the possible relation between political stability and economic growth in Turkey and Central Asian Turkic Republics namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. By doing so, it will be easy to conclude the effect of political stability on transition economies such as Turkic countries. The study employed panel data analysis methods which take cross section dependency into account. In this regard, it employs cross section dependency test and unit root tests. In the second step, the study used panel

unit root co-integration test. At the end, the study employed panel VAR causality and Köse and Emir Mahmutoglu Panel causality tests. Results imply that there is a uni-directional causality running from gross domestic product per capita to political stability. In country based analysis, it is seen that the causation linkage running from political stability to economic growth occurs in only Azerbaijan. In other countries, there is no relationship between variables. According to results, it is possible to conclude that political stability is not a pre-condition of economic growth in Turkic economies, except Azerbaijan. On the other hand, political stability might be a pre-condition of another macroeconomic indicator such as inflation, trade openness and etc¹⁶².

A study explored the drivers of political instability and how political instability affects the economy in the context of Yemen. It is a low country income, although the critical location is at the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula with 200 islands. The country is rife with terrorists and lives under much socio-political strife. The study implemented an empirical model to test the correlations and multiple regression between political instability and economic growth. The study found that there is a high negative correlation between volatility and economic growth with negative correlations value. Furthermore, the study investigated the significance of the regression -enter method- stepwise method which show the existence of the impact of the political instability index conflict, and civil war in economic growth. The study gave recommendation for all local, regional, and international stakeholder's researcher fined Yemen's instability problems along the history linked to the political regime. Therefore, if there is a real intension for peace and stability in Yemen, we should find a political solution first. The economic file should not be discussed only after the political part¹⁶³.

A study examined the role of financial development, FDI, democracy and political instability on economic growth in West Africa. The study uses the dynamic fixed effects technique on the

secondary data obtained from 1996 to 2016. The empirical findings suggest that even though no significant relationship is established in the short run, the long-run coefficient of FDI is found to be significant and positive; a 1% increase in FDI inflow into the West African sub-region results in a 0.26% increase in economic growth. The coefficient of democracy is significant neither in the short run nor in the long run, but political instability is found to significantly and negatively impact the growth of the countries. Finally, the estimate of financial development–growth nexus follows the supply-leading hypothesis. This study affirms the proposition that FDI is a relevant means of technology and knowledge transfers, thus resulting in increasing returns to production as a result of productive spillovers, which drives the growth of the economy. Consequently, an efficient institution – where the rule of law, political stability and economic freedom are top priorities – is a key to accelerate the growth of the West African economy. Similarly, the validity of the supply-leading hypothesis in West Africa was confirmed. As such, by deepening the financial system, the growth of the subregion is propelled because an efficient financial system is a basis for sustainable development. The applicable policies are those that promote growth through FDI, financial development, democracy and political stability. The governments of West African countries are enjoined to promote policies that attract FDI into the subregion and promote financial sector credits so that economic performances may be enhanced. In addition, the governments of West African subregion should fully entrench democratic practices and enhance a stable and sustainable political environment. This will not only restore investor confidence but will also facilitate the inflow of FDI into the West African economy¹⁶⁴.

A study was carried out on growth and political instability using a theoretical approach with macro-dynamic simulation. This work is tending to use theoretical model (economic dynamic model), trying to explain the effect that Political Instability can have on the economic growth.

Political instability is considered by economists as a serious issue, detrimental to economic performance. While talking about political unrest, we then think about African countries. Political instability in African countries can therefore be caused by internal and external factors. Coming from a country (Central African Republic) that suffers a lot from Political Instability, this analysis will help to contribute to the stability in my country and in all countries around the world. This work shows the leverage of Political Instability the rate of change in the capital stock per unit of effective labor which is the discrepancy between the actual investment per unit of effective labor and the break-even investment, used to keep the capital stock stable. By including the propensity of government change, the result leads to a fall of capital change rate with a subsequent negative effect on the economic growth. This because with a high propensity of government change, the investment incentive will fade leading to a downward tendency of actual investment¹⁶⁵.

A study investigated political instability and economic growth in Africa. Political instability, especially when it is of a violent nature, diminishes the productive, as well as the transactional capacities of the economy. This has adverse consequences for investment and thus future economic growth, a situation which in turn creates a fragile socio-political environment. The relationship between political instability and economic growth flows in either direction; political instability resulting in low economic growth (PI → LEG) and low economic growth resulting in political instability (LEG → PI). From the PI → LEG point of view, political instability influences the latter through a number of channels including the tax system, government spending and fiscal deficit, and inflation, all of which affect the level of investment, and thus influence future economic growth rates. From the LEG → PI point of view, low economic growth rates create conditions favourable for political instability. Reviewing economic and

political stability data from 52 African countries for the period 1980 to 2013, the analysis demonstrates through some scenarios that higher and relatively more stable long-term (1980–2013) average growth rates correlate with lower levels of political instability in most of the pairwise comparisons of the countries. This is shown to be especially true for less resource-dependent countries. Empirical analyses of the data comprising all the countries under investigation find there to be a strong bi-directional direct relationship between political stability and the level of growth, and it is even more so the case for conflict-affected countries, unlike the non-conflict-affected countries. Further analyses using three-year averages of the data from 1981 to 2013 find that greater fluctuations in the growth rate adversely affect the level of political stability in especially conflict-affected countries, thus indicating a correlation between economic instability and political instability¹⁶⁶.

A study explored the impact of political instability on economic growth, income distribution and poverty. The estimates are obtained by applying Heteroscedasticity consistent OLS on a cross-section of 103 countries from 1984–2011. The study take into account alternative dimensions of political instability: formal, informal and military coups d'état. Formal and informal political instability has statistically significant and positive impact on poverty and inequality. Similarly the study find that direct effect of Coups D'état on both poverty and income inequality is insignificant, while its indirect effect (through economic growth) is significant. On the whole the study indicates political instability is detrimental to the process of economic growth, worsen income distribution and increases poverty. The study suggested that governments in highly politically instable countries need to address the root causes of political instability and try to make a stable political system and policies. Only then, countries can attain higher and sustained economic growth and lower poverty and inequality rates¹⁶⁷.

A study empirically probed the interdependence among corruption, political instability and sustainable development for a panel of 28 developing economies and disaggregated sample of lower-middle and upper-middle income economies for the time period 2000-2014. The three stage least square (3SLS) estimation revealed that corruption negatively affects sustainable development and political instability. The political instability impedes sustainable development and corruption. The sustainable development reduces political instability and corruption. It explains that corruption enhances political stability and political stability increases corruption. The disaggregated estimates of developing economies are almost same as aggregate estimates of developing economies, however political instability has statistically insignificant effect on sustainable development in upper-middle-income economies. To go forward for sustainable development, the elimination of corruption is imperative¹⁶⁸.

A study investigated the impact of political instability on the economic growth in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia for the period of 1996-2016. The main objective of the study is to examine the existence of the long-run relationship between different five political indicators and the growth of the economy. The study utilized panel data analysis, using annual data covering the period of 1996-2016, for the four selected Arab countries. The empirical results of the study, using the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), highlight the impact of different political instability indicators on economic growth. Moreover, these results indicate that there is a strong long-run relationship between the several political indicators upon the economic growth. More specifically, the results show that the control of the corruption and the rule of law indicators have the highest impact on the economic growth, while the regulatory quality has the lowest¹⁶⁹.

A study aimed to analyze the impact of political instability on economic growth by focusing on the case of Jordan, a small country located in the Middle East, which represents a highly political

instable region. Political instability may have far-reaching implications for economic performance. The analysis is performed by regressing different indicators for internal and external political instability on economic growth for the period from 1980 to 2015 using the fully modified ordinary least squares approach. The results point at a significant impact of political instability on the economic growth of the country in all the specifications considered; in particular, the analysis reveals a positive impact of external political instability indexed by border countries' political instability and a negative impact of internal political instability, as proxied by the number of crimes and cabinet changes. Further, regarding the effect of the level of freedom, the authors find evidence for the so-called conflict perspective. The study is original and relevant for two main reasons. First, it adds to the debate on the effects of political instability on economic growth, and hereby, disentangles the effects of internal and external political instability. Second, it makes an important contribution by focusing on the case of Jordan, which has received little attention in the literature on political instability so far, even though political instability is a constant threat to the country. The study concluded that there is a positive impact of external political instability (border instability) on economic growth, which has been attributed to the movement of capital (both physical and human) and international support and assistance¹⁷⁰.

A study investigated the effects of corruption and political instability on Ethiopian enterprises' innovativeness based on pooled data from 644 and 848 enterprises (manufacturing, retailing, and non-retailing services) surveyed in 2011 and 2015, respectively by the World Bank. Both descriptive statistics and structural equation modeling (SEM) were employed for the data analysis. The descriptive statistics results revealed the decline in Ethiopian enterprises' innovativeness during 2015 in comparison with 2011. Similarly, Internet access and training

provided to permanent employees somehow decrease over the study period, which are believed to be unfavorable for enterprises' innovativeness. The model results revealed significant greasing effects of corruption, power outage, time and capital budget for R&D activities, exposure to foreign markets, provision of formal training to permanent employees, and number of employees with high school education on Ethiopian enterprises' innovativeness. However, political instability has significant negative effects on enterprises' innovativeness in the country. The study implied that quality of labor, access to training and foreign markets, and political stability are covariates that seek special attention of enterprises and other concerned parties to enhance innovativeness¹⁷¹.

Economic swings, political instability and migration in Kyrgyzstan was examined. Individual-level migration responses to economic fluctuations and political instability remain poorly understood. Using nationally representative survey data from Kyrgyzstan, the study look at variations in levels and propensities of internal and temporary international migration and relate them to changes in the economic and political environment in that Central Asian nation in the first decade of the century. A multinomial event history model predicting yearly risks of both types of migration detects no clear association of internal migration risks with episodes of heightened political instability but shows a decrease in those risks in response to the strongest economic shock of the observation period. In comparison, international migration risks, while also insensitive to political turmoil, appear to increase at the time of the most pronounced economic downturn. The results also point to instructive patterns in migration propensities by type of area of residence, education, gender, and ethnicity. These findings are interpreted in light of complex intersections of demography with politics, economy, and culture in this transitional Eurasian setting¹⁷².

A study examined the extent of the effect of control of corruption and political (in)stability on economic development in African countries. The study employed System General Method of Moment (GMM) framework on recent pooled of data from thirty-seven African countries over a period of 1996 and 2016. The study found evidence of political instability though not statistically significant and ineffective control of corruption in African countries. The study also found that simultaneous implementation of policies towards ensuring political stability and effective control of corruption are not complementary and has more negative impact on development in the region. Both policies are substitute in the context of African economy, and hence should be pursued through sequential reforms. This study also found that continuous implementation of the current policies towards having both political stability and effective corruption control may not have positive impact on development in Africa. The study strongly supports sequential policy reform in the region and also recommends review of the ongoing policies towards ensuring effective control of corruption in the region¹⁷³.

A study investigated how the political instability in 2009 affected the Madagascar vanilla exports. Madagascar vanilla sector has experienced robust growth over the past decade which contributes to both the economy and the job creation, especially in northeast region where Vanilla was planted. However, this growth faced a serious problem after the political instability in 2009. This study shows that the suspension of Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), due to the political instability, had a large negative impact on vanilla exports. To estimate its impacts on vanilla exports, the international trade data permit us to isolate those impacts from various factors between Madagascar and other vanilla exporting countries by using the different-in-different (DID) technique. We take the sample of 2007 to 2011 by using Tobit model with random effects in addition to OLS with fixed effect in order to observe how far political

instability hampers the vanilla exports in Madagascar. Through analysis, findings revealed that the political instability has a negative effect on economic growth in terms of Madagascar vanilla exports¹⁷⁴.

A study contributed to the literature on political instability and economic growth by specifically investigating the impact of political instability on the economic growth of member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). West Africa is regarded as the riskiest sub-region within the African continent. To achieve this objective, this study employed panel data techniques (fixed effects and generalised method of moments) on a sample of 15 ECOWAS member countries for the period 2005–2012. The findings from the analyses showed that terrorism, poor governance, social unrest, youth unemployment, death rate and natural resource rent have negative relationships with economic growth. The findings and policy implications deduced from this study could not have been any timelier considering the recent escalation of instability in West African countries and their fragile growth prospects¹⁷⁵.

A study aimed at examining the empirical relations between economic growth and a broad group of political instability factors including corruption, government instability, internal and external conflicts, religious and ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. Moreover, one of the main objectives of the study is to explore the effects of serious problems such as political instability and corruption on economic growth for a panel of OECD countries by using the system-GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimator during the period 1984-2012. The findings confirm most of the literature that political instability is negatively associated with economic growth. The study found strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that corruption negatively affects economic growth. The study presents strong evidence in favor of the view that government stability and internal and external conflicts are obstacles for rapid

economic growth. However, the results of system-GMM estimation indicate that democratic accountability, ethnic and religious tensions and bureaucracy quality have no statistically significant impact on economic growth of OECD countries¹⁷⁶.

A study explored the relationship between political instability and economic growth in Egypt. The literature claims there is a relationship between political instability and economic performance. Empirical studies, however, show different results for different world regions, different countries, and different periods. Studies concerning the effect of political instability on the economic growth path are rich with cases from several countries, but do not include developing countries, such as Egypt. This study investigates the robust relationship between economic growth in Egypt and political instability in the last five decades. The study examined time-series data from 1972 to 2013, using the Cointegration approach to determine the short-term and long-term relationships. Consequently, the study used an Error-Correction Model (ECM) to estimate the relationship between economic growth and political instability in Egypt. The results show that the impact of political instability on economic growth is negative and significant for all indexes of political instability used in the case of Egypt. The results have implications for policymakers who are planning for the economic growth of the country in the short- and long-term. The study recommended that policymakers should widen their focus from only economic variables to include political and institutional variables that affect economic growth. In sum, the policymakers could enhance the economic growth in Egypt if they decrease the negative impact of political instability. This should start by increasing the political transparency, free elections, and a high level of political rights. Moreover, the level of democracy should increase, regime durability should decline, years a chief executive stays in charge should be minimized, and bureaucracy should be augmented to enhance the economic performance in Egypt¹⁷⁷.

A study empirically investigated the relationship between political stability and economic growth in Nigeria for the period 1999 to 2014 using the ARDL model approach. The result revealed a positive and significant relationship between political stability and economic growth both in the long run and in the short run. The study concludes that a stable political environment is an indispensable element for economic growth and therefore, the government of Nigeria should as a matter of necessity, identify the root causes of unstable political environment and try to mitigate its effects so as to ensure sustained growth in Nigeria¹³⁴.

A study assessed the relevance of political stability on foreign direct investment (FDI) and the relevance of FDI on economic growth, in three panels. The first panel contains 11 very small economies; the second contains five well-developed and politically stable economies with highly positive FDI net inflows, while the third is a panel with economies that are prone to political violence or targeted by the terrorist attacks. The employ a Granger causality test and implement a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework within the panel setting. In order to test the sensitivity of the results and avoid robust errors, it employ an ARDL model for each of the countries within every panel. Based upon the results, it was concluded that there is a long-term relationship between political stability and FDI for the panel of small economies, while it find no empiric evidence of such a relationship for both panels of larger and more developed economies. Similarly to the original hypothesis of Lucas (1990), the study find that FDI outflows tend to go towards politically less stable countries. On the other hand, the empiric methodology employed did not find such conclusive evidence in the panels of politically more developed countries or in the small economies that this study observes¹⁷⁸.

2.4 Conceptual Framework



Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework on Political Instability and Socio-Economic Development

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2023

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2.5 Summary of Gap in Literature Reviewed

From the above review of the literature, it appears that at the theoretical level, the existence of an inverse relationship between political instability and economic growth is unquestionably recognized. However, there are still divergences as to how political instability affects economic growth. On the empirical side, the work is also divergent. Some argue that the results show favorable effects, while others show the opposite. As for the notion of political instability, it is also approached in different ways. To the best of our knowledge, literature that linked country wide experience of Nigeria in the fourth republic are still scarce. Only few studies devoted scant attention to linking political instability and economic growth in Nigeria¹⁵⁶. Thus, the contribution of this study lies in the fact that it enriches the socio-economic literature by treating the effects of political instability and socio-economic growth in the case of Nigeria on the one hand and the use of empirical technique which is less used in the analysis of the effects of political instability on growth as presented in the empirical review previously presented.

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Chapter Three

Methodology

This chapter describes the methodology framework to be used in attaining the stated objectives of the study and how the research hypothesis is determined. This chapter focuses on the procedures of data gathering and analysis employed in the study.

3.1 Research Design

This research adopted a cross-sectional survey to explore the effect of political instability and socio-economic development in Nigeria. The survey method involved the use of structured questionnaire, which was designed to obtain data from respondents on the instrumentation of effect of political instability and socio-economic development in Nigeria. The cross-sectional survey research design assisted to access the determined sample at the specific time without changing the behavior or trying to make casual statements¹.

3.2 Population of the Study

The study population cuts across government workers employed in offices located under Ibadan Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, and South west local government area, Oyo state, Nigeria. The government workers employed in local government offices were considered in this study due to the nature of the study; that most political instability issues emanate from and affects the grass root level the most².

3.3 Sample and Sampling Technique

In this study, convenience sampling technique was adopted. Due to the nature of this study, 400 employees of the above stated local government will be sampled since the socio-economic effects of instabilities are more felt by the people at the grass root.

3.4 Description of the Research Instrument

Questionnaire was adopted in this study as the instrument of data gathering. The purpose of using a questionnaire for a survey is because of the direct response, feedback and the literacy level of the proposed respondents. Furthermore, the copies of the questionnaire were retrieved within a short period of time and with ease. For the purpose of this study, the questionnaire was divided into three sections, A, B, and C. Section A covers the information about the respondent's bio data, which includes; gender, marital status and education/professional qualification. Section B and C will be used to elicit response from respondents in order to provide answers to the research questions. The questionnaire will be drafted using the 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from very low extent-1, low extent-2, moderate extent-3, high extent-4, and very high extent-5.

The variables of this study are operationalized as follows:

$$Y = f(X)$$

Y = Dependent Variable

X = Independent Variable

Where: Y = Socio economic development

X = Political instability

Functional relationships and equations:

$$Y = f(X) \dots\dots\dots f(i)$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta X + \mu \dots\dots\dots \text{eq. (i)}$$

Where: α = the constant of the equation

β = the coefficient of the independent variable

μ = the stochastic value/error term

X = Independent variable indices

Y = Dependent variable

3.5 Validity of the Research Instrument

The validity of research instrument was established through content validity. The questionnaire was checked and approved by researchers' supervisor as well as some other experts in the field. This will help to establish the face and content validity. The reliability of the research instrument was ascertained using Cronbach's Alpha and the items of the research instruments was deemed reliable should they meet reliability threshold of 0.7.

3.6 Reliability of the Research Instrument

The reliability of a research instrument concerns the extent to which the instrument yields the same results on repeated trials. Reliability of the research instrument is the measure of the dependability and the internal consistency of the items of the instrument of data collection. The data required for this study were gathered from questionnaires administered directly by the researcher with responses from the respondents, thus, the data was found suitable, appropriate and reliable for this study. The questionnaire was found to be appropriate for this study based on the level of originality, confidentiality and non-biases on the responses of the respondents.

3.7 Administration of the Research Instruments

This research utilised primary data. The primary data were obtained from the employees of selected local government areas using structured questionnaires, which were distributed to respondents and administered. To obtain the data, copies of the questionnaire were distributed to

the government workers employed in offices located under Ibadan Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, and Southwest local government area, Oyo state.

3.8 Method of Data Collection

The sample size under study are literate and can fill the questionnaire with little assistance from the research assistance on the field. Seventy percent (70%) of the questionnaires were returned after being filled while 25% of the instrument were collected a few days after. About 5% of the questionnaires could not be traced or retrieved from respondent.

3.9 Method of Data Analysis

The data was analysed with the use of both descriptive and inferential statistical method. Descriptive statistics analysis such as charts, frequency and percentages were used to present demographic data and inferential statistical technique were used to evaluate the effects and relationship between the variables. Regression analysis was used to analyze the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable.

Endnotes

1. K.J. Sileyew, *Research design and methodology*. Cyberspace, 2019. pp.1-12.
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Chapter Four

Results and Discussion of Findings

This chapter is focused on the descriptive analysis of the data that was obtained for the research for the research work. The analysis will be done based on the respective research questions and research hypothesis.

4.1 Presentation of Data

Table 4.1: Analysis of Response rate to Administered Questionnaire

	Frequency	Percentage
Number of questionnaires correctly filled, returned, or collected.	339	84.8
Number of questionnaires wrongly filled by respondents	61	15.2
Total number of questionnaires administered	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Interpretation of Result

Table 4.1 demonstrates that 400 questionnaires were distributed throughout the course of this study to collect data. The researcher collected a total of 339 questionnaires from the respondents, representing an accuracy rate of (84.8%), on which the study was based. However, this demonstrates that the majority of the respondents took part in the investigation, and as a result, conclusions from the study can be extrapolated with greater accuracy than average. However, 61 surveys—or 15.2%—were either incorrectly completed or misplaced.

Table 4.2: Background Information of Respondents

Age	25-35years	167
		49.3%
	36-45years	158
		46.6%
	46-55years	11
		3.2%
	56 years and above	3
		0.9%
	Total	339
		100.0%
Gender	Male	276
		81.4%
	Female	63
		18.6%
	Total	339
		100.0%
Highest level of Secondary education	Secondary education/OND	0
		0.0%
	BSc/BA/BTech/BEd	12
		3.5%
	MSc/MA/MTech/MEd	138
		40.7%
	PHd	189
		55.8%
	Total	339
		100.0%
Local government	Ibadan South West	107
		31.6%
	Ibadan North West	109
		32.2%
	Ibadan South East	37
		10.9%
	Ibadan North East	86
		25.4%
	Total	339
		100.0%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Interpretation of Result

From the table above, 167 respondents representing 49.3% admitted that they are between 25 to 35 years of old, 158 respondents representing 46.6% were between 36-45 years, 11 respondents representing 3.2% were between 46-55 years while 3 respondents representing 0.9% were from 56 years and above. 278 respondents representing 81.4% are male while 63 respondents representing 18.6% are female. 12 respondents representing 3.5% admitted that they possess BSc/BA/BTech/BEd, 138 respondents representing 40.7% possess MSc/MA/MTech/MEd while 189 respondents representing 55.8% have PHd. 125 respondents representing 36.9% were from Ibadan South West, 114 respondents representing 33.6% were from Ibadan North West, 114 respondents representing 33.6% were from Ibadan South East while 100 respondents representing 29.5% were from Ibadan North East.

4.2 Presentation of Research Questions

Research Question One: To what extent is Nigeria politically instable?

This section will present the result of the analysis in terms of frequencies and percentages. The result will be presented according to the sections of the questionnaire. The analysis of data for this study will be done according to the objectives and research questions.

Table 4.3: Political Instability

	Very low	Low	Modera te	High	Very high	Total
Inclusive political participation	100 (29.5%)	199 (58.7%)	35 (10.3%)	4 (1.2%)	1 (0.3%)	339 (100.0%)
Trust in governmental institutions	129 (38.1%)	180 (53.1%)	20 (5.9%)	10 (2.9%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Efficient political parties	138 (40.7%)	159 (46.9%)	26 (7.7%)	14 (4.1%)	2 (0.6%)	339 (100.0%)
Supremacy of law	154 (45.4%)	175 (51.6%)	8 (2.4%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Reduced political violence	189 (55.8%)	134 (39.5%)	15 (4.4%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Absence of strikes and protests in government institutions	161 (47.5%)	165 (48.7%)	12 (3.5%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Presence of effective checks and balance	160 (47.2%)	152 (44.8%)	23 (6.8%)	3 (0.9%)	1 (0.3%)	339 (100.0%)
Absence of politically induced riots	148 (43.7%)	175 (51.6%)	15 (4.4%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Absence of nepotism	193 (56.9%)	133 (39.2%)	12 (3.5%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Strong political culture	138	180	19	2	0	339

	(40.7%)	(53.1%)	(5.6%)	(0.6%)	(0.0%)	(100.0%)
Decreasing level of insecurity and terrorism	149 (44.0%)	166 (49.0%)	20 (5.9%)	4 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Reduction of corruption at various levels of government	148 (43.7%)	166 (49.0%)	21 (6.2%)	4 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Absence of crime/ social unrest	187 (55.2%)	148 (43.7%)	2 (0.6%)	1 (0.3%)	1 (0.3%)	339 (100.0%)
Equitable and inclusive representation of the	191 (56.3%)	127 (37.5%)	18 (5.3%)	2 (0.6%)	1 (0.3%)	339 (100.0%)
Transparency in government dealings	229 (67.6%)	89 (26.3%)	17 (5.0%)	4 (1.2%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Free and fair electoral process	205 (60.5%)	122 (36.0%)	12 (3.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Reduction in governmental crises	166 (49.0%)	158 (46.6%)	13 (3.8%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Interpretation of Result

The descriptive outcome of political instability is shown in Table 4.3. According to the data from question one in the table above, 100 respondents, or 29.5%, agreed to a very low extent that political participation is inclusive in Nigeria, 199 respondents, or 58.7%, agreed to a low extent,

35 respondents, or 10.3%, agreed to a moderate extent, 4 respondents, or 1.2%, agreed to a high extent, and 1 respondent, or 0.3%, agreed to a very high extent.

In response to question two, it was discovered that 129 respondents, or 38.1%, agreed to a very low extent that there is trust in governmental institutions in Nigeria, 180 respondents, or 53.1%, agreed to a low extent, 20 respondents, or 5.9%, agreed to a moderate extent, and 10 respondents, or 2.9%, agreed to a high extent. However, none of the respondents agreed to a very high extent.

In response to question three, 138 respondents, or 40.7%, said they agreed to a very low degree that political parties are effective in Nigeria, 159 respondents, or 46.9%, said they agreed to a low degree, 26 respondents, or 7.7%, said they agreed to a moderate degree, 14 respondents, or 4.1%, said they agreed to a high degree, and 2 respondents, or 0.6%, said they agreed to a very high degree. Question 4 indicates that 154 respondents, or 45.4%, agreed with Question four tells that 154 respondents representing 45.4% agreed to a very low extent that supremacy of law is in existence in Nigeria, 175 respondents representing 51.6% agreed to a low extent, 8 respondents representing 2.4% agreed to a moderate extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question five revealed that 189 respondents representing 55.8% agreed to a very low extent there is reduced political violence in Nigeria, 134 respondents representing 39.5% agreed to a low extent, 15 respondents representing 4.4% agreed to a moderate extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a high extent, while none agreed to a very high extent. Question six from the above table reveals that 161 respondents representing 47.5% agreed to a very low extent that there is absence of strikes and protests in government institutions, 165 respondents representing 48.7% agreed to a low extent, 12 respondents representing 3.5% agreed to a moderate extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question seven shows that 160

respondents representing 47.2% agreed to a very low extent that there is presence of effective checks and balance in the Nigerian political space, 152 respondents representing 44.8% agreed to a low extent, 23 respondents representing 6.8% agreed to a moderate extent, 3 respondents representing 0.9% agreed to a high extent while 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a very high extent. Question eight reveals that 148 respondents representing 43.7% agreed to a very low extent that there is absence of politically induced riots, 175 respondents representing 51.6% agreed to a low extent, 15 respondents representing 4.4% agreed to a moderate extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question nine tells that 193 respondents representing 56.9% agreed to a very low extent that there is absence of nepotism, 133 respondents representing 39.2% agreed to a low extent, 12 respondents representing 3.5% agreed to a moderate extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question ten reveals that 138 respondents representing 40.7% agreed to a very low extent that a strong political culture exists in Nigeria, 180 respondents representing 53.1% agreed to a low extent, 19 respondents representing 5.6% agreed to a moderate extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question eleven in the table above, reveals that 149 respondents representing 44% agreed to a very low extent that there is decreasing level of insecurity and terrorism in the country, 166 respondents representing 49% agreed to a low extent, 20 respondents representing 5.9% agreed to a moderate extent, 4 respondents representing 1.2% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question twelve from the table above reveals that 148 respondents representing 43.7% agreed to a very low extent that there is reduction of corruption at various levels of government, 166 respondents representing 49% agreed to a low extent, 21 respondents representing 6.2% agreed to a moderate extent, 4

respondents representing 1.2% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question thirteen reveals that 187 respondents representing 55.2% agreed to a very low extent that there is absence of crime/ social unrest, 148 respondents representing 43.7% agreed to a low extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a moderate extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a high extent while 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a very high extent. Question fourteen shows 191 respondents representing 56.3% agreed to a very low extent that there is equitable and inclusive representation of the populace at all levels of the government, 127 respondents representing 37.5% agreed to a low extent, 18 respondents representing 5.3% agreed to a moderate extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a high extent while 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a very high extent. Question fifteen revealed that 229 respondents representing 67.6% agreed to a very low extent that there is transparency in government dealings, 89 respondents representing 26.3% agreed to a low extent, 17 respondents representing 5% agreed to a moderate extent, 4 respondents representing 1.2% agreed to a high extent, while none agreed to a very high extent. Question sixteen from the above table reveals that 205 respondents representing 60.5% agreed to a very low extent that there is a free and fair electoral process, 122 respondents representing 36% agreed to a low extent, 12 respondents representing 3.5% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question seventeen shows that 166 respondents representing 49% agreed to a very low extent that there is reduction in governmental crises, 158 respondents representing 46.6% agreed to a low extent, 13 respondents representing 3.8% agreed to a moderate extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent.

From the findings of the descriptive analysis, it is evident that majority of the respondents believe that most of the factors listed in the questionnaire item under political instability are

features of the Nigerian political environment to a very low extent. Hence, it can be concluded that the Nigerian political environment is highly unstable in political terms.

Research Question Two: What is the extent of Socioeconomic Development in Nigeria?

Table 4.4: Socioeconomic Development

	Very low	Low	Moderate	High	Very high	Total
Stable inflation rate	178 (52.5%)	129 (38.1%)	22 (6.5%)	10 (2.9%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Increasing foreign direct investment	172 (50.7%)	140 (41.3%)	17 (5.0%)	9 (2.7%)	1 (0.3%)	339 (100.0%)
Good standard of living	137 (40.4%)	169 (49.9%)	27 (8.0%)	6 (1.8%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Decreasing poverty rate	102 (30.1%)	171 (50.4%)	53 (15.6%)	12 (3.5%)	1 (0.3%)	339 (100.0%)
Availability of and access to quality education	167 (49.3%)	170 (50.1%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Availability of and access to gainful employment opportunities to the populace	182 (53.7%)	155 (45.7%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Increased life expectancy	176 (51.9%)	162 (47.8%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Active security of lives	167	171	1	0	0	339

and properties of the populace	(49.3%)	(50.4%)	(0.3%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(100.0%)
Availability of and access to relative social support for the vulnerable	169 (49.9%)	169 (49.9%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Availability of and access to affordable medical care	227 (67.0%)	110 (32.4%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Good quality of life	220 (64.9%)	117 (34.5%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Healthy business environment	256 (75.5%)	83 (24.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Increased income level	206 (60.8%)	133 (39.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Increased literacy level	180 (53.1%)	158 (46.6%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Availability of and access to social amenities and infrastructural facilities	197 (58.1%)	121 (35.7%)	10 (2.9%)	2 (0.6%)	9 (2.7%)	339 (100.0%)
Gender equality at various levels	231 (68.1%)	93 (27.4%)	13 (3.8%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	339 (100.0%)
Availability of and access to civil rights	179 (52.8%)	123 (36.3%)	14 (4.1%)	13 (3.8%)	10 (2.9%)	339 (100.0%)

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Interpretation of Result

Table 4.4 shows the descriptive result of socioeconomic development. Question one reveals that 178 respondents representing 52.5% agreed to a very low extent that the country has a Stable inflation rate, 129 respondents representing 38.1% agreed to a low extent, 22 respondents representing 6.5% agreed to a moderate extent, 10 respondents representing 2.9% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question two tells that 172 respondents representing 50.7% agreed to a very low extent that foreign direct investment in the country is increasing, 140 respondents representing 41.3% agreed to a low extent, 17 respondents representing 5% agreed to a moderate extent, 9 respondents representing 2.7% agreed to a high extent while 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a very high extent. Question three reveals that 137 respondents representing 40.4% agreed to a very low extent that there is a good standard of living, 169 respondents representing 49.9% agreed to a low extent, 27 respondents representing 8% agreed to a moderate extent, 6 respondents representing 1.8% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question four from the table above reveals that 102 respondents representing 30.1% agreed to a very low extent that poverty rate in the country is decreasing, 171 respondents representing 50.4% agreed to a low extent, 53 respondents representing 15.6% agreed to a moderate extent, 12 respondents representing 3.5% agreed to a high extent while 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a very high extent. Question five reveals that 167 respondents representing 49.3% agreed to a very low extent on the availability of and access to quality education, 170 respondents representing 50.1% agreed to a low extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question six shows 182 respondents representing 53.7% agreed to a very low extent on the availability of and access to gainful employment opportunities to the populace, 155 respondents representing 45.7% agreed to a low extent, 2 respondents

representing 0.6% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question seven tells that 176 respondents representing 51.9% agreed to a very low extent on increased life expectancy, 162 respondents representing 47.8% agreed to a low extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question eight revealed that 167 respondents representing 49.3% agreed to a very low extent on active security of lives and properties of the populace, 171 respondents representing 50.4% agreed to a low extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent, while none agreed to a very high extent. Question nine from the above table reveals that 169 respondents representing 49.9% agreed to a very low extent on availability of and access to relative social support for the vulnerable, 169 respondents representing 49.9% agreed to a low extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question ten shows that 227 respondents representing 67% agreed to a very low extent on availability of and access to affordable medical care, 110 respondents representing 32.4% agreed to a low extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question eleven reveals that 220 respondents representing 64.9% agreed to a very low extent on good quality of life, 117 respondents representing 34.5% agreed to a low extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question twelve tells that 256 respondents representing 75.5% agreed to a very low extent on healthy business environment, 83 respondents representing 24.5% agreed to a low extent, none agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question thirteen reveals that 206 respondents representing 60.8% agreed to a very low extent on

increased income level, 133 respondents representing 39.2% agreed to a low extent, none agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question fourteen reveals that 180 respondents representing 53.1% agreed to a very low extent on increased literacy level, 158 respondents representing 46.6% agreed to a low extent, 1 respondents representing 0.3% agreed to a moderate extent, none agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question fifteen from the table above reveals that 197 respondents representing 58.1% agreed to a very low extent on availability of and access to social amenities and infrastructural facilities, 121 respondents representing 35.7% agreed, 10 respondents representing 2.9% agreed to a moderate extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a high extent while 9 respondents representing 2.7% agreed to a very high extent. Question sixteen reveals that 231 respondents representing 68.1% agreed to a very low extent on gender equality at various levels, 93 respondents representing 27.4% agreed to a low extent, 13 respondents representing 3.8% agreed to a moderate extent, 2 respondents representing 0.6% agreed to a high extent while none agreed to a very high extent. Question seventeen shows 179 respondents representing 52.8% agreed to a very low extent on availability of and access to civil rights, 123 respondents representing 36.3% agreed to a low extent, 14 respondents representing 4.1% agreed to a moderate extent, 13 respondents representing 3.8% agreed to a high extent while 10 respondents representing 2.9% agreed to a very high extent.

From the findings of the descriptive analysis, it is evident that majority of the respondents believe that most of the factors listed in the questionnaire item under socioeconomic development are existent in the country socioeconomic environment to a very low extent. Hence, it can be concluded that the Nigeria is not developing socioeconomically and more attention needs to be paid towards the factors that influences that aspect of the country's development.

Research Question Three: Is there any relationship between political instability and socioeconomic development in Nigeria?

Table 4.5: Relationship between political instability and socioeconomic development

Correlations		Political Instability	Socio-Economic Development
Political Instability	Pearson Correlation	1	.447**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	339	339
Socio-Economic Development	Pearson Correlation	.447**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	339	339

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Interpretation of Result

The correlation result table provides information on the Pearson Correlation value and significance value, which can be used to determine how well a regression model fits the data. The R value which is pegged at 0.447 indicates that 44.7% correlation exists between political instability and socioeconomic development. This shows the existence of a moderate positive correlation between political instability and socioeconomic development. The significance value is an indicator of the statistical significance of the relationship. A significance value of 0.000

therefore shows that the relationship between political instability and socioeconomic development is statistically significant.

Research Question Four: What effect does political instability have on the socio-economic development in Nigeria?

Table 4.6: Effect of Political Instability on Socioeconomic Development

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.447 ^a	.200	.198	3.36697

a. Predictors: (Constant), Political Instability

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	955.977	1	955.977	84.327	.000 ^b
	Residual	3820.400	337	11.336		
	Total	4776.378	338			

a. Dependent Variable: Socio-Economic_Dev

b. Predictors: (Constant), Pol- Instability

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	50.520	2.811			17.972	.000

Pol-Instability	.344	.037	.447	9.183	.000
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a. Dependent Variable: Socio-Economic_Dev

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Interpretation of Result

The table 4.6 above shows the model summary of the relationship between political instability and socio-economic development. The R value which is equal to 0.447 shows when converted that 44.7% correlation exist between socioeconomic development and political instability. This implies that as the political instability increases the socioeconomic development will also improve. The R² value which is 0.200 shows when converted that political instability has 20% effect on socioeconomic development. The adjusted R² which is 0.198 shows the true explanatory power of the effect of political instability on socioeconomic development when errors and discrepancies have been taken into account. Thus, there is a positive but weak effect of political instability on socioeconomic development. From the ANOVA table, it is evident that the effect of political instability is statistically significant at a value of 0.000.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

Building on the theoretical postulations of Mancur Olson's theory of stability and growth that explicitly claimed that, a complex relationship exists with economic growth. War, revolution, and other destabilizing events obviously disrupt economic activities in the short term and set the stage for more rapid growth in the medium term¹. Over the long term, however the theory asserts that political stability can be economically dysfunctional and cause growth to decelerate. Political stability has these economic effects because of the self-seeking activity of interest groups or "distributional coalitions". Drawing from his earlier work on the individualistic basis of group behavior, Olson asserts that "stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to

accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective action over time². His major conclusion is that these "distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing economic conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth"³. Olson is careful to avoid suggesting, however, that chronic political instability is beneficial for economic growth, despite the fact that it might keep interest groups perpetually off balance. It is worth quoting his reasoning at some length.

Finding from this study revealed that:

- i. Nigerian political environment is highly unstable in political terms
- ii. Nigeria is not developing socioeconomically and more attention needs to be paid towards the factors that influences that aspect of the country's development.
- iii. There is a relationship between political instability and socio-economic development in Nigeria
- iv. There is a positive but weak effect of political instability on socio-economic development

Endnotes

1. A. H. Tabassam, S. H. Hashmi & F. U. Rehman, *Nexus between Political Instability and Economic Growth in Pakistan*. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 230, 2016, 325-334.
2. G. Mustafa, A. Nawaz & M. Rubab, *The Impact of Political Instability on Economic Growth in Pakistan: Application of ARCH Model*. *Pakistan Social Sciences Review*, 1(2), 2017, 91-102.
3. Y. Fenetahun, Y. You, X. Xu, V. Nzabarinda & Y. Wang, *The Impact of Political Instability on Sustainable Rangeland Management: A Study of Borana Rangeland, Southern Ethiopia*. *Agriculture*, 352, 2021.

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Chapter Five

Conclusion

This chapter is the chapter that brings the study to a close, it focuses on the summary of the study, conclusion, and recommendations from the study.

5.1 Summary of Findings

Socio-economic growth and political stability are not only deeply inter-connected, but are also major factors in the successful existence and smooth operation of states. In a country like Nigeria, where a multi-party system is practiced, the political parties are supposed to remain dedicated to working for the social and economic development of the country. However, they are constantly at conflicting positions against one another, constantly disrupting the stability of the country in a bid to magnify the errors and inadequacies of the ruling party. This approach to politics and the state has fostered the increase of political instability in the country in recent times and its effect can be seen in the sluggish development of the country. Hence, the study seeks to find out the effect of political instability on socioeconomic development in Nigeria.

To this end, this research adopted a cross-sectional survey design. The study population cuts across government workers employed in offices located under Ibadan North east, North West, South east, and South west local government area, Oyo state, Nigeria. This research utilized primary data which involved the use of structured questionnaire. The data was analyzed with the use of both descriptive and inferential statistical method.

Findings from the analysis shows that the Nigerian political environment is highly unstable in political terms and the Nigeria is not developing socioeconomically and more attention needs to be paid towards the factors that influences that aspect of the country's development. It was also

found that 44.7% correlation exists between political instability and socioeconomic development. This shows the existence of a moderate positive correlation between political instability and socioeconomic development. The regression analysis shows that there is a positive, significant but weak effect of political instability on socioeconomic development.

5.2 Conclusion

The objective of this study was to analyze the effects of political instability on economic growth in Nigeria. From the result of the analysis which had showed that relationship exist between political instability and socio-economic development, it can therefore be concluded that:

- i. The political space in Nigeria is highly unstable.
- ii. The state of socio-economic development is not impressive.
- iii. There is a relationship between the level of political instability and social-economic development.

Drawing on the World Development Indicators (WDI) database for macroeconomic variables and from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for variables used in the construction of the political instability indicator show that political instability has a significant negative impact on economic growth in Nigeria, thus hindering economic growth.

In light of this result, economic policy implications can be formulated. Measures must be strengthened to reduce political instability in the country. These measures could include strengthening cohesion between the different ethnic groups, the absence of which causes mistrust between them. This mistrust can lead to internal unrest that undermines the functioning of the productive apparatus and, consequently, causes a decline in economic growth. Similarly, strengthening democracy and improving socioeconomic conditions would significantly reduce the level of instability, according to ICRG data. Since political instability is a concept that

manifests itself through several factors, the consideration of an aggregate indicator in this work could be a limitation of the present results insofar as they do not provide information on the component for which economic growth becomes more sensitive. Thus, our future work will be conducted in such a way as to disaggregate instability by focusing on mass instability (instability that corresponds to social movements such as strikes, demonstrations or riots).

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the summary of the study and conclusion, this study proffers the following recommendation.

- i. Inclusive participation in political activities should be encouraged among the citizens
- ii. Leaders and office holders should obey abide by the provisions of the law.
- iii. There is need to rebrand the political image of the country into a more positive one.
- iv. There is need to ensure that all factions that exists in the Nigerian political space are duly represented. This is in a bid to discourage factional political environment that breeds violence and other related crisis
- v. The government should ensure availability and accessibility of infrastructural facilities and social amenities.
- vi. Policies that enables an increased standard of living and a reduced poverty rate should be made.
- vii. Environments in which foreign direct investment will thrive should be created.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

From the above review of the literature, it appears that at the theoretical level, the existence of an inverse relationship between political instability and economic growth is unquestionably recognized. However, there are still divergences as to how political instability affects economic

growth. On the empirical side, the work is also divergent. Some argue that the results show favorable effects, while others show the opposite. As for the notion of political instability, it is also approached in different ways. To the best of our knowledge, literature that linked country wide experience of Nigeria in the fourth republic are still scarce. Only few studies devoted scant attention to linking political instability and economic growth in Nigeria. Thus, the contribution of this study lies in the fact that it enriches the socio-economic literature by treating the effects of political instability on socio-economic growth in the case of Nigeria on the one hand and the use of empirical technique which is less used in the analysis of the effects of political instability on growth as presented in the empirical review previously presented.

5.5 Suggested Area for Further Studies

In light of the presupposed political stability while the growth of the economy seems illusory. It is this reality that informed this study given the fact that democratic governance should ordinarily, among other things, usher in societal development, inclusion and participation of citizens in governance. Studies on accountability and transparency on the part of government officials as well as a stable political environment which attracts investment (local and foreign) that leads to increase growth of the economy are still scanty. Future research can dwell on this.

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The University Compliance Certification

This is to certify that this thesis written by Fatima Adenike YUSUF with matriculation number LCU/PG/001700 in the Department of Politics & International Relations, Faculty Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University, Ibadan Nigeria is in full compliance with the approved University format and style.

Signature

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