

Xenophobia and Nigeria-South Africa Economic Relations (2011 - 2021)

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Certification

This thesis entitled “**Xenophobia and Nigeria-South Africa Economic Relations (2011 - 2021)**” was carried out by **Esther Nesiana Fasola** with Matric No. **LCU/PG/001968** in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Lead City University under my supervision and that this work has not been previously submitted.

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Dedication

This research work is dedicated to God Almighty.

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Acknowledgment

I want to express unending gratitude to the Almighty God who enabled me to follow through with this program. Despite several hurdles and setbacks, I have been able to see it to its conclusion.

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Abstract

This study is an attempt to establish a link between the attack on Nigerians in South Africa and the trade and economic relations between Nigeria and South Africa as well as the patronage of South African multinational companies in Nigeria within the period under study. The objective of the study was to examine the causes and implications of xenophobia on trade relations between Nigeria and South Africa within 2011-2021. The Economic Growth Theory and Trickle-Down Effect Theory were reviewed as the theoretical framework of this study. Secondary sources of data were obtained from relevant books, journals, articles, newspapers, and blogs. Findings from this study revealed that no fewer than 117 Nigerians were extra-judicially killed in South Africa within 2016-2018, and over 5 buildings occupied by Nigerian business were burnt with unprecedented looting. There were also reports of attacks and looting of goods belonging to Nigerian businessmen and women. However, the causes of the xenophobic attack on Nigerians in South-Africa were found to be poverty which has its roots in apartheid. But, contrary to popular perception, Nigerians were said to have exaggerated the effect of violence on their citizens, probably because Nigeria has a better organised, savvy, and loud diaspora constituency in South Africa. It was concluded in this study that the ugly trend of xenophobic attacks has resulted in a cold war between Nigeria and South Africa in their socio-economic and political relationships. It is then recommended that the government of the South African should work towards fulfilling its constitutional and international obligation of protecting the lives, properties, and rights of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in their country, irrespective of their race or sex, creed or colour as articulated in various international agreements in which the country is signatory of.

Keywords: International economic relations, Nigeria, South Africa, Xenophobia

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List of Acronyms

Abbreviation	Meaning
ACHPR	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
AEC	African Economic Community
AFCFTA	Africa Continental Free Trade Area
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BUSA	Business Unity South Africa
CERD	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
<i>CET</i>	<i>Common External Tariff</i>
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
ECOWAS	Economic Commission of West Africa States
ENFP	Enlarged National Focal Point on Trade
<i>ETLS</i>	<i>External Tariff Liberalisation Scheme</i>
FMITI	Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment
IPAP	Industrial Policy Action Plan
LCCI	Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry
MAN	Manufacturers Association of Nigeria
NACCIMA	Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture
NASME	Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises
NDP	National Development Plan
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NIPF	New Growth Path, National Industrial Policy Framework

NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
PEBEC	Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC-FTA	Southern Africa Development Commission Free Trade Area
SADECC	Southern African Development and Economic Coordinating Conference,
TIC	Trade and Industry Chamber
UNDHRC	United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

The African continent is home to various ethnic groups, each with its own culture, traditions, and beliefs. The colonial systems that dominated Africa originated in the 18th century and aimed to impose order by establishing colonies/provinces and, eventually, countries. This was done without hesitation, acknowledging the existing systems as organized by Africans, and so encountered opposition from Africans¹. However, this resulted in European imperialism, armed invasion, conquest, and, eventually, colonization. South Africa and Nigeria have had a relationship since the 1960s, during the Apartheid era. Nigeria played an important role at the end of apartheid, and once the apartheid rule fell, migrants from Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Nigeria flooded into the country in search of investment possibilities. This connection can be traced back in time. Nigeria backed the campaign for African countries' emancipation from racial discrimination, colonial domination, and apartheid systems after gaining independence from colonialists on October 1, 1960. South Africa became the focal point of Nigeria's efforts to end apartheid and achieve freedom.

With the fall of the apartheid regime and the installation of constitutional democracy in 1994, the number of other Africans migrating to South Africa has increased. The massive number of documented and illegal migrants increasingly became a source of concern for South Africans². This added a further layer of prejudice and segregation. Locals perceived these migrants as threats and rivals for their scarce resources, including jobs, housing, and means of subsistence. Locals also accuse these migrants of engaging in sex work, crimes, and drug and

human trafficking, all of which are prevalent in their country³. This resulted in anger and violence by South Africans, who are largely from lower socioeconomic strata, further rupturing relations between the two countries.

South Africa, often known as the Republic of South Africa (RSA), is Africa's southernmost country. It is limited in the south by 2,798 kilometres (1,739 mi) of Southern African coastline running along the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, in the north by Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, and in the east and northeast by Mozambique and Swaziland, and it encircles the kingdom of Lesotho. South Africa is the largest country in Southern Africa, the 25th largest country in the world by geographical area, and the world's 24th most populated nation, with almost 56 million inhabitants. It is the southernmost country in the Old World's or Eastern Hemisphere's mainland. Around 80% of South Africans are of Sub-Saharan African origin, with a diverse range of ethnic groups speaking several African languages, nine of which have official status⁴.

Nigeria is known as the "Giant of Africa" due to its massive population and economy. According to our econometric estimates, the population will be about 215.87 million in 2022. Nigeria is Africa's most populated country and the world's sixth most populous country. Nigeria has one of the world's greatest youth populations. The country is regarded as a multicultural state since it is home to over 500 ethnic groups, the three biggest of which are the Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba; these ethnic groups speak over 500 distinct languages and are associated with a diverse range of customs.

Nigeria and South Africa are probably Africa's two most powerful countries. The study of both nations' economic ties focuses on the long-term repercussions of their economic relationship. These exchanges include trade in assets, ideas, products, and services, as well as

the consequences of laws, regulations, and policies like tariffs, trade quotas, limitations on foreign capital flows, and the exchange rate regime. These connections have significant repercussions, including unemployment and inflation, the rise or decline of certain businesses, and the results for different types of employees. These have an impact on national welfare, economic stability, inequality, and political movements, all of which have an impact on economic policies.

Both nations have consistently strived to extend their dominion outside their sub-regions throughout the years. The goal is to become Africa's leading state¹. Nigeria led the struggle against apartheid in the 1960s and 1970s. Nigeria's position was perceived by the world at large, from chairing the UN Special Committee against Apartheid to advocating the Commonwealth's anti-apartheid cause and participating in meetings of the Frontline States (FLS) of Southern Africa⁵.

With the demise of the apartheid administration and the introduction of constitutional democracy in 1994, immigration into South Africa increased dramatically, notably from neighbouring African nations." According to the 2011 South Africa Census, the number of foreign-born persons in the country had climbed to 2.2 million as of 2011⁶. Contradictorily, in resource-rich South Africa, there is poverty and a high unemployment rate, and the locals believe hook, line, and sinker that the immigrants, whom they call "Amakwerekwere" (a derogatory South African term for foreign visitors to a township), are to blame for the economic and societal challenges bedevilling the rainbow nation, including drug trafficking and rising crime rates⁷. Foreign nationals, especially African immigrants, have been the target of xenophobic assaults in South Africa on many occasions, including May 2008, April 2015, and March 2019. These infrequent attacks have harmed the Republic of South Africa's

relations with its immediate neighbours and a few other African countries, one of which is the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which has received several of its nationals in body bags after they were killed by xenophobes in South Africa for several years.

In Africa, xenophobia is growing more prevalent. According to worldwide media reports, prejudice against non-nationals, particularly fellow Africans, is on the rise from Kenya to the Maghreb and across Southern Africa. Since independence, the concept of being a "non-native" has existed in Africa (and was codified during colonialism). Bounded notions of citizenship have persisted in Africa for over two centuries, and xenophobia is one of the most recent manifestations of this trait. A hatred and/or fear of what is unknown or different from oneself is referred to as xenophobia. It is derived from the Greek words (Xenos), which means "alien," "foreigner," and (Phobos), which means "fear." The phrase is commonly used to denote fear or hate of foreigners or individuals who are considerably different from oneself, most often in the context of obviously distinguished minorities⁸. It is more broadly defined in the Dictionary of Psychology (1978) as "a fear of strangers".

South Africa has a very high rate of assaults against foreign nationals. Despite a lack of precisely comparable evidence, xenophobia is thought to have developed dramatically in South Africa following the establishment of a democratic government in 1994. According to a 2004 report issued by the Southern Africa Migration Initiative (SAMP), the ANC administration began an ambitious and inclusive nation-building project in its efforts to overcome old differences and develop new forms of social cohesion. One unintended consequence of this initiative has been an increase in prejudice toward foreigners. Violence against foreign nationals and African refugees is on the rise, and communities are fractured by hate and distrust.

Nigeria and South Africa are two African countries that have received international attention and recognition for different reasons. South Africa, with over 60.757 million people, has gained recognition as the conscience of racial parity on the world stage, having passed through and survived the throes of apartheid for decades before its eventual liberation, partly through global help and internal political struggle. Nigeria, with an estimated population of 215.87 million, is globally regarded as the most populous black country in the world. Despite being located in West and Southern Africa, Nigeria and South Africa have been intertwined in each other's many aspects of life-social, political, and economic⁹.

These difficulties contributed to the May 2008 unrest in South Africa, which targeted migrants seeking refuge. Sixty-one migrants were reported deceased, and 100,000 were displaced. As the violence escalated, hundreds of migrants sought safety in churches and police stations. Angry crowds with rods, clubs and axes assaulted houses and shops, specifically targeting migrants¹⁰. Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in South Africa; rather, it is a continuation of previous types of prejudice. Unfortunately, it is well known that state security services such as immigration and police have little or no compassion for the displaced¹¹. For more than four years, sporadic attacks against Nigerians have been on the rise. Several Africans were killed in Durban in 2015, and thousands fled South Africa because of the attacks¹². In 2017, Pretoria saw violent anti-immigrant protests. In Durban, Protestants drove foreigners out of their houses and ransacked their stores¹³.

Nigerian nationals' properties in Johannesburg were demolished on September 3rd, 2019. In Johannesburg, South African police detained more than eighty persons and verified the deaths of five foreigners. "Those who took part in the uprising damaged several target businesses owned by immigrants, notably Nigerians"¹⁴. Nigerian migrants were the most affected by

South Africa's recent xenophobic outburst. Locals used violence to assault foreign-owned companies, burning Nigerians who were caught in the act. In response, enraged Nigerians called for a boycott of South African companies operating in Nigeria, including Shoprite and Mobile Telephone Network (MTN). South African embassies in Abuja and Lagos have been shuttered temporarily, as have other South African enterprises in Nigeria¹⁵. This prompted Nigerian celebrities to postpone previously arranged events in South Africa. Nigerians were outraged by the number of deaths, as well as their belief that the government should have done more. This resulted in the recall of the Nigerian Ambassador to South Africa Kabiru Bala and the Nigerian government's boycott of the World Economic Summit¹⁶. One hundred and seventy-eight Nigerians were evacuated from South Africa by Air Peace, a private Nigerian aircraft that operated voluntarily on September 11th, 2019. It also investigates the extent to which these irritants affect ties between Nigeria and South Africa and proposes solutions.

In the aftermath of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, this research paper examines the larger picture of Nigeria-South Africa ties and how xenophobic assaults in South Africa have influenced relations between the two sub-regional powers throughout time. To that end, this paper has been divided into the following sections: conceptual clarification, theoretical framework, the historical context of Nigeria-South Africa relations, xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa: an overview, myths and instigators of xenophobic attacks in post-apartheid South Africa, the impact of xenophobic attacks on Nigeria-South Africa relations, conclusions, and recommendations.

Nigeria was the world's 20th biggest economy in 2015, with a nominal GDP and purchasing power parity of more than \$500 billion and \$1 trillion, respectively. In 2014, it surpassed

South Africa to become Africa's largest economy. In 2013, the debt-to-GDP ratio was 11%. The World Bank classifies Nigeria as an emerging market. It has been designated as a regional power on the African continent, a medium power in international affairs, and a rising global power⁵.

Currently, South Africa's GDP is \$351 billion while Nigeria tops it at \$448 billion⁶. Nonetheless, Nigeria's participation in South Africa has been hampered by institutional constraints throughout the years. This is because the South African market is well established and highly competitive. Nonetheless, it is recognized for its tight profit margins and modest growth potential. South African business owners frequently view Nigeria as a destination for their products rather than a potential for industrial investment. Regardless, the direct employment advantages of South Africa's commercial links with Nigeria much surpass those generated by Nigeria's oil exports to South Africa. This oil export is also Nigeria's principal source of bilateral trade.

When travel restrictions are enforced or boycotts of South African goods are threatened, South African firms situated in Nigeria are frequently targeted by retaliatory actions. Similarly, over the years, Nigerian companies and persons located in South Africa have been victims of heinous xenophobic attacks. These attacks on both sides have had major consequences, and Nigerian people in South Africa have had to be evacuated⁷. Both nations' commercial and economic relations have suffered as a result of these occurrences.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Africans have traditionally prided themselves on being friendly to visitors. South Africa, on the other hand, has recently shown discriminatory tendencies toward foreign people residing in the

country. Their antipathy for outsiders is rather telling. According to Human Science research, South Africa is a country plagued by anti-foreigner feelings and hate. These resentments and sentiments are becoming more violent, causing diplomatic challenges for South Africa as a whole.

Xenophobic violence is one of the major issues influencing Nigeria-South Africa business ties. It has become more common in post-apartheid South Africa. Since 1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, assaulted, or killed because of their status as outsiders or foreign nationals. Despite the lack of centralized and uniform recording processes, xenophobic violence has escalated across townships and informal settlements during this period. The domestic environment in South Africa has been hostile to non-nationals, particularly illegal migrants, and as a result, most communities have an implicit culture of impunity, favouring mob justice. Because of its hostile attitude toward non-nationals, South Africa has become one of Africa's most unsafe countries to reside in.

This anti-foreigner sentiment has had a significant impact on Nigeria. In the previous two years alone, around 116 Nigerian nationals have been slain in South Africa through extrajudicial proceedings, with the police killing 63 percent of the 67 Nigerians who were recently deported from South Africa. The government's approach toward immigrants has been questioned, particularly how they handle visa applications, judicial processes, and unlawful arrests of foreign nationals. Authorities have deported a record number of Nigerians as a result of this. This study aims to investigate the effects of xenophobic violence on Nigeria-South Africa economic relations between 2011 and 2021.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study is an attempt to establish a link between the attack on Nigerians in South Africa and the trade and economic relations between Nigeria and South Africa as well as the patronage of South African multinational companies in Nigeria within the period under study. Specifically, the study's objectives are to:

- i. determine the causes of xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa from 2011 - 2021
- ii. examine the implications of xenophobia on trade relations between Nigeria and South Africa between 2011 - 2021
- iii. find out the effects of the xenophobic attack on Nigerians in South Africa on the patronage of South Africa-owned multinational companies in Nigeria from 2011 - 2021

1.4 Research Questions

This study raised the following questions:

1. What caused the xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa from 2011-2021?
2. What are the implications of xenophobia on trade relations between Nigeria and South Africa from 2011-2021?
3. What is the effect xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa affect the patronage of South Africa owned multinational companies in Nigeria from 2011-2021?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study exhibits both theoretical and practical categories of importance. The study's theoretical significance stems from the fact that it will push the boundaries of knowledge on the

subject under consideration. It will also enable the students of political science and international relations to have more access to current data on the xenophobic attack and its economic impact on Nigeria-South Africa relations. Lastly, it will open new vistas of knowledge, add to the pool of literature on the subject, and create a new paradigm in the study. We are also optimistic that the outcome of this study will provoke further scholarly inquiries into the subject matter, which is open and susceptible to scientific verification.

The findings of this study would help the stakeholders (policymakers of both countries, business organizations, and embassies) in shaping the bilateral relationship between the two big nations of the continent. The significance of this research lies in the fact that Nigerian citizens in South Africa are being harassed, abused, discriminated against, and dehumanised by the local population as well as the authorities. There is, therefore, an overwhelming need for studies to be carried out regarding xenophobia to identify the causes and impact of xenophobic outbursts on Nigerian students as well as provide policymakers with information to be able to proffer solutions to tackle these xenophobic resentments. The study will provide us with facts on the conditions that instigate the formation of formal ties between the countries under study. It will help to derive new strategies to enhance reciprocal and mutual relations in the inflow of trade and economic relations between the two countries. The study will reveal the degree of damage xenophobic factors have done to both countries. It will serve as a cynosure for other nations affected by such dehumanization. Generally, the study shall make necessary recommendations that will strengthen the institutions and laws that protect foreign migrants in South Africa against xenophobic attacks.

Finally, the study shall be beneficial to foreign policymakers, statesmen and diplomats who will examine critically the implications of policies and their executions in relations with other countries.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study will cover the period between the years 2011 and 2021. Since the major recent xenophobic attacks happened in 2015 and 2019, this time frame is perfect for examining the economic relations between Nigeria and South Africa before, during, and after the xenophobic attacks. This study investigates the effects of xenophobic violence on Nigeria-South Africa economic relations between 2011 and 2021.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The following limitations were observed during the process of carrying out this study; the interest of the Nigerians and South Africans in helping with the collection of information was a major challenge. Also, information on the recent occurrence of reoccurring xenophobic attacks in the country was not made available.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

Economic Relations: This refers to the economic/trade exchanges that have developed between Nigeria and South Africa through time as a result of the global movement of products and sources of production. It is the product of several interwoven linkages in the global monetary and financial system.

Trade Relations: It is the economic transactions that are made between Nigeria and South Africa that count. Among the items commonly traded are consumer goods, such as television sets

and clothing; capital goods, such as machinery; and raw materials and food. Other transactions involve services, such as travel services and payments for foreign patents. International trade transactions are facilitated by international financial payments, in which the private banking system and the central banks of the trading nations play important roles.

Xenophobia: Xenophobia refers to acts, attitudes, behaviours, and beliefs that discriminate against persons (South Africans) based on the notion that they are not indigenous, foreigners, or members of communities that are completely different from their own. Xenophobia, often known as hate of foreigners, is characterized by a wide range of abuses, violations, and discrimination of the highest degree.

Endnotes

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Chapter Two

Literature Review

This chapter discussed the relevant conceptual, theoretical, and empirical issues relating to the effects of xenophobic violence on Nigeria-South Africa economic relations between 2011 and 2021. It presents the relevant literature which spurs the empirical investigation of this study.

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 International Economic Relations

International economics is the study of international dynamics that impact domestic economic situations and shape economic relationships between countries. In other terms, it investigates the economic interconnectedness of countries and its consequences on the economy. International economics covers a wide range of topics, including globalization, trade gains, trade patterns, the balance of payments, and FDI. Aside from that, international economics deals with the production, commerce, and investment of countries.

International economics has evolved as one of the most important issues for governments to understand. The area of international economics has grown dramatically over the years, thanks to different theoretical, empirical, and descriptive contributions. Economic activity across nations differs from those within nations in general. Because of numerous regulatory constraints, factors of production, for example, are less movable across nations. Internal economics studies the effects of various government limitations on production, commerce, consumption, and income distribution. As a result, studying international economics as a subfield of economics is essential¹.

The repercussions of economic cooperation between nations are the subject of international economic relations. These exchanges include commerce in products, services, assets, and ideas, as well as the consequences of laws, regulations, and policies like tariffs, trade quotas, limitations on foreign capital flows, and the exchange rate regime. These connections have significant repercussions, including unemployment and inflation, the development and collapse of sectors, and the results for different types of people. These have an impact on national welfare, economic stability, inequality, and political movements, all of which have an impact on economic policies².

International economics is concerned with the economic actions of many countries and the implications of such activities. In other terms, international economics is the study of economic relationships between countries and the impact of international concerns on global economic activity. It investigates economic and political issues concerning international commerce and finance. International trade is the cross-border exchange of commodities or services as well as other components of production such as labour and capital. International finance, on the other hand, investigates the movement of financial assets or investments across boundaries. Only with the advent of globalization was cross-national trade and banking made possible.

Globalisation has increased the free flow of products and services, capital, labour, and finance across nations. Globalization may have both beneficial and harmful impacts. Globalization, for example, has resulted in more employment possibilities and the standardization of worldwide economic rules and regulations. Furthermore, it has resulted in the removal of trade obstacles such as taxes and quotas³.

However, globalization has increased worldwide rivalry, resulting in a fall in organisational market share. As a result, whether or not a business engages in international commerce, the

consequences of globalization are significant. It also explains the operations of many international economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

2.1.2 Post-Pandemic Economy of Nigeria and South Africa

2.1.2.1 Post-pandemic Nigeria's Economy

Nigerians are wondering what would happen to the economy after the COVID-19 epidemic. But first, we may see Nigeria's economic structure as a component of endowments that moves from one stage of development to the next. As a result, the country's economic growth would change at different stages of development, implying that Nigeria's economy will require appropriate infrastructure (both real and intangible) to assist operations and transformation. Nigeria must generate additional prospects for African and global markets. Make no mistake about it: Nigeria urgently requires institutional improvements that promote efficiency and growth.

To economically develop the country, we must emphasize the value of education, training, and hard labour. We may also state that Nigerians work hard and are not frightened of difficult tasks. Even the President agreed that there was a modest need to prepare for the following step. It was recently expressed by the President Muhamadu Buhari, who stated, "This administration approaches a critical phase in its second term, hence the need to rejig the cabinet to strengthen weak areas, close gaps, manage the economy, and improve the delivery of public goods in the country."

When the government is willing, anything is possible, even if the anticipation was higher than the action. Government can always improve. This is more proof than ever that Nigeria has to

restructure the country's productive economic structures, and we need to do it fast. The post-COVID-19 pandemic economy is transforming the global economy into a sovereign national economy, resulting in a type of local and regional economic development: Take excellent care of your firm, and we will do the same.

Looking ahead, 2021 was a year of continuing economic research to lessen the pandemic effect and speed domestic market growth. It is time to convert to an import-substitution method and agribusiness to transition the agriculture industry from raw product export to agro-processing and export of processed products. The COVID-19 crisis has hit the most vulnerable economies and exposed growing inequality between countries; governments must rely on borrowed funds, and international organizations are compelled to reach a historic agreement to issue special drawing rights (SDR) to poor countries in exchange for economic sustainability. The epidemic has also ushered in a new way of doing business since we now live in a more international globe than ever before. Nigeria, like many other countries, is under pressure to make effective use of resources to attract greater trade and investment from other countries.

As many nations cautiously reopen for business, government policies and resource use remain critical indicators of progress toward resolving the COVID-19 situation. In other words, regardless of the hurdles at each stage of growth, Nigeria must focus on the internal market. The market is the fundamental mechanism for allocating resources effectively. However, economic growth, being a dynamic process, necessitates structural adjustments, including improvements in tangible and intangible infrastructure at all levels. Such upgrades and enhancements necessitate intrinsic coordination, with significant externalities to enterprises' transaction costs and returns on capital expenditure. As a result, in addition to an efficient market system, the government should actively facilitate structural and institutional improvements⁴.

However, before entering the political cycle of 2023, what should the government's economic priorities be for the rest of 2021? One of these steps should be investment programs for SMEs to achieve quantifiable economic growth and job creation, while the private sector concentrates on company innovations and partnerships to achieve business development. The government must also use a ground-breaking strategy as a key instrument in redefining methods for new company growth to fundamentally open Nigeria's economy to the private sector through institutional changes that facilitate value change. The country has enormous potential for economic recovery for the next generation of Nigerian leaders, but the government must be accountable for its role on the supply side by laying a stable foundation for the economy.

This indicates that economic development and change take place along two parallel but distinct paths: economic growth and development policies. Nonetheless, competitive behaviour and equilibrium dynamics remain important components of modern corporate growth. This involves investments in skilled labour through knowledge acquisition, mentorship, collaboration, and R&D. Looking at economic performance and sectors that attracted private sector investment, agricultural and energy industries, for example, stood out as the backbone of the economy. They are indicators that reflect structural elements of the Nigerian economy while analyzing the internal market development process. The significance of the state, on the other hand, in supporting structural change in the country's economic development cannot be overstated.

Reasons for a private-sector-led economy would encourage contributions for import substitution by shifting from raw material exports to processed exports. Policymakers must devise systems for identifying industries in which Nigeria may have a latent comparative advantage and removing constraining limitations to allow private enterprises to enter such sectors. Between January and March 2021, agriculture is the most productive sector of the economy. It accounted

for 22.35 % of total GNP. Nigeria needs a plan to increase the intensity of employment and the durability of its growth performance. Supporting the private sector by limiting government involvement in the business will alter perceptions⁵.

Nigeria's GDP per capita was last measured in 2020 at 2273.22 US dollars. Nigeria's GDP per capita is similar to 18% of the global average⁶. According to Trading Economics' global macro models and analysts' forecasts, GDP per capita in Nigeria is predicted to reach 2300.00 USD by the end of 2021. According to the econometric models, Nigeria's GDP per capita is expected to trend at 2450.00 USD in 2022.

2.1.2.2 Post-Pandemic South Africa's Economy

South Africa's political transformation is regarded as one of the century's most impressive political accomplishments. Since 1994, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has dominated policy until August 2016, when the nation had the most competitive local government election since 1994, in which the ANC lost majority support in four metropolitan areas. Political parties formed coalition accords that effectively deposed the ANC in Pretoria and Nelson Mandela Bay. The most recent general elections were place in May 2019, while the next local government elections are scheduled for November 2021⁷.

COVID-19 (coronavirus) is having a significant economic impact on South Africa. According to the World Bank, the economy will fall by 7% in 2020 as the epidemic weighs hard on both external demand and internal activity while the government implements containment measures. This severe recession is expected to exacerbate poverty by 2 million individuals (living below the poverty line in upper-middle-income nations, \$5.5 per day in 2011 PPP exchange rates).

After several years of slow expansion, South Africa succumbed to the epidemic. The economy increased by 0.2 % in 2019 (0.8 % in 2018), owing in part to the resumption of load shedding caused by operational and financial challenges at the electricity provider Eskom. The pandemic's longevity at the global and domestic levels will continue to stymie economic recovery in the first half of 2021. Furthermore, once economic activity resumes, pre-existing structural restrictions, such as electricity shortages, resurface. In 2021, gross domestic product growth is predicted to return to 3%. Commodity prices continue to be crucial for South Africa, which is a large net producer of minerals but a net importer of oil. Improving investment, especially foreign direct investment, will be crucial to accelerating development and creating jobs. South Africa has made significant steps toward improving the well-being of its population since its democratic transition in the mid-1990s, but growth has stalled in the recent decade. Between 2005 and 2010, the %age of the population living in poverty declined from 68 % to 56 %, but has since risen slightly to 57 % in 2015 and is expected to reach 60 % by 2020.

Poverty reduction progress has been hampered by structural problems and inadequate growth, which have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 epidemic. Rising unemployment, which hit an all-time high of 32.5 % in the fourth quarter of 2020, is significantly limiting improvements in family welfare. Youths aged 15 to 24 have the greatest unemployment rate, at roughly 63 %. South Africa is still a dual economy with one of the world's highest and most persistent inequality rates, with a consumer expenditure Gini coefficient of 0.63 in 2015. High inequality is sustained by a legacy of exclusion as well as the character of economic growth, which is not pro-poor and does not create enough employment. Wealth inequality is much more pronounced, and intergenerational mobility is minimal, implying that inequities are passed down from generation to generation with little change over time⁸.

The economy recovered well in the third quarter, increasing at the fastest rate since current records started in the early 1990s when coronavirus lockdown restrictions were eased, allowing for a gradual firming of activity. GDP increased by 66.1 % at a seasonally adjusted annualized rate (SAAR) in Q3, up from 51.7 % in the previous quarter and beyond market experts' projections of a 52.6 % increase. Annual economic output fell 6.0 % in Q3, a smaller reduction than the prior quarter's 17.5 % dip⁹.

The strong rebound showed significant improvements in both local and overseas demand. Private consumption increased by 69.5 % SAAR in Q3, compared to a 52.4 % decrease in Q2, as consumers resumed purchasing. Furthermore, fixed investment increased by 26.5 % in the third quarter, following a 59.8 % decrease in the second quarter, while government consumption increased by 0.7 % (Q2: -2.1 % SAAR). Externally, exports of products and services increased 201.4 % in Q3 (Q2: -76.0 % SAAR) as global demand improved. Furthermore, imports of goods and services declined at a slower rate of 1.6 % in Q3 (Q2: -54.0 % SAAR), indicating a strengthening of the domestic economy.

Goldman Sachs analysts Andrew Matheny and Dylan Smith commented on the South African economy's prospects, saying, "Data indicate a mechanical adjustment to the 2020 growth prediction to -7.2 % YoY, 1.1pp better than before" (while incorporating a slightly weaker sequential growth rate in Q4). The growth prediction for 2021 is now +5.3 % year on year, up from +4.5 % before. We also raise the prediction for the Q3 current account balance [...] to a surplus of 4.6 % of GDP or ZAR230 billion (annualised), up from 4.2 % of GDP or ZAR210 billion before, due to lower-than-expected service imports." Focus Economics Consensus Forecast panelists expect the economy to grow 3.6 % in 2021, the same as last month. GDP is expected to expand by 2.5 % in 2022¹⁰.

The COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent lockdown have resulted in a dramatic economic recession and increased unemployment, hurting young people in particular. The government intervened quickly to reduce the drop in family spending, but investment will fall to a historic low. The crisis also exacerbates existing fiscal issues, as it comes on the heels of a dramatic worsening in fiscal accounts during the previous three years. In 2020, the government deficit will be roughly 15% of GDP. Without consolidation, debt would reach 100 % of GDP in 2022, presenting sustainability concerns in an environment of poor growth and high government borrowing rates. South Africa must thus deal with the coronavirus's impact and assist the economy in the short term, while implementing changes to restore debt sustainability and drive development in the medium term¹¹.

2.1.3 South Africa and Nigeria's Brief History and Relations

South Africa and Nigeria have had bilateral relations since the 1960s, when South Africa was still controlled by an apartheid system. By that time, most African countries had obtained independence from colonial powers, and Nigeria, as one of Africa's sovereign countries, campaigned against the apartheid rule and made significant contributions to South Africa's emancipation. It provided major financial assistance to the ANC, and Nigerians sponsored the black youth of South Africa. The government also took the lead in enforcing economic sanctions and sports boycotts. Following South Africa's democratic breakthrough in 1994, there was a mass influx of Nigerian people to the country in the goal of assisting the newly democratised country in its new age. Relations between the two nations quickly deteriorated after South Africa's first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, sought Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth following the heinous injustices and violations of human rights perpetrated by Nigeria's tyrant, General Abacha. Nelson Mandela's advocacy for human rights in Nigeria

was widely viewed as a pro-Western move, and the resulting diplomatic stutter led to a worsening in ties between the two nations¹².

With full knowledge of the deterioration of South Africa-Nigeria bilateral ties, President Thabo Mbeki, who became State President the same year as Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, in 1999, attempted to stabilize relations between the two nations. Positive diplomatic connections had previously been developed between Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo during Mbeki's stay in exile in Nigeria. In 1999, the nations created a Bi-National Commission (BNC) to develop relations and unite the two countries. The advantages of the BNC and other agreements between them are clear in the fact that the amount of South African exports to Nigeria surged by roughly 540 % between 1999 and 2002¹³.

The nations' relations reached new heights when Nigeria became South Africa's largest economic partner on the continent, and they were further enhanced by their collaborative efforts on policy and continental politics. Things appeared to be going in the right direction until a catastrophic collision in their relationships occurred in 2012. A group of Nigerian individuals were denied entrance into South Africa because they could not present genuine yellow fever certificates, and as a result, a number of South Africans were deported back to their home country¹⁴. This occurrence severely harmed the existing bilateral relations, much to the dismay of both heads of state. Nigeria's backing for Gabonese diplomat and politician Jean Ping to stay as Chairperson of the African Union Commission, a position that South Africa desired for its own Nkozasana Dlamini-Zuma, exacerbated the issue. Nigeria's move was interpreted as unfriendly. Nigeria defended itself by claiming that it had just backed a decision made by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)¹⁵. Both nations endeavored to re-energise bilateral relations through various diplomatic channels, but it is impossible to deny the reality that while these two

countries have always had attributes that lend themselves to partnership, they also have qualities that lend themselves to conflict.

2.1.2.1 The Balance of Trade Between Nigeria and South Africa

As previously stated, the BNC was established in 1999, during Nigeria's "third wave of democratization," as Samuel Huntington termed it. This 'third wave of democratisation,' which occurred after the Soviet Union's demise in 1980, refers to a period when there were real concerns about authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic principles were broadly embraced¹⁶. Authoritarian governments were exposed, with neither the West nor the Soviet Union providing any help. The BNC was established to promote unity, trade, and cooperation between South Africa and Nigeria. In order to achieve these goals, a number of agreements were made, including the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment Agreement, the BiNational Commission Bilateral Trade Agreement, and the Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement. This enhanced bilateral commerce and investment significantly¹⁷.

Following the signing of these agreements, South African firms from a variety of industries, including financial services, tourism, retail, and telecommunications, quickly multiplied in the Nigerian market. Some of the firms that have made significant contributions to the Nigerian economy are Mobile Telephone Network (MTN), Digital Satellite Television (DSTV), Stanbic, Shoprite, and PEP¹⁸. These businesses tapped into Nigeria's economic potential, forming synergies that benefited the country's socioeconomic progress. According to Jonah Onuoha, over fifty South African businesses were conducting business in Nigeria in 2003, with MTN being the single largest investment. In contrast, nothing can be said about Nigerian firms' engagement in the South African economic market. According to statistics, there are just a few Nigerian

businesses in South Africa. Among them are a number of consulting businesses. Could it be that Nigerian firms lack the strength of South African firms? Or is it possible that South Africa lacks a viable industry for Nigeria to enter? However, while South Africa's economic activities appeared to trump those of Nigeria, there is the phenomenon described above of Nigeria's GDP superseding that of South Africa after Nigeria's GDP was rebased with the release by its National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2012 of a figure of N71,1 trillion (approximately US\$453,9 billion) and a projected figure for 2013 of approximately N80,2 trillion (approximately US\$509,9 billion). This increased the country's GDP by an astounding 89%. Nigeria is currently Africa's largest economy, ranking 26th worldwide, up from 39th previously. This increased the country's GDP by an astounding 89%. Nigeria is currently Africa's largest economy, ranking 26th worldwide, up from 39th previously¹⁹. This came about mainly because Nigeria had not rebased its GDP figure for over a decade, from a time when the country's economy was not as progressive and operational as it is now. Nigeria's growth in GDP furthermore illustrates the progression in the size of its consuming class; and even though the share of agriculture shrunk severely from 33 per cent to 22 per cent, industries such as telecommunications and financial services have grown substantially.

One wonders what ignited this economic boom, and whether it may be the outcome of the NEPAD goals established by African leaders over a decade ago. NEPAD, a 'holistic, comprehensive integrated strategic framework for the socioeconomic development of Africa,' was established in 2001 by ex-presidents Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal), as well as President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria), who expressed their 'determination to disengage Africa from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in'²⁰.

NEPAD has made significant progress in raising awareness of continental concerns such as peacekeeping and debt relief, as well as providing the continent with an organized approach to problem solving. However, due to a lack of resources, NEPAD's objectives have not been met with the expected success.

2.1.3.2 Realisation of NEPAD's Principles

One of NEPAD's principles is "African ownership and leadership, as well as broad and deep participation by all sectors, building the competitiveness of African countries and the continent, and forging a new international partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world"²¹. In the framework of this idea, the Nigerian entertainment sector is viewed as a good consequence owing to its worldwide competitiveness, which challenges the impression that the continent is behind in all aspects of life. NEPAD is a program that aims to realize an African Renaissance. As the ideology behind its activities, NEPAD strives to transform the continent's image from one of a conflict-ridden, poverty-stricken area afflicted by abject underdevelopment to one that recognizes it as a global contender. The entertainment business, known as 'Nollywood,' was one of the areas responsible for Nigeria's extraordinary economic development. Nollywood, the world's third-largest film industry after Hollywood and Bollywood, has contributed significantly to the economy. The Nigerian entertainment industry has seen growth in the export routes that have brought Nigeria's economic tales further abroad²².

The remarkable growth in the country's financial services and telecommunications industries has also contributed to Nigeria's economic leap, implying that the consumer market increased in comparison to the other sectors. One reason for this could be the Obasanjo administration's conceptualization of new policies that encouraged democracy and trade, as a result of which

South African companies involved in telecommunications, retail, and hospitality ventured into the Nigerian market, where they have uncapped the country's economic sector's potential. Even if this economic growth is beneficial to Nigeria, there must be a balance not just in terms of Nigerian economic growth but also in terms of commerce between Nigeria and South Africa. Nigerian businesspeople have complained that trade restrictions in the form of permits make it difficult for them to bring their goods into South Africa. This might possibly be due to Nigeria's economy being less diverse than that of South Africa; Nigeria is renowned as an import-dependent country that exclusively exports oil and gas.

Economic growth is inextricably linked to development, good governance, and security. Is this reflected in GDP growth? GDP growth would have no direct influence on the lives of ordinary Nigerians. The GDP per capita, a metric used to indicate the connection between overall income and population, has remained constant. GDP growth has not resulted in significant improvement in Nigeria's governance or security challenges. Bad government, a lack of infrastructure, peace, and transparency have formed Nigeria. The only institutions that would be primarily influenced by its GDP growth are those with a larger consumer market, and it will undoubtedly effect the government of Nigeria when it goes to the polls in 2015. On another level, though, this economic prosperity foreshadows Africa's eventual ascension. For it is certain to promote economic development and rivalry among African countries, eventually placing the continent to compete worldwide with other emerging and even developed countries.

2.1.4 Nigeria and South Africa in the Apartheid Era

Nigeria gained independence in 1960, during the decade when other African states gained freedom. The 1960s were a time when the worldwide community was dealing with colonialism, racial injustice, and apartheid. Apartheid was formally introduced as a program of strict racial

isolation by the smuts-Unity Hertzog's Party after gaining victory in South Africa in 1948, despite the fact that the basis had been constructed prior to World War II. Apartheid regulations such as the Native Land Act of 1913, the Native Urban Areas Act of 1952, and the Native Representative Act of 1936 all contributed to the practice. More laws were passed in quick succession after 1948 to subdue Blacks on the basis of "color bar, pigment, or negro phobia"²³.

The Sharpsville massacre on March 21, 1960, which killed 69 peaceful demonstrators protesting the introduction of Pass Laws and the ban on the African National Congress, ANC, were concrete events that confirmed South Africa's separatist policy and provided ammunition for international action against the apartheid system. Nelson Mandela and others were later imprisoned for treason on June 11, 1964. Nigeria, as an independent nation at the time, promised to use all of its resources to the fullest and resisted white minority rule in South Africa for more than three decades²⁴.

Nigeria became the only country outside of South Africa that is a member of the frontline states Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, with Nigeria's active participation providing leadership in the search for long-term solutions for South Africans through activities and parties in South Africa's political development and the apartheid menace through monitoring, contacts, and dialogue. Nigeria, as a frontline state, used a variety of fight, support, and interaction techniques with the racist dictatorship. Nigeria began to exhibit her unreserved involvement and dedication to the path of liberating South Africa from the grip of apartheid in early March 1961, when her exertion of pressure on the major powers and colonial rulers reached historic proportions²⁵. Nigeria's denunciation of racial crimes in South Africa remained vehement; sympathy with the downtrodden was exceptional, forthcoming, and immediate, while help to the liberation cause was ready-made. In many respects, Nigeria's

political backing was illuminating. First, following Nigeria's independence in 1960, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa traveled to the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in March 1962 to fight South Africa's apartheid policy and lead the racist South Africa's resignation from the Commonwealth gathering. Second, in the United Nations, Commonwealth, and OAU, Nigeria was relentless and outspoken in advocating for sanctions, boycotts, and outright expulsion of South Africa from member-state political, economic, and socio-cultural activities.

Under the Gleneagles Agreement, Nigeria financed a boycott of any athletic events featuring South Africa in 1977. The worst-case scenario in athletic events caused by Nigeria's effort occurred on July 8, 1986, when Nigeria led more than 30 out of 59 Commonwealth of Nations members to boycott the 13th edition of the Game, which was scheduled to take place in Edinburgh, Scotland. Members adopted Nigeria's lead in protesting British obstinacy and reluctance to impose sanctions on South Africa's white supremacist leadership. Antigua, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Dominica, Gambia, Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Togo are among the Caribbean, African, and Asian republics with different cultures and geography²⁶. Out of these states from Caribbean, Africa and Asia with diverse culture and geography include Antigua, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Dominica, Gambia, Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and St. Kitts. The others include St. Lucia and St. Vincent, the Grenadines, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, India, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Guinea and Cyprus (read "Grabbling the initiative")²⁷. The boycotting member-states attacked British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's tenacity, intemperate utterances, and advocacy of South Africa's apartheid administration. More vexing was Thatcher's rhetorical query on the subject.

As infuriating as Mrs. Thatcher's statement, the report of the Eminent Persons Group, EPG, which was established by a compromise agreement of the Commonwealth Summit in Nassau, Bahamas in October 1985, with Nigerian Olusegun Obasanjo as a member and later, a co-chairman, called for sanctions against Pretoria's racist regime. The call, on the other hand, was taken lightly. Nigeria discovered that Thatcher's behavior was dictated by the British government's economic interest in South Africa, as well as the corresponding notion that a transfer of political power from white-minority rule to black-majority rule would result in emigration of white South Africans to Britain, which many of them consider their second home. It was time for Thatcher to pay attention to economic realities in South Africa. The Nigeria Foreign Affairs Minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, defended the action of President Babangida in the Nigerian boycott initiative and accordingly stated that:

What the President (Babangida) does not want is the situation where you react all the time without you yourself taking the initiative to create situations. What the president would like is for Nigeria's reaction to a particular external situation to be quick, based on the necessary factors which constitute the ingredients of Nigerian foreign policy. In other words, we don't hide behind any other nation's actions or reactions before charting our own course (Professor Bolaji Akinyemi quoted in "Grabbing the Initiative.....")²⁸.

In reality, upon taking office, Babangida's administration was determined to take autonomous and decisive action in the direction of Nigerian foreign policy. The Babangida period was only second to the energetic and vigorous foreign policy of the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo administration in the 1970s. Although Britain was motivated by economic interests in her foreign policy measures in South Africa, Nigeria was obliged to flip the coin by indigenizing two significant British corporate enterprises in Nigeria- the Barclays Bank and British Petroleum- to protest Britain's callous position. Nigeria also took other steps and measures to vent her rage, including putting political pressure on the international community, which resulted in a global

campaign against military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, condemnation of industrialized countries' economic and political support for South Africa, and the cessation of syndicated loans to South Africa.

Government and its agencies, as well as the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 418 on November 4, 1977, imposing a mandatory embargo on the export of arms to South Africa and, as a result, designating the racial situation there as a threat to international peace and security for the first time. Nigeria aided South African aborigines with the formation of the South African Relief Fund in 1976, in addition to political and economic actions against the apartheid dictatorship. The fund was meant to provide South Africans with exceptional educational opportunities, such as scholarships, at Nigerian higher institutions. It is worth noting here that the Nigeria-led mass boycott of the Commonwealth Games accelerated the International Community's efforts against South Africa's racist administration. As a result, countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand signaled for sanctions, while the United States of America's government abandoned its policy of constructive engagement, urging South Africa to pass tougher legislation, resulting in comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa. The European Economic Community, EEC (now European Union, EU), which had wavered on the issue by urging Pieta Botha to release Nelson Mandela from prison, was forced to announce, via British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, that the Community would impose some form of sanctions or measures against the racist regime.

South Africa's apartheid system remained the focal point of Nigerian foreign policy till the 1990s. At the 27th OAU conference, which resulted in the Abuja Declaration, the 53 member-states requested that the apartheid regime make a concrete commitment to defend the lives and property of all South Africans. The summiteers reaffirmed their support for South African

liberation groups and other democratic forces in the battle, promising them continuing financial and material support to allow them to carry out their historic duty of freeing their nation (read: “Africa’s Burden...”)²⁹. Nigeria’s president and the new chairman of OAU, Ibrahim Babangida promised and stated that:

As regards sanctions, we must maintain the pressure on South Africa but must hold ourselves ready to initiate change when necessary. It will depend on De Klerk and his government (Ibrahim Babangida)³⁰.

The frontline states highlighted in a bulletin issued from its operations base in Lusaka that apartheid infrastructure and the multiplicity of apartheid laws remained intact, providing reasons to maintain the international consensus against apartheid. When Babangida used Nigeria's former Head of State and member of the Eminent Persons Group, Olusegun Obasanjo, to lead a delegation of industrialists, academics, and prominent civil servants to Johannesburg to explore ways of integrating South Africa with the rest of Africa, the main structures of apartheid-segregated neighborhoods, racial classification of citizens, and disenfranchisement of blacks remained intact. At a luncheon in his honor in Johannesburg, Obasanjo highlighted the Nigerian government's desire for informal people-to-people and commercial interactions with South Africans to overcome the isolation imposed by apartheid and to offer enabling conditions for progress in the abolition of apartheid. (See "Obasanjo in South Africa: No Longer a Foe.") Obasanjo's return to Nigeria was quickly followed by a return visit by South African President Frederick W. de Klerk, the apartheid South African regime's first leader to visit Nigeria. In April 1992, De Klerk arrived with a 50-man entourage and his wife, Eunice, and was greeted with a red-carpet celebration. Then, South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Pik Botha observed that with apartheid removed, all barriers between Nigeria and South Africa had been removed. He therefore announced:

In our thinking, apartheid is dead; South Africa and Nigeria can now play their rightful roles in Africa. We must help our continent, especially in view of developments in Central and Eastern Europe... the era of separation would end with this visit just as apartheid has ended (Pik Botha quoted in "Nigeria Receives South Africa ", Newswatch April 2, 1992:17-18).

In concrete terms, Nigeria and the other frontline states applied pressure that prompted the OAU to establish the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, or CODESA. It was the first time that all parties took part in the constitutional debates that accelerated the death of the atavistic apartheid dragon in 1994. The marriage of all parties in South Africa under CODESA produced the 1994. South Africans reduced their old national flag of pain and oppression on April 25, 1994, for millions of black South Africans, and history was made to generate a 'patriot' from a 'felon,' Nelson Mandela, who three decades after imprisonment became the first black South African president with a new national flag and anthem singing Nkosi, sikhelel'i Africa (God Bless Africa).

2.1.6 Nigeria and South Africa in the Post-Colonial Era

Because of their dual nature, post-apartheid ties between Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa are difficult to analyze. On the one hand, the end of apartheid and the restoration of both nations to elective civil government based on universal suffrage present enormous prospects for African commercial linkages and political leadership. On the other hand, these opportunities foster rivalry and conflict among them³¹. What accounts for the latter is that each country seeks to maximize its national interest in relation to the other, resulting in recurring rivalry. Nigeria's connections with the decolonized nations in post-apartheid South Africa have been less than expected. Part of the reason for the slow pace was Nigeria's hasty normalization of relations with South Africa's racist leadership near the conclusion of the country's battle to abolish apartheid. South Africans felt deceived, abandoned, and sacrificed in order to further Nigeria's economic

interests in South Africa. The Nigerian government's shift in attitude and rapprochement with South Africa's racist regime at the time of the introduction of a 'promising' political reform by the racist regime in South Africa's political development was interpreted by South African aborigines and freedom movements as Nigeria's policy of gradual loss of steam and abandonment of black South Africans in the struggle to mount international pressure for the goals of complete dismantling of apartheid. Even more aggravating was the fact that Nigeria had become a frontline state, leading six others. Furthermore, as the OAU's chairman at the time, South Africans perceived Nigeria's stance as one that may have a ripple effect among OAU member-states and limit maximal attempts to tighten the noose around the apartheid dictatorship. If that had happened, black South Africans would have been left to their fate. As a result, the African National Congress, ANC, and the Pan-African Congress, PAC, swiftly expressed their displeasure with Nigeria for allowing racist South African President Frederick W. de Klerk, his wife Eunice, and a 50-man entourage to visit Nigeria.

The group accused Nigeria of arranging the visit without informing them. Although Nigeria attempted to argue that De Klerk's visit gave South Africa political power to fight for membership in the OAU, of which Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida was chairman, the seed of doubt and treachery had been sowed in the minds of South Africans. Others, though, contended that the mending of relations between Africa's two titans was to better their economic links and support the idea of a post-apartheid South Africa. Kent Durr, South Africa's Ambassador to London, is of the latter school of thinking. He noted that Nigeria in the West and South Africa in the South hold the keys to the progress of the continents (read: "South Africa. Foe No More " Newswatch, October 28, 1991). In response to the "death of apartheid in South Africa," Durr advocated for reform and pushed Nigeria to develop business links with the nation.

According to him, improved relations between the two countries, combined with Nigeria's experience in ECOWAS, would benefit the goal of forming the African Economic Community, AEC, from the 16-member Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, the 19-member Southern African Development and Economic Coordinating Conference, SADECC, and the Meghreb Union.

On the Nigerian side, South Africa's creation of a military station in Equatorial Guinea under the backing of Western imperialists in order to destabilize Nigeria continues to send troubling signals to Nigerian foreign policy Thrusts. Although it was diplomatically resolved, as mentioned by Eke, South Africa's role in destabilization operations against Nigeria has not ended. Because of the availability of oil, Equatorial Guinea has remained a worldwide cynosure for the West. Its strategic location is also of geostrategic interest to Nigeria because to its potential for use against the country. In 2005, Mark Thatcher, son of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had tried and failed with an objective to unseat President Theodor Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea in an attempted coup plot. The fact that Mark Thatcher operated from South Africa (read: "Thatcher's Son Pleads Guilty to Coup Charges..."³²), is yet another pointer. The overall fear is that the process could have enthroned an anti-Nigeria leadership in Equatorial Guinea.

Discrimination against Nigerians in South Africa has also characterized post-apartheid ties between Nigeria and South Africa. Uneasy relations between Nigerians and South Africans may be viewed as a logical byproduct of long years of prejudice and misery. South Africans are hurt that immigrants, particularly Nigerians who have stayed there, are succeeding in their fields. Nigerians and their hosts in South Africa have been at odds for some time. For example, during xenophobic attacks against foreigners in 2008, numerous Nigerians were slain by South

Africans. The Nigerian embassy in South Africa reported that numerous Nigerians were slain in extrajudicial circumstances in 2007, in addition to reports of harassment, intimidation, and brutalisation by South African police and security forces. In an effort to explain the situation, the South African Ambassador to the United States, Welile Nhlapo stated that:

Nigerians are unfortunate that in certain cases, any Nigerian who is in trouble with the law, it is blown out of proportion. The media in our country (South Africa) is not helpful because they take some of these issues and blow them out of proportion. There is the problem of unsolved crime where people begin to say, it is these foreigner because they are not able to trace them³³.

South Africa's authorities in back-passing dismissed the severity of that case to the legal status of aliens and the principle of reciprocity³⁴. Nigeria's citizen diplomacy was therefore put to the test, as her 45,000 to 100,000 citizens who contribute to South Africa's economic growth should be safeguarded by active diplomatic engagement with the South African government. With Nigeria's tremendous political and economic assistance, South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia profited greatly from Africa's battle against colonialism and apartheid. Surprisingly, South Africa's post-apartheid ties with Nigeria have not been robust or promising. Another factor contributing to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa³⁵. Due to the operations of Nigerian 'criminals' in South Africa, much of South Africa's goodwill toward Nigerians for assisting the country during apartheid has vanished. Between 1994 and 1998, Nigerian organized criminal gangs, largely involved in illegal drug trafficking in South Africa, expanded dramatically. If Nigeria is pressed to engage in constructive and reciprocal interaction with South Africa, the chances for reconciliation between the two African giants would decline, and Africa's economic integration will suffer as a result.

South Africa is a corporate powerhouse in Nigeria, home to the world's biggest mobile telecommunications network, MTN. An estimated 55 South African businesses were conducting

business in Nigeria as of mid-April 2003. The MTN is the single largest investor. It entered the Nigerian market through the first African telecommunications auctions procedure in January 2001, when it was given one of Nigeria's Global System Mobile Licenses for a cost of US\$ 28 million. MTN's entry into the Nigerian market was the company's single largest investment outside of South Africa at the time. MTN had invested more than \$1 billion in infrastructure and other start-up expenditures in Nigeria by the end of 2003. According to BBC's William Wallies, MTN connected as many mobile phones in six months as NITEL built landlines in the decade it monopolized telecommunications. MTN's user base has risen to 1.7 million by the end of 2004. MTN earned R 2.4 billion in after-tax profit from its Nigerian operations in 2003-2004, accounting for 55.8 % of its overall earnings from non-South African businesses. Aside from MTN, data reveal that there are approximately 20 significant South African corporations working in Nigeria. These included, Eskom, South African Airways, Stanbic Bank, Multichoice /M-Net and Umgeni Waters. Others are Defresh Products Nigeria Ltd, South Africa-Nigeria Communications and Systems Ltd, Grinaker- LTA Construction Ltd, Protea Hotels, Critical Rescue International, Global Outdoor, Semces and Oracle Airtime Sales, among others. On the contrary, however, there are only few Nigerian companies in South Africa like Union Bank, First Bank, Philips Consulting News media, Financial Standards and This Day Newspapers.

Small-scale Nigerian businesses in South Africa that are insignificant. Other developments have put the degree of trust in Nigeria-South Africa ties to the test. Because Nigeria and South Africa hold the ace to Africa's future, good ties between them should be viewed as the unavoidable political prerequisite to Africa's economic freedom. However, there are other trends that might be leveraged to get access to Nigeria and South Africa's low degree of collaboration. The South African press portrayed Nigeria negatively. They like to make Nigerians' involvement in drug

trafficking, money laundering, and other related activities the top pages of their print media. The loss of Nigeria's renown, power, and prestige was highlighted when Zimbabwe had to pit its candidate, Benard Chidzero, against Nigeria during the OAU defense for an African successor to United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuella. Also in Angola, despite Nigeria's attempts to achieve the country's independence, the first request from Nigeria to operate a fishing trawler was denied. Only until Nigerian foreign policy is contaminated with the international rigor inherent in leadership will this phantom of humiliation vanish.

2.1.7 The Political Economy of Regional Trade Policymaking

2.1.7.1 Nigeria

Given Nigeria's long history of support for continental integration and its important participation in the early phases of AfCFTA discussions, the country's refusal to join the AfCFTA Agreement was rather surprising. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari stated in January 2018 that "it is Nigeria's view that, as African leaders and major architects of our Union, we must immediately accelerate steps to finalize the discussions and create the Continental Free Trade Area"³⁶. The AfCFTA Agreement was backed by Nigeria's Chief Trade Negotiator and the country's National Committee for AfCFTA Negotiations in the run-up to the Kigali Summit, and it was ratified by the Nigerian Federal Executive Council. However, President Buhari opted not to attend the Kigali Summit at the last minute, claiming the necessity for more internal deliberations on the AfCFTA³⁷.

This section examines the political economy of Nigerian trade policymaking, highlighting significant individuals, institutions, and other variables that drive trade policymaking in Nigeria and have influenced Nigeria's involvement with the AfCFTA process, including the choice not to

sign the AfCFTA Agreement. As a result, the section outlines the persons, organizations, and institutions who are likely to have an impact on whether – and how well – Nigeria implements the AfCFTA.

Structural Factors

Several 'structural' variables have formed the context in which Nigeria's formal and informal trading institutions, or 'rules of the game,' have emerged. Nigeria is a "magnet for transnational movements of commodities and people in the area" due to the size of its domestic market and its lengthy and porous borders with neighboring nations. The vast domestic market in Nigeria also supports a rather robust industrial base, at least by West African standards. Nigeria's strong economy provides 'economic power,' which contributes to the country's influence in West African politics, and the country is claimed to have used its 'unofficial veto' in ECOWAS issues to obtain several concessions and opt-outs on regional trade concerns. Several 'structural' variables have formed the context in which Nigeria's formal and informal trading institutions, or 'rules of the game,' have emerged. Nigeria is a "magnet for transnational movements of commodities and people in the area" due to the size of its domestic market and its lengthy and porous borders with neighboring nations. The vast domestic market in Nigeria also supports a rather robust industrial base, at least by West African standards. Nigeria's strong economy provides 'economic power,' which contributes to the country's influence in West African politics, and the country is claimed to have used its 'unofficial veto' in ECOWAS issues to obtain several concessions and opt-outs on regional trade concerns³⁸.

Another significant structural reason is Nigeria's wealth of oil and gas resources, which has resulted in the establishment of a "very opaque" oil economy characterized by "pervasive rent capture" and has significantly contributed to the country's bad governance and corruption record.

Oil rent redistribution supports Nigeria's "live and let live" political arrangements, but the country's oil dependence, notably for government income and foreign exchange profits, is problematic,³⁹ has stifled growth in other sectors and undermined efforts to diversify the Nigerian economy. As a result, Nigeria's merchandise exports are dominated by oil,^{40 41} and the country exports relatively little to other African countries. In 2016, Nigeria's merchandise exports to other African nations accounted for less than 15% of total exports.

The necessity to provide jobs for Nigeria's huge, youthful, and fast increasing population has prompted the Nigerian government to redouble its efforts to diversify the economy. However, inadequate infrastructure, unstable electrical supply, and rampant corruption pose significant obstacles to this goal. Nigeria's unfavorable business climate – the nation ranks 145th out of 190 countries in the World Bank's Doing Business 2018 report for ease of doing business – is a primary driver of informality in Nigeria, encouraging "a culture of adapting and improvising rather than obeying the rules." Finally, there are regional, ethnic, and religious divides³⁹ have shaped Nigeria's 'political settlement'⁴², which, is "evolving into a competitive clientelist one", characterised by short time horizons and weak implementation capacities. These differences also have an impact on public policy debate in Nigeria, as group solidarity frequently outweighs objective appraisal of policy recommendations⁴³.

Institutions

Against this context, Nigeria's trade policy has emerged as extremely protectionist, "arbitrary," "opaque," and occasionally "ad hoc," with the nation placing 183rd in the Doing Business 2018 report in terms of ease of dealing across borders.

National Trade Policy

Nigeria presently has no trade strategic strategy framework in place. The country's national trade policy was last revised in 2002, and several trade-related regulations in Nigeria are out of date. Nigeria also lacks an appropriate legal framework for enforcing trade remedies. The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan, the current government's economic strategy, gives limited direction on trade concerns, concentrating mostly on the need to diversify the country's export base⁴⁴.

Nigeria's policy inconsistency on trade reflects the absence of a guiding policy framework for trade, which is part of a larger pattern of inconsistency in economic policies⁴⁵. Nigerian administrations have often changed tariff and non-tariff measures in recent years⁴⁶. Representatives from the private sector lament the fact that many trade policies and instruments that have been enacted have only been partially or not at all implemented⁴⁷. Because of governmental inconsistency and inability to adequately implement policies, the trade regime has become unpredictable, increasing uncertainty for enterprises and discouraging investment. Nigeria's present trade policies and policy tools form a severely restrictive trade policy framework. Several imports are prohibited, while many others face high and fluctuating taxes or special levies. These trade restrictions are intended to preserve domestic industries such as cement, rice, autos, sugar, and poultry, and are supplemented in certain cases by incentives such as access to import permits or concessionary loans for investors who engage in backward linkages in these industries. There are also numerous goods for which the Central Bank does not provide foreign exchange. This boosts expenses for domestic businesses that rely on imported supplies and has encouraged some enterprises to relocate manufacturing to neighboring nations with greater access to foreign exchange⁴⁸.

The Nigerian government is having difficulty enforcing trade policy tools. It has, for example, been unable to sufficiently monitor whether beneficiaries of import permits have established the necessary backward links to receive the licenses, or to verify that customs personnel are not allowing unlawful goods into the nation in return for bribes. Government incentives for backward linkages in the rice industry have benefited "political farmers' middlemen who utilize political connections to get loans or vouchers and pass them onward for profit," while large-scale smuggling has continued to exert lower pressure on domestic prices.

Nigeria maintains high tariffs and import restrictions to protect native businesses and foster industrialization, and local industries are often believed to struggle to compete in a "more open context"⁴⁹. Narrower business interests have also played a role in the implementation of protectionist measures. Nigerian politics is highly impacted by "the robust lobby of manufacturers' strong protectionist interests" in pursuing protection for their specific items of interest. Their success is determined on their political ties and influence. The existing trade protection for vehicles arose from tight political ties between a new indigenous automobile manufacturer and previous government members. Similarly, Aliko Dangote, Nigeria's richest billionaire, who gained his money in cement, makes no secret of the fact that he persuaded former President Olusegun Obasanjo to limit cement imports into Nigeria⁵⁰. Some trade policy decisions may also be motivated by the political elite's special interests. For example, during the president of Olusegun Obasanjo, who also owns a big chicken manufacturing enterprise, limitations on poultry imports were imposed⁵¹.

Regional Trade Arrangements

Nigeria, as an ECOWAS member, uses the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) for imports from outside the area and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) for

imports from other ECOWAS member countries. The ETLS aspires to abolish tariffs and non-tariff obstacles to intra-ECOWAS trade and to establish a regional free trade zone. However, ECOWAS member states' implementation has been delayed and inconsistent, and tariffs and non-tariff obstacles to intra-ECOWAS trade remain. As a result, regional trade costs remain high, and intra-regional commerce is limited. In 2016, Nigeria exported just about 6% of its overall exports to other ECOWAS members.

Nigeria has "displayed a lack of leadership" in respect to the ETLS and ECOWAS, CET, and has previously acted "obstructively," delaying ECOWAS discussions toward a free trade zone and customs union⁵². While Nigeria has (reluctantly) accepted regional trade tools, they have not been implemented especially efficiently. In the case of the ETLS, fraudulent behaviors by customs employees at border stations and checkpoints along trade corridors have hampered implementation. corruption and unofficial 'taxation' on cross-border commerce has become a rich source of money for unlawful patronage networks within state institutions" in Nigeria. Revenue objectives for the Customs Service give an incentive for customs personnel not to recognize ECOWAS Certificates of Origin or engage in other revenue-maximizing tactics because there is a paucity of publicly available information on the ETLS, many Nigerian traders are uninformed of their rights under the system^{53,54}.

While Nigerian enterprises are the most frequent users of the ETLS in West Africa, Nigerian customs processes are difficult and time-consuming⁵⁵. It is also difficult for traders to register products under the ETLS and to make international trade payments through formal channels. These characteristics create substantial incentives to adopt informal trade channels, contributing to huge amounts of unrecorded 'informal' commerce across Nigeria's borders^{56,57}.

The ETLS's effective implementation has also been hampered by a significant amount of smuggling across Nigeria's borders. Prior to the recent implementation of the ECOWAS CET, Nigeria's high tariffs (in comparison to its neighbors), extensive use of import restrictions, and capacity constraints at its ports created incentives for traders to import goods from outside the region into other ECOWAS member states, particularly Benin, and then smuggle these shipments across the border to their intended destination in Nigeria⁵⁸. The harmonisation of Nigerian tariffs with those of its neighbors under the ECOWAS CET has reduced but not eliminated such smuggling, partly because Nigeria maintains certain higher tariffs on a number of items and has implemented additional steps to restrict imports from neighboring nations. Nigerian stakeholders claim that unethical methods in neighboring countries continue to allow non-ECOWAS items to enter the country through the ETLS⁵⁹. Smuggling is assisted by extensive corruption at border stations, which the Nigerian government either "turns a blind eye" to or actively engages in. Collusion between businessmen and customs officials is common, and it is compounded by "politicians who purposefully establish obstacles to generate political donations".

The apparent "ambivalence" of Nigeria toward regional trade integration reflects local opposition from both interest groups and rent-seekers. Many Nigerian stakeholders believe that regional trade liberalization threatens the country's industrial industry, which is primarily focused on servicing the home market. The Nigerian Senate called on the Federal Government to suspend Nigeria's participation in the ETLS and CET in 2016, claiming that these instruments had harmed the manufacturing sector and encouraged manufacturing firms to relocate to neighboring ECOWAS states to "manufacture and ship same products back to Nigerian market at zero duty"⁶⁰. The successful deployment of the ETLS would also pose a challenge to "systemic

corruption" at Nigerian borders. The "beneficiaries of these corrupt acts" have a strong interest in opposing trade barriers and limiting merchants' access to information.

Trade Policymaking

The Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMITI) is formally responsible for trade policy in Nigeria and hosts the Enlarged National Focal Point on Trade (ENFP), which facilitates stakeholder consultation and gives advice on trade policy⁶¹. Before going to the Federal Executive Council for approval, the Economic Management Team (EMT) acts as a clearing house for economic policy ideas, particularly those on trade. In recent years, these authorities' consultation with non-state players on trade-related issues has been insufficient, resulting to a "uncertain atmosphere around Nigeria's trade policy process, weak coordination, and, significantly, little to no voice for local stakeholders."

In 2017, President Buhari established the National Committee for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA National Committee) and the Nigerian Office for Trade Negotiations (NOTN), headed by the country's Chief Trade Negotiator, Ambassador Chiedu Osakwe. The former is responsible for monitoring and advising the government on AfCFTA negotiations, while the latter is in charge of leading Nigeria's trade negotiations, ensuring proper coherence between Nigeria's trade policy and its position in trade negotiations, promoting better coordination among various national agencies involved in trade policymaking, and organizing consultations through the ENFP and AfCFTA National Committee^{62,63}.

However, these formal institutional frameworks have not been efficient in carrying out their stated duties. For example, in the case of the AfCFTA discussions, it is commonly acknowledged that stakeholder consultation was hurried and insufficient. This failure might be attributed in part

to capacity and organizational restrictions⁶⁴. For example, private sector representation in the ENFP is frequently limited to staff of industry associations, and the Nigerian government, according to one ENFP participant, is not receptive to rigorous analysis undertaken by ENFP members because government officials lack the technical knowledge to assess and use evidence-based analysis⁶⁵. Meetings of the AfCFTA National Committee, according to participants, were primarily used to debrief on the AfCFTA negotiations. Funding is another concern. The ENFP has struggled to raise finances for regular meetings, while the NOTN has been unable to organize discussions before of the Kigali Summit⁶⁶.

These difficulties are exacerbated by inter-agency disputes. NOTN assumed functions previously held by the Department of Trade under FMITI, and disagreements between the two agencies have emerged. Some FMITI officials have criticized the NOTN's mission and raised severe misgivings about its execution⁶⁷. These attitudes may have weakened the NOTN's clout in the signing of the AfCFTA Agreement. More broadly, institutional mechanisms established by President Buhari to address business constraints in Nigeria, such as the NOTN and the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC), face questions about their legitimacy and sustainability, as they are seen as initiatives of specific political leaders. Furthermore, their activities are not well coordinated. PEBEC, for example, is not completely integrated into trade policy deliberations⁶⁸.

The influence and efficacy of these official economic and trade policy tools is further hampered by the reality that influential actors influence policymakers through other, more informal channels. Some large corporations and industry groups prefer to engage political leaders on substantive problems directly rather than through technical committees or stakeholder forums. In other circumstances, this may be due to the lack of an efficient process for consultation through

formal channels. This appears to be the situation with the AfCFTA, where pre-Kigali talks with the corporate sector appear to have been hurried⁶⁹. Representatives from the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS), two important private sector organisations, stated that they were unable to obtain a "favourable answer" from the Chief Trade Negotiator via the AfCFTA National Committee⁷⁰. Following President Buhari's need for further domestic consultation following Kigali, these commercial sector organisations successfully fought for direct participation with the NOTN, allowing them to confer directly with the Chief Trade Negotiator on their AfCFTA stance⁷¹.

The opinions and interests of well-connected parties lobbying through informal channels tend to influence Nigerian political leadership in formulating trade policy choices, rather than positions and recommendations developed through official institutions, analysis, and consultative procedures⁷². President Buhari was apparently swayed by certain important business persons in his decision to withdraw from the Kigali Summit, therefore defying the advice of the FEC and NOTN that Nigeria join the AfCFTA⁷³. This demonstrates how direct relationships to political officials are critical in determining private actors' influence on Nigerian trade policy. It should come as no surprise that such individuals prioritize political relationships and utilize strategies such as giving to political parties and politicians to acquire connections and influence⁷⁴.

2.1.7.2 Actors, Interests and Agency

Beyond the structural and institutional considerations mentioned above, much of what happens in Nigeria's trade and regional integration agenda is determined by the interests and agency of many individuals functioning within those frameworks. They are critical for comprehending Nigeria's position and involvement in the AfCFTA.

2.1.7.3 The Nigerian Government

Interviews with officials from several government ministries involved in trade policy indicate that they all believe that the AfCFTA will benefit Nigeria. According to FMITI officials, the AfCFTA is beneficial to Nigeria since the country has the industrial basis to export to Africa as well as the potential to invest in other African countries, as Nigerian banks have done⁷⁵. Interviewees from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) believe that greater intra-African agricultural trade can help to reduce uncertainties in global trade, but they caution that special projects being implemented by the Ministry to achieve self-sufficiency must be protected (such as in rice production)⁷⁶. Although customs authorities are concerned about the AfCFTA's influence on their revenue objectives, they feel the AfCFTA provides adequate security for Nigerian business and that smuggling into Nigeria will rise if Nigeria does not join in the AfCFTA⁷⁷.

The perspectives of the country's political leaders, particularly the President, are critical to trade policymaking in Nigeria since they have the power to veto or approve agreements and programs. The President's position and interests are critical since he has final responsibility for approving (or not agreeing) to regional trade accords. For example, President Obasanjo, a "Pan-Africanist" and supporter of regional integration, is credited for brokering a deal over the ECOWAS CET that allowed Nigeria to participate in the CET⁷⁸. President Buhari, on the other hand, is not known to be very enthusiastic about regional integration or to be particularly decisive on economic policy issues⁷⁹. Concerning the AfCFTA, his actions look to have been swayed by a close group of advisors and prominent business people, as well as considerations of the AfCFTA's impact on Northern Nigeria, Buhari's home region and a region from which he draws

much of his political support, a not insignificant factor given that he is running for re-election in 2019⁸⁰.

2.1.7.4 The Private Sector

The Nigerian private sector's trade-related objectives are diverse, and some private sector players are better equipped than others to engage with government and influence policy choices. Consumers and small-scale traders, for example, are less organized and have less sway in trade policy discussions. Large and politically connected manufacturers, many of whom gain from protectionism, are better organized and more powerful in trade policy creation. The Dangote Group, for example, is frequently "associated with high politics in Nigeria" and has effectively exploited the political power of its chairman, Aliko Dangote. It and other major Nigerian industrial firms have lobbied the Nigerian government to provide domestic workers with protection⁸¹. Concerned about the AfCFTA, Nigerian manufacturers are fearful that the pact may indirectly open the Nigerian market to goods from China, the EU, and other non-African sources⁸². They also claim that the NOTN did not consult the private sector properly and that additional research is required to examine the possible impact of the AfCFTA on the Nigerian economy⁸³.

Some industries in Nigeria's services sector appear to be more amenable to regional and continental trade integration. Firms in Nigeria's successful 'Nollywood' film business perceive a market consolidation potential^{75,76,77}. Leadership on the African continent and to ensure protection of intellectual property, while financial services firms see opportunities in e-commerce partnerships^{78,79}. Meanwhile, the Nigerian Bar Association sees the AfCFTA as a "welcome 'disruption,' as it would offer a "new vista of legal practice - International Trade Law -

to Nigerian attorneys," among other things⁸⁰, The Nigerian services sector has not contributed much to trade policies or trade talks, and it is not represented in consultative organisations such as the ENFP. This may be changing, since the Nigerian Coalition of Services Industries was formed in July 2018 to act as a lobbying body for services trade⁸¹.

In terms of the AfCFTA and regional trade liberalisation in general, the main private sector associations in Nigeria may be split into two groups. On the one hand, there are MAN and NANTS, both of which are quite loud in trade policy debates. These two organizations cooperate and synchronize their trade policy viewpoints, emphasizing the need of protecting local industry. Two of their main concerns are the absence of a national trade remedy regime to apply rules relating to safeguards, antidumping, and countervailing measures, and the need for appropriate and properly enforced rules of origin to prevent Nigeria from becoming a "dumping ground" for goods produced outside Africa.

On the other hand, various chambers of commerce, such as the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Agriculture (NACCIMA) and the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), as well as other industry associations, such as the Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (NASME), are present (NASME). These organizations have a more varied membership, with companies from the manufacturing, service, and agriculture sectors represented. Despite their recognition of possible hazards associated with commercial integration, they have typically been more supportive of Nigeria's involvement in the AfCFTA⁸².

While it may come as no surprise that MAN would seek protection for local producers,⁸³ The cautious stance of NANTS on the AfCFTA is more difficult to understand, considering traders would profit from a complete deal. Aside from NANTS, merchants, particularly small-scale

traders, do not play a large role in Nigeria's trade policy procedures. One probable explanation is that they are afraid of being targeted by government authorities for tax audits and other types of regulatory enforcement, particularly in Lagos, where the state government has increased its tax collection efforts in recent years⁸⁴. Another factor is that many small merchants' or market organizations in Nigeria are used as vehicles of political advancement and mobilization by local politicians, limiting their ability to serve as pressure groups for their members' interests⁸⁵. NANTS believes that a robust Nigerian manufacturing sector will benefit merchants under the AfCFTA. This viewpoint, however, represents the opinions of its secretariat, which, according to one observer, is relatively disconnected from the membership⁸⁶. This, together with its contradictory stance on regional trade, raises concerns about how effectively NANTS stances reflect the interests of Nigerian traders.

Many private sector actors in Nigeria oppose trade liberalisation under ECOWAS or the AfCFTA because they believe the Nigerian manufacturing industry is vulnerable to import competition due to various supply-side constraints in Nigeria, such as an unfavorable business environment, poor infrastructure, corruption, and policy inconsistency. The numerous perspectives and particular concerns of various private sector players in Nigeria concerning the AfCFTA arose during the NOTN's statewide AfCFTA consultation and sensitization effort between March and October 2018⁸⁷. Consultations were held in each of Nigeria's six geographic zones with representatives from business, sector-specific groups, labor, think tanks, and civil society.

According to the communiqués published at these consultation meetings, while certain important players, including MAN, are worried about the possible impact of the AfCFTA, there is widespread support for the AfCFTA in Nigeria⁸⁸. However, this assistance is qualified.

According to stakeholders, if Nigeria is to participate in the AfCFTA, the Nigerian government must take additional steps to address, among other things, power supply challenges, improve the business environment, invest in trade infrastructure, assist informal traders in entering the formal economy, improve the efficiency of bodies that support Nigerian exporters, and tackle the issues of transshipment, dumping, trafficking, and other illicit trade practices⁸⁹.

According to interviews, private sector actors across the spectrum are skeptical of the government's capacity to successfully execute and enforce trade (and other) laws and agreements. A legacy of institutional and policy inconsistency, as well as a poor track record on policy implementation, has made it difficult for the Nigerian private sector to believe that the government will: successfully implement reforms needed to improve the business environment in Nigeria, thereby addressing the disadvantage Nigerian firms face when competing with foreign firms; follow through on incentives proposed to support Nigerian firms engaged in trade; or implement its obligations arising from international agreements.

2.1.7.5 Other actors

Along with MAN, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was among the most vocal in opposing President Buhari's signing of the AfCFTA Agreement, stating that opening the Nigerian market will harm employment⁹⁰. The fact that labor representatives were not sufficiently consulted prior to the signing of the AfCFTA Agreement appears to have been a key issue for the NLC, as its leadership appears to be more optimistic about Nigeria's participation in the AfCFTA following the sensitization and consultation exercise⁹¹. According to CUTS International research, consumers in Nigeria are underrepresented in trade decisions. Consumer advocacy organizations, such as the Consumer Advocacy Foundation of Nigeria, have been generally ignored in Nigerian

trade policy discourse, and as a result, policies have tended to favor producers' interests (e.g., local protection), rather than consumers' interests (e.g. lower prices).

Overall, the study and interviews reveal that, despite the legal structures and processes in existence, informal links between influential actors and the political class have heavily affected Nigeria's involvement with the AfCFTA. While their worries about the need for protection are understandable, especially given the current economic climate, the point is that these informal channels will continue to play a role in the official AfCFTA implementation process. Ignoring this truth will almost certainly lead to frustration later on.

2.1.8 South Africa

South Africa's political leadership recognized long in advance of the Kigali Summit that it would be unable to sign the AfCFTA Agreement⁹². The administration must submit foreign agreements for vetting by legal experts under the country's laws before signing them, which had not yet been done for the AfCFTA Agreement. South Africa's trade minister stated that such screening was necessary due to the uncertainty posed by the Agreement's incomplete annexes, as well as the fact that its chapter on rules of origin was "an empty circuit board"⁹³.

South Africa needs extra time to speak with experts and obtain legal guidance before signing the AfCFTA Agreement. But it also wants to show its support for the AfCFTA process and ideals, avoiding the kinds of blunders it has made in the past when it comes to continental diplomacy. To address this issue, South Africa offered the Kigali Declaration as a means of demonstrating support to the AfCFTA without joining the AfCFTA Agreement⁹⁴. It also dispatched a strong group to Kigali, which included the country's new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and trade

minister, both of whom emphasized South Africa's support for the AfCFTA and the country's determination to join the agreement as soon as it was able⁹⁵.

South Africa signed the AfCFTA Agreement in July 2018 at the AU Summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and has subsequently ratified the Agreement (in December 2018), indicating that it would deposit its ratification document at the February 2019 AU Summit⁹⁶. Despite worries about the incomplete AfCFTA Agreements Annexes, the country's choice to sign and ratify represents a strategic decision. South Africa does not want to risk ratifying the AfCFTA once it is in force. It wants to be involved in deciding the unresolved components of the Agreement, and in order to do so, it must be present at the negotiation table⁹⁷. In this context, it is worth noting that Nigeria was urged to withdraw from the AfCFTA discussions following President Buhari's absence from Kigali, despite the fact that Nigerian officials have continued to engage in other AfCFTA-related fora⁹⁸.

South Africa has been a key player in the AfCFTA discussions. Many AfCFTA member countries have little experience negotiating some of the problems included by the Agreement, but this is not the case for South Africa, whose officials have extensive expertise negotiating trade accords. This expertise was put to good use during the negotiations, when South Africa was effective in supporting its stance on issues such as origin rules and the number of ratifications necessary for the Agreement to enter into force⁹⁹. The remainder of this part examines the political economics of regional trade policies in South Africa in order to identify the individuals and circumstances that affect South Africa's AfCFTA views (and on regional trade more generally). In doing so, the section highlights the major actors, institutions, and other elements that are likely to impact South Africa's position in regard to the AfCFTA and the country's ability to effectively implement the AfCFTA Agreement

2.1.7.3 Structural Factors

Two sets of structural considerations have had a disproportionate influence on South Africa's approach to regional trade integration. The first group of issues includes socioeconomic factors such as the country's high levels of poverty, inequality, and unemployment. South Africa is the world's most unequal country, according to World Bank data,¹⁰⁰ with the top 10% obtaining a disproportionate amount of national wealth and 79% of South Africans living in homes "with income per person less than the minimum wage"¹⁰¹. Poverty disproportionately affects the black people, a lingering legacy of apartheid. The country also has extremely high levels of unemployment. According to recent figures, 6.2 million persons of working age are unemployed, resulting in a 27.5 % official unemployment rate, one of the highest in the world. This statistic, however, excludes 'disappointed employees,' who are prepared to work but are not actively seeking for work. Including these individuals raises the unemployment rate to 37.3 %¹⁰².

These elements influence South African labor relations, political debates over economic development, and state-citizen interactions. They also have a significant impact on the country's economic policymaking. Key economic and industrial policies in South Africa, such as the National Development Plan (NDP), New Growth Path, National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF), and Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), seek to encourage and promote value-added, labor-absorbing industrial production in order to generate employment and sustainable development.¹⁰³

The second category of essential structural elements is related to the economic structure of South Africa. South Africa's economy is bigger, more diverse, technologically advanced, and better connected into the global economy than that of its SADC neighbors and most African countries. South Africa features Africa's largest manufacturing industry, a mature services sector, and an

advanced capital market. Furthermore, South Africa's economy is home to a number of significant indigenous global corporations. These factors have contributed to substantial amounts of South African exports and investment to the rest of Africa, particularly to SADC nations. Africa has emerged as South Africa's most significant export market, notably for manufactured products: more than a quarter of South Africa's exports (27%) and almost two-thirds (64%) of its manufactured goods exports go to other African nations¹⁰⁴. South Africa also runs a large trade surplus with both SADC and Africa as a whole¹⁰⁵. Furthermore, since its huge and fairly sophisticated retail, telecommunications, and financial services corporations, among others, have developed their presence in markets across Africa, notably in Eastern and Southern Africa, South Africa has become one of Africa's greatest investors. These tendencies have fueled dissatisfaction in neighboring African nations over South African corporations' dominance in their local markets, as well as worry within South Africa's government about the need to import more from the area¹⁰⁶.

2.1.7.4 Institutions

National Trade Policy

South Africa's national trade strategy is outlined in the Trade Policy and Strategy Framework, which was enacted in 2012¹⁰⁷. The Framework identifies trade-related measures that will contribute to the economic development objectives outlined in the NDP and New Growth Path, as well as respond to the policy frameworks' call for "'developmental' trade policies to encourage and upgrade value-added, labor-absorbing industrial production"¹⁰⁸. The Framework outlines the government's goal to utilize trade policy as an industrial policy tool. It suggests, among other things, a "strategic tariff policy" approach in which selected tariffs are employed to safeguard commodities produced by industries deemed strategic in terms of employment or value creation.

While South Africa's economy is largely open, the country's manufacturing sector receives much greater tariff protection than other sectors, with industries that feed the local market, such as clothes, textiles, leather, and automotive, receiving the greatest protection. The South African government is hesitant of negotiating trade treaties that might limit its domestic policy space due to its proclivity to utilize trade policy as a vehicle of industrial policy. South Africa's trade strategy has also grown increasingly Africa-focused in recent years, reflecting the continent's rising importance in South Africa's total commerce. Trading with Africa has become "the major strategic direction in South Africa's trade strategy" in several regards¹⁰⁹ and the government increasingly emphasises the need to promote intra-African trade¹¹⁰. South Africa promotes its 'developmental regionalism' approach in all of its regional trade interactions¹¹¹. This strategy aims to combine market integration initiatives with regional infrastructure development cooperation and a significant emphasis on industrial growth. This strategy matches South Africa's own policy of utilizing trade policy as an industrial policy weapon. However, this approach lacks a defined plan for trading in services.

Regional Trade Arrangements

South Africa is a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), together with four neighboring countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and eSwatini (previously Swaziland), collectively known as the 'BLNS' (until Swaziland changed its name). SACU is a colonial creation. It was founded in 1910, making it the world's oldest customs union. It is also likely to be Africa's "most integrated regional system," accounting for more than half of all intra-African commerce in products¹¹². South Africa dominates trade flows in SACU, accounting for more than 95 % of all intra-SACU commerce, with South Africa acting as either the importing or exporting country¹¹³. While the revised (2002) SACU Agreement does not address trade in

services (or other issues typically addressed by 'deep' regional integration agreements), "there is a high degree of de facto integration with regard to trade in services" in SACU, owing to South African firms' investment in the BLNS, a shared legal system, and mutual recognition of qualifications and standards¹¹⁴.

Because the regional entity that is supposed to handle the SACU CET has not been constituted, South Africa manages it. This enables the South African government to employ SACU tariffs to achieve national industrial policy goals. SACU's income sharing model gives the BLNS a disproportionate %age of SACU's revenue, partially to compensate them for having their trade policy effectively dictated by South Africa and being a captive market for South African enterprises. South Africa has attempted to renegotiate the SACU income sharing formula, concerned about the rising costs of this arrangement. The BLNS have opposed this since they have grown more reliant on the current structure as a source of government revenue: in certain years, SACU revenues account for more than half of overall government revenue in Lesotho and eSwatini¹¹⁵. As a result, efforts to revise the SACU income sharing agreement have made little headway¹¹⁶.

Because SACU is a customs union, member nations are expected to negotiate and sign all trade agreements with third parties as a group. While this has not always been the case, South Africa signed a bilateral FTA with the EU in 1999¹¹⁷ - Despite the difficulty of continually maintaining unified viewpoints, SACU member states have traditionally negotiated regional trade accords together. Nonetheless, SACU views in regional trade talks tend to mirror South African national interests. South Africa is also a member of SADC and was a "driving force" in the formation of the SADC Free Trade Area (SADC FTA). The fact that South Africa/SACU was willing to offer tariff-free access to the South African/SACU market for almost all SADC goods, while allowing

other (non-SACU) SADC member states to maintain tariffs on many South African goods, contributed significantly to the 'full realization' of the SADC FTA in 2012. South Africa's leadership on the SADC trade integration agenda, on the other hand, is "seen as self-interested and vulnerable to a large degree of animosity and rejection from neighboring nations." South Africa dominates intra-SADC commerce, exporting substantially more than it imports.

The country's impact on SADC market integration may be seen in a variety of ways. South Africa has supported a shift in focus from deep integration to 'consolidating' the SADC FTA and complementing it with efforts to expand the FTA through the Tripartite Free Trade Area and cooperation on industrialization and infrastructure development in line with the South African model of developmental regionalism. A big regional market is appealing to South Africa, but moves to enhance SADC integration would decrease domestic policy space for its own industrial policies. South Africa's influence can also be seen in SADC's limiting, product-specific rules of origin, which serve to protect South Africa's manufacturing industries from regional competition, as well as in SADC's conservative approach to trade in services, which reflects South Africa's concern about the impact of opening up its domestic services sector to foreign competition through regional trade agreements on its domestic policy space¹¹⁸.

South Africa benefits from SADC's wider market, since the region accounts for around a quarter of South Africa's merchandise exports. Tariff liberalisation under the SADC FTA, however, has been countered by certain SADC member states' increased use of non-tariff barriers, including discriminatory levies designed to boost indigenous businesses and protect them against imports, mainly from South Africa. Some in the South African business sector have expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of SADC enforcement measures to guarantee compliance with

regional agreements, as well as the South African government's inability to hold other SADC member states accountable¹¹⁹.

South Africa is also negotiating the establishment of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA). Twenty-two member countries (out of 27), including South Africa, have already signed the T-FTA Agreement, which will enter into force after fourteen member countries ratify it¹²⁰. Initially, the T-FTA was proposed to address the issue of overlapping REC membership in Eastern and Southern Africa. However, owing to South Africa's desire that the T-FTA discussions not open up what had previously been negotiated (the 'acquis') at the REC level, the T-FTA has included a series of bilateral negotiations between nations and customs unions that do not already engage in an FTA with one another. SACU, for example, has secured market access deals with the EAC and Egypt.

Reconciling the three RECs' varied rules of origin regimes has been a major difficulty in the T-FTA discussions. COMESA and EAC utilize relatively simple and liberal general rules of origin, but SADC has more complicated and restrictive product-specific regulations, reflecting South Africa's concern about its neighbors being exploited as "conduits for transhipped commodities." South Africa, negotiating on behalf of SACU, was adamant on adopting SADC-style norms throughout the T-FTA negotiations. Despite the fact that the COMESA/EAC model was deemed more suited for developing nations, the fact that this approach was finally approved demonstrates South Africa's influence and effectiveness in the discussions.

Trade Policymaking

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is the government department in South Africa in charge of developing trade policy and negotiating trade agreements. The DTI is responsible for

coordinating trade agreements with other technical ministries such as those in charge of finance, economic development, agriculture, health, natural resources, and energy. Coordination is a constant difficulty, not just across government departments, but also within the DTI's different divisions and components. In addition, the DTI represents the government in talks with domestic stakeholders. The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), formed in 1994 to encourage involvement in economic decision making and foster consensus and agreement between government, business, and labor on social and economic policy, is the principal venue for such interaction.

The Trade and Industry Chamber (TIC) of NEDLAC serves as a platform for the government to brief business and labor on recent advances in South Africa's trade negotiations, as well as for the three parties to reach an agreement on South Africa's stances in trade discussions. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), South Africa's largest trade union federation, and other trade unions and trade union federations selected by the Minister of Trade and Industry are represented in the TIC¹²¹. Meanwhile, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), South Africa's largest federation of business organisations, and a limited number of additional industrial and sector associations represent business.

According to one former NEDLAC participant, the platform's impact and efficacy have declined since the mid-to-late 1990s¹²². There are also "structural restrictions" that prohibit it from operating as a "inclusive policy-making platform." According to a current NEDLAC participant, the meeting is overly formal and regimented, and it focuses on "high-level" concerns. As a result, it does not allow for adequate consideration of the technical or sectoral difficulties that the private sector faces in terms of trade¹²³. This forces firms to seek solutions through bilateral channels other than NEDLAC. The TIC appears to have morphed into a "reporting forum," in

which the government briefs business and labor on current negotiation decisions and then solicits feedback¹²⁴. The fact that government negotiators are engaging in both T-FTA and AfCFTA discussions at the same time has further constrained their availability for regular and thorough dialogue¹²⁵.

Another difficulty for NEDLAC is inclusivity, which, according to some, does not adequately represent small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs). Many consider BUSA as supporting large industry, particularly "white business and the already empowered," particularly after the Black Business Council, a founding member of BUSA, broke from the organisation¹²⁶.

Despite these obstacles, NEDLAC continues to play an essential role in trade policymaking by bringing together major public and commercial players to discuss significant trade problems. For example, in the framework of the AfCFTA, government and business have worked intensively on origin regulations¹²⁷. A business official in NEDLAC stated that the DTI and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, the two ministries in charge of the AfCFTA, were becoming more open and eager to engage in trade discussions. The DTI appears to have taken a more comprehensive approach to engage with business, attempting to supplement official NEDLAC processes by organizing value chain workshops in the framework of the AfCFTA, among other things. According to an automobile industry spokesperson, NEDLAC is "working nicely" for that industry¹²⁸.

2.1.8 Trade Relation between Nigeria and South Africa 2020

Despite fears of xenophobia in Nigeria and South Africa, bilateral commerce between the two nations reached \$2.9 billion in 2019, with promises of enhanced trade with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). According to the Nigerian Consulate in Johannesburg, Nigeria accounts for 64% of South Africa's commerce in West Africa and is one of the country's top three crude oil suppliers. According to the Consulate, in 2020, South Africa bought R35 billion (\$2.48 billion) in products from Nigeria, primarily crude oil, and exported R6 billion (\$425 million) to Nigeria¹²⁹.

While the economic connection may be viewed as a win-win situation, the balance of the relationship favors South Africa, according to the Consulate, emphasizing the importance of consolidating ties and addressing any irritants to the collaboration. In addition, the embassy claims to have granted 10,341 passports to Nigerian individuals in South Africa between March 2020 and May 2021. In a statement issued from Johannesburg, South Africa, Consul General Malik Abdul stated that the embassy had a backlog of 3,946 applications awaiting production, with 1421 applicants scheduled for data capture. The consul general stated that the Mission has 404 unclaimed passports and invited all persons whose passports were processed and awaiting as of August 2020 to come to the Mission for collection. The Consul also stated that the consulate was working hard to remove the COVID-19-induced lockout backlogs of applications, imploring the people to be patient while the mission worked to clear the backlogs. On the reintroduction of administrative fees and costs for lost passports, Abdul stated that the move was made to unify and standardize consular services after receiving clearance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abuja. The Mission has raised the price for missing passports from R1,500 to R2,000, as well as the admin fee of R120 for data capture. "In this regard, the Mission could not impose any

costs unilaterally without the approval or cooperation of headquarters." "The R120 admin charge applies to all services provided by the two Missions."

The Nigerian envoy stated that the decision was made to eliminate discrepancies in all consular services, noting that visa costs have now been standardised. In terms of the punishment for lost passports, Abdul said that 484 Nigerian passports were reported missing at the mission between August 2020 and May 2021, with a request for re-issuance. According to Abdul, it was revealed that the 'so-called' missing passport statements had criminal overtones and immigration law violations. "Fines were necessary to prevent persons from indulging in such offenses, in accordance with experience in other Missions"¹³⁰.

"At such an exorbitant rate of loss declarations, the alternative will be to submit such losses to Nigeria for processing," the ambassador explained. "This will save the booklet for real requests of re-issue, hence decreasing the backlog and burden on the Mission." Abdul revealed that the consulate had received a directive to halt processing of missing passports until additional instructions were obtained from headquarters. Following that, the consul general accused some Nigerian organisations in South Africa of "peddling distortions and downright falsehoods" against the Mission and his person. "These dissatisfied people have gone ahead to instigate other Nigerians with the purpose to sabotage the Mission," the Nigerian envoy stated. "Moreover, a lie and falsehoods regularly repeated amounts to propaganda that might be perceived as fact by the naive and undiscerning"¹³¹.

2.1.9 Nigeria-South Africa's Bilateral Relations

Expectations that Nigeria would play a crucial role in revitalizing Africa following its independence on 1 October 1960 had waned significantly by the time South Africa re-entered the

comity of states as a democracy in 1994. The only thing that remained unforgettable was Nigeria's involvement in liberating Africa from colonialism, as well as her unique support for the end of apartheid in South Africa¹³². Nigeria's declining prominence might be attributed to her economy, which failed mostly due to the country's repeated military governments.

However, the new democratic administration in Pretoria, the popular government of national unity (GNU) led by anti-apartheid hero President Nelson Mandela, soon resumed diplomatic ties with Nigeria in 1994, despite the latter being commanded by late General Sani Abacha's military leadership. The decision was made to recognize Nigeria's participation in the liberation of apartheid South Africa. Despite the establishment of an official alliance between Nigeria and South Africa, the Mandela-Abacha friendship fell short of African hopes due to mistrust and rivalry between the two governments. One of the significant problems was President Mandela's demand that Nigeria democratize in accordance with the Harare Declaration issued by Commonwealth Heads of State and Government in 1991¹³³.

Pretoria's assumption of moral authority to advise on democracy and human rights advancement was based on what South Africa had adopted as her pillars of foreign policy after 1994, but was misinterpreted by Nigeria's military junta as an attempt by Pretoria to set up competition between the two countries, in which Nigeria claimed she was not interested. Nigeria's side of the debate was a misrepresentation of the facts in and of itself. Military engagement in politics, for example, was already out of favor across the world. The relationship between the two nations was strained due to Abacha's ambition to retain power and Nigeria's egregious violations of human rights.

Nigeria had had a series of military juntas led by Major-General Mohammadu Buhari that ended the country's five-year-old democracy led by President Shehu Shagari. On August 27, 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida led another military takeover in Nigeria, often described as a "palace

coup." Babangida, the so-called "Maradona" of Nigerian politics, duped Nigerians in the early 1990s with unfulfilled promises of transfer to a democratically chosen administration. The transfers were often postponed, but the eventual result was the controversial annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, which professional experts deemed to be the most credible election ever conducted in Nigeria¹³⁴.

Because of international and domestic pressure, General Babangida resigned down and formed a weak government known as the Interim National Government, led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, who was sworn in as Nigeria's ninth head of state. The decision astounded Nigeria and the rest of the world since it did not include the self-proclaimed victor of the June 12 presidential election, Chief M. K. Abiola. The ING was widely seen as lacking a public mandate, therefore it was not surprising that the ING had lasted only three months when the then-head of state claimed to have resigned on November 17, 1993. In reality, it was another another coup in Nigeria. The sole difference between this and prior coups was the moderate nature of the military takeover, which might be linked to the ING's weakness. Given the circumstances that had brought it to office, the administration was widely considered as illegitimate.

General Sani Abacha, the leader of Nigeria's new military regime, announced the suspension of all democratic structures and activities, as is customary with military leadership, but to the public's dismay, constitutional provisions were quickly replaced by arbitrary decrees, paving the way for the junta to engage in gross human rights violations in defiance of the judiciary. Because Abacha was considered by many as an insider of Babangida's military junta, who could only further Babangida's agenda at Aso-Rock (Abuja), Nigeria's seat of power, the regime encountered unprecedented resistance from human rights groups and crusaders for democracy. In the face of opposition, Abacha used violent force through the State security apparatus.

Extrajudicial executions, assassinations, and torture by state security, as well as the suspension of civil freedoms and restrictions on political and labor affiliation, characterized the military regime. Nigeria has now entered one of the darkest periods of human rights violation in its history.

General Sani Abacha's determination to remain in power rather than democratize exacerbated the country's dismal human rights status by arresting and detaining Chief M. K. O. Abiola, largely regarded as the victor of the June 12, 1993 presidential election. President Nelson Mandela, who had risen to the status of international celebrity, visited Nigeria in 1995 to beg for Abiola's release. Banjo cited three key sources of pressure on President Mandela: the US administration of President Bill Clinton, African politicians, and Abiola's family and supporters. The Nigerian administration dismissed Mandela's visit as purely a sympathy tour, which South African diplomatic sources contested, and blamed Abacha for driving Nigeria into political difficulties like to what had occurred in Rwanda. At this point, Mandela's rising worldwide stature put increased pressure on him from Western and African leaders in both non-governmental and governmental organizations to accelerate efforts to resolve the Nigerian problem and secure Abiola's release. In April 1995, Mandela went a step further by sending Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a prominent South African Nobel Peace Prize recipient, to Abuja. The move had little effect since Abacha made no promises, and Tutu informed Mandela that his efforts had been futile. He did, however, encourage Mandela to talk with Abacha further.

Another blunder by the military dictatorship was the arrest of a group of supposed coup plotters suspected of attempting to destabilize the Abacha administration, the most notable of whom were General Olusegun Obasanjo (later Nigerian head of state) and Major-General Shehu Musa Yar' Adua. Mandela made another substantial effort to interfere in July 1995, sending his vice

president, Thabo Mbeki, to Nigeria. Mandela's decision was a planned attempt to capitalize on the diplomatic skills of his capable deputy, who had done so much for the ANC throughout the apartheid struggle. Between 1976 until 1978, he was the ANC's envoy in Nigeria, while Obasanjo was Nigeria's military head of state. Mbeki's three-day working visit was fruitless since Abacha made no commitment to free Abiola and other key political inmates.

Mandela's confidence that he had secured General Sani Abacha's clear assurance of pardon for the 'Ogoni nine' (Ken Sarowiwa and eight others) during the Commonwealth meeting in Auckland was dashed when he learned of their abrupt execution. Mandela felt misled after assuring fellow Commonwealth leaders that the executions would not take place. He claimed he had used his moral standing to dissuade Abacha from carrying out the hangings, and he angrily accused Abacha of acting like a terrified tyrant who indulged in extra-judicial executions. The British Prime Minister, John Major, said that Abacha was sitting on a volcano and threatened to blow it up beneath him. He urged the West to impose oil sanctions on Abacha's administration and to exclude Nigeria from the Commonwealth. This merely meant that Nigeria and South Africa switched places. During the apartheid era, Nigeria successfully advocated for South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth, which was successful and held until the end of apartheid¹³⁵.

On his return to South Africa, Mandela recalled his High Commissioner to Nigeria, George Nene, who had been harshly attacked by South African civil society organisations for neglecting to engage Nigerian opposition parties and being close to corrupt authorities in Abuja. Nigerian politicians believed Nene had gone too close to the opposition and had lost touch with the Abacha-led administration in Abuja. The diplomatic feuds between Nigeria and South Africa are mostly caused by disagreements in their perspectives on African needs. It may be said that

Nigeria is eager to lead Africa in any direction but is unable to do so at the moment, particularly in economic terms; whereas South Africa is capable but reluctant to make any kind of sacrifice for Africa. Africa is doomed in the twenty-first century if it must rely on the Nigeria-South Africa axis. Nigerian and South African predominance is untenable at this point. For both nations to build hegemony for African development, Nigeria must become more competitive in the global economy in order to achieve parity with South Africa for peaceful objectives that benefit the cause of its ties with South Africa. Such parity will boost Nigeria's growth while also allowing South Africa to show respect in its dealings with Nigeria.

During the apartheid era, Nigeria had a double standard with South Africa. Connections between post-independence Nigeria and the apartheid state in Pretoria were strained and combative, whilst relations between Nigeria and South African liberation organizations, particularly the African National Congress (ANC) were cordial. It was even more so since Nigeria made Africa the focal point of its foreign policy, committing to the continent's entire independence from colonialism and racism. Nigeria stood unwaveringly against colonialism on the African continent, as well as the racism that prevailed in South Africa before 1994. In the latter days of apartheid in South Africa, President de Klerk visited Nigeria in April 1992 to address bilateral concerns, primarily commercial connections. The study, on the other hand, analyses Nigeria and South Africa's diplomatic fluidity since re-establishing official relations in 1994 in order to understand the roots of the misunderstanding and its impact on both nations' relations, as well as to offer better methods to develop their relations. According to the report, Nigeria has played big brother duties in Africa since 1960 but is currently unable to continue with such big brother programs. South Africa, on the other hand, immediately realized African economic prospects and sought to build a neo-imperial presence on the continent. However, the study says that the two

African giants may coexist peacefully, but Nigeria must accelerate its growth in order to achieve parity with South Africa and build a strong alliance for Africa. It also observes that South Africa is the true African behemoth, but Nigeria conceals her internal problems via diplomacy, particularly with South Africa.

2.1.10 South Africa, Nigeria Mend Relations and Agree Trade Deals 2019

On Thursday, South Africa and Nigeria sealed 30 trade and cooperation agreements, weeks after a wave of violence against Nigerian nationals in Johannesburg and Pretoria strained relations between Africa's two largest economies. Mobs armed with homemade weapons attacked immigrants' shops and residences in September, resulting in at least ten deaths, scores of injuries, and up to 400 arrests. In response, Nigeria returned around 600 of its people who were residing in South Africa¹³⁶.

Presidents Cyril Ramaphosa and Muhammadu Buhari, at the conclusion of the Nigerian leader's two-day visit, expressed remorse for the violence and subsequent reprisal in Nigeria against South African enterprises, instead promising to enhance commercial ties. After being attacked by Nigerians protesting attacks on their countrymen in South Africa, the local divisions of South African telecommunications giant MTN and grocery chain Shoprite closed all stores and service facilities in Nigeria. "As the South African government, we have conveyed our great sadness for the attacks on foreign citizens and our rejection of all forms of bigotry and violence."

Ramaphosa stated to media. According to Ramaphosa, the two nations have signed 32 bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding in areas like as commerce and industry, research and technology, military, agriculture, and energy. Nigeria is South Africa's greatest commercial partner on the continent, accounting for 64% of overall commerce with the West

African Region. Beyond the economic connection, Buhari stated that anti-foreigner violence must be addressed immediately. "We resolved to take meaningful actions to avoid such regrettable situations from recurring in the future," Buhari stated¹³⁷.

2.1.10.1 Trade and investment

South Africa hosted the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission in Pretoria in November 2009. During the conference, it was announced that Oando, a Lagos-based energy company, had just been listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and that the Nigeria-based Dangote Group had spent a record \$378 million in South Africa's cement business. In 2008, the two states exchanged nearly \$2.1 billion. Total bilateral trade has risen to \$3.6 billion by 2012.

South African imports of Nigerian crude oil accounted for 83 % of trade in 2012. South African imports from Nigeria surged by 750 % between 2002 and 2012 (primarily due to increases in oil imports), whereas Nigerian imports from South Africa climbed by 130 %¹³⁸. The Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce exists to strengthen and facilitate bilateral commerce links between Nigeria and South Africa. Its headquarters are in Lagos, Nigeria, and its membership includes 315 firms that do business in both Nigeria and South Africa. It consists of blue-chip corporations, Nigerian corporations, and South African corporations. Concerns have been made by Nigerian businesses over the perceived fast development of South African economic interests in the nation.

2.1.11 Xenophobia and Migrants' Irritants in Nigeria-South Africa Relations

Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in literature; it has existed from the dawn of time, but it was most visible in the ancient Greek city state, when citizens considered foreigners as inferior to Greeks and referred to them (foreigners) as "barbarians"¹³⁹. Over time, xenophobia has come

to be recognized as a worldwide phenomena that spans continents. The term xenophobia was derived from the Greek words 'xenos' and 'phobos.' Xenos denotes a visitor, stranger, foreigner, or someone who looks to be different, but phobos denotes a terrifying and shivering sensation. The dread of an outsider or newcomer is referred to as xenophobia. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance defines xenophobia as the rejection of visitors¹⁴⁰. Fear and rejection manifest themselves in discriminating behavior, which frequently leads to violence.

Xenophobia is an emotional and behavioral bias against outsiders and persons seen as aliens. It is definitely a psychological state of mind that causes anxiety or hostility toward guests. They think xenophobia is an anxiety illness that arises when individuals of diverse historical ancestry come into touch with one another; it is regarded as disharmony and dislike of unusual objects or outsiders. An ingroup's impressions of an outgroup as they suspect the outgroup's behavior. In this usage, the "outgroup" refers to other nationalities or people of other countries¹⁴¹.

Migration concerns have occupied a number of bilateral and multilateral forums throughout Africa, as well as at the regional and global levels. The phenomena of migration has profound origins in human history. Human beings enjoyed the unrestricted liberty to shift their places of habitation until the early nineteenth century. Migration has long been a hot subject in international relations and diplomacy¹⁴². International migration is becoming an increasingly important component of international economic interactions and globalization. It is not just for humans; animals migrate as well, but human migration is fundamental to worldwide scholarly debate. It is the movement of a person or group of people across political or administrative boundaries in order to settle.

Migration is defined as the worldwide movement of individuals to a destination country where

they are not nations or citizens in order to live and settle permanently. These folks come to raise their families and work in the area. Early immigration theory stated that the fundamental choice to leave one nation for another was based on the predicted income of the receiving country in comparison to the migrant's homeland. The variance in income and earning possibilities among countries impacts migration flow and the -%age of migrants¹⁴³.

2.1.12 Xenophobia in South Africa

Riots erupted on May 11, 2008, in Johannesburg, South Africa's Alexander Township. Two individuals were killed and almost forty were injured in the first violent outburst. Several demonstrations erupted in the following weeks in a more informal community near Johannesburg, as well as in villages near Durban and Cape Town. Despite community members and local officials' efforts to protect them, hundreds of thousands of African migrants (regardless of their legal status) were targeted in massive eviction operations conducted by vigilante groups comprised primarily of jobless teenagers¹⁴⁴. The media covered the pogroms under the headline "South Africa Descends to Hell," usually presenting the iconic picture of a Mozambique refugee, Eonest Nhamuave, who was necklaced with a gas tire and set fire by a mob. At the end of the first wave of xenophobic demonstrations, sixty-two people had been slain and over a thousand had been displaced, forcing them to seek refuge in huge government colonies. One year after the May 2008 assaults, foreigners were still at risk of violence, and little progress had been made in addressing the root causes of these attacks. In late May 2009, articles on the return of xenophobia and attack organisations in the Western Cape were published¹⁴⁵. During this time, a population of 1,500 to 2,500 Zimbabwean agricultural labourers were forcibly removed from their homes. A few people were physically attacked, and their homes were plundered. This resulted in a large number of foreign nationals being displaced¹⁴⁶.

On May 30, 2013, Abdi Nasir, a twenty-five-year-old man, was stoned to death. The violence was recorded and widely disseminated on the internet. After three Somali merchants were assassinated in June 2013, the Somali government encouraged South African authorities to do more to ensure its residents' safety¹⁴⁷. On June 7, 2014, a Somali in his 50s was reported to have died, along with two other nationalities who were critically hurt after an irate crowd of locals stormed their business. On Friday, February 24, 2017, an anti-migrant rally was held in Pretoria. Demonstrators went so far as to bring a petition to the Foreign Ministry, claiming that migrants who seized employment from South Africans were the source of criminal activity in the country. One hundred thirty-six protestors were arrested during the march.

Against September 3rd, 2019, xenophobic assaults were carried out on Nigerians' property in Johannesburg. Police apprehended more than eighty persons, and five foreigners were proven deceased. Several foreign-owned businesses (mostly by Nigerians) were damaged in the unrest¹⁴⁸. Violent neighbors attacked foreign-owned businesses, burning Nigerians apprehended on sight, prompting several Nigerians to demand that South African enterprises such as Shoprite, MTN, and PEP be boycotted in Nigeria.

2.1.13 Migration of Nigerians to South Africa

Nigeria and South Africa are two African countries that have received international recognition and attention for a variety of reasons. Nigeria is the most populous black nation on the earth, with an estimated population of 180 million, whereas South Africa has a population of about 57 million. Despite their geographical separation in Western and Southern Africa, Nigeria and South Africa are both active in numerous aspects of the economy and politics. With the end of apartheid and the establishment of democratic rule in South Africa in 1994, the number of migrants from other African countries increased dramatically¹⁴⁹. According to the 2011 South

African Census, there are 2.2 million foreign-born South Africans¹⁵⁰.

There are several complicated and particular reasons why Nigerians choose to leave their country. According to existing literature, Nigerian nationals leave their homeland for economic and coercive reasons. There are a variety of reasons for migration, including growing tensions caused by disparities and resource sharing, intergenerational conflict relating to family and marriage, religious commitments, and a lack of adequate living circumstances. According to the International Organization for Migration's profile for Nigeria (2014), ongoing outbreaks of war, intra-state ethno-religious problems, and unemployment, among other factors, are contributing to migration to South Africa and other countries. Youths are influenced by success tales and tend to disregard failure stories or warning indications from other countries¹⁵¹.

2.1.14 Impact of Xenophobic Attacks on Nigeria-South Africa Relations

Nigeria and South Africa are two African countries that have received international attention and recognition for different reasons. While Nigeria, with an estimated population of 180 million people, is widely regarded as the most populous black country in the world, South Africa, with over 57 million people, has emerged as the global conscience of racial equality, having passed through and survived the throes of apartheid for decades before its eventual liberation, aided in part by global assistance and internal political struggle. Despite being located in West and Southern Africa, Nigeria and South Africa have been intertwined in each other's many aspects of life-social, political, and economic¹⁵².

The majority of xenophobic attacks and extra-judicial killings in South Africa have occurred in Nigeria. According to Mrs. Abike Dabiri-Erewa, Senior Special Assistant to the President on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, 117 Nigerians were extra-judicially assassinated in South Africa

between 2016 and 2018 for various specious reasons¹⁵³. These heinous deaths of Nigerians in South Africa have had a variety of consequences for Nigeria-South Africa ties.

2.1.14.1 Diplomatic Impact

Nigeria and South Africa have been striving to repair their diplomatic relationship after the 2008 anti-foreigner riots. Nigeria and South Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2013 to strengthen diplomatic ties and prevent future xenophobic assaults¹⁵⁴. Despite this, assaults against Nigerians have continued. Following the xenophobic assaults in Durban and Johannesburg in April 2015, Nigeria's Acting High Commissioner to South Africa, Martin Cobham, and the Consul-General, Uche Ajulu-Okeke, were 'asked' for dialogue (rather than 'recalled,' as several media outlets wrongly stated)¹⁵⁵. Though Nigeria's conduct did not result in a break in ties with South Africa, the South African Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation viewed it as a "unfortunate and regretful decision"¹⁵⁶.

2.1.14.2 Economic Impact

Following a wave of xenophobic assaults against Nigerians residing in South Africa, as well as looting of their businesses and establishments, a retaliatory attack was launched on a South African-owned corporation doing business in Nigeria. On February 23, 2017, the telecoms company, MTN, had its flagship office in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, ransacked and office equipment vandalised. Apart from MTN, there are over 100 South African companies (previously only four) operating in Nigeria's telecommunications, manufacturing, aviation, construction, banking, hospitality, entertainment, and oil and gas industries - Power Giant, Eskom Nigeria, South African Airways, South African Breweries (SAB miller), Stanbic IBTC Bank, MultiChoice Africa (operating DStv/GOtv), Umgeni Water, and Shoprite, to name a

few¹⁵⁷.

2.1.14.3 Social and Psychological Impact

Xenophobic attacks in post-apartheid South Africa have instilled fear in the minds of Nigerians throughout the years. For fear of being assaulted, if not killed, a lot of them in South Africa no longer interact freely with the locals as fellow African brothers and sisters with a common history, values, traditions, and so on¹⁵³. It should come as no surprise that some of the live Nigerian victims of anti-foreigner violence are now suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Many Nigerians are reconsidering their plans to visit South Africa for tourism, shopping, business, first degree/postgraduate education, and other purposes after hearing/reading on print and electronic media the horrifying news of the deaths of Nigerians residing in South Africa¹⁵⁵.

2.2 Theoretical Review and Framework

2.2.1 Economic Growth Theory

Rostow's Economic Growth Theory is about growth, and it is essentially the theory of progress and modernisation. Rostow employs the metamorphosis growth, or growing as an organism, in this circumstance. In economic terms, it refers to the transition from conventional to contemporary. Rostow theory is a five-stage method that all modern people have been taught in a conventional manner. Rostow has made several efforts to increase mass consumption. Capital is one of the attempts. A capital may have a significant impact on the economy and the development of a country. The capital in this context relates to a tax policy, foreign investment, and the international trade exchange rate. As a result, it can be stated that what Rostow's require to generate growth is money. For example, in Indonesia, there is what is known as a small-

medium firm or Usaha Kecil Menengah, which may aid the economic situation but also requires capital to become larger and more successful¹⁹⁰.

In addition to increasing GNP (gross national product), practically all economic development methods have been criticized for failing to maintain people's wellbeing. The methods exacerbated unemployment and inequality while also increasing absolute poverty. This notion cannot reach the world's poor, such as those who are on the verge of death. In reverse, this notion leads the affluent to become richer and the poor to become poorer¹⁹⁰.

Scholars rarely agree on or about a theory, yet there is one called 'growth and equality.' The concept is still in its early stages. All approaches to 'growth and equality' have one feature: they are all based on the classic development idea that growth or expanding GNP does not provide advantages to the poor in developing nations as quickly as feasible¹⁹⁰. It is clear that the poor want assistance as soon as the globe or the country can provide it since they are fighting to make ends meet. Revolutions do not occur in poor nations, although they do occur in Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Most countries are today considered developed, with a strong economy that is well-known across the world.

2.2.2 Trickle-down Effect Theory

The trickle-down theory is an economic concept that claims that lowering marginal and capital gains tax rates, particularly for firms, investors, and entrepreneurs, can promote total economic development. According to proponents of the trickle-down theory, this boost leads to economic development and prosperity, which helps everyone, not just those who pay reduced tax rates.

According to the trickle-down theory, lower tax rates encourage individuals to work harder since they get to keep more of their earnings. Then they begin to spend or invest that wealth, and any

of these behaviors will boost the prosperity of everyone, not just those in the highest income levels. Furthermore, because of the greater work accomplished, the government may wind up collecting more income tax despite the reduced tax rates. Many nations have seen the success of the development growth idea. The scenario in which growth has consequences and advantages due of the 'trickle-down effect' that occurs everywhere. Consider the benefits to the health-care system. Malaria and smallpox vaccinations have been successful in many developing countries' rural areas.

The trickle-down effect appears to be the transmission of good economics to the poor. According to this idea, the 'trickle-down effect' did not transfer from the wealthy to the poor. It can be observed in Indonesian country, how much the affluent people who have so many possessions and money, why poverty is merely becoming worse and worse. It's depressing to watch privileged people toy with money and throw it away to buy a high-priced purse. On the contrary, some youngsters are unable to purchase a backpack for school, even at a reduced price. It might not happen if the wealthy are charitable and concerned about the poor. It may have an impact on the general economic situation, but it did not appear to have an impact on the poverty rate.

2.3 Review of Empirical Studies

2.3.1 Empirical Review on Xenophobia Cases in South Africa

A study assessed anti-immigrant violence and xenophobia in South Africa as an untreated malady and potential snag for national development. In this study, xenophobia is identified as one of the most prevalent life-threatening challenges affecting foreign nationals in modern South Africa. In recent years, the country's Kwa Zulu-Natal province has seen a spike in hate crimes, which has spread to neighboring places such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Limpopo, and Cape

Town. The study intends to establish xenophobia as an untreated anti-immigrant violence and possible stumbling block to South African national growth. It used data from earlier research enquiries to attain the desired outcomes. The phenomena was explored within the context of criminology. According to the report, until South Africans are dragged back in time to see the benefits of Pan-Africanism, terroristic culture would continue to reoccur and eat deep into the nation's socioeconomic fabric¹⁵⁸.

A study was conducted on the intolerance, xenophobia and cross-border supermarket groups' operations in South Africa. The study looked at if there was a link between xenophobic assaults and the stock market value of South African grocery chains. The study conducted an event study analysis of important cases of violent attacks against foreign-owned establishments in South Africa from 2006 to 2017. Using an event research technique and an enhanced market model, the study found evidence that the stock market views these occurrences as bad news rather than good news for supermarkets with operations in South Africa and other regions of Africa, as they experience a 2.57 % decrease in abnormal returns. The findings are interpreted as the economic consequences of xenophobic acts coming from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This research aims to offer insight into the problems of peace-building and the potentially dire consequences of xenophobia on economic activity in South Africa. The study suggested that when discussing xenophobic attacks, which have become a persistent feature in South Africa and can result in significant losses to migrants' lives, one should acknowledge that some proponents of violence propose benefits of limiting migrants into the country, and cross-border firms suffer as a result of xenophobic attacks directed at their stores¹⁵⁹.

A study was conducted on modeling the phenomenon of xenophobia in Africa. The study proposed a prey-predator-like model of xenophobia in Africa using the notion of a competitive

predator-prey system. The boundedness of the solution, the presence and stability of the xenophobic model's equilibrium states are all examined. Based on the parametric circumstances of effective group defense and anti-xenophobic policy execution, the coexistence state was determined to be locally and globally stable as a special instance. Sotomayor's theory was used to further investigate the system, revealing that each equilibrium point bifurcates trans critically. However, numerical evidence revealed period-doubling bifurcation, further complicating Africa's xenophobic scenario. Tolerance, group defense, and anti-xenophobic legislation are key criteria for the cohabitation of foreigners and xenophobes, according to further numerical simulations¹⁶⁰.

A study assessed South Africa from apartheid to xenophobia. How to explain the violent xenophobic attacks in South Africa in recent years forms the basics of this study. Leonard Gentle and Noor Nieftagodien, two militant South African activists interviewed here, examine the race/class basis for anti-foreigner violence in terms of apartheid's echoes/reverberations and the emergence of neoliberalism. They contend that apartheid's legacies have persisted due to the replication of racial and tribal categories, which has led to the entrenchment of exclusionary nationalist politics and the disintegration of black unity. South Africa's peculiar history of capitalist growth, on the one hand, and the African National Congress' embraces of neoliberalism, on the other, have fostered the underlying conditions of precarity and desperation that have culminated in the normalization of xenophobia. Unions, too, have failed to recognize the changing contours of the "working class." Gentle and Nieftagodien argue that in order to resist the increasing tide of xenophobia and establish working-class unity, it is necessary to address wider socioeconomic factors such as the global economic crisis, neoliberalism, and the enormous inequities it creates¹⁶¹.

A similar study investigated the Nigeria-South Africa relations and the politics of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. This research is proposed as a potential addition to existing efforts in Africa to address the politics of xenophobia in order to improve strategic ties and collaboration between Nigeria and South Africa, considering their strategic relevance to the continent. To do this, the study used both qualitative and case-study methodological approaches. Data were therefore gathered from both primary and secondary sources, including the South African High Commission and the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others. However, the findings show that the reason for xenophobic politics is primarily economic, motivated by struggle for restricted finite socioeconomic resources. This study suggests that the government should pay special attention to the disempowering socioeconomic conditions of the black South African community and work to bridge the widening socioeconomic gaps between the rich white South African community and the poor black South African community in order to prevent further deterioration of diplomatic and citizen relations between the two states¹⁶².

Research was carried out a philosophical appraisal of Pan-Africanism as a remedy to xenophobia in Africa. In the world economy, globalization flourishes and thrives on migration. The study intends to highlight how xenophobia stems from a crisis of personhood and how it impacts African state unity. The inquiry focuses on what is inherent to Africa and her people as a cure for xenophobia in Africa. As a result, the study recommends Pan-Africanism. The study will examine how xenophobia stems from identity crises, which pose a danger to the unity that binds nations, and how this may be resolved by a thorough understanding of Pan-Africanism. At the end of the day, Pan-Africanism must be properly understood without nostalgia, as opposed to its current lukewarm character¹⁶³.

Another study examined the impact of xenophobia attacks in South Africa on regional integration agenda. The notion of regional integration, as discussed in this paper, has long been practiced in Africa. Regional integration is a viable option for achieving much-needed development on a joint effort and result basis. While certain actions imply a united state, others, such as xenophobia, impede integration development. South Africa is a member of the African Union, which recognizes eight regional blocs in order to ensure Africa's integration. South Africa is a member of the SADC regional bloc, which now consists of sixteen countries. South Africa has consistently rated first on several development measures, and many nations have drawn development lessons from the leading nation. The recurrence of xenophobic concerns has a significant influence on the nation's ability to lead the regional integration agenda. On several instances, South Africa has witnessed widespread xenophobic violence. The role of xenophobia as an obstacle to Africa's integration has not been addressed and acknowledged. Tracing back from 1994, post-apartheid, violent attacks on migrants and refugees has been escalating. Each time an attack occurs, it results in the loss of life, injuries, loss of livelihood, and irreversible property damage. To put a stop to these discriminatory and intolerant acts, action is essential. South Africa, like other African governments, should recognize its international weakness. Integration gives rise to strength. Isolation should not be allowed to impede development growth. Disintegrative problem-solving techniques should be abandoned in favor of emphasizing the importance and benefits of integrative or multilateralism approaches. The government must entirely remove the environment of impunity that gives the impression that immigrants are treated unequally before the law¹⁶⁴.

A study conducted a mathematical approach to xenophobia with the case of South Africa. Xenophobia is a societal evil that leaves a path of ruin in its wake. To get an understanding of

xenophobia and devise ways for controlling it, a mathematical model is developed and studied. When the associated threshold parameter is less than unity, the xenophobia-free equilibrium is proven to be globally asymptotically stable. Furthermore, the xenophobic equilibrium point exists only when the associated threshold parameter is bigger than unity and is locally asymptotically stable when it is greater than unity. The model analysis results indicate that negative peer influence increases the development of xenophobia, whereas therapy and jail decrease its growth. The findings of the numerical simulations indicate that, while counseling and jail can both reduce xenophobia, counseling of the exposed and xenophobic, together with incarceration, may be the most effective method for combating this threat¹⁶⁵.

An empirical-causative analysis was conducted on the politics of xenophobia in South Africa. This research attempts to bridge the gap by seeking to understand and advance reasons why politics has endured despite all efforts to solve it. While Brown Harry's scapegoating thesis, Pillay's relative deprivation of South African blacks, and Crush's cultural explanation, among many others, attempted to offer empirical views on the manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa, what is central to understanding the xenophobic phenomenon was inadvertently overlooked. As a result, the research regards "politics" as crucial to any attempt to comprehend the manifestations of xenophobia in South Africa. The overwhelming scientific discourses and perspectives provided by this study on the politics of xenophobia would therefore aid in closing the gap between the existing literature and the body of knowledge.¹⁶⁶.

A study examined public diplomacy and South Africa's response to xenophobia. In South Africa, the necessity to comprehend and grasp what is going on in the minds of an ingroup against an outgroup is a function of effective and practical public diplomacy (PD): a two-way strategy to managing allegedly shattered relationships. This entails communicating with and receiving from

the impacted individual, as well as sharing ideals. PD is oriented on changing other societies' thinking and developing relationships with them. It entails the broadening of a country's intellectual, economic, cultural, and political spheres of influence. The research intended to address the question of whether South Africa has been able to use public diplomacy to combat the country's prevalent culture of xenophobia. This study investigated this gap using the scapegoating theory of xenophobia as a lens. Using the purposive sample approach, the researchers discovered that xenophobia in South Africa stemmed from irritation and unhappiness. It found that the future of South Africa's socioeconomic growth lay in partnership with other governments through carefully crafted policies as well as constructive and positive media reporting to buffer the potentially destructive consequences of xenophobia on South Africa's worldwide image¹⁶⁷.

A study assessed xenophobia as racism. The research expands on the idea that what is commonly referred to as xenophobia in the media and scholarly literature in South Africa is actually systemic and structural racism entrenched in colonial and apartheid history. As a result, the term xenophobia, which denotes native South Africans' fear and hatred of foreign others, tends to conceal rather than reveal that systemic and structural constructs of racism on a global and local scale produce and locate black Africans from other countries in South Africa as alien and foreign others on the receiving end of nationalist and ultimately racist passions of hatred and violence. In a country that has not fully recovered from the homeland racist nationalism that divided South African black natives along geographical and ethnic lines, black Africans from other countries take the place of racialized and excluded outsiders who become targets for hatred, discrimination, and violation. In this sense, xenophobia is truly racism and the coloniality of

being and belonging that it entails. As a result, this study offers a decolonial explanation and interpretation of xenophobia as racism in South Africa¹⁶⁸.

An assessment on Nigeria-South Africa relations from apartheid to post-apartheid. This study examined the relationships between Nigeria and South Africa from apartheid to post-apartheid. Donald Campbell's realism conflict theory influenced the research. While data was obtained using secondary sources such as textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, and online resources, the data generated was examined using content analysis. The study's findings revealed that certain contacts existed between Nigeria and South Africa during the Apartheid era, including bilateral political relations and bilateral economic relations. During the post-apartheid era, there were potential breaches in ties between Nigeria and South Africa, which today have severe consequences in the fields of political and diplomatic, socio-cultural, and economic. Based on the findings, the study recommended, among other things, that Nigeria and South Africa engage in high-level diplomatic engagement as a means of repairing their unsavory relationship, and that the government of South Africa assist individuals from Nigeria who have suffered losses in rebuilding their businesses because of the attacks¹⁶⁹.

The study evaluated the dialectics of Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic relations in the post-apartheid era. The purpose of this study is to assess Nigeria-South African ties in the post-apartheid era. This is against the backdrop of the two countries' long-term tendencies and inconsistencies in their external ties. The research asserts, based on secondary evidence and the realist theory, that Nigeria-South Africa interactions have been characterized by the dynamics of cooperation, rivalry, and conflict. According to the publication, ties between Nigeria and South Africa have fluctuated between diplomatic amity and hostility. According to the report of this study, the relationship has exacerbated the xenophobic problem in recent years. This study

acknowledged that Nigeria-South Africa relations would deteriorate until the governments of the two nations pursue long-term peace through functioning bilateral contacts and diplomatic discussion¹⁷⁰.

In a study titled “what orders xenophobia in South Africa?” As noted in this study, xenophobia was thought to be a South African phenomenon; yet, it is a general tendency in current international relations when governments achieve economic advancement and migrants from other states seek kindness within such framework. South Africa, on the other hand, has received more attention due to the unrestrained engagement of its residents in fueling xenophobic views. This study studies xenophobia in South Africa from a policy perspective, studying South Africa's different refugee and migration acts and by-laws to determine the xenophobic potency of their contents. The study also considers the human relations reason for xenophobia. The study is both observational and exploratory in nature, as direct victims of xenophobia are interviewed, and xenophobia-related media content is examined. The study indicates that, like in South Africa, xenophobia is a worldwide phenomenon that benefits from uncontrolled policy and unregulated citizenry responses to migrants' intrusion into host countries' economies and social norms¹⁷¹.

A study evaluated xenophobia as an impediment to the spirit of a United Africa in the 21st century. Since the triumph of liberalism over fascist ideologies in the twentieth century, the rate of migration has increased. As a result, xenophobic attacks on immigrant populations occur, making it an important term in the vocabulary of global race relations. Ironically, xenophobia is not a new phenomena; consequently, the research investigates the problem in modern international relations using historical tools. The investigation begins with a journey to imperial Egypt, when "a Pharaoh who knew not Joseph" rose to the throne and the ramifications of a xenophobe as ruler on Judeo-Egyptian ties were observed. The discussion advances to

demonstrate that, regardless of circumstance, all peoples may be xenophobic. There is evidence in Anglo-American nationalism driven by the desire to maintain jobs for 'nationals'; a replication of the commercial phase of pre-industrial nations' protectionism. The article concludes with an emphasis on South Africa and its xenophobia, as well as the ramifications for African unification. The study relies on secondary sources to weave its ideas and proposes that Africans cultivate a spirit of tolerance and love as the world becomes a global society¹⁷².

A study assessed xenophobia in South Africa as a mirror on insecurity in Nigeria. The end of apartheid in South Africa, Africa's most industrialized country south of the Sahara, was a good event. Many black Africans seized the opportunity to improve their lot in the once apartheid colony. The Rainbow Nation notion proposed by Nelson Mandela was inspiring. Pan-Africanism memories were reawakened. Many Nigerians fled to the nation to escape the economic difficulties brought about by many years of military rule, as well as the insecurity of lives and property that plagued the country. Thousands of migrants from other African countries arrived in the nation. Even for South African indigenous people, work prospects have dwindled. Economic challenges generated a strong hostility to immigration. On the one hand, the Rainbow Nation vision was attractive and renamed the apartheid enclave, while on the other, the peasantry and the oppressed rose out against immigrants in a series of bloodbaths known as xenophobia. The black South Africans relishing in freedom and dreaming of El Dorado could not be met by the economic decline. According to this research, xenophobic reactions are not a solution to economic problems since they weaken the core of African unity and the spirit of Pan-Africanism. However, it reflects Nigeria's weak reaction to the protection of its residents' lives both within and outside the nation, and it calls for a reassessment¹⁷³.

A study evaluated fake news, social media and xenophobia in South Africa. The study aims to highlight the impact of false news on South Africa's xenophobic debate. Despite scholarly scrutiny, it contends that fake news transmitted by social media platforms is progressively becoming a crucial component of South Africa's present xenophobic crisis. According to the article, false news in South Africa has been mostly driven by the expansion of social media platforms, which have recently become replacement news channels for an increasing number of South Africans despite their obvious flaws. The study concludes that the effect of false news has exacerbated socioeconomic and political conflicts both inside and outside of South Africa¹⁷⁴.

A research examines the impact of xenophobia reporting in Africa on African unity. Prior to the liberation of most African governments from the grips of colonial overlords, African media networks were active in opposing the colonial administration. As a result, they fought strongly against prejudice and dehumanization of Africans until they were released. However, xenophobia has recently gripped the majority of African countries. Africans are increasingly fighting and discriminating against one another. The study examined African media coverage of xenophobia. The approach and manner in which the media described the continent's xenophobic issue was proven to have increased xenophobia in Africa. Findings of this study reveal the African press used disparaging labels like "smugglers" and "thieves" to label African residents living in other nations. And this has instilled fear among African folks. Using framing theory, the report argues that the media has adversely framed coverage of xenophobia in Africa. In most cases, the media has taken sides in its reporting. Based on these findings, the report proposes, among other things, that African governments focus on building their nations so that their population do not move to other countries in search of better living conditions. Furthermore, the media should exhibit restraint in their portrayal of the continent's xenophobic dilemma by

refraining from branding and unfavorably referring to other individuals. Instead, the media should highlight these societal evils and put pressure on the government to deal with the culprits directly¹⁷⁵.

International law and xenophobia in South Africa were studied. For millennia, international law has governed sovereign states' acts and international interactions. Though some of these governments in the international system have demonstrated compliance with international law in some elements of their complicated relationships, they have done inadequately in others. The Republic of South Africa's periodic eruption of xenophobic assaults against foreign people continues to be an example of a state failing to fulfill its obligations as expressed in the international accords to which it has agreed. There has been an inflow of migrants entering South Africa since the post-apartheid period began in 1994. Unfortunately, these migrants, largely Black Africans, have faced discrimination and sometimes violence from disgruntled locals. The aim of this study is to highlight South Africa's responsibilities as a state party to various treaties that protect against racial discrimination, as well as the inability of successive South African administrations to fulfill that commitment. The paper used a historical approach as well as a qualitative way of collecting secondary data. The study stated that, going forward, South Africa, as a civilised state in the international community, should fulfill its commitment to protect the fundamental human rights of immigrants under its territorial authority in good faith¹⁷⁶.

A study investigated revisiting the strategies for the prevention of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. This study assessed the efficacy of xenophobia prevention initiatives in post-apartheid South Africa. A CDA was performed on newspaper snippets from South African tabloids (2015-2017), journal publications on xenophobia, and reports on xenophobic incidents. Policy strategies, intergovernmental tactics, citizenship empowerment and educational methods,

state-civil society interaction, and technology and media-related initiatives emerged from the data. This study created a qualitative score to assess the efficacy of these tactics and discovered three flaws: lack of sustainability, failure to address the fundamental cause, and denial of the existence of xenophobia. In conclusion, the study concluded that long-term and sustainable solutions to avoid such xenophobic acts in South Africa are required¹⁷⁷.

Research on regionalism in Crisis in Africa on AU and Nigeria-South Africa xenophobic conflict. During this time, both countries organized the expulsion of the other from the Commonwealth for prior human rights violations. Both have also contributed significantly to African socioeconomic progress through regionalism, such as NEPAD. Unfortunately, the current increase in xenophobic attacks on fellow Africans in South Africa is jeopardizing regional collaboration and African economic success. The study explores the roles of Nigeria in ECOWAS as a big brother in West Africa and South Africa in SADC, as well as the origins of xenophobia in South Africa. examines the ramifications of xenophobia on their population, as well as the impact on less affluent African nations that seek to them for political and economic aid or advice; quantifies the impact of the crises between Africa's greatest and second largest economy on the rest of Africa explains how regional integration would suffer and have an impact on African growth; advises what the AU should do to improve the situation and prevent it from happening again in light of the body's 2063 agenda¹⁷⁸.

The myth and realities of xenophobia and Nigeria-South Africa relations in post-apartheid era was conducted. Xenophobia and its attendant conflicts have been a recurring phenomenon all over the world. It has also caused concern among nations and their inhabitants, since lives and property of inconceivable worth have been lost as a result of the battle. Xenophobia also threatens to demolish a rich heritage of brotherhood shared by most African countries since the

colonial era. As a result, researchers have explored this issue from several angles. As a result, this study adds to the current literature on xenophobia by investigating its impact on Nigeria-South African relations in the post-apartheid era. The study used the documentary approach to collect data and the qualitative descriptive analysis method to analyze it. The theoretical framework was developed by the Relational Conflict theory, which assisted us in situating the study within the existing body of knowledge. According to the findings, xenophobic acts have posed a significant danger to the political, diplomatic, socio-cultural, and economic integration of Nigeria and South Africa since the end of apartheid in South Africa. In order to deepen African integration, we advised that the South African government and people embrace the spirit of African brotherhood and strive tirelessly toward peaceful coexistence with inhabitants of other African countries. Nigeria and South Africa, on the other hand, should reach a diplomatic arrangement to safeguard each other's residents in their respective territories. Any party who fails to comply shall face punishment¹⁷⁹.

Research was conducted on the social war or cultural slur on xenophobic violence and post-apartheid governance in South Africa. The study acknowledged that the recurring xenophobic attacks in South Africa and their aftermath had become a sore point in contemporary African international relations, particularly with the diplomatic outrage and response of several African countries that followed the latest outburst, which pointedly made a mockery of the Agenda 2063 vision. A variety of reasons have been advanced for the recent xenophobic expression by South Africans against African immigrants, including economic disenfranchisement, social grievances, and cultural differences, among others, and the inability of the South African government to fully address this issue raises more questions than answers. The reactions of impacted nations, particularly Nigeria, may be indicative of mistrust in African inter-state relations, as well as the

volatility and fragility of state mechanisms in dealing with this type of breakdown of law and order. This essay investigates and interrogates the sources of xenophobia in South Africa, as well as the politics and consequences of these assaults on African inter-state relations, particularly Nigeria-South Africa ties, as both nations are major players on the continent. The reactions of impacted nations, particularly Nigeria, may be indicative of mistrust in African inter-state relations, as well as the volatility and fragility of state mechanisms in dealing with this type of breakdown of law and order. This essay investigates and interrogates the sources of xenophobia in South Africa, as well as the politics and consequences of these assaults on African inter-state relations, particularly Nigeria-South Africa ties, as both nations are major players on the continent¹⁸⁰.

The impact of xenophobic attacks on Nigeria-South Africa relations was carried out. Nigeria and South Africa are two African sub-regional powers that have contributed significantly to the region's relative stability and security. Nigeria and South Africa, geographically located in West and Southern Africa, have been dealing for more than five decades in pursuit of their national interests, with their diplomatic, defense, commerce, and socio-cultural connections exhibiting conflict, cooperation, and competitive characteristics. Since South Africa became a liberal democracy and a beacon of human rights in 1994, the migration of documented and undocumented immigrants into the resource-rich nation has been a cause of concern for indigenes, who perceive them as rivals for the limited jobs available, among other things. As a result, natives in various South African townships have forcefully attacked foreign individuals, primarily African immigrants, in 2008, 2015, and 2019, to name a few examples. This research study revisits anti-foreigner violence in the rainbow country in order to highlight the influence on Nigeria-South Africa relations. This study used a historical approach and a qualitative way of

collecting secondary data. The frustration-aggression theory and constructivism were theoretically merged¹⁸¹.

An analysis of xenophobia in Africa on lost in translation was conducted. Following the full-fledged attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa in 2008, which had previously been isolated, xenophobia has recovered its position in African and worldwide discourse. As observers shifted their focus to South Africa in the aftermath of the assaults, the "Ghana Must Go" fiasco — the Nigerian government's wholesale expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria — was revisited. Instead of reporting xenophobic incidents, this article will problematize the notion and contrast it with terms like "Afrophobia" and "Negrophobia." According to the study, the term "xenophobia" has become so overused that it has lost its true meaning. The paper presented a critical examination of events that occurred in South Africa and placed them within a larger analytical perspective. The study concluded with a caution about the detrimental consequences of casually using the term "xenophobia," which may distort the meaning¹⁸².

The study assessed discourse in South Africa on xenophobia attack and development. The social and political progress of countries has changed relationships, ushering in a new era in which other nations believe they are better off than others. Betterment has resulted in hostility among countries both within and outside of the same country. This has resulted in internal civil war and external confrontations. These disputes have separated countries, particularly in Africa, where Ubuntu and communalism are spreading. The study will analyze the historical context of xenophobia, followed by its influence on Africanism and communalism to the point of impeding progress. The study will next offer a social developmental model that might aid in resolving xenophobia, which is a danger to South Africa's peace, stability, and prosperity¹⁸³.

A study on the impact of xenophobic attacks on Nigeria-South Africa relations was carried out. Nigeria and South Africa are two sub-regional powers in Africa that in no small measure have contributed to the relative peace and security in the region. Nigeria and South Africa, geographically located in West and Southern Africa, have been dealing for more than five decades in pursuit of their national interests, with their diplomatic, defense, commerce, and socio-cultural connections exhibiting conflict, cooperation, and competitive characteristics. Since South Africa became a liberal democracy and a beacon of human rights in 1994, the migration of documented and undocumented immigrants into the resource-rich nation has been a cause of concern for indigenes, who perceive them as rivals for the limited jobs available, among other things. As a result, natives in various South African townships have forcefully attacked foreign individuals, primarily African immigrants, in 2008, 2015, and 2019, to name a few examples. This study revisits anti-foreigner violence in the rainbow country in order to highlight the influence on Nigeria-South Africa relations. This article used a historical approach and a qualitative way of collecting secondary data. The frustration-aggression theory and constructivism were theoretically merged. According to the report, the South African authorities should stop labeling occasional anti-foreigner violence as "criminal crimes." It should now recognise and confront the problem as xenophobic assaults¹⁸⁴.

A study examined African languages and xenophobia peace sake in South Africa. The study contends that, in addition to socioeconomic and political considerations, language should be considered as a supporting armoury for Afrophobia in South Africa. In indigenous languages, African immigrant nationals are referred to as the undesired other. This presentation will use SeSotho-SeTswana and IsiZulu to demonstrate how such prejudice is embedded in indigenous languages. This study views Ubuntu philosophy as significant in uncovering the roots of

Xenophobia in South Africa since it is the foundation upon which local indigenous people create what it means to be human and belong to a community. Ubuntu has qualities that promote peace by connecting people. On the other side, it dehumanizes the 'other' by implying that they are 'other,' 'foreign,' and 'un-belonging.' The study contends that, in addition to socioeconomic and political considerations, language should be considered as a supporting armoury for Afrophobia in South Africa. In indigenous languages, African immigrant nationals are referred to as the undesired other. This presentation will use SeSotho-SeTswana and IsiZulu to demonstrate how such prejudice is embedded in indigenous languages. This study views Ubuntu philosophy as significant in uncovering the roots of Xenophobia in South Africa since it is the foundation upon which local indigenous people create what it means to be human and belong to a community. Ubuntu has qualities that promote peace by connecting people. On the other side, it dehumanizes the 'other' by implying that they are 'other,' 'foreign,' and 'un-belonging'¹⁸⁵.

A study carried out a retrospective study of the effects of xenophobia on South Africa-Nigeria relations. The underlying causes of xenophobia are complex and varied. Xenophobia refers to a dislike of the foreign, particularly strangers or individuals from different nations or cultures. Unemployment and rising poverty among South Africans at the bottom of the economic ladder have fueled worries of competition from better educated and more experienced foreigners. South Africa's long history of using violence as a form of protest, particularly against foreigners, as well as recorded disputes over migration policy and the extent of repatriation, provide a compelling reason for its xenophobia. While the majority of the attacks were focused towards foreign, particularly African, migrants, it was evident that this was not the norm. Attacks against Chinese speakers, Pakistani migrants, and South Africans from minority linguistic groups have also been reported (in the conflict areas). Settlements that have lately seen 'xenophobic' violence

have also seen violent and various types of protest over other concerns, most notably service delivery. The failure of the government to provide services was blamed on this type of xenophobia (HSRC, 2008). Because of the increased migration, this dispute is most likely not transient. Xenophobia presents itself in many places and communities, with disastrous consequences for the afflicted nationalities. As a result of this xenophobic mentality, Nigerians residing in South Africa have been the targets of serious violence and assault. Against this backdrop, this research tries to explore xenophobic assaults on Nigerians in South Africa. The technique is mostly qualitative, with secondary sources such as books, journals, newspapers, and online sources being used¹⁸⁶.

A research analysed at the backdrop of xenophobic views in Nigeria and South Africa and discovered that the dynamics of the phenomena differed in both nations. The economic problems of the 1980s, caused by mishandling of oil money and exacerbated by the collapse of oil prices on the international market, fueled xenophobia in Nigeria. According to the study, xenophobia in Nigeria is moderate, discreet, nonviolent, and directed by the ruling elite, and is politically motivated. In Nigeria, xenophobia arose as a result of the government's reaction to the country's economic predicament at the time. The study concluded that xenophobic views in Nigeria differ from those in South Africa. The phenomenon was state-driven in Nigeria on both occasions it occurred in 1983 and 1985 through a 'immigration order,' but the situation in South Africa is frequently citizens-driven with deep expressions of aggression, and it is suggested that African people and governments rethink the basis of their relations and recognize that the occurrence can negatively impact their politics, economy, and society¹⁸⁷.

A study investigated the implication of xenophobic violence on Nigeria-South Africa relations. The increased xenophobic assaults in South Africa on Nigerians and other Africans is an

unpleasant trend that causes great alarm among foreign policy professionals and observers. The recent scenario in Pretoria has led in the loss of innocent life and the destruction of expensive property by certain South African militant youngsters. According to Abike Dabiri-Erewa, Nigeria's Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Advisor, the government has lost around 116 nationals as a result of the illegal actions of certain hoodlums in South Africa. This remains a severe setback that threatens Nigeria's and South Africa's external relations. Secondary data sources include journals, books, Internet materials, newspapers, and official interactions between South Africa and Nigeria. The heinous pattern of xenophobic attacks has resulted in a socioeconomic and political cold war between Nigeria and South Africa. However, the research implies that necessary measures must be implemented to restore and ensure peace for South African immigrants. Failure to address the threat of xenophobic violence in South Africa risks devolving into regional war, which would undoubtedly harm the relationship between the two countries in all ways. The study adds to the current literature on xenophobic attacks and their influence on foreign relations; it also provides insight into the latest xenophobic incident that happened in 2017 and its impact on Nigeria-South Africa relations¹⁸⁸.

A similar study was conducted on xenophobia and Nigeria-South Africa relation. This research investigates the basic concerns of racial intolerance; hate for immigrants, particularly Nigerians, in South Africa, and their ramifications for the connection that exists between these two nations, with a focus on political, commercial, and economic interaction. It also investigates the impact of xenophobia on Nigeria's foreign policy. This study is based on realistic conflict theory and uses secondary data sources such as journal papers, newspaper articles, and policy briefs to explore elements of Nigeria-South Africa relations. This study notes that xenophobic attacks will cause serious setbacks in the South Africa-Nigeria relationship, and it also recommends that South

African citizens be educated on the effects of xenophobic attacks on the country's economic development, as well as a re-evaluation of Nigeria's foreign policy to pursue strict national interests while addressing domestic challenges¹⁸⁹.

The study assessed xenophobia and its implications for social order in Africa. One of the greatest difficulties confronting modern civilization is xenophobia, a kind of discrimination prevalent in countries, notably in South Africa. This study addresses xenophobia as a threat, demonstrating how this discriminating behavior divides communities by establishing a division among the many residents of the community, allowing for "otherness" rather than "orderliness." The study also discusses the philosophical ramifications of this societal split, especially for the human community. Seeking a viable solution to this problem, the research finishes by underlining the importance of tolerance in combating xenophobia¹⁹⁰.

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delivery. The failure of the government to provide services was blamed on this type of xenophobia (HSRC, 2008). Because of the increased migration, this dispute is most likely not transient. Xenophobia presents itself in many places and communities, with disastrous consequences for the afflicted nationalities. As a result of this xenophobic mentality, Nigerians residing in South Africa have been the targets of serious violence and assault. Against this backdrop, this research tries to explore xenophobic assaults on Nigerians in South Africa. The paper's approach is mostly qualitative, with secondary sources such as books, journals, newspapers, and internet sources being used¹⁹¹.

Another study examined media reports on the xenophobic question and prospect of Nigeria-South Africa relations. The persistent xenophobic attacks against immigrants, mainly Nigerians, in the recent decade have piqued the interest of academics, media practitioners, and diplomats. This is partly owing to Nigeria's historical and dominant involvement in dismantling South Africa's apartheid government. It was strengthened further by the presence of South African-owned multinational firms in Nigeria, such as MTN, Shoprite, and DSTV, which generate millions of dollars for the South African economy. This research investigates the xenophobic question, the locals' claim that Nigerian immigrants are robbing them of their economic gains. And its implications on the Nigeria-South Africa strategic alliance should be reconsidered. However, propositions derived from sociological concepts and theoretical explications such as Other, ethnocentrism, and tolerance advance an argument that the xenophobic attack is a covert and deliberate ploy by the South African government to diminish Nigeria's hegemonic influence in Africa, because the majority of hate speech triggering the attacks comes from public figures and government officials. This investigation examines the theories of anti-immigrant sentiments, alienation, frustration-aggression, and scapegoating. The goal is to determine the amount of

education that the South African government provides to its citizenry about the commercial cooperation that exists between them and Nigerians. This study's methodology included the utilization of secondary data as well as material from journals, books, government publications, and newspapers. The likelihood of a harmonious relationship between Nigeria and South Africa is grim since the South African government lacks the political will to curb the flow of xenophobia in South Africa, which is fostered by an unhealthy animosity among its inhabitants towards immigrants (especially Nigerians). As a result, this study suggests that Nigeria refocus its foreign policy away from the Africa project and onto sectors that might generate significant national interest¹⁹².

2.3.2 Empirical Review on Nigeria-South Africa Economic Relations

A research done on Nigeria's relations with South Africa were of double standard during the apartheid era. The likelihood of a harmonious relationship between Nigeria and South Africa is grim since the South African government lacks the political will to curb the flow of xenophobia in South Africa, which is fostered by an unhealthy animosity among its inhabitants towards immigrants (especially Nigerians). As a result, this study suggests that Nigeria refocus its foreign policy away from the Africa project and onto sectors that might generate significant national interest. The study, on the other hand, analyses Nigeria and South Africa's diplomatic fluidity since re-establishing official relations in 1994 in order to understand the roots of the misunderstanding and its impact on both nations' relations, as well as to offer better methods to develop their relations. According to the report, Nigeria has played big brother duties in Africa since 1960 but is currently unable to continue with such big brother programs. South Africa, on the other hand, immediately realized African economic prospects and sought to build a neo-imperial presence on the continent. However, the study implies that the two African giants can

have good ties, but Nigeria has to accelerate its growth in order to reach parity with South Africa and build a strong alliance for Africa. It also observes that South Africa is the true African behemoth, but Nigeria conceals her internal problems via diplomacy, particularly with South Africa¹⁹³.

An empirical study `examines Nigeria-South Africa relations with emphasis on political, trade and economic engagements. It explores the consistency and changing patterns in Nigeria-South Africa relations, which are related to Nigeria's failure to diversify its economy and South Africa's refusal to offer an enabling environment for Nigerians in its economic sector. It contends that Nigeria and South Africa have de-emphasized the main objectives of leading economic growth and development in Africa in favor of a competitive quest of regional hegemony. This article emphasizes growing regional cooperation and the promotion of bi-relations based on independent state institutions rather than the personalities of the ruling class. To explore facets of Nigeria-South Africa relations, the book depends on secondary sources of material such as journal articles, newspapers, and policy briefs. It suggests that Nigeria and South Africa should transition from competitive to amicable ties in order to lead Africa's anticipated economic growth, economic development, and political rebirth¹⁹⁴.

A study discussed the origins, nature, and dynamics of Nigeria's connection with South Africa between 1960 and 2007 in major sectors such as commerce, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), technology transfers, and foreign policy challenges. It investigates the unsettled exact nature of Nigeria-South Africa ties in the mainstream literature, in particular because experts prefer to argue that South Africa's relatively rapid developing economy has put it ahead of Nigeria and other African nations. As a result, Nigeria is mistakenly thought to be in either a dependent or cooperative relationship with South Africa. In light of this, the research employs a Marxian

political economics paradigm, which contends that the Third World's underdevelopment and reliance are the result of its incorporation into the international division of labor. The study employs a mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies, with data acquired from both primary and secondary sources. In-depth and unstructured interviews were performed with chosen foreign policy experts from both countries, and a Focused Group Discussion (FGD) was held at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, comprising a cross-section of academics with research interests in Nigeria-South Africa relations. Textual analysis was used to examine the data collected. The findings demonstrated that the generalization in scholarly publications that Nigeria is economically dependent on South Africa is incorrect. Despite the fact that South Africa has a larger economy than Nigeria, especially considering the supremacy of her technological power, research demonstrated that a combination of other components of national power can overcome that deficit. Indeed, Nigeria's latest GDP rebase has proven this point. As a result, the research emphasises the necessity for both nations to pool their unique resources, particularly through the Bi-National Commission (BNC), in order to achieve their shared aim of continental revival. Furthermore, given the inevitable tensions that this partnership will inevitably create, the study proposes an urgent need for both countries to harmonize, if not reconcile, the discrepancies in their foreign policies, which are exacerbated by domestic and external forces, in order to birth Africa's development in a globalising world¹⁹⁵.

Nigeria, along with other independent African governments, fought for the emancipation of their black brothers and sisters in South Africa during the apartheid era. Nigeria has no bilateral contacts with the South African government since the country was considered a pariah state in the international community due to its apartheid policies. There was a major shift in mentality with the advent of democracy in South Africa and Nigeria. Both nations have become African

giants, championing Africa's repositioning on the road of long-term prosperity and reducing its marginalization in international economic relations. They are now recognized as African continent's emerging titans. Nigeria has economic supremacy in western Africa, whilst South Africa has economic dominance in southern Africa. While Nigeria's economy is primarily reliant on the oil industry, which accounts for 95 % of its export earnings, South Africa's economy is diverse, including manufacturing, finance, and minerals, among other things. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the various bilateral relations that exist between both countries; their roles in the establishment of NEPAD, whose main goal is to eradicate poverty in Africa and to put African countries on the path of sustainable growth and development; and the establishment of the South Africa- Nigeria Bilateral Commission, which aims to increase the amount of trade and investment between South Africa and Nigeria¹⁹⁶.

Research done with the title “Nigeria’s Economic Boom: A Positive Outcome for Intra-Africa Trade”. For many years, South Africa and Nigeria's bilateral diplomatic relations have been defined by corporate cooperation and struggle for continental domination. South Africa is the continent's largest economy, followed by Nigeria and Egypt. However, things changed dramatically in April 2014, when Nigeria's rebased GDP overtook South Africa as the continent's economic superpower. Nigeria's amazing economic development, which has resulted in production that is more than 40% greater than that of South Africa, necessitates an attempt to examine and foresee prospective consequences for bilateral ties between South Africa and Nigeria. This study aims to reflect on the cooperative and competitive dynamics that characterize bilateral ties between the two nations, as well as to investigate any potential political and economic benefits that may enhance the growth of both countries and the continent as a whole. It concludes that Nigeria's economic boom should be considered in the perspective of NEPAD's

fulfillment of its aims, and it goes on to offer initiatives to improve bilateral commerce between the two nations. It also advises that Nigeria and South Africa should persuade OPEC and the BRICS to support the African Union's efforts to reposition the region in global affairs¹⁹⁷.

A study was conducted on the trade imbalance in Nigeria - South Africa economic relations, between 1994 - 2017. Findings from this study shows that Nigeria's exports to South Africa include oil, human resources, and raw commodities, with oil accounting for 95 % of total exports. South Africa exports manufactured items such as electrical equipment, machinery, wood, paper, foodstuff, drinks, alcohol, tobacco, rubber, and plastic. These are value-added items, and South Africa's economy is diverse. Nigerian enterprises have found it difficult to access the South African market since the two nations signed a formal bilateral commercial agreement in 1994. The study also investigated the existence of several South African companies conducting business in Nigeria, such as MTN, DSTV, ShopRite, and Stanbic Bank, to name a few. As a result, the study relied on secondary data. Newspapers, textbooks, journals, and online information are examples of secondary sources. The analysis discovered that, despite an increase in trade volume, the trade deficit favours South Africa. Considering the number of Multinational Corporations operating in Nigeria and technological knowledge, one could argue that South Africa is more positioned to benefit from trade profits than Nigeria. Nigeria might profit from that massive market and job prospects. To do so, Nigeria must add value to its agricultural raw resources as well as its oil products. In other words, investment in the economy's industrial sector¹⁹⁸.

The cultural history of Africa and international diplomatic relations from a study of Nigeria and South Africa was conducted. During the apartheid era, Nigeria's connections with South Africa were held to a double standard, according to this report. Connections between post-independence

Nigeria and the apartheid state in Pretoria were strained and combative, whilst relations between Nigeria and South African liberation organizations, particularly the African National Congress, were cordial (ANC). It was even more so since Nigeria made Africa the focal point of its foreign policy, committing to the continent's entire independence from colonialism and racism. Nigeria stood unwaveringly against colonialism on the African continent, as well as the racism that prevailed in South Africa before 1994. In the closing days of apartheid in South Africa, President de Klerk visited Nigeria in April, ushering in a new era. This research looks at the aesthetic history of Nigeria and South Africa 70,000 years ago, as well as significant trading networks that began approximately 2500 B.C.E. However, following the re-establishment of official contacts in 1994, diplomatic fluidity has been examined to understand the roots of those misunderstandings and their impact on both nations' relations, as well as to recommend better ways to encourage diplomacy. According to the report, Nigeria has played big brother duties in Africa since 1960 but is currently unable to continue with such big brother programs. South Africa, on the other hand, immediately realized African economic prospects and sought to build a neo-imperial presence on the continent. However, the study says that the two African giants may coexist peacefully, but Nigeria must accelerate its growth to achieve parity with South Africa for them to build a strong alliance for Africa. It also observes that South Africa is the true African behemoth, but Nigeria conceals her internal problems via diplomacy, particularly with South Africa¹⁹⁹.

A study assessed Nigeria-South Africa relations in the post-apartheid era (1993 – 2019). Nigeria-South Africa relations date back to the era of Nigeria's independence. According to this analysis, Nigeria made it plain in her Independence Day speech that Africa is the focal point of her foreign policy, and that the removal of apartheid in South Africa is her greatest issue. That was an

affront to the then-South African leadership, who considered Nigeria a threat and an adversary. This icy friendship lasted until 1992 when President DeKlerk and his entourage invaded Nigeria to hug one other. As a result, bilateral connections were formed that may benefit both countries based on their national interests. This relationship and diplomatic strategies were jeopardized under the administrations of Nelson Mandela and Nigeria's dictator, General Sani Abacha, but normalcy was restored during the regimes of Mbeki and Obasanjo. However, the eras of Zuma and Jonathan have been fraught with diplomatic difficulties. Their policies and interactions are sometimes warm, and sometimes chilly. The two nations' relationship worsened as a result of a series of xenophobic assaults against Nigerians residing in South Africa in 2017, followed by another in September 2019. This study addresses the basic themes of racial intolerance and hates for foreigners, with a focus on the Nigeria-South Africa relationship in the post-apartheid era. This study is based on the Realistic Conflict Theory, and it also used secondary data sources such as books, journal papers, newspaper articles, and internet sources. In its examination, the historical method was also applied. The majority of this Research's assessment instrument was comprised of reports acquired from these sources²⁰⁰.

The study examined the perceived effect of covid-19 in developing economies with lessons from Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) on developing economies. The article used secondary data and content analysis methods to investigate the perceived impact of COVID-19 on the economies of many African countries, including Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya. Against the backdrop of falling family spending, business investments, and global commodity demand as a result of the pandemic, the study recommends better approaches to make government economic policy more successful. As a result, the existing research suggests that, given the extent and

scope of the pandemic's economic effect, extra recovery tactics to promote demand are required. As a result, we urge that the federal government review and enhance efforts to improve the efficiency and efficacy of fiscal and monetary policy measures adopted by the government²⁰¹.

The study considered currency devaluation on the exportation revenue with a study of Nigeria, South Africa and China (2000-2017). The study provides insights into how currency depreciation affects overall export revenue in Nigeria, South Africa, and China. Secondary data for the inflation rate (INFR), the exchange rate (EXR), money supply (MS), and total export revenue (TER) from 2000 to 2017 were obtained from the World Bank Data Atlas and subjected to the Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philip Perron Unit Root test, Johansen Co-integration, and Vector Error Correction Model. According to the study, EXR, INFR, and MS had little effect on export revenue in Nigeria and South Africa but had a significant influence on export revenue in China. The results also demonstrate that only China has a long-run relationship with exportation revenue, whilst Nigeria and South Africa have no long-run association with exportation revenue. Thus, the study suggests that currency depreciation in China has a detrimental impact on the economies of Nigeria and South Africa. As a result, the research suggests that China maintain its currency devaluation posture, while Nigeria and South Africa re-evaluate and re-adjust their currency devaluation operations to boost export income²⁰².

A study was directed toward money supply and stock market performance in Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana. Using data from 1986 to 2018, the study investigated the impact of money supply on stock market performance in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana. World Bank (World Development Indicators 2018), Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2018, Johannesburg Stock Exchange Market Statistics 2018, and Ghana Stock Exchange Reports were used to compile the statistics (various issues up to 2018). For each of the nations analyzed, a simple

regression model was used, using the stock market index as the dependent variable and the money supply as the independent variable. In addition to the preliminary tests, the study used the Johansen Cointegration Test, Error Correction Model, and Granger Causality Test. The findings demonstrated a long-run link between money supply and stock market performance in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana. In addition, the findings revealed a unidirectional causal link between stock market performance and money supply in the three economies investigated. As a result, the study indicated that in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana, stock market performance impacts money supply more than money supply influences stock market performance. As a result, the study proposed that monetary authorities in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana pay greater attention to the influence of stock market performance on the supply of money in their respective economies rather than the effect of money supply on stock market performance²⁰³.

A study examined migration and Nigeria-South Africa relations. This research examined migration and the Nigeria-South Africa relationship. The selected theory was Arango's neoclassical theory of migration, and two problems were presented. The ex-post facto research approach was employed, and data for this study was obtained from secondary sources such as textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, and the internet. The study's findings revealed that Nigeria and South Africa have ties such as the Nigeria-South Africa NEPAD Initiative, South African Companies as Major Players in the Nigerian Economy, and the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission. Similarly, the data revealed that various causes cause Nigerians to move to South Africa, such as poverty, overpopulation, family reunification, and asylum. Based on the study's findings, Nigeria should, among other things, provide robust and unrestricted relations with South Africa outside of their existing relationships (NEPAD Initiative, Bi-National Commission, etc.) to other aspects of business, and Nigeria should also forge

strategic business alliances in South Africa to balance the unpleasant business equation. Furthermore, beyond the operating imbalanced bilateral and economic relations in favour of South African businesses in Nigeria, both countries must initiate a liberalized migration regime and a robust migration management capacity to enhance and strengthen Nigerians in the diaspora's strategic role as development partners²⁰⁴.

A study examined the struggle for hegemony in Africa with Nigeria and South Africa relations in perspectives between 1999-2014. This study examined Nigeria-South African ties, focusing on political, commercial, and economic interactions. It explores the consistency and changing patterns in Nigeria-South Africa relations, which are related to Nigeria's failure to diversify its economy and South Africa's refusal to offer an enabling environment for Nigerians in its economic sector. It contends that Nigeria and South Africa have de-emphasized the main objectives of leading African economic growth and development in favour of a competitive quest for regional hegemony. This research discusses growing regional cooperation and the promotion of relations based on independent state institutions rather than the personalities of the ruling class. To examine elements of Nigeria-South Africa relations, the study depends on secondary sources of material such as journal articles, newspapers, and policy briefs. It suggests that Nigeria and South Africa should transition from competitive to amicable ties to lead Africa's anticipated economic growth, economic development, and political rebirth²⁰⁵.

The collaboration or competition between Nigeria and South Africa was examined in a study. The dynamics of the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa, probably the two most powerful governments on the African continent, are the subject of this research. Each of the two republics is still attempting to expand its dominion outside its particular sub-region to emerge as Africa's leading power. These activities are not undertaken in isolation, but have an impact on

bilateral relations and are linked to the guiding principles of national interest. The study examine the trajectory of Nigeria-South Africa ties, from strongly political disputes to the strongest of friendly connections, using data acquired from secondary sources. In the end, the study discovered that collaboration and competition are important factors in inter-state interactions. Nigeria and South Africa currently have a historic chance to interact to advance the African continent's overall interest in the international system. Will the pursuit of their different national interests foster or undermine this role?²⁰⁶

A study evaluated the entrepreneurial motives and challenges of SME owners in the emerging economies of Nigeria and South Africa. This research is a comparative examination of the differences in entrepreneurial motivations and obstacles that exist in emerging economies. The study also underlines that knowing what entrepreneurs are up against will help them prepare and will invariably reduce the impact of the problems. According to research findings, entrepreneurs start businesses for a variety of reasons, and people become entrepreneurs mostly due to pull forces rather than push causes. 1200 samples were picked at random from two African rising economies. Pre-tested questionnaires were distributed to entrepreneurs in both economies at the economic centre. Descriptive statistics and one-way analysis of variance were used in the analysis. According to the research findings, a bigger number of entrepreneurs in both economies were motivated by passion, with very few motivated by poverty. The findings also suggest that entrepreneurial hurdles are common in all rising economies, but they differ in some circumstances. Furthermore, the results demonstrate a significant difference between average income level and the number of years in business ($F=7.60$; $p0.05$). The study suggests that obstacles such as epileptic power supply, lack of capital, and poor patronage would continue to

impede entrepreneurial activity and inevitably raise entrepreneurship failure rates in these nations if the challenges persisted²⁰⁷.

As mentioned in this study, international relations are often defined by 'conflict of interest,' which can lead to poverty, a worsening condition of affairs, and, ultimately, bloodshed. In light of this, the purpose of this article is to investigate the nature of Nigeria-South Africa ties in the twenty-first century and the lessons for Nigerian diplomacy. The researcher will make use of secondary data. Furthermore, frustrated aggression theory was used as the theoretical underpinning²⁰⁸.

2.4 Conceptual Framework




Figure 2.1: Effects of the Xenophobic Violence on Nigeria-South Africa Economic Relations

Source: Author's Computation, 2022

2.5 Summary of Literature Reviewed

The reviewed literature has focused on the essence of bilateral relations among sovereign states, the factors that influence Nigeria's foreign policy in particular, and the dynamics of Nigeria-South African relations from the time of independence to the period of Nigeria's hostile attitudes toward South Africa. The literature has also examined the occurrence that produces stresses and final severance, as well as Nigeria's resumption of diplomatic relations with South Africa. For example, it was mentioned that Nigeria's decision to restore diplomatic relations with South Africa, as well as establish the Bi-National Commission, was a result of the latter's willingness to implement 1994, a multiracial democracy based on universal adult suffrage, and also because Nigeria's elected president in 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, had already established a strong friendship with Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's then vice president. However, the research appears to have disregarded the effects of bilateral interactions on Nigeria's political economy. We may not have to forget that the Nigeria Telecommunication Limited (NITEL) formerly ruled the Nigerian telecommunications business, but things have changed since South Africa's MTN

entered the Nigerian market. Second, the literature appears to have overlooked the reality that bilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa in the twenty-first century have resulted in a severe political rivalry between the two nations as they vie for admittance to the United Nations Security Council. There is also a power struggle between Nigeria and South Africa in the continent's two major international organizations, the African Union and NEPAD.

In all, it is evident that the questions this previous research posed have not been adequately addressed. In other words, a gap still exists in the literature. This is so because it has not been ascertained whether there is a link between economic factors and the increasing ethnic conflict in Nigeria and South Africa. It is, therefore, this lacuna that we intend to fill in this study.

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Chapter Three

Methodology

This chapter focuses on the methodology used to carry out the study under the following subheadings: research design, description of research instruments, method of data collection, and method of data analysis.

3.1 Research Design

A research design is considered the structure of research. It is the overall strategy that a researcher chooses to integrate the different components of the study coherently and logically, thereby ensuring the research problem is addressed¹. This study adopts the descriptive research design. Descriptive research design is a scientific method which involves observing and describing the behaviour of a subject \without influencing the result. Descriptive research attempts to unveil the essential elements and characteristics of any phenomenon. This approach is chosen in this study to investigate the effect of xenophobia on the Nigeria-South Africa Economic Relations (2011-2021).

3.2 Population of the Study

A population is an entire group that a researcher wants to conclude about. The population can also be defined as a complete set of research respondents with a specialised set of characteristics which the researcher has identified and considered appropriate for the study. The population of this study includes the major Nigerian businesses in South Africa and the notable South African owned companies in Nigeria.

3.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques

This study adopted random sampling methods. This is a probability sampling method where the researcher selects respondents or research items and gives every item an equal chance of being selected. The method was applied in gathering relevant data for this study. This study does not have a numerical sample size as it is based on secondary data and data acquired from previous studies.

3.4 Description of Research Instrument

The research relied on secondary sources of data. Thus, the research instrument used are library (both physical and online) where data were gathered from textbooks, journals, newspaper editorials articles, reports, and magazines.

3.5 Validity of Research Instrument

Validity is the degree to which a research instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. This is the accuracy to which an instrument measures what it claims to be measuring. This study ensured that the research instrument examined all its construct of interest, measures the characteristics of variables and measured what the research intends to measure

3.6 Reliability of Research Instrument

The reliability of a research instrument concerns the extent to which the instrument yields the same results on repeated trials. Reliability of the research instrument is the measure of the dependability and the internal consistency of the items of the instrument of data collection.

3.7 Administration of Research Instrument Method of Data Collection

The researcher will use the selected related papers to collect data for the study. The researcher will conduct a critical review of the articles after obtaining permission from the various authors. Secondary data is information obtained through library research. Secondary data is freely available and used by people other than researchers. This means that secondary data is taken from published or unpublished sources rather than being collected directly².

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

The qualitative descriptive analysis will be used in this investigation. The purpose of qualitative descriptive analysis is to verbally summarize the material gathered during the research so that proper analytical methods may be employed to further identify links between the variables. Because the study depended heavily on secondary data, the preceding analytical procedure was required. The content of the qualitative data will be examined.

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Chapter Four

Results and Discussion of Findings

This chapter comprises the presentation and analysis of research data. It encapsulates the application of the theoretical framework in the analysis of the data which results in the understanding of the stylistic features of network providers' adverts on newspapers pages.

4.1 Presentation of Research Questions

4.1.1 Research Question One: What are the causes of xenophobia in trade relations between Nigeria and South Africa within the period under study?

The fundamental reasons for xenophobia are numerous and complex. Xenophobia refers to a dislike of foreigners, particularly strangers or individuals from diverse countries or cultures. Unemployment and rising poverty among South Africans at the bottom of the economic ladder have fueled fears of competition from better-educated and more experienced foreigners.

In 2015, there were outbreaks of violence against non-South Africans, particularly in Durban and Johannesburg, prompting the army to be sent to quell additional unrest. The number of violent incidents increased in 2008 and then again in 2015. Data for 2019 (until late September) suggest that the number of attacks is already reaching 2015 levels. In an October 2018 statement, South Africa's largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, condemned the ruling ANC party for a "scourge of xenophobic violence"¹.

"The causes are poverty and apartheid," says Sharon Ekambaram, who directs Lawyers for Human Rights, Refugee and Migrant Rights Program.

The increased xenophobic attacks in South Africa against Nigerians and other African peers are an unpleasant trend that causes great alarm among foreign policy professionals and analysts. According to Abike Dabiri-Erewa, Nigeria's senior special adviser on foreign affairs and diaspora, the country lost around 116 people between 2016 and 2017 as a result of illicit conduct championed by some hoodlums in the host country. This is still a severe setback that threatens Nigeria's and South Africa's external relations. The President of the Nigerian Community in South Africa verified the attacks and stealing of products belonging to Nigerian businesses and women in a report provided by the News Agency of Nigeria. According to the allegation, over five buildings occupied by Nigerian businesses were burned down with extraordinary theft². This action is contrary to immigration law and violates the core human rights premise.

The heinous pattern of xenophobic violence against Africans in South Africa is not a new issue in the country. However, recent attacks have heightened tensions both within and beyond the African continent.

In an October 2018 statement, South Africa's largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, condemned the ruling ANC party for a "scourge of xenophobic violence." This study included online interviews with Nigerian immigrants who stayed in South Africa, as well as six Nigerians with transnational family members in South Africa. This was complemented by an analysis of secondary interviews with returnees performed by three Nigerian journalists from the Vanguard, Punch, Nigerian Tribune, and the Nation publications. The interviews took place at Murtala Muhammed International Airport, where passengers were returning home on state-provided planes.

Since the big attacks against African migrants in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg in 2008 and 2015, xenophobia has been a perennial issue in Nigeria-South Africa ties. Xenophobic attacks, however, do not disproportionately target Nigerians, contrary to common belief. Nigerians frequently overstate the impact of violence on their people. This is most likely due to Nigeria having a more organized, savvy, and vocal diaspora constituency than South Africa³.

4.1.2 Research Question Two: What are the implications of xenophobia on trade relations between Nigeria and South Africa within the period under study?

The majority of xenophobic attacks and extra-judicial killings in South Africa have occurred in Nigeria. According to Mrs. Abike Dabiri-Erewa, Senior Special Assistant to the President on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, 117 Nigerians were extra-judicially assassinated in South Africa between 2016 and 2018 for various reasons. These heinous deaths of Nigerians in South Africa have had a variety of consequences for Nigeria-South Africa ties.

All concerned stakeholders, both government and private, have continued to express concern about the consequences of xenophobic violence on innocent black foreigners perpetrated primarily by some aggressive youths in South Africa, which has invariably resulted in a diplomatic cold war between Nigeria and South Africa. Given this, the two African countries with the largest economy stand to lose the most if the scenario persists. Experts have interpreted the violent attacks on Nigerians as an ungrateful reciprocation from South Africa because the former actively participated in rescuing the latter from the shackles of colonialism during the apartheid administration.

Though Nigeria is a major regional force in Africa, xenophobia may pose a new danger to its hegemony, which has suffered significant setbacks as a result of action and inaction by neighbouring African countries. In place of this, the ramifications of xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa can be divided into two categories: diplomatic or political implications and bilateral economic implications.

Political and Diplomatic Impact

Politically, the onslaught of xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa has far-reaching consequences if the two governments fail to gather sufficient political resolve to address this heinous situation. It has the potential to sever connections between the two countries. In diplomatic circles, when there is a severe disagreement between countries, the next option is to recall ambassadors, and whenever there is a breakdown in the relationship between countries, it usually takes time for such to be restored, given Nigeria and South Africa's positions on the African continent, it will also be detrimental to the progress of other African countries. Following the April 2015 xenophobic attack in South Africa, the United Nations Security Council was quick to condemn the attacks, as did her neighbours, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi, which followed suit in rejecting and criticizing these atrocities⁴. Nigeria, on the other hand, took a step further by recalling her South African diplomats. The xenophobic attacks thus heightened tensions between the two nations, with the Nigerian government believing that the South African government was not doing enough to safeguard her residents in South Africa, whom she believed was the major target of the attacks. Another aspect of this is the possibility of a loss of African solidarity. Because Africans usually regard each other as brothers and speak with one voice in the international arena, it is reasoned that a break in relations between Nigeria

and South Africa will lead to a divided Africa, limiting their chances of making a mark in international politics.

Nigeria and South Africa have been seeking to repair their diplomatic relationship after the 2008 anti-foreigner riots. Nigeria and South Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2013 to strengthen diplomatic ties and prevent future xenophobic assaults⁵. Despite this, attacks against Nigerians have continued. Following the xenophobic attacks in Durban and Johannesburg in April 2015, Nigeria's Acting High Commissioner to South Africa, Martin Cobham, and the Consul-General, Uche Ajulu-Okeke, were 'invited' for consultation (rather than recalled,' as several media outlets wrongly stated). Though Nigeria's conduct did not result in a break in relations with South Africa, the South African Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation viewed it as an "unfortunate and regrettable decision"⁶.

Economic Impact

Following a wave of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa, as well as looting of their shops and establishments, a retaliatory attack was launched on a South African-owned corporation doing business in Nigeria. On February 23, 2017, the telecoms company, MTN, had its flagship office in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, ransacked and office equipment vandalized. Apart from MTN, there are over 100 South African companies (previously only four) operating in Nigeria's telecommunications, manufacturing, aviation, construction, banking, hospitality, entertainment, and oil and gas industries - Power Giant, Eskom Nigeria, South African Airways, South African Breweries (SAB Miller), Stanbic IBTC Bank, MultiChoice Africa (operating DStv/GOTv), Umgeni Water, and Shoprite, to name a few⁷.

Some South Africans were targeted because they did not support the movement, while others were incorrectly labelled as foreigners. In terms of investment, the majority of foreign investors have lost faith in the police and the judiciary, which have failed to safeguard them. The majority of foreign investors are concerned about community security. As a result, as Charman et al. discovered, "foreign investors" are more vulnerable to abuse, crime, and extortion by individuals and community leaders (2012). Foreign businessmen have been obliged to rely almost entirely on approved institutions of justice, and they are hampered by a lack of trust and faith in the police and courts, which is exacerbated by cultural and linguistic hurdles. Foreign investors are typically singled out in police and prosecutor statements. Regarding the lengthy justice process and the victims of crime who are foreign investors, it is frequently noticed that prosecutors and police also struggled to communicate with and keep them engaged during court proceedings. According to studies, foreign investors were afraid of various types of violence during xenophobic attacks, which included murder, attempted murder, robbery, theft, and assault.

Social and Psychological Impact

Xenophobic attacks in post-apartheid South Africa have instilled fear in the minds of Nigerians over the years. For fear of being attacked, if not killed, a number of them in South Africa no longer interact freely with the locals as fellow African brothers and sisters with a common history, values, traditions, and so on. It should come as no surprise that some of the living Nigerian victims of anti-foreigner violence are now suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Many Nigerians are reconsidering their plans to travel to South Africa for tourism, shopping, business, first degree/postgraduate education, and other purposes after hearing/reading on print and electronic media the horrifying news about the killings of Nigerians residing in South Africa.

4.1.3 Research Question Three: Does the attack on Nigerians in South Africa hamper the patronage of South Africa-owned multinational companies in Nigeria within the period under review?

On September 11, 2019, Aare Afe Babalola was interviewed by Vanguard. Who, in turn, clarified the attack on Nigerians in South Africa and its sponsorship of South African-owned businesses in Nigeria, saying, "The solution is not in the appointment of special envoys or state visits, but in the current economic issues in Nigeria."

Nigerians living in South Africa have been targeted yet again by local vigilantes. Many just had their homes and businesses destroyed, but some who lost their lives were not so fortunate. Reports of these episodes, which the press dubbed "xenophobic attacks," drew the typical criticism from Nigerian authorities. The House of Representatives, in a press conference convened by the Speaker, was very vocal in demanding explanations from South African authorities. While the ruling party advocated for the nationalization of South African-owned economic interests, the Presidency announced the appointment of a special envoy to confer with South African authorities on the matter. It has now been announced that President Muhammadu Buhari will pay a state visit to South Africa in October as part of his efforts to heal fences.

According to Aare Afe Babalola, recent xenophobic attacks have primarily targeted Nigerians. A series of attacks against foreign nationals happened. Zimbabwean and Nigerian nationals faced the brunt of the violence in that incident. That episode was linked to the Zulu king's stirring statements, which called on all outsiders to leave the kingdom. Before that, attacks had been reported in 1998, 2000, 2008, 2009, and 2013. The governments of Nigeria and South Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2013 to strengthen diplomatic contacts to avert

future attacks. The events of 2016 and 2017 demonstrated that those attempts were futile. The regularity of these attacks begs the question of why they are so widespread in South Africa. Indeed, to comprehend why Nigerians have been targeted, several explanations have been advanced, the most entertaining of which is the Xenophobia explained.

However, to comprehend the core source of the problem, one must go back in time. To begin, it is necessary to stress that the term "xenophobia" is a political rather than a medical one. It refers to a situation in which members of one group or culture perceive members of another group or culture as threats to their interests. According to Wikipedia, it is "the fear of anything which is believed to be foreign or odd." Xenophobia can present itself in a variety of ways including interactions groups and perceptions of an out-group, including a fear of losing identity, distrust of its activities, hostility, and a desire to erase its presence to maintain a presumed purity. Xenophobia can also manifest as the "uncritical exaltation of another culture," in which a civilization is given "an artificial, stereotypical, and strange quality".

While many people attribute the growth of Xenophobia in South Africa to the post-apartheid era, the truth is that it began decades before that. It has been alleged, for example, that in the early twentieth century, South Africa passed various measures intended to keep out immigrants, such as the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913, which permitted for the expulsion of "undesirables," a group of individuals that included Indians. This virtually curtailed Indian immigration. There was also the Township Franchise Ordinance of 1924, which was meant to "deprive Indians of the municipal franchise."

Discussing Further the Impact of Xenophobia on Nigeria – South Africa Trade Relation

The role of large economic leaders such as Nigeria and South Africa as potential drivers of growth, economic development, and regional integration in Africa given their growing trade and financial linkages across the continent. For instance, using a panel regression model of 47 African countries. A great significant influence of South African growth shock on the rest of Africa, where a one percentage point rise in South Africa's economic growth increases economic growth in the rest of Africa by 0.5 - 0.75 percentage points⁸.

Over the past century, African countries have created several regional economic integration arrangements. The first two, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), formed in 1910, and the East African Community (EAC), formed in 1919, are today among the most vibrant and successful regional arrangements on the continent. In 2019, there were over 15 regional integration arrangements, and many countries have overlapping memberships. The overriding objective of these arrangements is the promotion of intraregional trade to achieve faster economic growth and reduce poverty. The AfCFTA is the most ambitious initiative in this vein. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is like the driver and the global trade environment is the track the continent needs to navigate to reach the goal of reducing poverty and improving living standards for the region's 1.2 billion inhabitants⁹.

Foreign nationals, mostly African immigrants in South Africa have occasionally been an object of xenophobic attacks in May 2008, April 2015, March 2019 to mention a few¹⁰. These infrequent attacks have had a negative impact on the Republic of South Africa relations with its immediate neighbours and a few other African countries one of which is the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

South Africa and Nigeria signed 30 trade and cooperation agreements. Nigeria accounts for 64 percent of South Africa's total trade with the West African Region and is one of its largest

trading partners on the continent. It enjoys a trade surplus because of the volume and value of crude oil export which accounts for 98% of South Africa’s imports from Nigeria. Unlike Nigeria’s trade relations with her, South Africa has been recording a trade deficit. The worst of these occurred in 2008 when about 60 people were killed and more than 50,000 forced from their homes. Another seven people died in similar attacks in 2015.




Figure 4.1: South Africa’s Tourist Arrivals (2018-2019)

Source: South Africa Statistics 2021

Considering Nigerian’s visits for tourism before these attacks and after, there is a great decline based on the continuous attacks on mostly Nigerian in South Africa. Nigeria is South Africa’s largest trading partner on the continent, with trade flows estimated at \$4.48 billion in 2018. Only 9% of Nigeria’s total trade is intra-African, and almost half of that is with South Africa¹¹. Figure 4.2 shows the export and import relationship between Nigeria and South Africa from 2011 to 2021.




Figure 4.2: South Africa – Nigeria Import and Export (2011-2021)

Source: Trading Economics 2021

2012 and 2013 show a good economic (import and export) relationship between the two countries, the attack of 2015 affected the relationship and has continued to fall in the import and export relationship of both countries. Referencing Nigeria’s exports of lead to South Africa was US\$465.13 Thousand during 2020, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. Nigeria’s exports of lead to South Africa data, historical chart, and statistics were last updated in July of 2022¹².

South Africa’s imports of rice from Nigeria was US\$245 in 2020, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. South Africa Imports from Nigeria of Rice data, historical chart, and statistics - was last updated in July 2022¹³.




Figure 4.3: South Africa – Nigeria Trade Relations (2011-2021)

Source: Trading Economics 2021

The 2018 attacks also had a great downturn on the import of goods and service from Nigeria, considering the amount of trade relation in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively. Nigerian economy has denounced attempts at reprisal attacks on South African owned businesses in Nigeria following xenophobic attacks recently carried out against African nationals, including Nigerians, working in South Africa. South African owned businesses operating in Nigeria were targeted with violence in retaliation for the xenophobic attacks in South Africa. While South Africans attacked Nigerians and their businesses in South Africa, hurting them directly. Reprisal attacks in Nigeria do not visit mayhem on South Africans but Nigerians who own businesses in places like shoprite that are franchised. Again, even buildings housing MTN offices and those of other South African businesses are owned by Nigerians¹⁴. It does not, therefore, make sense to attack businesses with South African interests in retaliation of Xenophobic attacks.

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Chapter Five

Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Findings

In Africa, xenophobia is growing more prevalent. A hatred and/or fear of what is unknown or different from oneself is referred to as xenophobia. It is derived from the Greek words (Xenos), which means "alien," "foreigner," and (Phobos), which means "fear." In effect, recent xenophobic attacks against Nigerians living in South Africa highlight the predominance of the Nigerian business community in the post-apartheid South African economy.

Chapter two reviewed the literature review relevant to this study under the following headings based on the context of the topic. The issue of xenophobic relations in contemporary South Africa is founded on and conditioned by the structure of its apartheid economy. A historical overview of Nigeria-South Africa ties.

Chapter three justifies the methodology used in achieving the purpose of the study. The study adopted a descriptive research design. Between 2011 and 2021, the study examined the effects of xenophobic violence on Nigeria-South Africa economic relations. Attacks on foreign nationals are occurring regularly and in a series. Nigerian nationals faced the brunt of the violence in that attack. That episode was linked to the Zulu king's stirring statements, which called on all outsiders to leave the kingdom. Before that, attacks had been reported in 1998, 2000, 2008, 2009, 2013, and 2019. The study focuses on the causes, effects, and future implications of this "xenophobic" conduct on the relationship between both countries.

Chapter four reviews the results of the findings and this chapter comprises the presentation and

analysis of research data. It encompasses the use of the theoretical framework in data analysis, resulting in a knowledge of the aesthetic elements of network providers' advertisements on newspaper pages. According to the study, the current terrible upheaval may jeopardise both countries' long-standing cordial relationship in socioeconomic and political alliances. Civil society organisations, student unions, and members of the Nigerian government have all expressed concern over the prospect of imposing strict policies on South Africa's corporate and economic interests in Nigeria.

The final chapter review summary, conclusion and recommendation are based on the development and outcome of finding by the researcher. Given this, the topic of xenophobic violence in South Africa, which has targeted Nigerians and other Africans in the country, must be investigated in this study. In terms of Nigeria, the research will look into the influence of xenophobia on Nigeria-South Africa ties.

5.2 Conclusion

To conclude this study, the heinous pattern of xenophobic attacks has resulted in a socioeconomic and political cold war between Nigeria and South Africa. Failure to address the threat of xenophobic violence in South Africa risks devolving into regional conflicts, which will invariably harm the relationship between the two countries in all ways.

Despite its British origins, Nigeria's foreign policy has been characterised by a strong emphasis on Africa. This has motivated her to take part in initiatives for regional integration, peacekeeping, and so on. Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy stance was also the driving force behind her battle and fight for peace and apartheid in South Africa and other African countries. However, Nigeria's foreign policy has been perceived as weak over time as a result of its declarative stance

on topics with little or no action. Such has been the status quo in terms of South African xenophobic attacks on her citizens and other African immigrants in 2008, 2015, and 2019, to name a few. Nigeria's foreign policy is considered ordinary since countries assisted by her Afrocentric foreign policy rarely express gratitude. Over the years, Nigerian-South African ties have seen the good, the terrible, and the ugly in diplomatic, trade, defense, and socio-cultural connections. The use of Nigerians as scapegoats in targeted attacks on African immigrants in South Africa has raised both local and international concerns.

This has ultimately had a negative influence on the two countries' long-standing diplomatic relationship. The governments of Nigeria particularly that of South Africa, must take the necessary steps to prevent xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in the near and far future.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations were made to improve the issue of xenophobic attacks and their impact on external relations in South Africa.

1. South Africans should be prevented from engaging in heinous anti-foreigner violence and extra-judicial killings of immigrants by the police; the South African government should arrest, prosecute, and convict the perpetrators; and the South African government should strengthen existing international laws by enacting policies that will prevent the recurrence of this evil.
2. The South African government should work to meet its constitutional and international obligations to protect the lives, properties, and rights of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in their country, regardless of race, gender, creed, or colour, as articulated in the

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the 1981 African Charter (ACHPR).

3. The South African government should also pay Nigerians and other foreign nationals who have lost their lives, as well as millions of dollars in goods and property, as a result of the country's recurring xenophobic attacks. However, to avert future occurrences, there is a need to adopt a proper mechanism by ensuring that severe punishment awaits whosoever perpetrates such actions.
4. The governments of both countries should enter into a bilateral agreement to ensure the safety of all immigrants.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

To the best knowledge of this researcher, there are only a few studies on this topic. This study has, therefore, contributed to the body of existing knowledge on the xenophobic attack between Nigeria and South Africa and its effects on their economic relations.

5.5 Suggested Areas for Further Research

Though attempts have been made in this study to establish the effects of xenophobic violence on Nigeria-South Africa economic relations between 2011 and 2021. But the following are suggested for further research.

1. Specific areas such as diplomatic crisis between Nigeria and South Africa; background to bilateral relations and multi-lateral/political dimensions of trade and investment.

2. There should be more focus on Nigeria-South Africa Relations: the analytic assessment.
3. Also, reviews on human capital and economic growth

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B. Educational Background

Educational Institutions Attended with Dates and Qualifications

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- BSc Education Political Science – University of Nigeria, Nsukka 2014
- S.S.C.E – Babs Fafunwa Millennium Senior Secondary School, Ojodu Berger 2013

C. Working Experience with Dates

- Niche Stack, Prague (SEO Content Writer) Dec. 2021 – June 2022
- Maselly Solution Limited (Founder) Sept. 2019 - Till Date
- Experiential Marketer Association of Nigeria (EXMAN)
(Personal Assistant to the General Secretary) Oct 2017 - June 2018
- Punch Newspapers (Social Media Manager) January 2017 - Oct 2017
- Infosystem Consulting Ltd, Berger, Ogun State (NYSC)

D. Membership of Academic and Professional Bodies

None

E. Publications

Learned Journals

- i. **Fasola, E. N. & Alaba, O.** (2022). Implications of Xenophobia on Nigeria-South Africa Relations (2012-2022). *Renaissance University Journal of Management and social Sciences*, 8(1).
- ii. Oyedokun, D. M. & **Fasola, E. N.** (2021). An Assessment of the Impact of Globalisation on the Sovereignty of the New States in Global Affairs. *WAUU Journal of International Affairs and Contemporary Studies*, 2(1).

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University Compliance Certificate

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